Competition for Seabed Resources

Internationalisation of seabed and national economic interests

Deep-sea mining opens up a new area of strategic competition between the major powers. Growing demand for resources increases the pressure to exploit marine deposits. In view of the growing interest in commercial exploitation, there is a risk that seabed minerals will become militarised or be extracted unsustainably. This brings the international interest in ocean governance and protection into conflict with the eco­nomic interests of individual nations.

The framework for exploitation of seabed resources is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982, which entered into force in 1994. It has been ratified by 170 states, and is legally binding for signatories of the international community. This has been associated with an internationalisation of the seabed and its subsoil, which is classed as the “common heritage of mankind” (Art. 136 UNCLOS). This means that property and access rights, as well as licensing procedures and environ­mental standards, are subject to the deci­sions of the international community. The United States has refused to sign UNCLOS because it fears that this could infringe on its sovereign rights.

The regulatory framework for the seabed, defined by UNCLOS as “the area”, is governed by the International Seabed Authority (ISA), based in Kingston, Jamaica. All signatories of UNCLOS are ipso facto members of the ISA, which has jurisdiction over approximately 55 per cent of the world’s ocean seabed, while the remaining 45 per cent falls under the jurisdiction of the respective coastal states (as exclusive economic zone [EEZ] or continental shelf). Although coastal states are free to grant mining licences in their national waters, these are also subject to the environmental provisions as members of UNCLOS.

Regulated exploitation of seabed resources beyond the EEZs will require sec­toral mining codes for the different types of material. This is being done by the ISA in a multi-stakeholder process encompassing the interests of states, companies, science and civil society. The resulting regulations, which must cover licensing, environmental protection, liability and financing, are cor­respondingly complex. Drafting of a regu­latory framework was originally scheduled to be completed by 2020, but the multi­plicity tasks and interests has prevented consensus being reached. A breakthrough is now expected in 2025.

Exploration of manganese nodule deposits is still under technical development. The mining equipment must be largely main­tenance-free and will require major invest­ment and incur considerable operating ex­penses, while the costs of processing tech­nologies are still difficult to estimate. An­other problem for the economic exploita­tion is the sometimes complex seabed topography, which still places significant restrictions on the use of mining technologies. Finally, comparative cost comparisons with terrestrial mining and recycling have not yet been completed.

Trump’s executive order

On 24 April 2025, US President Donald Trump issued an executive order “Unleashing America’s Offshore Critical Minerals and Resources”. It included a review of existing licence conditions and the prospect of new licences for seabed exploration and com­mercial extraction, even in areas “outside national jurisdiction” (Sec. 3, a (1)). Under a “one-stop shop” approach, Washington says it wants to be a global leader in the respon­sible exploration of seabed mineral re­sources, including the development of technologies and practices. It also offers to partner with countries that want to develop their own seabed resources.

The presidential decree increases the risk that the United States could ignore the ISA’s rules. Not being a signatory to UNCLOS, it might not feel bound by treaty law and could operate unilaterally. This would mean that deep-sea mining could be pursued commercially outside the rules of (customary) international law. The Brazilian Secretary-General of the ISA, Leticia Reis de Carvalho, therefore called on to the US government “to channel its efforts toward developing a leading role in deep-sea science, technology, and seabed mineral resource activities through the institutional and legal frameworks established by the international community under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, a treaty that enjoys broad global recognition and legitimacy”.

Just five days after Trump issued the ex­ecutive order, The Metals Company USA – the US subsidiary of a Canadian company with strong interests in seabed mining – applied for permission for commercial extraction of deep-seabed minerals under the US Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act (DSHMRA). This suggests that the United States could bypass the ISA, possibly even granting licences for areas beyond its national jurisdiction that overlap with those that are to be allocated by the ISA. The resulting seabed delimitation conflicts are likely to trigger international disputes over raw material governance and ownership of seabed resources. Competing claims could lead to geopolitical friction and dis­putes, turning international waters into an arena of global political rivalry.

The Metals Company’s application is initially limited to commercial extraction in US waters under the DSHMRA. However, the company may intend to expand this later by applying to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA, an agency of the US Department of Com­merce) for licences to explore and com­mercially extract seabed resources outside US waters. The company is primarily inter­ested in manganese nodules, whose exploi­tation is currently only profitable outside US waters, in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone (see below).

The Trump administration’s unilateral approach could end up propelling an inter­national race for resources, as Washington’s rush raises fears that other countries could follow suit.

The competitor: China

Chinese companies already dominate the mining and processing of critical minerals on land. China already accounts for 60 per cent of global production and 85 per cent of processing capacity. Now it has also set its sights on deep-sea lithium and cobalt. Large state investments have catapulted China to the forefront of this new sector, closely followed by Russia and South Korea. It leads both technically and in scale of exploration, with five of the seventeen exploration con­tracts approved by the ISA to date.

Unlike the United States, China has rati­fied UNCLOS and is taking advantage of its opportunity to shape the regulations cur­rently under negotiation. China’s clearly articulated interest in exploiting maritime raw materials has brought it into conflict with the thirty-seven states that support a moratorium on commercial deep-sea min­ing until the deep-sea ecosystem is better understood.

Beijing’s political pressure to adopt rules for commercial exploitation as soon as possible seems to be driven by the maxim “first come, first served”. China clearly wants to showcase its technological capabil­ities, gain economic advantages and under­line its status as a maritime power. Military interests linked to China’s drive for mari­time expansion are also likely to play a role. For example, dual-use technologies used in autonomous underwater vehicles to mea­sure ocean currents can also serve to con­duct kinetic strikes.

China is taking a strategic approach and forming alliances with island states – most recently with the Cook Islands – to explore and possibly extract their deep-sea mineral deposits. The Pacific nation of Kiribati is also reportedly considering a deep-sea min­ing partnership with China. This could give China access to a huge area in the Pacific Ocean, after Kiribati and The Metals Com­pany of Canada “mutually agreed” to termi­nate their cooperation at the end of 2024.

The way China’s involvement in deep-sea mining blurs the lines between scientific research, commercial exploitation and geo­political advantage is a cause for concern for many countries considering cooperating with Beijing. There is also an internal contradiction in China’s positions: on the one hand, it is interested in massive ex­ploitation; on the other, it also joins the majority of developing countries in sup­porting environmental regulations. Bei­jing’s argument that it is seeking to update outdated regulatory systems shaped by the industrialised countries is not widely shared by developing countries. Instead, China is working to create a strategic con­sensus among countries that support the exploitation of maritime raw materials. To this end, it is promoting scientific and technological exchange through the estab­lishment of transnational cooperation platforms, for example with Russia, South Korea, Japan and India.

Trials in the Clarion‑Clipperton Zone

The Clarion-Clipperton Zone (CCZ) is an abyssal plain in the central Pacific Ocean, between Hawaii and Mexico. It covers an area of 4.5 million square kilometres – as wide as the continental United States and half the size of Canada – and reaches depths of 4,000 to 5,500 metres. The zone is characterised by seamounts and rich deposits of nodules. In some places up to 60 per cent of the seabed is said to be covered with manganese nodules, which explains the great interest in exploiting the area economically and makes it ideal for trials. To date the ISA has only granted ex­ploration licences, but some of the licence-holding states would like to convert them into exploitation licences. However, it has not yet been possible to develop a mining code that strikes the difficult balance be­tween economic interests and environmental protection.

The ISA is responsible for regulating and managing the CCZ. To date, it has awarded seventeen contracts for exploration of poly­metallic nodules in the zone. Each is valid for fifteen years, and together they permit prospecting in an area of 75,000 square kilometres. In accordance with the principle of the “common heritage of mankind”, states may not claim the area or parts thereof as their own territory. When a the licence expires, the area reverts to the ISA. The licence-holders – fourteen state agen­cies and private companies (consortia) – are permitted to explore mining opportunities within their area and assess economic viability and environmental compatibility. They are contractually obliged to collect environmental data and to ensure that the testing of mining equipment does not cause serious damage the marine environment.

The licences were allocated on the basis of the environmental management plan for the CCZ approved by the ISA in July 2012. This takes into account the interests of mining exploration while recognising the designation of additional areas of special environmental interest.

Germany has also acquired an exploration licence, through the Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR) on behalf of the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs. It permits exploration in an area of 75,000 square kilometres in the so-called manganese nodule belt. The BGR planned to test an AI-controlled manganese nodule collector from the US company Impossible Metals in early 2026, although this has now been postponed.

Trump’s presidential decree targets the CCZ, seeking to satisfy American raw mate­rial interests through unilateral licensing, bypassing the ISA. This raises the prospect of competition between the major powers manifesting itself in the CCZ, not least in the form of a “tech cold war” in which control of technological value chains be­comes a “weapon”. The risk of confrontation increases where technological suprem­acy is intertwined with economic and mili­tary dominance. Binding regulations for dependable international cooperation are therefore needed to avoid conflicts on the ocean floor.

Is multilateralism failing in deep‑sea mining?

The ISA is the authoritative body for regu­lat­ing deep-sea mining beyond the EEZ, in other words, in all waters outside national jurisdiction. This means that every state – including the United States – is already free to use its own continental shelf as it pleases.

The triple role of the ISA complicates the search for consensus and could prove to be an obstacle to multilateral agreements on the future of deep-sea mining. Firstly, is the regulatory authority for deep-sea mining and environmental regulations; secondly, it is responsible for issuing the relevant licences and monitoring their implementation; and thirdly, it administers mining royalties and compensation payments to developing countries disadvantaged by deep-sea mining. The ISA’s Legal and Tech­nical Commission drafted an exploitation regime and submitted it to the Council in 2019, but since then, discussions have been bogged down by fundamental differences of opinion.

The search for robust regulations to enable deep-sea mining has so far been blocked by a group of thirty-seven countries led by France and Germany, which are calling for a moratorium until greater clarity about the risks has been obtained. Another group of countries (Belgium, China, India, Singapore, South Africa, the United Kingdom and various Pacific states) argues that, in view of the emerging race to exploit seabed resources, their extraction should be regulated as soon as possible.

The German government has always emphasised that it does not intend to sub­mit any exploitation applications until the relevant issues have been clarified. Chan­cellor Friedrich Merz’s coalition has also committed itself to a precautionary pause. But German industry is calling on the government to participate actively in the development of mining codes for seabed minerals.

Since maritime law grants preferential rights to developing countries (UNCLOS Art. 170 and Annex 4), the asymmetry of access to and benefits from deep-sea mining make it difficult to reach quick compromises. This applies in particular to the mining code for manganese nodules, which, as mentioned above, has not yet been agreed. Last but not least, there is disagreement on how to distribute mining royalties, which could be an attractive source of income for many countries. It has also proved difficult to agree rules for the equitable sharing of economic benefits from deep-sea mining outside national jurisdictions. In addition, according to a recent study by the Rand Corporation, it is foreseeable that deep-sea mining will lead to a decline in metal prices, which would result in lower reve­nues from terrestrial mining for developing countries. That decline is likely to be larger than any revenues from seabed mining licencing and associated economic devel­opment programmes.

The first part of the 30th ISA Annual Meeting, from 17 to 28 March 2025, failed to reach a full consensus. In view of this, the Pacific island state of Nauru proposed a “procedure for the consideration of applica­tions for exploitation plans in the absence of adopted exploitation regulations”. The proponent of the exploitation plans, Nauru Ocean Resources Inc. (NORI), intends to sub­mit an application in 2025 for permission to extract 1.5 million tonnes of nodules per year. NORI is a wholly owned subsidiary of The Metals Company, which also supports Washington’s unilateral move to permit nodule mining in international waters. The Metals Company is thus involved in initia­tives both within and outside the UNCLOS framework. This placed the ISA under pressure to reach a decision on the Mining Code during the second part of the con­sultations from 7 to 18 July 2025. However, recognising mounting pressure from both within and outside the ISA, a decision was not reached and the organisation’s Council will continue working on the draft regula­tions for exploitation of deep-sea mineral resources. There is no sign of a decision to initiate a procedure for reviewing an appli­cation in the absence of operating regulations (see Section 1(15)(b) of the Annex to the Agreement on the Implementation of Part XI of the UNCLOS).

Establishing new value chains

The development of deep-sea mining will require a new value chain – from extrac­tion to processed minerals. Refining pro­cesses are likely to change the most, as they will need to be adapted to deep-sea mate­rials, specifically requiring a different supply chain, new smelting technologies and disposal methods for overburden. In June 2022, the United States, together with its G7 partners, launched the Global Infra­structure and Investment Partnership to build clean energy supply chains. They also signed the Partnership for Mineral Security to counter Chinese dominance in this area. On 13 July 2023, the Biden administration announced $32 million to support projects focused on expanding the mining and processing of critical minerals and rare earths. However, this did not include deep-sea mining. The Trump administration has not pursued cooperation on raw materials with its G7 partners (or in its foreign policy in general).

For many countries, especially Pacific island nations, the priority is to develop a sustainable approach to deep-sea mining, in order to profit from the raw materials found on the seabed. This could prove short-sighted, if they fail to take the entire supply chain into account, including the stage of industrial smelting. Exporting manganese nodules to China or the United States for processing and refining is likely to signifi­cantly reduce revenues and entail addi­tional risks, especially as the small states mentioned above could be crushed between the major powers in the “tech cold war”.

The potential impact of increasing com­mercial activity in the deep sea is still large­ly unclear – both in terms of the potential economic benefits and in terms of priorities (economic or military). Due to the great depths involved, the vast extent of the spaces and the limited knowledge available to date, it is very difficult to operate in, monitor and control the deep sea. This applies equally to the ISA and to individual states and groups of states. So far, the EU itself has not been a player at the inter­national level in this area; the member states pursue their national objectives in­depen­dently.

The ultimate aim should be to agree environmental rules for the entire supply chain, not just for extraction (which is the initial priority). The environmental impact of smelting and overburden disposal in terrestrial mining is well known; impact assessments for deep-sea mining are still awaited.

Challenges for national and international ocean diplomacy

As ISA Secretary-General Leticia Reis de Carvalho outlined in her inaugural speech, ocean diplomacy faces major challenges – especially as disputes over deep-sea raw materials become more heated due to developments in geopolitics and industrial policy. The ISA wants to (and must) bring together the interests of a wide range of actors along the supply chain through its “multi-stakeholder” approach. These include governments, which formulate their own strategies to secure economic growth and seek to influence the ISA accordingly; environmental organisations and scientists committed to protecting valuable species and ecosystems; communities whose liveli­hoods depend on the oceans or on the ex­ploitation of terrestrial mineral resources; companies developing plans and technologies for responsible deep-sea mineral extrac­tion; terrestrial mining companies; and economic and ecological researchers.

The ISA intended to finalise its mining code for manganese nodules at its 30th meeting in July 2025, but deliberations will continue in its 31st annual meeting in 2026. It is under pressure – not least due to the actions of the Trump administration – to fulfil its legal and political responsibilities. Apart from the need for institutional reforms and a more strategic approach, the ISA and its member states must adopt regulations and rules that provide answers to key ques­tions. In so doing, they must con­sider the different positions that have emerged, in particular the gap between the group of countries in favour of exploitation and those advocating a moratorium. This de­mands ocean diplomacy that takes account of the geopolitics, but that generates addi­tional problems in reaching a consensus.

While some in the business world see critical raw materials as an instrument of (future) power, such positions ignore the fluid nature of international relations and technological development. They sideline options such as recycling and the circular economy, and especially the search for alternative materials and processes. In extremis, access to raw materials is equated with military power. It is also unclear how profitability, prices and demand for raw materials will develop.

Washington’s initiative to secure critical minerals on the seabed, described by the NOAA as “the next gold rush”, undermines the principle of the “common heritage of mankind”. Yet that principle is widely recognised in the international community, and should continue to guide future Ger­man policy. France and Germany, together with their allies, should continue to pursue the goal of curbing geopolitical competition for control of seabed resources and thus averting lasting damage to the ocean eco­system.