

5th Berlin Conference on Asian Security (BCAS)

Berlin, September 30 - October 1, 2010

A conference jointly organised by Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Berlin, Federal Ministry of Defence, Berlin, and Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta

Discussion Paper

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Session V: Global Zero: Asian Responses

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Barack Obama's 'Global Zero' and the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan of 1988: Pragmatic Idealism and the New Realist Commonsense

Abstract

This paper makes four interlinked arguments. First, nuclear abolition is no longer the aspiration of idealists and pacifists alone; it is now emerging as the new realist commonsense on nuclear weapons, especially in the US. Second, US President Barack Obama's commitment to take the lead to 'Global Zero', first enunciated in Prague in April 2009, must be recognised as a huge step forward in the quest for nuclear abolition; nevertheless, the 'new thinking' promised in the Prague speech has still not manifested itself in the Atlantic Alliance, as evidenced by *NATO 2020*, the draft new strategic concept of the Alliance. Third, a largely forgotten Indian initiative dating back to 1988, the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan, which had offered a roadmap to global, universal, non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament by 2010, is once again being taken up vigorously by India's disarmament diplomacy. Fourth, in order for 'Global Zero' to work in the Asia Pacific a mechanism for regular security dialogue on the growth of conventional military capabilities in the region, is urgently needed.

From the very beginning of the nuclear age, the dread of nuclear holocaust has fuelled the yearning for nuclear abolition. However, nuclear abolition has traditionally been the dream of idealists. This explains why, in a world governed by the exclusionary logic of sovereign statehood and driven by existential fears and security dilemmas, nuclear abolition was seen as an unattainable aspiration for over six decades.

In the last few years, the tide seems at last to be turning. Is nuclear abolition more feasible and likely today than in the past? What impact would nuclear abolition have on security relationships in the Asia Pacific? Is there a uniquely Indian perspective on nuclear abolition? These are some of the questions that this paper will explore. In the first section, I will analyse the emergence of a new realist common sense on nuclear weapons. In the second section, I will examine whether the nuclear abolitionist "Global Zero" rhetoric of US President Barack Obama has led to the unveiling of a new nuclear policy in the Atlantic Alliance. In the third section, I will argue that nuclear abolition has always been a central pillar of India's disarmament diplomacy, best exemplified by the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan of 1988. In the final section, I will consider the unique challenges that emerging Asia poses for Global Zero and suggest the type of security architecture needed to make nuclear abolition possible in the Asia Pacific.

The New Realist Commonsense on Nuclear Weapons¹

There are only two morally consistent positions that one can take on nuclear weapons. The first is to insist that nuclear weapons should not be subjected to rational analysis. This is because they are inherently evil, a lethal technology that kills indiscriminately, at long distances, on a mass scale and in extremely short time frames. Like human slavery, there is only one acceptable future for nuclear weapons: their abolition. Rational analysis of nuclear weapons justifies their continued existence, makes their use more likely, and postpones the day when our planet would be rid of them.

The other position is that nuclear weapons must be analysed rationally, precisely because they are weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear weapons exist and cannot be de-invented, although through mutual agreement their quantity and quality can be limited and controlled. Nuclear weapons bring stability through mutual deterrence, which can be achieved only by conveying unambiguously to potential adversaries that we can and will inflict severe punishment upon them if they were to attack us. Thus, paradoxically, the possibility of nuclear war can best be prevented by planning to fight a nuclear war. Indeed, nuclear weapons force us to ‘think the unthinkable’.

For over sixty years, the debate on the future of nuclear weapons has congealed around these opposing positions. Since Hiroshima, there have always been vocal opponents of nuclear weapons. The anti-nuclear cause has over the years attracted many gifted individuals and spawned many committed organisations. With few exceptions, the nuclear opponents have been idealists and pacifists, dreaming of a world rid of these weapons and indeed of war itself. Mutually assured destruction, for the idealists, is mad not only as an acronym but as a strategy.

Arrayed against the idealists are the realists. Contrary to caricature, the realists do not regard nuclear weapons as just another weapon. They see nuclear weapons as serving a political purpose (deterrence) rather than a military purpose (destruction). However, in order to deter, nuclear weapons must be able to destroy. A nuclear arsenal that doesn’t work cannot deter. Realists invoke the history of the Cold War to assert that nuclear deterrence does indeed work. The fear of extinction kept the missiles in their silos. The fear of annihilation leads to an outcome that is mutually cooperative.

The differences between idealists and realists are therefore clear and unmistakable. The idealists talk about nuclear disarmament, the realists about arms control. For realists, the abolition of nuclear weapons is a pipe dream. For idealists, arms control merely perpetuates the horrible nuclear nightmare.

¹ This section draws on an earlier publication: Varun Sahni, ‘Chance again for nuke ban’, *Mail Today* (New Delhi), 10 January 2008, p. 10.

Since the mid-2000s, a new nuclear abolitionist wave has been gathering momentum in the US. The new calls for nuclear abolition are coming from an unexpected quarter, exemplified by two influential articles in *The Wall Street Journal*, in January 2007 and 2008 respectively, co-authored by George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn and calling for a world free of nuclear weapons.² As is well known, Schultz and Kissinger are Republicans, Perry and Nunn are Democrats. Kissinger was secretary of state in the Nixon and Ford administrations. Schultz was Reagan's secretary of state. Perry was secretary of defence in the Clinton administration. Nunn was for many years chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. None of them is, by any stretch of the imagination, an idealist. Between them, these four personalities have shaped American foreign and security policy for over thirty years, so their views do count. These articles signify that the old realist-idealist divide on nuclear weapons could become a thing of the past.

What explains the new scepticism regarding nuclear weapons, particularly among key American realists? The foremost reason is the fear that nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of terrorists, who cannot be deterred. In such a scenario, deterrence fails and destruction results. The fear of the undeterred terrorist is pushing many realists to reconsider the desirability of retaining nuclear weapons. By openly advocating nuclear abolition, many realists were also reacting against the neoconservatives who came to dominate US foreign and security policy during the George W. Bush administration. It is ironic that the leading idealists during the Bush years were not the pacifists of yore, but rather a group of neoconservatives who believed and advocated that American power must be used to promote and enforce democracy. Unlike the realists, who hold that balance of power considerations should drive foreign policy, the neocons insisted that the nature of a country's political system was more important than its capabilities *per se*. Also, the success of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in banning the production, storage, deployment and use of chemical weapons – although chemical technology is much more accessible than nuclear technology – convinced many realists that it was indeed possible to successfully ban nuclear weapons. Over time, a critical mass of realists in the US became convinced that nuclear abolition was feasible and desirable, and not mere wishful thinking.

2 Shultz, George P., William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, 'A World Free of Nuclear Weapons', *The Wall Street Journal*, 4 January 2007; Shultz, George P., William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, 'Toward a Nuclear-Free World', *The Wall Street Journal*, 15 January 2008, p. A15, available at http://www.online.wsj.com/public/article_print/SB120036422673589947.html.

Obama's "Global Zero" and NATO's New Strategic Concept³

On 5 April 2009, US President Barack Obama addressed a large crowd in Prague that had gathered to hear him in Hradcany Square. Most of President Obama's speech was devoted to the future place of nuclear weapons in US policy.⁴ While making specific mention of North Korea and Iran, the speech made eight general points about US nuclear policy:

1. A world without nuclear weapons: 'I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.... To put an end to Cold War thinking, we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, and urge others to do the same.'
2. Maintaining the nuclear deterrent and security guarantees: 'As long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies.'
3. Strategic arms reduction: 'To reduce our warheads and stockpiles, we will negotiate a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with the Russians this year.... And this will set the stage for further cuts, and we will seek to include all nuclear weapons states in this endeavor.'
4. Nuclear test ban: 'To achieve a global ban on nuclear testing, my administration will immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.'
5. Fissile material cutoff: '[To] cut off the building blocks needed for a bomb, the United States will seek a new treaty that verifiably ends the production of fissile materials intended for use in state nuclear weapons.'
6. Civil nuclear cooperation: '[We] will strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a basis for cooperation.... [We] we should build a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation, including an international fuel bank, so that countries can access peaceful power without increasing the risks of proliferation.... We must harness the power of nuclear energy on behalf of our efforts to combat climate change, and to advance peace opportunity for all people.'

³ This section draws on a recent publication: Varun Sahni, 'Towards a New NATO Strategic Concept: A View from India'. Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, International Policy Analysis, October 2010, accessed from <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/07517.pdf>.

⁴ 'Remarks by President Barack Obama, Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic, April 5, 2009'. Washington, DC: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, accessed from http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/.

7. Non-Proliferation and treaty enforcement: ‘We need more resources and authority to strengthen international inspections.... Some countries will break the rules. That’s why we need a structure in place that ensures when any nation does, they will face consequences.... Rules must be binding. Violations must be punished. Words must mean something. The world must stand together to prevent the spread of these weapons.’
8. Nuclear weapons and terrorism: ‘[We] must ensure that terrorists never acquire a nuclear weapon. This is the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.... I am announcing a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years.... We must also build on our efforts to break up black markets, detect and intercept materials in transit, and use financial tools to disrupt this dangerous trade. Because this threat will be lasting, we should come together to turn efforts such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism into durable international institutions.’

Of these eight policy thrusts, the most significant surely is the forthright commitment to nuclear abolition. Indeed, there is nothing novel about the other seven points since all of them reiterate well established US policy. It can be expected that there will be enormous resistance to nuclear weapons abolition in the US, not least from within its huge and influential military and nuclear establishments. We should not be surprised to find American realists divided on the issue of Global Zero. Some realists would assert that the undeterred terrorist is now America’s primary security threat, and any end state short of nuclear weapon abolition leaves open the possibility of terrorists gaining access to nuclear weapons. However, other realists would undoubtedly continue to regard world politics as an arena in which states remain the principal actors and nuclear weapons retain their utility; in any case, it makes no sense for the US to disarm just as other powers like China are rising.

NATO has recently brought out *NATO 2020*, the draft of its new strategic concept. It is noteworthy that the word ‘disarmament’ does not appear even once in the *NATO 2020* document. This isn’t surprising: military alliances do not usually focus on disarmament issues. Nevertheless, this also reveals a rather traditional realist perspective. Unfortunately, the new Strategic Concept does not cater for the new realist commonsense that has been analysed in the first section of this paper. In particular, the *NATO 2020* document clearly states that

- ‘As long as nuclear weapons remain a reality in international relations, the Alliance should retain a nuclear component to its deterrent strategy’;

- ‘the retention of some U.S. forward-deployed systems on European soil reinforces the principle of extended nuclear deterrence and collective defence’; and
- ‘Broad participation of the non-nuclear Allies is an essential sign of transatlantic solidarity and risk sharing.’ (p. 43)

These are, of course, the bedrock principles that have defined the nuclear dimension in the Atlantic Alliance right from its very beginning. The lack of fresh thinking in this regard is particularly disappointing given US President Barack Obama’s endorsement of ‘Global Zero’. As President Obama stated in Prague, ‘To put an end to Cold War thinking, we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, and urge others to do the same.’ There is no sign in *NATO 2020* that the Atlantic Alliance has gone beyond Cold War thinking as far as nuclear weapons are concerned. The document also makes note of ‘President Obama’s decision to deploy a phased adaptive missile defence will provide more effective, rapid and reliable coverage than earlier proposals. It also puts missile defence fully within a NATO context, with participation open to all Allies and all Allies to be protected.’ (p. 11) It is not clear whether the endorsement – and future operationalization – of a missile defence system for all the countries of the Atlantic Alliance can be compatible with the goal of comprehensive nuclear disarmament. Thus, prudence demands a certain degree of scepticism about the likelihood of the US or NATO to move towards nuclear abolition, despite the open endorsement of this objective by President Obama.

Indian Initiative: Global, Universal, Non-Discriminatory Nuclear Disarmament by 2010

At the Third Special Session on Disarmament of the UN General Assembly in June 1988, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi proposed an ‘Action Plan for Ushering in a Nuclear Weapon Free and Non-Violent World Order’. The Action Plan proposed the elimination of all nuclear weapons, in three stages, by 2010, in a process that was global, universal and non-discriminatory (see Appendix). The Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan of 1988, as it has come to be known in India, had the following essential features:

- First, there should be a binding commitment by all nations to eliminating nuclear weapons in stages, by the year 2010 at the latest.
- Second, all nuclear weapon States must participate in the process of nuclear disarmament. All other countries must also be part of the process.
- Third, to demonstrate good faith and build the required confidence, there must be tangible progress at each stage towards the common goal.

- Fourth, changes are required in doctrines, policies and institutions to sustain a world free of nuclear weapons. Negotiations should be undertaken to establish a Comprehensive Global Security System under the aegis of the United Nations.

At the time that it was proposed, the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan, despite its many path breaking features, sank like a stone in a lake after making a few ripples. There are many reasons for its failure to become a credible roadmap for disarmament:

- In 1988, Rajiv Gandhi was in his last year in office and was voted out a year later. The succeeding government was internally-focused and did not take the initiative forward. Rajiv Gandhi himself was assassinated by the Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers while campaigning in the subsequent General Elections, called in 1991 in the wake of the successor government's collapse.
- The 1990s were an extremely tough decade for India on all fronts. After the Soviet implosion, India was friendless externally. It was saddled with a severe foreign exchange crisis that threatened to bankrupt it. Besides tackling externally supported insurgencies in Punjab and Kashmir, India was also beset with every type of domestic problem imaginable. It comes as no surprise that the Indian government was internally focussed during the 1990s.
- With the growing China-Pakistan nuclear nexus, it was also increasingly evident during the 1990s that Pakistan had acquired a nuclear deterrent by this time. Thus, the focus of the Indian government shifted from pushing for nuclear disarmament to ensuring that India also was ready to exercise the nuclear option. In retrospect, the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan is seen by many Indian analysts as a last-ditch Indian attempt to push for comprehensive nuclear disarmament, in the face of a closing window of opportunity that made overt nuclearisation a *fait accompli*.
- In the late 1980s, India was a large but weak state in the international system. There was therefore no reason for an Indian nuclear disarmament initiative to be taken seriously by any other state, especially the leading powers of the day. Indeed, the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan itself celebrates the successful conclusion of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty by the US and the Soviet Union.
- In 1989, the Warsaw Treaty Organization was dissolved. By 1991, the Soviet Union had ceased to exist. Western triumphalism in the 1990s made comprehensive nuclear disarmament a distant possibility. Securing the nuclear infrastructure in the post-Soviet space was the clear priority in the early 1990s.

India emerged out of the 1990s with its territorial integrity intact, having largely seen off the challenges imposed by Pakistan's asymmetric war strategy although the threat of externally-supported terrorism continued to loom large in the succeeding years. Due to economic liberalisation, the Indian economy was beginning to boom. The nuclear tests of 1998 had converted India into a state with nuclear weapons and sharpened India's quest for strategic autonomy. It was also during these years of extreme peril that India's long-incubating technological revolution finally emerged. By the early 2000s, it was increasingly clear that India was an emerging power that was playing a significant system shaping role in arenas as diverse as global trade and climate change. With India's slow but steady emergence as a system-shaping state, its disarmament diplomacy is likely to become more proactive. Already, a group of Indian analysts are working to update the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan, which remains the central pillar of India's disarmament policy. In 2006, the Indian delegation to the UN General Assembly circulated a Working Paper which reminded the international community that the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan 'provided a holistic framework seeking negotiations for a time-bound commitment for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons to usher in a world free of nuclear weapons and rooted in non-violence.' The Working Paper called on the international community 'to build a consensus that strengthens the ability of the international community to initiate concrete steps towards achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament', based on the following elements:

- Reaffirmation of the unequivocal commitment of all nuclear weapon States to the goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons;
- Reduction of the salience of nuclear weapons in security doctrines;
- Taking into account the global reach and menace of nuclear weapons, adoption of measures by nuclear-weapon States to reduce nuclear danger, including the risks of accidental war, de-alerting of nuclear-weapons to prevent unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons;
- Negotiations of a global agreement among nuclear weapon States on 'no-first-use' of nuclear weapons;
- Negotiation of a universal and legally-binding agreement on non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons States;
- Negotiation of a Convention on the complete prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- Negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons and on their destruction, leading to the global non-discriminatory and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified timeframe.

In the first of their two articles, Schultz, Perry, Kissinger and Nunn make an explicit mention of Rajiv Gandhi's antinuclear address to the UN General Assembly in June 1988 calling for a time-bound plan to abolish nuclear weapons. Thus, it would appear that the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan is being picked up from the shelf of discarded proposals and dusted off by analysts and policymakers not only in India but in other, perhaps more crucial, locales.

Asian Helsinki: Regular Dialogue Leading to Cooperative Security⁵

For any move towards Global Zero to work, Asia must be on board. Is that likely? As of now, the Pacific world is bereft of either a security community or a cooperative security structure, both of which are now staples of the Atlantic world. Without security dialogues, moving towards nuclear abolition is obviously impossible. One of the important aspects of the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan was to explicitly link the nuclear and conventional levels:

Beyond a point, nuclear disarmament itself would depend upon progress in the reduction of conventional armaments and forces. Therefore, a key task before the international community is to ensure security at lower levels of conventional defence. Reductions must, of course, begin in areas where the bulk of the world's conventional arms and forces are concentrated. However, other countries should also join the process without much delay. This requires a basic restructuring of armed forces to serve defensive purposes only. Our objective should be nothing less than a general reduction of conventional arms across the globe to levels dictated by minimum needs of defence. The process would require a substantial reduction in offensive military capabilities as well as confidence building measures to preclude surprise attacks. The United Nations needs to evolve by consensus a new strategic doctrine of non-provocative defence.

In Asia, the geopolitical map is changing, slowly but surely. For perhaps the first time in Asian history, and certainly for the first time since European colonialism,⁶ a continent-wide security architecture – linked quite clearly to the rise of China – is arriving in the Asia-Pacific. China is working hard to signal to its neighbours that its rise is 'peaceful,' the odyssey of a large country on the road to

⁵ I have been writing on this theme for some time now, my latest publication being: Varun Sahni, 'The Kindling Years: Balance of Power and the Role of Major Powers in Asia', in N.S. Sisodia and S. Kalyanaraman (eds.), *The Future of War and Peace in Asia* (New Delhi: Magnum Books, 2010), pp. 365-384.

⁶ It could be argued that there was a continent-wide balance of power in Asia during the 'Vasco da Gama Epoch', to use K.M. Panikkar's evocative phrase. See K.M. Panikkar, *Asia and Western Dominance* (New York: Collier Books, 1969).

development rather than the onward march of a rising power.⁷ How will the rest of Asia – and India in particular – respond to the rise of China? Would China succeed in convincing its neighbours that its rise is not the twenty-first century version of Wilhelmine Germany seeking its place in the sun?

Some Asian scholars, such as Kishore Mahbubani, argue that Europe's past will not be Asia's future.⁸ The rise of China would merely indicate reversion to a pre-modern and pre-European Asian order, based on notions of hierarchy and tributary relationship with China that all Asians recognise and understand.⁹ If deep historical memory of Chinese ascendance truly exists in much of Asia, India does not share that memory: the Himalayas stood in the way. Between the world historic transmission of Buddhism from India to China and the planting of tea in the Himalayan foothills, interaction between China and India was sparse across the centuries, limited largely to merchant caravans, itinerant pilgrims and cultural miscegenation in Indo-China. China and India met when Zhou Enlai and Jawaharlal Nehru met; in other words, the first real encounter between the two countries was as sovereign territorial postcolonial states.

Thus, Asia does have to take a cue from the historical processes that over time wrought a region out of the European continent. If we are prudent, we will not bank upon the ability of Asia's ruling elites to avoid war due to wise leadership, nor would we overemphasise the ever-increasing interdependence across Asia as a guarantee against future conflict. As I have suggested elsewhere, we could be entering the kindling years in Asia, with the tinder piling up as we carry along blissfully unaware of the gathering firestorm.

The Asia Pacific has a lot to gain from the experience of the Euro-Atlantic in setting up a cooperative security mechanism. The Helsinki process had many 'baskets' of issues, some pertaining to inter-state relations, other to matters *within* sovereign boundaries. Thus, mutually balanced force reductions and concerns about human rights violations were both a part of the Helsinki process. In Asia, it is easy to see that the internal aspect of the Helsinki process may be considerably less acceptable to Asian states than it was even to the states of eastern and central Europe. This is for two reasons. First, the states of Asia are, with some notable exceptions, young states, many of them postcolonial. Thus, these states are likely to guard their sovereignty with far greater zeal than did the long consolidated and somewhat tired states of Europe. Secondly, it is argued in some quarters than

7 See Zheng Bijian, *China's Peaceful Rise* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005); also see 'China's peaceful rise: A road chosen for rejuvenation of a great nation', *People's Daily Online* (19 February 2004). Source: http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200402/18/eng20040218_135155.shtml.

8 See Kishore Mahbubani, 'The great powers and Asia', *Global Forces 2005* (Proceedings of the ASPI conference: Day 1—Global Strategy), ASPI Strategy, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, April 2006.

9 See David C. Kang, 'Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks', *International Security* 27, 4 (Spring 2003): 57–85.

Asian cultures privilege the group over the individual, order over liberty and obligations over rights. While the latter argument is clearly a contentious one, we should not be surprised if many states in Asia resist the intrusive nature of the Helsinki process in what they regard as their ‘internal affairs’.

We must remember that the original Helsinki process was itself a contentious one. As a scholar has observed, ‘The issue was whether the *project* for a European security conference developed over the years, which finally merged into the *process* known as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, should be built into a permanent inter-systemic *organization* or not.’¹⁰ Different states also made different uses of it:

The CSCE process was only possible at all as a part of and expression of East-West détente. What this meant and whether in the long-term it would lead to a kind of convergence of the systems, whether each side would consider it more damaging or more to their advantage, or how the advantages of this kind of antagonistic co-operation were distributed, was discussed in and between Eastern and Western countries extensively, partially in earnest, partially as propaganda, and this on the other hand, partially in supporting the CSCE process and partially as attempts to torpedo it.¹¹

In other words, we should not be surprised if the process of creating a cooperative security architecture in Asia is a tortuous and contentious one. It would still be well worth the effort if it were to reduce the size of arsenals in Asia, enmesh Chinese and American capabilities in Asia within a larger cooperative process, lead to the evolution of a new and authentic *Asian* identity, build habits of cooperative behaviour on the Asian continent, and may be even play a role in the democratization of China. Sadly, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) is currently a pale shadow of its European counterpart. There can be few tasks more challenging and worthwhile than to begin the groundwork for the construction of a cooperative mechanism of Asian security. As a start, the major powers in the Asia-Pacific need to meet once a year to discuss their security concerns and share information that is mutually reassuring.

10 Wilfried von Bredow, ‘The OSCE: Construction and Identity Problems’ in OSCE Yearbook 2000 (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2001), p. 42; emphases in the original.

11 Ibid.

Appendix

Action Plan for Ushering in a Nuclear Weapon Free and Non-Violent World Order

1. Humanity stands at a crossroads of history. The world has lived too long under the sentence of extinction. Nuclear weapons threaten to annihilate human civilization and all that humankind has built through millennia of labour and toil. Nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon state alike are threatened by such a holocaust. It is imperative that nuclear weapons be eliminated. The recently signed INF Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union is a first major step in this direction. This process must be taken to its logical conclusion by ridding the world of nuclear weapons. The time has also come to consider seriously the changes in doctrine, in policies, in attitudes, and in the institutions required to usher in and manage a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world. Peace must be predicated on a basis other than the assurance of global destruction. We need a world order based on non-violence and peaceful coexistence. We need international institutions that will nurture such a world order.

2. We call upon the international community to urgently negotiate a binding commitment to an action plan for ushering in a non-violent world free of nuclear weapons. We suggest the following action plan as a basis for such negotiations:

STAGE I (duration: 6 years, from 1988 to 1994)

- 2.1.a. **Nuclear disarmament:**
- 2.1.a.i. Elimination of all Soviet and United States land-based medium and shorter range missiles (500 to 5500 km) in accordance with the INF Treaty.
- 2.1.a.ii. Agreement on a 50 percent cut in Soviet and United States strategic arsenals (with ranges above 5,500 km)

- 2.1.a.iii. Agreement on a phased elimination by the year 2000 A.D. of United States and Soviet short range battlefield and air-launched nuclear weapons.
- 2.1.a.iv. Cessation of the production of nuclear weapons by all nuclear weapons states.
- 2.1.a.v. Cessation of production of weapons-grade fissionable material by all nuclear weapons states.
- 2.1.a.vi. Moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons.
- 2.1.a.vii. Commencement and conclusion of negotiations of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

- 2.1.b. **Measures collateral to nuclear disarmament:**
 - 2.1.b.i. Conclusion of a convention to outlaw the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons pending their elimination.
 - 2.1.b.ii. Declaration by the United States and the Soviet Union that the fissile material released under the INF Treaty would be utilised for peaceful purposes only and accordingly be subjected to supervision by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
 - 2.1.b.iii. Declaration by all nuclear weapon states of their stockpiles of nuclear weapons and weapon-grade fissionable material.
 - 2.1.b.iv. Cessation of direct or indirect transfer to other states of nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and weapon-grade fissionable material.
 - 2.1.b.v. Non-nuclear weapon powers to undertake not to cross the threshold into the acquisition of nuclear weapons.
 - 2.1.b.vi. Initiation of multilateral negotiations to be concluded by 1995 for a new treaty eliminating all nuclear weapons by the year 2010. This treaty would replace the Non-Proliferation Treaty which ends in 1995.

- 2.1.c. **Other weapons of mass destruction:**
 - 2.1.c.i. Conclusion of a treaty banning chemical weapons.

- 2.1.c.ii. Conclusion of a treaty banning radiological weapons.

- 2.1.d. **Conventional forces:**
- 2.1.d.i. Substantial reduction of NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces, especially offensive forces, and of weapons system in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.
- 2.1.d.ii. Multilateral discussions in the Conference on Disarmament or in the United Nations on military doctrines with a view to working towards the goal of a purely defensive orientation for the armed forces of the world. The discussions would include measures to prevent surprise attacks.

- 2.1.e. **Space weapon systems:**
- 2.1.e.i. A moratorium on the testing and deployment of all space weapon systems.
- 2.1.e.ii. Expansion of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space.

- 2.1.f. **Control and management of the arms race based on new technologies:**
- 2.1.f.i. Arrangements for monitoring and assessing new technologies, which have military applications, as well as forecasting their implications for international security.
- 2.1.f.ii. For research in frontier areas of technology where there are potential for military applications, new technology projects and technological missions should be undertaken under the auspices of the United Nations in order to direct them exclusively to civilian sectors.
- 2.1.f.iii. Commencement of work, under the aegis of the United Nations, for the formulation of guidelines to be observed by governments in respect of new technologies with potential military applications.

- 2.1.f.iv. Commencement of negotiations for banning technological missions designed to develop new weapon systems and means of warfare.
- 2.1.g. **Verification:**
- 2.1.g.i. Acceptance in principle of the need to establish an integrated multilateral verification system under the aegis of the United Nations as an integral part of a strengthened multilateral framework required to ensure peace and security during the process of disarmament as well as in a nuclear weapon free world.
- 2.2 **STAGE II** (duration: 6 years, from 1995 to 2000)
- 2.2.a. **Nuclear Disarmament:**
- 2.2.a.i. Completion of Stage I reductions by the United States and the Soviet Union and the induction of all other nuclear weapon states into the process of nuclear disarmament.
- 2.2.a.ii. Elimination of all medium and short range, sea-based, land-based and air-launched nuclear missiles by all nuclear weapon states.
- 2.2.a.iii. Elimination of all tactical battlefield nuclear weapons (land, sea and air) by all nuclear weapon states.
- 2.2.a.iv. Entry into force of the comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT).
- 2.2.b. **Measures collateral to nuclear disarmament**
- 2.2.b.i. Negotiations on withdrawal of strategic nuclear weapons deployed beyond national boundaries.
- 2.2.b.ii. Completion of the ratification and entry into force of the convention prohibiting the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons.
- 2.2.b.iii. Conclusion of the new treaty eliminating all nuclear weapons by the year 2010 to replace the non-proliferation treaty.

- 2.2.c. **Space weapons:**
- 2.2.c.i. Agreement within a multilateral framework on banning the testing, development, deployment and storage of all space weapons.

- 2.2.d. **Conventional forces:**
- 2.2.d.i. Further reduction of NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces to minimum defensive levels.
- 2.2.d.ii. Negotiations under the Conference on Disarmament on global conventional arms reduction.
- 2.2.d.iii. Removal of all military forces and bases from foreign territories.

- 2.2.e. **New and emerging technologies:**
- 2.2.e.i Completion of negotiations on banning technological missions aimed at the development of new weapon systems.
- 2.2.e.ii. Completion of negotiations on guidelines in respect of new technologies with potential military applications.

- 2.2.f. **Comprehensive global security system:**
- 2.2.f.i. Negotiations on and establishment of a comprehensive global security system to sustain a world without nuclear weapons. This would include institutional steps to ensure the effective implementation of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations relating to the non-use of force, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the right of every state to pursue its own path of development.
- 2.2.f.ii. Arrangements for the release of resources through disarmament for development purposes.
- 2.2.f.iii. Elimination of non-military threats to security by such measures as the establishment of a just and equitable international economic order.

- 2.2.f.iv. The strengthening of the United Nations system and related multilateral forums.
- 2.2.f.v. The commencement of negotiations for the establishment of an integrated multilateral verification system under the United Nations.

- 2.3. **STAGE III** (duration: 10 years, from 2001 to 2010)
 - 2.3.a. Elimination of all nuclear weapons from the world.
 - 2.3.b. Establishment of a single integrated multilateral comprehensive verification system which *inter alia*, ensures that no nuclear weapons are produced.
 - 2.3.c. Reduction of all conventional forces to minimum defensive levels.
 - 2.3.d. Effective implementation of arrangements to preclude the emergence of a new arms race.
 - 2.3.e. Universal adherence to the comprehensive global security system.

- 3.1. There has been a historically unprecedented militarisation of international relations during the last four decades. This has not only enhanced the danger of nuclear war but also militated against the emergence of the structure of peace, progress and stability envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations.
- 3.2. To end this dangerous militarisation of international relations, we must build a structure firmly based on non-violence. It is only in a non-violent democratic world that sovereignty of nations and the dignity of the individual can be ensured. It is only in a non-violent world that the intellectual and spiritual potential of humankind can be fully realised.
- 3.3. The prospect of a world free from nuclear weapons should spur us to start building a structure of international security in keeping with the fundamental changes that are taking place in the world political, economic and security environment.

- 3.4. In a shrinking and interdependent world, such a structure has to be comprehensive, its components supportive of each other, and participation in it universal.
- 3.5. A world order crafted out of outmoded concepts of the balance of power, of dominance by power blocs, of spheres of influence, and of special rights and privileges for a select group of nations is an unacceptable anachronism. It is out of tune with the democratic temper of our age.
- 3.6. The new structure of international relations has to be based on scrupulous adherence to the principles of peaceful coexistence and the Charter of the United Nations. It is necessary to evolve stronger and more binding mechanisms for the settlement of disputes, regional and international. The diversity among nations must be recognised and respected. The right of each nation to choose its own socio-economic system must be assured.
- 3.7. Concomitant changes will be called for in the international economic order. The interdependence of all economies of the world makes for a symbiotic relationship between development in the South and stability and growth in the North. In a just and equitable order, access to technology and resources, on fair and reasonable terms will be assured. The gap between the rich and the poor will be bridged.