Gradual integration

In order to provide candidate countries with an incentive and to swiftly reward corre­sponding progress prior to accession, the European Council adopted a policy of “gradual integration” in 2023. However, it failed to provide any guidelines on how the concept should be implemented in practice. Since then, the Commission has been ex­plor­ing options that depart to varying degrees from the traditional methodology for ad­mitting new members so far lacking a co­herent conceptual model. Initially, forms of gradual or sectoral integration prior to accession were intended primarily to pro­vide incentives for reform by offering can­didates concrete benefits through partial integration. This refers, for example, as set out in the Growth Plans for the Western Balkans and Moldova, to gradual integration by policy sector, enabling participation in EU programmes. The EU supports and moni­tors efforts towards economic integra­tion and the development of the institutions and capacities that are indispensable for participation in the Single Market – the cornerstone of membership – on the basis of the individual countries’ reform plans.

Through gradual integration, Brussels aims to achieve faster socio-economic con­vergence between candidate countries and EU member states, because the longer ac­ces­sion is delayed, the greater the divergence becomes. Early involvement in EU processes and programmes also serves a socialisation function. In addition, it is cus­tomary to grant accession countries observer status in the Council or the European Par­lia­ment during the ratification phase. These measures are intended to contribute to inte­gration policy objectives of strategic autono­my, since the EU seeks to bind the accession countries closely to itself wherever it faces geostrategic competition, for example from Russia or China.

More far-reaching interpretations of grad­ual integration, aiming for Ukraine’s accession by 2027, have not been taken up by the Council. Proposals such as “staged accession” or “reverse enlargement” envis­age granting a country only limited forms of participation in the EU system and its institutions on a temporary basis, either before or even after accession. This would result in at least a temporary restriction of the rights of new EU member states, thus amounting to a form of second-class mem­bership. If, as is being discussed, a country were to be granted only reduced voting rights following its accession, for example in the Council, this would be discriminatory and hardly conducive to deeper integration. To date, no new member state has been required to accept such limitations.

Accession treaties and transitional arrangements

The EU has consistently incorporated pro­visions in accession treaties with new mem­ber states stipulating that, for a limited tran­sitional period, derogations would apply to the principle of the full and auto­matic application of the acquis commu­nautaire under primary and secondary law. However, these provisions pertained exclu­sively to policy areas and only to a limited extent to institutions and decision-making rights. They typically concerned, above all, the negotiation chapters on the four free­doms for goods, services, capital, and persons, as well as agriculture, transport, energy, the environment, taxation, and social affairs. For instance, during the 2004 enlargement round, the free movement of workers was excluded for a transition period of up to seven years. Typically, the EU takes measures to limit the costs in expenditure-related policy areas when new members join. For instance, new members receive only the full amount of funding to which they would be entitled from the EU funds on a phased basis. In addition, a cap is set on aggregate transfers, calculated as a share of the new member’s national gross domestic product.

Accession treaties also regularly provide for a general economic safeguard clause, a specific safeguard clause for the functioning of the Single Market, and a further clause covering criminal and civil matters in the area of justice and home affairs. In the case of Romania and Bulgaria, which joined in 2007, a special Cooperation and Verification Mechanism was applied, which remained in place until 2023. It targeted short­comings in the judiciary and in the fight against corruption and organised crime. These were early forms of post-acces­sion conditionality, which, however, proved not to be particularly effective. It is also important to distinguish it systematically from the differentiated levels of participation already built into both the Economic and Monetary Union and the Schengen system, which new EU member states can only join once they fulfil the respective criteria. In addition, the accession treaty for Romania and Bulgaria contained a clause with the option of a one-year postponement of accession, which the EU did not, how­ever, exercise.

It should be noted that, within the framework of its traditional enlargement policy, the EU has numerous instruments at its disposal to address mutual interests and capacities, particularly with regard to the challenges faced by new members in adopt­ing the acquis. What is serious, however, is that in the current process there is little confidence that the accession countries will adequately address the most significant short­comings in meeting fundamental political requirements. Experience shows that the prospect of membership constitutes the strongest incentive for reforms prior to the completion of accession. After­wards, the EU institutions’ ability to influ­ence and exert pressure on member states diminishes. Following accession, EU actors can rely only on the existing instruments of conditionality (see SWP-Aktuell 50/2024). In preventive terms, this involves the rule of law dialogue within the Council and, in the event of breaches, the rule of law pro­cedure under Article 7 Treaty on European Union (TEU), the rule of law mechanism for the protection of the EU budget, and infringement procedure, which make it pos­sible to impose penalty payments. In particular with regard to political conditionality, the respective shortcomings of the accession countries overlap with those in the EU itself, underlining the urgent need for reform within the EU-27.

Suspension of voting rights after accession and new safe­guard clauses

Measures are under discussion within the EU to ensure the capacity of the enlarged Union to act, including the possibility of denying new members so-called veto rights. Under such an arrangement, the states in question would possess no effective right to block – either temporarily or perma­nently – decisions requiring unanimity in the Council (such as on taxation, the CFSP, sanctions, or the budget). This is where the broader reform objective of extending majority voting in the Council converges with the interest in making vetoes more difficult to exercise.

Similarly, specific sanctions are under dis­cussion to make the EU response more effective if a new member violates the Union’s values, as set out in Article 2 TEU. According to Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos, however, such safeguard clauses are not intended to disadvantage new mem­bers, but rather to apply in the event of spe­cific violations. Even so, it remains entirely unclear how this provision would be imple­mented.

Reactions to these proposals from the candidate countries have been mixed. On the one hand, advanced candidates such as Montenegro have expressed concerns that they may be subjected to lasting discrimination and treated as second-class EU mem­bers. On the other hand, the Albanian and even the Serbian government are signalling their willingness to agree to such a “deal” if it enables rapid accession while preserving the other benefits of membership. At the same time, it is improbable that those mem­ber states calling for fundamental reforms to safeguard the EU’s capacity to act would be satisfied with safeguard clauses alone.

The special case of Ukraine

Undoubtedly, the most significant pressure for reform within the EU stems from the prospect of Ukraine’s accession. In the case of the Western Balkan states, unresolved conflicts and external influences do pose problems, but these are not comparable to the difficulties experienced by the eastern candidate countries, Ukraine and Moldova. The expected financial transfers to the West­ern Balkans are considered to be man­age­able, as the combined population of the countries concerned is approximately 16 mil­lion. Iceland, too, as a potential net contribu­tor, could be integrated using the traditional method with only minor adjustments.

The accession of Ukraine, which has been profoundly affected by Russia’s ongoing military aggression, would, however, present a challenge of a different nature, and even more so if it happened as an “emergency accession”. The geopolitical ramifications of the war may result in the introduction of a novel enlargement methodology and a new form of EU membership. Much depends on the terms of the ongoing negotiations to end the war (in which the Europeans are involved only indirectly), and equally on the future status of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Political or even legal commitments regarding Ukraine’s rapid EU accession are on the table. This is one reason why the Commission has raised the prospect of “phased integration”, or reverse enlargement. For Ukraine, this would amount to a purely nominal acces­sion with reduced rights and obligations, after which the country would only grad­ually achieve full membership.

Kyiv has stated its intention to conclude the negotiations – which have not yet offi­cially begun – by 2027 and can already point to impressive progress in aligning its legislation with the acquis. At the same time, Ukraine continues to face serious shortcomings in terms of resources and administrative capacity, as well as in the enforcement of legal provisions by super­visory authorities and the judiciary, affect­ing all relevant policy areas. This is also linked to the severe deficits in curbing cor­ruption and meeting other requirements from the “Fundamentals” cluster (see SWP-Comment 15/2026).

Ukraine’s accession prior to full alignment with the EU acquis would represent a significant departure from the accession methodology applied to date. Rapid acces­sion would also be difficult for the EU to absorb. The strain on its budget alone would be substantial, according to current calculations – in Cohesion Policy due to the special circumstances of reconstruction, and in the Common Agricultural Policy because Ukraine would increase the EU’s agricultural area by a quarter. One option, however, would be to exclude the Common Agricultural Policy for the long term, if not permanently, in order to reflect the coun­try’s exceptional circumstances. After all, fisheries and agriculture are likewise ex­cluded from the EEA, without this impairing the functioning of the Single Market. As the EU is pushing ahead with the gradual integration of Ukraine regardless of the accession date, it plans to mobilise signifi­cant financial resources, as evidenced by the €90 billion loan for the 2026/2027 period. If Ukraine were to be admitted pre­maturely – based on its readiness for acces­sion and following a reverse enlargement approach – this could lead to a special status for the country (and possibly other candidates) within the EU.

A new type of accession association for Ukraine

Ukraine, and linked to it the Republic of Mol­dova, remain special cases. The EU should now propose a new model for en­gage­ment that takes account of the unique circumstances of these two countries. Time is of the essence as the question of acces­sion could be used in Washington and Kyiv as a bargaining chip in negotiations over ending the war, thereby increasing pressure on the EU to act.

The allocation of a special status as an associated accession country would be prefer­able to a scenario of reverse enlargement. The latter approach would be ill-advised, as it would neither resolve Ukraine’s security concerns nor address the significant challenges of its reconstruction, let alone the difficulties associated with re­forms and ratifications within the EU. In­stead, a new type of accession association should combine two elements.

First, the EU should fully and consistently commit to the principle of gradual inte­gration prior to accession. To this end, all instruments and formats for closer ties with the EU must be systematically utilised and effectively combined. A key focus should be on participation in the Single Market and investment in Ukraine’s reconstruction. The optimal framework for this, both politically and practically, is an upgraded accession association based on the joint institutions created under the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (see SWP Comment 42/2024). Whatever scope exists for a demonstrative political upgrade should also be made visible through tangible integration. There are already numerous proposals to this end, ranging from a country’s participation in informal Council meetings following the conclusion of negotiation chapters to ob­server status in the European Parliament and other institutions, as is already the case in the European Economic and Social Com­mittee.

Second, the offer of an accession association should encompass a substantial secu­rity and defence partnership. To this end, every possible opportunity should be lever­aged to involve Ukraine in the further devel­opment of the CSDP, particularly in programmes to strengthen the defence in­dus­try. In doing so, the EU stands to benefit from Ukraine’s experience and industrial base. Willing and capable member states, along with the United Kingdom as a nuclear power, could take the lead and work with Kyiv to establish effective European defence structures closely linked to the EU and to a European pillar of NATO. Such measures should contribute to deliberations on opera­tionalising the mutual assistance clause under Article 42(7) TEU and the implementation of plans for a coalition of the willing in the event of a ceasefire.

An accession association structured in this manner should, on the one hand, pro­vide Ukraine with comprehensive political and economic support and, on the other, leave the country the necessary room for manoeuvre. The prospect of membership thus secured could prove important if a referendum is held in Ukraine on the results of the negotiations to end the war.