Disclaimer: This transcript has been generated by AI. It is not a fully edited and proofread text.

Opener: Look what's happening in Africa, what do you think? Africa will be a key partner in building the world we want to live in, whether it is on climate, digital or trade. Our continent will continue to make steady advances in women's education and equal access to services, thereby laying the foundation for more stable and peaceful societies.

Host: Many African nations, megatrends like globalization and digitalization offer both great opportunity and enormous challenges, in part because of external players vying to assert their own interests. How the resulting upheaval impacts the continent is the subject of the Megatrends Africa project, underway at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs and its partner institutions, the Kiel Institute and Eidos. And this is the podcast series. In today's episode, we ask how US President Donald Trump's transactionalism is impacting the dynamics of peace mediation in Africa, both for the worse and for the better. We will be focusing on the decades-old conflict between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda and also on Libya. You're listening to the latest podcast from the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, or SWP for short, here in Berlin. I'm your host, Esme Nicholson. And to assess the current state of mediation, I'm joined today by Emma Deddin-Badi and Fred Baumer, both experts in the field, and by SWP's very own Karoline Eickhoff. Emadeddin Badi specialises in conflict, security governance, and the political economy of violence in Libya and the wider North African Sahel region. He regularly briefs policymakers and works as an advisor for a number of organizations, including the United Nations and DCAF. Emma, welcome to Berlin. It's great to have you here today.

Emadeddin Badi: Thank you very much. It's great to be here.

Host: Fred Bauma is a human rights activist and executive director of Ebuteli, a research institute based in Kinshasa. He's also the co-founding member of Afriki, a network of more than 30 movements from Africa and its diaspora. He was previously director of the Congo Research Group at New York University. Fred, it's a pleasure to have you join us today. Hello.

Fred Bauma: Hello, and thank you.

Host: And Karoline Eickhoff is based here at SWP, working on the Megatrends Africa project. Her research focuses on global power shifts and their impact on Africa's international relations, with a particular emphasis on East Africa. Karoline, thank you for coming into the studio today.

Karoline Eickhoff: Hello, everyone.

Host: So we're very lucky to have experts with first-hand empirical knowledge with us here in the studio today. But before we get to the details on the ground, I'd like to get a sense of what has changed on the continent in Africa since the Trump administration started brokering transactional peace deals. Carolina, perhaps you can start us off. Hasn't peace always been transactional? And hasn't Washington always put its own concerns first?

Karoline Eickhoff: So peace negotiations have to some extent always been transactional in the sense that, of course, the conflict parties themselves engage in give and take interactions. So they will bargain with each other. They will pursue their own interests and they will expect concessions. So that by itself is not new at all. When we talk about transactional peace these days, it's really about the third party and the third party interest. So it means that third parties are not coming in anymore just to convene or to facilitate a conversation between the conflict parties. But they ask for something in return, but usually in line with their own foreign policy interest. Yeah. And this is not entirely new either. But I would say that what we see from the U.S. administration these days is basically taking this third party interest to another level where the peace element in the deals that are being made is almost like a side story to many of the other deals that are made. For example, when it comes to resources and what's also a bit new is that the administration is so overt about it.

Host: Well, Fred, warring parties in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda have signed a peace agreement last year called the Washington Accords. Tell us about that deal, both its terms and how it differs from previous mediation attempts, particularly when it comes to the third party interests that Karoline has been talking about.

Fred Bauma: So the Washington Accords, as people refer to, is a set of agreements between Rwanda, the U.S. and DRC, and it includes mainly two main agreements. So the peace and security, peace agreement between Rwanda and DRC, which goals was to create condition for peace in Eastern DRC, and which key component is the withdrawal of Rwandan army in Eastern DRC and the neutralization of FDLR, and also include the return of refugees and others. And the second agreement is what is referred to as a regional economic integration framework, which was aimed to create condition for stability, like prosperity in the region and investment in some projects. But alongside these agreements, there were also some bilateral agreements between the U.S. and different parties. Especially there were agreements between the U.S. and Congo called the Strategic Peace Partnership Agreement, which is more focused on mineral exploitation and so on. And there was a memorandum on understanding between Congo and the U.S. on security matters. And I think this is one example of what Caroline was talking about, because the U.S. at the same time is using its power and influence to put the belligerence on the table. At the same time, it is negotiating its own interests, both in Congo and in Rwanda in terms of mineral and investment. And I think at some point, these two goals, the bilateral one and the regional one clashes.

Host: Well, I'm going to come back to you a little bit more on how that clashes and the impact. If I may, just because I'd like to ask Imad now how the U.S. administration is pushing for a power sharing deal in Libya right now, as I understand it, and how these efforts maybe differ from previous negotiations.

Emadddin Badi: So, yes, the U.S. administration, or rather its special advisor for Arab and African affairs, Massad Boulos, is currently pushing a power sharing arrangement in Libya. This isn't traditional power sharing in the sense that it is between by and large individuals. So, you're seeing an effort by these special advisors to essentially broker arrangement between two families or two individuals. The prime minister, Abd al-Hamid Beyba, of the internationally recognized government in Tripoli, in Libya, and then the sort of de facto authorities in eastern Libya and in Rajma or in Benghazi, the Haftar family. The two individuals that have been the center of negotiations were the prime minister's nephew and Khalifa Haftar's son, Saddam. And the idea would essentially be to concoct a government between these two and a new presidency council in the hopes that this would create a viable environment for potentially economic, let's say, arrangements and the return of American companies to Libya. And that seems to be also the undertone of a lot of the U.S. efforts in Africa writ large.

Host: Well, again, I'm going to come back to you to find out how that's going. But Fred, returning to the Africa's Great Lakes region, how is then this agreement? You talked about these two agreements that there's potential that they may clash. How is it then perceived actually on the ground and what is the impact right now?

Fred Bauma: I would say the initial involvement of the U.S. and its capacity to lead to this kind of agreement was perceived positively in general. Also because in the past, U.S. was perceived as an ally to Rwanda, so using its diplomatic instruments to force those two actors to an agreement was perceived positively. However, with that hope comes a sort of despair because the evolution in the negotiation room and the peace deals that have been signed here and there are not followed by concrete improvements of the situation on the ground. So at the same time, there are progress in Washington. At the same time, the conflict escalated. In fact, in December 2025, almost at the same time, the peace accord was signed in Washington. A major city was fallen under the rebellion in East and DRC. So there is a disconnect between this and the situation on the ground. But at the same time, there is a lot of discussions on U.S. investment in DRC, but also U.S. potential investment in the area where conflict is. But from the discussions to the actual investment, there is also a big gap.

Host: Thank you, Fred. And what about Libya, Emad? What expectations are there about the current efforts? What are the alternatives? And specifically, what is at stake for the various stakeholders?

Emadeddin Badi: So a lot of a lot of questions there, but I'd say one like a few things that may be characterized and also color the way people are perceiving this plan of Massad Boulos is one. It's quite personal in that and personalized in that it's him negotiating and he's also negotiating with individuals. So it's quite exclusive. It's not a very inclusive framework. Not a lot of people are consulted, which naturally leads to some dissent. The second thing, and there is a mixed bag of views about this, is that obviously it's the U.S. being involved, which hasn't been the case previously. So that comes with the U.S. brand. That comes with the U.S. seriousness, let's say. That also comes with the perception that it's Trump pushing for this. It's a bit inevitable in a sense. And that is also triggering a lot of sentiments, let's say, in that a lot of the stakeholders are positioning themselves along the lines of this needs to be accommodated in some way, shape or form. However, a number of other stakeholders are increasingly now unhappy with said plan because it is triggering not only tensions within the communities that are supposed to sort of buy into said plan, but also triggering tensions within the very families that are also being negotiated with. And the second thing about this plan, aside it being personalized and not inclusive, is it doesn't seem to be very well, first of all, thought out. And it also doesn't seem to be set in stone, in a sense, in that it appears to be quite malleable.

Host: Do you think that's deliberate?

Emadeddin Badi: To a certain extent, it's possible, but it's also possible that it's incompetence to a certain extent. We're clearly seeing that this isn't so much institutionally led as much as it is individually led. So the line between sort of it being deliberate versus it being not well thought out is a bit blurry. And frankly, even engaging with U.S. policymakers, you're not able to get the right answers about it. But that being said, the fact that it is malleable offers some room for adapting to it, which is what stakeholders on the ground are doing to are doing. And most importantly, also with the U.N. is also trying to do, because let's not forget, there's also a U.N. sort of mediation track in Libya. And naturally, the U.S. sitting as a permanent member of the Security Council, the U.N. sort of needs to adapt to whatever Masaad Boulos is doing. So aside it being sort of complicated, let's say, to adapt to by the communities and by the stakeholders, it's also complicated for traditional mediation frameworks as well to adapt to.

Host: And you mentioned the U.N. I mean, what are the alternatives to what's being brokered right now?

Emadeddin Badi: Well, ideally, if you want to put this bluntly, if this is unplanned and not very inclusive, then the U.N. plan would be a bit better planned and a bit more inclusive. That would ideally be the alternative. But at the moment, unfortunately, the U.N. plan is sort of some portions of it are put on the back burner while we see what the U.S. is able to concoct and if it is able to concoct something. And I also have to say that the U.S. plan is currently facing setbacks as well at the moment in Libya. So it's an open question whether by the time even the podcast is out what the sort of new layout will look like vis-a-vis this plan.

Host: Okay, so it's very dynamic. Karoline, this new trend of transactionalism elicits very strong views. Are all of them negative? We've heard a little bit from both Fred and Imad about the hope that there's the potential to really get lasting peace. But it generally elicits strong views and we're particularly hearing that from Imad. What's your view? What's the situation?

Karoline Eickhoff: So I would say, and we've heard this both about the Great Lakes region and Libya, that the picture is pretty mixed. How people weigh the pros and cons or the potential and risk of these deals. I would say that when it comes maybe just to this, the motivation of the U.S. side, this kind of foreign policy priorities first, few people would approve of that in itself. So and there's also a lot of concerns about how these deals are made. The fact that they are so exclusive, so short term oriented. And from what we know about peace agreements, I think this goes a lot against what we would think makes deals sustainable. So I think there are a lot of concerns. But on the other hand, there are also some people who look at these deals and say or feel that they are maybe more pragmatic than other deals and pragmatic in the sense of getting something done. And this is particularly the case in regions in which conflicts have been protracted for years or even decades. And some like maybe multilateral initiatives have been going on, but they haven't really come to any conclusion or tangible improvements. And I think particularly of the Great Lakes here where many initiatives have been going on. And now the U.S. is coming in. So some people think that maybe it's a shortcut to at least arriving at some some things moving conflict parties, maybe reevaluating a bit the situation. So I think there's some some hope on that, especially in the situations that are really very, very protracted. And I guess there's also a bit of hope that with these that the U.S. is still able to do some things that other actors can't through influence, through relations so that they can get something a bit unstuck and really compel parties to stick to agreements that have been made, even if those are very, very short term and maybe very limited in scope. And that they could potentially then also create entry points for some other actors coming in who can maybe pick up on these short term deals and see what to make out of it in the next step.

Host: Well, Fred, are there examples of where transactionalism has performed well, either as a byproduct by accident or for lack of alternatives or for any other reasons in the Great Lakes region?

Fred Bauma: Well, I think in a very short term and maybe tactical consideration, there have been some positive outcome of it in terms of containing the conflict, not resolving the conflict. So, for example, when M23 was trying to move northward toward Wali Kali around a place where there's a mining site which sells minerals to U.S. companies, these transactional, like it is a very interested intervention of the U.S. allowed to contain that progression of M23. And I think in some sense, when the attack on Uvira also happened, the U.S. involvement was critical in forcing M23 to retract. However, and I think this is something similar to what Emad was alluded to, actors in the region tend to adapt themselves to this new setting. And so, in the long run, I mean, the capacity of this approach to resolve root causes of conflict is very limited so far. And so, everyone will position themselves on the side that is favorable to the interests of the mediators. And I think we can see it in the way people are coming out with very maximalist demands because they think they are in other deals with each of the parties. And I think we can also see it in a way that alongside these U.S.-led approaches, both in Congo or in Libya or in Sudan to some extent, there are other forums, like there are other processes that are being led by other mediators without proper results because people tend to prioritize where their interests are maximized.

Host: Emad, what about in Libya? Has any of the attempted transactionalism brought about positive developments or are we not that far yet?

Emadeddin Badi: I think, yeah, comparatively, we're probably not as far as maybe Western Sahara where there was sort of a deal or a U.N. Security Council resolution or in DRC Congo where there was also sort of an agreement sign. However, perhaps in Libya is where there's, to a certain extent, the perception that this is somewhat of a low-hanging fruit because the special advisor himself is quite actually relatively liked by the individuals that he's negotiating with, which, say, for instance, in Sudan is not so much the case, for example. So there's a perception that perhaps in terms of the panoply of files that the special advisor is leading or mediating on, that Libya could potentially be the one where there is an agreement. Now, to go back to your earlier question about long-term peace, I don't necessarily think that's the aim of the U.S. side. I would say it's to create a minimum level of stability for commerce or commercial relations to be established. that's one aspect of it. And the second would probably be to get an actual agreement signed. I think that's the benchmark against which this is measured. So actually, a victory potentially for Masaad Boulos would not necessarily be to bring peace to Libya, but to actually get Trump to sign another agreement and to be perceived as a peacemaker. So I think there, there's probably a bit of critique to be made about the long-term prospects of the successes of this approach.

Host: Or the lack of them, right, yeah. And where is it actually, again, it's very early days, but where is it making issues worse?

Emadeddin Badi: It's making issues worse in the sense that I would say there was a, the main worry was that a deal would be prematurely signed. And you're also seeing to a certain extent that there's often pressure that is pushed along U.S. electoral timelines, for instance. So let's secure something around the 7th of July, or let's secure something before the midterms, which aren't deadlines that really Libya needs to adapt to in theory, but that unfortunately to this U.S. administration, because of domestic issues, needs to be accommodated on their side. So, yeah, this is the kind of new dynamic that I would say would not be traditionally, would not be the traditional approach, let's say, in standard mediation, where it would be a bit more institutionally led, well, a little bit better thought out, let's say, and a bit better sequenced. Now we're having a plan or rough contours of a plan that are leaked by stakeholders, and that stakeholders are also, again, like Fred said, trying to adapt to and make better use of. The last thing I'll mention is also because Massad Boulos is negotiating with individuals, and because Libya has not had a suffrage, an actual presidential parliamentary suffrage in 10 to 12 years, a lot of these stakeholders are perceiving that this deal might actually be their lifeline for an extension in international legitimacy. They would possibly not be very popular in a vote, in a nationwide suffrage. So it's actually better for them, in a sense, to keep the hopes of these negotiations alive, to extend their political lifeline, let's say, without actually necessarily getting to a long-term deal. So it's quite a game of musical chairs in that sense. And unfortunately, the U.S. administration, either incapable or unwilling to sort of adapt to that as well.

Host: Fred, where is transactionalism actually making things worse in the Great Lakes region?

Fred Bauma: I think the worst part is the worsening of the conflict. So going back with this sentiment that we broker peace, but there is no peace. And to some extent, it appeals to a discourse that is oriented toward some population. Like in the U.S., Trump keeps saying that he resolves eight conflicts. And in reality, there is no conflict resolution in any of these. So it becomes just a performative exercise where you sign agreements, you bring people on the table, but you are not really contributing to ending conflicts or ending suffering. I think the U.S. has capabilities to do better, to go beyond what is superficial and to address the rooted causes. But I don't think there is an appetite right now to do so in this very transactional form. So I think the negative side is the missed opportunity of this approach, where there is a clear need, both from people and sometimes maybe from some actors, to end the violence, the direction where this approach is leading is now the direction of peace. And it is the same actor that is negotiating in both of these conflicts. And at the beginning of it, it was of the involvement of Masadoulos and the U.S., he was actually liked because of his pragmatic way. You know, he brings things on the table that people can negotiate. But in the long run, it's very limited.

Host: Well, that really brings me to my last question. I'd like to get, and you've already spoken to this to a certain extent, but maybe, Karoline, you can also talk to what this all means more broadly for peace mediation. Is the U.S. undermining previous efforts? And what are the alternatives?

Karoline Eickhoff: Yeah, when it comes to these questions about the impact, I think, as we have heard also from both contexts, is we don't really have much evidence yet because many of these deals are very recent, as Imad mentioned for Libia, for example. It's really, it's, the contexts are moving, the conflicts are changing. So I think at the moment, people rely on sort of personal views to make sense of this. And that's a lot about also how they feel about peace should be made and what role should principles play? Should deals be made in a multilateral context or should it be bilateral actors? So it's really a lot of personal sentiment that comes in, how people feel about these deals. There are certainly risks, and we know them well, these risks from short-term deals and exclusionary arrangements. I would probably not go as far as, say, at this point, that these transactional deals undermine previous efforts. I think it's a bit early for these kind of judgments or assessments. what I would say is that we don't really have much to indicate that they're doing much good in the sense of being the first step in something more comprehensive following. So I don't think there's much evidence to that either. And the experience from these two country cases don't really give that impression at the moment, or at least it's a bit more of a question of hope than perhaps something tangible that we could refer to at this point. The question of alternatives are really, it's just an open question at the moment. many people are discussing this, and some people lean more towards this transactional perspective and say perhaps actors should be more pragmatic, more transactional, while others lean more in the direction of sort of calling for the reestablishment of the old peace architecture as we knew it, basically. That is more oriented towards establishing processes, following norms, and so on. So there's really a debate where people alternate a bit between these two positions, and there's currently, I would say, no good answer found by the community of practice, but I wouldn't be surprised if we end up settling maybe on something in between. What I think is important is also that we focus a lot on the US approach and what the Trump administration is doing, but first, that's not the only actor who's leaning towards this transactional approach. There's a lot of other actors or governments coming in with this perspective of brokering short-term deals that are not following this traditional peace architecture. And there's also other trends that need to be, that answers need to be found to. Like the conflict settings themselves are changing a lot. We see a lot of internationalization. So there's a lot of trends in the sector that are currently really changing how conflicts are unfolding and how peace could perhaps be made. And I think, yeah, we should not forget that as we talk about alternatives, it's really not just about this US approach. And we're seeing there, there's a lot of challenges in the sector that new approaches need answers to.

Host: Well, and Fred, you talked about Trump's definition of peace, and we've heard a lot about short-termism. Just very briefly, can you paint a picture of what peace actually should look like in the Great Lakes region in Africa?

Fred Bauma: That's a very interesting question. Because for people in East Africa or in the Great Lakes, peace goes beyond cessation of hostilities. Peace means creating situations where people can live in their village, in their cities, study, do business, and plan in the long run what their life may look like. Currently, you live in Goma, you live in Bukavu, you don't know what will happen in two years. If you live in some villages, maybe you don't even know what will happen in two weeks. The other thing is the capacity of communities to live together in that region and to go beyond their grievances, which can only be rich if we accept to address profound wound and causes of the conflict. And I think in these processes, actors don't go beyond the big politics of conflict. Now, peace is a complicated thing, but I think in very simple terms, it will be being able to sleep and work up and plan your life without fearing that you may die in the next couple of weeks.

Host: And, Emad, can you give us a sense of what peace should look like or what the hopes of what peace looks like in Libya?

Emadeddin Badi: Well, it would largely depend on whose perception of peace we were talking about, I would say, not to give a diplomatic answer, but maybe I didn't center the community enough. Libya's sort of governance and its services are quite bad these days and also its economy. So to the community, it would be very basic things that would need improvement, that are governance-oriented, that are economic. The value of the Libyan din are electricity being provided, water being provided, fuel at the stations, all of which this summer, for instance, were not things that people had access to. I would question the extent to which the U.S. perceives it the same way. The only redeeming aspect to me of, for instance, the U.S. plan or this renewed push is that it is forcing a change to the status quo. And the status quo is bad, was bad, and was also unsustainable. So in that sense, that's a positive quality to it. There is a world where this sort of U.S. transactionalism, so to speak, could be channeled in a more constructive way towards long-term peace. At the moment, I question whether the formula is leading to that, and I also question the extent to which the formula would not lead to a return to conflict, which is the main danger at the moment of the U.S. plan, is this would actually be quite destructive. Should it be prematurely signed or should it not be well thought out? It could lead to a significant internationalization of the conflict. Now, the other, on the flip side, a lot of stakeholders and foreign interveners, and we haven't tackled all of them in the podcast, and we would probably need another podcast to do that, a lot of them are very comfortable with this status quo where the community is unfortunately not receiving its services or not voting, not having any democratic representation, but where resource extraction is possible. So, yeah, that's why I said this U.S. push for all its fault is, from my perspective, a net positive in that the status quo needs to change. My main worry is it reverting to conflict, unfortunately.

Host: So it's risky.

Emadeddin Badi: Exactly.

Host: What's clear is that peace mediation still has a lot of room for improvement with or without the Trump administration. No doubt we will return to these issues. But for today, I'd like to thank our guests, Emadeddin Badi, Fred Bauma, and Karoline Eichhoff for their shared insight and expertise. You can find links to their latest work and publications in the podcast show notes. And if you like what you hear, you can subscribe to us in all the usual places, including Spotify and Apple. You can also keep up to date with the latest analyses from SWP on Blue Sky and on LinkedIn. Today's episode was edited by Maya Dähne. Thank you for tuning in.