Military-Patriotic Education in Russia

Main objectives: Loyalty and recruitment

The key elements of military-patriotic education in Russia are the interpretation of the country’s history as a permanent, glorious defensive struggle against external threats (primarily from the West), its self-image as a besieged fortress and the glorifi­cation of its military. At the same time, the existence of an independent Russian “civili­sation” is postulated – one that stands in clear contrast with Western liberal values. Further, the Russian canon includes tradi­tional ideas of family, sacrifice, heroism and loyalty to the leadership, whereby the interests of the individual are to be sub­ordinated to those of the community.

The Russian leadership is pursuing three goals in the area of military-patriotic educa­tion. First, it wants to ensure the loyalty of the younger generation to the regime and thus secure its own long-term future. For the Kremlin, it is not enough that young people generally support its domestic and foreign policy; rather, it should also be pos­sible to mobilise them for specific projects initiated by the regime and thereby instil something more than mere conformist thinking. The war against Ukraine and the confrontation with Europe play a central role here. At a press conference on 14 De­cem­ber 2023, Putin cited an alleged quote from Bismarck according to which “wars are won not by generals but by teachers and priests”. Putin noted that Bismarck was “ab­solutely right” and commented: “Educating young people in the spirit of patriotism … is crucial.”

For teaching staff and older youths loyal to the regime, the new measures make it easier to identify regime critics, increasing the ability of the state to target individuals for repression. For example, Rospatriot­tsentr, which forms part of the state youth agency, conducts profiling tests on young people aged 12–18 to identify “leadership and anti-leadership figures”. In the occu­pied territories of Ukraine, the programmes also serve to eradicate the Ukrainian iden­tity of children and young people and edu­cate them to be loyal citizens of Russia.

Second, patriotic-military activities can be used to identify loyal young cadres for the regime and promote them accordingly. For example, the “Movement of the First” organises a competition called “Be, Don’t Seem To Be!” in which mentors aged 16 and above can participate and prove they are in line with the system. The career platform “Russia – Land of Opportunities”, estab­lished by the Presidential Administration in 2018, regularly holds competitions for future leaders at the “Senezh” training centre. One of the most prominent rising stars is Olga Zanko, who, in 2015, co-founded the organisation “Victory Volunteers ” at the age of 25. Six years later, in 2021, Zanko became a State Duma deputy.

Third, the programmes serve the purpose of recruiting young people for the military. In order to reach the target of 1.5 million men and women serving in Russia’s armed forces and to recruit enough personnel for the war against Ukraine, the regime is mak­ing sure that schoolchildren are taught basic military skills, a positive image of the armed forces is promoted and values such as sacrifice and heroism are instilled. The aim is to raise a militarised generation for whom army service and war are normal aspects of daily life. In addition, the mili­tary-patriotic programmes facilitate the involvement of war veterans in the regime’s activities, for example, through school visits. The return from Ukraine of hundreds of thousands of men who have experienced violence firsthand and, in some cases, have become accustomed to earning a good wage presents a challenge to Putin’s system. Deploying those individuals as multipliers of the military-patriotic education of the next generation is one way of ensuring they feel appreciated and enjoy both prestige and an income.

Besides its usefulness for the system, mili­tary-patriotic education in Russia has an ideological component. While Article 13 of the Russian Constitution prohibits the establishment of a state ideology, it is none­theless the case that elements of such an ideology have emerged during Putin’s rule. Military-patriotic measures in the educational sphere can be seen as having con­trib­uted to this. Thus, the Russian leadership is increasingly resurrecting certain fundamental characteristics of the Soviet system, even though it was precisely this development that Article 13 was intended to prevent.

Diversity of measures

The regime relies on various measures for the implementation of its military-patriotic education policy. These differ in terms of nature (compulsory or voluntary), content focus and target group (age and/or gender).

Some measures are obligatory for all school children and university students. They are based on a uniform curriculum. At the same time, there is a whole range of extracurricular activities on offer. While these are formally optional, implicit pres­sure from the system and certain practical considerations, such as the lack of alternative childcare, limit the individual’s free­dom of choice. The extracurricular activities allow the focus to be turned on a range of topics, which means that children and young people are ostensibly able to choose from among the narrowly defined ideological options and the net can therefore be cast as wide as possible. At the same time, young Russians are constantly exposed to similar content through other channels, such as pop culture and the gaming sphere.

Until the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s military-patriotic education was aimed primarily at schoolchildren, teen­agers and young adults. In October 2024, however, Putin pushed for similar activities to take place in kindergartens, including receiving visits from veterans, participating in parades and being introduced to the offi­cial propaganda. Overall, an ideological component with regard to gender relations is evident. While the paramilitary activities are targeted more at boys, the programme segments that deal with “civilian” skills are intended, above all, for girls. The latter are taught that, in principle, they can pursue any profession but being a mother is – in line with the traditional role model – the most desirable vocation for a woman.

A large number of state and state-affil­iated organisations are involved in the planning and implementation of the meas­ures. They range from the Ministry of Edu­cation and the Federal Agency for Youth Affairs (Rosmolodezh) to the Ministry of Defence, Cossack groups, veterans’ organi­sations and formally private “military com­panies”. The “Wagner” mercenary group, for example, founded the “Wagneryonok“ youth club and has held recruitment talks at schools, while other relevant companies, such as “ENOT“, have organised paramilitary youth camps.

The fact that many actors are involved in the military-patriotic education of the younger generation reflects a management and control system that is typical for the Kremlin. This system not only makes sure that many shoulders have to bear the cost of the measures; it also prevents any of the actors involved from gaining either access to excessive financial resources or influence. Based on the principle of “divide et impera”, the Kremlin’s control is ensured through overlaps, duplications and com­petition. Thus, although the new educational measures are aimed at the militarisation of society, the Ministry of Defence is just one of several important actors. The militarism that has developed in Russia is shaped by the Kremlin; it does not translate into greater autonomy for the military.

Perceptible, albeit limited criticism

According to opinion polls conducted among the Russian population, the 18–24 age group is the most critical of the regime’s cur­rent foreign policy. In particular, it has a negative view of the war against Ukraine. At the same time, interest in the war is lowest among this group. Thus, there is a mixture of rejection and apathy among Russia’s young adults. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that the critical opinions of this cohort are part of the motivation for the Russian leadership to seek to influence the younger generation through the measures described above. Evaluating how successful the regime has been in this endeavour is not easy, however.

As far as the “Important Conversations” are concerned, they have established them­selves over the past three years and are now widely accepted or at least tolerated. But there are indications that parents are mak­ing various efforts to have their children exempted from taking the subject – whether by submitting requests to the school, mak­ing informal agreements with teachers or organising competing activities. Some parents try to have their children put into the class of a teacher who is known to down­play the ideological content.

Although there are reports of school teachers being dismissed for refusing to con­duct the “Important Conversations”, these are probably exceptional cases. How­ever, it is likely that some teachers who might similarly have refused had already lost their jobs or resigned over their stance on Russia’s war against Ukraine. Among those who have remained, some appear to talk about the content differently from how the materials dictate or approach the topic in a different manner.

It should be noted that to date, attempts to avoid taking “Important Conversations” or to modify their content have been made only at the individual level (that is, by fami­lies or teachers or, more rarely, by an entire school) and have not been of an organ­ised nature. It can therefore be assumed that most children participate in these classes without the content being questioned to any significant extent. That said, some par­ents rely on being able to set different prior­ities or express opposing views at home.

Opinions about the university course “Fundamentals of Russian Statehood” are divided, but it tends to be seen as a neces­sary evil by its critics. There are virtually no reports of students refusing to attend the lectures. Severe criticism can be heard from some teachers who have undergone train­ing for the new course: they have had harsh things to say about the textbook, the ac­com­panying videos and the university’s instructions for the lectures. Critics of the course often condemn it as propaganda rather than a serious academic discipline. However, it is also seen by some as an op­por­tunity for genuine discussion, depending on how the lessons are structured. Several teachers have complained that the textbook contains statements that are un­clear; for example, the key term “civilisation” is not clearly defined. This not only makes it difficult to adequately convey the book’s contents; it also leaves the instructor vulnerable to attack as a regime critic if they offer an interpretation that is not to the liking of those in power.

The success of the extracurricular activ­ities can be measured by the number of participants. After all, these are “voluntary” activities, even if there are indirect pres­sures from group dynamics, a lack of alter­native leisure pursuits and reports that entire school classes have been forced to take part in these activities. Between 2022 and 2025, the official membership numbers of the Youth Army and “Volunteers for Victory” have grown from a few hundred thousand to 1.8 million and 1 million, re­spectively, although it is not clear whether these are actual members or merely partici­pants. According to official figures, no fewer than 13 million children and young people have taken part in the activities of the “Move­ment of the First” during the first three years of its existence. Even if these figures are to be treated with caution, it is evident that the number of young people being reached has increased significantly. In addition, the measures have proved of practical use in allowing the regime to con­tinue the war against Ukraine. Since 2022, more than 11,000 alumni of the Youth Army are said to have volunteered to serve in that war.

A new generation in the mould of the Kremlin

The Russian leadership is concerned that young people are more critical of the regime than are other age groups. Thus, the measures and programmes described above can be understood as an attempt to win over the younger generation using various methods. They are having an increasingly widespread impact, extending not only to schools but also to universities and, more recently, kindergartens. In addition, the relevant programmes are also being im­ple­mented in the Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine. This is a particularly perfidious approach, as Ukrainian children are being re-educated in line with Russian propaganda and turned against Ukraine both physically and psychologically.

There are differing views among ob­servers about what this policy will achieve. Some expect large parts of the Russian population to be successfully brought into line. Others believe that the measures will trigger protests in the medium term because some members of the target group feel patronised. Still others point to the increas­ing polarisation of society, which is being exacerbated by mobilisation campaigns and propaganda. If the parallels drawn with the Soviet era are taken seriously, it will likely take some time for opposition to the meas­ures to spread beyond a small marginalised minority – if, indeed, it does at all. Even though the world has changed dramatically since the Soviet era, Moscow is successfully ensuring that large parts of the Russian population do not have access to reliable information and instilling mistrust of West­ern media. This is due not only to the regime’s ability to control the flow of infor­mation, but also to the fact that many citi­zens would find it difficult or even painful to change their views.

Therefore, it cannot be assumed that the next generation in Russia will be in favour of a relationship with the West that is sig­nifi­cantly more positive than it is today. This is particularly true of those who are on their way to becoming part of the country’s political elite. Rather, it is probable that the values currently promoted by the Kremlin will be reflected in the actions of those indi­viduals, not least as these values are being underpinned by tangible incentives. Those who regard war as a normal part of daily life are likely to more readily support the conflict in Ukraine and accept the casualties. Those who revere heroes will likely seek to emulate them. Since many of the organisations mentioned above not only indoctrinate their own members but also seek to reach the wider population, their impact extends beyond the age cohort of children and adolescents. A militarised society will be more inclined to endorse the Kremlin’s bellicose approach and its risky foreign policy.

It is important to understand that ideological elements go hand in hand with practical benefits for the young people who participate in the programmes. If they see their involvement as a preliminary step to being admitted to their preferred university or gaining entry into an attractive profession, it will be easier for them to accept the programmes’ contents without raising any questions. This effect is reinforced by the formation and strengthening of networks over time. Participants meet again in other contexts and support one another professionally and/or privately. They accept the ideology or are more willing to espouse it because of the sense of belonging and social advancement that result from doing so.

Through its activities in the area of mili­tary-patriotic education for children and young people, the Kremlin is attempting to secure long-term support among the popu­lation for its current foreign policy. There will, of course, continue to be Russian citi­zens who oppose that policy in the future. However, they will most likely remain in the minority and belong to socio-economic strata that have little influence on political developments within the country. Those who shape Russian politics in the future will – either out of conviction or (more likely) opportunism – accept the ideology that has informally become established through the military-patriotic educational measures of recent years. That ideology vilifies the West and glorifies war. Thus, it will take generations, rather than years, for a different Russia to emerge.