

TURKEY'S DIASPORA IN GERMANY

A Transnational Community Divided between Transnational Integration and Distant-Nationalism

Yaşar Aydın

Introduction

The history of Turkey's diaspora in Germany dates back to the 1960s when large emigration waves from Turkey to Germany took place after the signing of a guest-worker agreement between the two states in 1961. Today there are more than 3 million people of Turkish¹ origin in the country who are active in the social, political, economic, and even cultural life of German society. The majority of Turks maintain a particular collective and subjective identity and retain strong social, cultural, economic, and even political ties with the Turkish homeland, while being at the centre of public attention in both positive and negative senses. Turkey's diaspora in Germany has long been a topic of animated political dispute, with one of the primary causes of concern being the strong interest of the Turkish government in Turks abroad. For the past two decades, Turkish politicians have increasingly intervened in political and social matters that concern Turks in different European countries but, above all, Germany.

In German politics and media, the Turkish government and Turkey's diaspora, due to its size and the nationalist agenda of most of its members, have been accused of jeopardising the integration of Turkish migrants and weakening the social coherence (for example, see *Die Welt* 2011, Popp 2013: 36–37). These and similar accusations have been particularly made with references to the diaspora and, more specifically, the radical ethnic nationalism that exists among certain diaspora Turks and the 'anti-Western' rhetoric of Turkish decision-makers. As a further point of contention, one critic points to the 'reactionary' and 'Turkey-oriented' praxis of such institutions as the Turkish Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği*, DITIB) (Elger 2022: 48–49), one of the largest Islamic organisations in Germany and a branch of the Presidency of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*, DİB or *Diyanet*) in Turkey.

Against this backdrop, this chapter breaks down the structure of and main cleavages within Turkey's diaspora in Germany and Germany's continued focus on the 'Turkish diaspora policy'. It should be mentioned in advance that this chapter constitutes neither a

comprehensive study of the topic,² nor is it an original empirical survey based on fieldwork, unlike my previous research. What is presented here is a record of recent developments and discussions on integration and inner community cleavages. My approach consists of synthesis and interpretation and draws from a number of sources, including statistical data, media coverage, and statements by both Turkish and German decision-makers.

Conceptual Framework: Diaspora, Diaspora Policy, and Diaspora Nationalism

To what does the term ‘diaspora’ refer? Does it make sense to call the Turkish community in Germany a ‘diaspora’? Historically, “[d]iaspora signified a collective trauma, a banishment, where one dreamed of home but lived in exile” (Cohen 1997: ix), but such a definition of ‘diaspora,’ suggesting a state of trauma, cannot be applied to the Turkish community in Germany. Migration researcher Thomas Faist argues that it is “not useful to apply the term ‘diaspora’ to settlers or labour migrants because they did not experience traumatic experiences and it cannot be said that most of the members of these groups yearn to return to their lost homeland” (Faist 2000: 208). Faist can be considered right, in the sense that only a small proportion of Turks were forced to leave Turkey due to political persecution or repression and can, therefore, be regarded as traumatised.

In recent times, however, the ‘diaspora’ concept has been redefined to the point that it is used to refer to other “peoples abroad who have also maintained strong collective identities

[and] defined themselves as diaspora, though they were neither active agents of colonisation nor passive victims of persecution” (Cohen 1997: ix). In contemporary literature there are four key aspects of the ‘diaspora’ concept: dispersion, retrospection, community spirit, and exterritoriality, encompassing, according to Michael Kearney, “a full cross-section of community members who are dispersed to many diverse regions of the world and who yet remain a myth of their uniqueness and an interest in their homeland” (Kearney 1995: 559).

In the case of Turks abroad, *first*, it can be said that more than 6 million Turks reside in dispersed locations outside of Turkey. Most live in Western Europe, where they represent an ethnic group, but also take part in social and political life as citizens of the host nation (*dispersion*). *Second*, Turks maintain strong ties with Turkey and identify themselves based on their country of origin (*retrospection*). *Third*, Turks are bound together – more or less – by a strong *community spirit* that is bolstered by a collective experience of exclusion and feelings of discrimination in the host country.³ And, *finally*, Turks maintain a collective identity that is no longer necessarily tied to a specific territorial area – be it the host country, the region of residence, or the country of origin (*exterritoriality*) (Berking 2000: 53).

‘Diaspora policy,’ or more precisely, ‘diaspora engagement policy,’ in the Turkish context, refers to the politics, strategies, and discourse involved in the establishment and/or strengthening of the self-confidence and capabilities of the Turkish diaspora (cp. Gamlen 2006). The approaches of the Turkish government towards Turks in Germany can be held up as a typical example of diaspora policy – the Turkish government encourages Turks in Germany to maintain social, linguistic, and political ties with Turkey and supports certain Turkish diaspora organisations in Germany – such as the DITIB and the Islamic Community Milli Görüş (*İslam Toplumları Milli Görüş* or IGMG), while also establishing new diaspora organisations, such as the Union of International Democrats (*Uluslararası Demokratlar Birliği*, UID), the Presidency for Turks Abroad

and Related Communities (*Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Toplulukları Başkanlığı*, YTB), and the Yunus Emre Culture Centre (*Yunus Emre Kultur Merkezi*, YKM), among others (Aydın 2014).

The ‘long-distance nationalism’ or ‘diaspora nationalism’ among Turks in Germany manifests in feelings that they are considered migrant or minority groups in the country and so are not accepted by the host society (Anderson 1998: 58–74). These feelings of exclusion, however, are not the sole cause of diaspora nationalism (Senay 2013, Jamal and Aydın 2022). Such migrants – in our case, Turks – overidentify themselves with the Turkish nation and, often with the government, encouraging their segregation and the creation of homogeneous milieus in the host society (Anderson 1998).

Another significant feature of these groups is their limited responsibility. Members of the diaspora participate in the politics of their country of origin but have no obligation to obey the laws or pay taxes and thus are not responsible for their actions in this regard. As Anderson states, a member of the diaspora who participates in the politics of their home country “need not fear prison, torture or death, nor need his immediate family” – as long as they do not return to the home country (Anderson 1998: 74).

The Past and Present of Turkey's Diaspora in Germany

Turkish Mass Migration to Germany

The mass migration from Turkey to Germany in the 1960s was the main factor behind the formation of the Turkish ‘diaspora’ and ‘diaspora policy.’ The ‘Turkish diaspora’ established itself in line with the needs of those who migrated from Turkey to Western Germany under the 1961 bilateral agreement signed between the two governments for the recruitment of workers. The migration of workers to Germany was followed by migrations to other Western European countries, such as France, Austria, the Netherlands, and Belgium and further afield to Australia and New Zealand in this volume and cp. Castles and Miller 2009). In the 1970s, under lenient family reunification policies, Turks were allowed to remain in Germany and to be joined by their partners and children in Turkey. The migration of Turks to Germany continued with the exodus of asylum seekers (*political migrants*) in the 1980s, students (*educational migrants*) in the 1990s, and highly qualified expatriates and dissidents in the 2000s (Aydın 2016).

The drivers of migration from Turkey to Germany are thus highly diverse, consisting of several different groups, including labour migrants, family members of earlier migrants, students, asylum seekers, and returnees and transnational circular migrants. For Turkey, emigration and immigration have become integral factors in the deep-rooted state policies concerning nation-building and national integrity, and, more recently, economic development and modernisation (Aydın 2016). The “Turkish diaspora,” therefore, can no longer be considered only a “labour diaspora” in that it also carries the characteristics of a “cultural (hybrid) diaspora,” according to the diaspora typology put forward by Robin Cohen (1997: 178).

Although initially intended to be ‘rotative’ or temporary by the Turkish and German authorities, the Turkish migrant community has become permanent. Today, according to official figures, some 2.8 million Turks reside in Germany, of whom approximately 1.5 million are German citizens while the remaining 1.33 million are still Turkish nationals. The number of Turks with dual nationality is estimated at 530,596 (DeStatis 2021).

Key Features of the Turkish Diaspora

As the discussion in the previous section shows, the 'Turkish diaspora' in Germany is a community with a relatively long history. The majority, 52.6 per cent, were born in Germany, while the remaining 47.4 per cent were born in Turkey and emigrated to Germany. Of them, 37.3 per cent have resided in Germany for more than 40 years, 42.2 per cent more than 20 years, and 11.7 per cent more than 10 years. Only 8.8 per cent of Turks who have lived in Germany for less than 10 years can be considered 'newcomers' (BAMF 2020: 201, 205).

The economic, socio-political, and cultural activities of the Turkish diaspora have a lasting influence not only on society and politics in Germany but also on bilateral Germany–Turkey relations and multilateral European Union (EU)–Turkey relations. As an example, the contributions of Turkish migrants supported the establishment of numerous town-twinning and friendship associations, further deepening German–Turkish relations. Their activities, however, were also linked to some political tensions and diplomatic misunderstandings, such as the arrest of Germany-based journalists Deniz Yücel in Turkey who was critical of the Turkish administration (Deutsche Welle 2018).

Today, Turks play an active role in all areas of social life in Germany and are represented in almost every profession. In larger cities and metropolitan areas, such as Hamburg, Berlin, and Cologne, the ownership of private medical practices, legal offices, restaurants, and driving courses by Turks is now considered normal. Turks have also taken up important positions in politics, trade, and sports, with Cem Özdemir, Mesut Özil, and Vural Öger being among the most noteworthy. The number of inter-ethnic marriages is also on the rise, with 19 per cent of all German women in bi-national marriages being married to Turkish men and 14 per cent of all German men in bi-national marriages being married to Turkish women (Focus 2015).

It is known that the approximate 96,000 Turkish entrepreneurs in Germany provide employment to around 500,000 people and represent an annual turnover of approximately 50 billion euros. This reflects the economic potential of the Turkish diaspora in Germany and the continued interest of Turkey in its diaspora (Auswärtiges Amt 2021).

Political Position of Turks in Germany

An estimated 893,000 Turks in Germany are eligible to vote (Çelikkan 2021), and Turks are represented in almost all political parties at the district and state level and in the German Parliament (*Bundestag*). Through their increasingly important role and weight in German politics and their transnational-oriented associations, Turks also influence bilateral relations between Germany and Turkey, as stated above, although the transnational bridge formed by the Turkish diaspora is also a source of diplomatic friction (Aydın 2019b: 165–183, Arkılıç 2022).

Sociologically and politically, the Turkish transnational diaspora in Germany is highly heterogeneous. *First*, there is a socio-cultural distinction between Islamists – the traditionally conservative and religious Turks – and Turks who have adopted a more secular lifestyle. *Second*, there are Turks who support, and more or less identify themselves with the Turkish government, or at least have a benevolent view of it, among which can be counted Islamist and conservative religious Turks and Turkish nationalists. On the other side of the coin are radical-extreme leftists, Kurdish nationalists, and Christian and Alevi minority groups of Turkish origin, among others. These communities are generally critical of the ruling Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP). Such groups were particularly

vocal at the AKP's decision to convert Hagia Sophia⁴ into a mosque in 2020 and at its support of Azerbaijan against Armenia in a 2020 war between the two countries⁵.

Third, while there are denominational differences, primarily between Alevi and Sunni Muslims, there are many grey areas where the two intersect. For example, some Alevis display nationalist tendencies while others act together with radical left circles. In addition, in Germany, supporters of the pro-secular Motherland Party (*Vatan Partisi*)⁶ and those of conservative-Islamist parties, such as the AKP or the Nationalist Movement Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*, MHP) (Aydın 2018) may agree on their criticism of the West, the United States, or the EU. On the contrary, some conservative Kurds lean towards Turkish state nationalism and display similar loyalties to the state as Turkish nationalists or conservatives.

Participation in Turkish elections is a central indicator of the transnational political orientations of Turks in Germany – voter turnout for the parliamentary and presidential elections between 2018 and 2023 was between 34 and 49 per cent in Germany (for a detailed analysis of external voting, see Chapter 17).

Two Types of Turkish Nationalism

Beyond the transnational attitudes and orientations, there is a strong sense of nationalism among the Turkish diaspora in Germany that can be classified under two types: *diaspora nationalism* and *right-wing ultranationalism*. The majority of Turks are strongly oriented towards Turkey but value their bilingualism and dual identities, defining themselves as 'German Turks,' 'European Turks,' or 'German with Turkish roots' (*transnational orientation*). There is also a clearly pronounced diaspora nationalism, with a significant proportion of Turks strongly identifying with Turkey and the Turkish government. This group romanticises and idealises Turkey and reacts strongly to any criticism of Turkey and its leadership. *Right-wing ultranationalism*⁷ is also strongly represented among the Turkish diaspora in Germany, organised under umbrella organisations and numerous diaspora organisations, such as football clubs and mosque communities, attracting significant numbers of the diaspora. Ultra-nationalist, radical right-wing groups, including the Osmanen Germania, Turan eV, or the Grey Wolves, enjoy a degree of approval in parts of the diaspora community (for more details, see Bozay 2021). Right-wing ultranationalism differs from diaspora nationalism in its characteristics of essentialism, friend–foe dichotomy, exaltation of the ethno-cultural self, hostility towards democracy, devaluation of the supposed Other, and, most importantly, open commitment to ideologies of inequality (Bora 2017: 279–284, Aydın 2022). Among Turks, ultranationalism manifests itself in the expression of a strong ethnic Turkish identity, an over-evaluation of the self, an over-identification with the Turkish government, and with what are perceived as 'national interests,' as well as an essentially anti-Western attitude and a stereotypical perception of German culture. Posts on social media platforms, such as Facebook, with anti-Semitic content and anti-Israeli, anti-American, and anti-European conspiracy myths circulated by some Turks are the most prominent expressions of this right-wing ultranationalism in virtual space.

Socio-political Cleavages within the Turkish Diasporic Community and Conflicts with the Host Society

The Turkish diaspora policy contains contradictory incentives that have produced different, and sometimes opposing, results for Turks in Germany. I will discuss some of these in detail below.

Encouraging Socio-Political Integration

The Turkish diaspora policy promotes integration and individualisation by encouraging Turks in Germany to naturalise and make better use of the available educational opportunities, to climb the social ladder, and to participate actively in social life and political decision-making. All of these require Turks to adopt the cultural values of their host societies, such as individualism and respect for different lifestyles and democratic norms. In this regard, the Turkish diaspora policy is in line with the German integration policy and the integration efforts of those of Turkish origin.

The Turkish government, however, has a different understanding of 'integration,' considering it rather as a factor in upward social mobility involving participation in the host country's prosperity as well as its political structures and processes. Acculturation, however, goes beyond this and is not envisaged in this integration concept. Since the new Turkish diaspora policy promotes conservative social morality and a conservative collective religious identity, it also contributes to the consolidation of the existing cultural fragmentation within the Turkish diaspora in Germany based on ethnicity, culture, and religion. Furthermore, it evokes scepticism among German decision-makers towards German Turks, questioning their ability to integrate into the host society.

In turn, through its initially conservative and later also nationalistic rhetoric, the AKP government has limited its audience and attempts at control and failed to reach some segments of the Turkish diaspora, such as pro-secular and liberal communities, Alevis, non-conservative Kurds, and Christian minorities. After more than a decade we can conclude that the new Turkish diaspora policy has not sufficiently addressed the diversity of Turkish-origin diaspora in Germany.

Conflicts with the Host Society

Although seeking the integration of Turks into German society, through its diaspora policy, the Turkish government has at the same time intensified the conflict between Turks and mainstream politics and society in their host countries. Aside from the conservative rhetoric of Turkish decision-makers, dramatic events in Turkey such as the Gezi Park protests of 2013, the failed military coup of July 15, 2016, and the response of the Turkish government to the resolution adopted by the German federal government declaring the mass killings of Armenians by the Ottoman Empire in 1915 as an act of 'genocide' led to a deterioration of the bilateral relations between Turkey and Germany (Smale and Eddy 2016). These three developments escalated tensions between Turkey and Germany at diplomatically delicate junctures. In 2013, a meeting organised by the UID – an AKP lobby organisation active in Europe – voiced its solidarity with the Turkish government at a time when the ruling government was under political pressure to justify its violent responses to the Gezi Park protests. This meeting attracted harsh criticism in German mainstream media. A similar solidarity rally organised in Cologne by the UID after the failed 2016 coup attempt, although peaceful, again attracted strong public criticism.

In certain political and public arenas, the little interest of Turkish diasporans in German politics has been described as a sign of their 'limited' integration (Lisovenko 2023), leading some German commentators and high-ranking politicians to question the loyalty of nationalist and conservative Turks to Germany (Piantl 2016). The crude lobbying activities and

insensitive activism of members of the Turkish diaspora with links to the Turkish government have also deepened the gap between Turks and mainstream German society, drawing them politically apart and spurring counter-mobilisations.

Securitisation of the Islam Debate

The 9/11 terrorist attacks of 2001 initiated an intense debate on Islam and Muslims in Germany (Bade 2013), turning Islam into a security issue. The place of Islam and Muslims in Germany and the compatibility of their lifestyles with European values and democratic norms thus entered the political agenda. Furthermore, the willingness of Muslims to integrate within democratically organised, plural societies was called into question. The German Islam Conference (*Deutsche Islam Konferenz*, DIK) founded in 2006 by former Minister of the Interior Wolfgang Schäuble focused on the security aspects of the discourse related to Islam and integration (Aguilar 2017).

The fundamental and overarching goal of the DIK was, and remains, to establish and maintain a permanent and regular nationwide dialogue between the German government and the Muslim community and their representation in Germany. In reality, however, it has become a means of transforming the Muslim faith and Muslims to align them with the values and interests of Germany – creating a 'German Islam' project that is firmly rejected by the well-established Turkish Muslim institutions in Germany. The DIK thus has contributed to the growth of nationalistic tendencies and the withdrawal of Turks from mainstream society, as well as an increase in the criticisms of Islam and anti-Muslim racism in the mainstream media by placing Islam at the centre of public attention. The resulting excessive debates on integration policy and on the dominant culture have led to the further alienation of many Turkish Muslims from society.

Besides this top-down politicisation triggered by the German integration policy and the policies of the Turkish government related to its diaspora, there is a bottom-up politicisation triggered by counter-left-wing radicalism, as discussed below.⁸

Vicious Circle. Mobilisation vs. Counter-mobilisation

After the failure of the peace negotiations between the government and the Kurdish Workers' Party (*Partiya Karherên Kurdistanê*, PKK), the PKK resumed its terrorism campaign, spurring harsh responses from the Turkish Armed Forces. This escalation of violence in Turkey cast a shadow over Germany, where the PKK and other Kurdish and radical/extremist leftist groups started to mobilise, encouraged by the developments in Syria. The battle for Kobane in September 2014, for example, provided the PKK with a significant boost in popularity and sympathy in Germany, being seen as the beginning of the end of the expansion of the Islamic State (IS). The staging of Rojava as a 'democracy project' was so successful because the fight against IS fascinated neo-communist, eco-anarchic and anti-fascist groups, and other ethnic resistance movements around the globe. Kurdish nationalists and extreme/radical leftist groups gained impetus from the renewed anti-capitalist and left-wing discourse around the world after the financial crisis of 2009. These factors together explain the successful mobilisation of some European scholars, intellectuals, celebrities and politicians by the legal wing of the PKK organisation, provoking nationalist sentiments among Turks in Germany (Posch 2022).

In September 2016, radical left-wing groups organised a protest in Cologne against the Turkish government and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan that was attended by thousands of people, during which symbols of the PKK, classified as a terrorist organisation by Turkey and the EU, were on display. The mild responses to the protest by the German government and the general public, in the eyes of many Turkish diasporans, were in stark contrast to Germany's negative reactions to the pro-Turkish government rally held a few weeks earlier (Bax 2016: 7). Members of the Turkish diaspora frequently claim that criticisms of the militancy of the Kurds and ultra-leftists in Turkish politics are notably lacking in Germany. The perceived double standards not only provoke ire among Turks in Germany but also nationalistic resentment (Aydın 2019a).

Conclusion

Why are Turks in Germany attracted to different types of Turkish nationalism, while fearing and opposing German nationalism? As discussed in this chapter, Turkish nationalism has gained strong impetus from the Turkish diaspora policy, although it is also a reaction to the militant activities of extreme leftist and Kurdish nationalist groups. These two communities are active in different spheres of German society and engage in political activities, which is perceived by diaspora Turks as 'anti-Turkish'.

The anti-Western nationalist rhetoric of Turkish decision-makers explains in part the (diaspora) nationalism among Turks in Germany. It is important to keep in mind that diaspora nationalism incentivises the maintenance of a particular identity that is not to be absorbed into mainstream society. I address the Turkish (diaspora) nationalism here within a broader context to understand its true nature and popularity within the diasporic space, directing the focus on the interplay of three factors: (1) socio-cultural dichotomies and political polarisation, and the lines of conflict within the Turkish diaspora that contribute to the reproduction of nationalism, (2) the strong impetus given by the Turkish diaspora to (diaspora) nationalism, and (3) the integration policy of the German government (*Bundesregierung*), the anti-Islamic and racist discourse in the German media, and the attitudes in the host society that contribute to feelings of exclusion from society, thus encouraging nationalist sentiments. In short, Turkish (diaspora) nationalism is, to a large extent, incentivised by this triple-themed politicisation.

Notes

- 1 In this chapter, I use the word 'Turk' and 'Turkish' to refer to territory and citizenship, encompassing all current and former citizens of the Republic of Turkey living in Germany, regardless of ethnicity, religion, or culture.
- 2 Recent years have seen a wealth of 'diaspora studies,' among which are a number of new books devoted to the Turkish diaspora. To mention just a few that are particularly relevant to the presented topic: Ayca Arkılıç (2022) *Diaspora Diplomacy: The Politics of Turkish Emigration to Europe* (Manchester: Manchester University Press), Derya Özkul and Hege Matkussen (2022) *The Alevis in Modern Turkey and the Diaspora* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Press), Buket Okten Sipahioğlu (2019) *Avrupa'da Türk Diasporası* (Istanbul: Cinius Yayınları), Talip Kuşukcan (2021) *Diaspora Türkleri: Avrupa'da Türk İmajı ve İslamofobi* (Istanbul: Cızıgı Yayınları), Orhan Aras (2019) *Avrupa'daki Türk Diasporası ve Lobisi* (Köln: Pem Yayınları), and Bahar Başer (2017) *Diaspora and Homeland Conflicts* (London and New York: Routledge).
- 3 Regarding the self-perception of Turks in Germany and their feelings of exclusion, see the survey carried out by Detlef Pollack, Olaf Müller, Gergely Rosta, and Anna Dieler (2016) *Integration*

- und Religion aus der Sicht von Türkeistammigen in Deutschland (Münster: Zentrum für Wissenschaftskommunikation des Exzellenzclusters 'Religion und Politik' der Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität). Available at <https://bit.ly/3ujYePU> (Accessed 30 January 2022).
- 4 Hagia Sophia, a Byzantine church that was built in the 6th century, was turned into a mosque after the conquest of Constantinople by the Ottomans. Atatürk, the founder of the Republic of Turkey, turned it into a museum in 1935.
 - 5 The author's own observations on social media. Regarding the influence of the Azerbaijan–Armenia War 2020 on the Turkish diaspora in Germany, see Tigran Petrosyan (2020) *Krieg aus der Ferne*, *taz*, 15.11.2020. Accessible at <https://bit.ly/3KWZ9ff> (Accessed 31 January 2022).
 - 6 Contrary to its stated socialist agenda, the Motherland Party is classified as a national, secular, and Kemalist-oriented party with anti-European and anti-American tendencies. Domestically, it supports a protectionist-corporatist economic policy and opposes any Turkish alliance with the United States or the NATO and Turkey's orientation with the EU internationally. In Eurasian geopolitics, it rather seeks alliances with the Russian Federation and China. See Yaşar Aydın (2023).
 - 7 For more details of right-wing Turkish ultranationalism in Germany, see Bozay (2021).
 - 8 Left-wing radicalism and left-wing extremism are worldviews centred on the rejection of bourgeois democracy and the rule of law, as well as a commitment to revolution and the violent overthrow of the political order, and an upheaval of socio-economic conditions.

References

- Aguilar, Luis Manuel Hernández 2017 "Suffering Rights and Incorporation: The German Islam Conference and the Integration of Muslims as a Discursive Means of Their Racialization" *European Societies*, 19(5) pp. 623–644.
- Anderson, Benedict 1998 "Long-Distance Nationalism" In Benedict Anderson (ed.) *The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World*, pp. 58–74 (London and New York: Verso).
- Aras, Orhan 2019 *Avrupa'daki Türk Diasporası ve Lobisi* (Köln: Pem Yayınları).
- Arkılıç, Ayca 2022 *Diaspora Diplomacy: The Politics of Turkish Emigration to Europe* (Manchester: Manchester University Press).
- Auswärtiges Amt 2021 "Deutschland und die Türkei: Bilaterale Beziehungen" Berlin: Federal Foreign Office website. <https://bit.ly/3s2A3CY>
- Aydın, Yaşar 2023 "Vaterlandspartei/Vatan Partisi" (Parteiensysteme der Türkei), *Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung*. <http://bit.ly/IzvK>
- 2022 "Die Geschichte und Gegenwart der Ulkucu-Bewegung: Zwischen Ultranationalismus und Staatsraison, säkularem Türkismus und Islamismus (Engl.: The Past and Presence of the Ulkucu Movement: Between Ultranationalism and Reason of State, Secular Turkishism and Islamism)" In Lobna Jamal and Yaşar Aydın (eds.) *Graue Wolfe – Türkischer Ultranationalismus in Deutschland*, pp. 15–36 (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung).
- 2019a "Politisierter (Fern-)Nationalismus am Beispiel der türkeistammigen Diaspora in Deutschland" In Caroline Y. Robertson-von Trotha (ed.) *Diaspora Netzwerke globaler Gemeinschaften*, Vol. 3, pp. 97–108 (Karlsruhe: Wika-Report).
- 2019b "German–Turkish Relations at Continuous Crossroads – Political and Structural Factors" In Ebru Turhan (ed.) *German–Turkish Relations Revisited*, pp. 165–183 (Baden-Baden: Nomos).
- 2018 "Die Parlaments- und Präsidentschaftswahlen in der Türkei im Juni 2018" *Südosteuropa Mitteilungen*, 04|2018, Year 58, pp. 54–71.
- 2016 *The Germany-Turkey Migration Corridor: Refitting Policies for a Transnational Age* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute).
- 2014 "The New Turkish Diaspora Policy: Its Aims, Their Limits and the Challenges for Associations of People of Turkish Origin and Decisionmakers in Germany" *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Research Paper 10*, Berlin. <https://bit.ly/3IETWQZ>

- Bade, Klaus 2013 *Kritik und Gewalt Sarrazin-Debatte, 'Islamkritik' und Terror in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft* (Schwalbach Wochenschauverlag)
- BAMF 2020 *Migrationsbericht 2019*, Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (Berlin Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und Heimat)
- Başer, Bahar 2017 *Diasporas and Homeland Conflicts A Comparative Perspective* (London and New York Routledge)
- Bax, Daniel 2016 "Mustergutmächtig Geklammert" *Die Tageszeitung* September 4, p. 7 <https://bit.ly/3Z1L5Hk>
- Berking, Helmuth 2000 "Homes Away from Home Zum Spannungsverhältnis von Diaspora und Nationalstaat" *Berliner Journal für Soziologie*, 10(1) pp. 49–60
- Bora, Tanıl 2017 *Cereyanlar Türkiye'de Siyasal İdeolojiler* (Istanbul İletişim Yayınları)
- Bozay, Kemal 2021 *Türkischer Rechtsextremismus in Deutschland – Die Grauen Wolfe* (Berlin American Jewish Committee Berlin Ramer Institute)
- Castles, Stephen and Mark J. Miller 2009 *The Age of Migration International Population Movements in the Modern World* (Hampshire Palgrave Macmillan)
- Cohen, Robin 1997 *Global Diasporas An Introduction* (London UCL Press)
- Çelikkhan, Ali 2021 "Deutsche Politik und die turkeistämmigen Wähler*innen" *Heinrich Boll Stiftung*, September 28
- DeStatis 2021 "Bevölkerung in Privathaushalten nach Migrationshintergrund" *Statistisches Bundesamt* January 31 <https://shorturl.at/pIQVY>
- Deutsche Welle 2018 "German journalist detained in Turkey – reports" *Deutsche Welle*, April 14
- Die Welt 2011 "Erdogans Rede erzürnt deutsche Politiker" *Die Welt* February 28 <https://bit.ly/3s0ZZPw>
- Elger, Katrin 2022 "Wolfe in Moscheen" *Der Spiegel*, no. 4, January 22, pp. 48–49
- Faist, Thomas 2000 *The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Trans-national Social Spaces* (Oxford Oxford University Press)
- Focus 2015 "Deutsche heiraten am liebsten Deutsche - oder Turken" *Focus*, February 19
- Gamlen, Alan 2006 "Diaspora Engagement Policies What Are They, and What Kinds of States Use Them" University of Oxford, Centre on Migration, Policy and Society Working Paper
- Kearney, Michael "The Local and the Global The Anthropology of Globalization and Transnationalism", *Annual Review of Anthropology*, November 2003, 24(1) 547–565
- Kuçukcan, Talip 2021 *Diaspora Türkleri Avrupa'da Türk İmajı ve İslamofobi* (Istanbul Çizgi Yayınları)
- Lisovenko, Vadim Vincent 2023 "Präsidentenwahl in der Türkei – Warum wählen die Deutsch-Türken mehrheitlich Erdogan?" *Die Politische Meinung*, June 5
- Ozkul, Derya and Hege Markussen (eds.) 2022 *The Alevis in Modern Turkey and the Diaspora* (Edinburgh Edinburgh Press)
- Pollack, Detlef, Olaf Müller, Gergely Rosta and Anna Dieler 2016 *Integration und Religion aus der Sicht von Turkeistämmigen in Deutschland* (Münster Zentrum für Wissenschaftskommunikation des Exzellenzclusters ›Religion und Politik‹ der Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität) <https://bit.ly/3ujYePU>
- Popp, Maximilian 2013 "Ersatzkanzler in Ankara" *Der Spiegel*, 19 pp. 36–37
- Posch, Walter 2022 "Die Geschichte und Gegenwart des Linksextremismus in der Türkei" In Yaşar Aydın and Lobna Jamal (eds.) *Die Grauen Wolfe in Deutschland* (Bonn Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung)
- Prantl, Heibert 2016 "Zweifel an den Jubel-Türken" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* July 31 <https://bit.ly/3Kd3Vaw>
- Republic of Turkey 2022 "Commercial and Economic Relations between Turkey and the Federal Republic of Germany" Ministry of Foreign Affairs <https://bit.ly/3KZgsfy>
- Scnay, Banu 2013 *Beyond Turkey's Borders Long-distance Kemalism, State Politics and the Turkish Diaspora* (London I B Tauris)
- Sıpaioğlu, Buket Okten 2019 *Avrupa'da Türk Diasporası Hollanda Örneği* (Istanbul Cinius Yayınları)
- Smale, Allison and Melissa Eddy 2016 "German Parliament Recognizes Armenian Genocide, Angering Turkey" *The New York Times* June 2 <https://nytimes.com/3YFaOps>

Websites

- DİTİB – Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği, <https://www.ditib.de>
- UID – Union of International Democrats, <https://u-id.org/de/>
- YTB – Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı (Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities), <https://www.ytb.gov.tr/kui/umsal>
- Yunus Emre Enstitüsü (Yunus-Emre Institute), <https://www.yec.org.tr/en>