

## **Non-Military Challenges in Pacific Asia: Implications for the U.S. and Europe by Ralph A. Cossa**

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### **Presentation outline** [draft: 12/6/04]

- pleased and honored to be part of this meeting; came directly from two weeks in Asia (Japan, Korea, Singapore, Philippines, and China).
- must acknowledge a bit of confusion as to what “non-military security challenges” are.
- have elected to use a broad definition and to present here a wide variety of topics for discussion, presuming that we will focus in on the more relevant items that provide the greatest opportunity for fruitful Europe-U.S. coordination and cooperation.
  - don't use the term “Atlantic” since my part of U.S. is in middle of Pacific . . . but still cares about Europe (and welcomes European tourists – think how much warmer we would all be in Honolulu right now).
- “non-traditional” security challenges are normally defined in terms of human security concerns and addressing transnational challenges such as terrorism, international crime, proliferation, and the like. I will touch on all these in due course.
- first want to touch on some less traditional non-military security challenges, at least as I define the term.

### **Rise of China**

- to me the greatest “non-military” security challenge confronting the U.S. and Europe is managing the political and economic rise of Asia in general and China in particular.
  - China too smart to challenge U.S. militarily (Sun Tzu); political, economic, and psychological battle for influence is real challenge.
- understand there is another session devoted to this topic so will not dwell on it here other than to lay out a few thoughts to stimulate the broader non-military debate.
  - too much attention paid within “neocon” or “blue team” circles to China's rising military power, but it is China's economic power and its political power, derived as much from its sheer size and

Middle Kingdom mentality as its growing military capabilities that poses the greatest challenge.

- China's psychological power growing faster than its actual power. Japan economy still overshadows China's and yet perception in East Asia is of rising China and declining Japan; perception greater than reality.

- China's "peaceful rise" is a given, since the only way that China can rise is as part of a peaceful, stable East Asia; real question is: will China be peaceful once it has risen?

- Asia still hedging vis-a-vis China, but now hedging *with* China rather than *against* China; hopping on bandwagon, while still engaging/entangling.

\*\*many opportunities exist for U.S.-Europe cooperation and coordination in managing the rise of China and in providing reassurances to rest of Asia that proper boundaries will be maintained to channel (as opposed to challenge, delay, or try to halt) China's rise . . . but also lots of opportunities for China to play U.S. and Europe against one another to China's benefit.

### **China-Taiwan "Zero-Sum" Game**

- Cold War between Taiwan and China is being played out on world stage, primarily in U.S., but also in Europe and elsewhere.

- Impending (Dec 11) elections will add a new dimension to challenge regardless of how they turn out, but especially if DPP/Pan-Green win majority in LY.

\*\* Need for U.S. and Europe to coordinate respective "one-China" policies and find ways of discouraging unilateral destabilizing steps by either side.

### **"Threat" of Democracy**

- democracy breaking out all over Asia = good news and bad news.

- no need to list or praise the many virtues of democracy.

- also need to recognize downsides, especially when it comes to foreign policy (de Tocqueville).

- Chen Shui-bian provides best evidence of domestic politics trumping foreign policy. Clear advantages (and, if overplayed, potential disadvantages) to playing anti-China card.

- unintended(?) consequence: significant deterioration in US-Taiwan relations

\*\* Need to continue to promote democracy, but Europe/U.S. cannot give impression that democracy equals free pass. Garden also needs constant tending; democracy in Indonesia particularly fragile and its success/failure will have profound implications within and beyond ASEAN.

### **“Threat” of Nationalism, Especially (but not only) in Democracies**

- Nationalism neither good nor bad *per se*, but can lead to problems when (over)played for political gain (Taiwan: vs. China; ROK/Others: vs. US)

- China use of nationalism to provide CCP with legitimacy (since communist ideology largely irrelevant) opens new avenues for instability: Sino-Japan tensions best but not only example.

\*\* Europe part of the solution or part of the problem? Need to separate views of particular leader or policy from broader relationship.

### **Managing/Supporting Japan’s Emergence as a “Normal” Nation**

- some in Asia see rise of Japan as security challenge (China, DPRK, ROK?, etc.)

- Japan and China (and India) must be able to rise simultaneously; challenge is to maintain current equilibrium in Asia as they all rise at different pace and potentially by different means (and in different directions?).

\*\* can’t overlook Japan; actively support enhanced role (including UNSC).

### **Managing Russia’s (Re-)Emergence**

- Russia is Asian as well as European power and significant opportunities exist to give Russia a constructive role in Asia (more so than in Europe?): Six-Party Talks, ARF, APEC, SCO, etc.

\*\*must avoid “who lost Russia” debate 5-10 years (or sooner) down the road.

*[will now turn to more traditional “non-traditional” security challenges]*

### **Countering Proliferation of WMD**

- halting WMD proliferation is long-standing problem in East Asia; not just DPRK; previous programs in ROK, Taiwan; (overblown) concerns of Japan going nuc (not to mention India/Pak).

- global nonproliferation regimes under serious threat, especially NPT and CTBT; need for/value of Additional Protocol increasingly obvious, to close NPT loophole.
  - security concerns regarding spent fuel storage, research reactors, etc. growing along with concerns about “dirty bombs.”
  - legitimate concerns about WMD/fissile material falling into hands of terrorists adds additional sense of urgency to previous non/counter-proliferation efforts.
- \*\* enforce/strengthen global regimes, including support for Additional Protocol; support/expand Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and regional efforts (Regional Maritime Security Initiative) to expand cooperation on stemming flow of WMD.

### **Countering Trans -National Crime, Piracy, Terrorism at Sea, Smuggling, etc.**

- more differences over style (how to) than substance (need to).
- \*\* opportunities for cooperation abound, within context of ARF and independently.

### **Counter-Terrorism**

- no question on the need to combat international terrorism or that terrorist threat exists in East Asia (especially but not limited to Indonesia, Philippines).
  - huge disagreements within Asia (and between US/Europe) on how/if Iraq fits into WOT.
    - personal view is that it did not; distraction vice extension of WOT, but . . . .
    - neither Asia nor Europe can afford to see U.S. fail in Iraq and deliberate distortions of U.S. objectives/intentions (anti-Islam – more on this later) works against common interests.
    - least recognized casualty in Iraq is damage the war/occupation has done to America “soft power.”
  - within Asia, especially since Oct 2002 Bali bombings, more differences over style (how to) than substance (need to) regarding WOT cooperation..
- \*\* despite complaints about U.S. “hectoring,” WOT presents real opportunities for

U.S./Europe- ASEAN and broader regional cooperation.

### **Ad Hoc Vs. Institutionalized Multilateralism**

- let me add another non-traditional (but not commonly discussed) security challenge: the threat to institutionalized multilateral organizations posed by ad hoc “coalitions of the willing” (or occasionally not so willing).

- threat posed to U.S. Asian alliances also not fully recognized/addressed, but beyond scope of this paper.

- unilateralism vs. multilateralism debate misses the point; real challenge is trend toward ad hoc groupings, due as much to inability/unwillingness of standing institutions to address urgent concerns as it is to U.S. impatience/arrogance.

- Kofi Annan’s admonition to U.S. broadly covered; his admonition to UNSC/UNGA largely overlooked.

\*\* ad hoc initiatives such as PSI needed and should be expanded, but parallel effort needed to make standing institutions (especially UNSC) more relevant; U.S./Europe share guilt.

### **Dealing with Radical Islamic Fundamentalism**

- terrorism is the means, not the real threat.

- fine line between acknowledging radical Islam as source of problem and not being seen as anti-Islamic . . . especially since many critics see value in using “anti-Islam” accusation for own political ends.

- battle for hearts and minds being lost.

- biggest loser will be moderate Islamic leaders/states, yet many (especially in Middle East) seem hesitant to speak up

- Asian leaders more willing to be bold (Mahathir, Abdullah Badawi, SBY?)

\*\* coordinated public diplomacy efforts needed, along with efforts to address “root causes.”

### **Human Security Concerns**

- threats posed by non-traditional human security issues not immediately nation-threatening but have long-term consequences; more importantly, they provide more acceptable vehicles for cooperation if done effectively.

- principle of “non-interference” is big factor but this principle is being redefined within ASEAN by ASEAN states, with useful spillover effects.

- include environmental concerns (Philippine logging, Indonesian forest fires), health issues (from basic quality of life to concern about pandemics/AIDS/SARS/bird flu, etc.), role/status of women, plus good governance, rule of law, promotion of democracy and human rights, etc.; also have vs. have not issues that are growing as economic progress proceeds unevenly within and among regional countries, widening the gaps.

- Myanmar/Burma presents special challenge here; neither ASEAN nor West has come up with workable game plan for moving Rangoon forward or even to pressure it to keep its own promises.

\*\* must be done carefully, preferably via ARF, given regional sensitivities, not only to U.S. unilateralism/interference but also European colonialism history which can cause rejection of American/European models despite their potential merits.

### **“Asia for Asians” vs. Broader Regionalism**

- subtle competition underway between Asian regionalism (ASEAN Plus Three, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, etc.) and Asia-Pacific (and broader) regionalism (ARF, APEC, ASEM).

- not mutually exclusive; ideally progress in one leads to progress in other dimension, but opportunity for exclusivism or anti-U.S./West orientation exists.

\*\* need to be supportive but keep watchful eye, especially on attempts by some to move Asian organizations in wrong direction or use them for propaganda purposes.

### **Bottom Line**

\*\* significant opportunities exist in Asia for U.S./Europe cooperation and coordination in dealing with non-military or non-traditional security challenges, despite obvious economic and political competition and tendency of some in the region to try to play Europe and U.S. against one another.