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Host: Nearly four years into Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a tenable peace plan remains elusive, particularly in the absence of an ironclad security guarantee, not least from the United States. Former NATO chief Anders Rasmussen warns that Ukraine faces a forever war unless Europe steps up and stands up to Russia. And while Ukraine is on the front line, EU leaders recognize that Moscow is already waging a hybrid war in Europe, attacking infrastructure, spreading fear and disinformation in a bid to undermine Western liberal democracy. You're listening to the latest podcast from the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, or SWP for short, here in Berlin. In today's episode, we are asking whether Europe has reached a tipping point when it comes to its own security, and to what extent Ukraine is already an integral, if unofficial, part of the continent's deterrence architecture. I'm your host, Esme Nicholson, and to answer these questions, I'm joined today by the authors of a brand new study published jointly by SWP and the Institute for Strategic Research in Paris, which considers an emerging model of European security with Ukraine and without Russia. Our first guest in town from the French capital is Céline Marangé, Senior Fellow on Russia and Ukraine at the Institute of Strategic Research in Paris. Céline co-edited the publication we're discussing today. Céline, welcome to Berlin and to the SWP studio. Great to be here. We're also joined by Susan Stewart, Senior Research Fellow at SWP's Eastern Europe and Eurasia Division. Susan is a specialist on Ukraine and co-leads SWP's working group, Reordering European Security. She also co-edited the study we're looking at today. Hello, Susan. Thank you for being here.Hello, it's my pleasure.
And our third guest is Kai-Olaf Lang, a Senior Fellow at SWP's Europe Division. Kai-Olaf's research focuses on Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltic countries and the EU's enlargement policy. Kai-Olaf, thank you for coming into the studio.Hello, everybody.

Host: Well, before we discuss the findings of your publication, I'd like very briefly to get your views on former NATO Chief Rasmussen's recent assertion that Europe must change its Russia strategy swiftly and be far bolder. Is he right? And if so, what needs to change? Kai-Olaf.

Kai-Olaf Lang: He's probably right in his assessment of the military dynamics and also when it comes to the longer outlook. However, this was indeed a very bold and far-reaching comment because this implies a sort of further NATO-ization of the war and a far-reaching commitment of NATO member states. And looking at what he said, to some extent, this even means a sort of security guarantee or at least indirect security guarantees for a country without being a member.

Host: Susan, what's your take on it?

Susan Stewart: I think he's absolutely correct. I mean, I think what he said points to the need to change the tempo and the intensity of our support for Ukraine. And actually, what we found in the study is that countries actually, a majority of countries want to do this. They want to integrate Ukraine into the security architecture. But in order to do that, Ukraine needs to win the war first. And for that, I think these types of measures that Rasmussen proposed are necessary.

Host: Céline?

Céline Marangé: Yeah, I also think that Rasmussen is right. And I think he gets right Putin's true intentions. He said that Ukraine faces forever war. And I think that Russia is preparing for a long attrition war. The Russian leadership has shown no real intention of negotiating a ceasefire, let alone the end of hostilities. And I think this is important that he underscored that.

Host: It's clear that war in Ukraine is already a major driver of change in Europe with defense spending. But one example of this, Susan, you just touched upon it. But to what extent is Europe United in its approach to security and the threat of Russia? And where does it diverge, Susan?

Susan Stewart: Well, certainly there are divergences. In fact, Russia is one subject on which there have always been divergences within the EU and and Europe more broadly. And Russia's aggression in Ukraine has, to some extent, changed that, but not completely. So we do have certain countries that are, let's say, spoilers or potential spoilers when it comes to the preferences of the vast majority, like Hungary or perhaps Slovakia. But on the whole, I would say that because of Russia's aggression against Ukraine and because of the coming to power of Donald Trump in the US for a second time, we do have really a critical mass of actors that are ready to step up with regard to European security and support for Ukraine.

Host: Céline, what expectations are there, say, of Germany and France? They're traditionally the EU's motor. And do they diverge?

Céline Marangé: I would like, first of all, to underline some points of agreement. In the report, we can find very positive findings, which is unusual nowadays. First, as Susan said, there is a large consensus among the countries we studied on preserving the existing security architecture by reinforcing its two pillars, that is the EU and NATO. But there is also a broad agreement on continuing Ukraine's integration into both organizations. And I must confess that I did not expect such results. And so it was a pleasant surprise for us. Now, it's fair to recognize that there is no unity yet on the precise role that Ukraine would play in the future security architecture. And I think that as regards Ukraine's admission into NATO, we see divergent views and positions. Some countries, such as Germany, are opposed to Ukraine's integration into NATO. But other countries, such as France, reversed their previous position and endorsed a NATO perspective for Ukraine, but only under some conditions and after the end of hostilities. So, yeah, things are moving, I would say.

Host: Well, the fact that your results are perhaps surprising is a reason that I've jumped straight into the differences rather than where the unity is. Susan, would you like to talk maybe a bit more about Germany's role?

Susan Stewart: Yes. I mean, first of all, there are now some indications that also this position of Germany about Ukraine being in NATO or not is shifting. So, and I think this is one of the important things to realize that indeed this combination of Russia's aggression and the actions of the Trump administration have led to a serious rethink in Germany about its role in European security. So we do see a lot of ambition there. We do see certain actions in terms of trying to take on leadership with regard to supporting Ukraine, for example, through the NATO framework, getting countries on board with purchasing further arms for Ukraine and so on, or the support for allowing Ukraine to use the Russian assets that have been confiscated with regard to sort of this European plan to actually use these assets without using them, so to speak. So I think on the German side, we see a kind of gradual but definite shift in this direction.

Host: What about Eastern Europe? Kai Olof, can you tell us about Poland's expectations and Poland's stance on the Russian threat?

Kai-Olaf Lang: Poland has always been a standard bearer of Ukraine, of Ukraine's independence and sovereignty long before the war had started. I would say that Poland follows a philosophy together with the Baltic states, also with the Nordic countries, which bases on the idea of decoupling from Russia, for example, in terms of energy. Poland has done a U-turn when it comes to imports of gas and oil from Russia. Second dimension, creating an effective defense, strengthening the eastern flank. There's been a cantus firmus of Poland in the alliance. We don't want to be a second class member. So boots on the ground, particularly U.S. boots, have been a priority, and this is still an important element of this kind of idea to move from deterrence to effective defense. And the third one is, of course, containing Russia in the eastern part of the continent by strengthening the independence of eastern European countries, countries in the southern Caucasus, particularly bearing in mind then that Ukraine is a cornerstone of the geopolitical equation in the region. So also bringing Ukraine not only closer to the west, but anchoring it into the institutions, particularly in the European Union, but also, I think, rather in the long term in NATO.

Host: And Céline, how about France's position?

Céline Marangé: Well, I will say that it's usually assuming Paris that Ukraine's military defeat would bring more instability to Europe because the Kremlin would be emboldened, but it could also lead Russia to test the credibility of Article 5 by launching direct or indirect attacks against a NATO country. I think there are good reasons to contend that the war on Ukraine is not an end in itself, that Russia is pursuing a grand design of disrupting NATO and weakening the EU through the war on Ukraine, but also through hybrid warfare in Europe. And on the top of that, the military and geopolitical context does not look good. I mean, in Ukraine, the situation on the front is deteriorating and everyday life is extremely complicated in an increasing number of cities. And Washington's commitment to European security and to Ukraine's sovereignty cannot be taken for granted anymore. And so, in this context, the idea in Paris has been to act swiftly and decisively. And this is why after the incident in the Oval Office earlier this year, London and Paris pushed a debate on security guarantees. It led to the creation of a coalition of the willing to offer Ukraine some security guarantees in case of a ceasefire.

Host: Well, we're going to come to that in a minute. So, if I may, I'd also like to ask what role pro-Putin populism is playing across the continent in dividing or undermining Brussels.

Susan Stewart: I think it's a very serious problem. I mean, we have to say that populism is not necessarily pro-Putin, but often it can be because populists try to provide simplistic answers to complex problems. And one way of doing that is often to assign Russia a role in a European security order that is completely unrealistic to make it out as a sort of future potential partner in this order. So, I think that what we see is a trend toward ever more populism. And these populist parties are also gaining strength in many countries. And if we have a kind of flipping of the government to a more populist trend in a variety of European EU member states, then we could see a reversal of this set of preferences that we found in our report.

Host: Kai-Olaf?

Kai-Olaf Lang: I would say it's a broader phenomenon. Of course, this kind of pro-Russian sentiments are part of the political culture and of party politics in some member states. But I think it's also the growth of anti-Western illiberal sentiments, not explicitly pro-Putin, but indirectly having overlaps and sort of having doubt about the strength of the West. And the third element, particularly in countries close to Ukraine, in some societies, there is a growing, say, anti-Ukrainian or Ukrainian skeptic posture. We see it, for example, in Poland, where the new president who was elected this year, who is certainly someone who is very bold and critical about Russia, no doubt, but he has not met his Ukrainian counterpart, Zelensky, so far. And looking at the Polish media, he said it would be a good idea if Zelensky came to Poland and to express his gratitude for the support and the solidarity of the Polish nation to Ukraine, also pointing at historical issues between both countries and so on. So I think it's a mixture of these elements. What I think is important at the beginning, we were talking about possible differences between member states of NATO and in the European Union when it comes to the approach vis-a-vis Russia. But there are also considerable differences within countries.

Host: Well, France being one of them, Céline.

Céline Marangé: I think that populism is on the rise in Europe for many reasons. In my view, this is one of the consequences of the digital revolution as well. But what is important to bear in mind is that the Russian secret services are not only exploiting populism, they are promoting populism across Europe with disinformation campaigns and other hybrid tools. I mean, in Russian strategic thinking, non-military indirect means a law to achieve strategic goals. Coercion and subversion are the two faces of the same coin. And so they are using an enhanced version of the Soviet playbook against our societies to stir up tensions, to fan the flames of mistrust, and in the end, delegitimize democracy. And I think that the development of artificial intelligence will give them new tools to target specific audiences forces and develop deepfakes, I mean, sophisticated deepfakes. And this is a real long-lasting challenge for democracy.

Host: This brings me on to populism to the west of us. Europe is very much between a rock and a hard place with war to its east and an unpredictable partner in the White House to the west. Ukraine is looking to join and reinforce Europe's security order. But traditionally, this has relied upon the backing of the United States. To what extent is this still an option? And what are the viable alternatives? Kai-Olaf?

Kai-Olaf Lang: I wouldn't say it is not an option. It's a necessity. Despite all the uncertainties and question marks coming from the U.S. and the grand reorientation which has taken place during the last years and which will certainly continue, irrespective of who lives in the White House, I think when we look to capacities, to nuclear capabilities and other issues, it's quite clear that in the current situation, Europe will not be able to defend itself. I think the interesting political question is what to do with this. And I think there is still a sort of broader consensus that there should be a sort of reinforced Euro-Atlantic commitment. That means strengthening the European pillar of NATO or the European dimension of transatlantic relations, but not to weaken the bonds with the U.S., but to strengthen them. For some countries, like Poland, they say if the U.S., for whichever reasons, tries to decrease their commitment for Europe, then we will try to strengthen our bilateral ties, our special relationship, whereas other countries might say now this is the European moment, and I think Celine knows this better than I do. In France, the old kind of idea of Gaulism, that means to emancipate Europe for Russia, might now revitalize in a completely new kind of geopolitical context.

Host: Well, that brings us on to some of the minilateral groups that appear to be forming. Susan, what's your view on the kind of alternatives that are forming or additions that are forming in terms of minilateral groups within Europe?

Susan Stewart: So I think what's happening is that there's still a desire on the part of almost all actors to have NATO and the EU as sort of the pillars of an upcoming European security order and to retain the U.S. as much as possible in that order. But the problem is that it's clear already for a while, even before this current Trump administration that the U.S. intends to reduce its security footprint in Europe, and that it's already happening. So I think that it's a question, again, of tempo. How quickly will this happen? Will it happen in an orderly fashion? So I think the attempts need to be in the direction of having it be in a more predictable manner rather than in some kind of sudden fashion. And where the minilateral formats come in or these ad hoc formats is to kind of bridge the time when certain organizations are perhaps paralyzed because they need consensus or they need unanimity to function in certain ways. And we don't have the time to wait for that unanimity to come together. So it's necessary for those countries that are like-minded to work together in certain fields. And I think for that it can be very useful as a supplement. And it could be that we get to a point where the big organizations are in some way blocked and we have to resort to a combination of these minilateral groups. But that is not the hope. The hope is that they will somehow work in synergy with each other, the big ones and the smaller ones.

Kai-Olaf Lang: I think it's a period of testing. So the Europeans try to establish different forms and formats. And they are quite diverse. So you have, for example, the Nordic-Baltic aid groups, which is really very operative. So they do much for regional security and they have very palpable projects in order to support Ukraine. Then we have more diplomatic formats like what is called Weimar Plus, so the heavyweights of Europe, France, Germany, Poland, Italy, the UK, which is not an EU state, but it's also important in this matter. Then we have informal, I would say, contact groups, the guys who went to meet Trump before his meeting with Zelensky, for example. So it's still not really clear. An important function might be to include Ukraine, these minilateral formats. Most of the members are in EU and NATO. But they could have this sort of bridging function because what is important, I think, also for our topic, European security architecture, European security order, Zelensky and the Ukrainian side, they try to present themselves as an indispensable component of the emerging new security arrangement in Europe. Remember Zelensky's statement that Ukraine has 110 brigades, Western Europe, 82 brigades, and Russia has 220. So I don't want to go in the military nitty gritty. I'm not an expert on that. But I think the general message was that Ukraine combined with Western Europe's military capabilities equals to Russia. And you need us in order to defend yourself from Russia. And he didn't include the U.S. in this kind of new equation.

Host: Well, you bring me actually to the question of rearmament and that side of security architecture. Russian rearmament outpaces that of Germany, for instance, many, many times over, too many times to say without inducing anxiety. Recent studies are accurate. Where is the so-called Zeitenwende? I don't mean just the German one, but across the continent. And to cite the title of the study again, if this is a tipping point, isn't time of the essence, even when it comes to rearmament? Susan?

Susan Stewart: I think time is of the essence. I think there is a Zeitenwende, not only in the sort of descriptive sense, but also in the sense of actions. I think we've seen that increasingly across the continent and also on the level of Brussels. But I do think it's been slower than needed. I think if you look at analyses that try to reconstruct what could have happened in 2022, if there had been a much more concerted effort at that time also with the U.S. to support Ukraine, that we would be in a very different place right now. But for us, the tipping point was the discovery that actually a critical mass of those European actors shaping European security have now embraced the idea that Ukraine is part of this security order and belongs to this security order and, in fact, can contribute to it and not only a country that demands sort of protection of its own security, but, as Kai-Olaf was just alluding to in terms of Zelensky's comments, can even be a security provider for Europe at a later point and that Russia is a country that, for the foreseeable future, will remain outside the security order. So we believe that tipping point has already been passed and we're already in this new phase where this is what we are working toward.

Host: Céline, in your view, where is the Zeitenwende and is it happening quickly enough?

Céline Marangé: I don't think it's happening quickly enough. The dangers coming from Moscow are mounting and coalescing. Russia has managed to rearm and adapt rapidly. It sustains high recruitment in the army. It is militarizing children and teenagers within the Union Army. 1.7 million children in Russia undertake military training. Russia should not be underestimated. This is a real challenge, but it should not be overestimated either. It's why economy shows signs of slowdown, inflation is high, stagflation is looming. So the situation is not alarming. I would not say that, but I think that we need to understand that the threat is real.

Host: Kai-Olaf, where do you stand on tempo?

Kai-Olaf Lang: I think we have, looking in particular countries, but also around Europe, a Zeitenwende of different speeds. The fact that Zeitenwende is a multidimensional process. It's about energy. It's about defense spending. It's about reinforcing the armed forces and so on and so forth. The tempo is different in these special domains, but also, of course, between countries it differs. I think this has to do with threat perception, because I think in most European countries, Russia is seen as a threat, even as a growing threat. But only in a couple of countries, it's seen as an existential threat. And then you still have some where Russia is not a threat at all. They say it's at least far distant, and the threat is an escalation of the conflict, so we have to do appeasement anyway. It's a minority, no doubt. But this all kind of brings about how strong the determination is, how much you want to spend on defense. And it's not only Hungary and Slovakia. That's also, for example, Spain, which has an exemption in NATO for defense spending, because their assessment of what is dangerous is quite different than that in the Baltic states.

Host: Well, and very briefly, if I may, I'd like to get a sense now from you all of how confident you are in Europe's ability, obviously with the additional pillars of security architecture, but in Europe's ability to stand up to Russia. How is this going to pan out, Céline?

Céline Marangé: I'm quite confident in Europe's ability to stand up to Russia and to withstand the pressure because we have no choice and because Ukrainians set up the example, because freedom and democracy are common goods that need to be defended. But the challenges ahead are not easy to overcome.

Susan Stewart: I think that Europe may be more robust than it believes it is, in the sense that, indeed, Ukraine was also not expecting such a full-scale invasion and has responded to it in a very robust manner. Unfortunately, it seems that Europe or many actors within Europe, because there are so many other challenges to be faced in parallel, it will only be at the point where we will really have to face a major crisis and perhaps with a military component that we will have the answer to this question. But at least our findings show that there is this majority of actors that has the preference of having a different European security order where Europe, in fact, does take significantly more responsibility for its own security together with Ukraine.

Kai-Olaf Lang: The tragedy of Ukraine and the doubts about the reliability of U.S. when it comes to European security have been strong impulses for Europe to do more for its own security and for its defense. So I think we run a good way and it will be important to have a sort of coalition, informal leadership coalition with Germany, with France, with the U.K. and with Poland at its heart, which keeps this process on track.

Host: So while it's clear that the majority of European countries are working to prevent a forever war in Ukraine, Russia's threat to Western democracy, peace and prosperity on the continent is set to remain and meaning that Europe must strengthen its deterrence capabilities. I imagine we'll return to the studio to continue this discussion. But for now, I'd like to thank our guests, Céline Marangé, Susan Stewart and Kai-Olaf Lang for their astute analysis today and for presenting some of the findings of their latest publication. You can find a link to the joint study in the podcast show notes. And if you like what you hear, you can subscribe to us in the usual places, including on Spotify and Apple. You can also keep up to date with the latest analyses from SWP on Blue Sky and on LinkedIn. Today's episode was brought to you by our editor, Maya Dähne, and by me, your host, and of course, by our guests. So until next time, it's goodbye from all of us here in the SWP studio. Goodbye. Goodbye. See you next time. Thank you very much for tuning in.