# WARSAW PAPERS AND REPORTS

Transatlantic Security: New Realities, Changing Institutions

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REPORT

OF THE WARSAW REFLECTION GROUP

APRIL 5–6, 2004

Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Warsaw Reflection Group

Adam Daniel Rotfeld, Chairman of the WRG

Steven E. Miller, Rapporteur

Members

Huseyin Bagci (Turkey)

Christoph Bertram (Germany)

Bronisław Geremek (Poland)

István Gyarmati (Hungary)

Helga Haftendorn (Germany)

François Heisbourg (France)

Bo K. A. Huldt (Sweden)

Richard Kugler (United States)

Pierre Lellouche (France)

Steven E. Miller (United States)

Jerzy M. Nowak (Poland)

Janusz Onyszkiewicz (Poland)

Lord John Roper (United Kingdom)

Adam Daniel Rotfeld (Poland)

Walther Stützle (Germany)

Raima Väyrynen (Finland)

Invited guests

Jacek Bylica (Security Policy Department, MFA, Poland)

Adam Kobieracki (NATO International Secretariat)

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Preface

This Report seeks to make a specific contribution to the ongoing debate on a future of transatlantic security. One year after the US intervention in Iraq, a few months after the Alliance's extension to the east and a few weeks after the enlargement of the European Union by 10 new countries, two issues have to be addressed at the NATO Summit in Istanbul: what kind of new strategy should be adopted by the Alliance and how to re-define the security relationship between NATO and European Union?

On April 5–6, 2004, a group of independent security analysts from Europe and the United States met in Warsaw under the auspices of the Polish Foreign Ministry to consider the future of the transatlantic security relationship in anticipation of NATO's Istanbul Summit in June 2004. The Warsaw Reflection Group of diverse backgrounds and views assembled at a time of great concern about the health of transatlantic relations. In the aftermath of the Iraq crisis of 2003, the damage to transatlantic relations was plain to see. The opposition of some European governments to the United States' intervention in Iraq revealed substantial divergences in perceptions, interests, and preferred courses of action.

The Warsaw Reflection Group debate was of an informal character. The Group is composed of leading security analysts from Germany (Christoph Bertram, Helga Haftendorn, Walther Stützle), France (François Heisbourg, Pierre Lellouche), the United States (Richard Kugler and Steve Miller) Finland (Raimo Väyrynen), Hungary (István Gyarmati), Sweden (Bo Huldt) and Turkey (Huseyin Bagci) as well as of Polish hosts, including former Minister of Foreign Affairs Bronisław Geremek and former Minister of Defence Janusz Onyszkiewicz. Lord John Roper (UK) accepted the invitation to attend the meeting and, although he was not able to come to Warsaw, he joined the Group and supported the Report.

A discussion paper *Transformation-Enlargement-Engagement* prepared by Mr. Jacek Bylica, Director of the Security Policy Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, provided a starting point for the discussion and inspired the exchange of views and opinions.

The debate was not limited to an analysis of the current situation from the perspective of different countries. It also identified the main goals and objectives

facing the Alliance in a new security environment as well as ways and means to achieve them.

The Report containing the conclusions from the debate and some recommendations was prepared by Steven E. Miller of Harvard University (USA). It is not a consensus document, nor does it faithfully reflect or represent the views of any single individual (including the rapporteur). Rather, it is intended to summarize the main perceptions, themes and ideas that emerged in the course of the intensive deliberations of the Warsaw Reflection Group and to highlight recommendations for action and innovation that may contribute to improving transatlantic relations and adapting transatlantic institutions—above all NATO—to the dramatically new strategic reality that now exists.

The Warsaw Reflection Group was received by Mr. Aleksander Kwaśniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, and met with Professor Marek Belka, newly designated Prime Minister of Poland.

The debate during the Warsaw meeting should be seen as a part of a long process aimed at adapting the Alliance to the new security environment and finding proper answers to new threats and challenges. For this reason the participants of Warsaw Reflection Group suggested treatment of the gathering in Warsaw as just the first in an open-ended series of meetings. Publication of these materials is intended to help in preparatory work for the Summit in Istanbul (28–29 June 2004) undergoing within NATO.

This Report marks also the beginning of a new series of publications of *Warsaw Papers and Reports* under the auspices of the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

I would like to express my gratitude to all those without whom this publication would not be possible. In particular I would like to thank Mr. Jacek Bylica, Director of the Security Policy Department, MFA, and Ms. Małgorzata Jankowska, Assistant to the Secretary of State, MFA.

Adam Daniel Rotfeld

Warsaw, May–June 2004

Highlights

Deliberations of the Warsaw Reflection Group identified numerous valuable functions performed by NATO:

- NATO provides the tangible link between the United States and Europe. This commits Washington the Europe's security and ensures that the United States remains a European power;

- NATO prevents the renationalization of defense policy in Europe;

- NATO has integrated and socialized the states of central Europe;

- NATO provides Article V protection to all member states, including those new members who gain confidence in their own security by virtue of that protection;

- NATO facilitates the management of relations with states of Europe further to the east, including notably Russia and Ukraine;

- NATO serves as a standing consultative mechanism—the most important such instrument in the transatlantic area—that facilitates transatlantic communication and cooperation;

- NATO can function as a "consensus engine" by providing a framework within which is it possible to harmonize views and policies;

- NATO represents a substantial reservoir of deployable military power—the largest such aggregation of military capability in the world;

- NATO's military forces are not only substantial but possess greater interoperability than other possible military constellations. NATO forces share technology, doctrine, and training to an extent not replicated anywhere else;

- NATO continues to be an important military planning mechanism;

- NATO can provide peacekeeping and nation-building capabilities, as it is now doing in Afghanistan;

- NATO plays a significant role in policing the periphery of Europe—as in the Balkans;

- NATO has gradually been assuming a more global role.

Transatlantic Security:
New Realities, Changing Institutions
Report of the Warsaw Reflection Group

Introduction

Many voices now call into question the centrality, the necessity, the relevance of the transatlantic partnership and its primary institutional incarnation, NATO. Trends are in evidence that, if unchecked, could profoundly harm or even undermine the transatlantic security community. These harsh facts and adverse trends would not be especially alarming if it were judged that the transatlantic relationship is an obsolete relic of the past whose importance has disappeared. On the contrary, however, the deliberations of the Warsaw Reflection Group were animated by a belief that there is great value in preserving the capacity of the democracies of Europe and North America to deliberate together and to act in harmony. Furthermore, NATO continues to perform a number of important purposes and has proven over the past decade to be resilient and adaptable. It has accepted new members, embraced new missions, and confronted new threats even while continuing with some of its traditional functions—such as linking the United States to Europe and preventing the renationalization of defense within Europe. The corrosive factors visible in transatlantic relations are disturbing precisely because many believe that the partnership remains significant and is worth preserving.

The New Security Environment

The transatlantic relationship has long outlasted the Cold War rivalry that promoted its creation. Inevitably, therefore, that relationship exists and must function in a substantially different security environment. If the protagonists in transatlantic relationship fail to understand the new and emerging strategic realities and fail to demonstrate the relevance of that relationship in the new context, its value and importance will decline. Hence, it is essential to assess and adapt to the security challenges that now press on the international agenda.

Stresses of Globalization. One powerful force shaping the international security environment today is globalization. It facilitates the free flow of people, money, ideas, and technology such that the international system is more integrated,

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local conflicts are less remote, distant lands are less sheltered from global influences. In such a world, diseases, ideologies, jobs, news, and even weapons of mass destruction can (at least potentially) spread around the globe, posing new and often serious challenges to states. Among other significant effects, globalization confronts traditional societies and cultures with the pressure of modernity, with what is often perceived to be the onslaught of an alien culture that disrupts treasured traditions and preferred ways of life. It is now evident that some will respond to the pressure (or threat) of globalization in adverse ways, resulting in friction, extremism, instability, and violence.

Extremism in Islam. Globalization may, indeed, be a primary cause of a second profound development that is helping to determine the new security environment: the rise of extremist elements in Islam. This is not, it should be emphasized, a problem with Islam itself nor with responsible Islamic states and groups; this is not a broad clash of civilizations. In fact, some regard this as a civil war within Islam itself between moderate forces who readily accept a secular, modernizing world and those disaffected and alienated wings within Islam who see in globalization and modernity a decadent threat to their unchanging traditional Islamic ways. The disaffected elements within Islam perceive a political, economic, cultural, and religious assault on their preferred order and have responded by embracing ideologies that are violent, politicized, intolerant, unforgiving, and compellingly anti-Western. The result has been the rise of an extremist political ideology of the deeply alienated in Islam, a sort of Islamic brand of fascism, that has made an open and explicit long term commitment to the defeat of the West and the restoration of its own version of a pure Islamic caliphate—harkening back hundreds of years to periods of Islamic predominance.

The Rise of Terrorism. A third notable feature of the new security environment is the rise of an international terrorist threat—a challenge not limited to but greatly exacerbated by the collision between extremist elements of Islam and the industrial world. This is a serious threat, one that has global manifestations and requires global responses. Obviously, since the attacks of September 11, 2001, this threat has been prominent on the international agenda and has dominated the policies of the United States. Repeated attacks in far-flung locations since 9/11 demonstrate that this problem continues unabated and is not limited to the United States. A protracted global struggle against terrorism will be necessary to limit as much as possible the harm done by terrorist violence. At the same time, some cautions are in order in thinking about the terrorist threat. First, it is not easy to

appropriately calibrate the threat and there is some risk of exaggerating the threat—with potential adverse consequences. Terrorism is a weapon of the weak and the main terrorist opponents are relatively small groups with relatively limited resources. Accordingly, while the terrorist threat should be taken seriously, it should not be allowed to overwhelm the international agenda. Second, there is a danger of lumping all terrorists together in ways that make the terrorist challenge appear larger and more daunting than it is. Most terrorist groups are local in nature and pursue limited and local objectives. Finally, while the struggle against terrorism has an important military component, terrorism is not a purely military security challenge. Political and economic factors and policies play important roles as potential sources of and potential remedies for terrorism.

The Threat of WMD Terrorism. The previous three trends—globalization, Islamic extremism, and terrorism—come together in particularly severe form in the specter of terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction. Modern technology can permit non-state actors to inflict damage massively out of proportion to their numbers, power, or influence. The diffusion of knowledge and technology on a global scale makes it plausible that some terrorists, under some circumstances, could obtain weapons of mass destruction. There is evidence that some terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda, are interested in acquiring WMD. Particularly if terrorists were able to obtain or to build a nuclear weapon, they would be able to inflict an attack vastly more terrible than the terrible attacks of 9/11. Accordingly, the threat of WMD terrorism—especially nuclear terrorism—now looms large on the international security agenda. Indeed, this concern figures prominently both in American policy and strategy and European Union's document on European Security Strategy "A Secure Europe in a Better World" adopted in December 2003, and provides some of the motive force behind the US global war against terrorism. The urgency now attached to preventing WMD terrorism leads directly to several closely related priorities: defeating dangerous terrorist groups; inhibiting as much as possible the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and eliminating or deterring state sponsors of terrorism who might provide to terrorists WMD or the materials to make them. This family of issues is now at the core of transatlantic security policy.

Weak States, Failing States, in the Arc of Instability. Many of the pressing security issues and crises that press on the international agenda derive from instability in large reaches of the developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. If the old fault lines of international politics centered on the division

between east and west, between the communist and the non-communist world, the new fault lines derive from tensions between north and south, the haves and the have-nots, the democratic and the non-democratic, the stable and the unstable. Many of the acute problems to be addressed—genocide, civil war, stateless zones—arise from the weakness or failure of states, from internal conflicts whose implications often spill into the international arena. For the transatlantic community, such problems raise painful moral dilemmas and vexing political and military challenges.

The Emerging of New Powers. Despite the preoccupation with terrorism and the war against Al Qaeda, other significant factors are at work shaping the evolving security order. One of these is the rise of emerging powers, including above all China. Before the terrorist attacks of September 11, it appeared that adapting to and managing China's rise would be a central challenge for the international order. The United States, in particular, was focused very heavily on the incipient rivalry with China and with the implications of Beijing's rapid accumulation of power. Though presently overshadowed by the terrorist threat, over the medium term, China's rise may turn out to be the most significant development of the period ahead. And there are likely to be other powers that emerge as significant factors in the international security environment, including possibly an assertive India, Japan or a resurgent Russia. Because relations among major powers have a dis-proportionate effect on the character of the international order, this set of issues cannot be ignored.

Coping with American Power. The unrivalled power of the United States is a basic fact of the international scene today. What Washington elects to do with its primacy and how the world responds to American primacy is one of the key determinants of the present international security environment. Even for America's friends and allies, it is a challenge to influence and respond to a power at once so strong and so willful. More fundamentally, the state of the debate within the United States about America's role and purpose on the international stage has a huge impact on the character of the international strategic environment.

The New Strategic Environment. During the Cold War, NATO was an alliance that thwarted a large common threat with a collective commitment to territorial defense. That world no longer exists. To retain its value and to flourish in the future, NATO will need to be relevant to and useful in the very different international order that now exists. The new strategic environment is marked by challenges and threats that are less territorial, more global, more fluid, less

Euro-centric. The great strategic challenge for NATO is to adapt to this new world, to recognize and respond effectively to the strategic realities that now dominate the international security agenda.

The State of Transatlantic Relations

Concern about the prospects and future of the transatlantic relationship derives from a wide belief that this relationship has been through a very damaging period. The evolution of events since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, has introduced great stresses within the Atlantic community and generated frictions and fractures in the interactions within that community. In particular, the intense disagreements that arose in the context of the crisis over Iraq revealed substantial differences in the perceptions and preferences of major parties across the Atlantic. Far from acting in harmony, NATO was deeply divided over Iraq, some key European states actively opposed US policy, and course of action taken by the United States—war in Iraq—was enormously unpopular with European publics.

The transatlantic collision over Iraq produced bitterness and anger in both directions. This has had adverse repercussions among both elites and publics. Among policy makers and foreign policy elites, relations have been marked by an unusual lack of trust and an unusual level of discord. Among populations, public opinion on both sides of the Atlantic is moving in very disturbing directions. Anti-Americanism has grown in Europe and anti-Europeanism has grown in the United States, while enthusiasm for and commitment to basic institutions of the transatlantic community has faded. Restoring the health of the transatlantic relationship requires the acknowledgement of these unpleasant realities.

Obviously, this disharmony has the potential to inflict lasting damage to the institutions and mechanisms of the transatlantic partnership. Leaders on both sides of the Atlantic need to make a conscious and concerted effort to repair the damage if recent negative trends are to be surmounted. Among other things, this will require much more effective public diplomacy by both the United States and the states of Europe. Ill chosen words and clumsy public relations have done much to reinforce negativity across the Atlantic. Within the Warsaw Reflection Group, there was particular concern that, at the societal level, the two sides of the Atlantic are drifting apart through inattention, indifference, and reciprocal misunderstanding. This will not change unless transatlantic elites become far more articulate and purposeful in explaining the virtues of NATO and far more effective at managing the inevitable difficulties and disagreements within it.

It may be that the available institutions will not suffice to solve the problems afflicting the transatlantic relations. Further innovation may be required, so consideration of further institutional adaptation within NATO is warranted.

NATO Extension and Transformation

NATO will not play the same role in the future that it played in the past. However, it remains valuable and is worth sustaining. It is, unfortunately, harmed and jeopardized by the recent and ongoing troubles in transatlantic relations. To build NATO for the future, it is necessary both to credibly reaffirm NATO's purposes and to adapt NATO to new strategic realities.

Potent Continuing Rationales and Purposes for NATO. If NATO no longer mattered, served no important purpose, or offered no capacities relevant to the issues of the day, then the recent transatlantic frictions and undermining of transatlantic institutions would not be particularly worrisome or consequential. The deliberations of the Warsaw Reflection Group, however, identified numerous valuable functions still performed by NATO that make it worthwhile to expend the effort to restore, preserve, and adapt it. Obviously, NATO is no longer needed to offset a menacing Soviet military threat, but nevertheless it still serves many useful purposes—purposes that need to be understood by transatlantic publics if the present mutual disaffection is to be surmounted. These purposes include:

- NATO provides the tangible link between the United States and Europe. This commits Washington the Europe's security and ensures that the United States remains a European power.

- NATO prevents the renationalization of defense policy in Europe.

- NATO has integrated and socialized the states of central Europe.

- NATO provides Article V protection to all member states, including those new members who gain confidence in their own security by virtue of that protection.

- NATO facilitates the management of relations with states of Europe further to the east, including notably Russia and Ukraine.

- NATO serves as a standing consultative mechanism—the most important such instrument in the transatlantic area—that facilitates transatlantic communication and cooperation.

- NATO can function as a "consensus engine" by providing a framework within which is it possible to harmonize views and policies.

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- NATO continues to be an important military planning mechanism.

- NATO can provide peacekeeping and nation-building capabilities, as it is now doing in Afghanistan.

- NATO plays a significant role in policing the periphery of Europe—as in the Balkans.

- NATO has gradually been assuming a more global role.

Challenges for NATO. If NATO is to remain a valued and useful instrument, it must successfully confront a number of serious challenges of reform and adaptation. These challenges arise as a consequence of the dramatic changes in the international order over the past decade, the dramatic alteration in threat perceptions after the terrorist attacks of September 11, the substantial shifts in national policies in response to the terrorist threat, the anticipation of further significant evolutions in the international order in the years ahead, as well as notable changes in NATO itself. This large and ongoing process of change calls into question the relevance and adequacy of NATO's conceptual and organizational structures.

The deliberations of the Warsaw Reflection Group identified four areas in which NATO needs to address the need for reform.

1. **Reconsidering NATO's Strategic Concept.** There is a wide view that NATO is functioning without a strategic concept suitable to the needs of the current moment. Important features of the new strategic environment are not adequately reflected in NATO's strategic thinking. To ensure NATO's continued relevance to the new international environment, a new strategic concept would need to address three large questions: What role can and will NATO play in the most immediate large challenge confronting the transatlantic community, the engagement with Islam to build constructive and

mutually satisfactory ties with 1.5 billion Muslims and to abate the threat of Islamic extremism that breeds terrorism? How will NATO relate to and what role will it play in the management of China's rise? And what global or out of area role is NATO prepared to play in an era when the main security challenges exist outside of Europe? Only by addressing such questions can NATO link itself directly to the most important strategic realities of the post-Cold War environment. It would be useful to work on an adapted strategic concept since the one adopted in 1999 has been outlived by events. However one should be aware of the fact that it could both have a unifying and a divisive effect, given the many divergences among opinions.

2. **Coping with New Members and Partners.** NATO has in recent years embraced a remarkable and rapidly growing set of new members and partners. The successful integration of these new affiliates and the creation of opportunities for engagement in NATO affairs that are satisfying, meaningful, and relevant to all participants is essential to the continued health of the alliance. NATO must address at least six challenges of participation.

   • **Incorporation of New Members.** How will NATO function as an organization of 26 member states? How can paralysis and inefficiency be avoided or minimized with so many participants involved in NATO processes? And how can NATO ensure that new members deliver on the promises made as conditions of membership?

   • **The Question of Future Members.** The arguments that have justified the first two waves of new members in NATO retain their force and relevance with respect to potential members who remain outside the alliance. Having accepted ten new members, there is no obvious logic that suggests that NATO should now draw the line and reject any further new members. What is NATO going to do about a possible third wave of new members?

   • **Enhancing the Experience of NATO's Partners.** Even after seven NATO partners became members of the alliance in 2004, a further 20 states remain as participants in NATO's partnership program. How can NATO sustain and reinvigorate its Partnership for Peace program so it preserves its attractiveness and utility? What role can NATO play, and what responsibility does NATO bear, in relation to partners in troubled regions such as Central Asia and the Caucasus? And is PfP still a steppingstone to NATO membership, as in the past?

- **Building Additional Partnerships?** Through its Mediterranean Dialogue, NATO has formal interactions with a further seven states in the Middle East and North Africa, a group that includes Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. What is the future of this endeavor? Should it be expanded to other countries? Should it be developed into a new partnership program that would give NATO genuine ties across the Mediterranean and into the Islamic world? Some members of the Warsaw Reflection Group saw this as a particularly fruitful path for rendering NATO directly relevant to the challenge of successfully engaging the Arab/Islamic world.

- **Nurturing Special Relationships.** NATO has established special relationships with some of its partners, including notably Russia and Ukraine. These relationships are potentially very important and constructive. (Some members of the Warsaw Reflection Group were particularly keen to emphasize that the importance of the relationship with Ukraine not be overlooked.) To date, however, these relationships have been regarded by Moscow and Kiev as somewhat disappointing and not entirely satisfying. What can be done to more fully build and exploit the special relationships with these very important countries?

- **Dealing with Europe's Neutrals**. Finally, Europe's neutral states—Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland—constitute an additional distinctive category of participants who feel that they share special characteristics and deserve to be treated as special cases. They more fully meet NATO's membership criteria and are more fully intetgrated in many ways into the western system than most of NATO's new members, but considerations of history and domestic politics prevent membership for now. How is NATO going to relate to this special category of partners?

Taking into account all categories of affiliation, there are now 53 states who are NATO members, NATO partners, or participants in NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue. Managing all these participants across all these categories of affiliation will be a complex and important challenge, and essential to the preservation of NATO as a vibrant organization that provides a satisfying experience to all its participants.

3. **Adapting NATO Institutions.** It follows directly from the rise of new strategic factors and the incorporation of new NATO members that the

adequacy of NATO's institutional needs to be reconsidered. The discussions of the Warsaw Reflection Group singled out two areas that may require reform and adaptation.

- **Rethinking NATO Decision-making**. As NATO grows, there is a risk that its decision-making processes will become unacceptably cumbersome. Can NATO proceed as in the past with 26 members? Can it continue to operate on a consensus basis with so many member states, reflecting such a diversity of interests and perceptions? Many believe that NATO will now have to explore more flexible decision-making arrangements that, perhaps only in some contexts and conditions, depart from the consensus principle. Similarly, it may prove desirable to consider delegating decision authority within NATO on some issues to those subsets of member states who are bearing particular responsibilities. It may be wise to consider some sort of directorate within NATO that has authority to produce clear and timely decisions even in the absence of consensus.

- **Revising NATO's Command Structure**. Members of the Warsaw Reflection Group believed that the time has come to revisit the issue of NATO's command structure. Is there any reason to believe that structures inherited from the Cold War past will be suitable to the challenges of the present? Does NATO need to adapt its command structure in light of new realities? Raising this question does not foreordain the answers that might emerge after serious consideration and debate. Should SACEUR always be an American? Within the Warsaw Reflection Group, there were advocates on both sides of the question. Some believe that SACEUR should remain as it has been because of the integral link this provides to American forces and to Washington. Others see potential advantage in moving this role into European hands. Another major concern is whether the strong tie between NATO and Amerca's European Command is sufficient in a world where NATO's role may be increasingly global and in which the American Central Command is often the lead military actor. Does NATO require a stronger link with CENTCOM? Should CENTCOM and EURCOM be combined in order to facilitate NATO action out of area? The time has come to think creatively about optimizing NATO's command structure for the challenges and missions that now routinely press upon the agenda.

4. **Strengthening NATO Capabilities.** NATO's utility and value will be enhanced if it develops usable capability relevant to the kinds of challenges

that arise in the new strategic environment. Within the Warsaw Reflection Group, three ideas found particular favor.

- **Develop the NATO Response Force.** At the Prague Summit in November of 2002, NATO launched a program to develop a Response Force intended to give the alliance the ability to respond rapidly, flexibly, and effectively to new threats and challenges, with a goal of being fully operational by October 2006. In the discussion of the Warsaw Reflection Group, this initiative was regarded as extremely important and as exemplary of the kind of adaptations that NATO ought to be undertaking. The earliest possible implementation of this initiative is regarded as highly desirable. NATO Response Forces cannot be seen, however, as a "training ground" for Europeans only, but as a joint venture of the Alliance.

- **Develop a Stabilization and Reconstruction Force.** In view of the roles that NATO may be asked or required to play in post-conflict settings (such as Bosnia and Afghanistan), it makes sense to consider a parallel initiative to develop within NATO a Stabilization and Reconstruction Force (SRF). The idea would be to provide NATO with a deployable force optimized for the post-conflict reconstruction phase of interventions. Such a force could include civil affairs components, military or other policing capacities, and civil engineering capacities that are urgently needed but often in short supply in the military units that are typically involved in such interventions.

- **Commit Additional Resources to Defense.** NATO has adopted a series of plans to augment the resources and thereby improve the capabilities of NATO's forces, including the recent Prague Capabilities Commitment agreed at the Prague Summit two years ago The fulfillment of such programs is essential. In the absence of serious efforts to raise European defense spending, several serious problems will persist. First, there is a large gap between American and European capabilities that impedes the ability to operate together when force must be used. It is highly desirable that this gap be narrowed. Second, simultaneous deployments in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Balkans have revealed limitations on the availability of deployable forces that limit the ability of the alliance or any of its members (including the United States) to deal with any further contingencies that might arise. Third, despite its aspirations for a common European Defense and Security Policy, Europe has an extremely limited ability to operate militarily without the United States. NATO's ability to act, to act together, and Europe's

ability to act independently, depends on the willingness of European societies to undertake greater investment in military capability.

NATO Relations with the EU

The European Union is slowly but surely gaining competence and capability in the security and defense policy area. To be sure, the movement in this direction has been halting and uncertain. Nevertheless, the EU's gradual emergence as an actor in the realm of security is regarded as a fact that is already significant—and it will be increasingly important in the future as EU capacities develop and evolve. Accordingly, it is a matter of great significance that the relationship between NATO and the EU is tended carefully, cooperatively, and successfully.

The EU is deeply embedded in a web of relationships—with the United States and Russia as well as with NATO—that bear centrally on the character of security cooperation within the transatlantic community. Within the Warsaw Reflection Group, it was generally regarded as essential for the EU itself to get its act in order in the security realm as a prerequisite to coordinating and harmonizing its important relationships with NATO, Washington, and Moscow. The evolution of the transatlantic security order will be shaped to a considerable extent by the EU's rate of progress in defining its own role and capacities in security policy.

The EU matters greatly also because it possesses competencies that are directly relevant to some of the great strategic challenges of the new era. In dealing with the stresses and frictions associated with globalization, in the crucial engagement with the Islam that is necessary to win over hearts and minds in the Arab world, in the struggle against the root causes of terrorism, the EU's ability to operate knowledgeably and powerfully in the areas of economics, trade, and aid is a great asset. NATO gives the transatlantic community a potent military instrument. The EU represents a complementary and highly relevant economic instrument that can, if properly understood and managed, widen the range of options available to transatlantic decision-makers. Indeed, the more the challenges of the new strategic environment are regarded as political and economic rather than military in nature, the more important the EU will be in the arsenal of transatlantic policymakers.

Because the EU's gradually growing role in the security realm is inevitable, important, and potentially useful, institutional adaptations are necessary to accommodate this fact. Transatlantic bickering and disharmony over the EU's emerging security role is both counterproductive and short-sighted. Viewing NATO and the EU as rivals or alternatives in the domain of security policy misses

not only the substantially overlapping memberships and shared interests across the two organizations, but also fails to recognize their essential complementarity. If NATO and the EU can find ways of harmonizing and coordinating their policies and activities with respect to security issues, this will be highly advantageous to the ability of the transatlantic community to act effectively in terms of both long term strategy and immediate crisis management.

In view of such considerations, the Warsaw Reflection Group judged that it is imperative to consider proposals for institutional innovation that would facilitate more coordinated security policy activity between NATO and the EU and between the EU and Washington. Four ideas were identified as worthy of serious consideration:

1. **Bring the EU into NATO.** One idea would be to bring the EU into NATO—not as an alternative to the membership of European states but as the 27th member. This would ensure that the EU had a full and formal voice in NATO affairs, that the EU would be fully apprised of NATO deliberations, and that NATO would be better informed about and better poised to understand the evolution of EU policies. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has been strikingly bold about matters of affiliation, embracing new member states, creating the Partnership for Peace, and establishing a formal dialogue with states south of the Mediterranean. Bringing the EU into NATO would be another bold innovation, but one consistent with and no more dramatic than the moves already made over the past decade. The question is however whether non-NATO members of the European Union want it.

2. **Allow EU Representation at NATO Meetings.** As an alternative to EU membership in NATO—or perhaps as a transitional move toward EU membership—NATO could establish arrangements that would allow EU representation, military and/or civilian as appropriate, in a variety of specified conditions. In effect, this would be another sort of "special relationship." NATO already has special relationships with important countries such as Russia and Ukraine that specify special procedures and rights of consultation and interaction. Why not a special relationship with the European Union, given its immense importance?

3. **Institutionalize the EU's Relationship with the United States (and NATO?).** NATO has long been heavily institutionalized, facilitating communication, interaction, and action. The EU's transatlantic connections

are not similarly institutionalized, but among the Warsaw Reflection Group there was considerable sentiment that such institutionalization is desirable. One significant step in this direction would be the creation of an EU–US secretariat that would be charged with preparing summits and providing continuity in EU–US relations. A variant of this idea would create a three-sided secretariat, including NATO as well as the EU and the United States. This would have the advantage of tightening the ties between NATO and the EU and would reduce the risk that there would come to exist two alternative transatlantic tracks.

4. **Create a New Policy Coordination Mechanism for Crisis Prevention.** NATO typically responds to crises. It would be much better if NATO had the ability to coordinate and act in the pre-crisis phase to prevent or minimize potential or emerging crises. In regions such as the Middle East and in relation to countries of great importance such as Saudi Arabia, it would be vastly preferable to develop harmonized strategies for anticipating and preventing crises rather than scrambling to cope with disasters after they have occurred (as in the Balkans) and after they have become more difficult and dangerous to address. NATO's existing institutions have not proven sufficient to successfully address the challenge of crisis prevention or to promote the requisite security cooperation that would promote successful crisis prevention. NATO should consider whether it is possible to develop a mechanism that would cope with this challenge more effectively.

APPENDIX

Transformation – Enlargement – Engagement
Discussion paper

The New Security Environment

1. Global security environment after 9/11 is characterized by **growing regionalization of threat perceptions**. In North America and most of Europe, a State-to-State armed aggression is no longer considered likely in the foreseeable future. Terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction top the security agenda, and combination of the above is viewed as a particularly ghastly scenario. On the other hand, classical State-to-State conflict remains a probability in most of Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. Many governments there pay only lip service to the new security agenda of the transatlantic community. Instead, some of them use fighting terrorism as an excuse to quell internal political, religious or ethnic dissent, and continue considering WMDs as a legitimate weapon, highly effective in raising if not their usable military potential, then at least political leverage and national prestige. An intermediate category, composed of both Europe's peripheries and sub-Saharan Africa, faces frictions and armed struggles of diverse intensity stemming both from inter-State and, more often, from intra-State roots. Weak governments there struggle to maintain control and influence over their own territory, often in artificially carved States.

2. **Reprioritization of threats is not only geographically uneven, but also intellectually incomplete.** On both sides of North Atlantic, WMDs in the hands of terrorists are currently viewed as the most serious, and in fact quite plausible, threat to security. Policies are speedily retooled to deal with them. However, at least in Europe, political sensitivities prevent open discussion of challenges to security caused by mass migrations, mostly from former colonies or other countries torn by internal conflicts or economic underdevelopment. But even peaceful and economically motivated migrations are often connected to trafficking of all sorts, transnational organized crime, and may in fact result in internal cultural, religious, ethnic and political tensions which even highly developed

Western European democracies find hard to absorb. Both 9/11 in the US and 3/11 in Madrid proved that immigrant communities in Western Europe provide a fertile breeding ground for the new type of terrorists.

3. **Security is a process and organizations are rigid structures.** Organizations as a rule are shaped to reflect a certain political reality at the time of their conception and find it hard to evolve at equal pace with the changing environment. This is particularly true of intergovernmental institutions, where national governments jealously guard their once achieved status. Decision-making by consensus invites opportunities for abuse by single States making important international decisions hostage to narrow national agendas. Principle of "one country – one voice," while supposedly most democratic, rarely reflects respective States' contributions, interests and stakes in a particular issue. In addition, international bureaucracies become influential pressure groups, fighting for institutional turf and sifting proposals for change through the prism of their own vested self-interest. These problems have been most acute in the United Nations and agencies of the UN System. The fact that the UN Security Council has repeatedly failed to meet its responsibilities in maintaining international peace and security invites the US, and for that matter—other countries, to seek solutions outside multilateral frameworks. On the other hand, the trust of countries of the Southern Hemisphere in the UN System has been undermined by historical failure to address the problems of world development, with the gap between the highly developed and underdeveloped societies growing wider in the last half a century instead of closing.

4. **Regional organizations have a very chequered record** in the field of maintaining international peace and security. In fact, the only ones which could already claim historical success are the ones established in the transatlantic area: the CSCE/OSCE, NATO and, in a different—much broader—dimension, the EU. For a number of different reasons, it will be difficult to follow their pattern and replicate their success in other regions, although attempts to plant their "clones" enjoy another comeback. In the face of failure or weakness of intergovernmental structures in other regions, the one option easily available, and in fact currently pursued, is the geographic extension of the existing effective organizations to other regions, if not in terms of membership, then activities. As the origin of all security organizations with proven effectiveness is clearly Western (or "Northern"), this could be potentially viewed in other regions as a return of a kind of semi-colonization by other means. Only structures limiting themselves to dialogue

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and economic assistance, as the EU before launching the CSDP, could escape this stigmatization. Also, the mandates and resources of these organizations rarely reflect the increased geographic and substantive scope of their activities. To further complicate the picture, "institutional rush" develops as different international organizations compete to cut out for themselves a piece of visible action in a particular, currently fashionable field.

5. **States have always maintained an option to use force** if they saw their existential and vital security interests threatened. Not only outright armed aggression, but also ranges of other situations have been cited as justification for military action, which in some cases might be described by observers as pre-emptive. Threat perceptions are often highly subjective, but once they take root, they become an objective reality pushing the escalation ladder up and up, and often leading to the use of force on grounds which the other side or third parties consider insufficient. It is only natural that it is weaker States that seek to put limits on this sovereign national decision by way of international institutions or legal frameworks. Post-9/11 high threat perception, arguably fully justified, in the militarily most powerful nation in the world makes it virtually impossible to think of imposing new universal legally binding limitations on the use of force by Nation-States. The United States is potent but not omnipotent. Americans need friends and partners, as they cannot do their security job alone. Helping the US conceptually and materially develop effective alternatives to the use of military force remains the most promising path for other Allies to take. In contrast to the US concept of pre-emptive strikes, the European Security Strategy has introduced a concept of preventive engagement. Thanks to a broad spectrum of capabilities (diplomatic and economic in addition to military tools), it aims to stop the emergence of threats before they materialize and jeopardize security.

NATO: Extension and Transformation

1. **The North Atlantic Alliance has always been imbalanced** in terms of military power and political influence. It is the vast political, military and to some extent economic involvement of the US in Europe which has helped the nations of the continent rebuild and maintain security. In the face of an overriding common threat, the Alliance had helped keep in check or transform ancient national frictions such as between France and Germany, Greece and Turkey, the UK and Spain. European integration, which enjoys such spectacular success in recent years, would also be impossible without the US security umbrella. With the disappearance of the Soviet threat, the Alliance has superficially outlived its

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adequacy and usefulness for both Americans and Europeans: some on both sides of the Atlantic have become convinced that they no longer need the other party and could better take care of their security interests through other ways and means. At best, the role of NATO in national security policies of most Member States has declined.

2. **NATO has been one of the first international organizations to grasp the significance of changes in the European political landscape and start transforming itself.** Starting from 1990 the Alliance is in constant adaptation to meet new challenges. Today, with 26 Members, new strategic partnership with Russia, special relations with Ukraine and partners within the PfP framework and Mediterranean Dialogue, NATO has transformed itself from a Cold War military alliance to an important international security organization. At the same time it has become obvious that development of new military capabilities has not kept pace with the scope of political changes.

3. **There is no doubt that new Members are joining NATO valuing it as the most successful defensive alliance in history. It is a paradox that they are joining NATO for what it has been so far, just as it is successfully rushing to transform itself**. The traditional function of territorial defense has gradually lost its central role in Europe. At the same time stabilizing and peacekeeping missions have become NATO's primary activity. But today the need to protect the whole transatlantic community against any new and old threats has not diminished, only the nature of threats has been changing.

4. **There is a limit to NATO involvement in out-of-area operations.** It is imposed on one hand by the willingness of Member-States to contribute resources to operations far away from national territory. On the other, it is not yet clear whether the Alliance should remain a regional organization or should have a global role and responsibilities. In any case, in order to remain an effective organization NATO has to be more selective with regard to the threats it decides to face.

5. With the second wave of NATO enlargement completed, **Partnership for Peace has to undergo a significant change.** So far both the Alliance and most Partners have viewed it as a stepping stone towards full membership. Although this will soon no longer be the dominant justification in case for most remaining partners, the relevance of partnership in supporting democratization processes in the Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia has not lost its importance. The main challenge is to adapt its instruments to the needs of specific countries and regions

while at the same time developing new ties with the Mediterranean region and countries from Greater Middle East.

Transatlantic and NATO–EU Relations

1. There are some grounds for claiming that strategic cultures in the US and Europe differ, stemming from different historical background, geographic position and available power. It is important, however, to keep those differences in perspective, contrasting them against a global background. **A number of factors work to bring the strategic cultures of the US and Europe closer, compared to other regions of the world.** These range from common values to post-industrial economic development. The latter results, *inter alia,* in strong aversion to human casualties on both fighting sides and the technological ability to achieve far-reaching military objectives with minimal use of force. European Security Strategy demonstrates that perceptions of threats and challenges are not that much different in Europe and the US, opening greater possibilities for coordinating policies to meet them.

2. With the single exception of Pearl Harbour, on 9/11 for the first time since the 19th century Americans felt directly threatened by an aggressor. It is immaterial that technically the aggression took off from US soil: it has been strongly perceived as originating in the Muslim world. On the one hand, it caused the US to close its borders tighter and create a fortress mentality, with Home Security and fingerprinting at the border as most graphic examples of this new approach, so much at odds with recent American practice. On the other hand, terrorist attacks have drawn the US out to do something in what had been perceived as the geographic source of terrorism: the so-called Greater Middle East. Military reaction to terrorist acts has been only one of possible options, but one offering most spectacular and speedy results in terms of emotional retribution. Many in Europe suspect that military power is used not always as the tool that promises to be most effective, but as the one most readily available. **As limitations of the military approach to fighting international terrorism are becoming visible, both in Afghanistan and Iraq, Americans are likely to appreciate more European "soft power" involvement.**

3. **By nature of its functions, activities and membership, the European Union is more democratic than NATO**. With no overwhelming US presence, the EU should be more open to true discussion, convincing others and even simple bargaining. The time of fundamental change of circumstances is ripe for a true security debate in NATO. In the EU, the great European powers feel truly their

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political, economic, cultural and demographic weight. It is a paradox already felt by new Member States that NATO—an institution obviously not balanced in terms of Members' influence—has been from the very beginning treating new members in a more serious and equal manner than the EU. In the EU, the new Member States are in fact finding themselves in the same "back seat" position versus larger European partners as the larger ones themselves find uncomfortable within NATO. Unless ways are found in both the Union and the Alliance to reflect the growing importance and self-confidence of Europeans, these dangerous trends will continue.

4. **NATO and the EU should be partners of first choice for each other.** They obviously complement each other in terms of hard and soft power. Working in concert they could achieve much better and more durable results of particular policies, particularly coercive ones. It is a paradox that NATO and the EU, two organizations with roots in the same geographical region and overwhelmingly overlapping membership, find it so difficult to engage in substantive dialogue, not to mention coordination, between themselves. There have to be deeper reasons for this than, obviously existing, clash of institutional cultures. There is growing danger that US–EU dialogue will be treated as a substitute of NATO–EU strategic dialogue and closer cooperation, both in Brussels and in the field.

Questions

Questions which merit discussion in this context include the following:

1. How to keep US interest in Europe and Europe's willingness to cooperate with the US?

2. Is there still consensus among the Allies on the necessity of US leadership in the transatlantic security structures?

3. How to facilitate NATO–EU common strategy in the new security environment?

4. What would be the most effective ways and means of cooperative search for promoting international peace and stability by NATO and the EU?

List of Participants

Huseyin Bagci

Professor at the Political Faculty of the Polytechnical University of the Middle East in Ankara; areas of interest: European security, Turkish foreign policy.

Christoph Bertram

Director of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik – SWP); former Director of the London Institute for International Strategic Studies (IISS); diplomatic correspondent for *Die Zeit*; areas of interest: European and Atlantic security policy, arms control.

Bronisław Geremek

Former Foreign Minister of Poland; Professor at College of Europe in Warsaw (Natolin); a scholar of medieval European history, especially of France and Poland; former researcher at the Polish Academy of Sciences, Sorbonne, Collège de France and other European and American universities; author of many publications, and Member of distinguished boards and associations.

István Gyarmati

Deputy President of the East-West Institute in New York; former high ranking official at the Hungarian Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs; former President of MTCR and OPCW; Member of the DCAF Council based in Geneva; Member of the European Security Forum and International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS); author of many books on international security.

Helga Haftendorn

Research Professor at Otto-Suhr-Institut fur Politikwissenschaft; earlier on Professor at Freien Universitat Berlin; Director of the Center on Transatlantic and Security Policy Studies; also worked for the Academy of Bundeswehr and at the Hamburg University; areas of interest: transatlantic relations, foreign policy of USA and Germany; Member of several board councils, including the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

François Heisbourg

Head of the Foundation For Strategic Research; former Director of the London International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS); adviser at the French Foreign Ministry Policy Planning Staff; areas of research: biological and chemical weapons, nuclear materials security, terrorism.

Bo K. A. Huldt

Head of the Department for Strategic Studies at the Swedish National Defence College (SNDC); former Director of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI) and Institute for International Strategic Studies (IISS) in London.

Richard Kugler

Distinguished Research Professor at the Center for Technology and National Security Policy; Adviser at the Office of Secretary of Defense; formerly a researcher at RAND Co.; areas of interest: US defense strategy, international security relations, NATO.

Pierre Lellouche

Deputy to the French Parliament, Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Member of the National Assembly EU Committee; Head of the Research Group on the Armament Industry; Head of the French delegation to NATO Parliamentary Assembly; Vice President of the NATO PA; former Deputy Director of the French International Affairs Institute (IFRI); former Diplomatic Advisor to President J. Chirac.

Steven E. Miller

Research Professor and Director of International Security Programme at Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University; Editor-in-chief of the quarterly *International Security*; former Senior Research Fellow at SIPRI, academic lecturer at Massachusetts Institute of Technology; author of many publications on international security, especially nuclear issues.

Jerzy M. Nowak

Ambassador of Poland to NATO and WEU; former Polish Ambassador to Spain; Security Policy General Director at the Polish MFA; Member of the official

team to negotiate Poland's accession to NATO; Personal Representative of the Minister for the Polish OSCE Chairmanship in 1998, engaged in the CSCE/OSCE and CFE processes; former Member of the Board of Directors of the East-West Institute in New York.

Janusz Onyszkiewicz

Former Defence Minister; Member of the Centre for International Relations in Warsaw; Deputy Chairman of the Parliamentary Defence Committee and Foreign Affairs Committee; Head of the Polish parliamentary delegation to the North Atlantic Assembly.

Lord John Roper

Liberal Democrat, Chief Whip in the House of Lords and a Professorial Fellow at the Institute for German Studies of the University of Birmingham; from April 1990 until September 1995, first Director of the Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union in Paris; former opposition spokesman on defence (1979–81) and Chief Whip of the Social Democratic Party from 1981 to 1983; from 1983 to 1989 a senior member of staff of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) and Editor of its journal *International Affairs*.

Adam D. Rotfeld

Ph. D., Professor, Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Member of the President's National Security Council; former Director of SIPRI (1991–2002); Member of a number of international research centres, governing boards and advisory committees.

Walther Stützle

Former Secretary of State at the German Ministry of Defence; Editor-in-chief of *Der Tagesspiegel* and former Director of SIPRI.

Raimo Väyrynen

Member of the Finnish Academy of Science; Professor of Political Science; Director of the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies; Member of the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies; former lecturer at the University of Notre Dame (USA); areas of research: international relations, theory of conflicts, non-proliferation and disarmament.

Invited Guests

Jacek Bylica

Ambassador, Director of the Department of Security Policy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; former Director of Foreign Minister's Secretariat; Director of Asia-Pacific Department at Foreign Ministry; Head of Arms Control and Disarmament Division at the Department of Security Policy at MFA.

Adam Kobieracki

Assistant Secretary General of NATO for Operations; former Director of the Department of Security Policy at Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Head of the Permanent Mission of Poland to the UN Office and the International Organizations in Vienna; Head of the Mission of Poland to OSCE; former Chairman of the OSCE Permanent Council; Chief Polish negotiator at the CFE adaptation talks.