China and East Asia 2004

Japan and the US

The Taiwan issue also sits uneasily among China and Japan, with Tokyo's recent military activities, constitutional debate, and participation in US missile defence, at least from the PRC point of view signalling an involvement in possible Taiwan scenarios. It was thus that early thinking by the new PRC leadership to downtune the traditional "militarist" accusation levied against Japan have come to nothing, a high degree of mutual economic complimentarity notwithstanding (Japan has been China's most important trading partner since 2002.) On the Japanese side, trends towards a multiparty system that would merit the name have also contributed to a higher demand for nationalism with issues such as the Senkaku Islands territorial dispute periodically making it back to the headlines. Lastly, both sides have been involved in a subtle competition for Russian oil and gas and a leading role on economic and security interaction in the wider East Asian region.

Whereas the Clinton administration had somewhat sidestepped an economically stagnant Japan and had at least rhetorically opted for a "strategic partnership" with the PRC, Bush, already prior to the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, had promoted Tokyo to "cornerstone" of its Asia-Pacific strategy. Underlying this decision was the Condoleeza Rice view of China as a "strategic competitor" that had prevailed at least until the EP-3 incident of 1 April 2001. Such rhetorics has disappeared from official statements since September 11, 2001, but the thinking basically lingers on in Pentagon and White House corridors. It was also in a general "anything but Clinton" mould that the Bush administration did away with the former's engagement attempt. In this context, Peking had been more or less free to decide when and how much progress to make over disputed issues such as missile proliferation. September 11 did change the picture to the extent that China somewhat grudgringly accepted its new encirclement by US alliances and military partnerships while trying to make the best of its membership in Bush's anti-terror coalition (although arguably, Russia has been even more cooperative). For the time being, the PRC is being rewarded with a higher level of American tolerance for human rights violations, especially in Northwestern Sinkiang, and Bush administration attempts to downplay a US$ 135 billion trade deficit in the presidential election campaign. Furthermore, some kind of tradeoff among the Taiwan and North Korean issues could still be in the making. At the same time it remains true, however, that US China policies have been subject to US domestic policies and that they have to respond to a broad spectrum of interests that would rule out any linear progress. Peking may not be Washington's most urgent foreign policy concern today, but latent suspicion, uncertainties going along with the PRC's internal development, and ramifications on Hong Kong, Taiwan, and other sectors of the Chinese periphery can easily turn it into such a concern again. Which is why China's nuclear weapon has been strengthened with a view to overcome missile defences. And which is why Japan has been appointed "cornerstone" by the US.