The background to US actions against Venezuela and Cuba

The above-mentioned actions, together with the threat of further coercive measures against Venezuela and Cuba, are part of the Trump administration’s repertoire of force against Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). That repertoire goes beyond punitive tariffs and deportations to encompass the US military presence in the Caribbean since 2025, the continued practice of sinking boats allegedly transporting drugs in the Atlantic and Pacific, and the targeted killing of the occupants of those vessels. These aggressive practices are enshrined in both the White House’s National Security Strat­egy (NSS) of November 2025 and the US Department of War’s National Defense Strat­egy (NDS) of January 2026.

The 2025 NSS criticises the historical claim of the United States to global dominance, describing it as “overstretch”. Now the aim is to achieve regional dominance in the West­ern Hemisphere through the reactivation of the Monroe Doctrine. There are four sub-objectives to that goal. First, the American continent must remain stable and well gov­erned in order to prevent mass migration to the US. Second, regional governments are to cooperate with the US in combatting drug trafficking and organised crime. Third, the Western Hemisphere must be free from both foreign interference and foreign investment in key areas. Fourth, US access to strategic resources must be secured. To these ends, the US intends to increase its military pres­ence on the continent. Targeted military opera­tions and the use of lethal force are deemed necessary. This reasoning defines the “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine.

The 2026 NDS similarly advocates a focused approach – one that, without being isolationist, replaces what is seen as the misguided policy of the past. As the strategy makes clear, the old policy was based on “cloud-castle abstractions like the rules-based international order” while neglecting the “warfighters’ warrior ethos” as well as the military’s core role and allowing itself to be distracted by interventions, wars, “regime-change” and “nation-build­ing” projects.

The defence strategy is summarised by the motto “Peace through Strength”. The Western Hemisphere is of paramount impor­tance – not least for homeland security – because the US government regards its national interests as being threatened by developments across the entire continent. The areas “homeland” and “hemisphere” are dealt with in the same chapter, sug­gesting that the two are seen as closely linked as regards security policy. Specifically, defence involves tightening border controls to prevent illegal immigration and drug trafficking, restoring US dominance in the Western Hemisphere and securing access to strategically important areas such as the Panama Canal, the “Gulf of America” and Greenland – all in accordance with the up­dated Monroe Doctrine.

The priorities of the 2025 NSS and the 2026 NDS are reflected in the agenda of the Shield of the Americas, the inaugural sum­mit of which took place on 7 March 2026 in Doral, Florida. So far, this US initiative for military cooperation has brought together 12 LAC states that have governments rang­ing from conservative to far-right. The US State Department describes the group as a coalition of “like-minded allies” that “will work together to advance strategies that stop foreign interference in our hemisphere, criminal and narco-terrorist gangs and cartels, and illegal and mass immigration”. Kristi Noem has been appointed special envoy for the Shield of the Americas.

Venezuela and the US as guardian

The Trump administration justified the mili­tary operation in Venezuela on the grounds of enforcing US national law as both Maduro and Flores were considered fugitives from US justice. According to the indictment against them, they and four other Venezuelans face charges of drug-related terrorism and trafficking, as well as possession of machineguns and other destructive devices. They have been de­tained in New York since their abduction, where they are to stand trial. The US government does not recognise Maduro as the legitimate head of state. He is accused of oppressing the Venezuelan people and endangering the security of the US and its citizens.

Secretary of State Rubio has outlined a three-phase plan for Venezuela: (1) stabili­sation; (2) recovery, opening up and recon­ciliation; and (3) transition. What is not clear from remarks made by US officials is whether the final phase refers to democratisation. In any case, elections are being postponed indefinitely while the stabilisation phase under US control is taking prec­edence. The US government does not envisage any significant role in Venezuela’s liberalisation for María Corina Machado, leader of the opposition alliance Democratic Unitary Platform and winner of the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize. Even during her visit in January 2026, when she presented Trump with her Nobel Peace Prize medal, she was unable to persuade him to publicly pledge his support for her.

The Trump administration’s preferred interlocutor is Delcy Rodríguez, who moved from the vice-presidency to the presidency following Maduro’s abduction. Washington has made clear that it expects Venezuela’s political leadership to cooperate. Whether it is doing so will be judged “by actions, not words”; and, if necessary, force could be used once again to ensure alignment. Ven­ezuela’s autocratic regime has come under enormous pressure from this repeated warn­ing. But at the same time, it has been given leeway to maintain its anti-imperial­ist, revolutionary rhetoric.

Following the military operation, the US seized Venezuelan tankers and took over the marketing of Venezuelan crude oil and petroleum products – initially, for an indefinite period. Furthermore, Venezuela was required to procure goods and services from the US. At first, all proceeds from oil sales were transferred to bank accounts in Qatar; however, at the end of February, the US secretary of energy announced that accounts controlled directly by the US Treas­ury Department would henceforth be used for that purpose. Currently, there is no transparency about where those revenues are being held or the conditions under which they are being transferred to the government in Caracas. In January, Secretary of State Rubio stated that – with immediate effect – the Venezuelan government must seek the approval of the US for its monthly budgets.

Established by the executive order of 9 January 2026, this transfer mechanism is intended, among other things, to prevent courts or creditors from seizing payments. Venezuela currently owes international bondholders, oil companies and others a total of more than US$170 billion. That debt is deterring US firms from investing in the reconstruction of Venezuela’s strug­gling oil infrastructure. Nevertheless, the US has granted licences to oil and gas com­panies to invest in Venezuela’s energy sec­tor and export Venezuelan gold. At the same time, there has been a selective easing of sanctions against Caracas.

US officials are making frequent high-level visits to Venezuela and, where appro­priate, granting rewards in order to bolster the demands it is making of that country. For example, John Ratcliffe, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), met with Delcy Rodríguez in Caracas on 15 Janu­ary. Two weeks later, on 31 January, Laura F. Dogu, the newly appointed US chargé d’affaires for Venezuela, travelled to the country’s capital to prepare for the reopen­ing of the embassy. On 11 February US Sec­retary of Energy Chris Wright paid a visit. On 18 February General Francis L. Donovan, commander of US Southern Command, arrived in Venezuela accompanied by Joseph M. Humire, assistant secretary for homeland defence and the Americas. On 4 March Doug Burgum, the secretary of the US Department of the Interior and chair of the National Energy Dominance Council, landed in Caracas; the following day, the two coun­tries announced the resumption of diplo­matic and consular relations. Shortly there­after, an official US government document (dated 10 March) recognised Delcy Rodrí­guez as the legitimate Venezuelan head of state with effect from 3 January. Also in March, a delegation of US investors and businessmen was received in Caracas. The US Embassy to Venezuela was officially reopened on 30 March, having been closed for some seven years. On 1 April the Office of Foreign Assets Control removed Delcy Rodríguez from the US sanctions list.

There is no mistaking that US policy towards Venezuela is having an impact: an economic transformation is taking place in that country without the way being paved for a political transition. The Chavista propa­ganda remains as background music– this is evidenced by, among other things, the establishment of a “High-Level Commission for the Release of Nicolás Maduro and Cilia Flores”. What is new, however, is the gov­ernment’s reporting smooth and productive cooperation with the US.

Cuba in the shadow of the US

Right at the start of his second term in office, Trump reversed the relaxation of restric­tions on travel to, and financial transactions with, Cuba that had been introduced by President Joe Biden. He also redesignated the Caribbean island as a state sponsor of terrorism. Following the military operation in Venezuela, Washington imposed a mas­sive blockade against Cuba that went well beyond the historical trade embargo. From then until 30 March, when a Russian oil tanker arrived in Cuba, the country re­ceived no oil supplies from abroad. Since the domestic transport system and supply of electricity are dependent on oil, the situa­tion has become critical on the island. There have been repeated nationwide black­outs with life-threatening consequences. Moreover, humanitarian aid is unable to reach the country. And amid the suspension of flights and the threats emanating from the US, tourism – a major source of income for Cuba – is collapsing.

While Donald Trump has spoken of a “friendly takeover” of Cuba and described developments in Venezuela as a “perfect scenario”, Francis L. Donovan, commander of US Southern Command, has denied the existence of a military invasion plan. The Trump administration has accused the Cuban leadership of crimes such as drug traf­ficking, promoting illegal migration and supporting terrorist groups abroad and holds it responsible for the oppression of its own people. Though not spelled out pub­licly by US government officials, it is clear that the United States is attempting to force political and economic changes in Cuba. Meanwhile, Washington and Havana have confirmed that they are holding talks, although the content of those discussions remains unknown.

US policy and international law

A US president who is dismantling democ­racy in his own country cannot be expected to push for the promotion of democracy abroad. Above all, the United States views LAC both as a security problem and as a source of raw materials. In line with its “America First” approach, the Trump ad­ministration is pursuing its own economic and geopolitical interests in the region as well as an imperialist policy that is based on violence and lays claim to exclusivity. As the case of Greenland has shown, that approach does not respect European inter­ests; thus, it is not “merely” a matter of great power competition with China and Russia. For this reason, it cannot be ruled out that relations between Germany and the EU (or, rather, its individual member states), on the one hand, and LAC, on the other, will be affected by the new inter­pretation of the Monroe Doctrine.

To date, US policy towards Venezuela and Cuba has focused on opening up the economy rather than the political sphere. Whether the easing of repression in Ven­ezuela ultimately leads to political liber­lisation and democratic regime change remains to be seen. Meanwhile, there are new economic realities being created in Venezuela under US control and the popu­lation has no influence over that process. Nor is the way being paved for a transition to democracy.

Although it refrains from using the term “regime change” in relation to Venezuela and Cuba, the Trump administration is call­ing for a change of the top political leader­ship and for a new economic policy in both countries. It has excluded the Venezuelan and Cuban opposition from negotiations with the ruling elites. Under duress, these groups are cooperating with the US to en­sure their political survival. In Venezuela, the Chavista regime is still managing to hold on, despite personnel changes and eco­nomic reforms. Today, the country is an autocracy under US tutelage – and Cuba could soon become one, too.

Trump administration is pushing for the militarisation of the fight on drugs and the securitisation of migration policy in LAC. At the same time, countries in the region are be­ing pressured by the aggressive US ap­proach into increasing their defence spend­ing in order to ward off a potential US inva­sion. These developments are hitting a frag­mented subcontinent where political co­ordination across ideological divides is vir­tually impossible. In general, the countries of the region have little room for manoeuvre. The predominant strategies are pragmatic adaptation and submission that ranges from being dogmatic to opportunistic.

Against this backdrop, there is a need for a German and European approach towards LAC that relies not on hard power but on a broad range of instruments that promote participatory politics, inclusive socio-eco­nomic development and partnership-based relations. Support for civil society in Ven­ezuela and Cuba, via political foundations and other non-state actors, is essential.

Current US policy involves human rights violations and breaches of international law. This is particularly evident in the sink­ing of boats, the military operation in Ven­ezuela and the energy blockade of Cuba. Some members of the international com­munity remain silent about those actions or endlessly “examine” them while simultaneously lamenting the erosion of the rules-based international order. Such behaviour applies both to LAC countries and to Ger­many and other EU member states. While violations of international law have always been committed, there is now a tendency to refrain from naming them as such. And that weakens international law and removes the taboo of using violence.

Neither political positioning nor struc­tural interdependencies should impair the ability to judge matters on the basis of international law. When legal assessments become dependent on political considerations, a distorted legal reality emerges that is coloured by ideology. A policy that pro­duces “alternative facts” – read: falsehoods – leads to injustice and damages its own credibility. It diminishes citizens’ trust in their representatives. And it undermines the foundations of constitutional loyalty. After all, the logic of legal principles under­lies both international law and the rule of law. Thus, as far as given facts are con­cerned, it is only their political handling that should be considered contingent, not their classification under international law.