The Creeping Integration of Far-right Parties in Europe

Fragmentation within the ‘far-right’ camp

The far-right camp remains highly frag­mented at the European level. The ECR group, which is considered “moderate”, represents national conservative and “soft” Eurosceptic positions. Founded in 2009, it emerged from a cooperation initiative between the UK’s Conservative Party and Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) party. Over the years, it has expanded to include national-conservative and EU-critical par­ties but does not present itself as a political force radically opposed to European inte­gration. Rather, it is critical of the current political course of EU institutions, which it believes are pursuing a federalist agenda that undermines the sovereignty of the member states.

During previous legislative periods of the EP, the ECR group often played a co­operative role. Its member parties, includ­ing Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy (Fra­telli d’Italia) party and Poland’s PiS, voted with the EPP on many issues and managed to project an image of being able to work with other forces in the parliament. How­ever, their national-conservative orientation is clearly evident on issues such as migra­tion, equality and the rule of law; and this makes it difficult to clearly distinguish the ECR from the PfE and ESN groups in terms of substance.

Post-Brexit, the “hard Euroscepticism” advocated by large parts of the PfE group is aimed predominantly not at leaving the EU but at fundamentally reversing European integration. The ultimate goal is to signifi­cantly curtail the powers of the European Commission and the European Parliament and return to a Europe that is organised primarily on an intergovernmental basis and engages in economic cooperation only. Internally, the group is influenced by large member parties such as Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz and France’s National Rally (Rassemblement National) under Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella.

At the same time, the PfE group is in­creasingly showing willingness to transition from fundamental opposition to playing an active role in policymaking – for example, by filling the post of rapporteur for the negotiations on setting the new climate tar­get for 2040. For its part, the ESN group, which includes some right-wing extremist parties, has maintained the character of an “AfD plus” group that is unable to gain any real significance in the EP owing to its fun­damental opposition role and small size.

Gains at the national level

Besides political shifts at the European level, it is, above all, national dynamics that determine the extent of the influence that political parties wield within the EU system. This is evident not least when far-right par­ties either assume government responsibility or gain blocking positions, as the new Polish president is currently able to do. But even if far-right actors at the national level fall short of gaining executive power, their stronger presence in the national parlia­ment can bolster their influence to such an extent that it eventually has an impact at the EU level. This is particularly the case in those Member States where far-right parties are the leading opposition force, as indicated by opinion polls or parliamentary strength, such as in France or Germany, as they exert considerable influence on the discourse on European policy.

As of September 2025, far-right parties head the governments of four member states – Belgium, Italy, the Czech Republic and Hungary. The parties in power in Bel­gium (N-VA) and the Czech Republic (ODS) belong to the more moderate wing of the ECR. Hungary is the exception among the four member states that have far-right par­ties at the head of government: its ruling Fidesz party belongs to the PfE group of the EP. In five member states – Bulgaria, Fin­land, Italy, Croatia and Slovakia – far-right parties serve as junior partners in government coalitions, while the Sweden Demo­crats party (ECR) has been supporting that country’s minority government since 2022. Slovakia is a special case: a far-right party (SNS) that is not represented in the EP serves as junior partner in the government of Prime Minister Robert Fico and his origi­nally left-wing party, Smer. The latter, which was expelled from the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) group of the EP, is moving increasingly to the fringes of the political spectrum. And since Geert Wilders’s PVV left the Dutch ruling coalition, the only EU member state to have a government with a PfE or ESN party as coalition partner is Italy with the Lega (PfE). Thus, one third of all member-state governments are either led or sup­ported by far-right parties.

Also evident from the party-political com­position of the member-state governments is the significance of the EPP group: in seven of the nine countries in which far-right forces are part of the government – the two exceptions are Slovakia and Hun­gary – EPP parties are included in the gov­erning coalition.

Looking ahead, a systematic analysis of the national elections that are due to take place within the EU by the end of 2027 shows that the following is likely to be par­ticularly relevant: in the Czech Republic ANO (PfE) is leading in the polls ahead of the elections due in early October 2025. Unlike the ODS (ECR), ANO has sought to join forces with Orbán’s Fidesz and, together with Slovakia, a new far-right Visegrád trio could be formed (without, for the time being, the participation of Poland). It is equally conceivable, however, that there will be a countervailing trend in Hungary: after many years of dominating the domestic political landscape, Fidesz is currently polling in second place in the run-up to national parliamentary elections due to take place in April 2026. The year 2027 is likely to be particularly important: presidential elections are due in France, where the National Rally is clearly in the lead. In Spain, Vox (PfE) is currently the third-strongest force; and in Poland, the PiS (ECR) is once again polling neck and neck with Donald Tusk’s Civic Coalition (EPP). Thus, there could be significant political change in three of the largest and most in­fluential members states in 2027, resulting in the increased influence of the far right in governing coalitions across Europe. At the same time, this would coincide with the critical phase of negotiations on the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), affecting political stability at the EU level.

Influence at the EU level

Despite the growing electoral success of far-right parties and their increased participation in governments at the national level, this has not yet translated into equal influ­ence at the European level. There are two conflicting principles at work here.

On the one hand, owing to the dual legitimacy endowed by the member states and their citizens, the EU is geared towards integrating as all major political forces as far as possible and making as many deci­sions as possible by consensus or through broad majorities. The aim is to avoid struc­tural minorities and ensure that there is broad-based democratic legitimacy across the EU, which remains very heterogeneous. It is only the EP that is based on the pure majority principle; but even here, it is usual for oversized and frequently changing majorities that cover the broad democratic spectrum to be formed.

On the other hand, because of their experiences during World War II, many European societies have developed a cordon sanitaire around far-right parties. Accordingly, despite their growing electoral suc­cess, these forces were long excluded from European consensus democracy; before the early 2020s, they were rarely involved in national governments. Thus, they have been of little relevance for the Council sys­tem and were excluded from the formation of majorities in the European Parliament. With those forces now gaining influence at both the national and European level, this is beginning to change: their increased par­ticipation in the EU institutions is already evident.

Increasing integration into the EU

Overall, the integration of parts of the far right into the EU’s political system is already well advanced and continues to grow. The member parties of the ECR, in particular, are now treated as normal political actors in many areas: in the European Council, in the Council of the EU, in the European Commission and as part of changing major­ities in the EP. This normalisation can be attributed to the EPP parties, which increas­ingly find common ground with the ECR on industrial and climate policy issues. For their part, the Social Democrats, the Greens and the Liberals have a very different atti­tude towards loosening the cordon sanitaire and are much more critical of cooperation with ECR parties.

This attempt at institutional differentiation regarding the cordon sanitaire is likely to be particularly challenging because of the blurred dividing line between the ECR and the more radical or extreme forces. Several member parties of the ECR formerly belonged to the part of the ID, while parts of the PfE were formerly members of the ECR. And because the boundaries are so fluid, integration into the EU institutions encompasses the broader far-right spectrum: Viktor Orbán influences every deci­sion in the European Council through his vetoes. Although governments with far-right parties have not formed a group in the Council of the EU, those forces are also regularly involved in the decisions made by this body. Most important, however, is that alternative majorities without centre-left parties are possible in the EP only if the ECR and the PfE agree.

Three factors determine how significant this integration is for EU policy. First, as is so often the case in the EU, the different decision-making procedures play an impor­tant role. If unanimity applies in the Euro­pean Council or Council of the EU, all na­tional governments must ultimately agree. While the political reality is that the power of the respective national governments varies depending on their political and eco­nomic weight, the lowest common denomi­nator will necessarily include governments led by far-right parties when major Euro­pean decisions are being made. But if quali­fied majority voting applies and the EP is in­volved, the co-decision rights are more dif­fuse. In this case, individual governments led by far-right parties can be outvoted or have to compromise more, whereas in the EP itself the influence of far-right groups depends on how the majorities are formed.

The second factor is the extent to which the various far-right parties are politically united at the European level, both as repre­sentatives of national governments and in the EP. This is particularly evident in for­eign and security policy – not least with regard to Russia, Ukraine and China. While MEPs from the PfE and the ESN often oppose the pro-European parliamentary majority in this area, the ECR is clearly willing to align itself with the centre-right (see SWP Com­ment 8/2024). There are also considerable differences in economic policy between the libertarian and protectionist approaches, but these do not necessarily run along the ECR-PfE axis. The similarities are greater on issues related to culture wars and, above all, on climate and migration policy.

The third factor is the overlap with the political positions and behaviour of the EPP. Whether at the national level or in the EP, it is usually the case that far-right parties obtain majorities and thus political power only with the support or as junior partners of the centre-right. As a result, their influence at the EU level is strongest when they can offer the EPP the option of forming alternative majorities and the latter is ready and willing to do so. In the current legislative period, this has not yet happened for fundamental decisions on European integration or foreign, security and defence policy, but it is increasingly happening in the area of economic, climate and migration policy.

Thus, because of its relative strength at both the national and European level, the EPP will play a central role in European integration in the coming years. Its policy and strategic orientation will be decisive in determining whether the EU can continue to rely on a pro-European centre. In the long term, the EPP will have to decide whether and to what extent it wants to carry on playing its tactical game of utilising shifting majorities across the political spectrum. The far-right parties will offer substantive proposals in an attempt to persuade it to make a complete policy change. But if the EPP wants to remain loyal to the pro-Euro­pean camp, it will have to abandon sooner or later its pursuit of an increasingly con­tradictory course of value-based position­ing, on the one hand, and selective major­ity-building with far-right actors, on the other. This is because the growing reser­vations about and tensions vis-à-vis the EPP within the centre-left camp threaten to up­set the existing balance and render the pro-European majority even more fragile.