Strategic Threat Analysis and Nuclear (Dis-)Order (STAND)
Geostrategic changes and the deterioration of the German and European security environment over the last decade pose new challenges for Germany's security and defence policy. In the context of Sino-American rivalry and the question of Europe's capacity to act, expectations are growing, including among many partners, for Germany to become more involved and take on more concrete responsibility in the field of security and defence policy.
The research project »Strategic Threat Analysis and Nuclear (Dis-)Order« (STAND) studies the effects of this strategic change on Germany and Europe as well as on German and European security and defence policy. In particular, the project analyses:
- Current threats and security risks for Germany and Europe;
- As well as changes in the nuclear order in the context of growing great power rivalry.
Examining these questions is particularly relevant now as both NATO and the EU revise their respective strategic documents in 2021/2022. Threat analysis is a key element of both processes; issues of nuclear deterrence will be discussed in the NATO context. Both documents will significantly shape Germany's security policy and thus require active participation.
Against this background, the project aims to provide research-based and policy-relevant expertise to:
- Enhance understanding of Germany’s existing threat environment, taking into account new challenges such as China early on,
- Enable an enhanced debate about nuclear order that embeds arms control strategically,
- As well as to define Germany's priorities in the context of NATO’s strategic reorientation and help shape this process.
This project is supported with a grant from the German Federal Ministry of Defence (BMVg).
Publications
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US Extended Nuclear Deterrence in Europe: Three Scenarios
Crisis of Trust, Breach of Trust and Full Disengagement
SWP Comment 2025/C 32, 10.07.2025, 7 Pagesdoi:10.18449/2025C32
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Russian Nuclear Weapons in Space?
Potential Destructive Consequences in Space, Escalation on Earth, and Damage to Arms Control
SWP Comment 2025/C 21, 15.05.2025, 8 Pagesdoi:10.18449/2025C21
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North Korea’s Arms Policy as an Indirect Security Threat to Europe
How Pyongyang Expands its Partnerships with Moscow and Tehran
SWP Comment 2024/C 49, 21.10.2024, 4 Pagesdoi:10.18449/2024C49
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Trump II and US Nuclear Assurances in the Indo-Pacific
Why Australia, Japan, and South Korea Have Other Concerns
SWP Comment 2024/C 36, 21.08.2024, 7 Pagesdoi:10.18449/2024C36
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Significant and Sound: US Medium-Range Missiles in Germany
SWP Comment 2024/C 30, 29.07.2024, 4 Pagesdoi:10.18449/2024C30
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Trump II and US Nuclear Assurances to NATO
Policy Options Instead of Alarmism
SWP Comment 2024/C 17, 25.04.2024, 7 Pagesdoi:10.18449/2024C17
Project management
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Areas of Expertise
- Arms control
- Nato
- Transatlantic relations
- Weapons of mass destruction / proliferation
Project staff
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Dr. Jonas Schneider
International Security (Deputy Head of Research Division)
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Juliana Süß, M.A.
International Security (Associate)
Research Cluster Cybersecurity and Digital PolicyAreas of Expertise
- Space policy
Projects
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What is Moscow trying to achieve with its nuclear threats? One year after the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, an SWP analysis reveals that the Kremlin has been pursuing a three-pronged intimidation strategy in this video of the STAND project.