Strengthening Europe’s Defence Capabilities through Clear Tasks and Objectives

First task: military support for Ukraine

Since the start of Russia’s war against Ukraine, the EU has firmly supported Kyiv. It has been providing the attacked country, with which it has been conducting acces­sion negotiations since June 2024, political, humanitarian, military and financial sup­port. Given Russia’s determination to con­tinue the war, Ukraine requires ongoing and increased support from its European partners. So far, the EU and its Member States have mobilised around €60 billion in military aid for Ukraine. Of this, over €6 billion has been financed through the European Peace Facility to deliver military equipment by 2024. A further €5 billion has been allocated from an additional sup­port fund for Ukraine to cover the cost of protective equipment, fuel, ammunition and missiles. Furthermore, the European defence industry has increased its ammunition production capacity by 40 per cent. The July 2023 Regulation on the Promotion of Ammunition Production (ASAP) mobi­lised €500 million from the EU budget to promote the expansion of production capac­ities for ground-to-ground and artil­lery ammunition, as well as missiles. As part of the EUMAM UA (European Union Military Assistance Mission to Ukraine) training mission, over 78,000 Ukrainian soldiers have received training in tactical and operational warfare, as well as training on modern combat equipment.

The EU came under additional pressure when the US significantly reduced its mili­tary aid to Ukraine. Washington did not provide any new support in March and April 2025 for the first time, and, in July, previously agreed arms deliveries were halted but then approved again. Above all, EU countries hardly have any capabilities in reconnaissance and strategic air defence, which Ukraine urgently needs.

Second task: Preparing security guarantees for Kyiv

Although there are currently no signs of a ceasefire, let alone a peace plan, between Russia and Ukraine, the US administration has made it clear that Europe should pro­vide military support for a potential cease­fire agreement and offer Ukraine comprehensive security guarantees. There is specu­lation about a European peacekeeping force of around 40,000 troops. Ukrainian Presi­dent Zelensky has suggested an even larger force of 200,000 troops.

To fulfil this task, EU states would need to significantly increase their armed forces. In Germany, for example, growth in the size of the armed forces has stagnated for years. The Bundeswehr does not have sig­nificantly above 182,000 soldiers. Even the permanent deployment of a 5,000-strong brigade in Lithuania would represent a sig­nificant undertaking for the Bundeswehr. Furthermore, the EU-27 would need to sub­stantially enhance their military cooperation and reconcile their divergent armament policies. Otherwise, maintaining and upkeeping their military capabilities would be a Herculean logistical task.

Third task: Keeping the US in Europe

Many Member States regard this as crucial to their interests. Most NATO countries in Europe are prepared to meet the US presi­dent’s demand to spend 5 per cent of their GDP on defence. This demonstrates the im­portance of the security guarantees that the US offers its European partners by station­ing up to 100,000 soldiers in Europe and by nuclear sharing within NATO. To this day, Europeans follow American guidelines for strategy and capabilities within the Alli­ance. To be militarily interoperable with the US, they purchase much of their mili­tary equipment from it. As with the start of the war in Ukraine, when European coun­tries purchased around 63 per cent of their additional military equipment from the US, many EU countries continue to source capa­bilities from America to maintain trans­atlantic relations.

Fourth task: Defending Europe without the US

The Trump administration’s drastic change of course has thrown the coordinates of the European security order into disarray. It con­tinues to send contradictory signals to its allies regarding the reliability and durabil­ity of American engagement in Europe, as well as its adherence to the NATO consensus on Russia and Ukraine.

The debate about an independent nu­clear deterrent in Europe demonstrates the extent to which some EU countries are convinced that they must prepare for a US withdrawal from the continent. Replacing American military capabilities entirely would require Europeans to increase defence spending significantly, even in the conventional sphere. Furthermore, there must be political willingness among Euro­peans to coordinate strategic goals and priorities in the future. The institutional framework in which this coordination should take place would then need to be determined – whether intergovernmental or supranational, within NATO or the EU.

Fifth task: As a long-term goal, establishing a European Defence Union

Replacing the US as the guarantor of Euro­pean security will be a long-term task, as will establishing a European Defence Union. Currently, supranational control in this policy area is far from achieved. Member States have considerable freedom to act in the defence sector and primarily pursue their national interests. At most, they co­ordinate their actions at an intergovernmental level. The European Commission is trying to counteract this. For decades, it has criticised the inadequacies, weaknesses and fragmentation of European armaments and defence services markets, repeatedly push­ing for the creation and regulation of a Euro­pean defence goods market. However, it has not yet succeeded in implementing its reform proposals. The Commission aims to promote European networking and closer cooperation on armaments policy. Its goals are to improve the interoperability of armaments, reduce opportunity costs and expenditure duplication and achieve greater economies of scale. EU Member States will incur significant costs in build­ing and expanding their defence capabilities, which will put pressure on national budgets. In view of this, the Commission considers the Europeanisation of the arms industry to be inevitable. The first essential step towards a defence union would there­fore be to establish a single defence market. This would grant the Commission access to a policy area that has previously been off-limits under the EU treaties.

First step: Support Ukraine

The most important task for Europeans is to support Ukraine in its defensive fight against Russia. Uncertainties regarding Washing­ton’s support for Kyiv are putting pressure on Europeans to increase their military aid. Until now, the EU has used the European Peace Facility to compensate Member States that have supplied Ukraine with weapons and ammunition. However, this off-budget instrument has been criticised because some Member States are using the compensation to supply Ukraine with obsolete equip­ment and replace their own capabilities by European funding. Meanwhile, numerous arms companies have relocated their production to Ukraine and are col­laborating with local businesses. The Euro­pean Commission has submitted proposals to integrate the Ukrainian arms industry closely with the EU’s. According to the Com­mission, this approach is intended to achieve further economies of scale in terms of the capabilities required for defence against Russia. It is also intended to reduce the cost of supporting Ukraine.

However, the extent of assistance still varies greatly between Member States. As a result, Russia is equipping itself with impor­tant capabilities more quickly than Ukraine.

In the short term, it is important to use the upcoming EU budget negotiations to increase the financial volume of the Euro­pean Peace Facility. Furthermore, Member States should be obliged to channel part of their additional defence spending into the Facility. This would to some extent cir­cum­vent the often difficult Council negotiations on increasing the Facility’s financial re­sources. EU funding for ASAP from the EU budget could also be boosted. These meas­ures could enable the EU to purchase from the US the military capabilities that Kyiv urgently needs.

Second step: Create an EU internal market for armaments

Member States should prepare to establish an internal market for armaments and ser­vices. This market should be governed by European competition and state aid rules, as well as transparent public tender and contract award criteria. The cost and price structures of defence contracts should be made more transparent, and the isolated national defence markets should be opened up to new (and often more innovative) Euro­pean suppliers. In a common market, pro­duction figures could increase, and defence manufacturers could benefit from economies of scale. Additionally, purchasing de­fence industry intermediate products within the EU should be made easier to strengthen cross-border competition in this single market.

Europeanisation would therefore have to be accompanied by the opening up of national defence markets and the liberalisation of intra-Community trade. Regarding exports to third countries, guidelines for defence equipment produced in the EU would need to be harmonised. This could also help to make European defence manu­facturers more competitive and innovative.

However, Member States have so far resisted these steps and are keeping a close eye on their national leeway. The European Commission’s economic and industrial policy incentives still fall short. It is making concessions, particularly with regard to cooperation requirements, and reducing demands for companies to work together in consortia. However, only a single European market for defence equipment would en­able EU countries to swiftly and cost-effec­tively close critical capability gaps. Such a market would allow the European Com­mis­sion to influence planning, development and procurement for the benefit of the EU.

The partnership agreements recently con­cluded by the European Commission with Canada, Japan, South Korea and the United Kingdom could benefit from a strengthened EU defence policy and regu­latory framework for arms control. The stronger the European defence industrial base, the greater the interest of partner countries. Ideally, standardisation would be achieved through the Commission’s internal market requirements and the open­ing up and transparency of national arma­ments markets. In the long term, this could ensure better interoperability between the armed forces of EU Member States and their partner countries.

A joint approach by like-minded countries could mitigate the potential consequences of a US withdrawal from Europe, both politically and in terms of the arms industry. If Europeans were to assert their independence more vigorously, this might persuade the US to open its arms market to European competitors for the first time, paving the way for a transatlantic market.

Third step: Joint financing

The European budget negotiations could be used to increase funding for the European Defence Fund (EDF) within the EU budget. To date, the fund has a total volume of €7.3 billion to promote the innovation, industry and science of the European defence sector. However, if the scope of EDF funding is to be extended to include other defence policy tasks, such as the joint procurement of am­munition or other military equipment, the EU Treaty (art. 42(3) TEU) would need to be amended.

Finally, incentives could be created to pro­mote dual-use capabilities with the help of other European programmes. For in­stance, the new regulations for the European Struc­tural and Cohesion Funds, which are cur­rent­ly under negotiation, could include pro­visions for a minimum funding rate to fi­nance the expansion of European transport routes in accordance with military mobility requirements, using European funding. Funds from European support programmes could also be used for cyber defence meas­ures, protective measures for critical infra­structure facilities and European armaments research networks. The general aim would be to relax the strict distinction between civil and military support measures.

Forth Step: Building community structures

The Europeanisation of national defence mar­kets and industries requires the estab­lishment of appropriate structures and institutions at a European level. Beyond the European Commission’s traditional market-regulating role, the EU needs institutions capable of coordinating strategic and mili­tary priorities, their political implementation and financial resources. In doing so, care must be taken to ensure coordination with transatlantic institutions within the NATO framework.

Clearly, an irregular meeting of EU de­fence ministers in the EU Council will not suffice to address fundamental strategic issues. The requirement for unanimity in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is also no longer appropriate given the enormous time pressure EU states are under to increase their defence capabilities. Furthermore, greater transparency is needed between NATO’s military planning and that of the European Commission. To date, NATO has negotiated with Member States individually. Consequently, there is cur­rently no transparency regarding mili­tary objectives and required capabilities, either between Member States or between NATO and the EU. A European Security Council could serve as an important link between Member States and NATO. It could be headed by a High Representative, at­tached to the European Commission, and supported by a military planning group. This would be particularly useful given that Europeans are not currently seeking to estab­lish a Euro­pean pillar within NATO.