The pseudo-constitutional façade of the Duma election

At the closing plenary session of the eighth State Duma on 27 July 2026, Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin praised the harmony within the parliament. He noted that dur­ing the outgoing legislative term, 26 per cent of all successful legislative proposals had been tabled on a cross-party basis, which signified a tripling of that figure compared with the previous convocation. Moreover, 68.5 per cent of all laws passed had been supported by all parliamentary groups. According to Volodin, the Duma had three priorities that it followed in its work: implementing Putin’s government programmes, supporting the “special military operation” in Ukraine and (in last place) representing the interests of the population. Volodin concluded his speech with the words: “There are many parties, but only one Russia.” He went on to chant “Russia – Putin – Victory” several times to a standing ovation from the deputies. For his part, the leader, thus extolled, praised the Duma for its contribution to the “consolidation of national sovereignty” in what he called fateful times. The deputies had fully lived up to their status as “true representatives of the people”. Putin and Volodin provided an accurate description of the role played by the State Duma in the Russian dictatorship. It is not a place where interests are represented; rather, it serves to simulate pluralism and the rule of law while, at the same time, producing legiti­macy through acclamation.

To ensure the Duma can fulfil these func­tions adequately, parliamentary elec­tions at the federal level – like all other elections in the country – have been manipulated ever more systematically since the 2000s. A key indicator of this trend is the constant adapting of electoral legislation to the needs of the Russian autocracy. While the 2020 Constitution formally strengthened the State Duma’s position vis‑à-vis the president, it further restricted the right to stand for election. Candidates for Duma seats are now barred from hold­ing dual citizenship, a residence permit issued by another country or bank accounts abroad. In spring 2020, the seventh State Duma (2016–2021) not only facilitated the implementation of a constitutional reform that was invalid according to the rule of law. It also served as the stage for a political charade that, in effect, annulled Putin’s previous terms in office in order to pave the way for him to serve another two terms (theoretically until 2036).

The eighth State Duma introduced legis­lative amendments that closely intertwined electoral legislation with the state’s repres­sive apparatus. Individuals convicted of “extremism” are now not only barred from standing for election until they have served their sentence or had it quashed; they are also prohibited from running for office for five years thereafter. Similarly, “foreign agents” are barred from standing for elec­tion and can no longer perform any role related to the electoral process. The Russian Ministry of Justice currently includes more than 900 organisations and individuals on its “register of foreign agents”. The number of those accused of “extremism” is not made public. Taken together, the restric­tions affect or threaten thousands of people who are being persecuted by the Russian state, whether in Russia or in exile, includ­ing the entire political opposition and independent civil society. A photograph posted years ago of the opposition politician Alexei Navalny – who was murdered in 2024 while in custody – is sufficient grounds to be stripped of one’s rights and sent to a penal camp for a long period.

The powers of the Central Electoral Com­mission (CEC), which is headed by one of Putin’s long-standing confidantes, Ella Pamfilova, have been expanded during the eighth State Duma. Since 2023, the institu­tion has been responsible for organising elections under a state of emergency. This means that the regions along the Russian-Ukrainian border and the occupied Ukrai­nian territories can be included in the electoral process, despite the ongoing war. Although the CEC is also responsible for enabling citizens living abroad to take part in elections, Pamfilova declared in mid-August 2026 that people who had turned their backs on Russia and “betrayed” it should “go to hell”. She called on the next State Duma to pass legislation banning the participation in elections of “foreign agents” living abroad.

The CEC has invited 103 states in Russia’s immediate neighbourhood, Asia, Africa and Latin America, as well as 12 non‑Western regional and national organi­sations, to send election observers. The speaker of the Federation Council, Valen­tina Matviyenko, has made the same re­quest to the parliaments of friendly states. The 2018 presidential election was the last election in Russia to which the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) sent an observer mission. Russia is endeavouring to create an alternative system of inter­national election monitoring. At the same time, Golos, which was Russia’s leading independent non-governmental organisation (NGO) in the field of election monitoring, announced its dissolution in 2025 owing to state repression. Moreover, jour­nalists’ access to polling stations was further restricted during the last parliamentary term. In today’s Russia, independent election monitoring or election reporting is impossible.

As part of an amendment to the law regu­lating the use of artificial intelligence in election campaigning, a ban was introduced in May 2026 on the use of AI-generated images and voices of “deceased or fictional persons” during election campaigns. This requirement poses a real threat to all par­ties. The far-right Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) is particularly affected as its profile is inextricably linked to that of its former leader, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who died in 2022. The Com­munist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) campaigns ex­tensively not only through references to the Great Patriotic War but also using images of Lenin, Stalin and other historical figures.

Voting rounds in Russia last three days. That timeframe was introduced in 2020 for the referendum on the new Constitution, the reason cited being the social distancing rules imposed during the Covid-19 pan­demic. In 2021, this arrangement was en­shrined in law as an option and has since been applied in all elections. The extension of the voting period makes it easier to manipulate voter turnout through adminis­trative pressure and to falsify results at local polling stations. Golos documented such interference in all elections held be­tween 2020 and its dissolution five years later. Electronic voting, which will be avail­able in 33 Russian regions from September 2026, opens up similar avenues. Its use has been systematically expanded since 2019 and, with it, the possibility of influencing voter turnout and election results.

Act Three in the fight against the anti-war opposition

Since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, re­pres­sion and manipulation have been geared towards nipping in the bud any opposition to the war. The farcical events surrounding the Yabloko party at the start of the Duma election campaign must be understood as part of a meandering conflict between the Putin dictatorship and that section of the Russian population critical of both the regime and the war. Yabloko was running on a programme that comprised seven objectives: “For peace and freedom! For a life without fear! For a ceasefire agree­ment, diplomacy and peace! Our aim is to prevent a nuclear war! For a Russia free from fear and political repression! For the protection of human life, for respect, digni­ty and well-being! Our goal is a thriving, democratic Russia!” From a Ukrainian per­spective, these slogans would not have con­stituted a basis for peace; but in the Russian context, they made Yabloko the only politi­cal force to openly oppose the war.

Yabloko (Russian for “apple”) has been part of the country’s political landscape since 1993. The liberal party was last rep­resented in the State Duma from 1999 to 2003. Thereafter, like other liberal-demo­cratic forces, it was pushed into political irrelevance by increasing manipulation. In the 2010s, it garnered between 1 per cent and 2 per cent of the vote in Duma and presidential elections. However, Yabloko still holds seats in the regional parliaments of Pskov, Saint Petersburg and Karelia and was therefore able to register for the State Duma election without having to collect signatures nationwide. Other opposition forces have repeatedly accused the party of benefiting from a certain proximity to the Kremlin and thus serving as a liberal fig leaf for the Russian autocracy. Grigory Yavlinsky, a founding member of the party, maintains direct contact with the Russian leader; his last confirmed meeting with Putin took place in October 2023.

But this supposed protective shield has not prevented Yabloko from coming under increasing pressure since 2025. Leading party politicians have been sentenced – in some cases, to several years’ imprisonment – for “discrediting the army”, “using ex­trem­ist symbols” and similar such “of­fences”. Nikolai Rybakov, the party leader, was handed an administrative fine at the end of 2025 for “extremist symbolism” after having expressed his sympathy with Alexei Navalny’s family in a social media post.

When, at the end of July, the CEC autho­rised Yabloko’s participation in the elec­tion, it probably assumed that the party would remain marginal. However, interest in Yabloko soared immediately after its registration, with the number of visits to the party’s website and related internet searches skyrocketing. Sociological studies estimated Yabloko’s potential at between 5 per cent and 20 per cent of the vote. Across the country, people were talking, singing and writing poetry about apples on social media: apples were being depicted, sliced, eaten and declared the favourite fruit. Yulia Navalnaya, Ilya Yashin, Vladi­mir Kara-Murza and other opposition poli­ticians in exile all voiced their support for Yabloko.

This unexpected response set the state’s well-oiled machinery of repression in motion. On 7 August 2026, the pro-estab­lishment parties represented in the Duma – the CPRF, LDPR and A Just Russia – called for Yabloko to be excluded from the election. The same day, an application to the Supreme Court in Moscow was lodged by the far-right party Rodina (Motherland). The allegations, which covered the entire arsenal of repressive laws enacted over the past 15 years, ranged from foreign funding through unauthorised online advertising and copyright infringement, to “extremist statements” and “LGBTIQ propaganda”.

On 10 August, the court ordered that Yabloko be excluded from taking part in the election. The presiding judge was Vyacheslav Kirillov, who has also been responsible for, among other things, the 2021 ban on the Russian human rights organisation Memorial International. From this smorgasbord of allegations, he selected “foreign funding, advertising financed out­side the election campaign fund and copy­right infringements” as the grounds for his ruling. Outside the courthouse, around 500 people, most of whom were young, protested in support of Yabloko. One week later, on 17 August, the court rejected the party’s appeal. Protests broke out once again, this time resulting in dozens of arrests. The CEC ordered Yabloko to be removed from the ballot papers but did not alter the numbering of the other parties. United Russia, which remains in the num­ber one slot, is now followed by the LDPR in third place. Also on 17 August, Lev Shlos­berg, Yabloko’s deputy chairman, was sen­tenced in Pskov to 11 years and one month in a penal colony on charges of “repeatedly discrediting the armed forces”, “spreading disinformation about the war” and viola­tions of the law on “foreign agents”.

Yabloko has been dealt a severe blow and the party’s future is uncertain. After the election, the Kremlin could pursue the allegations of extremism brought against Yabloko, criminalise the party and have it banned. Or it could continue to exclude Yabloko candidates one by one from national and regional elections. This would mean that by 2028, after seven years with­out participating in elections, the party would lose the legal basis for its existence.

The Yabloko episode shows that, amid the tensions within the country, the poten­tial for political mobilisation around anti-war positions is rising rather than falling – and that the Kremlin has misjudged the situation once again. This is now the third such incident since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in 2022. In the early days of the invasion, the regime crushed the burgeoning anti-war movement in the country. Two years later, Boris Nadezhdin and Yekaterina Duntsova were barred from the 2024 presidential election; both had intended to stand on an anti-war platform and had similarly caused quite a stir (see SWP-Comment 9/2024).

In summer 2026, Nadezhdin and his party, the Citizens’ Initiative, made another electoral bid by attempting to stand in the Duma election. He was declared a “foreign agent” in July and fled to France in early August. With every flare-up of social oppo­sition to the war, the state tightens the screw of repression a little further. From the Kremlin’s perspective, the risk asso­ciated with holding elections persists. But for the time being, the regime – or rather Putin as central decision-maker – appears keen to stick with them, not least to signal that the situation in the country remains stable.

Pluralism by the grace of the Kremlin: The systemic parties

Over two decades, the Kremlin has shaped a “party system” designed to simulate repre­sentativeness. The state administration con­trols this system by playing all the parties off against one another and ensuring the dominance of the ruling party, United Russia. Following the exclusion of Yabloko, it is only the five “systemic parties” already represented in the parliament – out of the 11 parties originally registered for the Duma election – that stand any chance of being admitted to the next Duma.

The end of simulated pluralism

Now in its fifth year, the “special military operation” is pushing the simulated plural­ism in the Russian State Duma to its limits. The full-scale war against Ukraine is gen­erating massive pressure to conform. Mean­while, the regime-controlled opposition parties are finding it increasingly difficult to distinguish themselves from the ruling United Russia party, which is as unpopular as it is omnipresent. None of the parties bound by Putin’s war policy is in a position to address the growing discontent among the population. The exclusion of Yabloko from the September 2026 election means that the segment of the population critical of the war is once again deprived of the opportunity to express their views at the ballot box. And the same can be assumed for that segment of the population at the other end of the political spectrum – those for whom Putin’s war strategy does not go far enough. The regime continues to have only one response to the growing domestic pressure: it is tightening its dictatorial grip on power so that it can carry on waging its war without compromise.

As regards voter turnout and the result for United Russia, the presidential administration has lowered its expectations since the start of the year from 55 per cent to 50 per cent and from 60 per cent to 45 per cent, respectively. In 2021, turnout for the election to the eighth State Duma stood at 51.7 per cent, according to official figures, while Golos put the actual turnout at no more than 38 per cent. Given the crisis-ridden mood in the country, it is likely that the people will be even less willing to go to the polls now. In a survey conducted in July 2026 by the commercial social and opinion research centre Russian Field, 27 per cent of respondents did not believe that any of the parties had satisfactory plans for the country’s future. Another 31 per cent felt unable to answer the question at all. On the basis of these figures, it is already clear that the representativeness and legitimacy of the ninth State Duma will be close to zero.

The next Russian parliament will be in an even worse position than its predecessors to simulate pluralism. Having tailored the Duma elections and the party system to its own needs for the past 20 years, the Putin regime is now undermining itself at a time of full-scale war. The Kremlin will probably stick to holding elections to avoid openly transitioning to a dictatorship. The State Duma, however, can no longer fulfil its function as a source of legitimacy for the Putin regime; the gap between the regime and the population has become too wide for that. For its part, the state is gradually shutting off all the valves through which discontent could be channelled. In doing so, it is depriving itself of the ability to gauge and assess social discontent. If dom­estic political tensions continue to rise, the system could well reach breaking point.