Megatrends Afrika: Why should Europe re-engage with the Sahel’s military-led states?

Disclaimer: This transcript has been generated by AI. It is not a fully edited and proofread text.


Opener: Look what's happening in Africa, what do you think? Africa will be a key partner in building the world we want to live in, whether it is on climate, digital or trade. Our continent will continue to make steady advances in women's education and equal access to services, thereby laying the foundation for more stable and peaceful societies.

Host: For many African nations, megatrends like globalisation and digitalisation offer both great opportunity and enormous challenges, in part because of external players vying to assert their own interests. How the resulting upheaval impacts the continent is the subject of the Megatrends Africa project underway at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs and its partner institutions, the Kiel Institute and Eidos. And this is the podcast series. On today's episode, we're talking about the Sahel and whether Europe should pay renewed attention to a region where millions of people continue to be displaced because of violent conflict and the devastating effects of climate change. We will ask how the EU can re-engage with the region where Russia has stepped in and where previous attempts to implement lasting security solutions have failed. I'm your host, Esmene Nicholson, and to address these questions, I'm joined today by two of SWP's very own experts. Our first guest is Lisa Tschörner, who joins us down the line today from Brussels. Lisa is based at SWP's Africa and Middle East division, where she researches conflict, peace building and political systems in sub-Saharan Africa, with a particular focus on Niger. Lisa, welcome to the podcast and thanks for joining us today. Our second guest is Denis Tull, who directs the Megatrends Africa project at SWP and whose research also focuses on civil wars, security policy and the political systems of the Sahel, with a particular emphasis on Mali. Dennis, thank you for coming into the studio today.

Denis Tull/Lisa Tschörner: Thank you for hosting.

Host: Before we consider why and how Europe should re-engage with the Sahel region, perhaps we could start by outlining the current situation in some of the countries in the region. Lisa, there have been major jihadist offensives of late. Can you perhaps bring us up to date in particular with Niger?

Lisa Tschörner: Yes. Well, first of all, I have to say that it has become increasingly difficult or challenging to have reliable data on the security situation because of the systematic state suppression of any independent reporting since the coup d'etat in July 2023 in Niger. But I think we can still see that the security situation in the country is deteriorating since the coup. So on one hand, the country is facing increasing security challenges from jihadist groups who continue to attack security forces, infrastructure and also the civilian population, but who have, for example, also started to be more active in parts of the country that had so far not been directly targeted or at least not so directly or to this extent targeted by jihadist violence, for example, the southern regions at the border to Benin and Nigeria. But on the other hand, there are also new armed formations that have become active and have claimed responsibility for a number of violent events, partly as a response to the coup d'etat, but also as a response to the increased insecurity in the country. But I also want to emphasise that it's not only the security situation that is worrying, but there also is an economic and financial crisis that is in big parts also linked to developments since the coup d'etat and that is also having a very negative impact on the living conditions of the population.

Host: And those are perhaps some of the reasons we'll get into later as to why and reasons as to why Europe should re-engage perhaps with the region. But Denis, can you perhaps update us on the current situation in Mali?

Denis Tull: Sure. I think the story is roughly similar. The military has now ruled Mali for five years, took power by coup in August 2020. And I think it's unfortunately fair to say that the overall situation has not improved. The violent crisis that is now ongoing, has been ongoing for a decade now, has not effectively been addressed by the government, although that was, of course, the justification for the coup. And so many Malians in 2020 were really pinning a lot of hopes on the military to turn the situation around. But that has not really worked out so far. And that's evident in the economic sphere, although that has, of course, been a longstanding problem in the country, especially an energy crisis, which has taken its toll on the population, on livelihoods, on the private sector, on the employment. And then, of course, as similar to what Lisa said, but perhaps more advanced and traumatic, if I can say so, in the security situation, where the government's main challenger, an al-Qaeda-affiliated jihadist insurgency called JNIM, has scored some important successes over the last six to 12 months. And really, before, most people would say, oh, this conflict cannot be ended by military means. And I think this assumption is no longer perhaps as certain as it seemed to be. And we are probably moving into some sort of decisive phase, because now the jihadists have really moved strongly into southern and western Mali. Also, what is novel, they have also moved into closer to cities and towns. And they have really put a stranglehold on these towns and cities in southern and western Mali to cut supplies for these places, including Bamako. And right now, really, public life has come to a standstill in Bamako, for example. And that is, of course, a show of force that is quite dramatic and which has probably also the intention to suggest, to show to the public, to demoralize the public, but also to show to it that the government has no solutions and is to some extent overwhelmed.

Host: Well, the situation is obviously escalating. And before we talk about what and how Europe should and can re-engage, perhaps we can talk about how it's previously engaged with the region. And it was involved in quite extensive attempts to stabilize the region until a couple of years ago. Denis, can you remind us of that involvement and also the intentions behind it and also what brought the involvement to an end?

Denis Tull: Yes. So, quickly, there was an insurgency in 2012. The French military intervened on demand of the Malian government. It saved the day. And in its wake, a lot of members of the international community flocked to Mali, a UN stabilization mission, various European Union missions to counter terrorism, to stabilize the country, et cetera, et cetera. And so, the Europeans were a strong part in that, including in MINUSMA, the UN mission. Unfortunately, all of this proved rather ineffective, which created, of course, a lot of frustration in Mali, which provided the context for the coup. But there was also a growing frustration about this large-scale international presence, which proved to be ineffective and a growing sense that Mali was, to some extent, under some form of trusteeship. And that was not picked up by a lot of international observers. And that also provided that. I mention that because after the military took power, they played, to some extent, that card to affirm national sovereignty, to position themselves against foreign interference, foreign presence. And they discovered that the more they embraced this discourse about nationalism, patriotism, and against the Western presence, the more popular they became. And that ended in a bitter divorce between the Malian government and its international partners, who then were basically either kicked out or basically uninvited. And so, since then, we have a situation of paralysis and really a complete broken relationship between Mali and the government.

Host: And those are some of the dynamics on the ground. But Lisa, to what extent did differing views within the EU maybe contribute to this fallout?

Lisa Tschörner: Well, the EU member states did not really manage to agree on a common approach on how to deal with the military governments in the region. So, Niger, for example, after the fallout with Mali was seen as the last anchor of stability. There was lots of hope that with Niger, the EU could collaborate in order to stabilize the region. But then there was also the coup d'etat in 2023. And, yeah, this put the EU member states in a difficult situation. So, and yeah, they didn't manage to agree on a common strategy. So, there was on one hand, for example, France who completely withdrew and decided to cut all diplomatic relations in order to avoid giving any support to the military regimes. But then, on the other hand, there were Mediterranean countries like Italy, for example, who chose a way more pragmatic approach, which is in big parts driven by the interest to curb migration into Southern Europe. So, Italy, for example, even maintained its military cooperation with Niger. But in between those poles, there were also many countries like Germany, for example, who could not even internally agree on how to deal with the new governments in the region and were therefore rather hesitant, I would say, with regard to any further engagement. So, while the German Foreign Office, for example, was rather in favor of the suspension of cooperation, the Defense Ministry, but also the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, pushed for a renewed engagement and argued that even with the coups, the actual problems, why the EU initially engaged in the region, so terrorism and migration, but also, for example, humanitarian needs and development goals, that they were still highly relevant and needed to be addressed, even though the democratically elected government had been oustered in both countries. But then there was also this overall fear of loss of influence in the region, especially given the fact that the military governments started to increasingly deepen their relationship with Russia that played a role or that still plays a role in this narrative that pushes for a re-engagement in the region.

Host: Well, and I'd like to come on to Russia, but Denis, can you talk a little bit about also the European dynamics?

Denis Tull: I just want to add that the disagreement or the difficulty to come to a common position now also reflects the fact that in the past, as numerous European countries were getting involved in the Sahel, as diverse also their interests and motivations were to get involved, not all had the same interests. Some were there to be good multilateral players, some were there in solidarity with France, others were concerned by more directly the impacts that may come from the Sahel on Europe. So there is a diversity of motivations, and I think that's probably quite normal, but this kind of diversity in the motivations of these countries to some extent persists. And of course, with the situation in Europe being quite different now, given the invasion of Ukraine, there are also other considerations and priorities.

Host: Well, Lisa, you just mentioned it, Russia has stepped in to fill the apparent void of Europe, and I'd like to actually start with Mali. And so, Denis, I believe the Wagner Group is involved in Mali. Can you tell us a little about this?

Denis Tull: Well, after the French army was kicked out, Mali, the Malian government basically made an appeal to Russia to be the new strategic partner, so the Wagner outfit was the response. They started arriving in late 22, and at some point had some 2,000 troops in the country, including for combat operations. And now this has taken over by Africa Corps, which is closer to the Russian Ministry of Defense. And Russia itself also provided more and more military hardware to the Malian army. So really, Russia became a strategic partner, the strategic partner of Mali. Overall, I think my impression is that this partnership has not been as effective as they may have hoped, considering, for example, especially the security situation. Some even think that both sides are increasingly disillusioned, that neither side got what it had hoped for, namely an effective military partner, which is the point of view of the need of the Malian government, or perhaps ample remuneration in financial terms, mining concessions on the Russian side. And all of that leads me to believe that Russia's role in the side received perhaps a disproportionate amount of attention in the European conversation. And also when you consider that no other Sahelian country has replicated the Mali model and has had a much more tacit and prudent kind of partnership with Russia, which is not to say that Russia does not play a problematic role, but I think there is some nuance to be had.

Host: Well, and Lisa, to what extent is Russia involved in Niger? I'm assuming that it's perhaps, as Dennis says, a more nuanced situation there.

Lisa Tschörner: Yes, definitely. So the Russian presence in Niger, I would say, is by far less important than in Mali. And this is, for example, something that is also very often overlooked in this discourse about Russia apparently filling a supposed vacuum or a void in the Sahel after the withdrawal of the West. So Niger has certainly also deepened its diplomatic relations with Russia since the coup. And there are also reportedly around 100 Russian military instructors that have arrived in the country in 24 officially to train the Nigerian army on the use of an air defense system that Niger had acquired in the context of the threat of a military intervention by the regional organization ICOVAS after the coup d'etat. But we don't see any Russian military personnel, for example, being involved in active fighting on the battlefield, as it is the case in Mali, which is something that the Nigerian authorities also seem to be rather hesitant or reluctant about. So, yeah, this is, I think, on one hand, because, yeah, the authorities have adopted this neo-sovereignist approach in dealing with a security crisis and don't really want any external interference, at least according to their narrative, from which they also draw their legitimacy, like Dennis had explained also for Mali. But also because the presence of Russian troops in the battlefield would potentially have a negative impact on some fragile local security arrangements with people, for example, in Niger monitoring very closely also the atrocities that Wagner or Africa are committing against certain groups in Mali.

Host: To come to our central question, why should the European Union attempt to re-engage in the region, especially at a time of many major crises from Ukraine to Gaza to Trump, as Dennis mentioned, is there political appetite within Europe to do so? And is there the consensus, Lisa?

Lisa Tschörner: Well, I don't think that there is the consensus yet, but I think that Europe is getting there. And I think that there are very valid arguments as to why Europe should not support the military regimes in the Sahel, especially from a human rights perspective, as is the position, for example, of France. But I also think that neither the people in the Sahel nor in Europe have an interest to see the Sahelian states further collapse into chaos or taken over by jihadist groups. And this is something, as Dennis had outlined, that is actually, at least in Mali, a not-so-unrealistic scenario anymore. And so I think that despite the fact that the military governments are, of course, highly problematic from a normative point of view, sticking to a confrontational position and completely abandoning any engagement in the region would not make things any better. But I think it would rather, on the contrary, shift the power balance further towards those who profit from the destabilization of the region and are actually actively working towards it. And I think that this is also something that policymakers in the EU are starting to see and to slowly agree upon, especially since the new EU special representative for the Sahel is also actively working towards this. So trying to bring the different poles closer together. So the EU is at the moment developing a renewed Sahel strategy that is supposed to come out towards the end of this year.

Host: And Denis, what about appetite within the region? Is European intervention even welcome?

Denis Tull: I would not say intervention, but some form of engagement by Europe is basically an essential question. And also the big unknown to me, because given how the military junters have behaved or how their discourse over the past two or three years, I think they have made very clear what they do not want. They do not want political interference, infringements on national sovereignty, paternalism, political demands, also exclusive partnerships with Europe, for example. But it is less evident what they actually want. And that's really the question. I think perhaps there is no demand side. But perhaps, and I think that's more likely, the explanation is that there is such a profound level of distrust in the relationship that it's hard to articulate something and to get into this kind of conversation because really the acrimony that has characterized the relationship over the past two, three years can hardly be overstated. So I think it makes sense for Europe to invest in these efforts to find out. But it's absolutely indispensable that there is a demand because if not, it's absolutely pointless for Europeans to engage. As Lisa said, there is a growing awareness that something needs to be done. And everybody is also aware that the Mali crisis did not stay in Mali. The Sahel crisis did not stay in the Sahel, but it's progressively expanding in the region, affecting coastal states in West Africa. So it will not go away.

Host: And what are the costs of not re-engaging within the region for Europe?

Denis Tull: I'm a bit cautious about often alarmistic kind of scenarios, which suggest, you know, that impending terrorist attacks on Europe from the Sahel may be imminent and such like. But I think this is a big region and it's in the neighborhood of Europe. It is affecting West Africa. So there is a lot of – it's certainly more costly not to act in terms of the stability, not only of the Sahel, but the region. And, of course, security questions cannot be totally ignored. And so in the short term, of course, there is now a very big deal of pressure because, you know, a Syria-like scenario, for example, in Mali, can no longer be totally excluded is another question whether this comes to be. But so there is a lot of different factors coming into play to calculate the costs that Europe may incur. But these costs are, of course, first and foremost also for the region because the countries in the region are the first – the ones that are affected.

Host: And Lisa, what risks do you see, specific risks do you see in not re-engaging?

Lisa Tschörner: Well, I think as I have outlined, I think that the people in the Sahel don't have an interest in those states further collapsing because I think there are hypotheses that one could also adopt that after this, like if the military regimes collapse, that this will bring about a renewed wave of democracy. I don't really see this coming anyway. So I think that what would come after a collapse of the military regimes would not necessarily be any better, but on the contrary, when it comes to a normative perspective. Despite all the difficulties in dealing with the military governments in the region, there are good reasons why Europe should try to re-engage. And I also see it a bit differently than Dennis with regard to this point, whether there is actually a demand. At least I can speak for Niger. The authorities have expressed that they would like Germany specifically to re-engage in the region, in Niger specifically. But I think the question is how. And this is where I think a political dialogue needs to happen, also on the European basis, in which, of course, different views and also problems can and must also be expressed and discussed, but in which also ideally common interests can be found. And they could then, I think, constitute the basis for a renewed engagement that focuses on the needs of the population and promotes human security. Because engaging in the region can, of course, not happen without collaborating with the de facto authorities. And this is something that Europe also must be clear about. So, yeah, there will certainly remain many dilemmas. But I still think that we need to keep in mind the costs of non-engagement and really think about what this means for the people in the Sahel.

Host: Lisa, you've just raised perhaps the most difficult question, which I was saving for the end. You've touched upon it a little bit in terms of Niger. But how exactly should Europe re-engage? And particularly with Russia on the scene, does Europe have any leverage, Denis?

DenisTull: The role of Russia should not be overstated. And certainly it should not be a driver of European engagement, because I think there are other priorities that are way more important. And also to basically go around and say we are here because Russia is here, is certainly not making European partners more credible in the Sahel. So, frankly, it's difficult to have a straightforward answer because the situation is now so dynamic and there are so many possible scenarios and plausible scenarios. I think Europe needs to prepare and to also have that conversation, as Lisa said, what is politically feasible and what is also defendable, because that's really the crux of the matter. The sticking point is really military rule. Not even military rule, but the confrontational attitude of military rulers in the Sahel. And so, a lot of people are reluctant to normalize relationships with these regimes. And some, I suspect, for example, in France would say, if we normalize relations with these regimes, this is the triumph of hope over experience. And this is hard to disagree with. But as Lisa said, I think there is a conversation to be had without red lines, as was the case before. I think Europeans also have to learn a bit their lessons of the past and the past mistakes. And I think that's certainly a major, major point to be more modest, also to be more modest in terms of what actually the leverage is. And I also agree that Europeans cannot on any scale have the ambition to help stabilizing the region by just saying, okay, in the meantime, we will just work with civil society and subnational actors. I think that's one way to go about it. But I don't think it certainly will have to have a stabilization effect on some scale. So, engaging with authorities in these countries is necessary and possibly also assisting the state and state institutions in some way. That should not be a taboo because I agree with Lisa. Their situation could still get much, much worse. And it's first and foremost for the Europeans to have that conversation. It's a difficult one to say we can agree on this or not. But just to stick into this situation of paralysis is certainly not defendable.

Host: And Lisa, talking about the how, is it possible to re-engage constructively?

Lisa Tschörner: This needs to be the outcome of a political dialogue with the authorities, but also with other actors, with civil society, with the opposition. So, I think it's very important what Dennis said, that the situation is very dynamic. And so, I think that Europe should think of different scenarios also and not take the situation as it is as a given because things are changing. And so, I think Europe also recognizes that it will always be one actor amongst others. And this is just something that is the case and that has also been the case before. This is also something that's often overlooked. So, countries like China or Russia have also had, were active in the region, even at the heights of Western engagement. This causes dilemma, especially when it comes, for example, to the presence of Russian mercenaries in Mali that commit human rights violations, of course. But Europe will never be the only actor in the region.

Host: Well, there's clearly far more to discuss about this vast region. And I have no doubt that we will return to the studio for updates on some of the issues addressed today. But until then, I'd like to thank our guests, Lisa Tschörner and Denis Tull. You'll find links to their latest work in the podcast show notes, where you'll also find a link to the project Megatrends Africa. And if you like what you hear, you can subscribe to us in all the usual places. You can also keep up to date with the latest analyses from SWP on Blue Sky and on LinkedIn. Today's episode was brought to you by our editor, Maya Dähne, by me, your host, and of course, by our guests. So, until next time, it's goodbye from our guests.

Lisa Tschörner/Denis Tull: Thank you. Goodbye. Thanks for having us. Bye.

Host: And also goodbye from me. And thank you for tuning in.