Defining the Terms

As well as offering an operationalised definition of the key concept, we also ask what Germany needs to do – on its own and in cooperation with its Euro­pean partners – in order to achieve greater strategic autonomy or sovereignty for Europe, and what ob­stacles, difficulties and conflicts of goals are to be expected. What is necessary and urgent? What is pos­sible at all? What material and political resources will Germany and Europe need to commit? What red lines will Germany in particular encounter in its own internal politics and among its partners? And which questions will need further political discussion?

Fundamentally, we understand strategic autonomy as the ability to set one’s own priorities and make one’s own decisions in matters of foreign policy and security, together with the institutional, political and material wherewithal to carry these through – in cooperation with third parties, or if need be alone. Strong strategic autonomy means being able to set, modify and enforce international rules, as opposed to (unwillingly) obeying rules set by others. The opposite of strategic autonomy is being a rule-taker subject to strategic decisions made by others: the United States, China or Russia. Germany can achieve strategic autono­my only in concert with its European partners.

Our understanding of strategic autonomy thus encompasses the entire spectrum of foreign policy and security, and not just the dimension of defence. Autonomy is – like the related term power – rela­tional, in the sense that it is realised in relation to others. It may represent an objective but is not an end in itself; rather it is a means to protect and promote values and interests. Politically, this is about an in­crease in autonomy, a process of gradual autonomisation, rather than an absolute condition. Autonomy means neither autarchy nor isolation, nor rejection of alliances. An autonomous actor decides on its own, on the basis of its own priorities, with which other actors it wishes to seek partnerships and alliances. In an interdependent world autarchy is neither possible nor desirable. Partners are essential for protecting and promoting values and interests. For Germany these are primarily the European Union and its members, with which it shares the project of European inte­gra­tion, and the other European NATO states.

Relevance and Purpose of Strategic Autonomy

This is not the first time that Europe has conducted abroader political debate about the idea of assuming greater responsibility for its own interests and secu­rity (see text box “Background: Strategic autonomy and European integration”, p. 6). The timing of the current European debate is attributable above all to US Presi­dent Donald Trump’s rejection of central elements of the liberal international order. Other key international actors like Russia have also challenged central components of the international order. So the

problems to which greater strategic autonomy is sup­posed to supply solutions are not restricted to the future of the transatlantic relationship, and are con­siderably more complex. We can speak of normative, territorial and institutional dimensions: International norms and principles – such as the prohibitions on torture, on the use of force in international relations, or on the use of chemical weapons – have been ex­plicitly or implicitly called into question. Individual actors have chosen to use force to change a territorial order that had largely held since 1945. And the United States, together with other states that other­wise present themselves as supporters of the inter­national order, has weakened international organisations, inter­national regimes, and international agreements by ignoring, exiting, undermining or even seeking to break them up.

The EU and its member states are under pressure from within and without: from within because the normative, political and institutional structure of the EU threatens to collapse under the weight of external crises and populist and nationalist movements; from without because competing actors with deviating normative ideas and interests (United States, Russia, China) seek to influence the EU’s inner workings and to sow division among the member states. At the same time the EU and its member states find it in­creasingly difficult to play an effective part in shaping the global order, when other major powers pick and choose among international rules or throw them overboard altogether.

The need and capacity for strategic autonomy vary between policy fields and sets of rules. In the area of trade policy and the World Trade Organisation, the EU’s exclusive responsibility forms the basis for suc­cessfully asserting its policies and preferences. In digi­talisation and data protection too, the EU possesses both the means and the will to exert international influence. But the dispute with Washington over the Iran nuclear deal underlines how hard it is for the EU to defend its own ideas about international order and security against political and economic pressure. Europe still has huge steps before it on the road to strategic autonomisation, and not only strengthening its own defence capacities. But at the same time the necessity to travel this road in order to be able to pro­tect Europe’s own values and interests is very clear.

A critical analysis will demonstrate that the striv­ing for strategic autonomy involves contradictions and conflicts of goals that politics cannot ignore for ever. The rejection of binding international rules – which characterises the current policies of the United States and other major powers – is after all discussed as an attempt to gain or regain (more) control or sov­ereignty. In their striving for greater strategic autono­my or sovereignty for Europe, Germany and its Euro­pean partners need to clearly distance themselves from that standpoint, both discursively and practically. Otherwise, in the worst case, Europe could actually encourage a further erosion or compartmentalisation of the international order rather than strengthening it. That would fundamentally contradict German and European interests. Precisely for that reason it is im­portant to describe and understand strategic autonomy not as an end in itself but as a means to guard values and interests. That also means upholding and developing an international order that is at least rules-based, open and inclusive, and if possible also liberal.

What We Are (or Should Be) Talking About

Our analyses and recommendations relate to the Fed­eral Republic of Germany as an actor. In the following chapters we will address significant aspects that belong on the agenda if an expansion of European strategic autonomy is to be sought. Each of these individual aspects (also) affects German politics, and demands discussions and decisions in Berlin. Ger­many is not the EU’s hegemon, but for many member states it is a (or the) leading nation. Without a deci­sive German contribution there can be no European strategic autonomy or autonomisation. At the same time Germany can only expand its strategic autonomy within the European context, in concert with its Euro­pean partners. And this will have to involve a sym­metrical or at least more balanced European partner­ship with the United States.

Rather than attempting to cover all the regions and policy areas of general importance to Germany and Europe, we concentrate on those issues and inter­national relationships that most central to the neces­sary discussions on the concept of strategic autonomy. In our pursuit of a comprehensive understanding of the concept, twenty-nine researchers at SWP have con­tributed to this study and furnished their respec­tive perspectives. Critical questions were discussed openly and controversially, and it should be noted that not all recommendations are necessarily shared by all the authors.

The first section discusses the EU as – from the German perspective – the most important framework for the strategic autonomisation of Europe: the EU’s insti­tutional development and foreign policy and security action-readiness, the roles of France and the United Kingdom, and the question of the legitimacy of a more autonomous or sovereign Europe. The second section examines the instruments, capabilities and resources that strategic autonomisation demands in various fields. Attention is also paid to Europe’s vul­ner­abilities and its conflict-readiness, not least in de­fending the rules-based international order that is so vital for the EU and its members. The issues include defence capabilities and deployabilty, the defence in­dustrial base, deterrence and the cooperation of Euro­pean armed forces, as well as economic and monetary considerations, diplomacy, sanctions and the resilience against sanctions imposed by others, intelligence, and civilian conflict management. Finally, we turn to the other international actors that shape the increasingly multipolar international system – or claim a right to define it: the relationships to the United States, China, Russia and other middle and emerging powers. In the concluding section we summarise our central recommendations for German policymakers, with reference to Germany’s leading or co-leading role.

Internal Preconditions for Strategic Autonomisation: Leadership – Efficiency – Capacity to Act

The question of greater European strategic autonomy is inextricably bound up with future constitutional developments in EU integration between deepening, differentiation and reversal. The current complexity of internal circumstances makes it difficult for the EU to render any effective contribution on strategic autono­misation: the CFSP and CSDP are inter-gov­ern­mental and consensus-based, and therefore tend to be slow, indecisive and susceptible to blockades and vetoes of single member states. At the same time grow­ing centrifugal forces are reflected in national unilateralisms and idiosyncrasies. In practice bringing together the Union’s external action under the leader­ship of the High Representative of the Union for For­eign Affairs and Security Policy is a piecemeal affair. That includes the spectrum from external trade policy through sanctions, institution-building and humanitarian aid to civilian and military missions. The EU is often far removed from collective positioning and action on the international stage. The larger EU mem­ber states in particular enjoy access to alternative forums. Disparate loyalties and contradictory interests also ensure that almost all political conflicts with major powers like the United States, China or Russia almost inevitably also generate friction within the EU. Simply keeping the slow-grinding wheels of consensus in motion consumes enormous political energy in Brussels and the national capitals, a price argued to be justified in terms of the objective of cohesion. Nevertheless the trade-off between inclusivity and legitimacy on the one side, efficiency and action on the other is increasingly unsatisfactory, as it prevents the EU from effectively asserting its interests and values.

In light of the planned departure of the United King­dom – as a foreign policy and security heavyweight – and the conceivable future accession of small Balkan states with little potential but full voting rights, the prospects are not going to improve in the short and medium term. Brexit means the end of the informal leadership triangle and leaves the two – relatively largest – middle powers France and Germany at the political heart of a Union of twenty-seven. Both are adjacent to geopolitically relevant spaces of instability in the southern and eastern neigh­bourhoods, and could as such channel the dif­ferent perceptions and foster a balancing of interests. Germany and France will have to drive the development of the EU’s internal leadership. In essence, Paris and Berlin will have to ensure an integrative equi­librium within the EU, also in the field of external policies, especially the CFSP/CSDP. In this equilibrium through integration the power differences between the mem­ber states will be balanced by the representation and decision-making rights specific to the EU’s institutional system. To date this equilibrium has been most relevant in the internal policies and the EU’s constitutional advances, and has been based on Franco-German compromises. A corresponding expan­sion to the CFSP/CSDP would require Germany to make sometimes painful decisions.

There are two fundamental options on the table: an incremental approach and a true system transformation of the EU.

There are two fundamental options on the table: an incremental approach and a true system transformation putting a directorate in charge of foreign and security policy. These proposals pose the question of how cohesion within the EU would be preserved, and to what extent. Both options could be configured for compatibility with a – currently rather unlikely – shift towards a federal EU.

Incremental approach (reform option): A shift from unanimity to selective (issue-specific) majority voting in the CFSP would align with the gradual/incremental approach. Qualified majority voting could be intro­duced for decisions, actions and positions, démarches and declarations, and greater use could be made of the treaty possibilities of enhanced cooperation and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). The latter produces variable geometry – although given the (German) preference for inclusivity often only after long exploratory discussions and as a last resort. Further options include delegating the implementation of CFSP decisions to particular countries or coun­try groups, and initiating contact groups and special formats that may be integrated ex post into EU struc­tures or can be linked to these, such as the E-3. Groups of countries may also emerge to engage regularly around particular issues or regions.

All these paths and instruments could be used more frequently and consistently, and not least be developed further in response to crises and challenges. The drawbacks are frequently slow ad hoc solutions, unclear burden sharing, unpredictability and weak­ness. The advantages lie in flexibility, in the sense of either using the EU framework or operating outside it, or employing a combination. One example of the latter would be the Franco-German-led talks with Russia and Ukraine in the Normandy Format. This option would also facilitate the engagement of third states like the United Kingdom, Norway, Turkey, Canada and others.

Enhancing efficiency through majority voting in the CFSP is a necessary step from the German per­spec­tive, but is regarded more cautiously in France for the risk of losing control and influence. Majority voting might be more acceptable for Paris if it were com­bin­ed with other steps such as a structural shift favour­ing the larger EU states. Small and medium-sized states fear that a transition to and expansion of majority voting would create a dynamic leading to regular and formally legitimised “majoritarian rule” by the large and influential member states. For many of them the attraction of the EU lies precisely in its fundamentally non-hegemonic structure. In order to stay well clear of the “slippery slope” they are blocking application of the passerelle clause (Article 48 (7) TEU), which creates an option for majority voting on matters out­side the military/defence sphere. Enhanced cooperation and other possibilities for exploiting the existing treaty options for majority decisions have also been little used to date. In fact the EU sees its unity and ability to balance the interests of very different states very much as a strength, also in the realm of external policy.

System transformation (directorate option): This would represent the more radical move, involving a break with the equality principle in favour of a permanent differentiation of member states’ rights to partici­pation and decision-making in the CFSP/CSDP. This would require the establishment of new structures and considerable adaptation of existing ones, and would amount to a true system transformation. Specifically, a directorate, for example a European Security Council (EU-SC), would be established above the European Council as the nerve centre of the CFSP. The five largest EU member states – Germany, France, Italy, Spain and Poland – and the President of the European Council would be permanent mem­bers of this super-formation, joined by six other EU countries on a rotating basis; the Presidency of the Council of the EU would always be one of the non-permanent members. This arrangement could be organised broadly on the model of the UN Security Council. The permanent members qualify on account of their size and geographical location, but would also have to be willing to invest in common goods and shared capabilities and policies. They would have to accept joint decisions as binding and place external representation, to a much greater extent than hither­to, in joint hands. That cannot be taken for granted, but would be imperative for internal acceptance of the directorate. In this concept the full European Council would function as something like a delib­erative plenary to discuss issues before the twelve-member EU-SC take decisions, but lose its role as the strategic centre and final instance on external policy. The entire underpinnings of EU external policy would have to be adapted, above all the Political and Secu­rity Committee, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the office of the High Representative.

The advantages of such a hierarchisation lie in the potential for efficiency gains, although these still presuppose the usual compromise and package solu­tions, which would still have to be worked out under the new conditions – in and by the entire EU nego­tiating system. Disputes and rivalries in the EU-SC would be expected to be considerably less sharp and paralysing than for example in the UN Security Council.

For smaller states with limited foreign policy agendas of their own and small diplomatic and inter­national services, the transformed system would at least bring cost savings. They might not automatically lose control and influence but that would be their fear. Germany could continue to uphold its self-appointed role as guardian of the interests of the smaller countries (which the smaller countries them­selves regard with mistrust). But this would become considerably harder in the context of a firm Franco-German alliance. Political/strategic convergence pro­cesses within the EU-SC could nevertheless be accel­erated and improved in the medium term. If the EU became more effective, energetic and united through such a transformation, it would be more likely to be perceived as a relevant strategic actor by powers like the United States or China.

The flip side of a directorate solution would be the loss of the principle of equality among member states and the danger of exacerbating frictions among them, if countries felt that they were left out and that their interests were not adequately represented. It would therefore have to be ensured that all member states – populations as well as governments – and all EU organs regarded the decisions made at the EU-SC level as legitimate. This would mean finding formally and politically convincing participation and decision-making processes and communication forms.

A European Security Council detached from the EU would be weak and powerless.

Above and beyond these issues, the directorate solution poses the question of vertical linkage with the EU’s policy-making system, with decisions and policies in areas like trade, competition and monetary policy. It is therefore relevant where and how an EU‑SC might be installed and what its remit would be. The state-like agenda for the EU would also bring clear theoretical advantages in the Foreign and Secu­rity Policy, making the Union the most suitable framework for pursuing Germany’s foreign policy objectives: namely, protecting the EU space in the broadest sense, gaining a voice in global politics, and shaping the international order. The EU’s entire port­folio – all its political, economic, military and cul­tural re­sources – could and would have to be mobil­ised. A Euro­pean Security Council detached from the EU would be weak and powerless. Given the centrality of economic/technological and monetary power in inter­national politics, they are also central to any internal transformation. But the aspect where Europe has furthest to catch up is the military component of secu­rity policy and its intersection with civilian crisis and conflict management. Permanent liaison and task-sharing with other actors like NATO, UN, OSCE and “G” groups therefore remain indispensable.

France: Germany’s Most Important Partner

Whether the CFSP/CSDP is gradually expanded or a directorate is established, France will be Germany’s foremost partner in steering the EU towards strategic autonomy. France itself is likely to want to push towards a directorate, because the government of President Emmanuel Macron, more than any other country, champions efforts to make Europe more “sovereign”. Macron’s far-reaching proposals for “re­founding Europe” name central fields of action, capa­bilities and resources that the EU must establish and develop if it is to become more strategic and autonomous in external policy terms. Alongside the Com­mon Defence and Security Policy this also applies to reform of the euro zone, including a functioning banking union and transfer mechanism; private and public investment in research, new technologies and the strengthening of innovation and competitiveness; and a leading role in international climate policy. If Germany is serious about its desire for strategic autono­my it will have to engage meaningfully with the French proposals, with the objective of agreeing a shared line with Paris and pursuing it consistently. Otherwise the project of Europe taking its own fate more firmly into its own hands is likely to quickly reach a dead end. Germany’s dealings with France will become a test of how well three objectives – that are weighted differently by Berlin and Paris – can be reconciled under the umbrella of strategic autonomy: differentiation between EU member states (for exam­ple in a directorate or core groups), the role of France and Germany as the motor of the Union, and the co­hesion of the EU as a whole. Paris requires Berlin to make difficult fundamental decisions, specifically in the currently most dynamic area of bilateral cooperation, namely security and defence cooperation.

The two governments have agreed joint military procurement projects and, under the auspices of strategic autonomy, criteria for Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in the scope of the Common Secu­rity and Defence Policy (CSDP). Beyond this, both sides are in broad agreement about the future of trans­atlantic relations and multilateralism. Since Washington withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal, Berlin and Paris have grown closer together in central foreign policy and security questions. Both emphasise that strategic autonomy for the EU in no sense means competition with NATO and that no parallel struc­tures are to be created. Instead, they say, transatlantic relations will become more robust in the medium term, as the EU states assume greater financial and opera­tional responsibility for their own security.

The defence and security dimension of European strategic autonomy is discussed in very concrete terms in Paris.

The defence and security dimension of European strategic autonomy is discussed in very concrete terms in Paris, for example in relation to giving sub­stance to the “mutual defence clause” of the Treaty of Lisbon (Article 42 (7)), which stipulates: “If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obli­gation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.” The French government has chosen to make Article 42 (7) a priority because it regards stra­tegic autonomy as meaning the EU’s ability to operate independently. Paris places collective defence at the heart of its deliberations and discusses four scenarios in which the EU needs to be able to respond without assistance from the United States: a terror attack against an EU member state, a hybrid attack, an attack against an EU member state that is not a member of NATO (principally Sweden or Finland), or an armed attack on a NATO ally where the United States is not willing to respond militarily under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. There is also debate in Paris about whether France should in future regard an attack on an EU or NATO partner as an attack on France, to which it could then also respond using nuclear weapons. By focussing on collective defence Paris is seeking to counter the impression that France is interested only in its own narrowly defined stra­tegic interests. Many EU countries suspected that President Macron’s “European intervention initiative” would principally benefit France through greater European military engagement in Africa. At the same time Paris puts Berlin in a difficult situation with its focus on collective defence, because Germany has to date located that question exclusively in the NATO framework.

Paris is pushing for advances in smaller groups, in the EU in general and especially in the Security and Defence Policy. Berlin also sees the need for this. But as the launch of PESCO demonstrated, it remains the case that France presses for exclusivity and optimal capacity to act while Germany looks more to inclu­sivity and legitimacy. France continues to assertively court Germany and offers exclusive cooperation, regard­ing a Franco-German entente as a first step towards a possible “Europeanisation” of the Security and Defence Policy. At least two projects are involved:

Firstly Paris would prefer to introduce the most important scenarios for independent action in con­nection with Article 42 (7), principally together with Germany. This would also open the opportunity for both sides to take the “Élysée Treaty 2.0” (Treaty of Aachen 2019) clearly beyond the document of 1963 (and beyond formulaic affirmations of strategic autonomy). Secondly, Paris has long been striving to reduce Europe’s dependency on the United States in defence procurement, and would like to create a more ambitious EU Defence Fund orientated on the needs of EU states with internationally competitive defence industries. Germany and France, Paris be­lieves, should operate as pioneers here, and define joint arms export guidelines. The French government sees little to gain from discussing these questions and processes among all twenty-seven EU member states. Finally the question also arises of the extent to which Berlin would be willing to assume (defence and secu­rity) responsibility for its EU partners and bear most of the associated costs.

These examples underline how Germany needs to review or even revise its integration preferences. That is likely to be necessary even under the incremental reform option described above, because even this would have to supply substantial progress on auton­o­misation. France is very critical of the German ten­dency to place great weight on defining the governance framework but to neglect the substance and purpose (as the United Kingdom always has been too).

The Status and Special Role of the United Kingdom

In the past the mere fact that the United Kingdom was a member of the EU gave grounds to believe that the EU could possess strategic qualities in the sphere of foreign policy and security. Brexit sees the EU relinquishing prestige in this respect and losing a potent actor in the CFSP and internal security, above all concerning cooperation between intelligence services. As a member, it should be remembered, the United Kingdom worked to restrict any de facto strengthening of the CFSP to pooling of sovereignty and capabilities, and rejected deeper legally binding integration of the kind that would be required for either the reform or directorate option. For either of these routes the United Kingdom would be at least a difficult partner, if not an obstacle. Anyway, the post-Brexit United Kingdom intends to pursue a decidedly national path predicated on independence and self-reliance under the motto “Global Britain”.

Regardless of its “special relation­ship” with the United States, the United Kingdom stands with EU‑Europe on major foreign policy issues.

The British will naturally continue to play a strategic role (at least in Europe) and will remain an impor­tant partner for the EU even after they leave. The United Kingdom possesses significant strategic and foreign policy resources, with its permanent seat on the UN Security Council, one of the world’s largest diplomatic networks, and close historical relations with countries like the United States, Canada, Aus­tralia and India. The United Kingdom is the only Euro­pean member of the exclusive Five Eyes intel­ligence cooperation, alongside the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. In terms of security and defence it also possesses a nuclear deter­rent of its own, highly combat-ready armed forces (compared to other European countries), close mili­tary integration with individual EU states, and a large independent defence industry. As the world’s fifth-largest economy, accounting for about 16 percent of the EU-28’s GDP with the City of London representing Europe’s largest financial centre, the United Kingdom is also a relevant factor in trade conflicts and eco­nomic sanctions. Those are areas where the EU needs to – and is willing to – prove its ability and deter­mination. Regardless of its “special relationship” with the United States, the United Kingdom stands with EU-Europe on major foreign policy issues such as Iran, the Paris Climate Agreement and the Middle East conflict. The United Kingdom itself wants a very close relationship with the EU, including foreign and security policy, which would enable a spectrum of cooperation from regular consultations to inclusion in the EU’s military operations and programmes. The current state of play is that the EU-27 are open to an ambitious partnership, as long as the existing limits for third states also apply to the United Kingdom. That means above all no voting rights and limits on participation in major projects such as the satellite navigation system Galileo, which is important for strategic autonomy.

The EU has two fundamental options for integrating the United Kingdom into the European Foreign and Security Policy after Brexit. The first prioritises strengthening the EU. Here the United Kingdom would be included on the basis of the existing rules for third states, without a vote or a seat in the EU’s organs and committees. The United Kingdom could for example participate in the EU Defence Fund (making a considerable contribution proportionate to its GDP), but would not have any formal say on how the money was spent. This “second-class” treatment could drive the British towards other forums like NATO, the French intervention initiative or other bi- and multilateral cooperations (which it might initiate itself). But if a European intervention was vital and a British contribution relevant, then action could be taken by an ad hoc coalition of willing and able states, rather than the EU itself.

The second option prioritises inclusion of the United Kingdom in the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy, granting it a special role on the basis that it falls into a different category than Norway or Turkey. Here the EU would grant special rights not otherwise open to a third state, such as partial or even general participation in EU foreign policy and security organs (for example in the case of participation in an EU opera­tion), as well as in programmes like Galileo and the EU Defence Fund. In return the United Kingdom would contribute its resources to the EU Foreign and Security Policy on a flexible basis. The gain for Euro­pean strategic autonomy would have to be weighed against the watering down or devaluation of the rights and duties of membership and the opening up of back-door options for vetoes and de facto par­tici­pation in the decision-making process without clearly defined responsibilities and burden-sharing.

The first option – strengthening the EU system – would be easiest to reconcile with the two options on the table for the future of the CFSP, reform or directorate. The option of a special arrangement for the United Kingdom would – like Britain’s EU mem­bership to date – hamper meaningful institutional progress.

Legitimacy

Strategic autonomy, in the sense of the ability to make and implement foreign policy and security decisions, requires strong internal and external political legitimacy.

Internal legitimacy depends on the citizens and the governments of the member states recognising the EU as a political system worth supporting. Because the EU is not a state, it cannot be judged by the same stand­ards of democracy and legitimate governance. The EU’s general and specific democracy deficits have long been discussed in political and academic circles.

Two questions are especially relevant with regard to the EU’s strategic autonomy: In which cases and under which conditions is it legitimate to transition to qualified majority voting in the EU Foreign and Security Policy? And in which cases is it advisable to involve the European Parliament for reasons of legitimacy?

It should be noted first of all that the use of military force – whether in the scope of NATO, the EU, the UN or a “coalition of the willing” – remains the sole prerogative of the member states according to their own national rules. Proposals to expand stra­tegic autonomy leave this absolutely unchanged, at least as long as there is no European army. In its ruling on the Treaty of Lisbon the German Federal Constitutional Court underlined that only the Ger­man Bundestag can legitimise the deployment of German combat forces or approve German partici­pation in shared military structures.

No state can be forced into foreign policy positions or actions against its will.

The inter-governmental principle grants every member state a veto in the CFSP. No state can be forced into foreign policy positions or actions against its will. But the member states must actively support the CFSP and act in the spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity in order to secure predictability and con­vergence of positions. Majority voting is, however, permissible in other policy areas of importance for the development of strategic autonomy. This applies above all to the Common Trade Policy, the single market and the euro zone. The member-state strand of legitimacy relies on the (weighted) votes of the mem­ber states in the Council, while the supranational strand implies the participation of the European Par­liament. All decisions and legal acts (outside the CFSP) are also subject to the oversight of the European Court of Justice. If (qualified) majority voting replaces unanimity in the CFSP in order to enhance the EU’s action-readiness, or decisions are placed in the hands of a European Security Council, the EU will find itself confronted with known legitimacy issues:

To date the principle of unanimity in the CFSP/ CSDP has guaranteed formal equality in the Council and the European Council between states with dif­ferent (power-)political weight. Malta, Ireland and Cyprus wield exactly the same veto power as Ger­many, France and Spain. Especially from the perspec­tive of the smaller and medium-sized states, any deviation from unanimity raises the question of how their interests are to be guarded and how they can assert influence. If no consensus can be reached, this means that a minority could not be persuaded, despite an earnest search for compromise. So the question arises whether CFSP decisions outside of military deployment are in fact different in nature from, for example, those in the Economic and Mon­etary Union (EMU). If these decisions are understood as being categorically different (with absolutely no possibility of majority voting, and thus a permanent veto option), there would be lessons to draw for the future. Countries with very specific or vital interests that are not shared or at least accepted by all existing EU states should not be joining the EU; one case in point would be Turkey. Membership for such coun­tries would offer no prospect of convergent foreign policy positions and a shared acquis politique. The par­ticipation of the European Parliament should also be considered in connection with the question of intro­ducing majority voting in the CFSP or strengthening the international role of the euro.

As far as the external dimension is concerned, the desire to strengthen strategic autonomy is bound up with the EU’s legitimacy as an international actor. The Union ties its external action to the principles of democracy, human rights and those defined in the United Nations Charter. It sets itself the objective of preserving its values (Article 2 TEU) and interests, as well as guarding its security, independence (!) and integrity (Article 21 (2) TEU). Strategic autonomisation must therefore also be dedicated to realising these goals and values; to that extent it is a means to an end. As such, the aforementioned objectives represent the yardstick for decisions of both principle and detail. Political debates about this at the national and EU level need to be conducted much more transparently and publicly. That is the job of parliaments. According to opinion surveys, EU-wide approval for greater cooperation between member states on for­eign policy and security is traditionally especially high. But common European policy often involves an unequal distribution of political, economic or financial costs between individual member states or social groups. That is the case where member states support one state out of solidarity, where an EU trade conflict or sanctions affect only part of the EU’s economy, or when military operations touch on the interests of only part of the membership. Then the actors of the Union – above all the member states – need to be willing and able to place these decisions in a broader context and communicate this to their citizens. That context may be solidarity with EU states or others, internal and external political credibility in terms of loyalty to European values, or a trade-off between different goods.

The EU’s legitimacy always feeds on both sources: indirectly through the member states and directly through the interaction of the Community organs. It therefore remains fundamental that all decisions are rooted in law. But this must also be guaranteed with­in the states of the Union. In foreign policy and secu­rity procedural legitimacy and output legitimacy are preconditions for acceptance.

Security and Diplomacy

Complete strategic autonomy for Europe in the sphere of defence and security would only be conceivable in the medium to long term, at best in ten to twenty years. Alongside adequate financing this would require the political support of all member states and their potential readiness to renounce national sover­eignty in order to achieve greater European self-reliance also in the military sphere. Greater strategic autonomy on the other hand demands above all the definition of an appropriate level of ambition guided by self-defined priorities, and the fulfilment of ensu­ing self-obligations. In this process it is decisive that the EU and NATO interact constructively rather than operating against each other.

Military capabilities can only be assessed against the relevant strategic goals. What appears appropriate and adequate for one purpose may be unsuitable or in­sufficient for another. In this connection three different levels of ambition need to be considered: a) (at least initially) ongoing dependency on the United States in the realm of collective defence while at the same time strengthening the European pillar of NATO; b) growing autonomy in a defence grey zone that does not necessarily involve the Alliance as a whole; and c) limited but necessarily growing autono­my in crisis management.

Economy, Trade, Competitiveness

Economic performance is a significant source of for­eign policy power. So it is not insignificant that the EU still accounts for 21.6 percent of global GDP, 15.2 percent of global trade in goods, more than 20 per­cent of trade in services and 21.2 percent of foreign investment.

Over time, however, the EU has been falling behind the other two main regions of North America (Canada, Mexico, United States) and East Asia (China, Japan, South Korea, ASEAN). This applies both to GDP (North America 27.8 percent, East Asia 26.5 percent) and foreign investment (North America 23.0 percent, East Asia 32.3 percent). Even if Europe is bound to con­tinue to fall further behind the Asian winners of globalisation, it will remain an economic pole on the global scale. Europe’s economic value creation, com­mercial decisions and technological innovations are all of global relevance. On account of its GDP, its broad industrial profile and its high foreign trade ratio Germany plays in a league of its own in Europe. The interdependency of trade and growth mean that Germany’s economic stability and growth are essen­tial both for Europe’s prosperity and for its global economic and political influence.

Germany and Europe’s economic stability, prosper­ity and competitiveness are subject to external and internal risks and vulnerabilities. For all the benefit European states and societies derive from intense global economic connectedness and interdependency, this occasionally creates so-called connectivity risks; the European economy depends on reliable external sources of energy, raw materials and technological components. The risk of macro-economic instability was highlighted in 2008/09 by the financial crisis, where the credit markets ceased to function for a time, in­come, employment and growth collapsed, and willing­ness to share losses within the euro zone dissipated.

Global competition means continuous defence of market positions against non-European competitors, creating ever new challenges for entrepreneurial initiative and state industrial policy. Germany and Europe will hardly be able to defend their competitive­ness without capable human capital, sophisticated market demand, an innovation-promoting environment, modern infrastructure and a forward-thinking regulatory system. Economic performance and tech­nological innovation are thus necessary preconditions for a European strategic autonomy.

As a global economic pole the Single Market is a veritable European power resource.

As a global economic pole the European Economic Area is a veritable European power resource. External economic interdependencies are always asymmetrical, so Europe’s economic relations with its neigh­bours always also have a power-political component. This applies even where it is unintended, as in the case of Ukraine’s Association Agreement with the EU. Conversely the EU’s intense external economic con­nections make it vulnerable, especially in relation to the heavyweights United States and China, which are both willing and able to actively exploit economic dependencies to assert political interests.

The United States and China are the EU’s princi­pal – but not only – partners and competitors (or even adversaries) in all global economic contexts.

United States

Even under President Trump the United States re­mains the preferred and most important partner for Europe. Indeed, until Europe undertakes enormous efforts of its own, the United States will be indispen­sable for its defence and security. But at the same time Trump’s motto “America First” and his disruptive and erratic foreign policy challenges Europe to more clearly define and protect its own interests. But the need for more European strategic autonomy stems from deeper and more structural factors than just a rejection of Trump’s presidency. Even if Donald Trump is not reelected as President in 2020, it would be short-sighted for Europe to place its faith in a return to the old days of transatlantic cooperation and to revert to the familiar role of the junior part­ner. In a speech in Brussels in December 2018, US Secretary of State Michael Pompeo underlined that Donald Trump’s critical perspective on multilateral cooperation in general and the EU in particular was in fact shared in large parts of his Administration. Only in a more balanced transatlantic partnership can Europe assert its interests in the way the United States claims the right to do. Europe and Germany should therefore prepare for more controversy, more open and more heated debates, and also for political disputes with the United States.

The United States under Trump regards the idea of European strategic autonomy in the realm of security with a mix of scepticism and rejection. Warnings about a possible decoupling of Europe from NATO have largely died out in Washington. And the prin­ciple of “America First” might also suggest that the United States be open to the idea of greater European self-sufficiency in the area of security and defence. But the United States – the Pentagon and the rest of the Administration certainly more than President Trump himself – wants to preserve its access to its European bases. Scepticism towards European autono­my is particularly strong where Washington suspects that European defence initiatives like the Permanent Structured Cooperation could serve to exclude US defence contractors from the lucrative European market.

The debate over punitive tariffs is just the tip of the iceberg. Lurking under the waterline is an ominous conflict over the future of the WTO.

In contrast to the security sphere, the economic balance of power between the United States and Europe is today largely even, in terms of the overall picture concerning trade in goods and services, and also investment. But the EU’s trade surplus in goods with the United States represents a source of tension with the Trump Administration. Trump favours im­port tariffs in specific sectors in order to reverse what he sees as an unfair US deficit and to persuade Europe to import more US-made goods. But the debate over punitive tariffs represents just the tip of the iceberg. Lurking under the waterline is an ominous conflict over the future of the World Trade Organisation, which Washington is actively undermining and whose rules other countries – first and foremost China – have been ignoring for years.

Sanctions represent another bone of contention, where the United States is increasingly exploiting Europe’s financial dependency to block and undermine European foreign policy and commercial inter­ests by means of secondary sanctions. If the EU in­tends to establish the euro as a reserve currency, for example to protect its businesses against the reach of US sanctions, it must first create a number of impor­tant preconditions. If the EU expands its finan­cial self-reliance by this route it could make greater use of the euro as an instrument for realising its own external economic and foreign policy objectives. Washington can be expected to respond negatively to this. President Trump plainly sees the EU as a growing rival. But it is also conceivable that future US Admin­is­trations could find it opportune to strengthen the euro as a counterweight to the growing significance of the renminbi and China’s expanding global influ­ence on markets and governments.

The conflict between the United States and China starkly reveals Washington’s interest in maintaining its influence on the EU’s economic and security policies. The Trump Administration is plainly pur­suing an objective of economic containment and delaying China’s technological transformation. Large parts of the US Administration, especially the Nation­al Trade Council, the National Security Council and the Pentagon, are seeking to economically detach the United States from China in order to reduce the exist­ing economic/technological and thus also security dependencies. Washington continues to increase its pressure on allies including the EU and its member states to unequivocally take its side in the associated economic and political conflicts. If Washington were to demand that Europe also decouple from China this would seriously harm the EU’s economic interests because China represents a growth market and a source of economic innovations and future developments. Chinese exports to Europe and investments in the EU also make a growing contribution to the Euro­pean economy and the Single Market.

In a time of uncertainty about the course of US for­eign policy and transformation in the international system it would be sensible for Germany to develop a policy of strategic risk hedging with its European allies and to expand its own foreign policy options. Even if increasing Europe’s strategic autonomy is a long-term affair, the maxim of strategic risk hedging already points to certain conclusions for dealings with the United States today: Depending on the constellation of conflicts and interests, strategic risk hedging can result in a policy of economic and diplomatic hard balancing. One example would be the use of international institutions to rein in US unilateralism. A softer form of balancing could imply Europe show­ing international leadership itself in those policy areas where the United States tends to block rather than initiate, such as climate policy. Finally, strategic risk hedging can also mean bandwagoning with the United States in selected areas. This certainly makes sense where an American initiative coincides with Europe’s own interests or if US policy can be influ­enced in Europe’s direction.

Germany and Europe must consider the costs of greater autonomy from the United States.

Regardless of the course adopted by Germany and Europe, they must quantify and account for the costs of greater autonomy from the United States. This applies equally to defence policy, financial and eco­nomic policy, and to relations with China. These costs include the risk of division in Europe. A glance at the past reminds us that transatlantic spats such as that over the Iraq war of 2003 have always also brought intra-European divisions in their wake. Above all bal­ancing towards the United States – even if it remains restricted to specific cases such as the Iran deal – makes it absolutely necessary for Europe to agree in advance on unshakeable shared positions.

China

Against the background of the emerging rivalry be­tween Washington and Beijing, the balance of power between China and the EU and its member states is developing increasingly asymmetrically to Europe’s disadvantage. Only in trade policy – and partially in investment – can the EU hold its own in a form respected by China.

Europe is of eminent importance for China in many respects: economically as most important sup­plier and second most important export market; tech­nologically as supplier of high-technology; institution­ally as a role model; politically in order to pursue its own ends towards third states and above all the United States; and selectively as a partner, for exam­ple in global health and in the stabilisation of third regions. While China, unlike Russia and the United States, sees a fundamental interest of its own in the continued existence and coherence of the EU in a multipolar world, in practice it pursues a policy of “divide and rule”. China selectively rewards and punishes individual EU states depending on their political and economic importance and in response to the acquiescence expected by China in central ques­tions. These include for example arms exports to Taiwan, meetings with the Tibetan Dalai Lama, and stances on the Uigurs, on the human rights situation in China and on the South China Sea. In the process China interacts with Europe on all levels, political, economic, technological, cultural and academic. For this it employs and initiates diverse political channels (such as strategic partnerships with the EU and with individual EU member states), dialogue formats (such as the 16+1 format with sixteen central and eastern European states), and high-level bilateral inter-gov­ern­mental consultations with Germany, France and the United Kingdom.

China’s expectations that the EU would become an independent full-spectrum actor in global politics and act as a counterweight to the United States have faded. But China would welcome any EU or European push towards strategic autonomy – as long as it was not manifested (or even concentrated) in a confrontative stance towards China itself.

Europe possesses no viable collective foreign policy position concerning the geopolitical struggle between the United States and China over hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region.

While Europe is in principle aware of China’s great political and strategic importance, in bilateral con­texts the EU member states treat China above all as a source of economic growth and diversification, as export market and investor. Europe’s political inter­ests – peace and stability in East Asia; Chinese con­tributions to global stability, development, environment, climate, and counter-proliferation; improving the human rights situation in China – are by con­trast often treated as secondary and in fact not pur­sued by all EU member states. Europe possesses no robust collective foreign policy position concerning the geopolitical struggle between the United States and China over hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. A clear stance on China’s authoritarian conception of order is also lacking. Even in trade and investment conflicts Europe fails to find a collective line. Too heterogeneous are the size, profiles and interests of the EU member states in their relationships with China: As far as economic relations are concerned there is a gulf between states that are attractive indus­trial and technological partners for China and those that compete as supplicants in Beijing. Some coun­tries have an explicit interest in global governance. The United Kingdom and France also each maintain a military presence of their own in Asia.

European strategic action towards China would require a political consensus about European strategic interests there. That would demand a stronger pri­ori­tisation of Europe’s China policy above and beyond the current foreign policy issues. The initiative would have to originate jointly from Paris, Berlin and London. The most important aspect is to demonstrate Europe’s economic ability to respond to and match China’s state-led economy. Europe’s external eco­nomic support instruments should also be expanded to enable Europe to offer competitive infrastructure investments in third states, also in order to compete with China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Russia

Transatlantic policy coordination on Russia has large­ly collapsed since Donald Trump assumed the US presi­dency. Between the openness for a comprehensive “deal” with Russian President Vladimir Putin pursued by the White House and the efforts by Congress to close down Trump’s foreign policy options with Rus­sia, coordination with European allies has been side­lined. This development is overshadowed by Washington’s increasing use of extraterritorial sanctions, which predates Trump’s presidency.

Greater strategic autonomy for Europe in the rela­tionship with Russia is especially important in this context. At the same time this relationship is espe­cially affected by significant conflicts of interests. Russia remains a multi-dimensional challenge that the EU and the European states will not for the fore­seeable future be able to deal with alone. If the US security guarantee were to be weakened before Europe is able to strengthen its own capabilities, the EU would face new vulnerabilities that Russia could probe along the EU’s external borders – for example in the Baltic states – and elsewhere. Today the EU and its member states have no adequate possibilities of their own to dissuade Russia from asserting its inter­ests in an aggressive and risky manner in the shared neighbourhood.

Although European and Russian positions coincide on individual issues, such as the Iran deal and US sec­ondary sanctions, there is no broader strategic over­lap. So Russia is not a general partner for a Europe seeking more strategic autonomy. The EU can thus best increase its influence in relations with Russia through a rebalancing of transatlantic coordi­nation, rather than a decoupling from the United States.

Moscow is ambivalent towards the EU’s striving for greater strategic autonomy.

Moscow is ambivalent towards the EU’s striving for greater strategic autonomy. On the one hand it wel­comes the fractures in the transatlantic alliance that have appeared under President Trump as the begin­ning of the postulated “post-Western” world order. Moscow sees this as an opportunity to realise its own model of order, a multipolar “concert of major pow­ers” in which Russia, China, the United States and the more powerful European states regulate their global conflicts of interests without heed to smaller states. Such a world order offers little space for an actor oriented on multilateral rules like the EU.

Russia sees its relationship with Washington as characterised by structural antagonism and is only interested in European autonomy in the sense of separation from the United States and NATO. On the other hand Moscow has no interest in greater Euro­pean capabilities – and therefore interprets the cur­rent erosion of the transatlantic partnership (in com­bination with Brexit and the rise of EU-sceptic parties) more as a symptom of progressive fragmentation of the West than the beginning of a new European self-sufficiency. The Kremlin is therefore interested in accelerating that process and levering countries and political forces where it sees potential for cooperation further out of the EU context. So Russia could make new offers to an autonomy-seeking “core Europe” in the realm of security (in connection with a “European security order”) and in part also in the economic sphere (following Putin’s offer of a “harmonious eco­nomic community stretching from Lisbon to Vladi­vostok”) in order to reduce the weight of US “hard power” in Europe. Possible proposals could include Russian support for CSDP missions outside Europe, for example in Mali, and cooperation in stabilising Libya or in conflict management in Syria.

But when it comes to increasing capabilities capacities at the EU level, resistance from Moscow is a more realistic prospect than serious offers of cooperation. Especially vis-à-vis the states of the Eastern Partnership, Moscow sees the EU as an adversary challenging its right to hegemony in its sphere of influence. The most important precondition for greater European autono­my is therefore a stronger immunisation of EU states against Russian influence in the dimensions of media, political parties, minorities, and intelligence services. This could contribute to addressing the reser­vations over the objective of more strategic autonomy that are found among central and eastern European states, in particular Poland. A strategically autonomous Europe will also have to find and hold to a unit­ed position on economic and energy policy in order to reduce the openings for divisive initiatives from Mos­cow. The controversial Nord Stream 2 Baltic pipeline is perhaps the prime example.

Trade and investment between Russia and Europe should as far as possible be shielded more strongly from the current unpredictability of US sanctions. Part of the solution here is to partially remove the exchange of goods and capital between Europe and Russia from the dominance of the US dollar. Russia and other states targeted by sanctions such as Iran and Venezuela are highly motivated to establish pay­ment systems and commodity markets operating inde­pendently of the dollar. Given Europe’s much closer integration with the US economy this can only be a selective matter, for example for financing in­vest­ments in Russia, and comes at the price of elevat­ed transaction costs. There would also be a risk of wors­ening relations with Washington. EU initiatives such as a special Russia (and Iran) bank or application of the Blocking Statute should always be transparent and comprehensible for the American side, on the basis of “agreeing to disagree”.

With its close economic ties with Russia and its great weight within Europe, Germany remains Mos­cow’s most important counterpart within the EU. This places special responsibility on Berlin for safely navi­gating these conflicts of interests in every step that Europe takes towards strategic autonomy. On the one side the dialogue with Russia needs to be maintained and meaningful cooperation continued. On the other, the coherence of the EU – including its eastern mem­ber states – represents the bedrock of foreign policy capacity to act. It is therefore important to always include the eastern neighbours in the dialogue with Russia. Germany’s close relations with Russia in par­ticular place it in a position to make the largest con­tribution to developing a strategically more autonomous Europe.

Middle and Emerging Powers

Germany shares the desire for greater strategic autono­my with a string of other middle and emerging pow­ers in the international system. They also find them­selves challenged to define their place in a chang­ing international order and want to make their weight and interests felt. But unlike Germany they are not part of an organisation of states comparable to the EU, through which they could pursue the objective of stra­tegic autonomy. Middle powers by definition by themselves lack the necessary economic and military resources to shape international politics entirely in­dependently in their own interests. But they do pos­sess sufficient power resources to actively shape re­gional foreign and security policy. Most of them also share a preference for multilateral cooperation in in­ternational institutions, civilian conflict manage­ment and a rules-based international order, to con­tain heg­emo­nic powers like the United States and China.

So states like Australia, Brazil, Canada, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico and South Korea basically have three options for expanding their strategic autonomy. Firstly they can define agendas and (fur­ther) develop norms on the international stage, for example through the G-20 forum. As well as asserting their own interests they may also act as intermedi­aries between the diverging interests of industrialised and developing countries, as seen in the example of climate policy. Secondly they can boost their influ­ence by forming their own networks and coalitions. Thirdly they can more closely coordi­nate their foreign policies in particular areas in order to jointly demon­strate international influence inde­pendently of the major powers.

There are (still) tight limits to closer cooperation between middle powers.

But there are (still) tight limits to closer cooperation between middle powers. The first of these is their relationships to Washington. Some of these middle powers are closely tied to the United States in terms of security and economic affairs. That is likely to make the emergence of independent positions and policies a costly matter, above all where this involves de facto departing from the US line. The states generally clas­sified as middle powers are extremely heterogeneous. Aside from a general preference for multilateralism and a rules-based order, the normative orientations and interests of states like Turkey or Indonesia differ very sharply from those of countries like Germany or Canada. Clear differences can also be identified in rela­tion to the observance of international law. Wide­ly differing views about which parts of the liberal inter­national order are in need of reform and which should be preserved, for example in the UN or the WTO, exist among the middle powers.

In view of this heterogeneity of middle and emerging powers it is unsurprising to find fundamental dif­ferences in their positions towards and relations with the European Union. Alongside the United States, China and Russia, the EU has declared seven middle and emerging powers as strategic partners: Brazil, Canada, India, Japan, Mexico, South Africa and South Korea. But to date the EU has largely failed to do jus­tice to the objective of “strategic” partnership in these relationships, having neither concretised the concept nor fulfilled its partners’ expectations. An EU with the goal of greater strategic autonomy would there­fore have to be able to fill out these relationships and reach viable agreements.

It certainly makes sense to look to an alliance – or perhaps more precisely a network – of multilaterally minded actors that share Germany’s and the EU’s vital interest in a rule-based international order. But it must not be forgotten that although some of the partners of choice such as India or South Africa share the same line on many questions, they cannot simply be coopted for the preservation of the international order because they themselves call for reform of that order. This applies not least to seats and voting rights in the UN Security Council. Many of these partners would work with Europe for effective global climate policy, strong international organisations, the obser­vance of global agreements and sustainability goals, and against protectionist restrictions on free trade. But the same partners are a great deal more sceptical when it comes to other elements of the “liberal” order like the International Criminal Court. A coalition for multilateralism must therefore see itself fundamentally as a reform alliance that seeks multilateral arrange­ments but also strives for consensus over the pos­sibilities for reforming and developing them.

Abbreviations

The Authors^*