Compass or Wind Chime?

Genesis of the Document

At the request of the German government, the EU defense ministers tasked Borrell on June 16, 2020, with drawing up a security policy position and setting out the opera­tional orientation of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) in the form of a military doctrine. The document is thus intended to flesh out the 2016 “Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy” (EUGS). Its task is firstly to establish a consensus on the common goals of the EU states in the policy field of “security” in a broader sense – that is, in crisis management, in the strengthening of partners in international relations, and in the protection of the Union and its citizens – and secondly to form a common strategic framework for the future direction of this policy field.

The drafting of the SC was divided into three phases. Starting in the summer of 2020, it was the responsibility of the HR/VP to prepare a joint threat analysis. It served as the basis for the second phase – a dia­logue process of the EU member states starting in January 2021 on the four areas of crisis management, resilience, capabilities, and partnerships. The 28-page docu­ment, presented in November 2021, bundl­es the discussions into five chapters, entitled “The World We Face,” “Act,” “Secure,” “In­vest,” and “Partners.” The current third phase gives the member states until March 2022 the opportunity to submit requests for changes. The process is also an expression of Franco-German cooperation in that Ber­lin has persuaded President Emmanuel Macron to complete the process during the French EU Presidency in the first half of 2022, and the joint action of Berlin and Paris thus represents the umbrella of the SC process.

Threat Analysis

Even though the final text will not be avail­able until spring, the draft already docu­ments a clear change in the EU’s view of the world. Compared to the 2016 EUGS, which painted a picture of international rela­tions in which the EU’s “soft power” seemed to be an effective tool, structural changes now come to the fore. The “return of power politics” is now the phenomenon that Brussels places at the center of its secu­rity policy planning. According to the draft, this new power politics not only includes traditional military means, but also new forms of threat, as the EU recently experi­enced on its external border with Belarus. Such threats make the classic distinction between war and peace increasingly diffi­cult. Europe, whose economic and demo­graphic importance in the world is declin­ing, must assert itself in this changed environment.

The analysis is based on two dynamics: On the one hand, there is the increasing bipolarity between the United States (US) and China, which is shaping international competition in virtually all areas. On the other hand, there is a multipolar dynamic in which a growing number of actors are trying to expand their respective spheres of political influence. These two factors are also changing the security policy parameters of the EU: The member states are ex­periencing a period of strategic competition and complex threats that affect the security of their populations and promote geopolitical shifts and instability on the Union’s bor­ders. The spectrum of threats has become more diverse and unpredict­able. Thus, while interdependence remains im­portant, it is increasingly conflictual and weaponized: vaccines, data, and technologi­cal standards are now instruments of politi­cal competition.

This return to power politics also means that countries such as China, Russia, and Turkey are once again arguing on the basis of historical claims and spheres of influence, instead of adhering to internationally agreed rules and principles and working together for international peace and secu­rity. In the meantime, not only the oceans, but also outer space and the cyber sphere are increasingly contested areas. The EU must adapt to this highly confrontational system, as there is a danger of being over­taken by geopolitical competitors. The goal is to develop an EU that can act as an inter­national security provider.

In the wake of this commitment, the Stra­tegic Compass firstly reviews all the regional orders of the international system and their respective security challenges. In this way, it remains largely rooted in the tra­ditional approach of the CSDP. The po­liti­cal institutions of the EU as well as the envisaged military and technological capa­bilities are primarily intended to serve the goal of managing crises in Europe’s periph­ery. The already publicized proposal of an EU Rapid Deployment Capacity of 5,000 soldiers underscores this.

In a second strand, those security chal­lenges are listed that are frequently and sometimes imprecisely or simply wrongly described as “hybrid”: disinformation, propaganda, election interference, cyber­attacks, and others. Here, the EU focuses on the protection of its citizens and thus expands the conceivable threat scenarios more than the EUGS. However, these remain secondary to the SC’s argumentative trajectory and policy conclusions.

Finally, the paper urges the EU to take on more responsibility for its own security by acting in its neighborhood and beyond. Using the term “strategic autonomy,” it refers to the guiding principle of European debates in recent years.

Shortcomings of the Draft

The Strategic Compass is the result of a pro­cess designed to achieve consensus – this also means that the member states were able to negotiate into the SC in an unconnected manner all the concerns that were particularly important to them. In the con­text of the United Nations, “Christmas tree mandates” for peace operations are well known, but they do not do justice to the realities on the ground and have no stra­tegic focus. By analogy, one could speak of a “Christmas tree strategy” in the case of the SC. The four most striking shortcomings of the draft are analyzed below.

The French Perspective

In January 2022, the revision of the Stra­tegic Compass has begun with a meeting of EU foreign and defense ministers in Brest. France will take the opportunity to con­tinue to put its stamp on the document until its adoption by the European Council in March 2022. Even in the November draft version, Paris was able to ensure that the EU’s security and defense policy goes beyond the treaty framework of the CSDP. This can be seen in the passages on space and satellite policy, which Paris uses to channel EU funding to its space industry. It can also be seen in the fact that, accord­ing to the paper, European-led ad hoc coalitions will also be able to claim their expenses for military missions through EU common costs in the future. Since 2017, Paris has also been working to give concrete form to the obligation to provide assistance (Article 42 (7) TEU).

In the upcoming drafting of the final ver­sion, Paris is also likely to insist on setting ambitious timetables for core strategic capa­bilities. Moreover, the Macron gov­ern­ment has long been pushing for a level of ambi­tion in security and defense policy that would allow the EU to immunize itself and its neighborhood against attempts by third parties to exert political as well as strategic influence, and that would enable it to credibly pursue its interests even in more remote regions such as the Indo-Pacific.

Recommendations

The new German government should take advantage of the window of opportunity that will open up during the revision of the Strategic Compass by March 2022. Specifically, it should use the negotiations to:

• demand clarity on the status of the docu­ment. This recommendation may sound odd, but what is more strange is that the SC, with its title that obliquely conflates two concepts (a strategy defines goals and the means to achieve them; a compass merely helps to find the way from one point to another), leaves unclear what it is supposed to be: a policy-field-specific derivation of the EUGS, a work program for Brussels institutions until 2030, or a signal to the rest of the world regarding the EU’s security policy goals?

• push for clarification of the regional scope of the SC or prioritization accord­ingly. If one follows the threat analysis of the document as well as the chapter on partnerships, one must inevitably get the impression that the EU is a globally active security provider. However, the operational conclusions leave little doubt that the focus of the document is realis­tically on the immediate European neigh­borhood. In this way, the EU threat­ens to raise false expectations among itself and others: While it has global interests, it will not be able to act autonomously across the globe in terms of security policy.

• also, in terms of function, push for prior­itization. It is not yet clear what, in the view of the member states, will be the central security challenge of the coming years, to which the corresponding plans will have to be primarily oriented, and from which capability requirements can be derived. Is it predominantly crisis management in the European periphery, protection against Islamist terrorism, or defense against disinformation and cyber­attacks? A critical review of the many projects contained in the draft should build on this step. Focusing on core strategic projects would enhance the EU’s credibility in international security.

• “[address] the elephant in the room more clearly,” namely EU members’ views on and expectations for the US’ security role in Europe. It is irritating that the draft SC assumes Sino-American systemic rivalry as the determinant of its own security policy, but it treats the US role in a rather dilatory manner thereafter. Do EU mem­bers expect the level of US security en­gage­ment in Europe to continue to decline, especially after the next US presi­dential election in late 2024, or do they expect continuity in US policy toward Europe? A lot should follow from this for the EU.

• specify to its EU partners what the suc­cinctly formulated but far-reaching level of ambition in its coalition agreement regarding European integration (“further development [of the EU] into a federal European state”) means for the areas of security and defense. Is it possible and desirable for Germany to take further steps toward deeper integration here, despite the fact that a European army is not addressed in the coalition agreement? Berlin should also take the opportunity to politically flank the SC and outline the finality of this EU policy field.

• finally, the German government should present an implementation document on the German conclusions from the Strategic Compass in early summer 2022. In this way, it could demonstrate to the out­side world its seriousness about drawing conclusions for its own security policy planning in the interests of the EU, and, domestically, its determination to give the SC a truly strategic character for Ger­man policy.