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People sit in front of a large stage where a man is speaking.

Antonio Guterres, United Nations Secretary-General, speaks at the U.N. Climate Summit in Baku (COP29)

International Climate Policy

More than ten years after the adoption of the 2015 Paris Agreement, international climate policy has moved from rule-making to implementation. One of the agreement’s goals is to limit the increase in global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, ideally to 1.5°C.

Under the Paris Agreement, the parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) have committed to submitting nationally determined contributions (NDCs), which they are expected to make progressively more ambitious. The first global stocktake, completed at COP28 in Dubai in 2023, once again highlighted significant ambition and implementation gaps in efforts to achieve the long-term temperature goal. Even the third generation of NDCs, which includes targets for the period up to 2035, has so far done little to raise the global level of ambition. Taken together, these commitments put the world on a warming trajectory towards approximately 2.8°C above pre-industrial levels by the end of the century.

Efforts in Belém to further specify the transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems—agreed upon at COP28—also encountered obstacles. The consensus principle and the continued formal distinction between industrialised and developing countries make it easier for individual fossil fuel-producing parties to block stronger commitments.

Even after the adoption of the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NCQG) at COP29, financing issues remain the central fault line between developing and emerging economies on the one hand and developed nations on the other. Numerous traditional donors are cutting their development budgets. It is therefore increasingly uncertain how the new climate finance target of at least $300 billion annually starting in 2035 will be achieved and, beyond that, how private funds on the scale of $1.3 trillion will be mobilised. Multiple crises, geopolitical upheavals, and disputes over global justice further complicate international climate negotiations.

Climate Foreign Policy in a new Geopolitical Setting

International climate policy and the global energy transition are increasingly intertwined with industrial and trade policy decisions, as well as with competition for technologies, raw materials, and markets. This is intensifying geopolitical rivalries, particularly evident in the competition between so-called “petrostates” and “electrostates”. While the former continue to base their economic and political power on the production and export of fossil fuels, the latter are gaining influence through their positions in clean technology markets and value chains.

In early 2026, the United States (US) once again withdrew from the Paris Agreement and also formally declared its withdrawal from the UNFCCC. The Trump administration is systematically seeking to favour fossil fuels through political and economic measures and to assert “energy dominance” through its foreign policy. The US government is also undermining international climate action on multiple levels.

Western countries increasingly view China’s dominant position in green technology markets—particularly those for solar panels, batteries, and electric vehicles—and in rare-earth markets as a security risk. Despite its growing importance for global climate action, Beijing has so far shown no intention of taking on a leadership role in international climate negotiations.

The European Union’s ability to act on the international stage is increasingly constrained. The late submission of its own NDC, internal disagreements over its formulation, growing domestic opposition to climate policies, and cuts in international financial support limit its room for action and its credibility. At the same time, European climate, trade, and industrial policy instruments, such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), are having far-reaching effects in non-EU countries. The CBAM has faced opposition from partner countries, especially in cases where economic and development policy implications are not sufficiently taken into account. So far, it has been accompanied by only limited diplomatic engagement, complementary financing, and technical cooperation to help affected partner countries adapt their production processes.

New Coalitations and Partnerships

Although climate negotiations are reaching their limits, the UNFCCC process remains indispensable for setting common goals, making progress transparent, and holding countries accountable. However, growing political momentum is being generated outside the UNFCCC process—through smaller coalitions, plurilateral initiatives, trade relations, and bilateral partnerships. As a result, international climate policy is becoming more fragmented.

In this evolving international landscape, middle powers are gaining in importance. Countries such as Brazil are leveraging their economic clout, raw material resources, and diplomatic standing to shape international negotiation agendas, form coalitions, and exert greater influence over the terms of climate, energy, and industrial partnerships.

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