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European Conceptions of the Transatlantic Relationship

Historical Overview and Some Conceptual Issues

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Introduction

This paper examines the conceptions for transatlantic relations from a European vantage point in a historical perspective. The major question is, how transatlantic relations should evolve, if European integration progresses. The assumption is that these conceptions have a major influence on those actors advancing European integration. The article starts with a short look at the "pioneer decades" revealing how different conceptions of European integration shape the views on the wanted structure of the transatlantic link. The aim of a "European federation", the Gaullist "Europe of the fatherlands" approach and the vision of a US-focused European-transatlantic security system lead to different transatlantic outlooks: an Atlantic Union at the same level than European integration, a "multipolar world" in which the U.S. represents just one partner of Europe, and the idea of a "real partnership". It is striking, how much these models are still part and parcel of current discussions.

Europe's reaction to the 1970s' idea of an "Atlantic Charter" disclosed that Europe's ambition go beyond a regional responsibility. During the rough times of the 1980s , Gaullism, and the traditional idea of a concomitant growth of the transatlantic relationship went hand in hand with sheer pragmatism. With the 1990s the mix of conceptions became more confusing: NATO's term of "interlocking institutions" was soon replaced by ideas of a "New Atlanticism" and finally by the suggestion of a bipolar EU-U.S. relationship. In reality, however, transatlantic relations turned into a "hybrid character" characterized by a complex mix of conceptions and outlooks.

Pioneer Decades

Establishing an effective and solid policy towards the Soviet Empire, finding a sustainable internal balance among the formerly warring European countries (with specific reference to the problem of integrating the Federal Republic of Germany into the Western world without alienating European neighbors), and defining the future role of the United States in Europe was a paramount task for European and North American policymakers after World War II. The help of a clearly perceived threat, American pressure on the European states to integrate (or the threat of a U.S. withdrawal) and outstanding statecraft were necessary to form the European-Atlantic security architecture in the mid-fifties, which prevailed in its basic form until the breakdown of the Communist states in Eastern and Central Europe – an achievement, certainly deserving the label "historic". One problem, however, was that the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic could agree on the above list of problems, but put different emphasis on the four major factors determining the scope and structure of cooperation and integration in Western Europe and the transatlantic link: The majority view in the UK was that the special relationship with the U.S., and the still existing Commonwealth, allowed for a rather relaxed stand on European integration; France stood between the maintenance of its sovereignty and its strong willingness to bind (West-)Germany into a robust international body, the latter implying a transfer sovereignty from Paris to this organization; and the German position relied on the assumption that integration in any such international or even supranational body would allow it to regain its sovereignty.

The problems emerging from this basic divergence of ideas and interests have been influenced by

- the perceived intensity of the threat posed by the Soviet Union
- the perceived urgency of the need to restrain German power and to overcome antagonisms in Europe by European and transatlantic cooperation and integration
- the level of emphasis on maintaining the sovereignty of the state and the way how to preserve it under the respective strategic circumstances and
- the policy of the United States.

The Korean war (1950−53) raised the level of the

perceived threat in all Western countries substantially and provided the grounds for setting up an integrated military structure in the form of NATO. But it also increased American pressure on Europe to integrate economically and politically and to take over a greater share of the defense burden, as the Americans were still wary of being too much entangled in a war-prone Europe. Consequently – and also on their own behalf – the Europeans initiated an attempt to overcome their divisions not only via economic integration (Schuman plan, 1950) but also by a purely European security and defense structure, with a greater burden for the Europeans and a diminished American role. In this concept, the Atlantic Alliance was still a factor in providing security, but more as a back-up institution for the European Defense Union (EDU) than the primary tool for defense. The interlocking of both institutions, e.g., by the possibility of joint meetings of the ministerial councils, the regular gatherings on the working level resembles the Berlin-plus arrangements of today.[1]

However, defense integration in a European framework was less popular than the Schuman plan, which proposed the establishment of a common authority for the German and French steel and coal industries to avoid any future war between the major hostile states in Europe. The initial Coal & Steel Community developed into the European Community (E.C.) and in the 90s into the European Union (EU). In addition, a diminished threat perception and fears about losing too much sovereignty led to the defeat of the plan in the Assemblée nationale in 1954.[2] Further, the British interest in playing a major role in Europe by virtue of its special relationship with the United States and Bonn's objective of regaining sovereignty within a strong international set-up coincided in a framework in which the United States became both the "pacifier" and the "protector" of Western Europe through the

mechanism of NATO.[3] This represented a major shift both the US's policy toward Europe and Europe's policy towards the United States. David Calleo describes this as following:
"Military rearmament succeeded economic reconstruction. The Marshall Plan was thus followed by NATO. Along with militarization came a different style in transatlantic political relations, a move from a 'two pillar' pattern, emphasizing a European unity distinct from American ties, toward a hegemonic pattern, emphasizing America's direct role in managing European affairs. Thus, while the political machinery for the Marshall Plan was embodied in the OEEC, where the United States responded to plans and requests first formulated by the Europeans, NATO's machinery created a Supreme Allied Commander – an American general directing the territorial defence of Western Europe."[4]

The philosophy of European integration started to be based on the "Monnet method" or functionalist logic, leaving high politics aside and building Europe by more modest and indirect methods.

However, regardless of the limited character of European integration in those days, the founding fathers already had a vision of Europe and the future transatlantic relationship. In the view of Monnet, European integration had to go hand in hand with the concomitant growth of transatlantic ties leading finally to a "common union". This union would, however, not have the same "quality" as the European integration. Monnet was convinced that even the U.S. would finally delegate powers to common transatlantic institutions.[5] Another, even broader vision accompanied the founding days of European integration: the idea that the union in the West is part of "the

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[1] See the respective protocol.
[2] There is also the theory, that the Russian-French agreement on peace on the Indochinese Penisula, motivated the French government, not to support the plan actively.

[3] See Uwe Nerlich, "Western Europe's Relations with the United States", *Daedalus*, Winter 1979, p. 88.
[4] David P. Calleo, "Early American Views of NATO: Then and Now", in Lawrence Freedman (ed.), *The Troubled Alliance. Atlantic Relations in the 1980's*, New York 1983, p. 9.
[5] See Elliot R. Goodman, *The Fate of the Atlantic Community*, New York 1975, pp. 228f.

process of civilization, which is the process of law and institutions penetrating into ever wider circles."[6] This is an expression of the historical lesson, on which – in the final analysis – European integration was based: the anarchy of nations as the major source for war and the loss of freedom. Even today European integration is a philosophy meant to overcome national founding myths (e.g. French revolution, or in the US-case, American independence and democracy) by a multi- or supranational one.

Apart from the U.S. centered approach based on NATO (plus a nascent European Community) and the Europe-centered (with American sponsorship) concept, there was only one additional general idea that emerged from the triple problem of regaining German sovereignty, German unification and German rearmament: the neutralization of the whole of Germany. This idea was not only part of the German discussion, but also put on the table by Moscow in March 1952. Nevertheless, for most Germans in the Federal Republic, this plan seemed too risky an undertaking in view of the obvious hegemonic aspirations (and practice) of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. The rejection of this option allowed the allied powers to avoid a difficult debate over whether a united Germany would have satisfied their own security needs and whether they would have been ready to guarantee the existence of a united Germany, possibly by stationing major forces in part of (Western) Germany. The idea of a neutral Germany stopped being a viable alternative after the Federal Republic had joined NATO in 1955.[7] It only won some ground in the founding years of the Federal Republic, because it was closely related to the widely spread feeling that rear-

mament of the Federal Republic had to be avoided ("Nie wieder Krieg") and because it raised the hope that, by neutralization, the unification of the Eastern and Western part of Germany could be achieved. It resurfaced as a political current within the peace movement in the early eighties, which was supported by socialist and communist groupings in West Germany and – in a conspiratorial way – by the GDR, but was not able to penetrate the ruling classes. After the Communist meltdown and the unification of Germany the neutralization concept lost one of its major inspirations: unification, but reappeared at the very fringes of the German political spectrum in the form of questioning the "Westbindung" of Germany.[8] Germany's policy concerning the Iraq crisis (Franco-German-Russian "axis") represents, however not an expression of this political current and a questioning of its inherent affiliation with the West, but is dominated by French Gaullism.

The idea of a – more or less – autonomous European defense system was a dead idea from the mid-50s until the beginning of the 90s, when it surfaced again as part of the process of European integration. In this framework, a European defense system is a logical complement of the process of European integration. It was – at least at the beginning – only loosely related with defense and security questions proper.

In the late 50s, another vision of the political order in Europe and the transatlantic link came to light: the vision of the French leader de Gaulle of a "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals". Gaullism was not meant to replace the European-Atlantic security system that had been established in the fifties, but to serve as a reference point for an alternative European and world order. As long as the bilateral system prevailed, France only implemented this vision – so to speak – in the framework of the European-Atlantic security system (which provided France some freedom of action). This became obvious during the high

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[6] Max Kohnstamm, then Vice President of Monnet's Action Committee, quoted by Elliot R. Goodman, *The Fate of the Atlantic Community*, op. cit., p. 228.

[7] The *Gesamtdeutsche Volkspartei,* a party which officially pursued the neutralization idea, ceased to exist in 1957. Prominent personalities of this party played, however, an outstanding role within the Social-democratic party (SPD) like Gustav Heinemann, Helene Wessel, Johannes Rau, Erhard Eppler and Jürgen Schmude.

[8] See Rainer Zitelmann/Karlheinz Weissmann/Michael Grossheim (eds.), *Westbindung. Chancen und Risiken für Deutschland*, Frankfurt/Berlin 1993.

times of NATO's dual-track decision and peace movement in the Federal Republic, when France openly supported the deployment of Cruise Missiles and Pershing-II missiles in Europe. It is obvious that the current EU policy resembles this conception in some important features. In order to provide this vision with some substance, France developed its own nuclear force (Force de Frappe), independently from the U.S. and NATO, left NATO's military integration in 1966 and developed a national defense strategy in which German territory performed the function of a "glacis" for conventional and nuclear maneuvers. De Gaulle's vision of the world and his view of the transatlantic link stood in rather sharp contrast to the prevailing Monnet inspired philosophy and pro-Atlantic outlook of those days:

• De Gaulle's long-term conception was based on an opposition to blocs and hegemons. In his view, stability could only be achieved in the long run by a multipolar world. France was to play an outstanding role in the framework of a united Europe, based on intergovernmental decision-making procedures. In Europe, a pan-European structure from the "Atlantic to the Urals" was to replace the bloc system.

• Nonetheless, he didn't disregard the political (bloc) realities in Europe. Within the Western bloc he looked out for as much freedom of maneuver for France as possible. As a result of this approach, NATO represented for him only a sort of an insurance policy in case of an emergency. France consequently withdrew from NATO's military integration in 1966, but was always willing to support NATO if there was clear and present danger.

This view also prevailed in the two major plans of the beginning 60s for the further development of the EC, drafted by the French diplomat Christian Fouchet.[9]

9 Fouchet proposed a confederal structure for the EC. The plan recommended a common foreign and defense policy. The center of decision-making was to be a Council of the Heads of States. The second plan even canceled the idea of a common defense, allocated more competences to the national governments, didn't spell out clearly

An Intermezzo – the "Year of Europe"

The European reaction to the American idea of an "Atlantic Charter" at the beginning of the 1970s mirrors the French vision of "multilateralism" and a "powerful Europe" by refusing to accept the – in those days – realistic American assessment, that Europe had – in a strategic sense – regional interests only. It thus rested on the idea that the EC should be part of this strategic declaration. In addition, France emphasized not the opportunities arising from the superpower détente of that period, but the danger of a superpower condominium at the expense of a nascent Europe (and French nuclear deterrent). The resulting Atlantic declaration of 1974 didn't mention a division of labor and – indicative of US attempts to disregard the EC on a strategic level – no declaration of principles underpinning the EC and the U.S. Transatlantic relations were inserted by way of compromise between European (or French) anticipation of Europe as a strategic actor and the US's unwillingness to grant the EC the benefit of the doubt and allow it to become a reliable partner of the U.S.

The 1980s – a Period Serving Many Visions

In the 1980s, European perceptions and criticism regarding the transatlantic relationship foreshadowed developments in the late 1990s. A conservative American President, Ronald Reagan, came in for increased criticism in Europe from different angles:
• On the one hand, the planned deployment of American Pershing-II missiles and Cruise Missiles on European soil in reaction to Soviet SS-20 brought about a massive legitimation crisis for NATO's policy especially in the Federal Republic even though it was Bonn government, which initiated the so-called dual-track decision that planed for the deployment of those missiles if the Soviet Union does not dismantle its recently installed SS-20 missiles.

the relationship between the Council of Heads of States and didn't reply to the criticism that NATO should prevail in the defense area.

• On the other hand, Paris was afraid that the discussed Strategic Defense Missile-System (SDI) might render meaningless the French nuclear deterrent, whilst possible success in the peace-movement's protest against the stationing of these missiles might finally lead to a neutral Germany which would render France's glacis politically unreliable.

This contradictory criticism was a major impetus behind the idea to increase European visibility in security and defense affairs, e.g. by the activation of that sleeping beauty, the Western European Union (WEU). This served a number of interests and also visions of Europe and the transatlantic liaison:

• The activation of WEU represented a pragmatic reaction to the legitimation crisis of NATO's and West Germany's security policy achieved without changing much of the political landscape.

• The strongly intergovernmental structure of the 10-member organization WEU fitted into the Gaullist view on European decision-making structure and was also a framework in which the French nuclear deterrent could receive the blessing of Western Europe.

• The new importance put on the WEU placed security and defense issues on a purely European agenda outside the Alliance. This could be supported as an intermediate step by political forces aiming at a fully integrated Europe (step in the right direction), too.

By this polyvalent function the activation of WEU could be part and parcel of a Gaullist vision of Europe and the transatlantic relationship, but also an instrument to implement Monnet's method of integration; pragmatic political animals could regard it as a useful step to manage an actual crisis in transatlantic and European security policy (and more specifically the problem with Germany).

From a New Atlanticism to a Bipolar Relationship?

The 1990s brought about fundamental changes in the strategic environment of the European-Atlantic security system: the meltdown of Communism and German unification. This weakened NATO as a security framework, in and for, Europe and raised two questions:

How to respond to the new, emerging security challenges?

How to restrain the expected growth in German power?

Initially NATO's answer to the first question was the assumption that there was still a "residual threat" from the Soviet Union/Russia; later "generic scenarios" planning for a possible revival of Soviet power came into the foreground and finally there was a growing readiness to plan for and engage in "out-of-area operations". Beyond integrating unified Germany into its existing structures, no major changes were initiated at NATO in reaction to the German question.

In regard to the German question, more fundamental alterations were made to the EC/EU. Not by accident, one could read in Paris in the run-up to the Maastricht Treaty the statement: "Non à Maastricht, c'est la guerre." The German question was a much more pressing one in Paris than in Washington. While this statement about the consequence a rejection of the Maastricht Treaty was certainly over the top, it reflected the French problem with the altered power balance in Europe after German unification, further reactions of a more long-term, structural nature came about slowly during the whole decade.

The creation of the European Union in the framework of the Maastricht Treaty was the major, initial answer to the German question. Germany's ongoing integration into NATO was certainly an important part of the solution, but secondary to the European response.[10] An indication for the primary European focus in this matter was that Bonn did not react to the US-American offer of

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[10] Reinhardt Rummel reflects this position in 1990 when he writes: "Modernizing European-American relations and ending the division of Europe can only be achieved on the bases of a consolidated European Union." ("Preparing West Europe for the 1990s", in Reinhardt Rummel (ed.), *The Evolution of an International Actor, Western Europe's New Assertiveness*, Boulder, Col., 1990, p. 26f.

1989 that the two become "partners in leadership".[11] What remained from this proposal however was the notion of interlocking EU-NATO institutions which still dominates NATO's views, but which cannot be found in the EU's "language". After the German non-reaction on the American suggestion, this "new Atlanticism" had two features: the further development of NATO and the growth of bilateral relations between the U.S. and the evolving EU. These features accompanied transatlantic relations until recently, as, for example, indicated by the creation of a NATO Response Force (NRF) in 2002. These developments were interrupted for some time by the debates on the war against Iraq but came into the forefront again at the beginning of President Bush's second term, when the Secretary of State and the President visited not only NATO and some member states in Europe, but also the EU in Brussels.

This, however, reflects only one side of the coin. The European course had its own logic. Two agreements reached at Maastricht have been of special importance: The intention to set up a common European currency (which came into being in two steps 1999 and 2002), and the formation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) "which might in time lead to a common defence".[12] Thanks to these two agreements, not only did the Deutschmark, symbol of Germany's growing economic and political power after the World War, become Europeanized, but so too did – at least part of – Germany's international influence. The new Treaty did not disregard NATO but rather respected "the obligations of certain Member States under the North Atlantic Treaty".[13] This was, however, nothing more than an adjournment in the game between the two organizations. On the one hand, it could always be argued that the internal logic of the EU's development will necessarily lead to a fully-fledged

EU and a bipolar EU-U.S. relationship (which raises the question on how NATO fits into this scheme), on the other, NATO's philosophy of "interlocking institutions", based on a "new Atlanticism", still reserved an important function for the Alliance as a unique place for the transatlantic security dialogue and a framework for common operations. The latent frictions between the existing NATO framework still responsible for the collective defense of its member states[14] and the possibility of a common defense under the auspices of the EU brought about a curious competition between the two organizations on their future role, especially in the "growing market" of so-called "out-of-area contingencies".[15] In 1992, the WEU Council declared that the organization would evolve into the defense component of the EU and the European pillar inside NATO (bridge function) and would prepare for so-called Petersberg tasks ranging from "humanitarian operations" to "peacemaking". At the same time, the out-of-area discussion at NATO, revolving around the argument that NATO had "to go out of area" or "go out of business" won ground, too.[16]

On the EU's side, the notion of "European autonomy" in security and defense matters proliferated. At first attached to political decisions within the CFSP framework[17], with the growth of WEU

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[14] The so-called Constitutional Treaty, which, however, have been voted down in France and the Netherlands, contains a collective defense clause, indicating the old European integration logic à la Monnet is still a politically influential force.

[15] For the early debate and development within NATO and EU see Peter Schmidt, "Partners and Rivals: NATO, WEU, EC and the Reorganization of European Security Policy: Taking Stock", in Peter Schmidt (ed.), *In the Midst of Change: On the Development of West European Security and Defence Cooperation*, Baden-Baden 1992, pp. 187–228.

[16] See Ronald D. Asmus/Richard L. Kugler/F. Stephen Larrabee, "Building a New NATO", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72 (September/October 1993), No. 4, S. 28-40.

[17] See Peter Schmidt, "Defis et perspectives de la politique de securite europeenne de l'Allemagne", *Politique étrangère*, Vol. 61 (automne 1996), No. 3, S. 569-581.

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[11] See Cornelia B. Rieß, *Der überforderte Partner? Konzepte amerikanischer Deutschlandpolitik nach dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts*, Münster 1997, pp. 63–65.

[12] Article J4, point 1 of the Treaty on European Union.

[13] Ibid, point 4.

and the creation of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)[18] the notion expanded to include later military operations, too.[19] This has led to today's situation where there is no clear-cut division of tasks between NATO and the EU with the exception of collective defense, which is still regarded as being part of NATO's mission only. The division of labor is based on the capabilities of both organizations and on political decisions and will in concrete cases.

The concept of the EU, however, goes beyond autonomy of decision and action. It promotes a new world order characterized by an effective interplay of international organizations, called "effective multilateralism". This concept mirrors the wide-spread belief in European circles in the 50s that European integration was not an aim in itself but a project aiming at the "civilization" of word affairs[20]. By this the European founding philosophy competes with the more national sense of mission, preferred by, for example, France and the U.S.[21]

Up to the 1990s, there was no doubt that the U.S. was Europe's most important partner. A look at the European Security Strategy (ESS) of December 2003 shows that this has changed at least on a strategic level. The U.S. is now only one of the EU's "strategic partners" amongst others.[22] This change is not only motivated by the functionalist logic of European integration aiming at the creation of a "autonomous political system" and the new strategic environment, but also by major differences with the American ally (e.g.: unilateralism versus multilateralism; Iraqi issue, disputes on international law etc.) and the more general assumption that the U.S. is not always ready to side with Europeans in certain operations. In addition, the view that Europe is better equipped to stabilize certain regions is gaining support, based on the assumption that the European crisis-management approach is better at integrating available military and civilian tools than the American one. Recent European declarations and policies even give reason to believe that the relationship with the U.S. has not only lost some of its importance but that there's a certain trend towards countervailing the United States:[23] Communiqués of gatherings of the EU with other

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[18] This "merger" was something, which didn't look feasible and reasonable at the beginning of the 90s because of the divergence of interests and perspectives of the states in Europe (see "Integration and Security in a New Europe: Inside and Beyond a West European Pillar", in Mathias Jopp/Reinhardt Rummel/Peter Schmidt (eds.), *Integration and Security in Western Europe. Inside the European Pillar*, Boulder, Col. 1991, pp. 308–309.

[19] The distinction was made between autonomous ESDP operations, operations in the framework of the Berlin-plus.

[20] For an argument in the tradition of Kant see Jacques Derrida/Jürgen Habermas, "Unsere Erneuerung. Nach dem Krieg: Die Wiedergeburt Europas", *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 31 May 2003. For a more pragmatic view but with a similar result see Alyson J.K. Bailes who stands in the tradition of this thinking in answering the question of what the EU should do in world affairs: "…. The best and only answer lies in the very special thing that our European Union is, and the very special things that it can and must offer to the world." (*Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)/European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) – Challenges and Prospects*, Hamburg: Institut für Friedensforschung, February 2005 (Hamburger Vorträge am Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik, 11/2005), p. 8.

[21] One could argue, that the European sense of mission is attached to the "international sphere", whereas the national ones are "domestic". This is, however, no longer true, because the European mission is also related to the safeguarding of freedom. In addition, the Union takes more and more on traditional tasks of the nation state.

[22] See <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>. For an extensive assessment of ESS see the first number of the *Oxford Journal on Good Governance* of May 2004 with contributions of Chris Patten, Javier Solana, Doug Bereuter, Steven Everts, and others.

[23] Even Tony Blair, sometimes called Bush's "poodle" said: "We are building a new world superpower…. since a single-power world is inherently unstable", qouted by Gerald Horne in a book review <http://www.politicalaffairs.net/article/articleview/998/1/90/>.

International Organizations and groupings– like with ASEAN, the South American states, and the U.N. – regularly contain the objective of an "effective multilateralism", which is meant to mobilize opposition against American tendencies and practices towards "unilateralism".[24]

It fits into this philosophy of countervailing its US ally, that the Union expanded its bilateral relations with the U.S. in the 1990s and started to include security issues as well. This approach is shown for example by the "EU-US. Declaration on Working together to Promote Peace, Stability, Prosperity, and Good Governance in Africa" and the "EU-US. Declaration on Enhancing Cooperation in the Field of Non Proliferation and the Fight against Terrorism." Such developments follow the line of a bipolar perspective of the transatlantic relationship. This bipolarism, however, renders it difficult to develop the Atlantic Alliance into a transatlantic "clearing house" where not the EU as a whole, but the member states of the Alliance have their say.[25]

At the same time NATO and the EU developed something called "strategic partnership" in 2002, which is based on rather close consultation mechanisms and the so-called Berlin-plus agreement, which provides ESDP above all with assured access to the planning capacities of NATO and also to the military assets of the Alliance[26].

[24] See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Counicl on the Commission's objectives, in the framework of the relations between the European Union and Latin America, in view of the 3rd Summit of Heads of State and Government of the European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean to be held in Guadalajara (Mexico) on 28 May 2004, Brussels, 7.4.2004, COM(2004) 220 final.

[25] See Helga Haftendorn, *Das Atlantische Bündnis in der Anpassungskrise*, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Februar 2005 (SWP-Studie, S 05/2005).

[26] See Volker Heise/Peter Schmidt, "NATO und EU: Auf dem Weg zu einer strategischen Partnerschaft?", in Thomas Jäger/Alexander Höse/Kai Oppermann (eds.), *Transatlantische Beziehungen. Sicherheit – Wirtschaft – Öffentlichkeit*, Wiesbaden 2005, pp. 65–86.

This fits into the "New Atlanticism" scheme of transatlantic relations, at least as long as NATO itself plays a major political and military role and the EU doesn't regard NATO as a tool box only.

Where Do We Go from Here?

The above overview of the conceptions of transatlantic security relations from the perspective of the EC/EU describes a relationship that is hybrid in character:
- There are features of a New Atlanticism in transatlantic relations, e.g. the joint evolution of the EU's CFSP and NATO (EU/NATO strategic partnership, recognition of the EU as a partner by the U.S., evolution and reform of NATO).
- This, however, goes along with policies and practices which stand for the European philosophy of "multilateralism". This in turn comes in two varieties:
  - the U.S. as just one of the EU's "strategic partners" and
  - the EU as – at least in parts – as a countervailing power to the U.S.
- At the same time, the bipolar part of the transatlantic relationship is growing, which is limiting NATO's political outreach.

Is this hybrid system a stable one or are we experiencing a transitional period of transatlantic relations in one direction or the other?

The current policy of the U.S. looks like a revival of the concept of New Atlanticism. The US-American policy of pushing the EU to enlarge further seems to be a part of this policy. The question is, however, whether the prerequisites for such a policy are still in place.

The EU's development poses a similar question: are the EU's structure, political cohesion and available resources, at a time of substantial enlargement, supporting a strategy of multilateralism either in the form of regarding the U.S. as just one of the major partners of the EU or even as a power which has to be countervailed?

To what extent can NATO, in its current shape, still play a role as a political "interlocutor" across the Atlantic and provide the U.S. with a privi-

leged form of influence?

Two very broad and general scenarios emerge raising different challenges for the transatlantic relationship:

If the EU continues to grow (in terms of deepening integration), a bipolar relationship will evolve. This will lead to a situation in which the differences between the European philosophy of transcending the nation state by "transnationalism" will stand in contrast to the U.S. approach which will continue to represent the satisfied nation state. This situation can only be resolved when the EU itself has developed into something like a nation state.[27] To a certain extent this tension is already with us today.

Concerning the transatlantic relationship, the original philosophy of European integration proposes the idea of a partnership among equals. However, this brings about the danger of competition or even countervailing practices.[28] Theorists and practitioners of European integration and transatlantic relations have seen this danger and proposed one option to avoid it: the concomitant growth of transatlantic institutions to which not only the Europeans but also the Americans transfer some sovereignty. Is this the only solution? Does further integration of the EU need the U.S. more as a picture of an enemy than a primary partner? How pronounced is the need for the further institutionalization of the transatlantic relationship today and how do the different founding myths of the EU and the U.S. prevent such a development? How could such a policy look like?

If the EU's enlargement process prevents the further deepening of the Union, the existing situation will continue or become even more complex. Some intricate sort of "mixed motives game" will come into being, in which the partners have to handle the mix of interdependencies between both sides on an issue by issue basis. This would result in the prolongation of the "hybrid structure" of the current relationship.

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[27] That's something the Europe federalists overlook. If the EU transcends the traditional nation states in Europe and develops into some sort of a super nation state "Europe": Would this new nation state not behave like the traditional ones?

[28] To assume that the EU lacks the military resources to countervail the U.S. overlooks that power constitutes not only just of the availability of military means. Economic weight, image in the world, the building of partnerships etc. are part of the power equation, too.

The founding of the European-Atlantic security system (from the 1950s to the 1960s)

Approaches	Europe's role	Role and function of transatlantic relations	Preconditions for the transatlantic concept	Perspectives for the transatlantic relationship
European federation (European economic and defense community)	• Economic integration (at the beginning of "strategic industries" but moving on to "high politics") • Defense integration in the form of the EDC	U.S. in a back-up function in the framework of NATO	• Strong threat perception • U.S. readiness to accept that role • Europeans can mobilize the necessary resources and political cohesion • European framework tight enough to keep the nascent German power in check • The nation state accepted as a cause for disaster	• An integrated Europe will share the same interests as the U.S. • Atlantic Union (however not at the same level as European integration) • European integration and the building up of a Atlantic Community should go hand in hand promoting a process of civilization (world order based on law and common institutions)
Gaullism (Fouchet I und II etc.)	• Economic and political recovery • Economic integration • Political cooperation	NATO is an insurance policy only (military function, not a political one)	• Moderate threat perception • NATO functions despite French national strategy and non-participation in NATO's military integration • The nation state accepted as a source for political stability	• The envisaged European Union as an intergovernmental institution • Multipolar world • Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals • The U.S. is just one power among others

Approaches	Europe's role	Role and function of transatlantic relations	Preconditions for the transatlantic concept	Perspectives for the transatlantic relationship
US-focused (European-Atlantic security system) NATO plus European economic integration	• Economic and political recovery • Economic integration • Political integration in the longer run	• U.S. has a protector and pacifier role through the NATO framework • Economic and political partnership with Europe	• Strong threat perception • Readiness of the U.S. to play this role and to mobilize the necessary resources and political support • On the European side: willingness to accept the superior American role • Little readiness to co-operate/integrate in the "high politics" area on the European side	Monnet method will lead to a real European Political Union (supranational) in the long run and a "real partnership" with the U.S. on an equal footing (Atlantic Community)
Neutralization of Germany	(West-) European powers have to guarantee Germany's status.	U.S. has to guarantee Germany's status.	Soviet readiness to accept this as a long-term solution	No specific transatlantic vision beyond the guarantee role of the U.S.

1970s

Approaches	Europe's role	Role and function of transatlantic relations	Preconditions /motivations for the transatlantic concept	Perspectives for the transatlantic relationship
Atlantic Charter (Nixon/Kisssinger)	No special U.S. – EC relationship European identity within NATO	Framework for the development of common interests and the definition of common values in order to work out a shared view of the world to build	• Foreign and defense policy in Europe remains a national undertaking within NATO's framework • Strategically, Europe has a regional role only	• Strategic leadership of the U.S. but regional responsibilities for the Europeans (division of labor) • Common action on the basis of common interests and a common view of the strategic objectives

The 80s

Approaches	Europe's role	Role and function of transatlantic relations	Preconditions/motivations for the transatlantic concept	Perspectives for the transatlantic relationship
European solidarity within the Alliance	Co-ordinating Europe's policies in different frameworks (EPC, WEU, EuroGroup, IEPG)	• U.S. still in a protector and pacifier role but confronted with a stronger European voice • NATO still fully responsible for defense	• Differences of interests across the Atlantic require a stronger European voice • NATO's defense policy is losing political support (legitimation problem) • Promoting European integration (Monnet method: from low to high politics)	Different background motivations and perspectives: • **Gaullism** (Europe as an intergovernmental organized body) • **Monnet-like** (European integration plus Transatlantic Union • **Pragmatism** (do we, do we, do) (?)

The 90s onwards

New Atlanticism (Baker)	U.S.-German (partner in leadership) or U.S.-European leadership	Further development of NATO Bilateral U.S.-EU relationship	Enduring hybrid European structure	A complex system of **interlocking institutions** with a major role for the U.S. in security and defense issues
From WEU to ESDP Drive towards EU autonomy	• Political autonomy in the framework of CFSP • WEU as a bridge between CFSP and NATO • WEU capable of undertaking the so-called Petersberg tasks • Integration of Petersberg tasks in EU • Autonomous ESDP operations (one option: assured access to NATO assets and capabilities) • EU promotes as a world-wide acting player "effective multilaterlism" (new world order)	• NATO remains the focal point for defense decisions • Only where "NATO as a whole is not engaged" are WEU/ESDP operations possible • NATO as a tool box for ESDP (Berlin-plus agreement) • Bilateral EU-U.S. relations • U.S. represents only one of EU's "strategic partners"	• Different views on world order (unilateralism vs. effective mulitlateralism) • Differences of interest across the Atlantic require a Europe capable to act independently • American will not always be ready to side Europe in certain operations • Deepening and enlargement of the Union go hand in hand	**Possible futures**: • New Atlanticism? • Biploar transatlantic partnership? • EU as a countervailing power to the U.S.? • U.S. just one of EU's strategic partners (multilateralism) • A hybrid structure (issue oriented)