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Discussion Paper

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***Session III: The US Military Presence and the Future of Security Partnerships***

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
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## The U.S. Military Presence and the Future of Military Partnerships

One frequently heard complaint from Chinese is that the U.S. is bent on a policy of encirclement, containment, and opposition to the rise of China.

Let us put to one side the obvious responses that a country seeking to contain another does not open its markets to the other, run huge trade deficits, admit hundreds of thousands of students to advanced universities, or the many other things the U.S. does with China.

Just a quick glance at the chart below (Military Personnel in the Asia-Pacific Region) and its detailed supporting spreadsheet, appended (Data on US Military Personnel) shows that since the end of the Cold War, the United States has reduced its manpower in the Asia-Pacific region from over 218,000 in 1988 to about 133,000 today. Even the roughly 85,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan cannot reasonably be calculated as part of a strategy for the Asian region, given their declared temporary and narrow focus on stabilizing the government in Kabul.



(Military Personnel Statistics, available at

<http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/miltop.htm>.)

This reduction in U.S. troop strength does not mean that the U.S., its allies, and friends are not upgrading and modernizing their military capabilities in the region, as is China. But it does illustrate that the trends in the region do not all point ineluctably toward future conflict.

**What are the trends in the U.S. alliances?** The most dynamic active U.S. alliance in the region is with the **Republic of Korea**. Despite the many political and economic difficulties between the two capitals during the presidency of the late Roh Moo-hyun, considerable change was effected in the structure and character of the alliance.

After years of foot-dragging by successive administrations, Seoul under Roh agreed to build down the forward U.S. bases, reduce overall manpower, and consolidate in new facilities near Osan and Pusan. Despite considerable American skepticism, Roh actually began the expensive acquisition of land and the construction to house the forces (and for first time their dependents). With the advent of the Lee Myung-bak government, this process has intensified and the alliance has grown visibly stronger as political issues melted away.

U.S. forces on the Korean peninsula are now actively transforming from their trip-wire role in the defense of the South against the North, to a regional role, with the enlarged air and naval facilities in Korea serving as staging points and logistical hubs. Ambiguity has been maintained over the contingencies in which those forces might use Korean bases, but it appears to be an increasingly permissive ambiguity. Over time, not only will there be fewer U.S. troops in Korea, but increasingly they will be specialists in supporting the flow of forces and supplies to other locations, inside and outside Korea, rather than dedicated combat troops themselves.

Recent significant developments revolve around the sinking of the South Korean corvette *Cheonan* on March 26, with the loss of 46 lives. In its aftermath, the U.S. agreed to step up sanctions against the North, seek a U.N. Security Council presidential statement on the incident, and conduct anti-submarine and other exercises to deter the North, which in turn have excited commentators and officials in China, who have interpreted the anti-DPRK exercises as actually aimed at China.

Moreover, the U.S. agreed to a three-year delay in the transfer of operational control (OPCON) of forces on the peninsula to South Korean commanders. Senior Korean military have been resisting taking on joint command responsibilities in wartime, arguing, correctly, that their training until now has not given them adequate preparation for the role.

**The alliance with Japan:** In tandem with the restructuring of the Korean alliance, the George W. Bush administration also agreed on a bases relocation plan with Japan in 2006, signed as a formal agreement earlier this year by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Among the goals is a reduction of the still extensive U.S. military “footprint” on the congested Japanese archipelago. The U.S. succeeded in transferring the nuclear powered aircraft carrier *George Washington* to nuclear allergic Japan’s Yokosuka naval base. Japan committed to bearing the cost of consolidating bases and transferring most of the Marine expeditionary force from Okinawa to Guam.

As is known to all, however, Japanese domestic politics have entered an anfractuous period too complicated to describe here, but which has made reaching decisions on almost anything –let alone military matters in still largely pacifist

Japan – very difficult indeed. To make a long story short, relocation of a tiny Marine air station at Futenma, located in a congested part of Okinawa, has proved until now to be politically impossible. Since the terms of the Bush agreement are essentially “all or nothing,” the failure so far of the Futenma relocation has halted progress on virtually all related relocations, with their attendant costly facilities construction and rehabilitation.

With the upcoming fiftieth anniversary of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty, an Obama state visit to Tokyo, and the APEC leaders’ meeting in Yokohama in November, observers are increasingly speculating that somehow the two sides will manoeuvre around the Futenma basing question. It seems nearly absurd that such a small facility is obstructing progress on so many other aspects of the alliance.

Having said that, there are significant underlying issues in the alliance. While Japan has been gradually reshaping its forces since the end of the Cold War, moving forces from the north to the south, and reducing the tank force in favor of naval and air assets, its overall defense budget has been slowly declining below the declaratory ceiling of 1% of GDP. As China’s military budget grows in double digits, Japan’s increments in capability have seemed minuscule.

The useful life of Japan’s extensive F-15 force is also approaching its end. Tokyo would greatly prefer acquiring F-22’s from the U.S. as force multipliers, but these have been barred by Congressional action, and the somewhat less capable F-35’s are a long way from delivery. Japan may default to domestic F-2’s, with significant limitations on capability.

Japan also has a need to develop intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities (ISR) between its southern islands, so as to monitor increasing Chinese ship and submarine movements in their straits. Tokyo also stands near to examining its prohibitions on arms exports, as the world’s defense industries continue to consolidate internationally and its own industries remain outsiders. These are likely to be the key topics of next year’s National Defense Program Guidelines, delayed by the political turmoil in Nagatacho.

Japan’s latent nuclear weapons capability remains a subject of speculation, but for now stands little chance of materializing. Having said that, if the effects of continued inattention to Japan’s defense needs cascade in the right combination of bad outcomes, including China’s rapid rise, it would be a quick though difficult decision to pursue nuclear weapons.

**China’s diplomacy with Japan deserves a reference here.** Since Wang Yi served as ambassador to Tokyo, China has navigated a significantly successful diplomatic course to assuage Japanese concerns about China, following the turmoil associated with Prime Minister Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni shrine and the 2005 protests against Japan in China. Premier Wen Jiabao and President

Hu Jintao conducted immensely successful state visits, calming Japanese opinion, even as opinion polls show underlying greater suspicion of China and greater confidence in the U.S. alliance. Prime Minister Fukuda set in motion a solution to oil exploration in disputed portions of the East China Sea. This has been complemented by straightforward Japanese recognition of its dependency on Chinese production platforms to support its economy.

More recently, this has been challenged by a dispute in the Senkaku/Diaoyudao archipelago over the arrest of a Chinese fishing boat captain. At this point, what catches the eye is that China has issued strong formal demarches, yet simultaneously repressed public expressions of protest, trying to protect the gains of the diplomacy of recent years.

**The alliance with Australia:** Having weathered the global financial crisis more successfully than virtually all other countries, Australia is in good fiscal shape and largely of a mind to continue the strong alliance relationship with the U.S. With the election of Kevin Rudd as prime minister in 2007, Canberra symbolically came to be led by someone intimately familiar with China, Australia's largest trade partner and looming investor.

But the strong embrace in the relationship between China and its 1.3 billion people, and Australia, with its 27 million, developed tensions that paradoxically reinforced the alliance with the U.S. In 2009, Australia issued a defense white paper that set a target for 8-12 or more additional advanced submarines and air assets, including F-35's, that were widely interpreted as only directed at China's new capabilities. They are, moreover, intended to be highly complementary with U.S. and Japanese forces.

Opinion is not uniform in Australia. Former defense official and Australian National University professor Hugh White recently published a paper calling for accommodation to China's inevitable rise to dominance in the Asia-Pacific region. Viewing this prospect over the coming two to three decades, White called for, among other things, suspension of criticism of China's internal policies and behavior. As time passes, more support for White's point of view may emerge in Australia, but for now, he is being subjected to intense criticism for defeatism and a Neville Chamberlain-like "Munich appeasement" of China.

**New Zealand** merits a brief word. Kiwi expeditionary capability was significantly downsized during the long prime minister-ship of Labor's Helen Clark. Yet, ironically, her willingness to dispatch contingents of New Zealand special air services and medical units to Afghanistan brought her closer to the United States than at anytime since the rupture in the ANZUS alliance in 1984. The issue of Wellington's refusal to accept tactical nuclear weapons has faded, and the alliance is healing slowly, though is far from fully functioning. Importantly, intelligence exchanges remain channelled awkwardly through Canberra.

**India** is of course not part of the U.S. alliance system, but since the 1999 visit by President Bill Clinton, and especially after the 2007 George W. Bush administration agreement with New Delhi on nuclear cooperation, attention has increasingly focused on the security dimension of India's relations with the U.S. This is being reinforced by the strong rhetoric of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Washington in 2009 and President Barack Obama's impending visit to Delhi.

The Indian Ministry of Defense is reportedly planning to double its arms procurement and spend over \$20 billion, more than twice the amount spent in the past 10 years on an annual basis. On the table are major naval acquisition programs, including buying six submarines for about \$2.3 billion and \$3 billion worth modernizations of India's artillery corps. In what Delhi says is a response to upgrades on China's side of their border, Delhi is constructing two new air bases and support and logistics for two new ground divisions near the Tibetan border.

Some have interpreted China's successful test of an anti-missile system this year as demonstrating a capability to deal with India's intermediate range nuclear-armed missiles. If so, this would be an uncharacteristic degree of attention by China to India. It is perhaps prompted by new respect for India's developing capabilities, as well as by its more robust assertion of its regional interests.

In the U.S., there are at least two schools of thought about the future of the relationship with India. One sees intensifying relations and equipment sales (India is looking at a new fighter to buy from competitors from the E.U., Russia, or the U.S.) as making India an increasing counterweight to China's regional influence. Journalist Raja Mohan says India is looking for a "goldilocks" outcome where its relations with China will not be too hot or cold, as India asserts its interests on the subcontinent, in Southeast Asia, and even in the Pacific. He maintains India's interests are largely congruent with America's. The George W. Bush administration was intensely attracted to this classic balance of power play; and the Obama administration somewhat more tepidly attached to it as well.

A second school sees India essentially pursuing its long-standing non-aligned policy, seeking benefits wherever it can find them. It argues that India will never be a deputy for U.S. security interest vis-à-vis China or any other power, and the current U.S. effort to draw India into an anti-China coalition is doomed to fail. It may take considerable time to discover which school has the right emphasis, but in the meantime it appears India will make the most of opportunities to strengthen its self.

**Southeast Asia**, where the U.S. has alliances with the Philippines and Thailand, is generally upgrading its defense capabilities at a modest pace, with new submarines and fighters being purchased by the countries that can afford them, Malaysia,

Singapore, and Thailand. The U.S. has maintained a robust exercise cycle with Southeast Asian forces, organized by the Pacific Command in Hawaii.

After years of arms length treatment, Indonesia under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has seen a major improvement in defense relations with the U.S. In May, Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced the symbolically important gradual rehabilitation of elite *Kopassus* forces into U.S. military activities and training.

Quite noteworthy was the response to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's appearance at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in July in Hanoi. After she asserted an American national interest in freedom of navigation in the South China SEA, eleven other foreign ministers spoke up in broad support for her implicit warning to China to cool its unilateral assertiveness in the region. This episode may come to be seen as a political tipping point from the decade of Chinese diplomatic and economic gains in Southeast Asia to one where China's growing military capabilities are becoming a greater source of local concern.

**Finally, the United States is strengthening selectively its capabilities in the Asia Pacific region.** According to the Congressional Reference Service, "in 2000, the Air Force wanted to base elements of an Air Expeditionary Force in Guam and had sent B-2 stealth bombers to Guam to broaden the range of U.S. options for possible contingencies involving North Korea. As PACOM's Commander, Admiral Dennis Blair acquired approval to forward deploy air-launched cruise missiles on Guam for the first time in August 2000. The Air Force moved precision munitions to be stockpiled on Guam, including Joint Direct Attack Munitions and Joint Standoff Weapons.

"In early 2001, the Navy announced that it would station up to three nuclear attack submarines at Guam, in order to shorten the transit time compared to traveling from homeports in Hawaii or California to the western Pacific and to shorten deployments for sailors. The first sub to be based at Guam arrived in October 2002. In July 2007, the USS Buffalo joined USS Houston and USS City of Corpus Christi as the three forward-deployed nuclear attack submarines permanently based at Guam. In 2010, the USS Oklahoma City was scheduled to replace the USS City of Corpus Christi at Guam.

"The three submarines based at Guam formed part of the Navy's deployment of 31 of 53 (or 59%) of nuclear attack submarines in the Pacific (a greater presence than that in the Atlantic) by the end of 2009. In 2002, the Commander of Pacific Air Forces publicly detailed his request for basing aircraft in Guam. In addition to munitions stockpiles and jet fuel, he reportedly requested F-22 stealth fighters, 767 tankers, C-17 transports, bombers, and Global Hawk reconnaissance drones. In March 2003, after a new Air Expeditionary Wing was activated at Guam's Andersen Air Force Base, B-1 and B-52 bombers deployed temporarily on a

rotational basis from air bases in Texas and Louisiana as U.S. forces prepared for war against Iraq. Beyond rotation of aircraft, the Air Force began continuous deployment of aircraft into Guam. As part of this build-up, the first B-52 bombers (stationed out of Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota) to deploy to Andersen arrived in February 2004. In April 2005, the Commander of Pacific Air Forces said that B-2 stealth bombers started to fly out of Andersen. In April 2005, F-15 fighters temporarily deployed to Andersen from Idaho. An Air Force official said in 2006 that the Air Force plans to station KC-135 tankers on Guam. In May 2007, the Air Force announced the deployment of 18 F-16 fighters to Guam for four months. In the summer of 2008, several F-22 fighters, based in Alaska since 2007, began deployments to Guam.

“Also, Andersen Air Force Base plans to have four to six Global Hawks for an Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Strike Task Force by 2009. However, in March 2007, the Navy decided not to homeport the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson at Guam. Nonetheless, by 2009, the Navy had a plan for a transient berth in Apra Harbor to support an aircraft carrier for up to three weeks at least twice a year.”

Most of these redeployments to Guam were presumably driven by contingencies related to Taiwan following the 1996 missile crisis and the 2000 election of a pro-independence leader of Taiwan, Chen Shui-bian. The transformation since 2008 of Taiwan from a U.S.-China flashpoint to something cooler has paralleled a rise in concern in the U.S. and in the region over China's new capabilities and what some see as assertiveness in the Yellow, East China and South China Seas. These new trends are likely to stimulate U.S. efforts to strengthen its operational capabilities with allies and friends beyond the Guam increments, as range and logistics sustainability require.

While the areas close to China's coast seem to be increasingly dangerous for hostile forces, however, China's current range limitations become quickly apparent. So, theoretical efforts to defend Taiwan from invasion are becoming costlier for the U.S., but outmatching Chinese forces at slightly greater distances from the Chinese mainland will pose only minimal cost increases for the U.S. and its partners for the near term.

There are two noteworthy developments in this regard. The first is the growing American realization that the U.S. role of sole arms supplier means that when arms are sold to Taiwan, relations between Beijing and Washington will be harmed, but not between Taipei and Beijing. Increasingly, Chinese believe they have reduced tensions across the Taiwan Strait (without having lessened their deterrent threat), and should be rewarded with U.S. restraint in arms sales, which they see as contributing to independence sentiment on the island. And any administration that tries to reduce the U.S. commitment to Taiwan's security will find itself in

domestic political controversy. This is a classic security dilemma, with no immediate end in sight.

The second development is the rapid increase in range and lethality of Chinese missiles, and countermeasures to them. There is considerable discussion in the media of the DF-21 being adapted to use against carrier battle groups, in order to intimidate the U.S. away from areas in fighter range of China. This progress with missiles is raising the cost of defending and hardening fixed facilities that might be used in a conflict with China. But it should be noted that, as with China's new anti-satellite capabilities, countermeasures are underway. The ballistic missile defenses in Alaska and California are likely to fuel China's acquisition of additional intercontinental capabilities. And China's ability to detect and target assets at sea remains highly unreliable due to the character of its over-the-horizon radar, while Chinese tactical and strategic assets are increasingly at risk from new American global strike conventional capabilities.

This give and take of capabilities is fairly rapidly expanding in scope, as China fields new capabilities. The contest for antisubmarine warfare dominance is another expensive arena, but well within U.S. and Chinese resource capacity.

**Obviously, the outcome of this competition over the longer term is much cloudier, and will depend heavily on the economic resilience of the two systems.** In the immediate aftermath of the global financial crisis, Chinese are overestimating their advantages and underestimating America's, perhaps for understandable reasons. It is up to the U.S. and its allies to demonstrate their economic and technical vigor again, if expansionist opinion in China is to be challenged and accommodation encouraged. Historically the U.S. has recovered from crises like the recent one, but never quickly. It can take two, three or even five election cycles to recover vigorously, and as wise man Lee Hamilton has said, "It is not written in the stars that the U.S. will recover." Observable behavior by leaders will be necessary to do it. Therefore evidence of that sort of behavior will be the best guide to the longer term strategic trends in the Asia Pacific region.

	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	Mar-10
<b>TOTAL Worldwide</b>	<b>2138213</b>	<b>2130229</b>	<b>2046144</b>	<b>1986259</b>	<b>1807177</b>	<b>1705103</b>	<b>1610490</b>	<b>1518224</b>	<b>1471722</b>	<b>1438562</b>	<b>1406830</b>	<b>1385703</b>	<b>1384338</b>	<b>1385116</b>	<b>1411634</b>	<b>1434377</b>	<b>1426836</b>	<b>1389394</b>	<b>1384960</b>	<b>1379551</b>	<b>1401757</b>	<b>1418542</b>	<b>1428860</b>
<b>TOTAL Foreign Countries</b>	<b>540588</b>	<b>509873</b>	<b>609422</b>	<b>447572</b>	<b>344065</b>	<b>308020</b>	<b>286594</b>	<b>238064</b>	<b>240421</b>	<b>227258</b>	<b>259871</b>	<b>252763</b>	<b>257817</b>	<b>254788</b>	<b>230484</b>	<b>252764</b>	<b>287802</b>	<b>290997</b>	<b>284967</b>	<b>295003</b>	<b>288550</b>	<b>*262793</b>	<b>*301072</b>
<b>East Asia and Pacific, Including US Territories</b>	<b>218213</b>	<b>212142</b>	<b>189878</b>	<b>178873</b>	<b>172882</b>	<b>171770</b>	<b>166138</b>	<b>150341</b>	<b>153859</b>	<b>146939</b>	<b>150829</b>	<b>150396</b>	<b>154654</b>	<b>145174</b>	<b>150093</b>	<b>153679</b>	<b>145539</b>	<b>132691</b>	<b>132721</b>	<b>129808</b>	<b>129794</b>	<b>*109439</b>	<b>*108299</b>
<b>EAP &amp; Central Asia</b>	<b>218218</b>	<b>212142</b>	<b>189878</b>	<b>178873</b>	<b>172882</b>	<b>171770</b>	<b>166141</b>	<b>150354</b>	<b>153869</b>	<b>146948</b>	<b>150840</b>	<b>150419</b>	<b>154684</b>	<b>145203</b>	<b>#N/A</b>	<b>#N/A</b>	<b>#N/A</b>	<b>152208</b>	<b>154246</b>	<b>155081</b>	<b>162132</b>	<b>*175876</b>	<b>*195639</b>
<b>East Asia and Pacific (excluding US Territories and Special Locations in the Pacific, See Below)</b>	<b>140967</b>	<b>134912</b>	<b>119118</b>	<b>104781</b>	<b>97609</b>	<b>99022</b>	<b>98269</b>	<b>89306</b>	<b>95191</b>	<b>91295</b>	<b>95680</b>	<b>98106</b>	<b>101447</b>	<b>91670</b>	<b>96385</b>	<b>99862</b>	<b>89846</b>	<b>78854</b>	<b>74530</b>	<b>72719</b>	<b>68812</b>	<b>*47976</b>	<b>*47339</b>
<i>Army</i>	34820	34422	32577	32585	28404	27392	29592	28984	29385	28524	29840	28697	29366	30584	30500	32978	32978	23159	21833	20850	19635	2747	2806
<i>Naval</i>	39879	35378	28498	22917	20951	23113	22648	20889	20171	18227	21612	25225	29389	19110	22023	19630	17305	16578	15297	15025	11965	*10763	*10599
<i>Marine Corps</i>	28563	28653	24485	22754	23554	23691	21364	15452	22202	21535	21530	21602	20660	20157	21873	23160	16134	16365	15109	15743	16753	*21625	*20970
<i>Air Force</i>	37705	36459	33558	26525	24700	24926	24665	23981	23423	23009	22698	22582	22030	21819	21989	24094	23429	22752	22291	21001	20459	*12841	*12964
Australia	753	717	713	707	518	339	330	314	328	333	322	323	175	803	171	574	196	196	347	140	140	139	129
Brunei	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Burma	10	11	10	10	9	10	9	9	11	10	9	11	7	10	11	9	9	9	9	11	10	11	10
Cambodia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
China	24	32	30	33	32	38	29	30	32	58	53	57	74	57	61	53	63	67	71	61	69	68	72
Fiji	1	2	2	2	3	4	18	2	2	2	4	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1
Hong Kong	30	35	34	31	43	34	27	28	29	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Indonesia	42	35	32	40	42	49	48	46	43	48	41	50	51	43	28	21	24	23	23	27	26	28	31
Japan	49680	49861	46593	44566	45946	46131	45398	39134	42962	41257	40364	40338	40159	40217	41848	40519	36365	35571	33453	32803	33286	35965	35562
Korea, Democratic Peoples Republic of	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	24	4	0	0	0	0	0	10
Korea, Republic of	45501	44461	41344	40062	35743	34830	36796	36016	36539	35663	36890	35913	36665	37605	37743	41145	40840	30983	29086	27014	25062	#N/A	#N/A
Laos	0	0	0	12	19	2	13	3	3	3	3	3	2	3	2	5	4	3	3	3	3	4	6
Malaysia	17	15	14	20	22	20	21	35	19	19	17	14	18	18	19	19	14	16	15	15	13	18	16
Marshall Islands	See "US Territories." below																						
Mongolia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Zealand	59	59	53	58	61	67	65	51	32	25	6	6	6	6	8	7	8	7	6	5	4	4	6
Papua New Guinea	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Philippines	16655	14475	13863	7781	1929	53	232	138	138	35	29	84	79	35	86	107	47	55	93	95	105	117	279
Singapore	27	29	50	68	145	162	165	168	158	168	152	167	411	160	167	171	237	169	164	125	129	125	122
Thailand	110	161	213	111	105	106	102	99	242	126	124	120	526	113	125	132	122	114	108	96	111	95	197
Tonga	0	0	0	0	0	23	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vietnam	0	0	0	0	1	2	2	4	6	8	14	11	16	16	15	17	19	13	15	14	14	14	15
Alloot	28056	24747	16167	11300	12990	17150	15011	13241	14642	13510	17627	21007	23352	12578	16090	17051	11887	11617	11117	12278	9803	11347	10842
<i>Northeast Asia Troop Strength (Japan and Korea)</i>	95181	94322	87937	84628	81689	80961	82194	75150	79501	N/A													
<i>Forward Deployment Pacific Theater</i>	N/A	96826	100610	102688	105630	95678	100207	103782	93974	82652	77650	75908	72205	*51293	*50704								
<b>US Territories and Special Locations in the Pacific</b>	<b>77246</b>	<b>77230</b>	<b>70760</b>	<b>74092</b>	<b>75273</b>	<b>72748</b>	<b>67869</b>	<b>61035</b>	<b>58668</b>	<b>55644</b>	<b>55149</b>	<b>52290</b>	<b>53207</b>	<b>53504</b>	<b>53708</b>	<b>53817</b>	<b>55693</b>	<b>53837</b>	<b>58191</b>	<b>57089</b>	<b>60982</b>	<b>61463</b>	<b>60960</b>
Alaska	22634	22919	21517	22574	22208	22015	19049	17039	16661	16069	16351	15714	15757	15802	15906	16282	17385	18169	20063	20063	20063	21597	20308
Hawaii	45843	45935	41887	44092	44864	42958	42161	38172	36392	34826	34643	32708	33930	34322	34608	34203	35061	32629	34935	34838	37847	36890	37637
American Samoa	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	2	1	1
Federated States of Micronesia	38	39	38	35	26	26	13	13	13	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Guam	8519	8122	7033	7147	7844	7424	6318	5509	5305	4510	3935	3621	3266	3322	3149	3293	3221	3018	2867	2836	3065	2970	3008
Johnston Atoll	136	129	165	136	238	268	289	262	263	220	217	220	223	33	23	17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Marshall Islands	42	56	89	79	67	30	28	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Midway Islands	13	12	12	9	6	7	4	6	5	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Northern Mariana Islands	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	1
Palau	13	13	13	13	13	13	0	64	29	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands	N/A																						
Wake Island	7	6	6	7	7	7	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	5	5	2	4
<b>Central Asia</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>#N/A</b>	<b>#N/A</b>	<b>#N/A</b>	<b>19517</b>	<b>21525</b>	<b>25273</b>	<b>32338</b>	<b>66437</b>	<b>87340</b>
Afghanistan	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kazakhstan	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	9	7	9	11	11	10	6	5	8	6	7	12	14	10	12	12
Kyrgyzstan	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Tajikistan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Turkmenistan	0	0	0																				