African states’ industrial ambitions and strategic agency

Many African states remain heavily depend­ent on the export of unprocessed raw materials, a model that captures a limited share of value and reinforces the weak upstream and downstream linkages to the wider economy. In 2024, more than half of African countries derived at least 60 per cent of their export revenues from oil, gas or mineral commodities. Rising global demand and geopolitical competition over CRMs have strengthened Africa’s strategic agency, prompting renewed efforts by the AU and mineral-rich states to use resource endowments as levers for industrial devel­opment and thereby increase local value addition. Though long articulated – most notably in the Africa Mining Vision (AMV) of 2009 – this ambition has become a political focus once again.

Against the backdrop of the global green energy transition and the associated grow­ing demand for minerals, the AU’s African Minerals Development Centre (AMDC), to­gether with the African Development Bank (AfDB), began work on the AGMS in 2022; the strategy was formally adopted in March 2025. Building on the AMV, it aims to strengthen continental coordination and strategic positioning amid intensified global competition by promoting regional initia­tives, such as shared infrastructure and the development of green industrial value chains. Implementation is to be supported by a Green Minerals Development Fund and public–private investment platforms, among other instruments. Mineral steward­ship and environmental, social and govern­ance (ESG) standards are identified as pre­requisites for sustainable development and as means of strengthening the global com­petitiveness of African producers.

But significant institutional challenges persist. While progress is being made under the industrial pillars of the African Conti­nental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), negotiations on raw materials remain particularly sensitive. Moreover, the AMDC, whose man­date is to support the implementation of con­tinental strategies and related instru­ments, has not yet been fully ratified; thus, there is no access to regular AU budget funding. At least 15 AU member states must ratify the establishment of the centre; as of the end of 2025, only four of the 55 mem­bers of the AU had completed that process – Nigeria being the last to do so and major con­tinental mining producers such as Ghana and South Africa still not having voted on the issue. Overlapping initiatives – includ­ing the Africa Minerals Strategy Group (AMSG), which, launched at the Future Min­erals Forum in Riyadh in 2024 (with Saudi Arabia as observer) – pursue similar objec­tives but operate outside formal AU institu­tional frameworks. As a result, continental coordination and the harmonisation of standards and operational practices remain a work in progress (as in the EU) while sup­port to member states continues to fall short.

At the same time, the political momentum is increasingly shifting to national capi­tals. Governments across Africa are becom­ing more and more assertive. Many are advancing new critical mineral strategies to capture greater value at home through ex­port restrictions, processing targets and in­vestment incentives. The strategies recently published or being drawn up by Zambia, South Africa, Ghana and Tanzania reveal the characteristics of various forms of resource nationalism and balance openness to in­vestment with stronger state intervention.

The new critical mineral strategies are primarily national in scope. Links to con­tinental frameworks such as the AMGS are limited, and political ambition has not yet been translated into implementation through regional initiatives. The most prominent of such initiatives – the Zambia–DRC battery cluster – has attracted considerable atten­tion but made only modest progress to date.

Ambitions and constraints of EU raw material cooperation

At first glance, the EU appears well posi­tioned: African governments remain open to new partners, and both sides are inter­ested in more sustainable and resilient min­eral value chains. On closer examination, however, it is evident that priorities differ: the EU’s focus is on supply security and industrial resilience, while African govern­ments emphasise investment and indus­trial development. The two agendas are not incompatible and the foundations for co­opera­tion are in place. The key challenge lies in strengthening the execution and delivery of cooperative projects.

The Global Gateway gap

A dedicated and well-coordinated external financing architecture is not provided for in the CRMA. As a result, the EU’s ability to support cooperation with African partners in a strategic and efficient manner con­tinues to be restricted. Despite early calls for an EU-level raw materials fund and inte­grated instruments that would combine pub­lic finance and de-risking tools for projects with technical assistance, there has been little commitment in this regard. For this reason, external engagement continues to rely on a fragmented set of existing instru­ments.

In practice, the EU’s external engagement over CRMs on the African continent is channelled through the Global Gateway, launched in 2021 by the Von der Leyen Commission as the EU’s global infrastructure and connectivity initiative. The Global Gateway does not constitute a single financ­ing instrument; rather, it brings together EU tools – notably, the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+) – and financial contributions from member states under the Team Europe approach. By crowding in private investment, the ini­tia­tive initially aimed to mobilise €300 billion between 2021 and 2027, including €150 bil­lion for Africa. In October 2025, the Com­mission announced that the overall target had already been exceeded.

In its current institutional design, the Global Gateway is difficult to operationalise as an effective and strategic instrument. Diffused responsibilities within the EU and its member states, combined with unclear access modalities for the private sector, are complicating factors for coherent implemen­tation. Significant gaps remain in the areas of project-pipeline transparency, project delivery and the mobilisation of private capital.

Moreover, integrating the raw material agenda into the Global Gateway proved chal­lenging from the outset. When the CRMA was adopted in 2024, the EU’s cur­rent Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) was already halfway through its seven year mandate (2021–27) and most Global Gateway–related budgets had already been allocated, limiting the scope for the funding of additional projects. While some flagship initiatives have been launched – including the Lobito Corridor as an enabling infra­structure project in Southern Africa – the EU has yet to translate political ambition into concrete CRM projects with higher private-sector involvement.

Future delivery of such projects hinges on the allocation of dedicated financial resources and thus on the negotiations over the next MFF (2028–34), which are set to intensify in 2026. In July 2025, the EU Com­mission proposed consolidating its external action instruments into a €200.3 billion “Global Europe” instrument, with geograph­ically oriented pillars. Although €60.5 bil­lion was earmarked for Sub-Saharan Africa, those funds have to cater to competing pri­orities that range from migration to hu­manitarian assistance. Thus, the sum is un­likely to prove sufficient to meet the scale required for comprehensive CRM engage­ment.

The EIB will play a decisive role in the European external CRM engagement. Its impact will be greatest if it acts not merely as a technical financier but as a strategic actor. Its willingness or clear mandate to engage in high-risk, capital-intensive projects out­side the EU will be central to the credibility of Europe’s diversification efforts and its CRM partnerships in today’s highly compe­titive global environment. In March 2025, the bank adopted a Critical Raw Material Strategic Initiative, signalling its increased engagement along the value chain, and an­nounced an annual spending target of €2 bil­lion for the sector. Those funds are likely to account for a major part of the €3 billion announced under the RESourceEU Action Plan in December 2025. Just how much financing will ultimately be available for non-EU projects remains uncertain, how­ever.

Given the limited resources within the EU, more effective coordination is essential in order to maximise impact. The EU has taken initial steps towards institutional in­novation. The Global Gateway Investment Hub is intended to function as a single-entry platform for companies. They shall submit investment proposals through government-led “Team Nationals” platforms, aiming to ensure aligning projects with EU and part­ner priorities while maximising coordinated national and European support. Effective coordination and collaboration is essential due to account for the realities of the raw material sector. Capital-intensive mining projects involve high risk and require multi-billion euro financing packages, as illus­trated by Vulcan Energy’s lithium project in Germany, which relies on a multi-actor financing package of around €2 billion.

At the same time, access for firms to EU financing is challenging, particularly for non-European firms, as requirements and due-diligence procedures are rigid and com­plex, and support limited in scale. That situa­tion could be remedied, at least in part, through the closer coordination between EU-level instruments and member-state tools. Several member states – including France, Germany and the Netherlands – have established dedicated raw material funds that can be used to achieve complementarity, particularly in the case of large, value chain-integrated projects and major infrastructure corridors. Uncoordinated national initiatives risk undermining the EU’s credibility. Italy’s €320 million pledge to the Zambian part of the Lobito Corridor, which was made outside the established coordination channels, exemplifies how unilateral action can weaken EU collective visibility and delivery.

Finally, proposals for enhanced coordination under the Global Gateway highlight the need to more closely integrate export credit agencies (ECAs) into the initiative. If tasked with earlier engagement and active risk-sharing, ECAs can add value by de-risk­ing capital-intensive raw material projects. For its part, Germany offers relevant experi­ence with its untied loan guarantees (UFKs), which could be leveraged more systematically. In 2024, there were 14 such guarantees in place, with just one other being ap­proved during that year. Thus, the available coverage capacity is still far from being fully utilised.

Conclusion and policy recommendations

The AU-EU Summit in November 2025 con­firmed that there is a large degree of politi­cal alignment in what is becoming an in­creasingly fragmented global order. Critical raw materials featured prominently on the agenda of the summit, reflecting the impor­tant role these commodities play in geo­economic competition and the industrial strategies of the two continents. There is a clear overlap of interests in Africa’s ambi­tion to leverage mineral resources for in­dustrial development and Europe’s need to diversify and de-risk supply chains. At a time when multilateral cooperation can no longer be taken for granted, resilient min­eral supply chains demand credible partner­ships. The structured dialogue with the AU, combined with the bilateral CRM agreements and the launch of the first strategic projects, provides a solid institutional foun­dation for such partnerships. Accelerating project delivery and scaling up industrial projects are the main tests of the EU’s cred­ibility as a partner in today’s highly com­petitive environment.

For its part, the EU needs to ensure that Africa is anchored more firmly in its raw material strategy. It must also shift away from its development-oriented approach and instruments. While technical assistance remains an important component of the Euro­pean CRM offer, in areas such as min­eral governance, standards and capacity building, CRM partnerships are increasingly being driven by industrial and geopolitical considerations. The work of the Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA) within the framework of bilateral CRM partnerships is important but cannot, in itself, constitute the primary organising logic of EU CRM engagement on the African continent. Depending on institutional capac­ity, the stronger involvement of indus­try-, trade- and energy-focused portfolios, par­ticularly that of the Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneur­ship and SMEs (DG GROW), is essential. This would not only strengthen industrial co­operation and integrate technical and market expertise; it would also ensure greater strategic coherence across the EU’s external actions.

There are three main requirements for putting such a shift into practice. First, more robust external project pipelines must be developed and jointly defined. Building on continental frameworks such as the AGMS, project pipelines drawn up with African partners and supported by African financial institutions would improve alignment with African industrial priorities while responding to Europe’s supply-security objectives.

Second, project delivery depends on the availability and strategic use of finance. For this reason, CRM cooperation needs to become a more integral part of the EU’s external financing architecture and em­bedded in the next MFF, including through dedicated budgetary lines and the expanded use of blended finance for projects along mineral value chains and enabling infra­structure. This should be complemented by greater transparency regarding the EIB’s RESourceEU commitment – in particular, the extent of its risk appetite and the scope of support for projects in African partner countries. At the same time, there should be no delay in enhancing coordination with­in the Global Gateway framework, with the aim of improving systematic coordination between EU institutions and member states and, crucially, strengthening the role of national ECAs in addressing the high-risk, capital-intensive nature of CRM investments.

Third, European companies are essential for project delivery. In particular, downstream offtake agreements are needed to provide long-term demand certainty and underpin public investment decisions. While public support remains vital in the current geoeconomic environment, com­panies must assume greater responsibility for building resilient mineral supply chains that support Europe’s industrial competitiveness going forward.

Within Team Europe, Germany can play a reinforcing role by advocating a stronger anchoring of the CRMA in the next MFF and supporting more coherent Global Gateway coordination with Brussels, under the lead­er­ship of the Foreign Office. The contribution of the respective line ministries should be clearly defined: the Ministry for Eco­nomic Cooperation and Development should expand support for external project pipe­lines and technical assistance, while the Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy should strengthen external economic in­stru­ments, including UFKs, and embed Ger­many’s raw material policy in a coordinated European approach.