The Pretoria Agreement’s fault lines

The cessation-of-hostilities agreement signed by the TPLF and the Ethiopian govern­ment in November 2022 in Pretoria, South Africa – after mediation by the African Union (AU), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the United States – remains an important framework for relations between Tigray and Addis Ababa, in the absence of alternatives.

The Pretoria Agreement brought about a noticeable improvement in living condi­tions in Tigray in the first few months fol­lowing its signing. Hostilities ceased and the government lifted the economic block­ade of the region and restored essential services (electricity, banking, telecommunications) that had been suspended during the war. The TPLF handed over its heavy weaponry under AU supervision.

The TPLF agreed to dissolve the regional government it had formed unilaterally in 2020 and, in consultation with Addis Ababa, establish an interim regional administration in March 2023. From the outset, however, the interim administration found itself in a difficult position, as it was also held account­­able by the people of Tigray for the Ethio­pian government’s failings.

These failures are particularly evident in three key areas concerning the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement. The first con­cerns the status of areas that belonged to the Tigray Region before the war and were occupied by Amhara militias and the ENDF at the start of the conflict. These include the Western and Southern Zones of the local administration, as well as Tselemti south of the Tekeze River (see map). The neighbouring Amhara Region claims these areas, which had in fact not formed part of Tigray prior to 1991. The Pretoria Agreement merely states that their status should be resolved in accordance with the Consti­tution. However, the steps necessary for a constitutional settlement have not yet been taken.

The Western Zone of Tigray is of strategic importance. Sesame and cotton are grown there on large agricultural estates for ex­port. The Ethiopian government fears that the TPLF could link up with armed groups across the border with Sudan and organise its own supply lines.

Second, closely linked to this territorial issue, is the plight of internally displaced persons. During the civil war, around 1.9 million people were displaced within and from Tigray. More than three years after the Pretoria Agreement, around 750,000 people remain displaced in the region, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees mainly from areas controlled by Amhara forces. With a total population of around six million, this represents a considerable burden. Displaced people who have been able to return to the disputed areas often find their homes destroyed or occupied. They also lack access to essential services. Without a mutually agreed resolution regarding political control of these areas, returns will remain difficult.

The third area of concern is the demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) of TDF soldiers. In Tigray alone, around 274,000 people have been registered for the DDR programme. Some 63,000 people have gone through the DDR process in Ti­gray to date. However, the process has stalled since 2025. Many of the soldiers live in poor­­ly supplied camps. In some cases, the TIRA has allocated more than half of its budget solely to the fighters still awaiting demobilisation. These funds were consequently unavailable for the region’s development.

These unresolved issues also stood in the way of the region’s reintegration into Ethio­pia’s political system. No elections were held either for a new regional parliament or to elect Tigrayan representatives to the parliament in Addis Ababa, although the Pretoria Agreement had stipulated this. The entire Tigray Region was excluded from the general elections that took place on 1 June 2026.

The TPLF’s search for a role

Following the devastating war in northern Ethiopia, an intense debate began within the TPLF and among the Tigrayan elite more broadly. How had violence on such a scale come about? How much responsibility lay with the TPLF, which had dominated Tigray’s politics for five decades, and how much compromise could still be reached with Addis Ababa?

The discussions also touched on the fun­damental question of Tigray’s place within Ethiopia’s state structure. Since the end of the 19th century, political elites from Tigray and Amhara had been competing for supremacy in Ethiopia. The rivalry esca­lated into several violent conflicts, such as the civil war against the Derg military re­gime from 1974 to 1991. The TPLF subsequently controlled the state and the econo­my for 27 years as part of a coalition of parties, until Abiy Ahmed, who is from Oromia, came to power in 2018. Under Abiy’s more centralised rule, the TPLF is unlikely to be able to play a national role any longer. However, according to an aca­demic from the region, many Tigrayan elites, including those in the TPLF, simply cannot accept their peripheral status.

In the post-war discussions, the interim administration was a bone of contention within the TPLF. Abiy prevented TPLF Chair­man Debretsion from becoming its head, whereupon the TPLF Central Committee elected Getachew Reda – its chief negotiator in Pretoria and former Minister of Com­munications – whom Abiy eventually ap­pointed in March 2023. Getachew’s govern­ment was caught between the uncompro­mising stance of the TPLF leadership led by Debretsion and the delaying tactics of the federal government in Addis Ababa.

In August 2024, the power struggle with­in the TPLF erupted into the open. The TPLF convened a party congress at short notice, which Getachew and other members of the TIRA boycotted. Shortly afterwards, Geta­chew and 15 others were expelled from the party. Getachew’s position soon became untenable. After the TPLF had already taken over parts of the administration with the help of security forces, Abiy dismissed Geta­chew in March 2025 and, following negotia­tions with Debretsion, replaced him with Tadesse Worede. Tadesse had previously headed the TIRA’s Peace and Security Bureau and, in that capacity, had controlled the TDF.

However, replacing the regional president did not resolve the underlying prob­lems. Tadesse soon encountered difficulties and resistance similar to those faced by his predecessor.

At the same time, relations between the TPLF and the Ethiopian state deteriorated. The National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE), which also oversees the political party system, had only re-registered the TPLF in 2024 (following its ban during the war) subject to certain conditions. The TPLF was required to hold a party congress to elect a leadership and adopt a constitution. The TPLF refused to comply with the legal framework, as this would have required it to register as a new political party, thereby renouncing its historical continuity. Fur­thermore, the TPLF argued that, as a signa­tory to the Pretoria Agreement, it was al­ready recognised as a political party. In May 2025, the NEBE ultimately revoked the TPLF’s registration. From the Ethiopian government’s perspective, the TPLF there­fore no longer exists as a legal entity. This complicates the initiation of direct talks.

The TPLF also faces a legitimacy problem within Tigray itself. On two occasions – March 2025 and May 2026 – it replaced previously legitimised interim administrations in Mekelle, partly through the use of force. Opposition politicians from Tigray report that they and their supporters are occasionally harassed and arrested. The TPLF has declared a “zero tolerance” policy towards media outlets that promote the agenda of its opponents. Tens of thousands of people, mainly young people from Tigray, have left Ethiopia in search of work, usual­ly heading for the Arabian Peninsula. In this situation, the TPLF benefits from the grey zone between war and peace in which Tigray finds itself. Its constant warnings about the Ethiopian government’s machi­nations help it to justify its own extra-legal measures.

Abiy the juggler

The Ethiopian government under Prime Minister Abiy faces its own challenges. It aims to drive forward the country’s ongo­ing political and economic transformation, moving away from the ethnic federalism and developmental-state model established under TPLF rule, and towards a unitary state and a controlled opening of the mar­ket economy.

Abiy must balance the interests of various groups without becoming dependent on them. He appears to be pursuing a strat­egy of dividing the opposition and thereby weakening it. A controversial national dia­logue, which could pave the way for con­stitutional amendments, is also part of his toolkit. However, no consultations for the national dialogue have taken place yet in Tigray itself.

Addressing and resolving the outstanding issues in the implementation of the Pre­toria Agreement would have meant jeopar­dising fragile relations with key groups. Clarifying the territorial status of Western Tigray by means of a referendum, which the government had proposed, would have required determining who was eligible to vote, particularly among people displaced from Tigray and new arrivals from Amhara.

The same applied to the government’s commitment to ensure the withdrawal of all “non-ENDF” troops, meaning primarily Amhara militias and Eritrean forces. Al­though Eritrean troops withdrew from cen­tral Tigray, they remained present in the north-east of the region, particularly in Zalambessa and Irob.

The government in Addis Ababa also capitalised on tensions within Tigray, which it actively fuelled, at least in certain in­stances. TDF fighters dissatisfied with the TPLF’s course split off in 2025 and began to form their own militia under the name Tigray Peace Force (TPF, Hara Meret in Ti­grinya). The ENDF appear to be supporting the TPF with ammunition, rations and pay. In November 2025, the ENDF deployed drones against the TDF as it pursued the TPF across the border into Afar.

In May 2026, Getachew, together with his new party, Simret, and other parties, founded the “Peace and Change Council”, which also includes TPF members. The coa­lition is led by General Tsdadkan Gebre­ten­sae, who commanded the TDF during the war and served as vice-president of the TIRA under Getachew. The Peace and Change Council aims to remove the TPLF from power in Tigray “by any means necessary”, as stated at its founding. Getachew has offi­cially served as Abiy’s adviser on East Africa, with the rank of minister, since April 2025.

“Tsimdo” and Eritrea’s interests

For its part, the TPLF is cooperating with its former arch-enemy, Eritrea. Initial contacts reportedly took place as early as the begin­ning of 2024 in Dubai, when Getachew met with Eritrean representatives on behalf of the TPLF and – according to Debretsion – with Abiy’s encouragement. A strategic objective of the TPLF is to ensure that it can no longer be cut off from the world by the government in Addis Ababa, as happened during the previous war.

As part of this rapprochement, Eritrea launched the “Tsimdo Selam” initiative in 2025. Representatives of Tsimdo describe it as a “grassroots peace movement” between related peoples in the border region of Ethi­opia, Eritrea and Sudan. However, given the actors involved in this alliance, Addis Ababa views the initiative as an anti-Ethio­pian alliance comprising the TPLF, Eritrea, the Fano (from Amhara) and other opposi­tion movements, which it claims is pre­paring a joint military offensive.

Eritrea has come a remarkable way – from fighting alongside the ENDF against the TPLF to becoming an ally of the TPLF against the Ethiopian government. For President Isaias Afwerki, the threat environ­ment has since shifted. Since 2023, Abiy has regularly spoken of Ethiopia’s right to access the sea and described the Red Sea as Ethiopia’s “natural boundary”. In November 2025, Ethiopian Foreign Minister Gedi­on Timothewos stated that Ethiopia had long had sufficient grounds to wage war against Eritrea, but was refraining from doing so out of a sense of responsibility.

Against this backdrop, Eritrea has an interest in overcoming its regional isolation without abandoning its existing totalitarian model of rule. That model also relies on constantly emphasising the threat of exter­nal interference, particularly by Ethiopia, in order to justify the continued militarisation of society.

There is a widespread willingness in the region to cooperate with a former enemy when that enemy is regarded as the “lesser evil” compared with the principal adversary, as discussions with various political actors in Ethiopia have shown. This calcula­tion shapes the TPLF’s relations with Eri­trea, those of the Fano with the TPLF, and also relations between the Peace and Change Council and the government in Addis Ababa. The actors assume that they can exploit each other’s interests for their own ends. It is a tactical collaboration, not a strategic alliance.

Regional entanglements

Tensions in northern Ethiopia involve not only Eritrea but also other regional actors that could contribute to an escalation and link it to ongoing armed conflicts.

For instance, Ethiopia’s relations with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), which control most of the border with the neigh­bouring country, have deteriorated signifi­cantly in recent months. Since late 2025, Ethiopia has become one of the principal transit countries for supplies to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), as evidenced by dozens of suspicious cargo flights per month and satellite imagery from Benishangul-Gumuz. The SAF also accuses Ethiopia of facilitating Emirati drone strikes against Sudanese tar­gets, citing, among other evidence, the flight data of a Turkish-made Akıncı drone shot down in May 2026.

Addis Ababa, for its part, views the pres­ence in Sudan of Army 70 – an armed group from Tigray with links to the TPLF – with concern. Army 70 has intervened in the war there on the side of the SAF. The group reportedly comprises several thou­sand fighters who could operate from the Sudanese border in the event of a potential conflict over Western Tigray.

Furthermore, Eritrea is strengthening its ties with Egypt, which is in dispute with Ethiopia over control of Nile waters. In June 2026, Asmara and Cairo agreed to cooperate in various sectors, including the maritime economy. Egypt also intends to participate in developing the ports of Assab and Mas­sawa – precisely those ports in which Abiy has expressed an interest through his rheto­ric on access to the sea.

Another factor influencing the region is the rivalry between the UAE and Saudi Arabia. The UAE is one of Abiy’s closest financial and military partners, whereas Saudi Arabia views further militarisation of the Red Sea with scepticism. In 2020, Riyadh established the Red Sea Council, a regional initiative of the littoral states, of which Eritrea is a member. The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz reinforces the eco­nomic importance of the Red Sea for Saudi oil exports. Transnational smuggling routes for Iranian weapons and military materiel in the Red Sea also affect Riyadh’s security interests. Saudi Arabia has in the past attempted to mediate between Ethiopia and Eritrea. However, these efforts failed be­cause the negotiations did not address the military use of Assab, a key interest for Ethiopia.

Sporadic violence and risks of war

Tensions between the TPLF and Addis Ababa are gradually escalating, without, so far, reaching a full-blown crisis. Both sides pre­sumably do not wish to risk a repeat of the devastation of the last war, but have al­ready shown that they remain prepared to use military force to advance their interests. Since the TPLF took power in March 2025, there have been several clashes between the TDF and the ENDF. At the end of January 2026, TDF units advanced across the Tekeze River into Tselemti, and a few days later also into areas of Southern Tigray. Heavy fighting ensued, during which the ENDF also deployed drones. The clashes ended, however, when the TDF withdrew to their original positions. Tadesse, then head of the TIRA, said on regional television: “The force we sent was not sent to ignite a war. It was sent to carry out a manoeuvre-type opera­tion, to create pressure so that the issue of displaced persons’ return and our sovereign territorial rights would move forward as a renewed agenda and elicit a response.” The Ethiopian government responded to the incident by massing troops along the borders with Tigray for several months.

The pressure on the TPLF to act is real, despite all its self-justification. There are shortages of cash, fuel and medicines. Since October 2025, Addis Ababa has fallen be­hind on its transfers to the regional admin­istration in Tigray. Public-sector employees, such as teachers, are not being paid. The population is caught in the crossfire be­tween the TPLF and Addis Ababa.

The politicisation of the TDF is further exacerbating the conflict. The TDF emerged as a cross-party resistance movement with many volunteers following the ENDF’s first offensive in 2020/21. However, in January 2025, TDF commanders openly sided with Debretsion and supported the TPLF’s take­over of the regional administration. There are now reports of forced conscription. In June, the regional assembly passed legisla­tion to mobilise troops and established a command post under Debretsion’s leader­ship. Resorting to forced recruitment con­firms reports that the TDF cannot rely on a substantial proportion of its troops being willing to fight. War fatigue is widespread, particularly given the prospect of a possible civil war within Tigray.

For both the TPLF and Abiy, the legitimacy of any potential military action is of great importance. Each side seeks to portray the other as the aggressor. The TPLF repeat­edly warns of the risk of war in open letters to international actors such as the AU, the United Nations and Western embassies. Conversely, the Ethiopian government warns international partners of alleged war preparations by the TPLF and Eritrea.

Neither the TPLF nor the Ethiopian government can fully control the escalation. There is a risk that smaller militias, such as the Tekeze Guards in Amhara-controlled Western Tigray, the TPF in Afar or the TPLF’s Army 70 in Sudan, might undertake military actions driven by local motives. The ENDF or TDF might then feel compelled either to follow their respective local partners or to respond to the limited actions of the militias. In this tense atmo­sphere, it is essential that reliable channels of communication are in place to ensure that miscalculations or misunderstandings do not escalate into a major conflict.

International entry points for prevention

International actors should press strongly to break the current spiral of escalation. A renewed outbreak of hostilities in northern Ethiopia could easily spill over into neigh­bouring countries. It is not yet too late to prevent the next war in the Horn of Africa. The TPLF and the governments in Addis Ababa and Asmara should cease their threats; the TPLF should register as a politi­cal party, and Addis Ababa should end Tigray’s economic isolation. These actors are likely to take such steps only if the other sides also cooperate. This requires international mediation.

The AU is taking the lead as mediator through its reinstated Special Envoy, Oluse­gun Obasanjo, who visited Mekelle in mid-June 2026. Other potential actors include the governments directly involved in the Pretoria Agreement: the United States, Kenya (with former President Uhuru Ken­yatta) and South Africa. Saudi Arabia and Turkey could also play a constructive role, particularly at the intergovernmental level, if they so wish.

Mediation will only succeed if it is genu­inely impartial and if the various levels of negotiation are properly coordinated. Uni­lateral pressure on one side of the conflict is likely to prove counterproductive. The United States runs the risk of having breached precisely this fundamental pre­requisite with its recent measures. For in­stance, it lifted its ban on arms exports to Ethiopia and imposed visa restrictions on TPLF leaders. The European Commission, too, must ask how conflict-sensitive its decision was to resume budget support for Ethiopia, even though its call – made three years earlier – for an investigation into war crimes had not been heeded. In a state­ment, the EU delegation to Ethiopia criti­cised the TPLF for its unilateral actions, but not the Ethiopian government for the eco­nomic isolation of Tigray. It is also clear, however, that public pressure is unlikely to deter the parties involved from further escalation; one-sided rhetoric could instead encourage them to take risks.

The German government should ensure that EU institutions adopt a balanced posi­tion towards the parties to the conflict. The German and European role should not be limited to supporting the ongoing AU medi­ation, particularly as the AU has traditionally been reluctant to criticise its host coun­try, Ethiopia.

The most important lever for influencing the Ethiopian government lies in the multi­billion-dollar programmes run by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), within whose governing bodies EU member states wield considerable influence. Germany should advocate for a joint message to the Ethiopian government that another large-scale war would jeopardise the successful continuation of these pro­grammes. The IMF itself has already high­lighted precisely this risk. The IMF and the World Bank should also take a more critical view of Ethiopia’s high gold exports, a sub­stantial share of which originates from informal mines in Tigray.

Germany and the EU should also raise the crisis in Ethiopia in discussions with extra-regional partners such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Israel and Turkey. A key shortcoming following the Pretoria Agree­ment was that its implementation was not accompanied by a regional dialogue mecha­nism for security in the Horn of Africa. The current geopolitical rivalry in this region could at least be mitigated through greater communication, transparency and regular dialogue formats involving the states in the region and the external actors mentioned. Establishing a joint format will be difficult due to these rivalries; therefore, international special envoys will need to continue to work intensively to maintain these chan­nels of communication and coordinate their efforts. As a matter of preventive diplomacy, this engagement is more nec­essary than ever.