South Korean Trends

But how strong exactly were anti-American sentiments in South Korea last year? Some surveys provide us with some indications. First, there is some data from a regular international survey which was last conducted in October 2002. This survey, which included questions about how the US is perceived, came to the result that favourable views of the US had declined since 2000 in 20 out of 27 countries for which previous data was available. Among US allies, the deepest fall was recorded in Germany - from 78 to 61% - but the lowest favourable rating came from South Korea which saw a drop from 58 to 53%. Second, according to a Gallup poll conducted in December 2002 in the ROK, close to 55% of the respondents did not want to the US to leave Korea while nearly 32% were in favour of a withdrawal. Compared to 10 years ago, support for the US military presence had gone down by 8% while support for a withdrawal had gone up by 10%.

The same Gallop poll also showed that negative views of the US were most wide-spread among younger South Koreans. Thus, while only 26% of middle-age South Koreans held negative views of the US, the respective shares among South Koreans in their 20s and 30s were 76% and 67%. Moreover, 51% of the respondents believed that North Korea's nuclear intransigence was the result of Bush's hard-line policy. Only 25% attributed the problem to North Korean actions and intentions. In summing up, we can note that in the very same month Roh Moo-hyun got elected to become South Korea's new president, views of the US were far from favourable. However, a clear majority of South Koreans still supported the US troop presence - and this, it has to be remembered, at the peak of last year's wave of anti-Americanism. As Cha has rightly noted, a "powerful geostrategic logic pushes South Koreans to continue placing their bets on a relationship with the great power that and that shares their political and economic values - that is, the United States". Having said that, anti-Americanism is bound to remain a latent force in Korean society and politics. Whether it will gain in strength and put further strain on the US-ROK alliance depends not in the least on North Korea's future behaviour and the US role - real and perceived - in the six-party talks

Let us now link the last presidential election and the recent bout of anti-Americanism in South Korea. Looking at the small difference in the final vote tally between Roh and Lee in the election - only slightly more than 2% -, it has been suggested that Roh made it into the Blue House because he was the much more US-critical candidate among the two big contenders. However, any other personality or media-related factor - Roh as the more convincing political reformer, Roh as the anti-establishment figure able to mobilize disillusioned voters, Roh's savvy use of Internet-based campaigning - could equally be used to explain the final difference between Roh and Lee. What is to my mind, however, much more important, is that for the first time divisive policy and ideological issues played a role in elections in democratic South Korea. Now, the interesting question is whether this new political cleavage - which, as I suggested, is closely connected to generational trends - will help to bring about a new party system.

My personal hunch is that the 2002 presidential election is indeed a harbinger of things to come. While region-based voting is far from dead, partisan realignment coalescing around the progressive/conservative-cleavage will continue. But it will take time to take effect; we can thus view the current phase as a transition period. The parliamentary election next April will give us some idea how far partisan realignment has proceeded. What I do not expect at this point, is that, ceteris paribus, the coming election will help to solve the current problem of divided government, i.e. the opposition controlling the parliament. As you know, right now the oppositional Grand National Party holds nearly 150 out of 273 seats in the parliament. Roh's own party has split up, being divided into the remnants of the old Honam-based Millennium Democratic Party and some 40 Roh loyalists who have formed the so-called "Uri-dang" or "Our Party". If, and this is indeed a very big if, the GNP manages to secure two-thirds of the parliamentary seats next April, politics in Korea will be effectively paralysed. If such a situation occurred, and again I do not see it coming, Roh would not even be able to govern by surfing the waves of popular opinion.

In general terms, divided government - as we witness it right now in South Korea - makes implementing consistent policies difficult in the first place. But Roh's lack of leadership and the well-meaning, if sometimes amateurish and naïve approach of his administration have certainly compounded the current political crisis in South Korea. Unfortunately, I do not see much ground for optimism for the short to medium-term future. In the worst case, the current crisis of governance will continue until the end of Roh's term. This, of course, would not bode well for South Korea's ability to deal effectively with issues such as the nuclearisation of North Korea and the faltering economy. But then maybe, my discussant is somehow able to restore my faith.