Contours of an EU Partnership and Alliance Strategy

Special role for Ukraine

Ukraine plays a remarkably prominent role. In the SAFE Regulation, with few exceptions, it is put at the same level as EU mem­bers, analogous to the EEA states. This is surprising insofar as Ukraine, unlike the EEA members, does not participate in the EU internal market. Nevertheless, Com­mission President Ursula von der Leyen is striving for close integration of the Ukrainian defence industry, which is developing rapidly under the pressure of war, for example with regard to drones and AI tech­nology.

Ukraine’s special status goes even further. EU member states wishing to apply for SAFE loans are required to submit a “Defence Industry Investment Plan” to the Commission. This should not only specify any planned purchases, but also emphasise its own steps to support Ukraine and its participation in joint procurement (Art. 7 para. 2 SAFE Regulation).

The 65 per cent target is to apply to all businesses based in the EU, the EEA and Ukraine – without Kyiv having to conclude a partnership agreement. This is intended to accelerate links between the Ukrainian and EU-European defence industries, but it also represents a remarkable example of gradual integration into the EU, long before the desired full membership. Last but not least, the Ukrainian president has attended most of the European Council meetings since 2022 as a guest for individual agenda items – whether in person or via video link.

New security partnership with the United Kingdom

The EU has also explicitly created new opportunities for the United Kingdom. Dur­ing the Brexit process, London withdrew from any institutionalised cooperation with the EU in matters of security and defence policy. However, a rapprochement has been taking place since Russia’s full-scale inva­sion of Ukraine in 2022; the current Labour government has been working towards an EU-UK security pact (see SWP Comment 27/2024). Nonetheless, the existing third-country rules, which clearly exclude coun­tries outside the EU internal market from defence industry cooperation, would have severely limited the scope of such a security pact.

The SAFE Regulation and the White Paper on defence now stipulate that joint procurement and the modalities of origin can be extended beyond EU and EEA mem­bers and Ukraine to “like-minded” states that have negotiated a security partnership agreement with the EU. EU leaders explic­itly include the United Kingdom among these “like-minded” states and concluded a Security and Defence Partnership Agreement with it in May 2025 at the first EU-UK summit since Brexit.

This agreement sets a new course in four respects. Firstly, it closes one of the gaps in the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, which was concluded after Brexit in a phase when the British – under Prime Minister Boris Johnson – were still explicitly ruling out structural cooperation with the EU in foreign and security policy matters. In con­trast, regular formats for exchange are now being created between the High Represen­tative and the British Foreign and Defence Secretaries, as well as at the working level between the European External Action Ser­vice (EEAS) and the relevant British min­istries.

Secondly, the agreement – in combination with the SAFE Regulation negotiated at the same time – lays the foundation for the United Kingdom to participate in joint procurement in the EU without being in the internal market. However, in order to realise this and to determine the conditions under which British defence companies fall under the 65 per cent internal procurement target of SAFE, a further agreement is re­quired and is currently being negotiated. Thirdly, the partnership agreement also contains a series of declarations of intent to deepen EU-UK cooperation in security and defence policy. These include a framework agreement for British participation in civil­ian and military EU operations, an agree­ment on administrative cooperation with the EDA and cooperation on military exercises, including the exchange of personnel between the EU and British institutions.

Fourthly and finally, a broad range of topics was defined on which cooperation would be intensified. These include re­gional security (such as Ukraine, the Western Balkans, the Arctic and the Indo-Pacific), the coordination of sanctions, maritime security, armaments policy ini­tiatives, cyber security, coordination in international organisations, external eco­nomic security, migration, the climate and security nexus, and global health. Alongside Norway, this potentially makes the United Kingdom the EU’s closest secu­rity partner – if the declarations of intent are actually pursued.

A difficult balancing act with Turkey

The cooperation with Turkey poses other challenges. On the one hand, the country has the second-largest armed forces in NATO; it has built up a substantial defence industry, for example in the drone sector, and already has arms agreements with individual EU and NATO states such as Poland, Spain and Italy. The country’s stra­tegic importance for the Black Sea region, the South Caucasus and the Middle East has also increased. On the other hand, security relations between the EU and Ankara have been de facto blocked since 2004 due to the Cyprus conflict. Although Turkey has participated in previous military operations within the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), it has so far been excluded from all arms policy ini­tiatives such as PESCO, the EDF and the EDA. In regions with a large Turkish mili­tary presence, Ankara also acts as a strategic rival to (parts of) the EU, for example in the case of Syria. Last but not least, the trend towards the autocratisation of Turkey has recently accelerated. It was particularly striking that the arrest of Istanbul’s mayor and Erdoğan rival, Ekrem İmamoğlu, in March 2025 took place shortly after the invitation to the strategic exchange with the EU. The official criticism from Brussels was correspondingly cautious.

In view of this balancing act, which is not new, it is all the more remarkable that the EU is becoming more open to involving Ankara in security policy. Turkey was always invited to the consultations with like-minded partners following European Council meetings. It has also been represented in the British-French strand of the Coalition of the Willing since the London meeting on 2 March 2025, and it has pub­lic­ly offered the prospect of participating in a mission to monitor a potential ceasefire in Ukraine.

For its part, the Commission has proposed in the SAFE Regulation that all candi­date countries – including Turkey – can participate in joint procurement proj­ects. Conversely, however, defence products from Turkey and other candidate countries are not automatically included in the “European” share, unlike goods from Ukraine. The (albeit cautious) rapprochement with Turkey is particularly evident when contrasted with the approaches to other candidate countries beyond Ukraine, which were not included in the exchange formats that have now been carried out twice following the European Council meet­ings in March 2025. This also applies to Montenegro, Albania and North Macedonia, which have already joined NATO. However, the EU has already concluded security partnerships with the latter two. There are also question marks over how to deal with Georgia: Legally, it is now a candidate coun­try and thus would fall under the category of partners under SAFE. The EU also con­ducted a regular security dialogue with Georgia up until 2024. However, since the Georgian government has recently turned towards Russia, the accession process has been de facto halted and concrete defence industrial cooperation is unlikely as long as the political situation in Georgia does not change.

Strengthening global partnerships

Beyond the EU’s direct neighbourhood, the EU also wants to conclude further security partnerships. Of particular importance now is Canada, which has been hit with particu­larly high tariffs by the Trump administration. Additionally, President Trump regu­larly threatens to make it the “51st state” of the United States. As a result, the EU is coordinating closely with Canada on trade issues and has already begun negotiations on a security agreement. The latter is to explicitly include a defence industry com­ponent so that the country can participate in joint procurement and Canadian prod­ucts are included in the “European” share. In a break from tradition, Canada’s new prime minister, Mark Carney, did not travel to the United States for his first visit abroad, but to France and the United Kingdom. The upcoming EU-Canada summit, which both sides are planning on the eve of the NATO meeting at the end of June 2025, will also focus strongly on security and defence co­operation. The EU has also been con­ducting a security dialogue with NATO member state Iceland since 2023.

The EU’s most prominent global partners are Japan and South Korea. It has long main­tained comprehensive free trade agreements with both countries and has also had a security agreement with each since the end of 2024. South Korea has now become an important defence supplier for individual member states such as Poland (see SWP Research Paper 2/2023). Both countries have supported Ukraine financially and with arms deliveries, also as a signal to China with regard to Taiwan. Security policy co­operation is also to be explored with Aus­tralia, with which the EU is negotiating a free trade agreement, and with New Zealand, with which such an agreement has been in force since 2024.

The EU is also emphasising India as a potential partner (see SWP Research Paper 17/2024) and has been holding regular consultations in recent years. An EU-India free trade agreement is being sought, al­though the negotiations are complex. In February 2025, the entire von der Leyen Commission visited the country – the first non-European trip in the new term of office. Among other things, it was agreed in New Delhi to examine a possible security part­ner­ship agreement. The EU also wants to establish a security dialogue with Singapore.

The EU needs to make itself an attractive partner

The most important prerequisite for the success of this alliance strategy is that the EU makes itself a more attractive partner. Only an EU that invests extensively in security and defence and in which such investments flow largely to its own industry and that of selected partners can offer full security agreements. SAFE needs to be widely utilised by the member states in order to succeed where previous EU initia­tives have failed: namely in the development of joint procurement, financing and cooperation in the rearmament of Europe. The new German government should set a good example here. Then the EU can approach its partners with promising offers.

Cleverly designed EU partnerships should simplify the complex European security architecture, or at least not complicate it any further. Incompatibilities with NATO initiatives should therefore be strictly avoided. Conversely, EU projects can strengthen the European pillar of the alli­ance through close ties with NATO part­ners; this applies to countries such as the United Kingdom, Norway, Canada and (more limited due to the difficult relationship) Turkey.

In order to realise a genuine partnership and alliance strategy, the EU should work on linking the security partnerships with broader cooperation where possible – in trade policy, in the defence of the rules-based order and in geostrategic competition. The EU already has far-reaching trade agreements with important partners: from Norway’s EEA membership to the association agreements with Ukraine and other candidate countries; the Trade and Coopera­tion Agreement with the United Kingdom; and the free trade agreements with Canada, Japan and South Korea. The aggressive and unpredictable tariff policy of the US admin­istration requires new partnerships that can be coupled with security cooperation. There are a number of options for this. For example, consultation mechanisms could be set up with partners in the event of – economic or military – pressure from third parties; dialogues on military security could be combined with those on economic secu­rity; or joint measures could be agreed on security-related topics, such as access to critical raw materials or the protection of supply chains and critical infrastructure. This also requires more synergies between economic and military security within the EU, in particular through coordination within the Commission and with the EEAS.

If Europeans want to avoid becoming a pawn of foreign powers in a world increas­ingly characterised by spheres of interest, they must summon the strength to become a pole of their own. Not all steps towards this must be taken within the EU framework, as the British-French initiative to support Ukraine shows. However, attractive EU security partnerships based on joint in­vestments and a strengthening of Europe’s own defence industry – coupled with the expansion of trade relations – can serve as a powerful instrument. This should also make it possible for the EU and the Euro­pean pillar of NATO to avoid being played off each other in Europe’s security archi­tecture. Instead, the EU should endeavour to combine its strength in the internal market with effective security partnerships.