Environmental policy

How this shapes the key areas of reform is particularly evident in environmental policy. Around 60 per cent of Colombia’s greenhouse gas emissions come from the agriculture, forestry, and other land use (AFOLU) sector. Deforestation, forest degradation, and extensive livestock farm­ing are major drivers. The extreme concentration of land ownership and insecure land titles have fuelled the armed conflict between the state, guerrilla groups, paramilitary groups, and criminal networks for decades. This hinders forest conservation, ecosystem-based adaptation, renew­able energy projects, and the development of alternative sources of income. Petro’s land reform is therefore also essential for the implementation of his environmental, climate, and energy policies.

This implementation is to be ensured through measures such as the ratification of the Escazú Agreement, which aims to strengthen participation and legal protection in environmental matters, the pro­tection of environmental and human rights defenders, and the expansion of protected areas as well as the formalised powers of indigenous authorities. Deforestation fell by just over 54 per cent between 2021 and 2023, reaching its lowest level since records began. However, the renewed increase in 2024 highlights that progress remains fragile and that the structural drivers of forest loss have not yet been sustainably curbed.

Climate policy

With its long-term climate strategy, pub­lished in 2021, Colombia committed to achieving carbon neutrality by 2050. In September 2025, the country submitted its updated nationally determined contribution (NDC) for the period up to 2035 to the United Nations (UN), thereby further speci­fying the government’s path to carbon neutrality by 2050 under the Paris Agree­ment. The existing target for 2030 – a 51 per cent reduction compared with the business-as-usual scenario – is supplemented by an emissions corridor for 2035: Colombia aims to have limited its greenhouse gas emissions to between 155 and 161 million tonnes of CO₂ equivalent per year by then. The updated NDC brings together mitigation, adaptation, and bio­diversity targets more closely under the guiding principle of a socio-ecological transformation. It also sets out specific steps for developing a roadmap towards a gradual phase-out of fossil fuels and the removal of fossil fuel subsidies; plans include, for example, a subsidy inventory and reform proposals by 2027, as well as the publication of the roadmap by 2029.

Energy policy

The Petro government began developing the concept of a just energy transition in late 2022 through a nationwide dialogue process and subsequently set it out in the “Roadmap for a Just Energy Transition”. The National Development Plan 2022–2026 translates this approach into concrete programmes, including energy communities that enable municipalities to produce renewable energy in a decentralised manner. In addition, the government is focusing on programmes to replace fire­wood in households, energy efficiency measures, the electrification of transport, and the “Colombia Solar” programme. The latter combines relief for low-income households with a decentralised energy supply and the generation of electricity from renewable sources. This is achieved by channelling some of the electricity subsidies for low-income households into investments in solar installations. At the same time, the government has reaffirmed its stance on fossil fuels: No new exploration contracts for coal, oil and gas will be awarded, although existing contracts remain in force. By addressing the supply side of fossil fuels at a policy level, Colom­bia occupies a unique position among the countries of the Global South that export fossil fuels.

The expansion of renewable energy is progressing at varying speeds. Solar energy and decentralised projects have grown significantly; the share of non-conventional renewable energy sources in Colombia’s electricity mix has risen sharply since 2022. By the end of 2024, installed solar capacity stood at 1.9 gigawatts, accounting for around 9 per cent of the country’s installed electricity generation capacity. At the same time, the expansion of large-scale wind energy projects is proceeding slowly, par­ticularly in the department of La Guajira. The reasons include grid bottlenecks, regu­latory uncertainties, insufficient consultation processes, and conflicts with the Wayúu communities living there over territory, the distribution of benefits, and cultural impacts. Hydropower remains vulnerable to shortfalls in rainfall.

Regional dependence on coal, particularly in the departments of Cesar and La Guajira, where employment and municipal revenue remain heavily tied to the coal sector, is proving difficult to overcome. Economic diversification and the development of viable alternatives to coal – such as new supply chain segments, tourism, green hydrogen, and renewable energy – have so far remained fragmented overall and cannot replace export earnings and govern­ment revenue from fossil fuels in the short term. In addition to a lack of investment and regulatory uncertainties, unresolved questions of land rights and participation, as well as limited local capacities, are preventing economies of scale.

Concrete progress is evident in the field of electric mobility: Tax and regulatory incentives have been established and, most recently, clarified. Between January and May 2025 alone, 6,153 new electric vehicles were registered in Colombia, an increase of 252 per cent compared with the same period of the previous year. Bogotá is also among the cities with the largest fleets of electric buses in Latin America. The govern­ment has taken initial steps towards phas­ing out subsidies for fossil fuels, primarily through adjustments to the Fuel Price Stabi­lisation Fund (FEPC) and through – albeit highly controversial – proposals to reduce diesel subsidies.

The financing factor

The implementation of Petro’s agenda depends largely on access to finance. Given the difficult fiscal situation, the Colombian government remained heavily reliant on revenue from fossil fuels during his term in office. Colombia requires substantial addi­tional investment for the energy transition, adaptation to climate change, and socio-ecological transformation that far exceeds the state’s fiscal capacity (equivalent to 7–10 per cent of GDP annually until 2030). Through a country platform centred on a portfolio of prioritised projects, the govern­ment is seeking to pool financing for this transition. The projects require US$40 billion; the country platform is intended to mobilise funds from development banks, private investors, and international part­ners. In addition, the phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies is intended to create fiscal space. So far, however, the platform has not yet secured the level of external financing and risk mitigation needed to implement Petro’s transformation agenda.

Current priorities

The EU is Colombia’s third-largest trading partner and, after the United States, its second-largest source of foreign direct investment. In 2023, Germany and Colom­bia signed a bilateral Partnership for Climate Action and a Just Energy Transition. The partnership focuses on expanding renew­able energy, protecting the environment and biodiversity, and promoting sustainable urban development. To this end, the German government pledged up to €200 million in funding to Colombia. Germany is involved in the Colombian peace process, and Colom­bia is one of the three bilateral partners of the Federal Ministry for Economic Co­operation and Development (BMZ) in Latin America.

Regardless of the election result, Colombia remains an important partner for Germany and the EU. In 2025, the EU and Colombia agreed to launch negotiations on a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which is to cover, among other things, climate and the environment, renewable energy, security, and the fight against drug trafficking and organised crime. The frame­work for cooperation on climate and energy policy is provided by the Joint Declaration on the Environment, Climate Action and Sustainable Development, signed in 2022, and the high-level dialogue based on it. The EU and Colombia are working closely together in the UN climate negotiations.

For the period 2021–2027, the EU is providing Colombia with at least 106 million euros, which is intended to mobilise larger investments under the Global Gateway strategy. The investment package covers areas crucial to Petro’s reform agenda, such as renewable energy, green hydrogen, and regional electricity integration. In addition, the EU supports sustainable financing instruments (such as the implementation and further development of the green taxonomy), combating deforestation, pro­moting the circular economy, and strengthening sustainable value chains.

Other key areas of cooperation include the expansion of the Bogotá metro and the establishment and expansion of local electric bus manufacturing. Regional EU programmes such as Euroclima and AL-INVEST Verde complement this cooperation through regulatory advice, capacity-building, innovation support, and tech­nology transfer. Since 2024, the European Investment Bank (EIB) has translated its support for the just energy transition, pledged at COP27, into concrete action through loans for electric mobility, elec­tricity grids, renewable electricity gene­ration, and solar projects.

However, viewed as a whole, the cooperation falls short of its potential strategic significance. The EU is perceived by Colom­bian partners as a fragmented, hesitant actor with only limited strategic visibility. Financing often only materialises once projects are already well advanced; the EU has little presence during the early, high-risk phases, when project development, permits, consultation, social safeguards, and initial guarantees are required. Further­more, the EU has as yet failed to make a quantified commitment to Colombia’s country platform. From a Colombian per­spective, the Global Gateway procedures are also difficult to navigate: It is not always clear which institution is responsible for what, how projects are prioritised, or how local stakeholders are involved. On the European side, a lack of coordination between EU institutions and member states hinders strategic coordination (see SWP-Aktuell 67/2024). From a European perspec­tive, cooperation suffers from high staff turnover and delays on the Colombian side, as well as uncertainty regarding administrative continuity.

Recommendations to Germany and the EU for reliable implementation

For Germany and the EU, cooperation with Colombia following the change of government depends less on new formats than on implementing what has already been agreed in a (more) reliable manner. A clearer proposal from Team Europe should align existing instruments, such as the Global Gateway, more closely with Colombia’s country platform. There should be a limited number of projects jointly prioritised with Colombia, along with clear lines of respon­sibility between the European Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS), the member states, the EIB, and implementing bodies. In addition to greater coherence, the aim should be, above all, the ability to act sooner, better alignment with Colombian priorities, and transparency regarding financing.

Germany and the EU should prioritise supporting Colombia in implementing those elements of the “Roadmap for a Just Energy Transition” and the existing trans­formation portfolio that remain compatible with changing political priorities. The way the transition is shaped at the local and social levels will help determine whether Petro’s reform agenda can be sustained politically. In view of the impending change of government, European cooperation should aim to specifically safeguard these dimensions. Indigenous, Afro-Colom­bian, and rural communities must be involved at an early stage and granted substantive rights. Consultation alone is not enough. In Cesar and La Guajira, Germany and the EU should support regional just-transition approaches that combine skills development, social infrastructure, and alternative value creation, while also involving local small and medium-sized enterprises.

To generate results more quickly and make them diplomatically visible, focus should be placed on the pragmatic expan­sion of existing areas of cooperation: renewable energy, public transport, com­bating deforestation, and the intersections between environmental policy, organised crime, and the illegal economy. In terms of industrial policy, Germany and the EU should prioritise sectors where demand, regulation, and initial capacity already exist in Colombia, such as public electric mobility, charging infrastructure, grid tech­nology, and selected supplier segments. German and European financing should in earlier and assume more risks. Grants, guarantees, blended finance and project preparation funding could support early-stage projects and help crowd in additional investment.

It remains to be seen whether Bogotá, under de la Espriella, will remain among those states that support the international TAFF process. At the very least, it is unlikely that Colombia will continue to play an international leadership role in the process following the change of government. This makes it all the more important to anchor cooperation with Colombia in existing commitments and frameworks and to ensure that issues relating to the socially just phasing out of fossil fuels continue to be incorporated into the high-level dialogue with Colombia. For German and European climate and energy diplomacy, this means that the continuation of the TAFF debate will depend more heavily on other partners – in particular the Netherlands, Tuvalu, Ireland, and Brazil. Broader involvement of relevant non-state actors and institutional embedding should be taken into account from the outset. It is important to link this plurilateral dynamic over the long term to the UN climate process and the second global stocktake.

For Germany and the EU, there is more at stake than the success of bilateral cooperation: If they succeed in transforming what has so far been rather piecemeal cooperation into a more coherent, resilient, and more firmly locally rooted partnership, German and European climate and energy diplomacy would gain credibility with coun­tries that export fossil fuels. Furthermore, this would underpin the commitment to ensuring that the global energy transition is carried out in a socially just manner. Both would also provide a clear argument for advancing the international debate on a just transition away from fossil fuels.