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## CIMIC in the ISAF Mission

Conception, Implementation and  
Development of Civil-Military Cooperation  
in the Bundeswehr Abroad

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**CIMIC in the ISAF Mission  
Conception, Implementation and Development of  
Civil-Military Cooperation in the Bundeswehr Abroad**

The concept of Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) as seen in the Bundeswehr and NATO is to support the implementation of a military mission. In a stabilization mission like ISAF for example, the aim is to establish a safe and secure environment to facilitate post-war reconstruction. In order to achieve this, the concept of CIMIC aims first, to shape civil-military relations through establishing, sustaining and coordinating relations with civilian actors in the theater of operations; second, to support civilian actors and agencies to create conditions necessary for the fulfillment of the mission thereby increasing the acceptance of the armed forces and thus their protection; and third, to assist the armed forces and the decisions of military leaders through providing a direct insight into the civilian situation on the ground.

As an integral part of the planning and conduct of military operations therefore, CIMIC has little to do with humanitarian or development aid. Popular images of soldiers drilling wells or erecting school tents, however, suggest that, when it comes to CIMIC activities, the Bundeswehr particularly distinguishes itself in the (re-)construction of infrastructure. However, it is neither realistic nor desirable for soldiers to act as “aid workers.” In view of this discrepancy between operational reality and public perception, the nature and scope of CIMIC has elicited divisive discussion. An inherent ambivalence is the fact that, on the one hand, CIMIC is a tool for the commander to accomplish his military mission and that, on the other hand, aid and reconstruction are often represented (and criticized) as an original contribution to be made by the armed forces.

Further conflict results from the fact that, as a self-protection measure, CIMIC is expedient and legitimate, however, the central task of armed forces in stabilization operations is to contribute to the creation of a safe and secure environment. In a deteriorating security situation such as in Afghanistan, the necessary degree of self-protection will inevitably have to be weighed against the establishment of security. Therefore the following questions arise:

- ▶ What are the basic principles, parameters and functions of civil-military cooperation and how does

the CIMIC concept contribute to a safe and secure environment for the stabilization of post-war societies?

- ▶ The role played by CIMIC in the Afghanistan mission will be discussed on the basis of a case study: What are the objectives to be achieved by the ISAF mission, what CIMIC activities of the Bundeswehr have turned out to be particularly suitable for promoting the accomplishment of the mission, what problems and inconsistencies have arisen? It shall also be examined whether the different objectives are compatible and can be adapted, if necessary. In addition, the blockade positions of individual actors are to be identified.
- ▶ Finally the author will take a look at emerging shortcomings and how they could be resolved in the long run in order to push ahead with civil-military collaboration.

In conclusion, it must be said that CIMIC, through liaison and supporting reconstruction efforts as well as providing civilian situation pictures for stabilization operations, has gained in operational significance. Thus CIMIC has become an important contributory factor to the effectiveness of operations, especially in fluid security situations. Nonetheless without a sufficient military approach, CIMIC will not be enough. In order to increase the effectiveness of civil-military interaction, the following should be taken into consideration:

- ▶ Personnel directly involved in CIMIC should be deployed for a period of at least six to twelve months as frequent rotation may result in the loss of communication structures and be detrimental to the rapport that has been established with the population and civilian actors in the theater of operations. At the same time, contingent rotations should be carried out at staggered intervals so that the available knowledge can be more effectively transferred to the respective successors.
  - ▶ In view of scarce specialist personnel, CIMIC should be strengthened i.e. by creating sustainable structures since there is a shortfall of available CIMIC personnel that are suitable for foreign assignment (especially as far as field-grade officers are concerned).
  - ▶ During mission preparation, interdepartmental cooperation should be intensified to include more experts from non-governmental organizations (NGO) and the exchange of information improved. Early interaction is the prerequisite to efficient cooperation in the theater.
- ▶ At NATO level, the position of 'Civilian Actors Adviser' (CIVAD) should be supported. This person could improve the cooperation with non-NATO actors by advising the commander and assisting him through high-level liaison efforts. Ideally, this would help to overcome two stumbling blocks of civil-military cooperation – differences concerning organizational culture and deployment duration. The limited force strength and allocation of funds for the Afghanistan mission – revealed by a comparison with the commitment in the Balkans – is becoming more and more debatable. What is to be taken into consideration in this context is the fact that on account of its operational and other restrictions the Bundeswehr is only able to influence the security situation to a limited extent. Of course Germany's reserved strategy should not go as far as to make the establishment of security appear secondary to self-protection. Nonetheless a certain reluctance concerning project work has proven to be the right course of action especially since it is now being harmonized at inter-agency level in the provincial reconstruction teams. CIMIC can, however, make complementary and supplementary contributions in support of civilian resources, particularly in fluid security situations. It seems therefore problematic that in 2008 only 36 CIMIC soldiers were employed in the German contingent. Thus, this gives rise to three further suggestions:
    - ▶ Personnel responsible for the liaison efforts and providing a detailed insight as regards the civilian situation on the ground should be increased. If more personnel were available, it would certainly be easier to support the activities of civilian organizations and make more effective contributions to the establishment of a secure environment.
    - ▶ Only through diluting operational restrictions can the functional ambivalence of protection versus self-protection and so one of the causes of CIMIC's self-blockade be overcome. Otherwise necessary and legitimate self-protection will always come before the creation of a safe and secure environment.
    - ▶ At NATO level, the network-orientated 'Civil Military Overview (CMO)', which is overseen by a joint civil-military consortium, certainly represents a promising tool for improving the information base. In future, the 'Afghan Country Stability Picture', which is an ISAF data base for reconstruction and development aid, should also be integrated into the CMO.

## The Concept of Civil-Military Cooperation

Within the context of German national defense, ‘civil-military cooperation’ until the mid 1980s encompassed all tasks and measures performed in cooperation between military and civilian agencies (at national or NATO level) in order to ensure an effective territorial defense for the Federal Republic of Germany. Thus, this specified the rules under which German and allied armed forces could utilize civilian resources (Host Nation Support) and primarily involved a logistical challenge to which military personnel could be temporarily assigned.

The change in global politics that occurred between 1989 and 1991 largely eliminated the military threat in Central Europe and thus old-style ‘Host Nation Support’ requirements. Concurrently, new risks emerged with failing and failed states and international terrorism which required innovative concepts for the Alliance strategy as an instrument of international crisis and conflict resolution.<sup>1</sup>

At the same time, a pragmatic change became apparent in the German forces within the framework of the UNOSOM II operation in Somalia. It was an example of that „ad hocism“<sup>2</sup>, which, beyond clear guidelines, is frequently crucial for the further development of regulatory-policy concepts. Thus the Bundeswehr provided direct support to Somali people between August 1993 and March 1994 within the limits of available capacities; this support encompassed outpatient and inpatient medical care, the drilling of wells, infrastructure improvement and the establishment of schools.<sup>3</sup> This was the first time

that instead of providing civilian assistance to military operations extensive military resources of the Bundeswehr were provided to a civil society.

### The Origin and Basic Framework of Civil-Military Cooperation

The doctrine for the programmatic determination of the basic principles of civil-military collaboration is relatively new; it is mainly the result of UN-mandated NATO operations conducted in former Yugoslavia.<sup>4</sup> These operations led to a new simultaneity of civil and military measures requiring coordination and sometimes even a close cooperation between the actors. In view of the complex humanitarian emergency situation and the resulting necessity of coordination between the armed forces and civilian actors in the theater of operations, it became clear that, in terms of a comprehensive security concept, civil-military cooperation had to be improved and re-regulated. As a result of this process therefore, which began with the 1995 IFOR Mission in Kosovo, the “NATO Civil-Military Co-operation Doctrine”, or CIMIC for short, was established and soon gained in stature.<sup>5</sup> Hence the current CIMIC concept is a product of the challenges encountered during multifunctional peace-supporting stabilization operations.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Within the CIMIC context, only the US Army could provide civil affair personnel at first. Therefore the European Allies were interested in developing their own capabilities. Cf. William R. Phillips. “Civil-Military Cooperation: Vital to Peace Implementation in Bosnia”, in: *Nato Review*, Vol. 46, No. 1, Spring 1998, pp. 22–25.

<sup>5</sup> In this context, an IFOR commander remarked: “In November [1995], we had never heard of CIMIC, we had no idea what you did [...] now we can’t live without you.” Cited according to Phillips, “Civil-Military Cooperation” [Cf. Fn. 4], p. 23.

<sup>6</sup> Within NATO, the generic term “stabilization operation” is used meaning “stabilisation operations and military support to reconstruction efforts: Stabilisation operations are intended to bring about order and security to an area so as to improve the conditions for reconstruction efforts to proceed.” NATO, *Strategic Commands’ Input to Nato Policy for Stabilisation Operations and Military Support to Reconstruction Efforts*, Norfolk: Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation [SACT], March 2, 2007, para. 16.

<sup>1</sup> Cf., among other documents, the conclusions drawn in the NATO Strategic Concept adopted in Rome in 1991, paragraph 14, pp. 31 et seq., [www.nato.int/docu/basic/b911108a.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/b911108a.htm).

<sup>2</sup> Thus Wim van Eekelen states that “the international community has approached the new tasks of peace support that have befallen upon it with a certain degree of ‘ad hocism’”. Eekelen., *Military Support for Civilian Operations in the Context of Peacekeeping Missions*, Report of the Civilian Affairs Subcommittee on Civilian Affairs and Cooperation, Nato Parliamentary Assembly, November 1998, para. 3, [www.nato-pa.int/archived/pub/comrep/1998/ar260cccsc-e.asp](http://www.nato-pa.int/archived/pub/comrep/1998/ar260cccsc-e.asp).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Holger Kammerhoff, “Unterm Blauhelm am Horn von Afrika”, in: Peter Goebel (Ed.), *Von Kambodscha bis Kosovo. Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr*, Frankfurt a.M. and Bonn 2000, pp. 120–135 (133 et seq.).

However this is no longer limited to the monitoring and/or supervision of ceasefire agreements (as with first generation *peacekeeping*), but now also includes the multifaceted cooperation between numerous civilian and military actors in the country of deployment. Thus, this now incorporates a large range of international commitments – such as humanitarian aid, repatriation of refugees as well as police tasks or disarmament, demobilization and the reintegration of combatants for example. Moreover the roots of the conflict should also be sought to overcome so that a political-economic system can be established in order to enable a peaceful coexistence (*post-conflict peacebuilding*).

Stabilization operations in post-war societies such as the Afghan encompass a complex interaction of missions and assistance. They can differ considerably in relation to the cause and type of the conflict, its duration and intensity as well as the allocation of armed forces and funds. In addition, they are usually characterised by a fluid security situation, therefore humanitarian assistance, *peacekeeping* in the form of sporadic engagements with militant opposition groups and major combat operations must frequently be performed simultaneously.

A subject of particular controversy is the character and scope of civil-military cooperation<sup>7</sup> as there exists an inherent contradiction, that is on the one hand CIMIC is an operational-tactical tool to enable the fulfilment of a military mission and on the other hand subsidiary humanitarian aid and reconstruction are often presented as tasks to be undertaken by the armed forces.<sup>8</sup> However, the impression given that soldiers are acting as “aid workers”<sup>9</sup> is neither realistic

nor desirable. It rather reflects the area of political debate in which CIMIC finds itself.

The political community and their forces employed in operations abroad are genuinely interested in stabilizing an unsecure environment to the extent that the soldiers are able to withdraw from it again as soon as possible. The main reason for this is that democratic countries have a low tolerance to participation in long-term military missions in addition to the maintenance costs involved. The successful stabilization of a post-war society which allows for a partial or complete withdrawal is determined by the extent to which peace and security have been consolidated and so avoid a relapse into a state of war. Moreover the strength of a country’s governmental structures, institutions and control capabilities should also be taking into consideration. This essentially civilian task, which falls to the international community, can in the long term only be undertaken in a secure and stable environment.

The linear model – a high-intensity military operation to end hostilities is followed by the civil-military stabilization operation which leads to the gradual assumption of responsibility by civilian actors and finally to the withdrawal of the foreign armed forces – is more often than not interrupted by fluid security situations in real operations. In the long run, however, it is the absence of hostilities and other physical violence that is crucial for building confidence among the population and thus rebuilding a post-war society.<sup>10</sup>

In a traditional approach, CIMIC within military stabilization operations will be limited to three original core functions – facilitating cooperation with the civilian community, increasing the civilian population’s acceptance of the operation as well as contributing to the planning and conduct of operations. Thus, force employment per se is restricted to as short a time period as possible.<sup>11</sup> A progressive, holistic approach would additionally include tasks for the medium and long term and so make it necessary to

<sup>7</sup> Cf. for example German Bundestag Public Hearing on the Topic “Civil-Military Cooperations,” October 25, 2006, Protocol No. 16/24.

<sup>8</sup> For instance, on the Federal Foreign Office Website CIMIC is illustrated by a photograph showing white tents in front of a mountain range. The caption reads: “The acronym CIMIC signifies the Bundeswehr’s civil-military cooperation abroad. The photographs show the erection of school tents in Afghanistan by CIMIC.” Federal Foreign Office, German Engagement in Northern Afghanistan (Kunduz, Faisabad and Mazar-e-Sharif), [www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Aussenpolitik/RegionaleSchwerpunkte/Afghanistan-Zentralasien/Engagement-Kundus-Faisa-Mazar.html](http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Aussenpolitik/RegionaleSchwerpunkte/Afghanistan-Zentralasien/Engagement-Kundus-Faisa-Mazar.html).

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Andreas Heinemann-Grüder and Tobias Pietz, “Zivil-militärische Intervention – Militärs als Entwicklungshelfer?“, in: Christoph Weller et al. (Eds.), *Friedensgutachten 2004*, Münster 2004, pp. 200–208; Michael Schmunk, *Die deutschen Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Ein neues Instrument zum Nation-*

*Building*, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, November 2005 (SWP-Studie 33/2005), pp. 26 et seq.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Sascha Hardegger, *CIMIC-Doktrin im Spannungsfeld zwischen humanitärer Hilfe und militärischer Krisenintervention*, ETH Zürich: Forschungsstelle für Internationale Beziehungen, January 2003 (Contributions No. 41), pp. 18 et seq.

<sup>11</sup> This was the original approach used during IFOR. Cf. Thijs W. Brocades Zaalberg, *Soldiers and Civil Power. Supporting or Substituting Civil Authorities in Modern Peace Operations*, Amsterdam University Press 2006, p. 252.



integrate military and civilian concepts, tools and capabilities in order to reform or develop the security sector.<sup>12</sup> Moreover this approach may under certain circumstances also include the assumption of governmental responsibilities (police or constabulary and penal system), as has already occurred in exceptional cases during the KFOR mission. When applying such a progressive approach to the concept, it is, however, problematic to use the term CIMIC as this is still used in the traditional sense and also because it fails to reflect the different interpretations of the two concepts. Instead the term “civil-military interaction” would better describe the tasks incorporated in the latter, holistic approach, since interaction is actually the determining element of the operation.<sup>13</sup>

In a narrow sense, CIMIC, as an operational-tactical tool, has the task of supporting the commander in the fulfillment of his missions – among other things relating to force protection<sup>14</sup> – and the subsidiary task to contribute to civil reconstruction, i.e. the establishment of public order and infrastructure.<sup>15</sup> In a broader sense, CIMIC can play a supportive role forming part of comprehensive politico-strategic assets, for example within the framework of reforming the security sector. CIMIC continues to contribute to the overall process; it is, however, no longer the pivot of civil-military interaction.

Lessons learnt from the Balkans have taught that if lasting peace is to be established in post-war societies a long-term military commitment is required. Here, CIMIC can serve as a force multiplier so that the mili-

tary operation can be conducted more effectively and thus can end sooner; or at least curtailed. This is mainly because the soldiers who are responsible for CIMIC activities, on account of constant liaison and contact efforts, can assess the social, economical and political processes in the theater in a timely manner. As a result it is possible to detect any destabilizing developments early on and so deploy the appropriate forces in case a situation turns out to be of military significance. Within the course of a successful stabilization phase, this may contribute to a reduction of the armed forces within the framework of an “exit strategy”.<sup>16</sup> In order to achieve this by a joint integrated approach, CIMIC must be adapted to the specific task spectrum in the respective theatre (e.g. depending on the size of the territory or population size or the threat situation). At the same time, the operational requirements are also to be implemented at the tactical level in a goal-oriented manner. Finally, military operational planning must be integrated into an overall coherent political plan since military measures alone will not achieve lasting effects.

### Civil-Military Co-operation in NATO and the Bundeswehr

At the NATO summit held in Washington in April 1999, the Atlantic Alliance adopted a new Strategic Concept. This reflected the lessons learnt from the military operations in former Yugoslavia and primarily involved the issue of going out-of-area as well as the core functions of the Alliance. Due to the new found importance of CIMIC therefore, the Concept included a passage stating that the interaction between armed forces and a country’s civil society is critical to the success of a military operation as well as emphasized their interdependence.<sup>17</sup> Thus the new Strategic Concept, mandated by NATO’s Military Committee (MC) was declared an Alliance guideline at the highest

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Hans-Georg Ehrhart, *Civil-Military Co-Operation and Co-Ordination in the EU and in Selected Member States*, Study, European Parliament, DG External Politics of the Union, October 2007, p. 1, [www.ifsh.de/pdf/aktuelles/ehrhartcivmilcoo.pdf](http://www.ifsh.de/pdf/aktuelles/ehrhartcivmilcoo.pdf).

<sup>13</sup> The generic term *interaction* entails the different relational levels. CIMIC is usually not cooperation because essential prerequisites such as common goals, institutions and a mutual security of expectation frequently do not exist – this is rather sought in relations with NGOs for example.

<sup>14</sup> Force protection is essentially risk management; the attempt to avoid all risks compromises the mission. In NATO force protection is defined as follows: “Measures and means to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, materiel, action and operational effectiveness thereby contributing to mission success”. Nato, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Force Protection*, AJP-3.14, Ratification Draft 1 [2007], para. 0102.

<sup>15</sup> Action needs to be taken at the beginning of a mission in particular when civilian organizations may not yet be able to assume reconstruction efforts (reconstruction gap). Cf. Garland H. Williams, *Engineering Peace. The Military Role in Post-conflict Reconstruction*, Washington. D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2005, pp. 5 et seq.

<sup>16</sup> An example in this context are the *Liaison Observation Teams* (LOTs) employed in Kosovo. Cf. Frank Baumgard and Klaus Kühl, “Zivil-militärische Zusammenarbeit Bundeswehr. Ein operativer Faktor der Planung und Führung von Stabilisierungseinsätzen”, in: *Europäische Sicherheit*, Vol. 57, No. 10, 2008, pp. 54–58.

<sup>17</sup> Nato, *The Alliance’s Strategic Concept*, Press Release NAC-S(99)65, Brussels, April 24, 1999, para. 60, [www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm).

political level and implemented within the context of “CIMIC 2000.”<sup>18</sup>

### NATO Civil-Military Co-operation Doctrine

NATO Directive MC 411/1 dated July 2001 defines the significance of CIMIC for operations both within the framework of collective defense pursuant to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and, especially, within the framework of non-Article 5 crisis response operations as follows: “The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies.”<sup>19</sup>

CIMIC became a concrete doctrine in *Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-9* in June 2003.<sup>20</sup> According to this doctrine, CIMIC is an integral part of the planning and conduct of military operations and is to contribute to achieving a stable and sustainable end state for the mission in the implementation of the overall strategy. The CIMIC staff is integrated into Headquarters and is tasked with the coordination in theater. If possible, NATO forces are to support the civil actors without, however, jeopardizing the mission. In addition, when engaging in CIMIC activities, care is to be taken that the tasks performed will be assumed in due course by appropriate civilian agencies.

### Civil-Military Cooperation in the Bundeswehr Abroad

As a policy document, the current “Subconcept for Bundeswehr Civil-Military Cooperation” (TK ZMZ Bw)<sup>21</sup> dated May 2007 lays down the rules for civil-military cooperation at home (ZMZ/I)<sup>22</sup> and abroad (ZMZ/A). It reflects the changed security environment as formulated in the 2006 White Paper on German Security Policy, and it corresponds to the objectives and requirements for the transformation of the Bundeswehr from a national defense force to an expeditionary force – i.e. the change the armed forces will have to prepare themselves for at a strategic and organizational level.<sup>23</sup>

Complex multifunctional operations abroad where military and civilian assets or objectives have to be harmonized represent a new type of military action for the Bundeswehr. This necessitated the further development of previous considerations which had been laid down in a version of the October 2001 sub-concept. The new version is based on NATO’s CIMIC doctrine. It is, after all, usually in concert with multinational forces that the Bundeswehr participates in conflict prevention and crisis management operations as well as in operations conducted in support of Alliance partners. It is therefore only a logical consequence to follow the guidelines established by NATO – this also includes using the term CIMIC instead of the German term ZMZ/A (civil-military cooperation abroad) within the Bundeswehr.

<sup>18</sup> Pursuant to MC 411 dated August 1997, a working group had been established tasked with conceiving a CIMIC capability for the *Allied Command Europe (ACE)* by 2000. According to ACE directive 82-2 dated January 1998, “CIMIC 2000” contained a conceptual component (development of guidelines, doctrine, tactics, techniques), an implementation phase (training of the commanders and staffs as from the summer of 1998) as well as the practical implementation of CIMIC tasks. Cf. Eekelen, *Military Support for Civilian Operations* (cf. Fn. 2), para. 16. Cf. Peter Braunstein, “CIMIC 2000 – Zivil-militärische Kooperation”, in: *Europäische Sicherheit*, Vol. 49, No. 12, December 2000, pp. 47–50.

<sup>19</sup> Nato International Military Staff, *MC 411/1. Nato Military Policy on Civil-Military Co-operation*, para. 4, [www.nato.int/jms/docu/mc411-1-e.htm](http://www.nato.int/jms/docu/mc411-1-e.htm).

<sup>20</sup> Cf. *AJP-9. Nato Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Doctrine*, June 2003, [www.nato.int/jms/docu/AJP-9.pdf](http://www.nato.int/jms/docu/AJP-9.pdf). A draft doctrine had been available as early as June 2001.

<sup>21</sup> The concept TK ZMZBw (Teilkonzeption Zivil-Militärische Zusammenarbeit Bundeswehr) is classified; therefore CIMIC is explained on the basis of NATO documents.

<sup>22</sup> Beyond the state of defense and tension, the Bundeswehr can, within the framework of civil-military cooperation at home (“ZMZ/Inland”), also render subsidiary support during disaster relief operations. In addition, there are tasks and Alliance structures for rendering support during humanitarian disasters, civil emergency planning in the event of a crisis or disaster and, if necessary, complementary Host Nation Support activities to be accompanied by CIMIC measures. Cf. *AJP-9* [cf. Fn. 20], paras. 106 and 401.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. BMVg, *Weißbuch 2006 zur Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr*, Berlin, October 2006, p. 95 et seq., pp. 102 et seq.

## CIMIC Core Functions

The shaping of civil-military relations (*civil-military liaison*) essentially encompasses the establishment and coordination of civil-military relations, the regular exchange of information about the mutual effects of military and civil action as well as the announcement and harmonization of mission and operational planning. In this way, the prerequisites are to be created for civil actors, on the one hand, to develop an understanding for the conditions, possibilities and limitations of military action, and on the other hand to consider military concerns when planning and executing their measures. In an ideal case, this should create a synergetic co-existence. Such an active support and information policy will, however, be restricted through the parameters of operational command and control as well as security.

In general, the military does not seek to control the civilian organizations. In the interest of establishing effective relations, the CIMIC staff should rather have a comprehensive understanding of the mandate, role, structure, methods and principles of civilian organizations. The concept particularly stresses the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence that should not be compromised. Emphasis is also placed on the fact that liaison efforts are to be initiated at the earliest possible stage. This is to be done, among other things, on the basis of – usually publicly available – information on the country of deployment (on its geography, climate, society, culture, economy etc.) which is collected prior to deployment and then updated in theater.<sup>24</sup> The CIMIC forces are thus accorded critical importance in the early planning stage and during force employment.

During the mission itself, establishing and maintaining confidence-building relations with the civil actors are a focus of CIMIC activities. These activities form the basis of the other two areas of responsibility – support of the civil environment and support of the armed forces. The respective environment and the character of CIMIC may change depending on operational conditions be it in combat or stabilization operations. In all scenarios, the political, social, cultural, religious, economic, ecological and humanitarian circumstances of the country and its population

must be taken into consideration when compiling a civilian situation picture as well as the condition of the authorities and structures that usually exist in a rudimentary form at national, regional and local level. What is just as important however is the presence of international organizations (IOs), governmental and nongovernmental organizations as well as agencies of the donor countries or sponsors (such as the EU, USAID, the World Bank) with their different mandates, roles, structures, methods and principles. Operations are subject to constantly changing framework conditions and may therefore differ considerably as to their mandate, intensity, prioritization as well as allocation of forces and funds. If intensities are fluid or change suddenly, the assessment of the civilian situation is of crucial importance.<sup>25</sup>

It is therefore the central task of CIMIC personnel to enable the commander to cooperate with the civil actors in his mission area by providing a civilian situation picture and to maintain the relevant contacts. This task includes a) the establishment and maintenance of contacts; b) the integration of important civil actors into strategic and operational planning; c) a continuous assessment of the civil environment including the identification of local needs (such as drinking water supply, infrastructure, medical care) and the evaluation whether and to what extent they can be met; d) the supervision of appropriate activities, if necessary by calling in experts<sup>26</sup>; e) the objective of a timely and smooth transfer of responsibility to the respective authorities; f) the cooperation with other staff elements; and g) advising the commander accordingly.<sup>27</sup> Current information on the civilian situation as well as the information exchange with relevant civilian agencies and actors at all levels are regarded as the basic prerequisites for the above tasks. In concrete terms, this means an extensive reporting system ranging from reports on communications via security to road networks and containing various assessments and project updates.

<sup>25</sup> During high-intensity operations, CIMIC has the task to advise military leaders with regard to the situation of civil actors and to assess the use of civil resources. At the end of combat operations and during the transition to stabilization operations (possibly including riot control), the complete CIMIC task spectrum will be applied.

<sup>26</sup> CIMIC forces must be distinguished from *functional specialists* who, since their expertise is frequently lacking in the theater of operations, are employed to analyze, plan and execute infrastructure projects (such as agricultural economists, civil engineers or site engineers).

<sup>27</sup> Cf. AJP-9 [cf. Fn. 20], para. 103.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. SHAPE, *Guidelines for Operational Planning (GOP)*, Final Revision 1, SHAPE (June 2005), paras. 4–11, pp. 4–7. Cf. Larry Jenkins, “A CIMIC Contribution to Assessing Progress in Peace Support Operations”, in: *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 10, No. 3, Fall 2003, pp. 121–136 (129).

The aim of supporting civilian agencies and actors (*support to the civil environment*) is to increase the acceptance of the forces in order to enhance force protection. The military forces can contribute to realizing the overall political objective of normalizing reconstruction aid by supporting the civil environment and promoting the re-establishment of governmental and social structures (including infrastructure). A broad “spectrum of alternative actions” is especially required in places where a secure environment must be created.<sup>28</sup> This process is more likely to succeed through indirect aid, i.e. by coordinating support for governmental or nongovernmental organizations, or by directly supporting the civilian population (in order to create favorable conditions for the military operation and/or because civilian organizations or structures are not able to do so).<sup>29</sup> Furthermore, additional aid can be provided as part of an overall strategy or within the framework of national objectives as long as assets are available. What must be taken into consideration in this context are the respective host nation guidelines as well as the donor countries’ development concepts as well as the overarching objectives of national, international and supra-national institutions. In general, support of the civil environment contributes to one’s own mission accomplishment and constitutes a supplementary measure.

Finally CIMIC field-grade officers contribute to the planning and conduct of military operations by advising military leaders and assisting them in their decision-making. In this way, they provide invaluable *support to the armed forces* through essential information on the situation of the civil actors, including the population, as well as the assessment of the interactions and reciprocal effects of military and civilian actions. The civilian situation picture based on this information includes, depending on the area of operations and the mission, data on the social and economic situation of the population, the ethnic situation as well as cultural and religious particularities, the condition of the civilian infrastructure as well as the education, health and veterinary systems and the governmental security sector (including the judicial system). In addition, the civilian situation picture provides information on how the armed forces’ actions and conduct are perceived by the civil

actors and the population, which measures the civil actors are planning and which common projects have already been carried out.

In order to complete the overall situation picture, other functional areas in a staff or headquarters (i.e. LEGAD, POLAD, G2/J2, G4/J4, J6/G6, MP/FJg)<sup>30</sup> besides CIMIC field-grade officers (S5/G5/J9) make contributions or conduct their own assessments. The CIMIC staff can be tasked with coordinating and integrating the contributions. It is part of the CIMIC command and control process to systematize the measures that are required on account of the situation by taking into consideration the available forces, space, time and other factors and to assess their civilian impact on the military mission. Thus CIMIC exerts an immediate influence on the decision-making process during operational planning.

In his situation briefings, a CIMIC officer can, for example, recommend certain self-protection measures, suggest ways how the civil environment could support the military, state requirements for coordination and harmonization vis-à-vis civilian organizations or assess the consequences of the employment of own forces for the living conditions of the people and the country’s economy. If necessary, he can declare a requirement of support to the civil environment or he can lay down general rules of conduct to be observed when dealing with the population and civilian organizations in the theater of operations. Finally, the armed forces also need to rely on civilian resources in theater – whether they require personnel, material (e.g. for constructing bridges or roads) or information. At the same time, negative effects on the population, economy, environment, infrastructure or the work of humanitarian organizations should be avoided.

<sup>28</sup> Bundeswehr, *CIMIC – Ein militärischer Auftrag*, Potsdam, August 23, 2007, [www.einsat2.bundeswehr.de/C1256FID0022A5C2/CurrentBaseLink/W2763FKB027INFODE](http://www.einsat2.bundeswehr.de/C1256FID0022A5C2/CurrentBaseLink/W2763FKB027INFODE).

<sup>29</sup> Cf. AJP-9 [cf. Fn. 20], paras. 104, 1.b; cf. also para. 202.

<sup>30</sup> In multinational joint forces the letter “J” (Joint) denotes staff divisions (S) and general staff divisions; J9 encompasses CIMIC. In battalions/brigades/divisions, the pertinent designation is S5/G5, in higher headquarters it is J9 since there “plans” is called J5. Further designations are: LEGAD (Legal Adviser), POLAD (Political Adviser), G2/J2 (reconnaissance/situation of other forces), G3/J3 (personnel/situation of own forces), G4/J4 (logistics) J6/G6 (communications) MP (Military Police).

## Conclusions

Each doctrine is only as good as its implementation which is in turn largely determined by the culture of the armed forces involved.<sup>31</sup> Therefore interaction between civil-military components combined with their respective national characteristics can also determine the order in which CIMIC measures are prioritised and whether the doctrine is applied at all or whether specifically trained military personnel are employed for the purpose of collaboration or reconstruction efforts.

CIMIC activities are to facilitate the cooperation with the civil environment, increase the acceptance of the mission by the civilian population and thus force protection as well as contribute to the planning and conduct of operations. Thus, creating benefits to the military purposes clearly is the main objective. The creation of a secure environment may be enhanced by supplementary aid being rendered by informations gleaned from liaison efforts. This aid may take the form of coordinating support to governmental or non-governmental organizations or directly supporting the civilian population. Such measures may be useful because they create favorable conditions for the military mission and/or because the relevant civilian organizations are not (yet) able to provide these conditions.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Paul Johnston, "Doctrine Is Not Enough: The Effect of Doctrine on the Behavior of Armies", in: *Parameters*, Fall 2000, pp. 30-39, [www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/00autumn/johnston.htm](http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/00autumn/johnston.htm).

## CIMIC in the ISAF Mission

Germany participates in operations abroad with more than 6,000 soldiers 140 of whom are tasked with CIMIC activities (see the Table on p. 15). The focus of these operations has been the mission in Afghanistan under the leadership of NATO since August 2003. The current German ISAF contingent encompasses up to 4,500 military personnel most of them being employed in the northern region of the country.

Ideally CIMIC contributes to developing an overall strategy containing military and civilian aspects and to achieving the objectives defined therein. To what extent this is implemented in real life is to be examined in the following case study. For this purpose and against the backdrop of the concept presented in the beginning, the mandate and the military mission are described at the politico-strategic level and will be discussed by means of examples at the operational-tactical level. What are the objectives to be achieved with the ISAF mission and what CIMIC activities have turned out to be particularly appropriate for promoting mission accomplishment? Where did problems and discrepancies arise? Moreover it must also be discussed whether the different objectives are compatible and can be adapted if required. In addition, the blockade positions of individual actors must be identified.

### ISAF Mandate and Operational Restrictions

The Afghanistan Agreement, which was signed on December 05, 2001 envisioned the deployment of a UN-mandated international force. On account of Resolution 1386, the United Nations Security Council authorized the "International Security Assistance Force" (ISAF) to take all measures necessary to ensure the success of the mission. However, the the ISAF forces were at first stationed only in Kabul and it was not until October 2003 that Resolution 1510 allowed the extension of the ISAF mandate beyond the capital and its surrounding areas. According to the current Bundestag mandate "the objective of the ISAF operation is to support Afghanistan in maintaining security so that both Afghan government authorities and UN along with other international civilian personnel, particularly those involved in humanitarian and

reconstruction efforts, can work in a secure environment."<sup>32</sup> The credibility and legitimacy of the operation thus essentially depend on the ability of the armed forces to make a contribution towards security in Afghanistan.

In its "Afghanistan Concept" of September 2008, the German Federal Government laid down the task of its armed forces as follows: "The military component provides the necessary secure environment for the reconstruction process – until Afghan security forces are able to do so themselves."<sup>33</sup> According to ISAF's operation plan, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) serve as "catalysts of change" and the NATO forces contribute to their military support.<sup>34</sup> Appropriate stabilization operations are to create an environment where trust and security prevail and where reconstruction is thus possible. Presence and commitment equally serve to achieve the desired results with the spectrum of military operations ranging from local self protection to offensive land and air operations and with a robust approach according to the UN mandate being considered necessary in order to maintain the initiative.

The rights and obligations of the forces deployed abroad are above all to be derived from the mandate forming the basis of the mission. Germany agreed to the operation plan and the rules of engagement in the NATO Council. In three areas, however, declarations were made concerning their national implementation. Firstly Bundeswehr soldiers will not actively participate in counter-drug operations, secondly that they will use military force to accomplish the mission only in accordance with the principle of proportionality and thirdly "essentially operate in the ISAF regions North and Kabul and will be employed in other regions only for NATO support activities that are

<sup>32</sup> Bundestag, *Antrag der Bundesregierung*, Drucksache 16/10473, October 7, 2008, p. 2, <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/104/1610473.pdf>.

<sup>33</sup> Bundesregierung, *Das Afghanistan-Konzept der Bundesregierung*, September 9, 2008, p. 14, [www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Publikation/Bestellservice/\\_Anlagen/2008-10-14-afg-konzept.property=publicationFile.pdf](http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Publikation/Bestellservice/_Anlagen/2008-10-14-afg-konzept.property=publicationFile.pdf).

<sup>34</sup> SACEUR OPLAN 10302 (Revise 1) ISAF, December 2005 [www.folketinget.dk/samling/20051/UM-del//Bilag/44/242709.PDF](http://www.folketinget.dk/samling/20051/UM-del//Bilag/44/242709.PDF).

**Table**  
**German CIMIC Personnel in Missions Abroad\***

	Field-grade officers	Noncommissioned Officers	Field forces	Total
<b>KFOR</b>				
KFOR Headquarters	1	–	–	1
German Contingent, Multinational Task Force South	4	–	–	4
CIMIC and Liaison Monitoring Team (LMT)	20	23	16	59
Maneuver Battalion Pristina	1	1	1	3
Total KFOR				67
<b>EUFOR</b>				
Liaison Observation Team (LOT)	11	24	2	37
<b>ISAF</b>				
Mazar-e Sharif: Contingent Headquarters	5	3	–	8
PAT Taloquan	1	1	–	2
PRT Feyzabad				
PRT	3	1	–	4
CIMIC Platoon	4	4	–	8
Total PRT Feyzabad				12
PRT Kunduz				
PRT	3	1	–	4
CIMIC Platoon	4	4	–	8
Total PRT Kunduz				12
ISAF Headquarters Kabul	1	1	–	2
Total ISAF				36
Total CIMIC				140

\* The *Liaison Observation Teams* and the *Liaison Monitoring Teams* are commanded by the CIMIC Staff Divisions since they perform a mission at the interface with the civil environment. These CIMIC-like forces have completed a training course for liaison and observation teams (intercultural competence, communication training etc.), but not the complete CIMIC training cycle. Information according the Federal Ministry of Defense, Armed Forces Staff V 3, Bonn, April 2, 2008.

limited as to time and scope provided that these support activities are indispensable for the accomplishment of the overall ISAF mission.”<sup>35</sup>

From the point of view of the German Federal Government, these national caveats do not limit its capacity for action in Afghanistan. However one must differentiate between the caveats as published and their interpretation within the context of a specific operation. Thus as regards the latter it is possible that further limitations may ensue.<sup>36</sup> For example, on

<sup>35</sup> Deutscher Bundestag, Einsatz der Bundeswehr in Afghanistan im Rahmen der Internationalen Sicherheitsbeistandstruppe, Drucksache 16/2380, August 9, 2006, pp. 8 et seq.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. Peter Dahl Thruelsen: “[...] the real extent of caveats is indeterminate, because a number of new caveats are only made known when a unit seeks clearance for operational use

account of a Ministerial Decree in 2006, German soldiers are only allowed to patrol in armoured vehicles, with medical support and escorted by EOD teams.<sup>37</sup> Combined with other operational restric-

back in the national capital. These ‘ad-hoc’-extensions to existing national caveats hamper the effectiveness of ISAF operations and the likelihood of operational success in the provinces.” Idem, *Nato in Afghanistan. What Lessons Are We Learning and Are We Willing to Adjust?*, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2007 (DIIS Report 2007:14), p. 20.

<sup>37</sup> That soldiers only go on patrol protected goes without saying. However, the personnel and equipment required to achieve this protection can vary widely depending on concrete objectives. Cf. Paul Gallis, *Nato in Afghanistan: A Test Case of the Transatlantic Alliance*, CRS Report for Congress, RL33627 (Updated May 6, 2008), p. 6.

tions, these caveats make ‘unity of command’ more difficult, as has been the case in previous operations<sup>38</sup>, and also impede joint operations with Afghan security forces. The problem intensifies if, at the same time, capability gaps exist – concerning reconnaissance, communications, vehicles and infantry as well as engineer forces or air transport. In short: “The caveats as well as the gaps increase the risk for every ISAF member in Afghanistan.”<sup>39</sup>

### The Afghan Security Situation

The security situation is characterized by militant opposition forces such as the Taliban threatening the still fragile Afghan government institutions.<sup>40</sup> The number of insurgencies and terrorist acts (assassinations, ambushes involving booby traps, suicide attacks) is increasing; they are mainly directed against Afghan security forces and civilians. Attacks on local and international aid workers stand out in this context – food convoys have been attacked and raided, aid workers killed or kidnapped. The country is divided into a more stable western and northern part where tribal disputes as well as crime lie at the root of security problems and the southern and eastern part where an increasingly better coordinated insurgent movement is taking hold. So far however, more than half of the deaths among NGO staff have occurred in the north and were mostly related to criminal activity. Consequently the work of the German Welthungerhilfe organization can only be carried out by “observing the most stringent security measures.” According

38 “Just like IFOR and SFOR, unity of command was not achieved in the multinational KFOR operation – the Nato commander lacked the necessary leverage and control, and nations reserved the right to dictate how, where, and when their contributing forces would be employed and deployed”, cf. Williams, *Engineering Peace* [cf. Fn. 15], p. 142.

39 General Karl-Heinz Lather, quoted in: “In Afghanistan fehlen Soldaten”, in: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, May 10, 2008, p. 5. Cf. Sascha Lange, *Die Bundeswehr in Afghanistan. Personal und technische Ausstattung in der Einsatzrealität*, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2008 (SWP-Studie 9/2008).

40 Cf. The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security. Report of the Secretary-General, UN-Doc. A/62/722-S/2008/159, March 6, 2008, para. 2, 17 et seq., 47, as well as Shadid Afsar, Chris Samples, and Thomas Wood, “The Taliban. An Organizational Analysis”, in: *Military Review*, May/June 2008, pp. 58–73, <http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/MayJun08/SamplesEngMayJun08.pdf>.

to the organization, some projects must be “remotely controlled” because it would be too dangerous for the aid workers to travel through the country.<sup>41</sup>

### The German Provincial Reconstruction Teams

Germany has assumed command of the Regional Command North with Mazar-e-Sharif as the centre of operations (and logistics base) and has been responsible for the northern region as lead nation since 2006, especially with its two PRTs in Kunduz (since November 2003) and Feyzabad (since September 2004). From the beginning a shortage of resources, in particular troops has made the Afghanistan mission a testing ground for innovative concepts.<sup>42</sup> The American initiative to rely on civil-military hybrid organizations in the form of PRTs and thus to make a virtue of necessity corresponded to the “light footprint” approach which was designed to avoid giving the impression of an occupying force.<sup>43</sup> The basic principle of the German PRTs is the cooperation of civilian and military experts who, under an overall political mission, work as peers (receiving their directions from a two-pronged command constituted by the Federal Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry of Defense). As a result of collaboration at both a conceptual and operational level, the PRTs are thus believed to be more effective. The military capabilities serve to establish security and thus to enable the civilian PRT agencies to carry out their work.<sup>44</sup>

Ideally, CIMIC liaison efforts will, among other things, contribute to necessary self-protection – for example, when a PRT commander finds out that suspicious persons who may intend to carry out attacks

41 Hans-Joachim Preuß, *Afghanistan: Schwierige Kursfindung für Hilfsorganisationen*, October 5, 2007, [www.welthungerhilfe.de/afghanistan-spezial.html](http://www.welthungerhilfe.de/afghanistan-spezial.html). Cf. *The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications* [Cf. Fn. 40], para. 64 et seq.

42 Cf. Schmunk, *Die deutschen Provincial Reconstruction Teams* [cf. Fn. 9], pp. 8 et seq., 37.


43 Cf. Lakhdar Brahimi, Briefing to the Security Council S/PV.4469, 6 Feb. 2002, p. 6. Cf. Markus Gauster, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan. An Innovative Instrument of International Crisis Management Being Put to the Test*, Garmisch-Partenkirchen: George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, January 2008 (Occasional Paper Series No. 16), pp. 8.

44 Cf. Appendix 1 to Annex C to OPLAN, in: OPLAN ISAF [cf. Fn. 34], p. C-1-1.



## Map

## Regional Command (RC) North



enter the region.<sup>45</sup> On account of limited military capabilities and in order to ensure the PRTs protection the commander is frequently dependent on local resources, in particular the collaboration with local rulers which makes for a fluid and fragile security situation and in so doing, compromises the rule of law through the acknowledgment of local regimes.<sup>46</sup> A frequently voiced criticism is that in PRTs under German command self-protection comes before the accomplishment of the mission, i.e. the establishment of security.<sup>47</sup> Here, German operational restrictions exert a direct influence on the employment of military capabilities. For instance, in the fall of 2006, the Danish contingent consisting of 41 soldiers at the time assumed half of the patrol duties of the 400-strong PRT Feyzabad – “primarily because of German restrictions

on movements outside the camp and their restrictive rules of engagement.”<sup>48</sup>

As a first step towards achieving the intended expansion of the civil-military concept, the branch office of the PRT Kunduz established a permanently staffed Provincial Advisory Team (PAT) in Taloqan in February 2008. This team consists of up to 40 civilian and military personnel, primarily soldiers of the German ISAF contingent (including 2 CIMIC soldiers), and is supposed to integrate the local staff members of the GTZ (German LLC-type Association for Technical Cooperation) which serves as an implementing organization of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. The expansion is to successively advance the reconstruction efforts in the provinces so far not under ISAF responsibility such as Jawzjan, Takhar, Sari Pul, Samangan. Additional PATs are to be established in the respective provincial capitals. Their main function is to strengthen the authority of the Afghan government by effecting stabilization and reconstruction measures in collaboration with the provincial government as well as local governmental and non-governmental organizations.<sup>49</sup>

<sup>45</sup> Such intelligence may be the result of CIMIC efforts but are not their objective.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. Ali A. Jalali, “The Future of Afghanistan”, in: *Parameters*, Vol. 36, No. 1, Spring 2006, pp. 4–19 (6). Cf. Barbara J. Stapleton, “A Means to What End? Why PRTs Are Peripheral to the Bigger Political Challenges in Afghanistan”, in: *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 1, Fall 2007, p. 38.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. Gauster, Provincial Reconstruction Teams [cf. Fn. 43], p. 27, and Schmunk, Die deutschen Provincial Reconstruction Teams [cf. Fn. 9], p. 26.

<sup>48</sup> Thruelsen, *Nato in Afghanistan* [cf. Fn. 36], p. 21.

<sup>49</sup> Bundesregierung, *Afghanistan-Konzept* [cf. Fn. 33], p. 41.

## CIMIC Core Functions in the ISAF Mission

Based on the ISAF mandate, the German Commander of Regional Command North has the civil-military mission to create a secure and stable environment and to establish the conditions for further positive development. A fundamental problem, however, is the fact that the conceptual design of the ISAF mission did not, to a sufficient extent, take into consideration the extremely deficient structures of the political system in Afghanistan that had been destroyed by war. In fact, each actor – from the political to the operational-tactical level – is confronted with the fact that one must effect “state-building without a state”.<sup>50</sup> In view of this situation which is further compounded by a deteriorating security situation, the insufficient force strength and allocation of funds in comparison with the commitment in the Balkans is becoming more and more debatable. In the PRT Kunduz for example 410 soldiers (330 of them from Germany) are in charge of an area of approximately 20,000 square kilometers.<sup>51</sup> The funds provided by the international community are also insufficient.<sup>52</sup> These factors affect the ISAF mission as a whole, but they have a particular effect on CIMIC.

The significance of CIMIC forces in gathering information facilitates an assessment of developments in the theater of operations, which cannot be rated

<sup>50</sup> Cf. Citha D. Maaß, *Afghanistan: Staatsaufbau ohne Staat*, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2007 (SWP-Studie 4/2007). Cf. Andreas Schneider, “Zivil-militärische Zusammenarbeit und Koordinierung des Wiederaufbaus am Beispiel des deutschen PRTs in Kunduz – eine Betrachtung aus Sicht des Deutschen Entwicklungsdienstes Afghanistan”, in: Walter Feichtinger and Markus Gauster (Eds.), *Zivil-Militärische Zusammenarbeit am Beispiel Afghanistan*, Wien: Landesverteidigungsakademie, March 2008, p. 159.

<sup>51</sup> In the case of KFOR, (Kosovo) the ratio soldiers/citizens is 23.8/1000, in the case of ISAF (Afghanistan) it is 1.6/1000. Cf. Timo Noetzel and Martin Zapfe, *Aufstandsbekämpfung als Auftrag. Instrumente und Planungsstrukturen für den ISAF-Einsatz*, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, May 2008 (SWP-Studie 13/2008), p. 12, as well as Nima Abbaszadeh et al., *Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Lessons and Recommendations*, Princeton: Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, January 2008, p. 28.

<sup>52</sup> “For all the talk of progress the fact is that investment in the Afghans is the lowest per capita of any development programme by the international community since World War Two», sic Hekmat Karzai and Julian Lindley-French, “Listening to Afghans”, in: *Afghanistan Times*, November 19, 2007, p. X29. Cf. James Dobbins et al., *America’s Role in Nation-Building. From Germany to Iraq*, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2003, p. 146.

highly enough, especially in fluid security situations.<sup>53</sup> Nevertheless, in February 2008, only 36 CIMIC soldiers were employed in the whole German ISAF contingent – and of these, 12 each in the two PRTs (see Table p. 15). The question arises how, with such a small number of CIMIC personnel, a realistic and up-to-date civilian situation picture is to be compiled. Without doubt, not all data in the three provinces need to be continuously verified by reconnaissance teams, and not all inquiries need to be conducted by specifically trained CIMIC forces. However, as far as the CIMIC operations in Kosovo are concerned which are being phased out and where a comparable situation exists (post-war society, lack of governmental structures, violent crime), a disproportionately larger force contingent encompassing 67 soldiers is employed especially for liaison efforts. And that although the German theater of operations in the northern Afghan provinces of Badakhshan, Kunduz and Takhar comprising an area of 64,520 square kilometres is six times larger than Kosovo. If one were to take the number of the CIMIC-like forces remaining in Kosovo as a yardstick, about 400 CIMIC soldiers – a number of utopian dimensions – would have to be employed in Afghanistan to be in proportion with the country’s geographic dimensions (disregarding its different topography and other factors). Even though one should not place too much emphasis on the ratio between force strength and surface area, this comparison vividly demonstrates the disproportionately higher significance that is accorded to the mission in the Balkans than to that in Afghanistan.

## Civil-Military Liaison

German CIMIC forces are employed in various ways. CIMIC staff personnel at Regional Command North and in the PRTs task reconnaissance teams (2 soldiers and a translator as well as a security escort if necessary) that compile the local civilian situation picture, establish and maintain contacts, identify concrete projects and render assistance during the coordination and implementation of such projects. The main task of the field forces employed for reconnaissance is to conduct talks in the villages and towns located in their areas of responsibility and to gather impressions in order to compile “village profiles.” Topics of dis-

<sup>53</sup> Cf. Jenkins, “A CIMIC Contribution to Assessing Progress” [cf. Fn. 24], pp. 129 et seq.

cussion are relevant factors such as the drinking water supply, the educational infrastructure, the security situation or the condition of local institutions. In addition, the project teams (a civil engineer and a site engineer as well as a translator) check the development of infrastructure projects for example. The actual liaison efforts, however, are undertaken by the liaison officers who represent the “face of CIMIC” and are only accompanied by an interpreter – these efforts include talks with representatives of the provincial government, provincial council, Afghan forces and police as well as the media, with mayors, mullahs and elders or the representatives of UNAMA as well as governmental and non-governmental organizations.<sup>54</sup> Based on all this data, the CIMIC staff personnel compile the civilian situation picture.

Due to the pre-deployment training undergone by CIMIC soldiers, the knowledge concerning civilian actors and current programs in the theater of operations has improved as has the information transfer during Bundeswehr contingent rotations. Nonetheless, the internal database in Kunduz has been rebuilt for several times because of the loss of data during rotations.<sup>55</sup> In addition, the transfer of information between nations participating in the ISAF mission still poses a persistent problem. An example is the transfer of command of a PRT in Baghlan Province, which had been under German command until September 2004, to a Dutch unit. Although documents were exchanged after field forces had collected large amounts of data in accordance with the CIMIC mission, the Dutch were not able to obtain a quick overview of the specific requirements in the theater of operations. Consequently, several parallel data bases were created which did not only lead to a doubling of work steps, but also to negative consequences concerning the support of own forces.<sup>56</sup> Moreover the multinational units continue to record data in the individual national languages (e.g. Finnish); there is no overarching, obligatory information management, apart

from the respective national and intra-agency reporting channels.<sup>57</sup>

For a long time, the internal structure of the German PRTs did not convey a very consistent image of inter-agency cooperation. Since representatives of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development as well as the GTZ (German LLC-type Association for Technical Cooperation), KfW (Reconstruction Loan Corporation) and DED (German Development Service) had objected to being accommodated in the same camp as the Bundeswehr, the separate “Deutsche Haus für Entwicklungspolitik” (German House for Development Policy) had initially been established in Kunduz. The Federal Foreign Office and the Bundeswehr criticized this measure claiming it would further the impression that separate policies were pursued. The development cooperation organizations, on the other hand, claimed to represent the “third pillar of the German joint commitment” and criticized the dominant role of the Bundeswehr. On the whole, however, the assessment prevails that the work carried out by the PRT Kunduz is now as comprehensive and integrated as that of any other PRT. In the meantime all other ministerial representatives present in Kunduz (from the Federal Foreign Office, the Federal Ministry of Defense, the Federal Ministry of the Interior, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development) have moved into the same municipal building. Nevertheless, concerns continue to exist because this measure no longer allows the clear-cut division between civilian and military components that is cultivated in public.<sup>58</sup>

<sup>54</sup> Cf. Bundeswehr, CIMIC – Ein militärischer Auftrag [cf. Fn. 28]; Winfried Nachtwei, “Afghanistan-Besuch im Oktober 2006: Zwischen Anschlagsgefahren und Aufbaufortschritten”, [www.nachtwei.de/index.php/articles/440](http://www.nachtwei.de/index.php/articles/440).

<sup>55</sup> Cf. Citha D. Maaß, “Viele Deutsche, viele Konzepte”, in: *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, October 10, 2007, p. 2.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. Sebastiaan J. H. Rietjens, “Managing Civil-Military Cooperation. Experiences from the Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan”, in: *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 34, No. 2, January 2008, p. 180 et seq.

<sup>57</sup> In the “Afghan Country Stability Picture”, an ISAF-based data base, the reconstruction and development aid provided by all development cooperation actors in Afghanistan is recorded. However, entries are voluntary, therefore it cannot be assumed that the list is up-to-date or complete. Currently the database contains information on more than 58,000 projects to the total tune of 11 billion USD. Cf. Nato, *Fact Sheet. Progress on Reconstruction and Development in Afghanistan*, December 2007, [www.nato.int/docu/comm/2007/0712-hq/pdf/r-d-update.pdf](http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2007/0712-hq/pdf/r-d-update.pdf). Cf. Abbaszadeh et al., *Provincial Reconstruction Teams* [cf. Fn. 51], p. 9.

<sup>58</sup> Cf. Abbaszadeh et al., *Provincial Reconstruction Teams* [cf. Fn. 51], p. 28; Winfried Nachtwei, “Delegationsbesuch der ‘ISAF-Insel’ PRT Kunduz am 31. Januar 2004”, [www.nachtwei.de/index.php/articles/news/275](http://www.nachtwei.de/index.php/articles/news/275); Schmunk, *Die deutschen Provincial Reconstruction Teams* [cf. Fn. 9], p. 29.

### Support for the Civil Environment vs. Self-Imposed Restrictions

Due to a self-imposed restriction on behalf of the German Federal Ministry of Defence, extensive reconstruction projects in support of civil environment are not to be undertaken.<sup>59</sup> Smaller aid measures, entitled Quick Impact Projects, showing immediate and visible results are to be undertaken instead.<sup>60</sup> In addition, the commander also has a “petty cash fund” of around €30,000 at his disposal. This fund covers a four month period and should be spent on measures essential to the success of operations, such as bridge and road construction, but, however not on CIMIC activities. Usually funds for CIMIC projects in Afghanistan are provided by third parties – in particular by the Federal Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, but also by private donors, firms and associations –, but not immediately from the FMOD budget (Departmental Budget 14).<sup>61</sup> The Bundeswehr provides the necessary personnel, material and equipment.

In accordance with the inter-agency approach, projects are essentially funded through the Provincial Development Fund which supplements and enhances Quick Impact Projects. For this purpose, Euro 4.72 million will be provided from FMOD Departmental Plan 14 (Title “Structural Crisis Prevention”) until the end of 2008 as well as funds from the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development in the amount of Euro 3.5 million. This money will be used to implement small-scale projects in the provinces of Kunduz, Takhar and Badakhshan that are under the sphere of influence of the German PRTs and the Taloqan PAT.<sup>62</sup> On the whole, the number of and budget

for CIMIC projects in Afghanistan – in proportion to the country’s surface area – are significantly smaller than those for the SFOR und KFOR missions.<sup>63</sup>

The positive results that collaboration with German PRTs can engender are illustrated by cooperation with a craftsmen association in Kunduz. Since January 2005, the German Development Service DED has supported the cooperation of CIMIC forces as far as the implementation of construction and maintenance projects is concerned; it has been possible to triple the project volume without increasing the annual subsidies. Now these directly benefit the crafts enterprises and the day laborers in the villages. The economic use of resources, however, is not an argument in favor of civil-military cooperation; on the contrary, one might ask why there is a military component at all in this civilian project encompassing crafts enterprises. For the positive effects of civil-military PRTs become particularly evident in their logistic capability in volatile security situations, not, however, in their promotion of the interests of Afghan small and medium-sized businesses. In real life, however, provincial governors frequently request the support of the military component of the PRT in less serious situations due to a lack of resources at district and provincial level.<sup>64</sup>

The dilemma is that on the one hand assistance is needed which in many cases can only be given by armed forces because alternative civilian resources are not available – for example in consequence of the harsh winter in 2007/2008 which claimed almost 1,000 lives among the population in January. On the other hand this reduces “humanitarian spaces” where NGOs can undertake dialogue with all relevant parties spatially removed from the armed forces and at another time (provided they pursue a distance

<sup>59</sup> “The Federal Ministry of Defense agreed that the military components of the PRTs under German command would not conduct CIMIC to the same extent as they had during the Balkan operations, but would at the most render as much emergency aid as would be indispensable for the purposes of military stabilization”, sic Schmunk, *Die deutschen Provincial Reconstruction Teams* [cf. Fn. 9], p. 29.

<sup>60</sup> *Quick Impact Projects* are mainly based on an assessment of the civilian situation, they encompass the reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure, the establishment of the water supply or the education system and include the provision as well as the transport of urgently needed goods “and thus immediate humanitarian assistance.” Bundeswehr, *CIMIC – Ein militärischer Auftrag* [cf. Fn. 28].

<sup>61</sup> BMVg, FÜ S V 3, *Zusammenstellung von CIMIC-Informationen*, Bonn, April 2, 2008.

<sup>62</sup> Cf. Deutscher Bundestag, *Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung*, Drucksache 16/10034, July 16, 2008, p. 49.

<sup>63</sup> 2,779 CIMIC projects that were implemented within the framework of SFOR (1997–2004) and KFOR (1999–2008) costing approximately Euro 19.8 million are contrasted with 760 CIMIC projects implemented within the framework of ISAF (since 2002) costing approx. Euro 4.6 million. Cf. BMVg, FÜ S V 3, *Zusammenstellung von CIMIC-Informationen*, Bonn, May 5, 2008.

<sup>64</sup> In 2006, approx. USD 260,000 were spent on projects where CIMIC forces, the Federal Foreign Office and the German Development Service cooperated (the money was spent on wells, bridges, workshops, the renovation and erection of school buildings as well as on school supplies). Schneider, “Zivil-militärische Zusammenarbeit” [cf. Fn. 50], pp. 150 et seq. A positive assessment can also be found in Feichtinger and Gauster, *Zivil-Militärische Zusammenarbeit am Beispiel Afghanistan* [cf. Fn. 50], p. 47.

strategy).<sup>65</sup> This also results in a hospitalization effect which creates dependencies and runs counter to the objective of an 'Afghan face' i.e. promoting their sense of personal responsibility.<sup>66</sup>

Taking stock of the relationship between armed forces and the civil environment, clear-cut statements cannot be made. In general, it is hard to predict how the relations between deployed forces and the population and in particular the population's assessment of the security situation will develop, barring vivid examples such as the above-mentioned case in Kunduz.<sup>67</sup> The relationship between the Bundeswehr and the NGOs on the other hand was strained initially, but became positive and pragmatic later on. The NGOs have recognized that the Bundeswehr is not a competing organization and that reconstruction can be more effectively achieved in a secure environment.<sup>68</sup> On the other hand ISAF has been criticized for assuming all tasks itself – this criticism aims at the principles of soldierly action as such: The forces work upon the principle that deficiencies are identified, after which a proposal for solution is drawn up according to military procedures and implemented upon approval. In summary, it can be said that CIMIC units should only render humanitarian and reconstruction aid in those areas that are too insecure for NGOs.

### Support for the Armed Forces and the Problem of Resource Shortage

Does the small number of German CIMIC forces in Afghanistan combined with the limited character of their operations when compared to the Balkans indicate that the concept of CIMIC, which was so

highly praised upon its inception, is on its way to being marginalized? Rather not, as one could, on the contrary, contend that the Bundeswehr has an insufficient number of troops stationed in northern Afghanistan and so therefore it can only improve the security situation (in terms of the mandate and operational mission) to a certain extent. Moreover the current posture of the armed forces is not conducive to extensive CIMIC activities.

If CIMIC personnel is in principle only allowed to move outside the camp with a security escort and in protected vehicles and if, however, for this purpose, there are neither enough infantrymen nor enough protected vehicles,<sup>69</sup> the mission can only be accomplished to a limited extent – and this in view of the other existing self-inflicted restrictions in a deteriorating security situation. Of course this also applies to the extent at which CIMIC personnel can advise military leaders and so inform decisions.

In order to accomplish the military mission of creating a safe and secure environment, one needs in particular an adequate number of forces.<sup>70</sup> This includes forces capable of conducting offensive operations. The strength of ISAF, however, is only 90% of the number of soldiers agreed upon among the troop-contributing nations in the Combined Joint Statement of Requirement (CJSOR).<sup>71</sup> If the states participating in stabilization missions do not provide the promised number of soldiers and on top of that impose national caveats, this may contribute to an escalation of violence – because, as a result the air force and artillery must be employed to conduct tactical operations against militant opposition forces instead of the more appropriate land forces.<sup>72</sup> The civilian victims that

65 Cf. "Security Still 'Major Constraint' in Afghanistan Relief Efforts – UN Official", in: *UN Daily News*, March 17, 2008.

66 Cf. AJP-9 [cf. Fn. 20], para. 202. Cf. Plattform Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung, *Zivile und militärische Komponenten im Nachkriegs-Wiederaufbau. Chancen und Risiken einer ungewohnten Nachbarschaft*, Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung und Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden, May 2004, p. 9.

67 A study determined that the vast majority of the population in the northeast is of the opinion that the security situation had improved within the last two years. Cf. Jan Koehler and Christoph Zürcher, *Assessing the Contribution of International Actors in Afghanistan. Results from a Representative Survey*, October 2007 (SFB-Governance Working Paper Series No. 7).

68 Mira Gajevic, "Deutsche Soldaten sind hier beliebt", in: *Berliner Zeitung*, February 2, 2004, p. 6; Nachtwei, "Delegationsbesuch der 'ISAF-Insel' PRT Kunduz" [cf. Fn. 58].

69 The PRT's protection unit escort soldiers operating outside camp on CIMIC missions. A shortage for example of infantrymen led to discussions about increasing the ceiling of the number of soldiers permitted under the German parliament's mandate. Cf. "Forderung nach Truppenaufstockung spaltet Union und SPD", in: *Spiegel Online*, April 23, 2008, [www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,549052,00.html](http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,549052,00.html); Thomas Wiegold, "Sicher mit mehr Soldaten", in: *Focus Online*, April 16, 2008, <http://blog.focus.de/wiegold/?p=396>.

70 Cf. Lange, *Bundeswehr in Afghanistan* [cf. Fn. 39], pp. 9–13.

71 The International Crisis Group states critically: "Since the need assessment has always been done with an eye more on availability than true requirements, it would be a 'minimalist force' even fully resourced." Idem, *Afghanistan: The Need for International Resolve*, February 6, 2008 (Asia Report 145), p. 13.

72 The number of air raids increased from 86 in 2004 to 2,926 in 2007. This is attributed to the increased Taliban activities after 2005 and a lack of ground forces. Anthony H. Cordesman, *US Airpower in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2004–2007*,

this strategy engenders do not only mean loss of human lives but are also extremely counterproductive at a political level. For, the Afghan population will no longer support the ISAF mission, the Taliban will find more favorable conditions for recruiting new fighters and, what is more, public support for the Afghanistan mission in the contributing nations will decrease.

A major challenge for ISAF (and the Afghan security forces) is in fact building the population's trust in the forces' robustness. This, however, points again to the problem of obtaining an adequate number of forces: For regions that have been rid of insurgents cannot be secured sustainably because the ISAF forces have to be employed elsewhere and Afghan security forces with the necessary training level and equipment are not yet available in sufficient numbers. Winning hearts and minds is therefore not only a question of rendering assistance; in order to gain the population's trust, militant forces must be engaged successfully and sustainably while at the same time avoiding civilian victims.

Insofar the popular version of CIMIC i.e. appealing to the population's basic needs and material self-interests in relation to counterinsurgency operations. For the population must not only be convinced that ISAF's success is in their own interest but it must also believe that the forces will prevail and guarantee lasting protection. Thus, the main goal is winning the population's respect not their affection.<sup>73</sup> Both require flexible and sufficiently equipped armed forces. In this context, it is not intended to exercise military control over the whole country (such control would not even be desirable because the important thing is to avoid the negative image of an occupying force). What essentially is required to counter insurgents are non-military measures; these, however, also necessitate military support measures and a safe and secure environment.<sup>74</sup> Furthermore, an inadequate military

presence can have serious consequences concerning the CIMIC task spectrum. After an attack in May 2007 for example, the Bundeswehr practically stopped all liaison and reconstruction efforts of its PRT in Kunduz; in the following months, it conducted "only a few foot patrols to remain in touch with the people".<sup>75</sup>

Nevertheless the Bundeswehr and ISAF forces must always be seen in the context of the Afghan National Army (ANA). Consisting of some 60,000 men, the ANA is on the way to achieving its target strength of 134,000 by 2013 and has, in particular illustrated real progress. According to a report published in March 2008, six of the nine large-scale military operations were conducted under Afghan command. One of which was the ISAF operation "Harekate Yolo II" of November 2007, the purpose of which was to tackle insurgents in the north western provinces of Faryab and Badghis. The Afghans conducted the offensive together with the Norwegian Quick Reaction Force of RC North; the Bundeswehr rendered reconnaissance and provided medical support. Being integrated into the staff, German CIMIC forces were involved in the overall operation and dealt with the procurement of relief supplies for the population; the distribution of this winter aid was left to the ANA soldiers in order to enhance their standing with the population.<sup>76</sup> In this case, the establishment of both security and self-protection formed an effective symbiosis, promising success in terms of an exit strategy. The fact that tasks are successively assumed by local security forces emphasizes the principle of Afghan self-reliance and contributes to the stabilization of the national government. However, such operations can only lead to sustainable security if civilian reconstruction and development aid are provided.<sup>77</sup>

Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Dezember 2007, [www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071213\\_oif-oef\\_airpower.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071213_oif-oef_airpower.pdf).

<sup>73</sup> Affection is irrelevant insofar as the enemy is quite capable of intimidating a population that only has a favorable attitude towards the armed forces. It is, however, much more difficult convincing people to believe that the enemy will not prevail. Dave Dilegge, "Hearts and Minds", in: *Small Wars Journal*, October 21, 2007, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/10/hearts-and-minds/>.

<sup>74</sup> Thomas Ruttig, *Musa-Qala-Protokoll am Ende*, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2007 (SWP-Aktuell 13/2007); The Senlis Council, *Stumbling into Chaos: Afghanistan*

*on the Brink*, London: Senlis Afghanistan, November 2007, pp. 57-61.

<sup>75</sup> Susanne Koelbl and Olaf Ihlau, *Geliebtes, dunkles Land. Menschen und Mächte in Afghanistan*, München 2007, p. 281.

<sup>76</sup> Carlotta Gall, "Afghans Should Be Able to Secure Their Own Country by 2011, Nato Predicts", in: *International Herald Tribune*, April 21, 2008; Noetzel and Zapfe, *Aufstandsbekämpfung als Auftrag* [cf. Fn. 51], pp. 18 et seq.

<sup>77</sup> In this respect, "Harekate Yolo II" can also serve as a negative example of a known pattern as far as comprehensive or networked approaches are concerned: "The military complains about the lack of development following operations; civilians point out they were not involved in the military's planning." International Crisis Group, *Afghanistan* [cf. Fn. 71], p. 14.

## Conclusions

In the public debate in Germany, more often than not, the moderate contribution made by CIMIC forces towards establishing security on account of their reconstruction efforts is emphasized. What is not mentioned in this context is the fact that the CIMIC forces do not have enough personnel nor are they sufficiently equipped for these efforts as is proven by the example of the German ISAF contingent. Given the German population's attitude towards the ISAF mission ranging from reservations to outright disapproval, CIMIC offers a positive image of Germany as a "civilian power".<sup>78</sup> Pictures of soldiers constructing bridges and drilling wells give the German contribution to international military operations a civilian and therefore popular image although such measures not only serve to support the population but also to promote the forces' self-protection. This image promotes the political legitimization of the mission at home and makes it easier to have the forces' mandate extended by parliament.<sup>79</sup> However, CIMIC projects cannot achieve sustainable success. What is more, they are not appropriate for replacing contributions within the framework of due Alliance solidarity – i.e. the active establishment of security by applying military force. If it is pointed out that Germany sent "soldiers" to Afghanistan, "not armed aid workers",<sup>80</sup> the subject-matter in this context is also burden-sharing within the Alliance and Germany's concrete contribution to long-term stabilization operations.

In the current operational reality, the self-commitment imposed by the Ministry of Defense to render, at best, emergency aid in conjunction with the national caveats and insufficient resources convey the im-

pression of a CIMIC self-blockade. Nonetheless this does not mean that armed forces are now surplus to requirements during reconstruction efforts, quite the contrary, they are rather indispensable, especially in fluid security situations. However, CIMIC forces should not revert to their approach of frantically implementing numerous projects which characterized the Balkan mission – under different circumstances and with different requirements ("roof batten CIMIC") – and which represents the initial failings of the German CIMIC approach.<sup>81</sup> The parties profiting from the self-induced blockade positions are militant and criminal opposition forces. Since a sufficient military presence throughout the area of operations seems not to be realizable, better use should be made of CIMIC capabilities to carry out liaison efforts, support projects and assess the situation. CIMIC forces should be augmented so that they can contribute to the establishment of a secure environment to a larger extent.<sup>82</sup> Even in the context of a deteriorating security situation, one could thus establish a positive example in the German area of responsibility that would always be complementary and supplementary to the measures taken by civil actors.<sup>83</sup>

<sup>78</sup> As a component of the civilian power concept, the maxim "politics before force" describes an attitude based on German experiences which does not encompass a fundamental pacifism but a "profound skepticism of military instruments of power." Hanns W. Maull, *Die deutsche Außenpolitik: Auf der Suche nach neuen Orientierungen*, Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, Mai 2004 (Working Paper Series No. 9-04), p. 10 [http://cges.georgetown.edu/docs/Docs\\_Working\\_Papers\\_Page/Working\\_Paper\\_Maull\\_09-04.pdf](http://cges.georgetown.edu/docs/Docs_Working_Papers_Page/Working_Paper_Maull_09-04.pdf).

<sup>79</sup> According to the German population, the Bundeswehr, when employed abroad, should mainly assume humanitarian tasks. The disapproval rating increases considerably as soon as the military component of a mission becomes its most important aspect. Thomas Bulmahn and Rüdiger Fiebig, "Sicherheits- und verteidigungspolitisches Meinungsklima in Deutschland", in: *Sowi.News*, No. 4, 2007, p. 6.

<sup>80</sup> Hans-Ulrich Klose, "Gleiches Risiko für alle", in: *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, February 21, 2008, p. 2.

<sup>81</sup> Cf. Constanze Stelzenmüller, "In der Beliebtheitsfalle", in: *Die Zeit*, October 28, 2004, p. 6.

<sup>82</sup> The International Crisis Group recommends revising the PRT approach, but also and in particular demands a stronger emphasis on the establishment of security. Cf. International Crisis Group, *Afghanistan* [cf. Fn. 71], pp. 18 et seq.

<sup>83</sup> At present, effective project implementation is complicated by the tense security situation in some regions and – consequently – by a serious shortage of civilian personnel. Cf. Bundesregierung, *Afghanistan-Konzept* [cf. Fn. 33], p. 28.

## Further Developments in Civil-Military Interaction

In multi-dimensional stabilization operations, the role of the armed forces is to establish a secure environment, thereby ensuring and supporting the construction of civilian infrastructure and governmental structures. In this context, CIMIC forces act as an “interface” between the armed forces and the civil environment, as illustrated in the KFOR, SFOR and ISAF missions.<sup>84</sup> As regards the latter however, civil-military interaction has, in practice, encountered considerable problems. As a result this has given rise to new and rather radical ‘civilization’ approaches on behalf of the command and control organisations. This is because the armed forces must constantly respond to a changing external security environment, involving a continuous renegotiation of the relationship between the military and civil society as well as the way the soldier is perceived at home.<sup>85</sup> Against this backdrop therefore, the shortcomings of CIMIC activities will be assessed and suggestions as to how they can be resolved in the long-term will be given.

### Strategic and Conceptual Interface

The traditional distance between development and security policy has, in view of the manifold challenges of international post-conflict management, been replaced by a new closeness. The German concept of networked security as well as the inter-agency approach of the German PRTs illustrates this convergence. Common ground has emerged between the governmental and non-governmental aid organisations as well as the armed forces, especially as regards the use of military infrastructure and transport assets for emergency relief work, the protection of convoys and personnel, as well as the distribution of relief aid and the exchange of information.<sup>86</sup> At the same time, aid organizations have criticized Bundeswehr con-

tributions to humanitarian aid work and the reconstruction of infrastructure. This is largely because aid organisations see a problematic relationship between military aims and humanitarian aid. According to them, “the conditionality of military aid is contrary to humanitarian thinking”.<sup>87</sup> Aid organizations fear a military takeover of traditional resources and areas of responsibility.<sup>88</sup> Moreover they even regard any kind of joint presence with armed forces as a contradiction to their aim of peacefully mitigating potential violence.<sup>89</sup>

There are multiple reasons for this negative attitude towards cooperation with the armed forces. Above all the organizational structures of both the military and aid organisations differ considerably. On the one hand, there is the homogenous military world of the armed forces where discipline and a central command structure are of great importance, on the other hand there is the decentralized heterogeneous structure of NGOs and other international organizations with their flat hierarchies and informal code of conduct working in the area of operations. What is also different are the concrete objectives and the associated timelines. The desired military end state does not necessarily correspond to the situation required for humanitarian or development policy reasons; therefore procedures or intermediate objectives are usually not consistent either. This is compounded by differences concerning deployment periods and the associated turnover of personnel: While NGO representatives have often worked in the country of deployment for decades – the German Welthungerhilfe organization in Afghanistan for example since 1980 – and while representatives of

<sup>84</sup> Braunstein, “CIMIC 2000” [cf. Fn. 18]. p. 48.

<sup>85</sup> Cf. Sabine Mannitz, “Weltbürger in Uniform oder dienstbare Kämpfer? Konsequenzen des Auftragswandels für das Soldatenbild der Bundeswehr”, in: Bruno Schoch et al. (Eds.), *Friedensgutachten 2007*, Berlin 2007, pp. 98–109.

<sup>86</sup> Cf. Heinemann-Grüder and Pietz, “Zivil-militärische Intervention” [cf. Fn. 9], p. 201.

<sup>87</sup> Hardegger, *CIMIC-Doktrin im Spannungsfeld* [cf. Fn. 10], p. 75.

<sup>88</sup> Cf. Heinemann-Grüder and Pietz, “Zivil-militärische Intervention” [cf. Fn. 9], p. 200.

<sup>89</sup> According to this point of view, the joint presence is not only contrary to the ethical standards of civilian conflict management but also to conflict-sensitive procedures that development cooperation organizations demand for their programs and tools as well as the Civil Peace Service. Cf. Schneider, “Zivil-militärische Zusammenarbeit” [cf. Fn. 50], p. 157. Cf. Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst, *Leitlinie des DED im Bereich Friedensförderung und Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung*, DED-Handbuch 1.2.9 (August 2002).



the GTZ (German LLC-type Association for Technical Cooperation) have long-term contracts of more than two years' duration for instance, the Bundeswehr soldier's period of deployment usually is no longer than four months (that of federal ministry staff usually is six to twelve months). As a result the CIMIC soldiers in particular have little time to maintain and strengthen contacts with civilian agencies, and the continuity required to establish trust and understanding does not exist. This is particularly true for relations with the population.<sup>90</sup> Compared to civilian organizations, armed forces do have certain advantages (combat-ready personnel, superior equipment, means of communication, an established command structure) enabling them to assume the tasks planned in the theater of operations within a relatively short period of time; UN organizations, on the other hand, must frequently wait to obtain funds and personnel.<sup>91</sup> The employment of armed forces, however, becomes critical in the case of long-term missions, where the enormous cost factor associated with force employment becomes important – especially if the desired objective is not achieved.<sup>92</sup>

From the point of view of the aid organizations, however, the functional and spatial proximity to the armed forces primarily involves the risk that they could lose their protective patina of neutrality and could thus become the targets of attacks.<sup>93</sup> Nonetheless it is important to note that the Taliban's

propaganda in Afghanistan is directed against any external interference be it military presence or the establishment of girls' schools. At the same time, terrorist attacks and criminality are not for the most part directed at 'foreigners', but rather local policemen, soldiers and civilians, including local aid workers. Therefore one cannot say that aid workers operating near armed forces represent "primary targets", that there exists a direct correlation with the work effected by German PRTs or that a pattern is discernible according to which civil-military interaction results in an increased threat level.<sup>94</sup> On the contrary the question is raised to what extent civilian organizations traveling around the country with armed escorts contribute to a militarized atmosphere.<sup>95</sup>

Certainly the concern of aid organizations that a cooperation with the armed forces involves the risk of "being subordinated to short-term military strategies" is understandable.<sup>96</sup> This is reflected by the perception that the "hearts and minds strategies" offering the population material supplies in exchange for information, cooperation or political support would result in a "tendency towards militarizing humanitarian aid".<sup>97</sup> Thus the armed forces are accused of jeopardizing humanitarian or long-term development measures by pursuing tactical objectives. This results in the dilemma that a minimum of coordination between the armed forces and aid organisations is unavoidable in order to achieve de-confliction, which, nonetheless frequently fails due to such concerns, that is, unless such concerns are only to serve the independence of both actors. The armed forces' humanitarian activities are also naturally limited by the commanders' self-interest not to employ soldiers for tasks that do not

<sup>90</sup> "It takes 6 to 8 weeks for new officers to establish relations with Afghan actors. If soldiers having these relations are then exchanged every four, sometimes six months, this represents an extremely inefficient use of personnel especially in a society characterized by personal relationships," Nachtwei, "Afghanistan-Besuch im Oktober 2006" [cf. Fn. 54].

<sup>91</sup> Cf. Dick Zandee, *Building Blocks for Peace. Civil-Military Interaction in Restoring Fractured Societies*, The Hague: Clingendael Institute, September 1998, pp. 48 et seq.

<sup>92</sup> "Does the German military mission [...] have to cost half a billion Euro each year when only Euro 100 million are invested in civilian reconstruction?" Susanne Koelbl, "Zum Dorfkick mit Splitterschutzweste", in: *Spiegel Online*, October 16, 2007, [www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,511168,00.html](http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,511168,00.html).

<sup>93</sup> Cf. Victoria Wheeler and Adele Harmer, "Resetting the Rules of Engagement: Trends and Issues in Military-humanitarian Relations", in: *HPG Research Briefing*, No. 21, March 2006, pp. 2 et seq., [www.odi.org.uk/hpg/papers/HPGbrief21.PDF](http://www.odi.org.uk/hpg/papers/HPGbrief21.PDF), as well as Stephan Klingebiel and Katja Roehder, *Entwicklungspolitisch-militärische Schnittstellen. Neue Herausforderungen in Krisen und Post-Konflikt-Situationen*, Bonn: Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, 2004, pp. 34 et seq. Cf. John Hill, "Blurring the Line. Involving the Military in Humanitarian Affairs", in: *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 19, No. 5, May 2007, pp. 42–47 (45).

<sup>94</sup> Farahnaz Karim, *Humanitarian Action in the New Security Environment: Policy and Operational Implications in Afghanistan*, London: Overseas Development Institute, September 2006 (Humanitarian Policy Group Background Paper), p. ii, [www.odi.org.uk/HPG/papers/BGP\\_Insecurity\\_Afghanistan.pdf](http://www.odi.org.uk/HPG/papers/BGP_Insecurity_Afghanistan.pdf). Cf. Senlis Council, *Stumbling into Chaos* [cf. Fn. 74], p. 37.

<sup>95</sup> Cf. Karim, *Humanitarian Action* [cf. Fn. 94], pp. 15, 17, cf. also p. 31; Wheeler and Harmer, "Resetting the Rules of Engagement" [cf. Fn. 93], p. 3; Williams, *Engineering Peace* [cf. Fn. 15], p. 51.

<sup>96</sup> Klingebiel/Roehder, *Entwicklungspolitisch-militärische Schnittstellen* [cf. Fn. 93], p. I

<sup>97</sup> Cf. Verband Entwicklungspolitik deutscher Nichtregierungsorganisationen (VENRO), *Streitkräfte als humanitäre Helfer? Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Zusammenarbeit von Hilfsorganisationen und Streitkräften in der humanitären Hilfe*, May 2003 (VENRO-Positionspapier), pp. 2, 13.

represent their primary duties and thus, assistance is only provided in an extreme humanitarian emergency, like the winter of 2007/2008 for example. The decision not to undertake, in contrast to the Balkan missions, extensive CIMIC operations remains the same. After all, the Bundeswehr does not follow an obscure military logic, but, as an executive body of the state, it has the task to organize a part of the state's potential for force in the best possible manner. Armed forces have to execute the tasks they are assigned. They are, according to humanitarian principles, not impartial. Nevertheless, whether aid organizations will be able, in fluid security situations and during civil wars, to maintain the principle of impartiality, is doubtful.

At the other end of the civil-military spectrum, the subsidiarity of military disaster relief must be questioned. Armed forces have the task to stabilize the situation for the purpose of creating a secure environment; by doing so they are to make themselves redundant over time. The exact moment when responsibilities are handed over to civilian actors is, however, mainly determined by the success of the armed forces' employment itself – a factor which renders the avowed subsidiarity of military efforts in terms of a self-mandate doubtful, also and especially in view of the process during which CIMIC tasks are to be assumed by civilian organizations.

As regards the German PRTs for example, it was stated that the strength of their military components lay in the “clever combination of armed presence, liaison efforts and conflict management.” It was claimed that this no longer had anything to do with traditional ideas of military coercion: “Criticisms saying that the Bundeswehr is not required here fail to realize the structurally unstable situation in the region and the need for the presence of an international ‘third party’ that has authority over the many warring factions. Without such a stabilizing influence, there may well be humanitarian projects but no reform of the security sector. Fears that the armed forces would compromise the independence of humanitarian aid were not borne out.”<sup>98</sup> After all, even NGOs cannot effectively operate in an insecure environment. In this respect, an improved security situation serves as a basic condition for the civilian

reconstruction efforts in the respective country.<sup>99</sup> In a hostile environment, NGOs are either forced to cooperate with the armed forces to ensure their security or they are forced to distance themselves or even to withdraw from the area of operations. During active combat operations, however, the PRTs themselves are endangered.

What is required is not only a “cooperation reflex”,<sup>100</sup> where a harmonious cooperation between civilians and soldiers becomes a matter of course, but also institutionalized procedures. Such procedures concerning the interagency cooperation within the German PRTs can, however, not be applied to the interaction with independent civil actors such as NGOs whose interest in practical cooperation is low. The ‘networked approach’ is certainly plausible in theory. However in practice it can only be effective if both sides cooperate. To make this approach work, common and pre-deployment training are required. What is also important is promoting “routine interaction and dialogue between the actors”.<sup>101</sup> At the international level, this is achieved through the participation of NGO members in NATO conferences as well as in seminars and training courses organized by the CIMIC Center of Excellence (CCOE) based in the Netherlands. In Germany this objective is promoted by the Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF). In addition, liaison personnel is seconded in the respective ministerial departments (Federal Foreign Office, FMOD, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development), which is a further step towards the overall improvement of civil-military interaction and illustrates some of lessons already learned. Finally, the CIMIC concept itself is a result of this learning process, but nonetheless contains further potential for development.

### Civil-Military Cooperation, Civilized?

Through the development and implementation of the CIMIC concept, the armed forces have been adapted to meet the complex challenges that stabilization missions pose. In order to improve their effectiveness, however, more far-reaching measures are required.

<sup>98</sup> Nachtwei, “Delegationsbesuch der ‘ISAF-Insel’ PRT Kunduz” [cf. Fn. 58].

<sup>99</sup> Cf. Klingebiel and Roehder, *Entwicklungspolitisch-militärische Schnittstellen* [cf. Fn. 93], p. I, cf. p. 13.

<sup>100</sup> Cf. Eekelen, *Military Support for Civilian Operations* [cf. Fn. 2], para. 27.

<sup>101</sup> Klingebiel and Roehder, *Entwicklungspolitisch-militärische Schnittstellen* [cf. Fn. 93], p. V.

This includes quite practical issues that, as a result of the 2006 Riga NATO summit, had already been discussed in the “Comprehensive Political Guidance”, i.e. an intensification of the cooperation with international organizations and NGOs. Better use is to be made of their civilian capabilities and resources so that alternative capabilities for the reconstruction of post-war societies may not be required – the member states of the Alliance are known not to have supported the suggestion of creating a “NATO Stabilization and Reconstruction Force.”<sup>102</sup>

NATO’s new “Future Comprehensive Civil-Military Interaction Concept”<sup>103</sup> does not only provide the approach that has so far been called “enhanced CIMIC” with a new label, but also encompasses the evolution of civil-military interaction from military reckoning to a political strategy. Therefore, this is not only a continued optimization process on the basis of the lessons learned; it is rather the execution of the transition from the operational-tactical CIMIC concept “in support of the mission” to a political-strategic interaction pattern. At the same time, the new interaction concept goes beyond the previous CIMIC concept in terms of approach and scope. The mission of the 2006 NATO summit was to develop pragmatic suggestions to improve the coherent application of NATO’s instruments.<sup>104</sup> At the 2008 Bucharest summit where the ISAF mission was declared a “top priority,” the above-mentioned task was extended; the members adopted a “comprehensive approach” encompassing a broad agenda containing the key terms “concerted efforts” and “coherence”.<sup>105</sup>

What is of particular interest is the relationship between this new concept and the proposed appointment of a “Civilian Actors Adviser” (CIVAD) by the Supreme Allied Command Transformation (SACT).

**102** Cf. Comprehensive Political Guidance. Endorsed by Nato Heads of State and Government on 29 November 2006, para. 7e., [www.jiato.int/docu/basicxtjb061129e.htm](http://www.jiato.int/docu/basicxtjb061129e.htm); cf. Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler, “Needed – A NATO Stabilization and Reconstruction Force”, in: *Defense Horizons*, Vol. 45, September 2004, [www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/defense\\_horizons/DH\\_45.pdf](http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/defense_horizons/DH_45.pdf).

**103** Nato, *Future Comprehensive Civil-Military Interaction Concept*, July 11, 2007. The original designation was “Transformational Concept for Enhanced CIMIC”.

**104** Cf. *Riga Summit Declaration*, Press Release (2006)150, November 29, 2006, para. 10, [www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm).

**105** Cf. *Bucharest Summit Declaration*, Press Release (2008)049, April 3, 2008, paras. 6, 11, 14, [www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-049e.html](http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-049e.html).

This, once again illustrates an effort to expand the task spectrum of CIMIC by way of a civilian component. The purpose of which would be to achieve a better understanding of civilian organizations in the areas of humanitarian aid and development cooperation.<sup>106</sup> The same intention is pursued with the idea of “development advisers” who are to advise the commander on development policy matters – as do representatives of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development in German PRTs. The role of CIVAD would be to improve cooperation with non-NATO actors at all levels through assisting the commander with high-level liaison efforts.

The CIVAD would have several advantages in comparison to a CIMIC soldier. As a civilian, he would not be subject to contingent rotations and thus, he could ensure a greater degree of continuity as far as liaison efforts with civilian actors/organisations are concerned. Moreover in view of his background and professional experience as a staff member of an IO or NGO, in particular with civilian organisations, he would be more accessible to non-NATO actors than would a military representative. Ideally, the CIVAD would do away with two of the important stumbling blocks of civil-military cooperation – differences concerning organizational culture and deployment duration – so that an integrated solution could be achieved. During the preparation stages of the mission, the CIVAD should be trained alongside the commanders two other advisers, that is, the political (POLAD) and legal adviser (LEGAD).

Furthermore, the exchange of information at NATO level between civil and military actors as well as nationally led PRTs must, in relation to (multi-) national contingent rotations be improved. Here, there is an inconsistency between on the one hand an excess of information and on the other hand information exchange deficit. As no formal agreements have, to date been reached that aim to tackle this issue, current information on armed forces, the security situation, the humanitarian situation as well as reconstruction and development projects are typically exchanged on an ad hoc basis or at best, during personal meetings

**106** A similar proposal suggests employing advisers on development policy in Bundeswehr CIMIC units. Cf. Klingebiel and Roehder, *Entwicklungspolitisch-militärische Schnittstellen* [cf. Fn. 93], p. V; Nato, *Civilian Actors Adviser (CIVAD) Concept. Draft (v 0.1)*, SACT: Norfolk, March 2007; Paul LaRose-Edwards, *Nato as a Trusted Partner in Civil-Military Interaction*, Discussion paper prepared for the University of Victoria Conference, March 18/19, 2007, pp. 2 et seq.

held weekly between PRT commanders and IO/NGO representatives. In addition to the “Afghan Country Stability Picture”<sup>107</sup>, NATO’s network-based “Civil-Military Overview” (CMO) offers an option for reducing this deficit.<sup>108</sup> This database is to be maintained by a joint civil-military consortium, that is, the “Civil-Military Fusion Centre” (CFC). This would enable NATO to provide the tools and processes required for a cooperative or even joint effort to be made within the framework of a comprehensive approach.

In reality however, a number of problems impede the exchange of information. For instance, resistance to cooperation will have to be overcome, and as regards the armed forces concrete procedures concerning the classification and disclosure of classified documents will have to be changed. The NGOs involved will have to provide extensive information and what’s more the exchange of data between individual organizations must have mutual consent given that they are in competition for financial resources. A mutual exchange of information along with transparency relating to respective plans and activities are the basic requirements for cooperation on the ground and the basis for successful civil-military interaction.

### Outlook: Coherence and Pragmatism

With the tasks of maintaining contacts, compiling civilian situation pictures and supporting reconstruction efforts for stabilization operations CIMIC has gained in operational significance. Having been a support measure, CIMIC has become a factor capable of making a direct contribution to operational effectiveness. However, CIMIC will remain piecemeal, if force strength is insufficient and there is no coherent strategy.

In the attempt to achieve coherent collaboration, the various interests of the individual groups of actors must be addressed. These interests coincide as regards one crucial juncture, namely that both the military commander and the civilian head of an NGO are interested in the armed forces accomplishing their mission successfully and thereby fostering a withdrawal as soon as possible. Thus, with regard to the planning

<sup>107</sup> Cf. Fn. 57.

<sup>108</sup> Cf. Nato, Civil-military Fusion Centre (CFC) and Civil-Military Overview (CMO), *Concept Primer for information Sharing and Shared Situational Awareness between Civil and Military Actors*, Headquarters SACT, February 2008 (ACT Working Document), p. 7. A prototype can be found at [www.cimicweb.net](http://www.cimicweb.net).

of a stabilization mission, the end state must form its basis and be continuously adapted. In this context, the lessons drawn from the EUFOR mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially as regards the CIMIC-like forces deployed (Liaison and Observation Teams, LOTs), can serve as a point of departure when developing the CIMIC approach in Afghanistan and its staffing accordingly. In view of the country’s geography, it appears to make sense to create CIMIC units consisting of a combination of LOTs and PATs; on account of the current operational restrictions and the scarcity of resources (for example when it comes to air transport and emergency medical care), this seems hardly realizable, however.

Coherence as a desideratum for foreign and security policy activities requires the ability and willingness to employ the available tools in a concerted effort so as to achieve common goals. The practical problem is that a higher level of interaction cannot be reached without having previously achieved the lower level, that is, the exchange of information. Moreover even NGOs operating at the international level frequently lack the human and structural resources (that are available at military headquarters) to implement joint planning – if the willingness to do so exists in the first place.

At the interface of civil-military interaction, one particular method of overcoming mutual reservations is the exchange of information. This exchange should gradually be improved so as to achieve a higher level of interaction. In the final analysis, achieving coherence means creating an integrated model similar to the inter-agency cooperation in the German PRTs. As far as the relationship between the armed forces and NGOs is concerned, there are multiple obstacles impeding the desired cooperation. Many suggestions have already been made as regards how to overcome such obstacles; however, implementing them is another matter and a highly ambitious undertaking.<sup>109</sup> A “prototype” civilian adviser (CIVAD) could provide an answer to this problem as this position would not

<sup>109</sup> Furthermore a lack of coherence does not necessarily mean inefficiency as long as the different approaches do not interfere with each other. Cf. Julia Hett, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan. Das amerikanische, britische und deutsche Modell*, Berlin: Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze (ZIF), April 2005 (ZIF-Analyse), p. 21. Cf. Laure Borgomano-Loup, *Improving Nato-NGO Relations in Crisis Response Operations*, Rom: Nato Defence College, March 2007 (Forum Paper Series 2), pp. 41 et seq. and pp. 51 et seq.

only constitute a pragmatic but also an integrated solution.

In addition, the ambivalence of protection versus self-protection that is inherent in the ISAF mission and becomes particularly apparent in the CIMIC approach remains a problem. This becomes even more apparent as soon as the security situation deteriorates. The Canadian Major General Marc Lessard notes with respect to Afghanistan that too often “security” means security for the ISAF forces; but what is crucial for the success of the mission, is the protection of the population against insurgent attacks.<sup>110</sup> The cautious German strategy should not be carried so far as to make the mandate of establishing security appear secondary to self-protection. In this context, a stronger mandate is not necessary. What is necessary however is the ability to actually implement the mandate – enabling the Afghan security forces on the long run to conduct robust and effective operations on their own.

In view of its importance to multi-dimensional stabilization operations, CIMIC, which is limited as regards specialist personnel, should be strengthened through creating sustainable structures. It is not only recommended that the number of CIMIC personnel deployed in the ISAF be increased, but also that the duration of their deployment be expanded to at least six or even twelve months. This is because the frequent change of personnel leads to the loss of communication relationships and prevents the establishment of a trusting relationship with the population and civilian organizations. Moreover contingent rotations should be carried out at staggered intervals so that knowledge, especially as regards the theater of operations is effectively transferred. To date, it appears that the role of CIMIC in the Bundeswehr is not sufficiently represented and what’s more there is a shortage of CIMIC personnel fit for foreign assignment, particularly as far as field-grade officers are concerned. The lack of resources on the one hand and the prioritisation of self-protection on the other hand impede the establishment of a safe and secure environment.

What is needed beyond a “NATO Stabilization and Reconstruction Force” which is politically neither realizable nor desirable is the implementation of a comprehensive approach so that the joint efforts of the EU, NATO and the UN are executed in a systematic

and coordinated manner on the basis of harmonized plans and can thus have the desired effect. In this respect, the objective of civil-military interaction in terms of achieving cooperation remains unchanged. Appropriate intermediate steps will have to be defined in NATO’s new Strategic Concept and specified and implemented at national level. However, the Bundeswehr must have sufficient personnel and materiel resources at its disposal in order to be able to accomplish the political mission.

**110** Cf. Matthew Fisher, “Winning Not a Standard of Success in Afghanistan, Says General”, *canada.com*, April 7, 2008, [www.canada.com/topics/news/world/story.html?id=1b6b6c80-9bd3-480e-8f3c-c6f02ba98fac&k=19677](http://www.canada.com/topics/news/world/story.html?id=1b6b6c80-9bd3-480e-8f3c-c6f02ba98fac&k=19677).

## Acronyms and Abbreviations

AA	Federal Foreign Office
ACE	Allied Command Europe
AJP	Allied Joint Publication
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANSO	Afghan Non-Governmental Safety Office
BMI	Federal Ministry of the Interior
BMVg (FMOD)	Federal Ministry of Defense
BMZ	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
CIMIC	Civil-Military Co-operation
CIVAD	Civilian Actors Adviser
CMO	Civil-Military Overview
DED	German Development Service
EUFOR	European Union Force
EZ	development cooperation
GTZ	German LLC-type Association for Technical Cooperation
HPG	Humanitarian Policy Group
IFOR	Implementation Force (Bosnia-Herzegovina)
IO	International Organization
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan)
KFOR	Kosovo Force
LEGAD	Legal Adviser
LMT	Liaison Monitoring Team
LOT	Liaison and Observation Team
MC	Military Committee
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PAT	Provincial Advisory Team
POLAD	Political Adviser
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
SACT	Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation
SFOR	Stabilization Force (Bosnia-Herzegovina)
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
TK ZMZ Bw	Sub-concept for Bundeswehr Civil-Military Cooperation
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VENRO	Association of German Development NGOs
ZMZ/A	Civil-Military Co-operation Abroad
ZMZ/I	Civil-Military Cooperation at Home