The Trump Factor, China, and the Limits of “ASEAN Centrality”

Although Trump’s participation remained uncertain until the last moment, his an­nounce­ment of his attendance already shifted some of the summit’s dynamics and priorities. By unexpectedly announcing his intention to attend the ceremonial signing of a peace agreement between Thailand and Cambodia, the US President introduced an issue that few observers had anticipated regarding the summit’s agenda. Shortly before, the two conflicting parties were still far from reaching an agreement. Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul had initially rejected the proposed agreement and was not interested in US sponsorship. Nonetheless, Trump’s involvement moved the nego­tiations forward, and he further insisted that the Chinese delegation be excluded from the signing ceremony. This ensured that media attention focused entirely on Trump’s role asa mediator.

The long-standing border conflict be­tween Thailand and Cambodia, particularly in the area surrounding the Preah Vihear temple, reignited in May. Violent clashes occurred between border patrols, escalating at the end of July 2025 when both sides employed heavy artillery and Thailand used fighter jets. Hundreds of thousands fled the border region. In response, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim sought to serve as the mediator between the two par­ties. Trump eventually increased political pres­sure by threatening to suspend any nego­tiations on lowering US tariffs on imports from Cambodia and Thailand for as long as the hostilities continued. After days of in­tense fighting, a ceasefire was agreed, followed by the conclusion of negotiations with the US on tariff reductions. While Washington’s pressure certainly played a role, the primary mediation was carried out by Malaysia as ASEAN Chair. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet nonetheless praised Trump’s “extraordinary statesmanship” and even nominated him for the Nobel Peace Prize.

Trump’s presence at the summit was also significant in the context of the escalating US-China trade conflict. On 9 October 2025, Beijing announced stricter export controls on rare earths, to take effect on 1 December. Trump responded by threatening 100 per cent tariffs on Chinese imports. With the new export controls, China applied its own Foreign Direct Product Rule (FDPR) for the first time – a measure originally intro­duced by the US in 1959 and previously used mainly to restrict semiconductor exports to China. In effect, China mirrored the US’ approach and applied it against its originator. Given that China controls ap­proximately 80 per cent of global production and 90 per cent of processing of rare earths, the Chinese export controls could have significant geopolitical and security consequences for the US and many other countries, as shortages of rare earths would negatively affect key components of the defence industry.

On the sidelines of the ASEAN summit, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer, and Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng held talks aimed at de-escalating the US-China trade dispute. These discussions also influenced the summit’s dynamics. A negotiated Frame­work Agreement was interpreted by both sides as a sign of mutual goodwill, signifi­cantly reducing the risk of escalation. Sub­sequently, the US announced that it would withdraw the 100 per cent tariffs imposed on China, while China stated that it would postpone the planned export controls by one year. The meeting also served as prepa­ration for the personal meeting between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping at the APEC summit in early November in South Korea.

This was met with relief among the ASEAN states, as China and the US are their two most important trading partners. More­over, as a result of the US-China trade con­flict, the US had pressured all countries in the region to limit their economic relations with China. At the same time, Southeast Asian markets were flooded with inexpensive Chinese consumer goods that could no longer enter the US due to higher tariffs, placing local producers under pressure. Had China carried out its threatened export restrictions on rare earths, the consequences would have been damaging not only for the US, but also for ASEAN states.

The “Trump factor” largely shaped the sum­mit due to the Sino-American rivalry, highlighting the limits of the principle of “ASEAN Centrality”. While ASEAN success­fully exercised its convening power and attracted high-level participants, major po­litical processes important to Southeast Asia occurred on the margins of the summit with­out the participation of ASEAN members.

In areas that received considerably less international attention, ASEAN nonetheless achieved notable successes. These include the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA 3.0) and the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Competition (AFAC), adopted in September. ACFTA 3.0, long delayed, has increased eco­nomic relations between ASEAN and China. The agreement’s main priorities are the digital economy, “green transformation”, and the connectivity of regional supply chains. It also foresees the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers and the harmonisation of technical standards. ACFTA 3.0 is expected to increase Chinese investment in these sectors and shift certain production processes to ASEAN states. Furthermore, the agreement is intended to provide Southeast Asian goods with expanded access to the Chinese market, particularly in electronics, pharmaceuticals, and “green energy”, as well as agricultural products and raw materials. In doing so, China also sought to present itself as a reliable partner of ASEAN, in con­trast to the US.

AFAC aims to strengthen cooperation and coordination among the relevant national authorities of ASEAN member states. De­spite an existing ASEAN free trade agree­ment, the share of intra-ASEAN trade in goods remained relatively low for several decades. In 2023, intra-ASEAN trade amounted to US$769.9 billion, whereas trade among EU member states totalled US$4.135 trillion in the same year. Many ASEAN member states conduct far more trade with partners outside Southeast Asia, primarily with China and the US, than with partners within ASEAN. Intra-ASEAN trade accounted for only 21.2 per cent of the bloc’s total trade volume, compared with over 60 per cent for the EU.

Integration Despite Divergence: Timor-Leste Joins ASEAN

One of the highlights of this year’s ASEAN Summit was the formal accession of Timor-Leste to ASEAN, following more than two decades of debate. Shortly after Timor-Leste’s independence in 2002, the country’s political leadership, which emerged from a national liberation movement that had fought against Indonesian occupation, placed stronger regional integration on its agenda, with ASEAN membership as the primary instrument. Since 2005, Timor-Leste had participated in the ASEAN Regional Forum, a multilateral forum for security cooperation that includes the 10 ASEAN member states as well as 17 additional part­ners, including the EU. In 2007, Timor-Leste signed the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Co­operation (TAC) and submitted a formal mem­bership application in 2011.

Timor-Leste’s accession process has been long and arduous: President José Ramos-Horta sarcastically described that “the road to ASEAN is more difficult than the road to heaven”. Several member states had long expressed reservations about Timor-Leste’s membership, despite the country having fulfilled the ASEAN Charter’s accession cri­teria since 2014. Concerns centred on its lim­ited economic development and lack of ad­ministrative capacity to meet the obligations of membership, as well as the openness with which Timorese politicians addressed human rights violations and democratic deficits in the region – actions that some ASEAN mem­bers perceived as interference in domes­tic affairs. Conversely, ASEAN mem­bership has enjoyed cross-party support in Timor-Leste since independence.

With a population of only 1.4 million, Timor-Leste is the smallest and poorest member of the regional organisation. As of 2024, 33.7 per cent of the population is under the age of fifteen years, and the lit­eracy rate stands at 72 per cent. After 450 years of Portuguese colonial rule and 24 years of Indonesian occupation, the country became fully independent in 2002 follow­ing a UN-administered referendum in 1999. Timor-Leste is considered the only liberal democracy in Southeast Asia according to common indices. Despite or perhaps be­cause of its small size and limited economic capacity, the government has consistently championed democracy, human rights, and international law on the international stage. For instance, following the military coup in Myanmar in 2021, Timor-Leste was the only state in the region to recognise the demo­cratic opposition, the National Unity Gov­ernment (NUG), as the legitimate government, leading to significant tensions with the military junta. In the context of the South China Sea conflict, involving China, Taiwan, and four ASEAN states (Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei) over territorial claims and control of islands, reefs, shoals, and exclusive economic zones, Timor-Leste actively advocates for the ad­herence to international law. Given its recent history, this position is unsurprising, as a UN-led transition process ended Indo­nesian occupation and enabled independence. In terms of democratic norms and adherence to international law, Timor-Leste’s positions are expected to align closely with those of the EU and most of its mem­ber states in the future. Interest in the new member within Europe remains limited: For example, Germany has no embassy in Dili, and bilateral development cooperation was discontinued in 2023.

Economically, Timor-Leste remains highly dependent on the exploitation and export of offshore oil and gas resources, which finance nearly the entire state budget. Its main economic partner is China – par­ticularly through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – a consequence of the declining engagement of the US and other Western donor countries. China has also been in­stru­mental in developing the country’s severely underdeveloped infrastructure. Other key trading partners include neigh­bouring Indonesia and Australia, as well as Japan and South Korea.

In foreign policy, Timor-Leste maintains neutrality while traditionally fostering close political ties with the US and US allies – es­pecially Australia – as well as with ASEAN members such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Viet­nam, and the Philippines. This partly ex­plains why Timor-Leste was able to join ASEAN despite reservations from some mem­bers. Its accession provides an opportunity to curb Chinese influence to some degree through stronger regional integration, including participation in the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and the Regional Compre­hensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), currently the world’s largest free trade agreement.

Timor-Leste’s accession presents a challenge for ASEAN, not least because of the country’s limited material capacities. At the same time, however, it also offers opportunities to deepen regional integration and serves as a testament to ASEAN’s continuing appeal as a regional organisation.

Is ASEAN Still Relevant?

Despite the successful expansion of ASEAN with the recent admission of Timor-Leste, doubts about the organisation’s effectiveness have grown over the years – both within and beyond ASEAN. The reasons for this are manifold and include structural as well as institutional factors that directly affect ASEAN’s ability to respond to current practical challenges. The summit did not address these issues. The structural factors primarily stem from the heterogeneity of ASEAN member states. The organisation includes: a liberal democracy, namely Timor-Leste; defective or illiberal democracies such as Indonesia and the Philippines; hybrid regimes such as Singapore, which combine democratic and authoritarian ele­ments; Leninist one-party systems (Vietnam and Laos); military dictatorships (Myanmar); and absolute monarchies (Brunei). Economic disparities among members are equally pronounced: Timor-Leste is one of the poor­est countries in the world, while Singapore ranks among the wealthiest. Many ASEAN members are also structurally dependent on China and/or the US. This applies not only to economic and trade policy matters, but also to issues of technology and defence policy. These structural asymmetries and the resulting divergence of interests among members continue to impede regional inte­gration and cooperation.

Among the institutional factors that constrain ASEAN’s effectiveness is its low degree of institutionalisation. Unlike the EU, ASEAN does not possess supranational institutions but is organised as an intergovern­mental body; its members therefore retain full national sovereignty. Consequently, there are no binding enforcement mechanisms or overarching institutions to ensure that member states comply with jointly adopted decisions. The ASEAN Sec­re­tariat in Jakarta serves only a coordinating role and holds no decision-making author­ity. Another limiting factor is the so-called “ASEAN Way”, which rests on the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, the prohibition of inter-state use of force, and decision-mak­ing by consensus. The consensus principle has allowed member states to block policies they found objectionable, even when a major­ity of members supported them. The principle of non-interference has likewise made it exceedingly difficult for ASEAN to contribute to the resolution of intra-regional problems such as violent internal conflicts.

Structural and institutional factors alike shape ASEAN’s handling of current chal­lenges. Since decisions must be taken unani­mously, individual members can block the adoption of common positions. This occur­red, for example, in the case of territorial disputes in the South China Sea, involving four ASEAN members on one side and China on the other: Cambodia and Laos prevented ASEAN from taking a position perceived as too critical of China. Divergent national interests have also prevented ASEAN from issuing joint statements on extra-regional conflicts, such as those in Gaza or Ukraine.

Observers see ASEAN’s weakness most clearly in its failure to respond effectively to the civil war in Myanmar following the 2021 military coup. Members sympathetic to the military regime– citing the prin­ciples of consensus and non-interference – were able to block a more robust stance toward the junta, even though it had vio­lated core ASEAN principles. In spring 2021, ASEAN member states agreed on a Five-Point Consensus (which included, among other meas­ures, a ceasefire), to which the Myan­mar junta also consented. The military regime, however, subsequently ignored the agreement and ASEAN lacks the means to enforce its implementation. Divisions among ASEAN members over the Myanmar crisis were also evident at the Kuala Lumpur sum­mit: Elections announced by the junta for December 2025, which were scheduled to take place amid an ongoing nationwide civil war and without the opposition’s participation, were merely “taken note of”. These elections, which are widely expected to be neither free nor fair, were not criticised. Although ASEAN rejected the junta’s pro­posal to invite ASEAN election observers in order to lend legitimacy to the vote, mem­ber states were nevertheless told that they were “free to send observers” individually.

ASEAN likewise played no significant role in the border conflict between Cam­bodia and Thailand. Rather, as noted earlier, it was Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim whose diplomatic initiative, sup­ported by pressure from Washington, brought the parties to the negotiating table. In response to the tariffs imposed by US Presi­dent Trump under his self-proclaimed “Liberation Day”, which affected all ASEAN members to varying degrees, ASEAN mem­ber states initially agreed to respond “joint­ly” against the US. Yet just a day later, several states began bilateral negotiations with Washington on separate tariff arrangements.

ASEAN’s continued relevance for Germany and the EU will likely depend above all on in its “convening power”. Due to its recognised neutrality in the US-China great-power rivalry and its inclusive multilateralism, ASEAN provides a platform for dia­logue and conflict management. The Kuala Lum­pur summit underscored this role through its contribution to de-escalation in the Sino-American trade dispute. Moreover, ASEAN remains an important partner in promoting multilateralism and rules-based international cooperation. The strategic partnership estab­lished with the EU in 2020 provides a broad foundation for such cooperation.

ASEAN members such as Vietnam, Malay­sia, and Thailand offer key production, logis­tics, and investment locations for Ger­man and European companies pursuing diversification strategies (“China Plus One Strategy”) aimed at reducing their dependence on China. In general, Southeast Asia is likely to continue to gain political signifi­cance, due to the growing economic weight of its members and the region’s strategic location as a central arena of US-China rivalry in Asia.

For these reasons – and because ASEAN seeks to deepen regional integration and enhance cooperation with external part­ners, including those in Europe – the orga­ni­sation, and many of its member states in particular, will remain important partners for Germany and the EU. Both Timor-Leste’s accession and the EU’s first-ever invitation to attend an ASEAN summit further under­score ASEAN’s ongoing significance.