Launch Capabilities

A fundamental prerequisite for autonomous space actors is the ability to launch satel­lites with one’s own rockets. Currently, the majority of European satellites are launched by the US company SpaceX. Thanks in part to its reusable rocket engines, SpaceX offers the most frequent launch services and, fur­ther­more, is comparatively cost-effective.

To date, SpaceX has proved reliable. Nevertheless, relying on just one US com­mercial provider entails risks; and this would be especially the case if SpaceX were to become a single point of failure. From a purely economic perspective, it is unlikely that the company would turn away Euro­pean customers; but an interruption due to political reasons cannot be ruled out. For instance, priority could be given to US satel­lites used for military purposes. While the risk of losing access to all SpaceX services is low, such an eventuality would have severe consequences, as Europe’s capabilities to independently launch satellites into orbit are very limited.

The European heavy-lift launch vehicle Ariane 6, which has been financed and de­veloped by the member states of the Euro­pean Space Agency (ESA), would be capable of reaching the strategically important geo­stationary orbit (at an altitude of approximately 36,000 km above Earth); however, it is still unclear how frequently the launcher can be used. The current near-term goal is for Ariane 6 to carry out up to 10 launches per year, but if and when such a launch cadence can be achieved remains unknown.

Several obstacles complicate Europe’s efforts to establish its own launch market. First, the European satellite market is com­paratively small and thus demand for launch services is low, accounting for approximately 1 per cent of the global launch market. How­ever, the interdependence between the satellite market and launch capabilities sug­gests that the planned expansion of Euro­pean space capabilities and the associated commercial growth, are likely to have a positive impact on the European launch market.

Second, a structural transformation is required – one in which European demand is consolidated. Only in this way can suffi­cient demand be generated and the launch market made competitive. To this end, the European Launcher Challenge by ESA and the European Flight Ticket Initiative by ESA and the EU have been established. Both ini­tiatives provide financial support to launch companies, with ESA serving ultimately as anchor customer. As both are still at an early stage of development, it is too soon to assess how successful they will be.

Europe has demonstrated that it can develop and launch its own rockets. The key challenge now is for ESA and the EU to structure the launch market efficiently so that European launch capabilities are economically attractive for regional com­panies.

Space Situational Awareness

Space situational awareness enables the monitoring of events and potential threats in space, as well as the tracking of one’s own satellites. Threats can include other satellites equipped with weapons systems or surveillance technology. For instance, in September 2025 Germany reported that a Russian satellite appeared to be shadowing a communications satellite used by the Bundeswehr, presumably with the intent to commit espionage. Continuous monitoring of the space environment is therefore cru­cial for the protection of national satellite systems.

European space actors use ground-based radar stations to collect data on the space environment. Some of these data are shared through multilateral vehicles, such as the EU Space Surveillance and Tracking (EU SST) system. However, for operationally relevant information – such as when hos­tile satellites are approaching one’s own – European capabilities are insufficient and Europe has to rely on the more detailed data provided by the US military. Thus, a gap is evident in Europe’s space defence and deterrence capabilities.

Continuing to share data with Europe is in the United States’ interest, as this prac­tice helps create a safer space environment. Nevertheless, there is a risk of the US being unable to provide its data or able to do so only with a delay, which could have serious consequences. Such a scenario might materi­alise if the United States were to become involved in a conflict – and particularly if American satellite systems themselves were targeted.

Building a comprehensive space situational awareness system is a complex under­taking that requires massive investments. The barriers to Europe developing independent capabilities are significant, not least owing to its starting position. Even in the United States, the development process is not considered complete: over the next four years, US$1.7 billion will be spent solely on the country’s ground-based radar capabilities. With substantial financial resources, Europe could expand its capa­bilities; however, structural and political issues still need to be addressed. Right now, it remains unclear whether individual states will continue to invest in their own capabilities or whether a multilateral sys­tem within the EU or ESA is to be pursued.

Satellite Communication

Satellite communication is essential for modern defence, including for command and control purposes and the networking of sensors. Europe possesses some national capabilities that enables satellite communication, while NATO consolidates the com­munications satellite systems of France, the United Kingdom, Italy and the United States.

For this reason, Europe’s dependence on the US in the field of satellite communication is comparatively low at present. How­ever, demands on communication networks are increasing: more bandwidth is needed as the volume of data to be processed in­creases in sensor-rich battlefields. In prac­tice, this means that a resilient network is required to connect sensors and transmit data in a timely manner. This is underscored by the German armed forces’ vision of Multi-Domain Operations (MDO), which is also being pursued by NATO. MDO entails military operations across all domains, for which synchronisation is essential. It demands a network that not only provides sufficient bandwidth but is also resilient and interoperable. To achieve this data capacity, it is very likely that at least part of the network will have to be space-based. The war in Ukraine provides a pointer on how this might work, at least in relation to drones: SpaceX’s Starlink satellite constel­lation offers connectivity with high data capacity via an internet connection and can thus be used for drone operations. Thanks to the simple internet connection, the sys­tem is interoperable without requiring additional linkages. Moreover, software up­dates have proved that it is highly resilient.

However, European dependence on Star­link would be risky – and not just because it is potentially a single (not to mention com­mercial) point of failure. According to anonymous sources, the Trump adminis­tration instrumentalised Starlink on one occasion and used it as a political lever, although SpaceX CEO Elon Musk has denied that happened. Media reports suggest the Trump administration was acting in rela­tion to Ukraine, despite Poland having paid SpaceX around US$50 million per year to maintain the service for Kyiv. While, ulti­mately, the service was not suspended, the incident demonstrated that the political interests of the US government could over­ride the commercial interests of a company.

Europe is in possession of several communications satellite systems that enable military communication. These systems form part of the capabilities of the major European space actors – France, the UK, Italy and Germany. However, even if they are able to provide high data capacity and fast transmission, it is unlikely that demand can be met in full without commercial service providers. Furthermore, there is the question of resilience: building a resilient system requires both diversity and redun­dancy.

Europe would need a system similar to Starlink to connect a large number of sen­sors via satellite networks and ensure seam­less interoperability. Potential European alternatives – such as the commercial OneWeb constellation or the planned EU constellation IRIS² – remain qualitatively inferior or come with uncertainty as regards their timeline for completion. Thus, while Europe is independent in satellite communication for command and control, it is not yet autonomous in sensor networking.

In order to meet demand, Europe will have to establish a constellation – in other words, hundreds of satellites. Such an undertaking faces several challenges, par­ticularly regarding production capacity and scaling. At present, European companies have no experience in the mass production of satellites, owing to what, historically, has been insufficient demand. Moreover, there are deficiencies in the supply chains. Many components are imported: among other things, Europe relies on supplies of elec­trical, electronic, and electromechanical parts, as well as software, from outside the region. That reliance could prove critical in the event of a conflict. Consequently, states should encourage their domestic industries to assess whether components would remain available in times of crisis. Further­more, companies should be asked to ensure that components – especially security-relevant or highly innovative ones – are adequately protected against sabotage and industrial espionage.

Some of these challenges, including pro­duction and scaling, could be addressed simply through increased funding. The cost of the newly planned satellite factory in Berlin of the US company Planet Labs, is in the eight-figure range, which illustrates the high initial investment required to build such infrastructure. Projects of this kind need to be supported financially not only by individual European states but also by the EU so that European companies remain in the region and Europe itself is able to benefit from their products and services.

Finally, bureaucratic hurdles further com­plicate cooperation among European com­panies. A unified legal framework is still lacking. Although the EU has published a draft European Space Law, that legislation is not expected to enter into force until 2030. Therefore, it remains to be seen to what extent the new law will create more favour­able conditions for industry in which capac­ities can be pooled and scaling facilitated.

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)

Satellite imagery enables secure, rapid and precise reconnaissance; and, for this reason, it is an important component of modern warfare – for example, in target acquisition. Space-based intelligence data are cur­rently shared by NATO members, with the US possessing by far the most ISR satellites. The number of satellites is relevant because it is not only the resolution of a satellite image that matters but also the revisit rate (that is, the frequency with which a satellite passes over the same point on Earth, allow­ing the data to be updated).

At the same time, it is important to note that the United States has used the exchange or provision of intelligence data for politi­cal purposes, namely, in March 2025, when the flow of satellite data to Ukraine was suspended. This affected not only data from the US military but also from the commercial provider Maxar. Even though the pro­vision of data to Ukraine was not within the framework of NATO but on a bilateral basis, it cannot be ruled out that the US will also withhold reconnaissance data from Euro­pean NATO states – at least temporarily – perhaps to encourage European countries to invest more in their own capabilities.

In addition, the process of data sharing within NATO is not a trouble-free one, even under “normal” conditions. Different IT sys­tems complicate that process; and in some cases, real-time transmission is not possible. This means that it is not even necessary to deliberately withhold intelligence data – a delay in US release could in itself under­mine a European mission. And as is the case in space situational awareness, data could be delayed or only transmitted in part owing to increased US internal demand.

Europe’s own space-based intelligence capabilities are limited. They consist of small constellations owned by Germany, France and Italy that enable military recon­naissance through optical and radar sen­sors. The United Kingdom, Spain and Poland are planning to have capabilities in this area, too. Thus, the revisit rate of Euro­pean capabilities is currently low, preventing a comprehensive, continuously avail­able situational picture from being formed.

The hurdles to building Europe’s own reconnaissance satellites on a large scale are similar to those for communications satel­lites: gaps exist, above all, in production capacity, scaling and supply chains. How­ever, unlike in the communications sector, there are already suitable commercial pro­viders on the market that could fill these gaps, such as the Finnish company ICEYE. But in contrast with the United States, the integration of commercial services into mili­tary structures is proceeding only slowly in Europe. NATO wants that to change, but it remains uncertain how suc­cessful the ini­tiatives planned by the alliance will be.

The continued resistance towards commercial integration will require a cultural shift in order to overcome this historic lack of investment. Europe’s total spending on space over the past 40 years amounts to just 15–20 per cent of the investments made in US space activities over the same period. In the United States, the potential value of commercial actors was recognised at an early stage and procurement processes modernised. If Europe is to seek the closer integration of its commercial capabilities into military operations, stronger support will be required at both the national and EU level. That means long-term contracts, which will allow industry to plan and in­vest, as well as an overhaul of procurement processes. Moreover, it will be up to NATO to integrate these partners into military infrastructures and enable unified, time-critical data transmission. In addition, per­sonnel will need to be trained to analyse the data and processes optimised.

Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT)

PNT services are essential for command and control and critical for weapons systems that rely on navigation signals for guidance, such as precision‑guided munitions. The US Global Positioning System (GPS) for troop command and control is used by NATO and integrated into all weapons systems guided by satellite‑based navigation signals. Theo­retically, this gives the United States the ability to degrade or even disable the capa­bil­ity of supplied weapons systems to receive GPS signals – for example, through software updates.

Ultimately, the extent of Europe’s depend­ence on software updates in weapons systems depends on the respective system. But as long as Europe continues to procure US weapons systems, limitations in range or targeting accuracy remain at least a theo­retical possibility, not least if – for political reasons – the United States were to dis­agree about the intended use of the weap­ons or the target. Even in the event of a collective defence scenario under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, the US could consider certain targets too escalatory, especially if it were not a direct party to the conflict.

The EU possesses its own navigation satel­lite system, Galileo, which could, at least in theory, reduce Europe’s dependence on the United States. The system was origi­nally designed for civilian use, but the in­troduction of the Galileo Public Regulated Service provides an encrypted signal for gov­ernmental users. The German armed forces plan to develop multifunctional receivers for their equipment so that they can receive both GPS and Galileo signals. However, the timeline for completion is not yet known. Also unclear is whether the receivers can be integrated into US systems, which make up a large part of Europe’s arsenal.

At the same time, it must be ensured that Galileo signals can be received in the event of a conflict, as it is relatively easy to disrupt satellite signals. Russian armed forces have significant electromagnetic war­fare capabilities, such as jammers. In the event of a confrontation with Moscow, Euro­pean systems would need to prove them­selves against Russian systems, which have been developed over many years, received massive investments and are combat‑tested.

While European projects aimed at enhanc­ing resilience in navigation already exist, they remain in the planning phase. Meanwhile, the UK government has an­nounced plans to develop a terrestrial long‑range navigation system, which could be operational by 2028. Other European states should invest in ground-based alter­natives, too; and these should be integrated into NATO’s navigation infrastructure. Technology is not a barrier here, as long-range navigation systems were still being operated in Europe until just a few years ago. The main obstacles are political – for example, there is a lack of awareness of how vulnerable the electromagnetic spec­trum is.

Missile Early Warning

Infrared sensors in space are capable of detecting the heat signature generated by a missile launch. Thus, they provide an early warning capability and generally give the attacked party more time to respond than ground-based radar systems. At the same time, space-based sensors make it possible to obtain a global overview of missile launches. At present, the United States is the only Western country to operate such a system.

As long as the US remains a member of NATO, it can be expected to share its mis­sile early warning data with other members of the alliance in the event of an attack. Washington has no interest in the destruction of European territory, not least because European infrastructure – for example, the RAF Fylingdales radar station in northern England and NATO’s Allied Air Command headquarters in Ramstein, Germany – con­stitutes an integral part of US capabilities. Therefore, concerns regarding the availability of early warning data are related, above all, to the risk of a potential overload on the US side, which could delay the transmission of data to Europe.

In the event of such a delay, Europe would have to rely solely on ground-based radar capabilities. Highly manoeuvrable and more advanced missile systems, such as hypersonic missiles, would likely be de­tected only at a late stage. Several projects aim to complement European radar capa­bilities with space-based sensors. They in­clude TWISTER with its space component, ODIN’S EYE, as well as JEWEL, which was recently announced by Germany and France and builds on ODIN’S EYE. However, no precise timeline has yet been established for either project. As a result, European missile defence – particularly with regard to space-based sensor capabilities – will remain dependent on the US at least in the medium term.

The obstacles to becoming more independent from the United States in missile early warning can be overcome. Europe has already invested in infrared technology and possesses the necessary technical know-how, although further investments are required. However, it is political issues that pose the greater challenge: as with space situational awareness, it must be clarified whether capabilities are to be procured multi­laterally and how they should be operated ultimately. Because of the ways in which data sharing and the warning of member states are organised, missile early warning can function only within the NATO framework. In the medium term, the most realistic option is for European data to complement US capabilities.