China’s Claim to a New World Order

Relevance for Germany and Europe

Against this backdrop, the SCO summit and Xi Jinping’s announcement of the GGI hold significant relevance for Germany and Europe. Mechanisms and organisations led by China can no longer be dismissed as mere “talking shops”. Under Xi, the CPC leadership has steadily expanded its con­vening power. The term refers to China’s capacity to bring together diverse states and groups on a regular basis to deliberate on specific issues. This form of soft power differs from formal leadership. Instead, it provides ostensibly “neutral” platforms for dialogue and produces flexible agreements without imposing universal normative con­ditions. It is a type of leadership that does not impose universal (normative) conditions. Convening power thus enables leadership without responsibility, as illustrated by China’s unwillingness to hold partners (e.g. Russia) accountable for actions like the war in Ukraine. In today’s interregnum of global order – marked by fragmenting power relations and the erosion of traditional structures that once ensured stability – such convening power has grown increasingly im­portant. The current interregnum creates openings for Beijing to position itself as a responsible and inclusive broker of the international order, or even as promoting its redesign. A case in point is the framing of the SCO as an embodiment of “real multilateralism” (真正多边主义, zhenzheng duobian zhuyi), based on equality among states and defined in contrast to US hegemony and Western double standards.

Xi’s tendency to make sweeping policy announcements, especially in the realm of foreign affairs, can no longer be dismissed as the repetition of “empty concepts”. Behind China’s global initiatives lie not only coherent narratives, but also hard-nosed interest-based politics. As Xi re­af­firmed at the SCO summit, Beijing’s central objective is to reshape the global governance system. In practical terms, this in­volves adapting the UN framework to Chi­nese preferences while embedding its own principles, including its legal interpretations. This is not a distant prospect but a process already underway. Over the past five years, Xi has articulated and consolidated this vision through four global ini­tiatives – on development, security, civili­sation, and governance – which feature prominently in his summit speeches, bi­lateral meetings, and (inter)national public diplomacy efforts, and are often supported by Chinese think tanks. It is at the inter­section of convening power and discursive power that this influence becomes most visible. The effects of discursive power are already evident, particularly in the con­struction of an independent international discourse system that redefines the idea of international law as well as concepts such as development and technology policy.

China’s New Imperial Quality

China’s discourse and practices under Xi display imperial qualities. Here, “imperial” is understood less in a strictly military-expansionist sense and more as referring to the subtle production of centre-periphery relationships that contribute to maintaining the autonomy and security of the CPC. In this framework, the CPC and, geographically, the People’s Republic of China con­stitutes the centre. The peripheries, by contrast, are not necessarily defined by national borders or geographic proximity. Instead, they take the form of smaller, varied spheres of influence. A case in point is the control Chinese actors exert over digital, economic, and financial infrastructures in other states, as well as over trans­national supply and value chains.

The SCO summit reflects various facets of this new form of imperiality. Foremost is China’s expanding influence over the eco­nomic and infrastructural frameworks of regional states, facilitated by Chinese finan­cial support. A prominent example is the proposed SCO Development Bank, designed to allow both sanctioned and non-sanc­tioned member states to channel funds through a multilateral institution denominated in renminbi (RMB). Complementing this initiative, Beijing has pledged an addi­tional 10 billion RMB in loans to the mem­ber banks of the SCO Interbank Consortium (SCO IBC) over the next three years. Xi has also offered SCO states the possibility of adopting China’s BeiDou satellite navigation system as an alternative to US-con­trolled Global Positioning Systems (GPS), thereby further extending Chinese tech­nological influence.

The second facet of China’s new imperiality lies in its strategic cultivation of informal access to SCO member states, particularly to political and economic elites willing to grant Chinese actors partial control over national or local economic processes. Recur­ring meetings on the sidelines of the SCO summits (or other China-plus-x formats) fur­ther consolidate transnational ties between Chinese companies and local part­ners. Additional business-oriented mechanisms within the SCO reinforce this dyna­mic. For example, on 17 July 2025 six weeks prior to the Tianjin summit, the SCO Busi­ness Forum convened some 400 business and government representatives, with dis­cus­sions centred on the green transformation of the energy sector – which was also a key summit theme. Shortly thereafter on 6 Sep­tember, SCO economic ministers reconvened in Vladivostok to consolidate the summit’s results. Alongside these events, a proliferation of consortia and forums within the SCO has provided regular platforms for interac­tion among a wide range of actors, deepen­ing China’s influence across multiple levels.

The third facet of Beijing’s new imperiality is its effort to build an ever-expanding network of bilateral partnerships. The ob­jec­tive is not to forge formal alliances, but rather to extend differentiated privileges to selected partners. These may include finan­cial contributions to institutions, such as the SCO Development Bank or SCO IBC, or preferential access to technologies developed under SCO environmental cooperation. This makes bilateral meetings at multi­lateral summits especially significant for the Chinese government. In practice, China frequently employs a “divide and rule” strategy, supplanting traditional bal­ance-of-power politics. The benefits for Beijing are not always immediately measur­able. At times, they manifest through sym­bolic gestures, such as when states endorse the “One China principle”, which Beijing seeks to entrench as an international norm. The support of this principle by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan made on the sidelines of the summit following the announcement of a strategic partnership with China, illustrates this tendency.

The fourth facet of China’s imperiality is its success in spreading ideas and persuading others to adopt them. China’s foreign policy concepts, particularly the Global Initiatives, exhibit a notable degree of inter­nal coherence. At the SCO summit, Xi un­derscored his vision of reshaping the world order, with a central focus on transforming the UN system and thereby altering the global framework within which international politics unfolds. This effort can also be read as an attempt to legitimize China’s actions in the South China Sea, Taiwan, the Arctic, and in various technological domains.

Lessons for Germany and Europe

It becomes evident that Germany and Europe must adopt a broader perspective on China. At present, engagement is largely structured around three core areas. First, both the European Union (EU) and Ger­many seek to uphold the principles of fair trade. New EU instruments, such as anti-subsidy and anti-dumping tariffs or the regulation on third-country subsidies, are also designed to counter unfair Chinese practices. German and European representatives also consistently raise the issue of limited market access for European com­panies in China. Concessions, however, remain rare: Whenever restrictions are eased, new regulatory hurdles for foreign firms typically emerge. Second, unilateral dependencies must be identified and reduced. Above all, this applies to China’s near-monopoly in processing critical raw materials and its global dominance in the battery supply chain. Third, German and European policymakers repeatedly high­light close ties between China and Russia, criticizing both the political rapprochement between the two states and Beijing’s toler­ance of dual-use exports to Russia. These three core areas are central to safeguarding German and European interests, as clear prioritisation would enable more effective use of limited capacities and resources.

However, there is a danger that the global-strategic perspective may be ne­glected in Europe’s approach to China. Con­centrating too narrowly on the three core areas – already complex in themselves – risks obscuring the broader picture. Put differently, the forest (China’s global ambi­tions and emerging imperial posture) may be overlooked for the trees (three core areas). The challenge for German and Euro­pean policymakers is not to play these priorities against one another, but to pur­sue them while at the same time considering China’s global strategic significance.

Xi’s initiatives are already shaping the principles of the current interregnum. Ger­many and Europe cannot afford nostalgia for the liberal order of the past, as central elements of that order are being redefined or supplanted by Beijing. While China for­mally supports an “international law-based international order”, it seeks to reinterpret international law in ways that serve its own interests and to introduce new principles, such as the obligation to recognize the “legiti­mate security concerns” of all states, even when these infringe on the sovereignty of others. For Germany and Europe, the current interregnum poses a fundamental challenge of deciding which elements of the rules-based order should be defended or renewed. Engagement with China’s ideas and initiatives is closely linked to this chal­lenge. Bilateral relations remain important, but they must be complemented by sus­tained, strategically anchored engagement with Chinese discourse and practices on international order. Diplomacy here func­tions not only as negotiation, but also as information gathering strategy. For this reason, German and European representatives, at least at the second and third politi­cal levels, should attend China-initiated summits, while European researchers should participate in public diplomacy events to more assertively project European narratives. Beyond advancing concrete interests, European diplomacy must finally acknowledge China’s global strategic weight.