Alignment of Necessity

Bilateral cooperation with Turkey: Poland, Spain and Italy

In the case of Poland, Spain and Italy, bilat­eral relations with Turkey are shaped, above all, by security imperatives and mili­tary-industrial interests. Warsaw considers the deepening of ties with Turkey to be in line with its strategic focus on reinforcing NATO’s eastern flank in today’s volatile security environment. In 2021, Poland became the first EU and NATO country to purchase Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones. At the same time, the Turkish defence com­pany ASELSAN is supplying the Polish firm AMZ Kutno with reconnaissance and sur­veillance systems. Above all, Polish decision-makers view defence cooperation with Turkey, which is currently limited to pro­curement, as a means of driving a wedge between Turkey and Russia and anchoring Turkey firmly within the Western security architecture. According to this view, Ankara is a crucial partner for containing Russia. In fact, in April 2025, Turkey joined the Three Seas Initiative as a strategic partner. The initiative was launched in 2015 by Croatia and Poland in order to strengthen transportation, energy and digital infrastructure links among the 12 EU member states situated around the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas.

Like Poland, Spain regards NATO as the main institutional framework for cooperation with Turkey. But unlike Warsaw, Madrid’s main interest is in NATO’s south­ern flank. Turkish engagement is seen as strategically crucial to counterbalance the eastern flank-oriented priorities of the central, east and north European allies. From the Spanish perspective, Turkey plays a vital role in the security of the eastern Mediterranean, while Ankara’s “relatively limited engagement in the western Medi­terranean, particularly regarding Morocco and Algeria”, lowers the risk of bilateral tensions stemming from national sensi­tivities. Despite the different approaches of the two countries towards Hamas, Madrid’s criticism of the Netanyahu government’s Gaza policy is positively received in Ankara.

Spain, too, collaborates with Turkey in the area of defence. It has become one of Turkey’s top defence suppliers and co-production partners. After signing a memo­randum of understanding (MoU) in Decem­ber 2024 to jointly develop the Hürjet advanced trainer aircraft for the Spanish Air Force, Madrid recently announced a €1.375 billion investment. Furthermore, the design of Turkey’s drone-capable amphibious assault ship, TCG Anadolu, was based on that of the Spanish aircraft carrier Juan Carlos I. Madrid’s approach to Ankara as a potential partner in defence is part of its broader strategy of expanding external partnerships in order to boost “its defence exports and counterbalance the influence of more dominant European companies and member states”.

Like Spain, Italy sees Ankara as a crucial defence partner. In terms of share of arms exports to Turkey, both Spain (34%) and Italy (24%) have recently overtaken Ger­many (19%) and the US (17%). Italy’s defence cooperation with Turkey is strongly moti­vated by its industrial goals. In March 2025, the Italian company Leonardo and Turkey’s Baykar Technologies signed an MoU to establish a joint venture for UAV production – a sector in which Europe remains relatively weak. The partnership offers mutual benefits: access to a rapidly growing UAV market and new export destinations for Italy and deeper integration into the European defence market for Turkey. Baykar’s acquisition of Italian aviation firm Piaggio Aerospace in December 2024 under­scores this mutually reinforcing dynamic.

Beyond the defence sector, Rome regards Ankara as a potential partner in energy se­cu­rity, the management of migration flows and the provision of security in Africa. But at the same time, the two countries are competing for influence in Libya and the eastern Mediterranean.

Cautious but open for engagement: Sweden, Finland and Germany

The second group of EU member states adopts a more cautious, though relatively open approach towards their relations with Turkey. The NATO accession experiences of Sweden and Finland – in the case of the former, Ankara’s foot-dragging, in particular – have overwhelmingly shaped those countries’ perceptions of defence cooperation with Turkey. While they tend to regard Ankara as unpredictable, they recognise its strategic importance within NATO owing to its geographical location and military capa­bilities. The feeling that Turkey is “too im­portant to lose, too unreliable to prioritise” encapsulates the pragmatic, if somewhat ambivalent engagement of these two coun­tries with Ankara.

Germany has a similar outlook. How­ever, its relations with Turkey are characterised, above all, by deeper diplomatic, economic and societal ties. As the EU mem­ber with the largest Turkish diaspora, Germany has a complex relationship with Turkey – one that is shaped by the friction between the cautious attitude of business, political and security elites towards con­tinued cooperation, on the one hand, and growing public criticism not only of issues related to human rights and the rule of law in Turkey but also of armament in general, on the other.

In recent years, there has been a notice­able – albeit slow and wary – shift in Berlin’s policy towards Ankara. Germany increasingly views Turkey through a prag­matic lens, based on three key factors: i) the geopolitical urgency triggered by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and reinforced by the erratic stance of the Trump administration on European security; ii) the re-election of President Erdoğan and his ruling alliance (in 2023); and iii) Turkey’s military and strategic importance.

Germany’s recent approval of arms exports for the Turkish Navy is driven by this evolving state of affairs. The move follows the lifting of an embargo initially imposed by Germany and other EU member states after Turkey’s military incursion into northern Syria in 2019. Moreover, Berlin recently withdrew its veto on the delivery of Eurofighters to Turkey. There are three underlying motivations for this policy shift: i) containing Russian influence in the Black Sea; ii) keeping Turkey close to the West; and iii) preventing a complete rupture in defence cooperation with Turkey.

Reluctant to cooperate: France and Greece

Like the second group of countries, France and Greece have low political confidence in Turkey. Paris increasingly sees Ankara as a “strategic competitor”, while Athens’ threat perception of Turkey is high. Owing to numerous tensions between France and Turkey during the past decade – including over Syria, the eastern Mediterranean, Turkey’s diaspora policy and the ongoing authoritarian trend in Turkey – ties be­tween the two countries have steadily soured. From 2013 to 2022, Turkey ranked just 30th among the top buyers of French arms exports. Since the Turkish military incursion into northern Syria in 2019, France has approved export licences on a case-by-case basis and no longer allows the sale of weapon systems.

Even though bilateral relations seem to have entered a new phase of dialogue – amid efforts to reorganise the European security architecture and amid the chang­ing regional dynamics in the Middle East – it remains unclear whether the recent tentative rapprochement between Paris and Ankara will lead to a sustainable shift in the French perception about security and defence engagement with Turkey: that is, a shift from “possible confrontation” back to “active cooperation”.

Two factors are important here. The first has to do with the strategic competition between France and Turkey and French per­ceptions of that competition. Paris views Ankara as unreliable and ambivalent owing to that latter’s balancing act between Moscow and its Western allies and its purchase of the S-400 air defence system from Russia. At the same time, it believes that the Islam­ic resurgence in France, which it sees as destabilising and polarising factor, has been driven by Turkish Muslim organisations. Moreover, France and Turkey harbour com­peting geopolitical ambitions: they both have long-term visions of developing secu­rity and political ties with countries in Africa and the Middle East and reaping the economic benefits. For its part, Ankara instrumentalises colonial grievances as part of its aspirations to gain and expand its influence. And it is suspicious of Paris’s close relations with Greece (and the UAE).

The second main factor shaping French perceptions about security and defence cooperation with Turkey is the emphasis that Paris puts on European strategic autonomy and – in connection with this – its tendency to prioritise European industries. France’s initial objection to a Czech-led initiative in 2024 to procure ammunition from third countries and its advocacy against “opening EU funds to foreign companies manufacturing their equipment in Europe – especially mis­siles – or to companies that do not have the right to alter products according to specific needs, or whose products come with restrictions of use” reflect that stance. In 2024, France, together with the Republic of Cyprus and Greece, blocked the financing of the supply of Turkish UAVs and artillery shells to Ukraine.

For its part, Greece is another member state reluctant to engage with Turkey in defence. Athens and Ankara view each other as historical foes and have been em­broiled in numerous unresolved disputes over the status of islands in the Aegean Sea, airspace-related issues and maritime bounda­ries in both the Aegean and Medi­terra­nean. The two countries also differ over how to settle those disputes. Furthermore, Ankara’s veiled threats against Greece over the latter’s alleged militarisation of the Aegean islands remain a source of concern in Athens. In 1995, the Turkish parliament gave the government the green light to declare casus belli (cause for war) in the event of Greece unilaterally expanding its territorial waters in the Aegean Sea beyond six nautical miles. For its part, Athens demands that Ankara’s participation in EU defence pro­grammes should be conditional upon Turkey’s lifting of its war threat.

In 2021, following what had been the longest military face-off in the region since the 1970s, Athens and Ankara resumed exploratory talks. Although NATO and the US have played a crucial role in easing tensions between Athens and Ankara in the past, the heightened frictions between Washington and Ankara over the past ten years and the growing strategic cooperation between the US and Greece (along with the Republic of Cyprus), which started under the first Trump administration and acceler­ated under Biden, cast doubt on Washington’s ability to act as a mediator today. Thus, NATO’s significance as a platform for deconfliction between Athens and Ankara will be crucial going forward.

Securing the Black Sea region

US President Donald Trump’s indirect em­powerment of Moscow – albeit his notice­ably harsher rhetoric lately – is unlikely to be viewed favourably in Ankara. Turkish policy in the Black Sea since the end of the Cold War has been to maintain a balance of power vis-à-vis Russia while avoiding direct confrontation with Moscow. Neither a strong nor a weak Russia is in Ankara’s interests. Turkey now faces the possibility of a militarily and geopolitically strengthened Russia that could be tempted to regain lost ground in North Africa, the Caucasus and the Middle East at Ankara’s expense. Such a scenario is not in the interests of the EU – nor, indeed, of Ukraine. For its part, Kyiv views Turkey as a key player in secur­ing and stabilising the Black Sea region.

Cementing the NATO alliance

Trump’s policy of calling into question NATO and Washington’s security guarantees for Europe and Ukraine is viewed by Ankara as both providing an opportunity and posing a risk. As noted above, the Turkish leadership firmly believes that Turkish involvement in European security is not an option but a necessity. But Ankara not only wants to be involved; it also wants to actively shape the future of European security. NATO plays a central role in Tur­key’s security identity. While NATO mem­ber­ship has enabled Turkey to perform its balancing act between Russia and its West­ern allies, Turkey’s security elites perceive it as the key guarantor of the country’s own security. Thus, Ankara has high stakes in NATO continuing to serve as the main frame­work not just for European security but also for its own. (Indeed, a majority of the EU member states, like Ukraine, regard NATO as the central pillar of Europe’s collective security, too.)

Conversely, Turkey, which consistently participates in NATO missions, is crucial for the alliance. In June 2022, for example, Turkey assumed the command of NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force; and in January 2024, it signed an agreement with Romania and Bulgaria to clear floating mines in the Black Sea. In addition, Turkey conducts round-the-clock air and naval reconnaissance missions in the Black Sea and provides up to 67 per cent of all situa­tional awareness information to NATO and Ukraine.

Stabilising the shared southern neighbourhood

Because of Trump’s ambivalence regarding Washington’s commitment to European security, his interventionist approach in the Middle East (Gaza and Iran) and the poten­tial strengthening of Russia, Ankara now faces what could be two revanchist great powers in its neighbourhood. It is likely that in this situation and with its threat perceptions heightened, Turkey will view Europe as a stabilising force and a source of predictability in today’s uncertain and inflammable international environment. Just as Ankara will gain in relevance for Brussels in defence and security policy, so the EU will feature more prominently in Turkish calculations.