On 10 October 2026, a massacre took place near the Egyptian-Sudanese border. According to the Sudanese human rights organisation Emergency Lawyers, at least 114 Sudanese gold miners were killed in an air strike. The region is rich in gold deposits on both sides of the border, and for many years those resources have been exploited informally by small-scale miners. Eyewitnesses reported having seen military aircraft and repeated bombings targeting gold miners and suggested the attacks may have taken place on Sudanese territory. Both the media and human rights organisations hold Egypt responsible for the massacre, but there has been no international condemnation. For its part, Cairo has so far neither confirmed nor denied any involvement. Back in June, the Egyptian Air Force had attacked informal gold mines in the border area. According to Egyptian security officials, up to 50,000 Sudanese gold miners were present in the region. The increasing military violence against gold miners comes at a time when the Egyptian government intends to massively expand industrial gold mining and open up the sector to private investors. The military is playing a central role in this reorganisation – both in regulating and exercising control over the sector and as an economic player that itself stands to benefit significantly from the expansion.

Expansion of the Egyptian Gold Industry

In mid-July 2024, Egyptian Minister of Petroleum and Mining Karim Badawi announced an ambitious target: by 2030, annual gold production would increase by around 43 per cent compared with the 2023–24 financial year to 800,000 ounces. This corresponds to just under 25 tonnes of gold per year, the current market value of which is around USD 3.2 billion. The increased gold output will be an important source of revenue for Egypt as the country grapples with a chronic foreign-exchange shortage and high external debt.

Until now, Egypt’s industrial gold mining has been concentrated largely at the Sukari mine, near the tourist resort of Marsa Alam. Since 2020, however, the government has been pushing ahead with the development of other deposits, having committed to opening up the sector to private and international investors. In those efforts, it is receiving support from Europe: as part of its strategic partnership with Egypt (concluded in 2024), the European Union (EU) is promoting the fundamental strengthening of the Egyptian private sector. At the same time, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), which is majority-owned by European interests, agreed in May 2026 to work together with the Egyptian mining authority to modernise the country’s mining sector.

In November 2020, following a reform of the country’s licensing and royalty regulations, seven international and four Egyptian mining companies were granted exploration licences for a total of 82 areas in the Eastern Desert – the resource-rich arid and mountainous region between the Nile Valley and the Red Sea, which extends southwards to the Sudanese border. Further licences were subsequently awarded. In May 2026, the government facilitated market access by lowering leasing fees and further streamlining approval procedures. Two months later, the mining authority introduced a more flexible licensing system, under which 261 areas were put out to tender for gold exploration.

The Military as a Key Player

Under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the armed forces have significantly expanded their activities across the country’s economy. In the mining sector, their role in the granting of licences has been further strengthened since the passage in May 2026 of the implementing regulation to the Mining Act. That regulation states explicitly that in addition to the Ministry of Defence’s approval – which was already stipulated – the approval of the Operations Staff of the Armed Forces is required. This means that the military has a right of veto over the granting of concessions even outside those areas under its direct control. Furthermore, it is represented on the board of directors of the newly organised mining authority. Most important, the military is a direct economic beneficiary from gold mining and the gold trade: through its National Service Projects Organisation (NSPO), it holds a 34 per cent stake in the state-owned Shalateen Mineral Resources Company (SMRC), which plays an important role in the reorganisation of the Egyptian gold sector.

Through separate statutory agreements in 2021, Shalateen was granted extensive concession rights, particularly along the border with Sudan – a region that is one of the richest in gold in the Eastern Desert. Unlike in the case of most international tenders, those rights were not awarded through open competition. Furthermore, Shalateen has established processing facilities in Aswan Governorate at which smaller companies and gold miners who previously operated informally will continue their activities under state supervision.

The extent to which Shalateen has benefited from the reorganisation of the gold sector within such a short period can be seen from the figures published by the company itself: between 2020 and 2025, reported gold production rose from 266 kilograms to 950 kilograms and the company’s net profit increased by more than 800 per cent to over USD 28 million. How much of that profit is distributed to shareholders and who else benefits from company spending cannot be ascertained from publicly available corporate information. This is particularly relevant given the involvement of the military, whose largely opaque economic empire generates substantial revenues that are beyond effective civilian control.

Shalateen is not only reaping economic benefits from the reorganisation of the gold sector; it also appears to be assuming state regulatory functions. Reportedly, the company is helping put an end to informal gold mining. While, in the past, such activity was tolerated to an extent and some of the mined gold was marketed through private trading networks, Shalateen is now preparing to assume control of access to gold deposits and steer mining into state-regulated channels. It is thereby laying the groundwork for both the planned expansion of industrial gold mining and the granting of further concessions to private investors. To this end, it is also intended that the company will cooperate with the security forces and local authorities, according to official statements.

Control through Massive Force

The enforcement of state control over the Egyptian gold sector has been accompanied by widespread military violence against informal gold miners. Back in July 2023, a large-scale military operation was launched south of the Sukari gold mine. During that operation, shelters and equipment were destroyed, numerous people were arrested and, according to eyewitness reports, gold miners were killed. And research by the independent Egyptian news portal Mada Masr suggests that in the spring of 2026, Shalateen may have attempted to forcibly bring several informally operated mining areas near the Sudanese border under its control.

Those affected are predominantly Sudanese small-scale miners, many of whom are from Darfur and Kordofan and mine gold on both sides of the border. Through informal trade networks, the gold extracted on the Sudanese side ends up in Egypt, while food, fuel and chemicals are transported in the opposite direction. According to estimates by Chatham House, around 60 per cent of the gold mined in the Northern State, River Nile State and Red Sea State of Sudan could be finding its way to the neighbouring country.

Combating cross-border smuggling is one of the objectives of the Egyptian military campaign. At the same time, the Egyptian military has its own economic interests in the gold trade with Sudan: via the NSPO (which holds a stake in Shalateen), the Egyptian armed forces, together with the Sudanese military, is a shareholder in the Egyptian Sudanese Company (ESC), which is involved in the Sudanese gold trade. 

In June 2026, the military campaign escalated to a new level. Egyptian fighter jets attacked several informal gold mines in the southern border region. Armoured units then advanced into the mining areas, closed down mines and drove out thousands of gold miners. Many of those affected were deported to Sudan. The operations were part of a military operation that had been officially announced on 22 June.

With the massacre allegedly perpetrated by the Egyptian military on 10 October, the escalation may have peaked – at least for the time being. The suspicion that the attack took place south of the 22nd parallel – and thus on Sudanese territory – by no means rules out Egypt’s involvement. Indeed, it is possible that the Egyptian military was attempting not only to deprive the gold miners of their shelters beyond the border to prevent them from returning to the Egyptian mining areas but also to dismantle the cross-border informal trade networks. Two days after the 10 October massacre, the armed forces said their campaign against informal gold mining would continue. They justified their actions on the grounds of protecting national resources and enforcing state sovereignty and warned against “misleading rumours” and “foreign agendas”.

Questionable European Support

So far, there has been no public condemnation from Europe of the violence against informal gold miners. This is all the more remarkable given that the military crackdown runs counter to key objectives of EU cooperation with Egypt. The strategic partnership concluded by Brussels and Cairo in 2024, which is backed by macro-financial assistance (MFA) totalling EUR 5 billion, aims primarily at economic stabilisation in the north African state (alongside closer cooperation on migration and security policy). Strengthening the private sector and improving the investment climate play an important role in achieving that goal; and the military’s dominant position in the gold sector conflicts with those efforts. What is more important, however, is that Article 2 of the 2025 decision of the European Parliament and the Council on providing MFA to Egypt stipulates that in order to receive such assistance, Egypt must take concrete and credible steps to uphold democratic principles, the rule of law and human rights. In view of the military violence against informal gold miners, it is highly questionable to what extent this requirement is being met.

The EBRD’s cooperation with the Egyptian mining authority raises questions, too. As recently as at the end of September 2026, the EBRD and the Egyptian mining authority were discussing their cooperation, agreed in a memorandum of understanding in May, on modernising the Egyptian mining sector and improving investment conditions. However, such efforts will come to naught as long as the military continues to exploit and expand its privileged position in the gold sector – a position that allows it to play the dual role of economic actor and regulator. Moreover, the enforcement of its own interests through violence fundamentally contradicts the declared principles of the development bank, which is committed to the promotion of both market-based structures and respect for human rights.

The Europeans should draw conclusions from these contradictions. They should publicly condemn the violence against informal gold miners and press for an independent investigation. The EU should make the disbursement of the final tranche of MFA – which is worth EUR 1.5 billion and scheduled for late 2026 or early 2027 – conditional upon compliance with human rights obligations and verifiable progress in dismantling economic privileges for the military. Article 4 of the aforementioned 2025 EU decision explicitly provides for the suspension or cancellation of payments if the agreed conditions are not met. The EBRD, for its part, should suspend its cooperation with the Egyptian mining authority until it has been ensured that the reorganisation of the gold sector will take place without military force and under conditions of fair competition. Otherwise, European support risks legitimising a policy that entrenches economic privileges for the military and condones serious human rights violations.

Dr Stephan Roll is a Senior Fellow in the Africa and Middle East Research Group at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP).

Paula Martini is a research assistant in SWP’s Africa and Middle East Research Group and “Megatrends Africa” project.