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German Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Relations

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German Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Relations*

“So, yes, we’d be more Gaullist if we hadn’t had the Nazi period and the Second World War. Of course, why not? Because then we would have had a different history. But given our real history, we don’t only look to the trans-Atlantic relationship because it’s in our interest but also because it is in our institutions; it is part of our way of life.”¹

1. Introduction

As the German-American clash over Iraq was unfolding, such an astute observer as Henry Kissinger interpreted the way in which Chancellor Gerhard Schröder handled the topic of Iraq in the German election campaign as the harbinger of a profound change in German foreign policy. In his view, the electoral benefits derived from Schröder’s strategy indicated that a kind of anti-Americanism may have become “a permanent temptation of German politics.” For Kissinger, the issue of Iraq was merely “a pretext for a reorientation of German foreign policy in a more national direction.” The new “German way” – in whose name Germany allegedly sought confrontation with the U.S. without consulting other European states – represented, as he argued, a challenge not only to the U.S. but also to Europe.²

More than a decade after the disappearance of the common threat of Soviet communism, and after the departure of old political elites that were shaped by the experiences of World War II and the Cold War, does the special German-American relationship finally belong to history? Is it accurate to argue that German foreign policy is moving in the direction of unilateralism and nationalism? Twelve years after unification, was Germany finally fulfilling the expectations of those U.S. security policy experts who could not imagine that Germany’s leaders had internalized constraints on the use of power and come to understand national interests in a multi-lateral sense?³

From a specific (American) “realist” view of international relations, it had been expected that, after the end of the Cold War, Germany would turn toward a nationalistic foreign policy stance that increasingly emphasizes and asserts its own interests. Whoever shares this view could easily interpret the confrontation over Iraq as an indication of such a development. From this perspective, it made sense to elevate Foreign Minister Fischer’s response to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld making the case for war at the 2003 Munich Conference on Security Policy – “Excuse me, but I’m not convinced” – to something very fundamental: to „a declaration of independence from the United States, the end point of a half-century of nearly automatic compliance with the American wish.“⁴

One might speculate about whether Donald Rumsfeld would share this view of a “Golden era” in German-American relations. He will remember another crisis - thirty years ago, in October 1973 during the Yom Kippur war when he was US ambassador to NATO. At that time, the German government - first confidently then, after the US administration had raised the alert level of American military forces without consulting the allies, publicly - demanded that the US stop delivering weapons from and over West German territory to Israel. Most other

* Paper prepared for the conference on „German Foreign Policy in the 1990s and Beyond“, Brühl, July 14-17, 2004.

¹ Foreign Minister Fischer quoted in Richard Bernstein, „The German Question,“ in *The New York Times Magazine*, May 2, 2004

² Henry A. Kissinger, „German-US Relations Thrown Into Crisis,“ *Korea Times*, October 23, 2002.

³ On these basic elements of German political-military culture, see Thomas U. Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).

⁴ Bernstein, „The German Question“ (fn.1).

NATO members, among them Great Britain and France, had already denied the United States the right to fly over their territory. Reading about this clash between the allies in Henry Kissinger's memoirs⁵ - reading his harsh critique of the European allies distancing themselves from the United States, opposing American policy on an issue of utmost importance without offering a convincing alternative - helps to put the Iraq crisis and some of more exaggerated readings of German behavior into historical perspective. In the 1973 confrontation, France and Great Britain were leading the opposition. Therefore, it was indeed something new that Germany, together with France, took the lead in opposing the United States on a security policy issue considered vital by the administration.⁶ But despite all diplomatic maneuvering and the denial of international legitimacy to the war, the Schröder government did nothing to restrain the US from using the military infrastructure in Germany.

Thus, one should be cautious of attempts to revive the "myth" of German assertiveness. This myth was originally created in the aftermath of Germany's unilateral recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, then presumably the first time that Germany openly defied the United States and its West European partners by coming up with an ill conceived and clumsy policy. In reality, however, the announcement of recognition was more a sign of helplessness than assertiveness, more a symbolic act to defuse domestic pressure than the beginning of a new geopolitical venture.⁷

Looking at Germany's role in transatlantic relations and the Iraq crisis, I can neither detect a dramatic break in the premises and approaches guiding German policy in dealing with the United States nor a departure from the fundamental norms shaping German national interests. German policy towards the United States can be interpreted as an adjustment process to strategic changes in American grand strategy that, in effect, amounted to a rather consistent new paradigm of hegemonic unilateralism: the preservation of unipolarity, i.e., the maintenance of military supremacy regardless of potential threats and adversaries; a heightened perception of intolerable threats, which has led to the rejection of containment as *the* fundamental concept of security policy with respect to the new threats; the attempted legitimization of preventive war against states that support terrorism in whatever form, and the emphasis on strategic independence (which, of course, does not rule out instrumental multilateralism).⁸ Those changes accentuated structural problems in the transatlantic relationship: the deeply rooted difference in the perception of security threats and the response to them and, related to that but more fundamental, those diverging perspectives on world order that have led to conflicts over the role of international institutions.⁹

⁵ See Henry A. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, (Little Brown and Company), Chapter XVI; I had only the German translation at hand: *Memoiren, 1973-1974: Band 2* (München: C. Bertelsmann Verlag, 1982), pp. 820-875.

⁶ See Rajan Menon, „The End of Alliances,“ *World Policy Journal*, vol. 20, no. 2, Summer 2003, pp.1-20 (4)

⁷ See Peter Viggo Jakobsen, „Myth-making and Germany's Unilateral Recognition of Croatia and Slovenia,“ *European Security*, vol. 4, no. 3 (Autumn 1995), pp.400-416.

⁸ Speaking of a new paradigm does not imply that elements do not have old roots or have not been part of American foreign policy. But taken together and in contrast to American foreign policy in the second half of the twentieth century we certainly can talk about a new paradigm. In more detail, see John Ikenberry, „America's Imperial Ambition,“ *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 81, no. 5 (September/October 2002), pp. 44-60; Robert Jervis, „Understanding the Bush Doctrine,“ *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 118, no. 3 (Fall 2003), pp. 365-388; David C. Hendrickson, „Toward Universal Empire: The Dangerous Quest for Absolute Security,“ *World Policy Journal*, Fall 2002, pp. 1-10; Ken Jowitt, „Rage, Hubris, and Regime Change,“ *Policy Review* (April/May 2003, no. 118, pp. 33ff.; Edward Rhodes, „The Imperial Logic of Bush's Liberal Agenda,“ *Survival*, vol. 45, no. 1 (Spring 2003), pp. 131-154; John Lewis Gaddis, *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England: Harvard University Press, 2004).

⁹ For a variety of perspectives on the problems and developments in transatlantic and German-American relations, see Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, *Allies at War: America, Europe, and the Crisis over Iraq* (New York: McGraw-Hill 2004); Helga Haftendorn, „A Poisoned Relationship? Die transatlantischen Beziehungen nach den Terrorangriffen des 11. September 2001,“ in: Werner Kremp and Jürgen Wilzewski (eds.), *Weltmacht vor neuer Bedrohung. Die Bush-Administration und die US-Außenpolitik nach dem Angriff auf Amerika* (Trier: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Trier, 2003), pp. 249-275; Markus Kaim, „Friendship under strain or fundamental alienation?,“ *International Journal*, Winter 2003-2004, pp.1-17; Joachim Krause, *Die transatlantischen Beziehungen seit dem Ende des Kalten Krieges* (Kiel: Institut für Sicherheitspolitik an der Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, May 2003); Gert Krell, „Arroganz der Macht, Arroganz

As a result, the transatlantic framework as one of the two pillars of German foreign policy has been eroding at a time when normative world order conflicts have become sharper in the German-American relationship as a result of the “war on terror”.¹⁰ The changing strategic setting made it more difficult for Germany to balance its basic orientation as a civilian power with the imperative of preserving the transatlantic link.

The strategic and normative changes emanating from the United States have had a couple of consequences: First, with the strategic change in US foreign policy, one of the main settings of German multilateralism has been eroding, given the US preference for ad-hoc coalitions and the strong penchant for unilateralism. NATO as “a functional institutionalization of the transatlantic security community based on common values and a collective identity of liberal democracies”¹¹ has lost its salience in American foreign policy. With the geostrategic paradigm shift – the focus on the Middle East and the challenge of terrorism and rogue states – NATO is no longer what it used to be: “a unique institutional framework for the Europeans to affect American policies” with consultation norms and joint decision-making procedures as the underpinnings of Europe’s influence on the United States.¹² Second, the traditional premise of German foreign policy in the transatlantic setting – gaining influence by cooperation – has been put into serious doubt. Even the most imaginative counterfactual speculation cannot make plausible how Germany could have influenced the Bush administration in its steadfast move towards regime change by force. Third, the vexing issue of when to use force has become dominant with the Bush administration’s push for a normative change with respect to the purposes for which legitimate wars can be waged. Fourth, as a consequence, Germany gave up its policy of “as well as” and sided with France against the US (after the French saved Germany from being left alone).

A new administration might be less unilaterally inclined and might be more willing to live up to the consultation norm. Yet the paradigm shift in U.S. foreign policy will continue to confront Germany’s policy toward the United States with new challenges even if the “imperial moment” will be over. With Europe being no longer the central front and with a new American security agenda, there will be no resurrection of the former unique German-American relationship. In this respect, one can speak, as a German historian has done, of the “end of the transatlantic epoch”¹³. Nevertheless, despite a changing perception of the United States and the “deromanticizing” of the relationship, a functionally driven cooperative relationship will remain a cornerstone of German foreign policy culture - albeit of lesser importance than in the past and posing more challenges.

These are the main arguments and conclusions of this paper. They will be developed in four steps. First, I will look at the question how a changing perception of the international role of the United States has affected the domestic context of German foreign policy making in terms of public opinion. Second, continuities and changes in the basic premises and approaches of German policy towards the United States will be identified. Third, German policy in the Iraq crisis will be evaluated, contrasting it with the German approach in the Kosovo crisis. Fourth, the paper ends with some conclusions and observations regarding the basic questions about German foreign policy orientation that guide the broader project on German foreign policy.

der Ohnmacht. Die Weltordnungspolitik der USA und die transatlantischen Beziehungen,“ in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B 31-32/2003 (July 28, 2003), pp. 23-30; Harald Müller, „Das transatlantische Risiko – Deutungen des amerikanisch-europäischen Weltordnungskonflikts,“ in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B 3-4/2004 (January 19, 2004), pp. 7-17; Gustav Lindstrom (ed.), *Shift or Rift? Assessing US-EU relations after Iraq*, (Paris: European Unions Institute for Security Studies), 2003; John Peterson and Mark A. Pollack (eds.), *Europe, America, Bush: Transatlantic relations in the twenty-first century* (London/New York: Routledge, 2003); Thomas Risse, „Die neue Weltordnung: US-amerikanische Hypermacht – europäische Ohnmacht,“ in *WeltTrends*, (Summer 2003) no. 39, pp. 110-119; Peter Rudolf, „Die USA und die transatlantischen Beziehungen nach dem 11. September 2001,“ in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B 25/2002 (June 21, 2002), pp. 7-13;

¹⁰ See Gunther Hellmann, „Der „deutsche Weg“. Eine außenpolitische Gratwanderung,“ *Internationale Politik*, 9/2002, pp. 1-8 (4).

¹¹ Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 223.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 225.

¹³ Gregor Schöllgen, „Die Zukunft der deutschen Außenpolitik liegt in Europa,“ *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B11/2004 (March 8, 2004), pp. 9-16 (14).

2. Changes in German public opinion

Public opinion in a liberal democracy such as Germany – that is the premise of the following analysis – places constraints on and creates incentives for foreign policy making and serves as a framework for discussions and decision-making processes among the political elite.¹⁴ As will be shown, changes in public opinion create incentives for keeping some distance from the United States and for pursuing a “Europe first” option. But NATO as the traditional transatlantic link remains part of German foreign policy identity.

Well before the “Iraq crisis” one could recognize a shift toward a more skeptical view of the international role played by the U.S. The extent of American power, and particularly its unilateral deployment in the pursuit of narrow national interests, appears to be the most important factor contributing to a less positive view of the U.S. in German public opinion.¹⁵ In 2002, nearly two-thirds of Germans shared the opinion that the U.S. is pursuing only its own interests when it intervenes in the world’s crisis regions. Less than 10 years ago, in 1993, only 58 percent expressed this opinion. An even more significant indicator of changing attitudes toward the international role of the U.S. is the declining number of Germans who view the U.S. as the guarantor of peace and security throughout the world. In 2002 only 48 percent shared this view, compared to 62 percent in 1993. These changing figures might be interpreted as an expression of attitudes toward the policies of the current U.S. president, which tend to be negative: in spring 2002, only 19 percent of Germans expressed a positive opinion of the current president, while 50 percent held a negative opinion.

In the case of Germany, however, less positive attitudes toward the international role of the U.S. might be connected to frustrated expectations, i.e., the disappointed hope for a relationship with the U.S. that is based on real partnership. In 1993, when Germans were asked whether the U.S. played a dominating role in German-American relations or whether Germany had become an equal partner, opinions were still very mixed. Less than 10 years later, the German public appears to have shed all illusions: 73 percent ascribe a dominating role to the U.S., while 26 percent still consider Germany an equal partner. Nevertheless, a more skeptical view of the United States should not be equated with increasing anti-Americanism. The number of persons holding self-declared anti-American attitudes remains relatively constant at one-fourth of the population.

The Iraq confrontation led to further changes in German public opinion towards the United States. The number of people holding the view that a strong US leadership role in world affairs is desirable has declined to 45% in June 2003 from 68% the year before.¹⁶ Asked whether the EU or the US were more important to German vital interests, 81% chose the EU in June 2003, up from 55% in 2002 – a fact interpreted by American analysts in the sense that “Germany, the long-time ally, now expresses an unambiguous preference for Europe over the United States.”¹⁷ Compared with France, the US is no longer seen as Germany’s most important partner: In September 2003, 49% of the Germans considered France to be more important, 46% the United States. The majority of the German public seems to have lost confidence in the United States as the most reliable partner (in comparison with France and Great Britain). Whereas in 1996 almost two-thirds of the German public considered the US to be the most reliable partner in a crisis, it is France that now has almost reached the level of confidence

¹⁴ On the role of public opinion in liberal democracies and on the German case, see Thomas Risse-Kappen, „Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies,“ *World Politics*, vol. 43 (July 1991), pp. 479-512; Frank Brettschneider, „Massenmedien, öffentliche Meinung und Außenpolitik,“ in Wolf Dieter Eberwein and Karl Kaiser (eds.), *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik, Band 4: Institutionen und Ressourcen*, (München: Oldenburg Verlag, 1998), pp. 215-226; Christian Holst, „Einstellungen der Bevölkerung und der Eliten: Vom alten zum neuen außenpolitischen Konsens?,“ in Eberwein and Kaiser, *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik*, pp. 227-238.

¹⁵ For the following, see the public opinion data in *Der Spiegel*, May 18, 2002, pp. 26-31.

¹⁶ *Transatlantic Trends 2003*. A Project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo, p. 8

¹⁷ *Transatlantic Trends 2003*, figure on p. 9, quote on p. 3.

(56%) the United States once enjoyed.¹⁸ The preference for France is part of a wider “Europe first” orientation having emerged as a reaction to a high level of frustration with American foreign policy.¹⁹ In June 2003, 70% of Germans (up from 48% the year before) wanted the EU to become a “superpower”.²⁰ A growing number prefers a more independent European course in diplomatic and security affairs compared to those who believe that the US and the EU should remain as close as they had been. The preference for a more independent course rose from 51% in April 2002 to 63% in February 2004.²¹ According to another poll taken in 2003, 81% supported the view that a common European stand is more important for German foreign policy than close relations with the United States.²²

Interestingly, the more skeptical view of the United States and the preference for Europe over the United States has not negatively affected the image of NATO. Asked whether NATO was needed in the future 85% agree, with only a minor difference between West Germans (86%) and East Germans (80%). Only a small minority of 11% judge NATO to be unimportant in the future. And the opinion that NATO will remain necessary is even higher among younger than among older Germans.²³ Thus, it is not surprising that the Europe first orientation does not translate into a preference for building up a European military organization. Two-thirds (68%) prefer the EU to use NATO in its security policy. This preference cuts across party-lines, age and educational level.²⁴

How can one make sense of this more negative view of US foreign policy and at the same time the unfaltering preference for NATO? Obviously NATO is less seen as an instrument of American foreign policy than as part Germany’s foreign policy identity.²⁵ The fact that NATO was not the premier location where the transatlantic dispute was being played out seems to have insulated NATO from the more negative perception of the US international role. If NATO had had a role in the war, one could have expected a deteriorating view of NATO. This certainly holds true for the German “East” where, as the Kosovo war made plain,²⁶ one has to reckon with lingering uneasiness about NATO missions going beyond collective self-defense.

3. German „Amerikapolitik“: Old premises, new problems

German diplomatic vocabulary seems to lack the word “Amerikapolitik”. We talk about “Rußlandpolitik” or “Chinapolitik”, but we usually do not talk about “Amerikapolitik”, we speak about transatlantic relations. Relations with the United States are so interwoven with a variety of institutional settings and so many international issues and the interactions are so dense and complex that it is hard to isolate a policy towards the United States from the wider context of transatlantic relations. Yet for analytical clarity it is useful to distinguish a spectrum of approaches on how to deal with the United States as the preponderant power.²⁷ Those approaches range from

¹⁸ Transatlantische Beziehungen. Ergebnisse einer repräsentativen Bevölkerungsumfrage im Auftrag des Bundesverbandes deutscher Banken, Mannheim: Institut für Praxisorientierte Sozialforschung November 2003, p. 6.

¹⁹ 82% believe that the US only pursues its own interests without regard for the interests of European allies. See Transatlantische Beziehungen, p. 9.

²⁰ Transatlantic Trends, p. 10.

²¹ The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, Mistrust of America in Europe Ever Higher, Muslim Anger Persists, Washington, March 2004, p. 28.

²² Transatlantische Beziehungen, p. 5.

²³ Transatlantische Beziehungen, p. 12.

²⁴ Transatlantische Beziehungen, p. 13.

²⁵ In general on this issue, see Mary N. Hampton, “NATO, Germany, and the United States: Creating Positive Identity in Trans-Atlantia,” in Security Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2/3 (Winter 1998/99), pp.235-269.

²⁶ See Renate Köcher, „Das Kosovo spaltet Deutschland in Ost und West,“ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 16, 1999, p.5.

²⁷ In general on strategies for dealing with American preponderance, see G. John Ikenberry, Strategic Reactions to American Preeminence: Great Power Politics in the Age of Unipolarity (United States Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, July 28, 2003, Web-posted October 10, 2003).

dissociating to associating strategies, from “balancing” on the one side of the spectrum to “bandwagoning” on the other.

At the level of the fundamental foreign policy orientation, “hard” balancing in the traditional sense of building up Europe as a countervailing power dissociated from the United States is certainly not the approach guiding German foreign policy. There may be issues, especially in the economic field, where Europe effectively acts as a counterweight within a highly symmetrical relationship, able to restrain American options through the threat of economic retaliation. In the security field, where power asymmetry is high, the development of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) is often perceived as an attempt at restraining the United States through building up a counterweight. But from the mainstream German position, ESDP, which lies in the logic of the European unification process, is an effort to lessen dependence in security matters on the United States and to gain more leverage vis-a-vis the United States. It was the Kosovo war that gave new impetus to the old vision of a common European security policy. It was one major lesson drawn from the political and military weakness made plain by the Kosovo crisis: the European Union must increase its capability to act autonomously in the process of preventing and managing crises in Europe so that Europe gains “real equity” (“*wirkliche Gleichberechtigung*”) with the United States.²⁸ In the aftermath of the Kosovo war and fed by the general perception that U.S. foreign policy had been drifting towards unilateralism, it became almost a dogma that only a stronger Europe will get a hearing in Washington. In the predominant German view, ESDP has been conceived as the basis for a new atlanticism, for a real partnership based upon greater European strength.²⁹ And it is a hedge against security risks and the re-nationalization of security policies should the transatlantic link weaken or dissolve.

Thus far, Europeanization follows the logic of Germany’s basic strategy of “self-containment”³⁰ through integration into Western institutions. The balancing act has been to reconcile the Europeanization of security policy with U.S. insistence on the institutional primacy of NATO. Some sort of the highly feared “European Caucus” in NATO would change the structure of transatlantic interactions – from hegemonic leadership relying upon the traditional “multiple bilateralism”³¹ to a new form of cooperation based upon greater equity. This might lead to a “redistribution of power in the alliance”.³²

From time to time, the conflict over the primacy of NATO has erupted.³³ This was the case most recently in spring 2003 when Germany, France and Belgium, in the context of a “European Security and Defense Union”, came forward with some proposals on EU military planning capacities. After a strong reaction by the Bush administration perceiving these steps as the buildup of a European counterweight³⁴ and due to the interest in involving Great Britain, a compromise was worked out. It reflected the traditional balancing act between European security integration and maintaining the transatlantic link.³⁵

²⁸ Rudolf Scharping, „Europäische Sicherheitspolitik und die Nordatlantische Allianz,“ Speech on July 5, 1999 in Berlin; in addition, see the speech by Joschka Fischer, May 10, 1999 in Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Bulletin, May 26, 1999, p. 335.

²⁹ See Karsten D. Voigt, Coordinator for German-American Cooperation, Foreign Ministry, „The Discussion of a European Security and Defence Policy: Labor Pains of a New Atlanticism,“ Speech on 8 March 2000 in Washington, D.C. (http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/6_archiv/2/r/r000308a.htm).

³⁰ For this characterization of German foreign policy, see Wolfram F. Hanrieder, *Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989)

³¹ Michael Brenner and Phil Williams, *Europa und die Vereinigten Staaten. Amerikanische Sicherheitspolitik in den neunziger Jahren* (Sankt Augustin: Forschungsinstitut der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Mai 1992) p. 13.

³² Ernst-Otto Czempel, „Nicht von gleich zu gleich? Die USA und die Europäische Union,“ in *Europa oder Amerika?*, pp. 901-915 (quote on p. 910).

³³ See Peter Rudolf, “U.S. Leadership and the Reform of Western Security Institutions: NATO Enlargement and ESDP,” in Bernhard May/Michael Hönicke Moore (eds.), *The Uncertain Superpower: Domestic Dimensions of U.S. Foreign Policy after the Cold War*, Opladen: Leske+Budrich 2003, pp. 93-101

³⁴ See the speech by the U.S. ambassador to NATO R. Nicolas Burns at the conference „NATO and the Greater Middle East“ in Prague on October 19, 2003; www.nato.int/usa/ambassador/2003/s031019a.htm.

³⁵ Siehe Charles Grant, “Reviving European defence cooperation,” in: *NATO Review*, Winter 2003 (available at www.nato.int).

Some in the German foreign policy community may be tempted to use a widening Atlantic in order to promote a common European identity. But from the prevailing perspective Europe cannot be developed into a strong effective international actor against the United States. There are too many European nations that prefer bandwagoning with the distant hegemon to bandwagoning with the most powerful European nations. This recognition seems to have guided foreign minister Fischer when he reassured Washington that the future Europe will not be conceived as rival to the United States.³⁶ When he explicitly made clear that the German goal is a multilateral order and not multipolarity, he probably wanted to send a clear signal to concerned atlanticists in the American foreign policy elite, alleviating their unease about the notion of multipolarity, which is mostly used in the French debate, but occasionally heard in the German debate.

The Iraq crisis in transatlantic relations, the political debates in Germany and self-critical commentaries have tended to obscure the tenets of basic consensus within the political class in Germany. The transatlantic relationship is still seen as one basic framework of Germany foreign policy. The CDU/CSU might be more emphatic in stressing common values, interests, and a common destiny.³⁷ Others, including the Chancellor and the foreign minister might prefer a more businesslike focus on common interests. According to Chancellor Schröder NATO epitomizes the transatlantic core of German foreign policy; it remains “the most important pillar of our common security” and “the most important forum for transatlantic dialogue and transatlantic cooperation”.³⁸

The defense policy guidelines from May 2003 reaffirm the traditional premise of German security policy: “The transatlantic partnership remains the foundation of our security. Also in the future, there will be no security in and for Europe without the United States.”³⁹ It is a rather astonishing feature of the German foreign policy debate that one geopolitical core aspect of this premise is so little debated: the assumption that U.S. still remains necessary as a European power in order to allay fears of an overly powerful Germany. As German Foreign Minister Fischer put it: “Without transatlantic relations in Europe, including the Europe of today, Germany would immediately assume a role for which we should definitely not strive. This would put too much strain on us. The U.S. provides not only a global balance; it also provides a balance in Europe up to this very day.”⁴⁰ This subtle reassuring role accorded to the United States is still an aspect of German thinking on foreign policy although only a minority in the broader German elite would subscribe to this view.⁴¹

German foreign policy follows an approach in dealing with the United States that lies between “hard balancing” and “full bandwagoning” in the traditional sense. In the spirit of its own self-constraint, Germany is interested in the continuation of functioning transatlantic relations as a basic framework for German foreign policy. This is the widespread premise that guides German political discourse. However, in order for Europe to assert itself in cases where European and American strategies diverge, it is deemed necessary to change transatlantic relations in the direction of a cooperative balance. In this field of tension, it is necessary to deal constructively with the transatlantic dilemma that results from asymmetric power and strategic divergence within the alliance. If Germany rejected the new security agenda of the United States, the U.S. could lose interest in the alliance, and the chance to influence the U.S. could even be less than is the case now. If Germany fully aligned itself with the American agenda encapsulated in the Bush doctrine in which the “new” NATO and its centerpiece – the multinational NATO Response Force proposed by the U.S. – play a role, it would risk costly involvement in

³⁶ See John Vinocur, “Germany rejects a U.S. rivalry,” *International Herald Tribune*, July 18, 2003.

³⁷ See the foreign policy guidelines passed by the CDU Vorstand on April 28, 2003, in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, May 6, 2003, p. 9.

³⁸ Speech by Chancellor Schröder „Grundsätze und Instrumente deutscher Sicherheitspolitik“, in Berlin on March 19, 2004; in addition see the speech on „Europe and the Future of Transatlantic Relations“ by Foreign Minister Fischer at Princeton University on November 19, 2003.

³⁹ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien für den Geschäftsbereich des Bundesministers der Verteidigung* (Berlin: May 2003), p. 22 (translation by the author).

⁴⁰ Speech by Foreign Minister Fischer before the German parliament during a debate on transatlantic relations on June 27, 2002 (available at www.auswaertiges-amt.de; translations by the author).

⁴¹ According to a survey in late 1995 on the foreign policy views of the German elite only 29% held this view. See *Das Meinungsbild der Elite in Deutschland zur Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik. Eine Studie von Infratest Burke Berlin im Auftrag des Liberalen Institutes der Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung in Kooperation mit der RAND Corporation*, Berlin: March 1996.

policies over which it has little to no influence.

German policy so far can be interpreted as an attempt at adapting to the new American agenda while at the same time staking out own positions and avoiding too close an alignment with the United States in the Middle East. The Iraq conflict, in which Germany and France pursued a policy of “soft balancing” (Robert Pape), of trying to restrain American power through the United Nations or, at least, of denying legitimacy to the war, has overshadowed the fact that Germany adjusted to the American war on terror in a way most analysts would not have dared to predict. It was a Social Democratic chancellor leading a Red-Green coalition government who went to great political risks to get a mandate to send German troops to Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. And it was a Social Democratic defense minister who in December 2002 declared: „Our security must also be defended on the Hindukush.“ And it was a Green foreign minister who eased the pragmatic rapprochement with the United States by declaring the “destructive Jihad terrorism and its totalitarian ideology” to be the greatest threat to regional and global security at the beginning of the twenty-first century and by proposing a new transatlantic initiative for the Near and Middle East.⁴² While bandwagoning in general with the new American agenda, mainly supporting the goal of a long-term transformation of the Middle East, German foreign policy has tried to put a clear European stamp on the emerging transatlantic debate over the Greater Middle East, mainly by insisting that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has to be addressed head on. The challenge for German and European foreign policy is to incorporate the new agenda, which is focused so much on the nexus of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, without succumbing to the naïve illusions and imperial temptations originally associated with this agenda.

4. From “No Sonderweg” to the “German Way”? The clash over Iraq and its meaning

The “war against terror” and the war against Iraq have raised the most troublesome question for German foreign policy and, as a result, for German-American relations: How does one justify the exercise of military force?

German policy on the use of force has evolved in way that the question indeed is whether Germany is still a “civilian power”.⁴³ Only diehard American neo-realists would have dared to predict what happened in spring 1999: German forces participating in offensive military operations against a sovereign state – without a UN mandate and at a time when a ‘Red-Green’ coalition was governing! Although the war clearly was a watershed moment for German politics, German participation did not presage a new assertive foreign policy. At heart, the approach in the Kosovo conflict was consistent with the main features of Germany’s political-military culture after 1945, especially with its strong multilateral orientation.⁴⁴ German military participation was not borne of assertiveness, but of helplessness. Germany did not want to bear the blame for the failure of a policy of coercive diplomacy it had little possibility to influence. Moreover, American pressure to consent to a credible military threat came at a time in which the domestic constellation could not have been more susceptible to it. In fall 1998, the newly elected Red-Green coalition government with a strong human rights commitment was eager to avoid any impression that it would pursue a German *Sonderweg* (special path). It was clear from the beginning that Chancellor Schröder did not want to taint his chancellorship with accusations of a German *Sonderweg*. When it became clear that coercive diplomacy finally meant war, German policymakers saw no alternative to participating in limited military strikes, apparently sharing NATO’s basic assumption that after a few days of air attacks the Yugoslav leadership would give in to NATO’s demands. Participation was interpreted by Chancellor Schröder as an affirmation of the integration into the Western community, which he presented as part of Ger-

⁴² Speech by foreign minister Fischer at the Munich Conference on Security Policy, February 7, 2004.

⁴³ Hanns W. Maull, „Germany and the Use of Force: Still a ‚Civilian Power‘?“, *Survival*, vol. 42 (Summer 2000), pp. 56-80.

⁴⁴ In detail for the following interpretation, see Peter Rudolf, „Germany and the Kosovo Conflict,“ in Pierre Martin and Mark R. Brawley (eds.), *Alliance Politics, Kosovo, and NATO’s War: Allied Force or Forced Allies?* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 131-143.

many's *raison d'état*. Participation was seen as precondition for preserving the multilateral framework in which the Federal Republic traditionally has smoothly exercised its influence. And it was the "humanitarian" nature of the Kosovo conflict that made Germany follow American leadership and that helped to secure public support for a limited military intervention. If the war had been fought for traditional "national interests" such as oil, things would have turned out in a different way. Of course, the wider implications of the Kosovo conflict for regional stability and the influx of refugees from Kosovo affected German interests, but the prevailing perception in the German discourse was that the use of military force was the last resort to forestall a humanitarian catastrophe.

In political terms, the participation of German military forces paid off, since the steadfast solidarity with the allies gave German foreign policymakers the credentials to make a come back with innovative ideas. Using the presidency of the European Council, the German government rallied support for an integrative, Marshall Plan-style, long-term vision for Balkan stability. Moreover, it pursued a „dual strategy“ for ending the war: on the one hand, unwavering support for allied military pressure on Milosevic, thus avoiding any impression that Germany could be the weak spot in the Western coalition; and on the other hand, new diplomatic efforts to end the war by involving Russia and the United Nations and by injecting some flexibility into the Western negotiating position in order to induce Milosevic to make concessions. With the „Fischer Plan“, German foreign policy was pursuing a delicate balancing act: staking out some independence of the United States while at the same time avoiding any impression that Germany would walk down a *Sonderweg*. In the end, German foreign policymakers could claim success: Belgrade accepted what became the „Petersberg Peace Plan“ – shortly before NATO and Germany had to face the most difficult decision: whether to invade Kosovo.

The Kosovo conflict left uneasiness about the dominating role of the United States and the way American-style coercive diplomacy had shut off other options, in the end leaving no other choice than military escalation. Especially among Social Democrats and Greens, the "sin" of having to consent to military action without a United Nations mandate has remained a vexing memory.

When the issue of using force came up next, in the wake of September 11, 2001, there was there was widespread support for "Operation Enduring Freedom" – apart from left fringe of the German political and intellectual elite. Three-fifths of the German public supported the war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, and approximately one-third did not. The intervention could be justified as a legitimate form of self-defense, even though the way in which the war was conducted aroused concern.

Germany parted ways with the United States when the Bush administration, driven by the quest for absolute security, unilaterally extended the scope of the "war on terrorism", merging different risks and threats into a "monolithic threat" and waging the war in a state-centered way directed against "rogue states" with weapons of mass destruction.⁴⁵ In the Iraq case, the German-American confrontation had two dimensions: the normative, world-order conflict over whether preventive war should be accepted as legitimate, and the political clash over the negative, counterproductive regional results of waging war against Iraq in the midst of an unfinished campaign against Islamic terrorism.

If one takes a sober look at the problems and dilemmas that U.S. policy toward Iraq has raised, the position of the German federal government appears by no means to be as unreasonable as many critics believe, despite all electoral tactics and all the loud noise that surrounded the election campaign. Most accounts of the Iraq confrontation in German-American relations suffer from one or all of the following three errors: First, they assume a policy driven by primarily domestic considerations without any strategic rationale. The fact that the policy had domestic functions does not imply that this policy cannot at its core be rational in terms of balancing foreign policy interests. Second, standard accounts neglect the basic insight that policies generally have to be evaluated in terms of alternative policies. A policy may be far from optimal, but compared with alternative policies it may be the least bad one, given the international and domestic context. Third, some of the more polemical accounts ignore the common sense wisdom that the deterioration of a relationship is mostly the out-

⁴⁵ See Jeffrey Record, *Bounding the Global War on Terrorism* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, December 2003), quote on p. V.

come of interaction.⁴⁶

Political positions that are adopted with electoral results and the political survival of the Red-Green coalition in mind are not necessarily devoid of strategic rationality.⁴⁷ Whoever considered it wrong and dangerous to pursue a policy of regime change through military intervention – and this was exactly what the warnings and questions directed by the German government to the United States boil down to – logically could not support a coercive diplomacy whose demands for new and unconditional weapons inspections were largely instrumental. Upon closer look at the American debate, this is the impression that had been emerging forcefully for quite some time, at the very latest since Vice President Cheney's speech in late August 2002. However, doubt had long been cast on the assumption that threats of regime change simply served the purpose of achieving Iraqi disarmament.

If one had adopted the American line, how could one then have credibly rejected possible future American demands to participate? This would have meant supporting a policy that one considered wrong and overly risky even if it were ultimately sanctioned by the UN Security Council under U.S. pressure. The doubts, criticisms, and questions expressed by the German government were of the kind that were repeatedly articulated in the American debate as well: doubts concerning the allegedly growing threat posed by Iraq, doubts concerning the United States' willingness to be involved long-term in the construction of a new order in Iraq and the Middle East after a military intervention had ended, and doubts concerning the wisdom of a policy that – in the midst of the war against Islamist terrorism – sought to open up a new conflict before progress had been made toward achieving peace in the Middle East.⁴⁸ Yet it was an unusual provocation when Chancellor Schröder – in an interview with the *New York Times* – publicly expressed such fundamental doubts about the wisdom of American policy and reproached the Bush administration for changing its policy in favor of regime change in Iraq without consulting its allies.⁴⁹ Given the state of the American debate, it can be seen as an attempt to influence it – at the cost of creating bad blood with the Bush administration.

Why did Chancellor Schröder make so much about not being consulted? Iraq was seen as an issue with potentially far reaching political and economic ramifications. Since the issue affected the interest of allies, they could claim to get a chance to factor in their perspectives. And Chancellor Schröder even claimed a right to be consulted arising from the fact that Germany had shown its solidarity in the Afghan case – with the Chancellor even risking his political survival to get a coalition majority for German participation in the war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.⁵⁰

Those who argue that an ill-conceived policy driven by domestic imperatives had reduced Germany's influence on American policy to a minimum must be able to present a plausible argument as to how a different approach would have enabled Germany to be effective in influencing an American President who had decided to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council with veto power, France was at least able to apply tactical brakes after the Bush administration decided to work through the United Nations in an effort to solidify domestic political support and to show consideration for Great Britain. There was no prospect of a common European position from the outset due to Great Britain's adoption of Washington's stance. Thus, how could Germany have acted as broker? The measuring stick used by critics of German policy in the Iraq crisis is Germany's role in the good old days when US foreign policy was Europe-centered and

⁴⁶ For the view that the fault for the "breakdown" ("Zerrüttung") of German-American relations lies with the red-green coalition, see see Nikolas Busse, „Die Entfremdung vom wichtigsten Verbündeten. Rot-Grün und Amerika,“ in: Hanns Maull/Sebastian Harnisch/Constantin Grund (eds.), *Deutschland im Abseits? Rot-Grüne Außenpolitik 1998-2003* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2003), pp. 19-32.

⁴⁷ For an elaborate explanation focusing on „the domestic political consideration of preserving the Red-Green Government in the face of considerable opposition within the coalition government to foreign military interventions in general and early military action against Iraq in particular“ see Sebastian Harnisch, *Bound to Fail? – Germany's Policy in the Iraq Crisis 2001-2003*, Paper to be presented at the 27th Annual Conference, September 18-21, 2003 of the German Studies Association in New Orleans, quote on p. 4.

⁴⁸ See, for example, the interview with Foreign Minister Fischer in *Frankfurter Rundschau*, August 7, 2002.

⁴⁹ *The New York Times*, September 5, 2002.

⁵⁰ See Interview mit Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder in *Die Zeit* vom 15. August 2002.

NATO played an important role in finding common ground despite recurring strategic disagreements.⁵¹ This perspective ignores the structural changes in the transatlantic relationship and the mindset of an administration that had no intention of letting its vision being watered down by consultations and that believed that in the end other states would simply jump on the bandwagon.

The fact that a tested proven relationship such as the German-American one could be thrown into crisis shows how troublesome and divisive conflicting strategic and normative perspectives can become if heated by mutual frustrations and animosities at the highest level.⁵² Both political leaders believed the other had broken promises. According to senior administration officials, Chancellor Schröder had allegedly indicated at a meeting with President Bush in January 2002 “that he ‘understood’ that Bush might have to go to war in Iraq, and he advised Bush only to do so quickly and decisively. Again in Berlin in May 2002, U.S. officials say, Schröder pledged not to run his election campaign against a possible U.S. war in Iraq. When Schröder ended up doing so, Bush – who aides say ‘believes the character of a person is known by whether he keeps his word’ – felt betrayed and did not hesitate in private conversations to call Schröder a ‘liar’.⁵³ According to a “senior German official” interviewed by Philip Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, Chancellor Schröder denied having misled Bush. Chancellor Schröder himself could claim to have been misled by Bush, who, in May 2002 in Berlin, had promised consultation on the issue of going to war against Iraq.⁵⁴ Bush’s assurance during this trip to Europe in May 2002, when he met Schröder and then Chirac, “I have no war plans on my desk” was at best misleading – given the fact that war planning was well underway.⁵⁵

The alleged or actual historical comparisons between Bush and Hitler – which in any case were completely incorrect and deeply insulting to American ears – further contributed to “poisoned” relations between the German and American governments.⁵⁶ These comparisons made it easier for the U.S. administration – in partly genuine, partly staged indignation – to punish its long-time ally with a withdrawal of affection. The administration did so perhaps with the intention of influencing the German debate to its advantage, but also with the goal of preventing other states from engaging in that kind of blunt criticism of its Iraq policy.⁵⁷

German behavior in the Iraq crisis has often been interpreted as a renunciation of multilateral norms, as a departure from principled multilateralism.⁵⁸ Philip Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, two American analysts who blame both sides for setting in motion the vicious circle leading to transatlantic crisis, argue that „Germany was the first to depart from alliance norms“, explaining it solely to be the domestic calculus of Chancellor Schröder:

„His declared refusal to support the use of force against Iraq even if authorized by the UN Security Council was, simply put, irresponsible. It went against everything German foreign policy has stood

⁵¹ This is obviously the yardstick of Christian Hacke, „Deutschland, Europa und der Irakkonflikt,“ Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B24-25/2003 (June 10, 2003), pp. 8-16.

⁵² See Stephen F. Szabo, „Germany and the United States Safter Iraq: Form Alliance to Alignment“, in Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, 1/2004, pp. 41-52.

⁵³ Gordon and Shapiro, Allies at War, pp. 102-03, based upon interviews with „senior administration officials“ in October 2003.

⁵⁴ Gordon and Shapiro, Allies at War, p.103.

⁵⁵ Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon&Schuster 2004), p. 129.

⁵⁶ Justice minister Herta Däubler-Gmelin reportedly spoke of Bush using the coming war as a diversion from domestic problems – a classic tactic also used by Hitler. This alleged remark infuriated the Bush administration; for Condoleezza Rice it had „poisoned“ German-American relations. In a letter to President Bush Chancellor Schröder expressed his regrets that Bush’s feeling were deeply wounded through the alleged remarks, adding that the minister had assured him not to have made the remarks. But the White House was not satisfied, Bush, believing that the Chancellor had contributed to the atmosphere allowing that kind of remarks, expected a clear apology and the dismissal of the justice minister. See Gordon and Shapiro, Allies at War, pp.101-02.

⁵⁷ The United States – this was the message of the harsh reaction – will not tolerate that kind of behavior: otherwise if “the biggest boy in Europe runs against America, there will be a snowball of Anti-Americanism that will gain speed and size as it rolls won the hill.” As a „State Department official“ put it quoted in Paul Richter, „No Thaw in German-U.S. Ties,“ Los Angeles Times, November 1, 2002.

⁵⁸ For example, Johannes Varvick, „Die NATO-Politik der rot-grünen Bundesregierung 1998-2003,“ Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, vol. 14 , no. 1 (2004) 1, pp. 93-121 (108).

for since the founding of the Federal Republic. Germany's decision to stand with France in blocking NATO's preparation for the possible defense of Turkey in the context of an Iraq war was also difficult to defend. Whatever the American motives in calling for a NATO role in planning for the defense of Turkey, Germany's decision to refuse that role was deeply damaging to the notion of NATO as a defense alliance on which its members could rely."⁵⁹

Was the German government's sweeping rejection of even a UN-sanctioned military intervention, as Stefan Kornelius was one of the first to state, really "a dramatic change in German foreign policy away from multilateralism and international organizations."⁶⁰ The reason that this issue was not very much debated might have been, as he argued, that no one took such a foreign policy shift seriously. But the fundamental question has rarely been raised: Should Germany support a policy that is viewed as strategically wrong and morally dubious simply for the sake of a multilaterally oriented foreign policy? The fact that the limits of multilateralism in security policy were so little debated shows how ingrained this mindset still is.

One can very much dispute whether, from a foreign policy point of view, it was tactically smart and politically wise to make this "no participation" pledge directed towards the German electorate. But to interpret this position as "great power gesture" ("Großmachtgebärde") and a "clear break" with the tradition of the Federal Republic misses a crucial point:⁶¹ Never before had a German government faced the question of whether to actively take part in a war deemed wrong and not in Germany's vital interests just for the sake of demonstrating its multilateral orientation! One has to keep in mind: It was all too clear that the question was not to enforce UN resolutions by force, but to overthrow a regime and to occupy a country. The often criticized statement that such a question of war and peace had to be decided in Berlin is so self-evident that it takes a highly idealistic, even apolitical notion of multilateralism to find fault with this simple truth. As the foreign policy debate has shown, principled multilateralism remains a powerful undisputed measuring stick for criticizing governmental policies.

What about the criticism that Germany damaged NATO as a defense alliance? One cannot claim that in substance Germany violated allied norms. There was no indication that Germany would not assist Turkey in case it needed help. It was the US, not Turkey that pushed the issue within NATO, demanding a German contribution (among them Patriot missiles and participation in AWAC missions) and thereby instrumentally using this organization to set a dilemma for the German government: either accepting that war was coming or exposing itself to the accusation of lacking solidarity.⁶² Pushing NATO to get involved in the defense of Turkey was a "trap" set by the Bush administration.⁶³ As a "senior German official" put it: "We promised to supply the Patriots to Turkey bilaterally and asked the United States please do not force us to be an obstruction within NATO. But the Bush administration was determined to make life difficult for Schroeder by having Germany vote yes to the deployment, thus undermining the chancellor's own position against the Iraq war. That was a really nasty bit of political game-playing, and we viewed [it] as bullying, pure and simple."⁶⁴ One wonders whether the US administration was aware of the fact that a request that included the participation of German military personnel would have necessitated a vote in the German Bundestag, exposing the government to great political risks.⁶⁵ When Turkey requested support, Germany, concerned about the damage to the alliance, decided to get along with a scaled-backed version of the proposal now being handled in NATO's Defense Planning Committee (where France is not a member).

⁵⁹ Gordon and Shapiro, *Allies at War*, pp. 175-76.

⁶⁰ Stefan Kornelius, „Der Rosenkrieg,“ *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, November 2/3, 2002, p. 4.

⁶¹ Gunther Hellmann, "Von Gipfelstürmern und Gratwanderern: 'Deutsche Wege' in der Außenpolitik," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B 11/2002 (March 8, 2004), pp. 32-39, quote on p.37.

⁶² For an account, see Gordon and Shapiro, *Allies at War*, pp. 136-141, who ignore the domestic problems for the German government related to the decision.

⁶³ Gordon and Shapiro, *Allies at War*, p. 141.

⁶⁴ Quoted in James Kitfield, "Damage Control," in *National Journal*, July 19, 2003.

⁶⁵ Harnisch, *Bound to Fail?*, pp. 20-21, emphasizes this domestic factor.

5. How much fundamental foreign policy change?

In my view, those observers who warn about a “German way” – by the way, an expression that Chancellor Schröder claims not to have used with respect to foreign policy – have read too much into the Iraq crisis. Thus, I would dispute the claim that the German position not to support military measures against Iraq even if mandated by the UN Security Council can be interpreted as “clear turning away” (“eindeutige Abkehr”) from the role conception of a civilian power, as Hanns Maull has put it. He himself added one important differentiating observation: the approach of then Red-Green government resonated so much with the German public because of the deep roots of the resentments against the use of military force typical of the civilian power conception.⁶⁶

This leads to the more general question of how to “measure” basic foreign policy change. A policy position may be inconsistent with “core components”⁶⁷ of Germany’s traditional national role conception: the general strategic preference for embedding German foreign policy into multilateral frameworks, second, the milieu goal of a civilized international order and third, at the level of foreign policy instruments, a preference for non-military means and strong aversion against the use of military force. Even if this were the case (and I have offered a more benign evaluation of German behavior in the Iraq crisis), one would have to tackle the basic analytical question: Under which conditions would it be possible to make the general inference that core components of Germany’s foreign policy identity no longer shape foreign policy interests? Policy positions at odds with one of the core components may well be explained by situational pressures and the need to balance tensions emerging among these core components. Neither the foreign policy discourse in Germany with respect to the transatlantic relationship nor actual policies in the wake of the Iraq crisis indicate a profound change in the orientation of German foreign policy.⁶⁸ But we can expect the strains of further adjustment and non-adjustment to a changing transatlantic framework.

⁶⁶ Hanns W. Maull, „Editorial: Deutschland auf Abwegen?“, in: Maull, Harnisch and Grund, *Deutschland im Abseits?*, pp. 7-17 (quote on p. 16).

⁶⁷ On these „core components“ see Ulrich Klotz, *National Role Conceptions and Foreign Policies: France and Germany Compared* (Cambridge: Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Working Paper 2002).

⁶⁸ For a similar view, see Thomas Risse, „Kontinuität durch Wandel: Eine ‘neue’ deutsche Außenpolitik?“, *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B11/2004 (March 8, 2004), pp. 24-31.