Project rationale

The starting point of the research project is a shared structural problem. Both the European Union (EU) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) are advanced manufacturing economies with sophisticated defence industries, but neither controls all stages of the supply chains required to field and sustain military capabilities. A defence-industrial supply chain extends from extraction and processing of raw materials through component and subsystem manufacturing, system integration, testing and certification, to maintenance, repair, overhaul, spare-parts provision, software support and industrial surge production. It also includes the institutional framework that permits systems to be manufactured and used: export controls, intellectual-property rights, classified-information protection, technical standards, certification procedures and crisis-prioritisation mechanisms. Against this background, EU-ROK defence-industrial cooperation should not only be assessed by the volume of arms sales, but by whether it reduces critical dependencies and improves the ability of both partners to manufacture, sustain and regenerate military capabilities in crisis. The project therefore analyzes whether EU-ROK cooperation can help reduce concentrated dependencies – particularly in China-centred processing of critical materials, advanced electronics and selected chemical inputs – while supporting the EU’s objective of reinforcing its own defence technological and industrial base.

Its central question is:

Under what political, industrial and regulatory conditions can EU-ROK cooperation improve the ability of both sides to manufacture, maintain and replenish defence capabilities?

This question has become more urgent as the EU seeks to rebuild and expand the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base, while South Korea seeks to consolidate its role as a high-value, globally competitive defence-industrial partner.

Emanating from this central question are a number of sub-questions that guide the analysis:

• Which nodes of EU and Korean defence-industrial supply chains are most exposed to external concentration, disruption or coercion?
• Where do China-linked vulnerabilities arise directly, and where do they arise indirectly through processing, electronics, logistics or industrial intermediates?
• How can Korean participation support the EU’s objective of strengthening the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base rather than creating new external dependencies?
• Which sectors are most suitable for early cooperation: critical materials, magnets, defence semiconductors, ammunition, MRO, naval supply chains, industrial cyber resilience or secure technical data?
• What institutional arrangements are needed to enable practical cooperation under the EU–ROK Security and Defence Partnership?
• How should intellectual-property rights, export controls, technical data, certification, local production and crisis-time delivery be addressed in future industrial arrangements?

Research objectives

The project has six interrelated objectives.

1. Define and map defence-industrial supply chains
2. Identify shared EU–ROK vulnerabilities
3. Examine China-linked risks
4. Assess existing EU-ROK cooperation
5. Identify promising fields for industrial cooperation
6. Develop policy options for EU and Korean decision-makers

(made possible by financial support from the Korea Foundation)