One year of nuclear rhetoric and escalation management in Russia’s war against Ukraine: An updated chronology

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Introduction

During the night of February 23, 2022, Russian forces crossed into Ukraine, seeking to capture Kyiv within days. A few hours later, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the beginning of a “special military operation.” In his speech, the Kremlin leader warned those who tried to stand in Russia’s way that they would face “never seen” consequences—a statement many interpreted as a thinly veiled threat to employ nuclear weapons. Nuclear allusions piled up in the subsequent weeks and months. Moscow’s nuclear insinuations were accompanied by Western comments, condemnations, and a few counter-threats. Most importantly, the Russian allusions triggered a public debate in several Western countries about how such narratives should be interpreted and what responses they required. This working paper attempts to collect Russia’s nuclear narratives and the reactions of the West.

It is difficult to identify a suitable starting point for this chronology since Russian-Western relations had already been strained for a long time when Moscow’s troops marched onto Kyiv. We decided that going back to autumn 2021 could offer readers a useful before-after comparison. Nonetheless, given both available resources and space constraints, prior to the invasion, this chronology only includes (a) ex post revelations of Washington’s assessments of Moscow’s intentions; (b) Russia’s public statements on a potential conflict with NATO; and (c) the Kremlin’s nuclear-related narratives. We purposefully exclude numerous other contentious issues, like for instance Russia’s demands that NATO rule out Ukraine’s membership;¹ insist upon Western restrictions on weapons deployments;² threats to deploy intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe in response to a similar NATO decision;³ or refusal to rule out a military deployment to Cuba or Venezuela.⁴

From February 24, 2022 onwards, we mainly focus on tracing nuclear signaling between Russia and the West, but we also include the two sides’ attempts at managing and controlling escalation dynamics; at exercising deterrence, dissuasion, and compellence; and at dealing with the domestic and international political implications of these nuclear-related processes. Therefore, we identified, evaluated, and coded more than 160 statements and actions with a nuclear dimension, but also included hundreds of other potentially relevant exchanges. Below, we start by listing the most important developments. Subsequently, we present them graphically. The bulk of this paper, however, contains our summaries of all relevant statements and actions. We sought to tie them together into a narrative and (where reasonably easy to access) refer to primary sources. Nonetheless, this chronology does not claim to be exhaustive.

This is the third update of this chronology. An earlier version was published in September 2022. The first version of this working paper appeared in German in May 2022.

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³ Alexander Marrow and Mark Trevelyan, “Russia says it may be forced to deploy mid-range nuclear missiles in Europe,” Reuters, December 13, 2021 [https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-says-lack-nato-security-guarantees-would-lead-confrontation-ria-2021-12-13/].

⁴ Vladimir Isachenkov and Matthew Lee, "Russia’s talk of troops in Latin America called ‘bluster’,” AP News, January 14, 2022 [https://apnews.com/article/europe-russia-ukraine-vladimir-putin-moscow-473d4b2eebf4dc59d8e7df9e8653ba].
Key statements & developments

Below we include a selection of the most important nuclear interactions in this conflict. We coded the Russian steps and Western reactions. For the sake of simplicity, we distinguished between two actors only: Russia (RU) and the West (W). We classified the most important statements or actions as escalatory, warning or de-escalatory. “Escalatory” is anything that can be considered at least an implicit threat of nuclear use. “Warning” is anything that can at least be interpreted as an allusion to nuclear capabilities or a possible conventional escalation, but without the threat of nuclear use being directly derived from it. “De-escalatory” is everything that questions or even retracts previous statements or actions that were somehow linked to possible nuclear use, or includes steps through which actors (probably intentionally) forego an escalatory action.

1. **27 January 2022: RU [warning]**: Medvedev: Russia has “the right” to use nuclear weapons in response to an existential threat, a right that makes it “possible to achieve various goals.”

2. **7 February 2022: RU [escalatory]**: Putin: If Ukraine attempts to take back Crimea, European countries will be in conflict with Russia, which is a “leading” nuclear power superior to “many” NATO countries in terms of “nuclear force.”

3. **19 February 2022: RU [warning]**: Yearly nuclear exercise, normally held in autumn.

4. **21-22 February 2022: RU [warning]**: Putin: Ukraine is seeking to acquire tactical nuclear weapons, which would pose a “strategic threat” to Russia.

5. **24 February 2022: RU [escalatory]**: Putin: Whoever tries to hinder Russia will face consequences “never seen” in history.

6. **24 February 2022: RU [warning]**: Putin: Russia is “one of the most powerful nuclear states” and “there should be no doubt for anyone” that a direct attack on Russia would lead to defeat.

7. **24 February 2022: W [de-escalatory]**: Biden: No US troops involved in the conflict, only to defend NATO.

8. **24 February 2022: W [warning]**: Le Drian: NATO also has nuclear weapons.

9. **26 February 2022: W [de-escalatory]**: Western states decide to only impose economic sanctions upon Russia and deliver military support for Ukraine.


11. **27 February 2022: RU [escalatory]**: Putin: Russian deterrence forces will be placed on “high combat alert.”


13. **28 February 2022: W [de-escalatory]**: Psaki: Announces additional support for Ukraine, but the United States can defend itself.

14. **27 February 2022: W [warning]**: Borrell: Financial aid to Ukraine, but also military jets (MiGs).

15. **28 February 2022: W [escalatory]**: US warning to Russia against using tactical nuclear weapons.


17. **1 March 2022: RU [warning]**: Russian military exercises with nuclear submarines in the Barents Sea and with mobile ICBMs in Siberia.

18. **28 February & 1 March 2022: W [de-escalatory]**: Biden: US citizens have no reason to be afraid of nuclear war: US forces will not fight in Ukraine, only defend NATO.

19. **2 March 2022: W [de-escalatory]**: Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria, NATO will not send MiGs to Ukraine.

21. 2 & 3 March 2022: RU [de-escalatory]: Lavrov: Thought of nuclear war is on Western, not Russian minds. Zakharova: Russia will not use nuclear weapons first.

22. 4 March 2022: W [de-escalatory]: NATO foreign ministers reject the no fly zone requested by Ukraine.

23. 5 March 2022: RU [warning]: Putin: A no fly zone would have “disastrous consequences.” And: The decision to put Russia’s deterrence forces on high alert had been necessary because UK Foreign Minister Truss had announced a NATO intervention in Ukraine.

24. 8 March 2022: W [de-escalatory]: Haines: No changes of the Russian nuclear posture, Putin wants to deter Western support for Ukraine.

25. 9 March 2022: RU [warning]: Peskov: MiGs that take off from “any other airfields” on NATO territory would be “an extremely undesirable and potentially dangerous scenario.”

26. 10 March 2022: W [de-escalatory]: Wolters: MiGs could be “mistaken as escalatory and could result in Russian escalation with NATO.”

27. 11 March 2022: W [de-escalatory]: Biden: NATO will be defended, but a direct confrontation with Russia – a third world war – has to be avoided.

28. 15 March 2022: W [warning]: Poland demands a NATO peacekeeping mission for Ukraine.

29. 16 March 2022: W [de-escalatory]: NATO decides not to send peacekeeping troops to Ukraine but to expand economic and military assistance.

30. 16 March 2022: RU [warning]: Putin: The West wants to “finish off” Russia, but it will fail.

31. 18-20 March 2022: RU [warning]: Use of a conventional Kinzhal missile in Ukraine.

32. 20 March 2022: W [de-escalatory]: Austin: Putin trying to “reestablish some momentum” and the United States can defend itself.

33. 22 March 2022: RU [de-escalatory]: Peskov: Nuclear weapons would only be used in “existential threat.” Ryabkov: Russia would “never escalate anything.”

34. 23 March 2022: RU [warning]: Peskov: A NATO mission in Ukraine would be “very reckless and extremely dangerous” and could have “consequences that would be hard to repair.” Lavrov: Everyone should try to avoid a “direct clash between the Russian and NATO armed forces.” Medvedev: Russia’s destruction could lead to nuclear war. Rogozin: Russia could destroy “any aggressor.”

35. 23 March 2022: W [escalatory]: Anonymous Biden administration official: Use of a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine would mean “all bets are off” regarding direct US intervention in the war. But nuclear use remains unlikely. Sullivan: There have been no Russian preparations.

36. 23 March 2022: W [warning]: France conducts test of nuclear-armed missile and deploys three of its four nuclear submarines.

37. 23 March 2022: W [warning]: Stoltenberg: „Any use of nuclear weapons will fundamentally change the nature of the conflict.”

38. 26 March 2022: RU [warning]: Medvedev: Russia could use nuclear weapons if its existence is threatened, even by conventional weapons.

39. 28 March 2022: RU [de-escalatory]: Peskov: Any outcome of the operation in Ukraine is “of course” not a reason to use nuclear weapons, only an existential threat would be. But: Everyone understands what Putin meant with his warning “not to interfere.” And: He does “not think” Putin would use nuclear weapons if a third country intervened in Ukraine. But: Russia has “all the possibilities” to punish such states. But: “No one is thinking about using, even about the idea of using a nuclear weapon.”

40. 31 March 2022: W [de-escalatory]: Senior Pentagon official: “No indication" Russia is preparing to use tactical nuclear weapons.

41. 1 April 2022: W [de-escalatory]: Pentagon cancels Minuteman III test.
<table>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>7 April 2022</td>
<td>W [warning]: G7 and Børrell: Any threat or use of nuclear weapons would be “unacceptable and result in severe consequences.”</td>
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<td>14 April 2022</td>
<td>RU [warning]: Medvedev: If Sweden and Finland join NATO, “no non-nuclear status of the Baltics will be possible.”</td>
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<td>14 April 2022</td>
<td>W [de-escalatory]: Burns: Putin’s threats must be taken seriously, but so far there are no alarming indications.</td>
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<td>19 April 2022</td>
<td>W [de-escalatory]: Kîrby: Washington is monitoring Russian rhetoric, but confident its strategic deterrent posture remains sufficient.</td>
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<td>19 April 2022</td>
<td>RU [de-escalatory]: Lavrov: Russia initiated Putin-Biden and P5 statements that nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought.</td>
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<td>20 April 2022</td>
<td>RU [warning]: Russia tests nuclear-capable Sarmat intercontinental missile. Putin: Sarmat will “safeguard Russia’s security from external threats.”</td>
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<td>20 April 2022</td>
<td>W [de-escalatory]: Kîrby: Sarmat test was “routine” and Russia “properly notified” the United States.</td>
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<td>25 April 2022</td>
<td>W [escalatory]: Austin: United States wants “to see Russia weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>25 April 2022</td>
<td>RU [warning]: Lavrov: The risks of nuclear war are “very significant,” “serious” and “real.” But: He does not want to “artificially inflate these risks.” And: It is Russia’s “principled position” that nuclear war is inadmissible. Western arms deliveries to Ukraine are “pouring oil on the fire.”</td>
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<td>26 April 2022</td>
<td>W [de-escalatory]: Johnson: No risk of Moscow using nuclear weapons.</td>
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<td>27 April 2022</td>
<td>W [de-escalatory]: Kîrby: United States do not want “to see Russia in a position to be able to do this again” and Russia should not be “in a position going forward, where they haven’t suffered consequences for this unprovoked invasion.”</td>
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<td>27 April 2022</td>
<td>RU [escalatory]: Putin: “If someone intends to intervene on what is happening from the outside and creates unacceptable strategic threats for us, then they should know that our response to oncoming strikes will be swift, lightning fast.” And: “We have all the tools for this, ones that no one can brag about.”</td>
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<td>28 April 2022</td>
<td>W [warning]: Sullivan: “We won’t succumb to nuclear blackmail,” nor “tolerate nuclear saber rattling and nuclear brinksmanship.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>28 April 2022</td>
<td>W [warning]: Biden: United States is prepared for “whatever” Russia might do, but would send only military assistance, not troops, to Ukraine.</td>
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<td>29 April 2022</td>
<td>RU [de-escalatory]: Lavrov: Russian policymakers are “champions of making pledges by all nuclear countries never to start a nuclear war.”</td>
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<td>4 May 2022</td>
<td>RU [warning]: Russia simulates electronic launches of nuclear-capable missiles in Kaliningrad – unclear whether training routine or political signaling.</td>
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<td>5 May 2022</td>
<td>RU [de-escalatory]: Antonov: Russia would only use nuclear weapons defensively, in response to WMD use or when state existence is endangered.</td>
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<td>6 May 2022</td>
<td>RU [de-escalatory]: Zaitsev: Nuclear contingencies spelled out in Russia’s nuclear doctrine do not apply to the conflict in Ukraine.</td>
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<td>6 May 2022</td>
<td>W [warning]: Tomero: Nuclear use would have “devastating consequences” for Russia.</td>
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<td>7 May 2022</td>
<td>W [warning]: Macron inauguration ceremony with a nuclear component.</td>
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<td>7 May 2022</td>
<td>W [warning]: Burns: No evidence that Russia is planning for nuclear use, but its saber-rattling cannot be taken “lightly.”</td>
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<td>9 May 2022</td>
<td>RU [de-escalatory]: The nuclear-capable component of the Victory Day parade is cancelled and Putin makes no nuclear references.</td>
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<td>10 May 2022</td>
<td>RU [de-escalatory]: Grushko: Official nuclear doctrine drives policy.</td>
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<td>10 May 2022</td>
<td>W [warning]: Haines: Russia is using nuclear threats to deter Western supply of military aid – Putin would only use nuclear weapons in case of an existential threat. But: losing the war and/or a NATO intervention could qualify as such.</td>
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<td>12 May 2022</td>
<td>RU [warning]: Medvedev: NATO aid to Ukraine could lead to an open conflict with Russia, which would risk “full-fledged nuclear war.”</td>
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<td>28 May 2022</td>
<td>RU [warning]: Russia tests a hypersonic Zircon cruise missile.</td>
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<td>29 May 2022</td>
<td>RU [de-escalatory]: Kelin: Russia will use nuclear weapons when state existence is threatened. This has “nothing to do” with a “limited conventional operation.”</td>
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<td>31 May 2022</td>
<td>W [warning]: Biden: “Any” nuclear use “in this conflict” would be “completely unacceptable” and “entail severe consequences.”</td>
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<td>2 June 2022</td>
<td>W [de-escalatory]: Biden: Signals US readiness to engage Russia on strategic stability to reduce risks of arms race or nuclear escalation.</td>
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<td>3 June 2022</td>
<td>RU [warning]: Medvedev: Foreign-supplied weapons use against Russia could lead to strike on suppliers, which could lead to nuclear apocalypse.</td>
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<td>15 June 2022</td>
<td>RU [warning]: Ryabkov: US planners have an “ideology” of “limited nuclear war,” and a US nuclear use would be an “irreversible event.”</td>
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<td>17 June 2022</td>
<td>RU [de-escalatory]: Putin: “We are not threatening anyone” but would use “resources” to “defend our sovereignty.”</td>
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<td>17 June 2022</td>
<td>W [warning]: US tests Trident II missile.</td>
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<td>25 June 2022</td>
<td>RU [escalatory]: Putin: Announces the transfer of nuclear-capable missiles to Belarus and the re-equipment of its bombers to carry nuclear weapons.</td>
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<td>27 June 2022</td>
<td>W [warning]: G7 agrees that “any” nuclear use would be “unacceptable and met with severe consequences” – concern after Belarus announcement.</td>
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<td>28 June 2022</td>
<td>RU [de-escalatory]: Peskov: Russia is not planning to deploy nuclear weapons to Belarus, just nuclear-capable delivery vehicles.</td>
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<td>28 June 2022</td>
<td>W [warning]: US military unsuccessfully tests a hypersonic missile.</td>
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<td>6 July 2022</td>
<td>RU [warning]: Medvedev: Trying to punish a country with a large nuclear arsenal is “absurd,” could pose a “threat to the existence of humanity.”</td>
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<td>7 July 2022</td>
<td>RU [de-escalatory]: Matvienko: Russia sees nuclear weapons only as a deterrent, “exceptional cases” are “clearly and strictly prescribed.”</td>
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<td>12 July 2022</td>
<td>RU [warning]: Zakharova: Washington is “dangerously teetering on the brink of an open military confrontation” with Moscow – such “direct armed conflict between nuclear powers” would be “fraught with nuclear escalation.”</td>
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<td>12 July 2022</td>
<td>RU [warning]: Rogozin: Russia is preparing tests of Sarmat missiles.</td>
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<td>12 July 2022</td>
<td>W [warning]: United States conducts two successful hypersonic missile tests.</td>
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<td>20 July 2022</td>
<td>W [de-escalatory]: Brown: If Putin uses nuclear weapons in Ukraine, US policy is “all about deterrence” and avoiding a “slippery slope that we can’t recover from.”</td>
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<td>2 August 2022</td>
<td>RU [de-escalatory]: Restatement of official nuclear doctrine and claim that none of its contingencies is “relevant to the situation in Ukraine.”</td>
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<td>5 August 2022</td>
<td>RU [de-escalatory]: Russia’s nuclear policy is “aimed exclusively at protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country.”</td>
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<td>5 August 2022</td>
<td>W [warning]: Kahl: It is “not the time” for a sole purpose declaratory policy, in light of, for instance, Russia’s nuclear rhetoric.</td>
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<td>16 August 2022</td>
<td>W [warning]: US test launch of the Minuteman III ICBM.</td>
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<td>16 August 2022</td>
<td>RU [de-escalatory]: Shoigu: “From a military point of view, there is no need to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine.”</td>
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<td>22 August 2022</td>
<td>RU [de-escalatory]: Ryabkov: Clash between nuclear powers must be prevented. As per Russian doctrine, nuclear use only in case of aggression and threat to existence of the state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 September 2022</td>
<td>W [de-escalatory]: Macron: France’s role is to avoid nuclear escalation and “everything” has to be done for “countries not to get engaged in the conflict carelessly.”</td>
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<td>7 September 2022</td>
<td>W [warning]: US conducts an announced Minuteman III test.</td>
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<td>14 September 2022</td>
<td>RU [warning]: Zakharova: Sending long-range weapons to Ukraine would make the United States “a direct party to the conflict.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 September 2022</td>
<td>RU [warning]: Putin: Russia could intensify attack on Ukrainian infrastructure. And: Russia's military conducts nuclear drills in the Arctic to test its ability to “defend the Russian arctic by military means.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 September 2022</td>
<td>W [warning]: Biden: Russian nuclear use would “change the face of war unlike anything since World War II” and a US response would be “consequential.”</td>
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<td>20 September 2022</td>
<td>RU [escalatory]: Medvedev: Russia could defend the four Ukrainian provinces it was annexing with “all the forces of self-defense.”</td>
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<td>21 September 2022</td>
<td>RU [escalatory]: Putin: Russia will “make use of all weapon systems available to us” in case of “a threat to the territorial integrity” of Russia. “This is not a bluff.”</td>
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<td>21 September 2022</td>
<td>W [warning]: Stoltenberg: Allies will not engage in similarly “reckless and dangerous nuclear rhetoric,” but “will make sure that there is no misunderstanding in Moscow about the seriousness of using nuclear weapons,” which would cause “unprecedented consequences.”</td>
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<td>21 September 2022</td>
<td>W [de-escalatory]: Biden: Condemns Russia for “making irresponsible nuclear threats,” but does not issue any own warnings.</td>
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<td>22 September 2022</td>
<td>RU [escalatory]: Blinken: Urges the UN Security Council to “send a clear message that these reckless nuclear threats must stop immediately,” but refrains from issuing any own warnings.</td>
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<td>22 September 2022</td>
<td>RU [escalatory]: Medvedev: Any weapons, “including strategic nuclear weapons and weapons based on new principles, could be used” to protect “all the territories that have joined [Russia].”</td>
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<td>23 September 2022</td>
<td>W [de-escalatory]: US officials: Express concern Putin could use tactical nuclear weapons, but stress that there is “no evidence” Russia was preparing such a strike.</td>
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<td>24 September 2022</td>
<td>RU [escalatory]: Lavrov: Russia’s “entire territory” is “under the state’s full protection” and all Russian “doctrines” apply to Russia’s “entire territory.”</td>
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<td>25 September 2022</td>
<td>W [escalatory]: Sullivan: “Any use of nuclear weapons will be met with catastrophic consequences for Russia.” Washington has been “clear and specific” towards the Kremlin regarding the US response.</td>
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<tr>
<td>26 September 2022</td>
<td>RU [warning]: Ryabkov: Accuses Washington of an “irresponsible, extremely aggressive, extremely pushy course,” which is “bringing everyone closer to a dangerous line.”</td>
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<td>27 September 2022</td>
<td>RU [escalatory]: Medvedev: If the “threat” to Russia from “Nazi Ukraine” exceeds “the established danger limit,” the Kremlin “will have to respond,” including with “the most formidable weapon,” while the West will still “not directly intervene in the conflict even in this situation.”</td>
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<td>27 September 2022</td>
<td>W [de-escalatory]: US Strategic Command: “We have not seen any reason to adjust our own nuclear posture at this time.”</td>
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<td>28 September 2022</td>
<td>RU [warning]: Zakharova: The West talks “with ease” about nuclear weapons and is “engaged in total destruction” against Russia, whereas Moscow has pursued “many attempts to dialogue.”</td>
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<td>18 October 2022</td>
<td><strong>W [warning]</strong>: Stoltenberg: Medvedev “is not right” to claim that there would be no serious NATO response to nuclear weapons use. “We have stated clearly that there will be severe consequences.”</td>
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<td>20 October 2022</td>
<td><strong>W [warning]</strong>: Blinken: Washington has been “very clear” with Putin “directly and privately” about the “severe consequences” that would follow any nuclear use.</td>
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<td>23 October 2022</td>
<td><strong>RU [escalatory]</strong>: Shoigu: Claims that Ukraine could escalate the conflict with a dirty bomb and calls his US, British, and French counterparts to repeat this message.</td>
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<td>23-24 October 2022</td>
<td><strong>W [warning]</strong>: Austin and Wallace: Warn Shoigu not to use such allegations as a pretext for further Russian escalation. And: US, UK, and French foreign ministers issue a statement, “rejecting Russia’s transparently false allegations.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>24 October 2022</td>
<td><strong>RU [escalatory]</strong>: Russia places forces on alert to respond to a WMD attack. Kirillov: Claims Kyiv is planning a false-flag dirty bomb operation. Moscow sends a letter to the UNSC containing allegations against Ukraine.</td>
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<tr>
<td>24 October 2022</td>
<td><strong>RU [de-escalatory]</strong>: Naryshkin: It is “absolutely not” possible that Russia would use nuclear weapons in Ukraine.</td>
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<tr>
<td>24 October 2022</td>
<td><strong>W [warning]</strong>: Price: Expresses concern over “mirror imaging,” and underlines that the Administration has been “very clear” about the “severe consequences” of nuclear use.</td>
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<td>24 October 2022</td>
<td><strong>W [de-escalatory]</strong>: Various US officials: There are no indications Russia is preparing to use WMD.</td>
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<td>25 October 2022</td>
<td><strong>W [warning]</strong>: Biden: “Russia would be making an incredibly serious mistake for it to use a tactical nuclear weapon.” Austin rejects “pretexts” for Russian escalation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>26 October 2022</td>
<td><strong>RU [warning]</strong>: Russia conducts a planned nuclear exercise. Putin: “We know about the plans to use the so-called dirty bomb for provocations.”</td>
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<td>26 October 2022</td>
<td><strong>W [warning]</strong>: Blinken: Washington has “communicated directly and very clearly” the “consequences” of using nuclear weapons.</td>
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<tr>
<td>27 October 2022</td>
<td><strong>RU [de-escalatory]</strong>: Putin: Ukraine is preparing a false flag attack with a radioactive bomb, but “there is no sense in [using nuclear weapons] for us, neither political, nor military.” Moscow has “never said anything proactively about Russia potentially using nuclear weapons.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 October 2022</td>
<td><strong>W [warning]</strong>: Biden: If Putin has “no intention” to use nuclear weapons, “why does he keep talking” about “the ability to use a tactical nuclear weapon.” Putin has “been very dangerous in how he’s approached” the nuclear question.</td>
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<td>30 October 2022</td>
<td><strong>RU [warning]</strong>: Lavrov: The current situation bears similarity with the Cuban missile crisis. “This situation is very disturbing.” Russia does not see readiness from Western leaders to “show responsibility.”</td>
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<td>31 October 2022</td>
<td><strong>W [warning]</strong>: Cleverly: Nuclear use would “change the nature of the conflict” and imply “severe consequences for Russia.” The dirty bomb claims are “absurd.”</td>
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<td>2 November 2022</td>
<td><strong>W [de-escalatory]</strong>: Kirby: Administration has “grown increasingly concerned about the potential” that Putin might use a nuclear weapons, but there are still no concrete indications.</td>
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<td>2 November 2022</td>
<td><strong>RU [de-escalatory]</strong>: Russian Foreign Ministry: Russia’s doctrine mandates only “defensive goals” and does not permit an “expansive interpretation.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 November 2022</td>
<td><strong>RU [de-escalatory]</strong>: Kelin: Russia will not use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, they are designed for other purposes. Peskov: Moscow would abide by its doctrine.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 November 2022</td>
<td><strong>W [warning]</strong>: G7: “Any use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons by Russia would be met with severe consequences.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 November 2022</td>
<td><strong>RU [warning]</strong>: Medvedev: Russia’s has to stop the devil and is fighting “Nazis,” but it has various weapons and could “send all enemies” to hell, though this is “not” its task.</td>
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</table>
149. **17 November 2022: RU [de-escalatory]**: Peskov: “No one” in Russia “has ever speculated on the issue” of using nuclear weapons, as “such matters” were “unacceptable per se.”

150. **30 November 2022: RU [warning]**: Shoigu: Russia will invest in nuclear infrastructure. Lavrov: Even conventional clash between nuclear powers has to be avoided, as “escalation may become uncontrollable.”

151. **1 December 2022: W [de-escalatory]**: Blinken: Administration still fears nuclear use, especially in an emergency for Russia, and does not want to expand the conflict, does not want a “war with Russia” or a “third world war.”

152. **3 December 2022: W [warning]**: Nuland: “When we explained what the price would be for Russia, Putin decided to do something different,” namely to attack Ukraine’s energy infrastructure.

153. **3 December 2022: RU [de-escalatory]**: Zakharova: “Nuclear Armageddon” has not happened not because of US “tough warnings,” but because “no one on this side of the border was planning it.”

154. **7 December 2022: RU [warning]**: Putin: Warns of the “growing” threat of nuclear war, but emphasizes that he has “not gone crazy” and would not “brandish these weapons like a razor, running around the world.”


156. **7 December 2022: W [warning]**: Stoltenberg: Moscow’s nuclear rhetoric during the autumn “increased concerns” among NATO allies, but “Russia must know that any use of nuclear weapons would totally change the character, the nature, of the conflict.”

157. **8 December 2022: RU [de-escalatory]**: Antonov: “Russia takes seriously its special responsibility as a leading nuclear power,” and its statements are merely “classic deterrence in extreme geopolitical circumstances.”

158. **9 December 2022: RU [warning]**: Putin: It is worth thinking about developing nuclear disarming first-strike options, as the United States is already doing.

159. **9 December 2022: W [de-escalatory]**: Austin: Repeats that Putin’s rhetoric is irresponsible, but does not engage in own warnings.

160. **10 December 2022: RU [warning]**: Gavrilov: Washington green lighting Ukrainian strikes against Russian territory is “playing with fire, risking a full-scale war which could easily go nuclear.”

161. **13 December 2022: W [warning]**: Smith: The Administration will “continue to signal to Russia” that any nuclear use in Ukraine would produce “unprecedented consequences.”

162. **18 December 2022: W [warning]**: Burns: The Administration has “made very clear [...] what the serious risks of [nuclear use against Ukraine] would be.”

163. **19 December 2022: RU [warning]**: Putin: The Belarusian air-force will receive training to use nuclear-capable airplanes, a change in Russia’s approach to military cooperation.

164. **25 December 2022: RU [warning]**: Medvedev: “The only thing” that stopped the West from directly engaging in the war against Russia was nuclear deterrence.

165. **27 December 2022: RU [de-escalating]**: Lavrov: “We have repeated again and again that there can be no winners in a nuclear war, and it should never be unleashed.”

166. **19 January 2023: RU [warning]**: Medvedev: Russia’s defeat could “trigger a nuclear war.”
Graphic representation

Nuclear escalation dynamics between Russia and the West
Nuclear escalation dynamics between Russia and the West

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Autumn & Winter 2021 - 2022: First nuclear signals

By October 2021, the US government had concluded that Moscow was planning a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and Washington was assessing how to help Kyiv organize its defense while also reducing the dangers of nuclear escalation. In an October meeting at the White House, Mark A. Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, presented intelligence revealing that Russia’s government envisioned a takeover of most of Ukraine. US officials thought the plan to be of “staggering audacity,” and that it could pose a direct threat to NATO’s eastern flank, or even destroy the post-World War II security architecture of Europe. Thus, US President Joe Biden determined that Putin had to be either deterred or confronted, anonymous sources told journalists in August 2022.

American policymakers saw Ukraine as a “troubled former Soviet republic with a history of corruption,” and assessed how to best organize its resistance. Washington would need to deliver “significant new weaponry" to enable the Ukrainians to defend themselves, US policymakers concluded. “Too little could guarantee a Russian victory. But too much might provoke a direct NATO conflict with nuclear-armed Russia,” reporters summarized the Administration’s quagmire. Revealingly, the article mentions no discussion of a possible direct intervention. Rather, US officials saw even “significant” military deliveries as prone to lead to nuclear escalation. Milley’s notes for the October meeting at the White House encapsulated the US goals and dilemmas: How to “underwrite and enforce the rules-based international order” against a nuclear-armed state “without going to World War III?” To achieve this end, Washington would have to avoid a “kinetic conflict between the US military and NATO with Russia.” Also, it would have to “contain war inside the geographical boundaries of Ukraine.” And finally, the United States and its allies would have to “empower Ukraine” and give it the “means to fight.”

Throughout the winter, the US government deployed additional forces to Europe and sent arms to Ukraine. And yet, the “overriding White House concern about provocation influenced each decision about how much assistance and what kind of weapons to give the Ukrainians to defend themselves,” Washington Post journalists were later told. “I make no apologies for the fact that one of our objectives here is to avoid direct conflict with Russia,” Jake Sullivan, the US National Security Adviser, said of the prewar period. However, determining what Russia would interpret as provocative had been “more art than science,” a US official later explained to journalists. “There has always been a balance between what is required to effectively defend, and what is going to be seen by Russia as the United States essentially underwriting the killing of huge numbers of Russians.”

In turn, the Russian leadership sought to leverage uncertainty in its reactions to deter further Western involvement. Speaking to an online investment forum, Vladimir Putin, Russia’s President, warned NATO on November 30, 2021 against deploying troops and weapons to Ukraine, saying this would represent a “red line” for Moscow and would trigger a strong response. The Alliance’s eastward expansion had already threatened Russia’s core security interests, Putin said, and NATO could use Ukraine’s territory to deploy missiles capable of reaching Moscow within five minutes. Russia had therefore been forced to counter these growing threats by developing new hypersonic weapons, arms that would soon enter service.

5 Shane Harris et al., “Road to war: As Putin prepared his invasion, the U.S. struggled to convince allies — and Zelensky — of the danger,” The Washington Post, August 16, 2022 [https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/interactive/2022/ukraine-road-to-war/].

Also, Russian officials started to suggest that a direct confrontation between Russia and NATO could become a reality. On December 2, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov told the OSCE that the strategic stability architecture was “rapidly being destroyed” and NATO was refusing to “constructively examine” Russia’s proposals to “deescalate tensions and avoid dangerous incidents.” The Alliance’s “military infrastructure” was drawing closer to Russia’s borders and the “nightmare scenario of military confrontation” was returning.7 No one should doubt Russia would defend its security interests, Russia’s ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Antonov wrote in a US outlet on December 30. If NATO kept “constructing military-strategic realities imperiling the existence of our country,” Russia would be forced to “create similar vulnerabilities for them.” The “military exploration” of Ukraine by NATO was “an existential threat” for Russia, and “urgent action” was needed, Antonov noted ominously.8

As war became more probable, the US government issued a series of public and private warnings. For instance, in a news conference on January 19, Biden said that Russia had in fact already decided to invade Ukraine. The US President also offered a forceful warning. Such an attack would be “a disaster for Russia” as US allies and partners were “ready to impose severe costs and significant harm on Russia and the Russian economy.” Russia would be “held accountable” if it invaded. Yet the US President also suggested that a “minor incursion” might not prompt a severe response, signaling that there were disagreements within NATO on what to do with respect to various levels of Russian aggression.9 The next day, January 20, the White House sought to walk back the President’s caveat. He had been “absolutely clear” with Putin. “Any assembled Russian units move across the Ukrainian border, that is an invasion” for which Russia would pay a “heavy price.”10

On January 21, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken met Lavrov in Geneva, and again cautioned against invasion. Reportedly, the US official told his Russian counterpart that, in response to an invasion, Western sanctions would be fast and merciless, isolating Russia and crippling its economy. Also, Blinken reportedly said that NATO would provide Ukraine with massive military assistance. “If one Russian soldier or missile touched one inch of NATO territory, the United States would defend its allies,” the Washington Post later reported on the meeting. Blinken found Lavrov’s response “strident and unyielding.”11 During the subsequent press conference, Blinken said that a Russian invasion would be met with “swift, severe, and a united response” from the United States and its “partners and allies.”12

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7 "Russia to unveil security pact proposals in bid to restrain NATO,” Reuters, December 2, 2021 [https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-unveil-proposals-new-european-security-pact-soon-lavrov-2021-12-02/].
8 Anatoly Antonov, "An Existential Threat to Europe’s Security Architecture?,” Foreign Policy, December 30, 2021 [https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/12/30/russia-ukraine-nato-threat-security/].
11 Shane Harris et al, "Road to war: As Putin prepared his invasion, the U.S. struggled to convince allies — and Zelensky — of the danger,” The Washington Post, August 16, 2022 [https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/interactive/2022/ukraine-road-to-war/].
1. Warning

A month before the invasion, the Russian leadership started to bring its nuclear arsenal into the political narrative, already suggesting an expansive interpretation of the official doctrine. Dmitry Medvedev, the Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council and a former president and prime minister, stated in an interview on January 27, that there was no need to review Russia’s nuclear doctrine. Moscow had “the right” to use strategic nuclear forces “in response to an attack involving weapons of mass destruction against us or our allies and in response to any other threat to our country’s existence, in other words, to a danger that threatens the very existence of our state.” This was “a comprehensive formula” that made it “possible to achieve various goals,” Medvedev said.13

On the same January 27, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told Blinken that “regional security should not be guaranteed by strengthening or even expanding military blocs.” Actors should create a “balanced, effective and sustainable European security mechanism through negotiations, with Russia’s legitimate security concerns being taken seriously and addressed.”14

At the end of January 2022, Putin’s top economic advisors warned against the consequences of Western sanctions if war broke out. At the President’s residence outside Moscow, Herman Gref, the CEO of Sberbank and one of the most liberal members of Putin’s extended circle, gave a presentation that had been worked by those present, including by Elvira Nabiullina, the central bank governor. Harsh sanctions would set Russia’s economy back decades. GDP could fall by a third within two years. Real incomes could be cut by a fifth. Russians’ quality of life would lag behind even developing countries as restrictions on imports would make Russia struggle not only to find advanced technologies, but essentials such as medicines and food, the economic advisors noted. However, Putin cut Gref off and asked him what Russia should do to avoid the worst of the sanctions.15

February 2022: The high-time of nuclear threat-making

2. Escalatory

Ten days later, Putin continued developing the nuclear narrative. On February 7, the Russian President implied at a joint press conference with French President Emanuel Macron during the latter’s visit to Moscow that Ukraine could drag NATO into a nuclear war. If Ukraine joined NATO and decided to take back Crimea through military means, European countries would be automatically drawn into a military conflict with Russia, Putin said. The Kremlin understood that “NATO’s united potential” was incomparably larger than that of Russia, but Russia was “one of the world’s leading nuclear powers” and was “superior” to “many” NATO countries “in terms of the number of modern nuclear force components.” Putin claimed that neither he nor Macron wanted to see developments “unfold” that way.16

13 “Medvedev sees no need to review Russia’s nuclear doctrine,” TASS, January 27, 2022 [https://tass.com/politics/1393713].


15 Max Seddon and Polina Ivanova, “How Putin’s technocrats saved the economy to fight a war they opposed,” Financial Times, December 16, 2022 [https://www.ft.com/content/fe5fe0ed-e5d4-474e-bb5a-10c9657285d2].

On **February 19**, sitting alongside Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko, Putin oversaw an annual "strategic nuclear exercise," usually held in fall. Russian forces tested nuclear-capable air-, sea-, and land-based ballistic and cruise missiles.\(^{17}\)

In a televised address on **February 21**, Putin accused Ukraine of seeking to acquire nuclear weapons and stated that the possibility of "foreign technological support" could not be ruled out.\(^{18}\) On **February 22**, he sought to clarify his earlier statement, stating that tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine would be a "strategic threat" to Russia.\(^{19}\)

In parallel, also on **February 21**, Moscow recognized the Ukrainian separatist regions of Donetsk and Luhansk as independent states. The European Union as well as the United States and several other countries responded by announcing a first wave of economic sanctions against Russia.\(^{20}\) Against this background, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz suspended the certification process for the controversial Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline.\(^{21}\) On **February 23**, US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, after a meeting with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba, stressed that Washington would continue to deliver weapons to Ukraine even if Russia expanded its invasion, and would continue to support Kyiv with US Javelin anti-tank systems as well as other measures. The State Department’s Ned Price had earlier stated that aid to Ukraine "would be accelerated in the event of additional Russian aggression." Since 2014, the United States had committed more than 2.7 billion US dollars in security assistance to build the capacity of Ukraine’s forces, including more than 650 million US dollars in 2021.\(^{22}\)

During the night of **February 23-24**, as Russian troops were already moving into the neighboring country, Putin announced a "special military operation” in Ukraine. "Irresponsible Western politicians" had created “fundamental threats” by expanding NATO eastwards and, thus, moving military infrastructure closer to Russia’s border. Any further NATO expansion or the “ongoing efforts to gain a military foothold” in Ukraine were “unacceptable.” NATO was just a “tool of US foreign policy.” In “territories adjacent to Russia,” which were “our historical land” to Putin, a hostile “anti-Russia” was taking shape. It was "fully controlled from the outside" and "doing everything to attract NATO armed forces and obtain cutting-edge weapons." The West had now crossed the “red line” that Russia had repeatedly mentioned. To achieve its goals, NATO was "supporting the far-right nationalists and neo-Nazis in Ukraine, those who


\(^{18}\) "Address by the President of the Russian Federation,” Website of the President of Russia, February 21, 2022 [http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67828].

\(^{19}\) “Vladimir Putin answered media questions,” Website of the President of Russia, February 22, 2022 [http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67836].

\(^{20}\) A great resource for all information related to Western sanctions on Russia during its war of aggression against Ukraine is: Chad P. Brown, “Russia's war on Ukraine: A sanctions timeline,” PIIE [https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/russias-war-ukraine-sanctions-timeline].


will never forgive the people of Crimea and Sevastopol for freely making a choice to reunite with Russia. Moscow had to take “bold and immediate action” to “defend” its people, and Putin had decided to “carry out a special military operation.” It sought to “demilitarize and denazify Ukraine, as well as bring to trial those who perpetrated numerous bloody crimes against civilians, including against citizens of the Russian Federation.”

5. Escalatory

Washington was pursuing a “policy of containing Russia, with obvious geopolitical dividends,” Putin added. However, NATO’s policy was for Russia “a matter of life and death.” The Western actions were “not only a very real threat” to Russia’s interests but to “the very existence” of the state and to its “sovereignty,” Putin said. Hence, he addressed “those who may be tempted to interfere in these developments from the outside,” saying that “no matter” who tried to stand in Russia’s way or “create threats for our country and our people,” had to know that “Russia will respond immediately, and the consequences will be such as you have never seen in your entire history” – what many interpreted as a veiled threat to employ nuclear weapons against those who interfered in Russia’s attempt to eliminate an existential threat.

6. Warning

Later in the same speech, Putin also emphasized that Russia was “one of the most powerful nuclear states” and had a “certain advantage in several cutting-edge weapons.” Within this clearly nuclear context, however, the Russian President defined the preconditions for a possible nuclear strike much more narrowly: “There should be no doubt for anyone that any potential aggressor will face defeat and ominous consequences should it directly attack our country.” That a direct attack on Russia could be answered with nuclear weapons was consistent with both Russia’s nuclear doctrine, adopted in 2020, and the declaratory policies of other nuclear powers.


25 “Full text: Putin’s declaration of war on Ukraine,” The Spectator, February 24, 2022 [https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/full-text-putin-s-declaration-of-war-on-ukraine].

### 7. De-escalatory

Representatives of NATO countries strongly condemned the Russian invasion. On **February 24**, US President **Biden** condemned the “brutal assault [by the Russian military] on the people of Ukraine without provocation, without justification, without necessity.” He noted that NATO would convene to “map out the next steps” to “further strengthen all aspects” of the Alliance.”

Biden added: “Our forces are not and will not be engaged in the conflict with Russia in Ukraine. Our forces are not going to Europe to fight in Ukraine but to defend our NATO Allies and reassure those Allies in the east.” However, the United States would “defend every inch of NATO territory with the full force of American power” and the Alliance was “more united and more determined than ever.”

### 8. Warning

Other NATO Allies expressed similar outrage. French Foreign Minister **Jean-Yves Le Drian** called Putin a “cynic” and a “dictator” on **February 24** and issued a first nuclear counter-threat, saying that the Russian President had to understand that the transatlantic Alliance was also a nuclear alliance.”

On **February 25**, Russia vetoed a United Nations Security Council draft resolution submitted by Albania and the United States that would have condemned Russia’s “aggression against Ukraine in violation of Article 2, paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter.”

### 9. De-escalatory

Western statements, in turn, were accompanied by actions, which however remained limited to economic sanctions and military aid. Thus, in the days following the invasion, the United States, the European Union, many other European states, but also Canada, Japan, and Australia, adopted an unprecedented sanctions package against Russia; and on **February 26**, Pentagon Press Secretary **John Kirby** announced “an additional $350 million in military assistance” for Ukraine, “including antiarmor, small arms and various munitions, body armor, and related equipment in support of Ukraine’s front-line defenders facing down Russia’s unprovoked attack.”

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27 “Remarks by President Biden on Russia’s Unprovoked and Unjustified Attack on Ukraine,” Website of the White House, February 24, 2022 [https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/02/24/remarks-by-president-biden-on-russias-unprovoked-and-unjustified-attack-on-ukraine/].

28 “Remarks by President Biden on Russia’s Unprovoked and Unjustified Attack on Ukraine,” Website of the White House, February 24, 2022 [https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/02/24/remarks-by-president-biden-on-russias-unprovoked-and-unjustified-attack-on-ukraine/].

29 “Poutine doit comprendre’ que l’OTAN ‘est une alliance nucléaire’, lance Le Drian (‘Putin must understand’ that NATO ‘is a nuclear alliance,’ says Le Drian),” *Le Figaro*, February 24, 2022 [https://video.lefigaro.fr/figaro/video/poutine-doit-comprendre-que-lotan-est-une-alliance-nucleaire-lance-le-drian/].


Nonetheless, certain Western statements could have been interpreted by Russian policymakers as laying the ground for a direct intervention. British Foreign Secretary Liz Truss said on February 27 that the immense costs of the war could well be the beginning of the end for Putin. She feared, however, that Putin was determined to use the most unsightly means. Thus, she urged Russia, not to escalate the conflict, but noted that the West had to be prepared for Russia trying to use even the worst weapons.

The “long-running conflict” in Ukraine was “about freedom and democracy in Europe,” Truss noted. “If we don’t stop Putin in Ukraine, we are going to see others under threat: the Baltics, Poland, Moldova, and it could end up in a conflict with NATO. We do not want to go there,” she warned, suggesting (intentionally or not) that the Western stakes warranted a direct intervention.

Russia was seemingly unimpressed by the overall Western reaction, but highly sensitive to the British statement. On February 27, Belarus held a referendum to amend its constitution, allowing the previously unconstitutional deployment of nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory. The draft of the new Constitution had already been presented on December 27, 2021. Lukashenko had said that his country would be ready to host Russian nuclear weapons if NATO moved US atomic bombs from Germany to Eastern Europe. "I would offer Putin to return nuclear weapons to Belarus," he had told an interviewer. Back then, Lukashenko was apparently responding to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, who had earlier in November said that the Western military Alliance would need to consider redeploying nuclear weapons east, if the new German government changed the country’s policy on nuclear sharing.

Even more disconcerting than the decision in Minsk, on February 27, Putin ordered Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu and Armed Forces Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov to put Russia’s “deterrence forces,” which include nuclear weapons, on a “high combat alert.” Putin cited “unfriendly economic actions” taken against Russia by Western countries, namely the “illegitimate sanctions,” and “aggressive statements” directed at Russia as reasons for the decision. It was not initially clear what specific steps would accompany this decision.

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35 “Amended Belarusian Constitution would drop country’s goal to be nuclear-free, neutral,” TASS, December 27, 2021 [https://tass.com/world/1381539].

36 Vladimir Isachenkov, “Belarus president offers to host Russian nuclear weapons,” AP News, November 30, 2021 [https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-germany-migration-europe-ab1efae5e65bf01af3be2f6139ef64b].

37 “Meeting with Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov,” Website of the President of Russia, February 27, 2022 [http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67876].

38 “’Abschreckungskräfte’ in Alarmbereitschaft (’Deterrence forces’ on alert),” Tagesschau, February 27, 2022 [https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/europa/putin-atomsstreitkraefte-101.htm].
The West’s reaction was immediate. On the same day, US Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield condemned Putin’s move “in the strongest possible way.” Moscow’s escalation of the war was “unacceptable” and the Russian leader had “tried every means possible to actually put fear in the world,” the ambassador said. The US government had to “ramp up” its efforts at the United Nations and elsewhere to “hold him accountable.”

Stoltenberg expressed similar sentiments. Putin’s nuclear statements were congruent with Russia’s “very aggressive rhetoric,” with which it was trying to threaten Ukraine, but also NATO Allies, and to force the Alliance to withdraw all its forces from Eastern Europe. Russia’s stance only underscored the importance of Allies standing together, Stoltenberg said. This was why the West was supporting Ukraine, but NATO had in recent months and weeks also significantly increased its presence in the Eastern part of the Alliance, Stoltenberg said.

In turn, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba noted that the Russian “alert” decision had followed the announcement of a planned meeting between a Ukrainian and a Russian delegation for talks in Belarus. Accordingly, he interpreted Putin’s move as an attempt to raise the stakes and put additional pressure on the Ukrainian delegation. However, he said, Ukraine would not give in to such pressure. If the

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<th>12. Warning</th>
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<td>Then, on February 28, Shoigu declared that he had implemented Putin’s order by adding additional personnel at various locations – “shifts on duty” at “command posts” had been “put on enhanced combat duty.” Experts consequently classified the decision as largely symbolic.</td>
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<th>13. De-escalatory / warning</th>
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<td>White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki saw the Russian decision as part of a typical pattern of the Kremlin, artificially fabricating threats to justify further aggressive actions. Russia had not been threatened by NATO or Ukraine at any time, she said. The United States had the ability to defend itself, but it also had to speak out against what Putin was doing, Psaki continued, noting that Washington was “open” to providing additional assistance to Ukraine.</td>
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Russian announcement was a direct threat to employ nuclear weapons against Ukraine, such an attack would be a disaster for the world, but it would not break the Ukrainian government’s will, Kuleba said.44

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<td>Also on February 27, as a result of a foreign ministers’ meeting, the European Union announced the delivery of weapons and lethal support to Ukraine worth 450 million euros. In a press conference, Josep Borrell, the European Union’s top diplomat, stated that this would include the delivery of fighter jets, which Ukraine had asked for: “We are going to supply arms and even fighter jets. We are not talking just about ammunition; we are providing the most important arms to go to war,” Borell said. “We know what kind of planes [the Ukrainian army can operate] and some Member States have these kinds of planes.”45 Borell was referring to fighter jets of the Soviet MiG or Sukhoi type, which for example Bulgaria, Croatia, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia reportedly owned.46 Media later suggested that several Western governments had hoped a potential delivery of fighter jets would not be made public.47 In addition, Borell said Poland had agreed to act as a “logistical hub” for the delivery of such “material assistance.”48</td>
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<th>15. Escalatory</th>
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<td>Much more significant than these public statements, however, was the fact that Washington probably warned Moscow on February 28 or March 1 through government channels against using tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine. US media reported this in mid-March, citing statements by US officials from the National Security Council.49</td>
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<td>Russia’s rhetoric, meanwhile, remained unchanged. On February 28, a Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Maria Zakharova, stated in an interview that it would be a “golden dream” for the United States to deploy nuclear weapons in Ukraine.50</td>
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50 “It would be US ‘golden dream’ to have nuclear weapons in Ukraine — diplomat,” TASS, February 28, 2022 [https://tass.com/world/1/4112847](https://tass.com/world/1/4112847)
Also on February 28, Moscow reacted to the February 27 statements of British Foreign Secretary Truss. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov noted that the Russian government believed “statements” on “possible altercations or even collisions and clashes between NATO and Russia” were “absolutely unacceptable.”51

March 2022: Drawing red lines

On March 1, Russia held another military exercise involving nuclear submarines in the Barents Sea and the deployment of mobile intercontinental ballistic missile systems in Siberia.52

In the face of Moscow’s threatening gestures, Western officials sought to simultaneously condemn Russia’s behavior and avoid further escalation.

In a press conference on February 28, US President Joe Biden denied the question of whether Americans should be afraid of nuclear war.53 In his State of the Union address on March 1, he further reiterated that US forces “are not engaged and will not engage in conflict with Russian forces in Ukraine.” Hence: “Our forces are not going to Europe to fight in Ukraine, but to defend our NATO Allies – in the event that Putin decides to keep moving west,” the US President said. He had made “crystal clear the United States and [its] Allies will defend every inch of territory of NATO countries with the full force of our collective power.”54

The West also refrained from taking reciprocal steps in response to Russia’s nuclear alert. On March 1, Stoltenberg condemned Moscow’s “irresponsible” actions, but stressed that NATO would not alter its nuclear alert level. Russia itself had agreed in several statements that a nuclear war could not be won and therefore should never be fought, the NATO Secretary General said. Therefore, the Alliance would not do anything that could escalate the situation further.55 The Commander of the United States Strategic Command, Charles A. Richard, expressed similar views. He was satisfied with the current deployment of the US forces and had made no recommendations to make changes, he explained.56

Also, Western governments seemed bent to keep arms deliveries to Ukraine out of the public focus – presumably to avoid further escalation with Russia. For instance, at a March 1 meeting of the US House

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<td>In a press conference on February 28, US President Joe Biden denied the question of whether Americans should be afraid of nuclear war.53 In his State of the Union address on March 1, he further reiterated that US forces “are not engaged and will not engage in conflict with Russian forces in Ukraine.” Hence: “Our forces are not going to Europe to fight in Ukraine, but to defend our NATO Allies – in the event that Putin decides to keep moving west,” the US President said. He had made &quot;crystal clear the United States and [its] Allies will defend every inch of territory of NATO countries with the full force of our collective power.”54</td>
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52 Vladimir Isachenkov, “Russia holds drills with nuclear subs, land-based missiles,” AP News, March 1, 2022 [https://ap-news.com/article/russia-ukraine-vladimir-putin-business-europe-moscow-563573526a93ea73a95609b8d86db61b9c].


54 “Remarks of President Joe Biden – State of the Union Address As Prepared for Delivery,” Website of the White House, March 1, 2022 [https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/03/01/remarks-of-president-joe-biden-state-of-the-union-address-as-delivered/].


of Representatives Armed Services Committee, two members of the Biden Administration, Jessica Lewis and Mara Karlin, confirmed that the United States had provided lethal support, including Stinger missiles, to Ukraine. There had been no prior statements on this from the White House, Pentagon, or State Department. 57

Russian officials meanwhile kept up their narrative. In a March 1 speech to the Conference on Disarmament, Lavrov said that Ukraine had been seeking to acquire nuclear weapons, a threat that warranted a Russian response. Ukraine still had “Soviet nuclear technologies and the means of delivery of such weapons” and Russia could not “fail to respond to this real danger.” 58

On March 2, the United Nation General Assembly passed a resolution “condemning the decision of the Russian Federation to increase the readiness of its nuclear forces” and demanding that Russia “immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders.” 59

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<td>Just one week after it had been announced, the delivery of fighter jets by EU states was put on hold – apparently also mainly due to efforts to avoid escalation with Russia. For example, at a joint press conference with Stoltenberg on March 2, Polish President Andrzej Duda declared his country was not sending “any jets to Ukraine because that would open a military interference in the Ukrainian conflict.” Poland was “not joining that conflict,” and NATO was “not a party to that conflict.” Warsaw was “supporting Ukrainians with humanitarian aid” but was not “going to send any jets to the Ukrainian airspace.” Stoltenberg made similar comments, noting that the Alliance had provided “different types of military support: material, anti-tank weapons, air defense systems and other types of military equipment” as well as financial support, but that NATO was “not to be part of the conflict” and was “not going to send the troops into Ukraine or move planes into Ukrainian airspace.” According to media reports, Slovakia and Bulgaria also rejected the delivery of MiG fighter jets to Ukraine. 60</td>
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| Last but not least, US Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III on March 2 postponed a planned test launch of the US Minuteman III missile. “Now, in this time of heightened tensions, the United States and other members of the international community rightly saw [Putin’s actions] as dangerous and irresponsible and ... an unnecessary step,” Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby said. “To demon-

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60 “Press conference with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the President of Poland, Andrzej Duda at Lask Military Airbase in Poland,” Website of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, March 1, 2022 [https://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natooh/opinions_192582.htm].

strate that we have no intention of engaging in any actions that can be misunderstood or misconstrued, the secretary of defense has directed that our Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile test launch scheduled for this week to be postponed," he further commented on Austin's decision. "We did not take this decision lightly, but instead to demonstrate that we are a responsible nuclear power."62

Russian policymakers in the meantime sought to dial back earlier narratives and blame the West for the heightened danger of nuclear escalation.

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### Table: De-escalatory

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| **March 2**| Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova expressed skepticism with regard to a possible Russian nuclear escalation. "We assume that this apocalyptic scenario [of Russia using nuclear weapons first] cannot be realized under any pretext and under any conditions," she said. "When it comes to the use of nuclear weapons, we have already stated our position several times. Perhaps you are confusing us with the United States, but the Russian Federation has never spoken about this."63

In a **March 3** interview, Foreign Minister Lavrov stated that the goal of Russia's "military operation" in Ukraine was to prevent Kyiv from acquiring nuclear weapons. In addition, he made somewhat cryptic comments about a possible war with the West, yet arguing that Moscow's nuclear rhetoric was merely a reaction to Western threats. Thus, Lavrov noted that the French Foreign Minister Le Drian had reminded the Russian leadership that France also had nuclear weapons (see February 24). The Russian official also commented that British Foreign Secretary Truss had said "she was prepared for conflict between NATO and Russia" (see February 27). Also, he added that US President Biden had said that the alternative to sanctioning Russia was World War III. "I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the thought of nuclear war is constantly running through the minds of Western politicians but not the minds of Russians," Lavrov concluded. "I assure you that we will not let any provocations cause us to lose our balance. But if a real war is unleashed against us, this must be a concern for those who are hatching such plans. And I believe these plans are being hatched."64

Meanwhile, fighting near Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant during the night of **March 4** highlighted nuclear risks of a different kind as a building next to the power plant caught fire. Against this background, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy urged NATO countries to establish a no-fly zone (NFZ) in Ukraine. This was the only way to guarantee that Russia would not be able to attack any other nuclear facilities, he explained.65

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63 "Россия не хочет воплощения сценария нажатия ядерной кнопки, заявили в МИД (Russia does not want to implement the scenario of pressing the nuclear button, said the Foreign Ministry)," RIA Novosti, March 2, 2022 [https://ria.ru/20220302/mid-1776597080.html?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop], and "Las unidades nacionalistas de Ucrania destruyeron a la población de Donetsk y Luhansk": portavoz del Ministerio de Exteriores de Rusia ("Ukrainian nationalist units ravaged the population of Donetsk and Luhansk": Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson)." La W Radio, March 2, 2022 [https://www.wradio.com.co/2022/03/02/las-unidades-nacionalistas-de-ucrania-destruyeron-donetsk-y-luhansk-portavoz-del-ministerio-de-exteriores-de-rusia/].


65 "We have survived the night that could have stopped the history of Ukraine and Europe - address by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy," Website of the President of Ukraine, March 4, 2022 [https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/mi-perezhili-nich-yaka-mogla-zupiniti-istoriyu-ukrayini-ta-y-73337].
22. De-escalatory

Zelenskyy’s NFZ request was however denied at an extraordinary NATO foreign ministers’ meeting to address the situation in Ukraine on March 4 – with reference to the associated risk of escalation. In the press conference that followed the summit, Stoltenberg condemned Russia’s “irresponsible” actions near the Zaporizhzhia nuclear facility. However, he stressed that NATO was “not part of this conflict” and was not seeking war with Russia. The Alliance had a responsibility to ensure that the conflict did not escalate and spread, he said. That scenario would be even more destructive and dangerous. Stoltenberg also said that NATO continued to believe in arms control, but that such negotiations would require a Russian regime that takes political processes seriously. According to Stoltenberg, the Allies had rejected the establishment of a no-fly zone because such a direct engagement of NATO states could lead to a larger war in Europe.


68 “We continue to fight, we will protect our state and liberate our lands thanks to our heroes - address by the President of Ukraine,” Website of the President of Ukraine, March 4, 2022 [https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/mi-prodovzhuemo-borotysya-mi-zahistimo-nashu-derzhavu-i-zvi-73357].

69 Tweet by @ABaerbock, Twitter, March 4, 2022 [https://twitter.com/ABaerbock/status/1499818157053255684].

23. Warning

Putin warned on March 5 against the establishment of a no-fly zone. This would have “tremendous and disastrous consequences” – “not only for Europe but also globally.” Russia would consider the states seeking to impose a NFZ as parties to the conflict. Similar to Lavrov, Putin also claimed that Ukraine was trying to obtain nuclear weapons and still had relevant capabilities from Soviet times. He described the Western sanctions against Russia as tantamount to “war,” even though “thankfully” the conflict had “not got” to a hot war “yet.” Putin explained that Russia’s “so-called partners” understood what a NFZ “could lead to” and how much was at stake, “despite their reckless statements, for example, like the statement made by the UK Foreign Secretary, when she blurted out that NATO could get involved in the conflict. And we immediately had to take a decision to put our deterrence forces on high alert” (see Truss on February 27 and Lavrov’s statement on March 3).

Meanwhile, views on a no-fly zone remained unchanged in both Ukraine and within NATO. Zelenskyy repeated his demand on March 5 and 6. On March 6, Baerbock again explained her reasons for rejecting a NFZ. In the current situation, one was forced to choose “between plague and cholera,” the foreign minister said. The situation in Ukraine was heartbreaking, and yet one could not justify a “spillover of this war to Poland, to the Baltic states.” She repeated that it was necessary to “keep a cool head.” A no-fly zone would mean that “NATO planes would shoot down Russian planes.” One would then be “directly involved in this war,” Baerbock said. The European governments also had a responsibility for Europeans and for ensuring that the war did not turn into a third world war, the minister stressed.

However, Ukrainian demands for fighter jets resurfaced in Western debates. On March 6, US Secretary of State Blinken stated that the United States was in “very active discussions” with Poland on the extent to which Washington could supply US fighter jets to Warsaw to fill the resulting gap if Poland chose “to provide [MiG] fighter jets to the Ukrainians.” For the US government, a deal in which the United States would compensate Poland for supplying MiGs to Ukraine represented an acceptable alternative to direct US deliveries to Kyiv. The latter could be seen by Russia as an escalation, US media reported, citing statements by three anonymous officials within the Biden Administration. A Polish decision to deliver MiGs, to which Washington could supply US fighter jets to Warsaw to fill the resulting gap if Poland chose “to be off the table again. On March 8, Polish Foreign Minister Zbigniew Rau announced that Poland was ready “immediately and free of charge” to transfer all its MiG-29 jets to Ramstein Air Base and “place them at the disposal of the Government of the United States of America.” In exchange, Warsaw was requesting Washington to provide “used aircraft with corresponding operational capabilities.” However, the Polish initiative had not been coordinated with the US government, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland said the same day. Hours later, Pentagon spokesman Kirby rejected the proposal as not “tenable.” The “prospect” of fighter jets “at the disposal of the Government of the United States of America” departing from “a US/NATO base in Germany to fly into airspace that is contested with Russia over Ukraine raises serious concerns for the entire NATO alliance,” Kirby said. The decision about “whether to transfer Polish-owned planes to Ukraine” was “ultimately one for the Polish government.”

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71 “I am sure that soon we will be able to tell our people: come back, because there is no more threat - address by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy,” Website of the President of Ukraine, March 5, 2022 [https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/ypevnenij-sho-vzhe-skorom-smozhemo-skazati-nashim-lyudям-73365], and “Ukraine receives support from partners backed by concrete steps - address by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy,” Website of the President of Ukraine, March 6, 2022 [https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/ukrayina-otreatse-vyd-partneriv-pidtrimku-pidkriplenu-konkre-73377].


73 “Secretary Blinken With Margaret Brennan of CBS News,” Website of the US Department of State, March 6, 2022 [https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-on-cbs-face-the-nation-with-margaret-brennan].


Also on March 8, the US House of Representatives Select Intelligence Committee held a hearing to assess Russia’s nuclear threats. At that hearing, Avril Haines, the Director of National Intelligence, stated that Russia had probably underestimated the international response to the invasion of Ukraine. Still, Putin was unlikely to be deterred by such blowback. Instead, he might escalate further to force a disarmament of Ukraine and its neutrality, and to prevent Kyiv from moving any closer to the United States or to NATO. The US intelligence community assessed that Putin perceived the West as not respecting him enough. The Russian president probably thought he could not afford to lose this war, Haines said. What kind of victory he was willing to accept might change over time, due to the war’s significant costs, she noted.

Putin’s nuclear saber rattling fit this assessment very well, Haines added. Nonetheless, the public announcement of a heightened alert of Russian deterrent forces was highly unusual. The United States had not seen such public pronouncements since the 1960s, Haines pointed out. But the US intelligence community had not observed any specific adjustments in Russia’s nuclear forces, going beyond what had occurred in previous moments of heightened tensions in recent decades. Putin’s nuclear threatening gestures were likely intended to discourage the West from providing additional support to Ukraine, Haines said. Putin was probably still confident that Russia could defeat Ukraine and wanted to prevent Western support that could tip the balance and force a conflict with NATO, she concluded.  

Meanwhile, the failed MiG deal was again the subject of a March 9 telephone conversation between Austin and Polish Defense Minister Mariusz Błaszczak. In the subsequent press conference, spokesman Kirby reiterated the US government’s opposition to the Polish proposal. He said that the US did not currently support the transfer of more fighter aircraft to the Ukrainian Air Force and therefore had no desire to have Polish jets placed under US custody. Kirby cited three reasons for this: “First, we believe the best way to support Ukrainian defense is by providing them the weapons and the systems that they need most to defeat Russian aggression. In particular, anti-armor, and air defense. [...] Secondly, Ukrainian Air Force currently has several squadrons of fully mission capable aircraft. We assess that adding aircraft to the Ukrainian inventory is not likely to significantly change the effectiveness of the Ukrainian Air Force relative to Russian capabilities.” Finally, “the intelligence community has assessed the transfer of MIG-29s to Ukraine may be mistaken as escalatory. And could result in significant Russian reaction that might increase the prospects of a military escalation with NATO” Kirby added. Thus, providing additional combat aircraft offered “little increased capabilities at high risk.”

On March 9, German Chancellor Scholz also rejected the delivery of fighter jets to Ukraine from the Ramstein Air Base in Germany. He said it was necessary to consider very carefully what could be done concretely to support Ukraine – “and that certainly does not include fighter jets,” the chancellor said in a joint press conference with Canadian President Justin Trudeau, who agreed: All actors had to be very careful in order to avoid contributing to escalation and to an expansion of the conflict.


Meanwhile, Zelenskyy thanked Poland for the proposed alternative solution in a March 9 address and called on the countries involved to resolve the purely "technical issue" of the delivery procedure "immediately." Human lives were at stake, he said. In an interview, the Ukrainian president added that he thought Russia's nuclear threats were a "bluff." It was one thing to be a "murderer." It was another thing to be suicidal. Any use of nuclear weapons spelled the end for everyone involved – not just the actor using them first. Putin's threat displayed weakness. "One threatens to use nuclear weapons only when all else fails," Zelenskyy said. "I am sure that Russia is aware of the disastrous consequences of attempting to use nuclear weapons."82

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<td>In turn, Kremlin spokesperson Peskov warned at a March 9 press conference against the use of &quot;any other airfields&quot; for military aircraft takeoffs. This was &quot;an extremely undesirable and potentially dangerous scenario.&quot;83</td>
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On March 10, anonymous sources leaked to the media that the government in Warsaw had proposed to deliver MiGs via Ramstein out of fear of possible Russian military strikes – potentially nuclear – on Polish military bases. However, with the US equally unwilling to take on additional escalation risks, the West instead decided to supply air defense systems to Ukraine.84

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<td>The Commander of the United States European Command Tod Wolters indeed expressed such escalation concerns on March 10. MiGs would &quot;not appreciably increase the effectiveness of the Ukrainian Air Force&quot; as it already owned &quot;numerous mission capable aircraft&quot; that were &quot;flying daily.&quot; And: The US intelligence community assessed that the transfer could be &quot;mistaken as escalatory and could result in Russian escalation with NATO,&quot; which would produce &quot;a high risk scenario.&quot;85</td>
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The US government had a "tight rope to walk – support Ukraine, keep the coalition (NATO/EU) together, and not provoke a mercurial Putin," former US Director of National Intelligence James Clapper explained in an interview. After all, the "Russian threshold for using nuclear weapons [was] lower." However, Clapper expressed incomprehension at the strict rejection of MiG deliveries. After all, he said, Washington was already supplying thousands of Stinger and Javelin missiles to Ukraine, "which are responsible for the deaths of thousands of Russian soldiers – which would seem to violate Putin's 'red line' already."86

81 "Ukrainians withstood and inspired the whole world with their determination" address by President Volodymyr Zelensky, Website of the President of Ukraine, March 9, 2022 [https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/ukrayinci-vistoyali-j-nadzhnuli-ves-svit-svoyeyu-rishchitchyi-73457].

82 "Wenn die Ukraine bei dir ist, fühlst du dich sicher (When Ukraine is with you, you feel safe)," Die Zeit, March 9, 2022 [https://www.zeit.de/2022/11/wolodymyr-zelenskyj-ukraine-russland-krieg-interview/seite-2].

83 "Peskov calls possibility of other countries using their airfields to support Ukraine a potentially dangerous scenario," Interfax, March 9, 2022 [https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/76036/].


Statements by Western leaders shed additional light on NATO’s dilemma. In an interview on March 11, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson noted that any head of state in Zelenskyy’s position would call for a no-fly zone; and yet, the United Kingdom could not agree to such a demand. There was “a line” beyond which the United Kingdom and NATO would be deemed to be in direct conflict with Russia. To implement a no-fly zone, UK pilots would have to shoot down Russian warplanes, Johnson said. It was “agonizing,” but “everything” had to be done to avert such a scenario, as it would involve “two P5 nuclear powers.”

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| On the same day, Biden also stressed that while the United States would “defend every inch of NATO territory with the full might of a united and galvanized NATO,” Washington would “not fight a war against Russia in Ukraine.” The reason: “A direct confrontation between NATO and Russia is World War III. And something we must strive to prevent.”

The United States had a “sacred obligation on NATO territory — a sacred obligation — Article 5,” but Washington would “not fight the third World War in Ukraine,” Biden added at a political event. |

These caveats notwithstanding, the West agreed on further military assistance to Ukraine. On March 11, Josep Borrell said that the European Union would provide another 500 million euros worth of military assistance to Kyiv. The following day, Blinken also announced further US support of up to 200 million US dollars.

As Russia’s threats appeared to succeed in deterring the delivery of fighter jets to Ukraine, however, officials in Moscow began to link other arms deliveries to potential escalation. For instance, on March 12, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov told an interviewer that Moscow had warned the United States that orchestrating the delivery of weapons from a number of countries to Ukraine was not only a “dangerous move,” but it would render the “convoys” “legitimate targets.”


88 Tweet by @POTUS, Twitter, March 11, 2022 [https://twitter.com/potus/status/1502353759455821833].


Around the world, many worried about the crisis’ dangers. UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres on March 14 noted the potential for escalation in the current situation. Thus, he warned that a nuclear conflict was again "within the realm of possibility" and that raising the alert of Russian nuclear forces had been a “bone-chilling development.”

Regardless, on March 15, in an unprecedented show of solidarity, the prime ministers of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia, as well as Polish Deputy Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński, traveled to Kyiv, where they met with Zelenskyy and Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmzgal.

### Warning

| 28. | In this context, Kaczyński made a renewed push for direct Western support for Ukraine, calling for “a peacekeeping mission from NATO, or even possibly from a larger international structure, but a mission that will be able to defend itself and that will operate on Ukrainian territory.”

This proposal was met by a mixed response. Ahead of an extraordinary NATO defense ministers’ meeting on March 16, Danish Defense Minister Morten Bødskov said the Danish government was “ready to contribute soldiers” to such a peacekeeping mission “if it can help put an end to this bloody war.” German Defense Minister Christine Lambrecht, however, expressed caution. “This is not a war in which NATO is involved,” she said. It was necessary to “prevent a conflagration” and to “keep a cool head to ensure that this war does not become a NATO war.” Nevertheless, she said, a very intensive discussion was needed about what constitutes “credible deterrence” and what would be “required” to achieve it. “Even if there is no evidence so far that the alliance territory is under attack, we cannot rule it out,” the minister stressed.

### De-escalatory

| 29. | In the press conference following the NATO defense ministers’ meeting on March 16, however, there was no mention of the Polish proposal for a peacekeeping mission. Stoltenberg said Allies were united in their support for Ukraine, but they were equally united in saying that “NATO should not deploy forces on the ground or in the airspace of Ukraine.” This is because they “have a responsibility to ensure that this conflict, this war, doesn’t escalate beyond Ukraine.” NATO would “not tolerate any attack on Allied sovereignty or territorial integrity,” he stressed. In this context, Stoltenberg announced a "reset" of the Alliance’s “collective defense and deterrence for the longer term.” Above all, NATO’s eastern flank should be strengthened. Referring to the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, which had ruled out the permanent stationing of NATO troops on the territory of the former Warsaw Pact states, he stressed that today we were in a “totally different security environment.” The Alliance would not let this document “create problems or hindrance for NATO to make the necessary deci-

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93 "Secretary-General’s remarks to the Press on the war in Ukraine [as delivered]," Website of the United Nations, March 14, 2022 [https://www.un.org/sg/en/node/262376].


sions.” In light of Putin’s nuclear threats, Stoltenberg warned, one should “not underestimate the dangers related to the military capabilities of Russia, including the will to actually use force and impulse devastation and destruction on others.” NATO would do everything necessary “to make sure that there is no room for misunderstanding in Moscow, for miscalculation in Moscow about our commitment, readiness to protect and defend all allies and every inch of NATO territory.” In addition, he explained, ministers had decided to provide significant support to Ukraine.90

Also on March 16, in an emotional speech to the US Congress, Zelenskyy campaigned for the establishment of a no-fly zone or, alternatively, the delivery of S-300 air defense systems to Ukraine.99 And indeed on the same day, Biden announced an additional military support package for Kyiv, including “800 anti-aircraft systems to make sure the Ukrainian military can continue to ... stop the planes and helicopters that have been attacking their people and to defend their Ukrainian airspace.”100 According to the White House, the 800 million US dollars package included additional 800 Stinger and 2,000 Javelin air defense systems and 100 advanced guided missiles.101

| Russian rhetoric, meanwhile, remained aggressive. In a videoconference with representatives of Russian regional governments on March 16, Putin leveled serious accusations against Western states. The West, he said, wanted to “cancel” Russia, “to finish [it] off, to reduce [it] to nothing by turning [it] into a weak and dependent country, destroying [its] territorial integrity and dismembering Russia.” But this would not work, the West would “fail,” Putin stressed. He also again described Western sanctions as having “all the attributes of an aggression, a war.” This comparison could be interpreted as a potential legitimization for further Russian aggression, or even for threats involving nuclear weapons. |

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Against the backdrop of continued Russian rhetoric, US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan spoke with his Russian counterpart, Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of the Russian Federation Security Council on March 16. In this context, Sullivan warned Moscow “about consequences and implications of any possible Russian decision to use chemical or biological weapons in Ukraine.”103


100 “Remarks by President Biden on the Assistance the United States is Providing to Ukraine,” Website of the White House, March 16, 2022 [https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/03/16/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-assistance-the-united-states-is-providing-to-ukraine/].


102 “Meeting on socioeconomic support for regions,” Website of the President of Russia, March 16, 2022 [http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67996].

On March 17, Zelenskyy continued his political campaign for additional support for Ukraine. In a speech to the German Bundestag, he urged the German government to take “the leadership role that Germany deserves” and called on members of the Bundestag to provide more aid to Kyiv. In particular, he said, Germany should trade less with Russia and support Ukraine’s EU accession plans. He also indirectly asked for a no-fly zone.104

The response remained muted. In a joint press conference with NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg, Scholz promised Germany would “continue to stand by the brave Ukrainians in defending their country and resisting Russian aggression – with financial means, with humanitarian aid, but also by supplying military equipment.” However, he stressed, “it should also be clearly stated: NATO will not intervene militarily in this war.”105 Stoltenberg expressed a similar view. NATO had “a responsibility to prevent this conflict from escalating further. That would be even more dangerous. And would cause more suffering, death and destruction.”106

On March 17, the issue of MiG deliveries came up again. At a press briefing with US Defense Secretary Austin, Slovak Defense Minister Jaroslav Nad’ said the jets and their possible replacement with newer US aircraft had been part of the conversation with Austin.107

US intelligence agencies, meanwhile, expected Russian reliance upon nuclear deterrence to increase. On March 17, US Defense Intelligence Agency Director Lt. Gen. Scott Berrier submitted a written statement noting that “this war and its consequences slowly weaken Russian conventional strength.” As a result, “Russia likely will increasingly rely on its nuclear deterrent to signal the West and project strength to its internal and external audiences.”108

Possibly also against the background of this assessment and referring to the Polish proposal of a NATO peacekeeping mission, US Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield stressed again on March 20 that there would be no American ground troops in Ukraine. “We don’t want to escalate this into a war with the United States, but we will support our NATO allies,” Thomas-Greenfield explained, reiterating a repeatedly stated US position. Nevertheless, “other NATO countries may decide that they want to put troops inside of Ukraine,” she further explained. And: “If there is an attack on any of our NATO countries under Article 5, ... we will support those countries and defend those countries,” she affirmed, noting that the United States had troops in NATO countries.109

104 Volodymyr Zelensky, “Selenskyj Rede vor dem Bundestag im Wortlaut (Zelenskyj’s speech to the Bundestag verbatim),” Zeit Online, March 17, 2022 [https://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2022-03/volodymyr-selenskyj-rede-bundestag-ukraine].


Stoltenberg gave a similarly cautious reply on **March 20**, when asked whether a potential Russian use of chemical weapons would change NATO’s position on a no-fly zone. “Allies support Ukraine, but at the same time it is extremely important that we prevent this conflict from becoming a full-fledged war between NATO and Russia, because that will cause much more damage,” he explained. “Russia is a nuclear power,” Stoltenberg stressed. Putin was spreading “dangerous nuclear rhetoric” and the Alliance’s main responsibility was to protect one billion people living in NATO countries, he said. However, the use of chemical weapons would be “a blatant and brutal violation of international law.”

### Table 31. Warning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Against this background, Russia seemed bent to signal resolve by choosing to employ new types of nuclear-capable weapons. According to Russian media, Moscow employed a new Kinzhal hypersonic missile for the first time in Ukraine on <strong>March 18-20</strong> – a nuclear-capable missile, but carrying a conventional warhead.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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### Table 32. De-escalatory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The US government appeared unimpressed. On <strong>March 20</strong>, US Defense Secretary Austin explained that Putin was using these weapons because he was trying to “reestablish some momentum.” As for Moscow’s nuclear threats, Austin stressed, “any threat of the use of a nuclear weapon ... is very dangerous.” However, he remained “confident” that the United States could defend itself as well as its allies and partners. Russia’s nuclear rhetoric was “not helpful,” but he was taking it seriously. A potential use of chemical weapons by Russia, Austin said, would draw a “significant reaction from not only the United States, but also the global community.” However, he would “not speculate about what exactly would change [the US calculus].”</th>
</tr>
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### Table 33. De-escalatory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Once again, some Russian officials started to walk back their government’s nuclear narratives. For instance, in a <strong>March 22</strong> interview, Kremlin spokesman Peskov again claimed that Ukraine had sought to develop nuclear weapons. However, when asked whether Putin would use nuclear weapons, he merely referred to Russia’s official doctrine, according to which nuclear weapons could be used only in the event of an “existential threat” to Russia. There was no other reasons than the ones mentioned in the doctrine, he stressed. Nonetheless, he avoided a definitive answer on whether Russia was considering using nuclear weapons in the current situation. On the same day, Sergey Ryabkov toed this line. “The question of potential use of [Russia’s] military nuclear potential [was] completely tied to the corresponding clauses of the Russian military doctrine and corresponding points of the basics of state policy on nuclear deterrence.” Russia had “an extremely responsible approach to this matter” and would “never escalate anything.”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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112“Austin vows ‘significant reaction’ if Russia uses chemical or biological in Ukraine,” *CBS News*, March 20, 2022 [https://www.cbsnews.com/video/austin-vows-significant-reaction-if-russia-uses-chemical-or-biological-in-ukraine/#s].


114“Russia adheres to responsible approach to matter of use of nuclear weapons — diplomat,” *TASS*, March 22, 2022 [https://tass.com/politics/1425609].
### 34. Warning

The very next day, however, Russian officials again warned of a possible NATO-Russia confrontation should there be a NATO peacekeeping mission in Ukraine. This “would be a very reckless and extremely dangerous decision,” Peskov explained. Any possible contact between Russian and NATO forces “could have clear consequences that would be hard to repair,” he continued. Lavrov expressed similar sentiments: “This would be the direct clash between the Russian and NATO armed forces that everyone has not only tried to avoid but said should not take place in principle,” the Russian minister concluded. Later, on March 23, Medvedev said the United States had conspired to destroy Russia as part of a “primitive game” since the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union. The Kremlin would never allow the destruction of Russia, he added, but warned Washington that if it did achieve what he characterized as its destructive aims, then the world could face a dystopian crisis that would end in a “big nuclear explosion.” Russia’s destruction could lead to an unstable leadership in Moscow “with a maximum number of nuclear weapons aimed at targets in the United States and Europe.” Dmitry Rogozin, the head of the state aerospace corporation, Roscosmos, said that Russia’s nuclear arsenal would help deter the West from intervening in Ukraine. Russia was “capable of physically destroying any aggressor or any aggressor group within minutes at any distance.”

### 35. Escalatory

On the same day, on March 23, US media reports suggested a marked hardening in US rhetoric regarding a potential Russian nuclear use. According to a Biden administration official, the US president “remained adamant about keeping American forces out of Ukraine.” Yet “it would be misguided not to closely examine the thresholds, if any, under which the president would reverse himself.” Even the use of sub-strategic nuclear weapons inside Ukraine “would mean that ‘all bets are off’ on the United States and NATO staying out of the war,” a senior official reportedly said. Similarly, Democratic Senator and Armed Services Committee Chairman Jack Reed also suggested that a Russian attack with chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons of mass destruction in Ukraine would have “consequences.” A nuclear attack inside Ukraine could even “be considered an attack on a NATO member,” if nuclear radiation were to be blown into a NATO state, he reportedly added. However, according to US officials, the Biden administration so far considered the likelihood of a nuclear attack to be low. Neither the US nor NATO had observed any military actions indicating Russia was preparing a nuclear strike, said a senior official. “We haven’t seen anything that’s made us adjust our posture, our nuclear posture,” National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan also confirmed.

### 36. Warning

France appeared similarly undaunted by Russia’s threats. Notwithstanding the level of tensions, the French Defense Ministry announced on March 23 that it had conducted a test of a nuclear-armed

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118 Nebi Qena and Cara Anna, “NATO: 7,000 to 15,000 Russian troops dead in Ukraine,” AP News, March 24, 2022 [https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-zelenskyy-kyiv-europe-nato-e35e54b40359e5213ff4d4911577b609a].

air-launched missile as planned. According to later media reports, the French armed forces also deployed three of their four nuclear submarines around the same time. French experts suggested this was done to protect the submarines from a potential Russian nuclear strike on French naval bases.

Ahead of an extraordinary NATO summit on March 24, NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg appeared much more determined than before as well. In a press conference on March 23, he stressed the Alliance was not only “ready … to protect and defend Allies” but also “ready to respond massively to any potential threat or attack against any NATO Allied country.” NATO has “deployed a substantial number of combat-ready troops to the eastern part of the Alliance” and “on top of that, increased the presence by the United States and others within the bilateral arrangements.” At the extraordinary summit, Stoltenberg declared, Allies would further agree to deploy “four more battlegroups to Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania” and to substantially increase their long-term presence as part of the previously announced deterrence and defense “reset” of the Alliance. Russia had to stop its “dangerous” and “irresponsible” nuclear saber rattling, Stoltenberg continued. NATO was sending Russia a “very clear message … that a nuclear war cannot be won and should never be fought,” he said. The war in Ukraine had to end, “because we need to do everything we can to prevent the war from escalating beyond Ukraine and becoming even more deadly and even more dangerous,” he stressed.

37.

### Warning

Echoing earlier statements from US officials, Stoltenberg also declared that “any use of nuclear weapons” would “fundamentally change the nature of the conflict.” Similarly, any chemical weapons use would be “absolutely unacceptable,” “a blatant violation of international law” with “severe consequences,” and would “fundamentally change the nature of the conflict.” Any use of chemical weapons would be “absolutely unacceptable.” On the following day, Biden echoed this sentiment, stating that a Russian use of chemical weapons “would trigger a response in kind.”

A growing rhetorical confrontation ensued. In an apparent parallel to Russia’s nuclear doctrine, according to which nuclear weapons could be used in case of an existential threat, Vladimir Medinsky, a member of Russia’s presidential administration declared on March 24 that the West was “pushing Russia towards destruction.” “The very existence of Russia as a Russian civilization is at stake today,” he declared. On March 25, Lavrov commented on Western sanctions against Russia, claiming that “a genuine hybrid war, a ‘total war’” had been declared against Russia. “This term … is now pronounced by many European politicians when talking about what they want to do with Russia,” he said and added,

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120 Tweet by @Armees_Gouv, Twitter, March 23, 2022 [

121 Michaela Wiegel, “Frankreich schickt drei Atom-U-Boote zu Manövern (France sends three nuclear submarines on maneuvers),” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, March 24, 2022 [

122 “Press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg previewing the extraordinary Summit of NATO Heads of State and Government,” Website of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, March 23, 2022, [

123 “Remarks by President Biden in Press Conference,” Website of the White House, March 24, 2022, [

124 “Мединский: Запад подталкивает Россию к разрушению политической системы и всей страны (Medinsky: The West is pushing Russia to destroy the political system and the entire country),” TASS, March 24, 2022 [
the goals are not concealed, they are publicly announced, that is to destroy, devastate, ruin, and suffocate the Russian economy and Russia as a whole.”

<table>
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<tr>
<th>38.</th>
<th>Warning</th>
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<tr>
<td>On March 26, Medvedev once again emphasized the expansive nature of Russia’s nuclear doctrine. According to its own “special document on nuclear deterrence,” Moscow was “entitled” to use nuclear weapons in four instances. The fourth case was when “an act of aggression” was “committed against Russia and its allies, which jeopardized the existence of the country itself, even without the use of nuclear weapons, that is, with the use of conventional weapons.” The Russian government possessed a “determination to defend the independence, sovereignty of our country, not to give anyone a reason to doubt even the slightest that we are ready to give a worthy response to any infringement on our country, on its independence.”</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

The verbal escalation continued. Also on March 26, at a meeting with Ukrainian refugees in Poland, Biden called Putin a “butcher.” In a subsequent speech at Warsaw’s Royal Palace, he went further declaring, “for God’s sake, this man [Putin] cannot remain in power” and describing NATO’s mutual assistance clause, Article 5, a “sacred obligation.” This statement, which seemed to indicate a shift in US goals towards a policy of regime change vis-à-vis Moscow, caused a stir among observers and was promptly walked back by the Biden administration. “He was not discussing Putin’s power in Russia, or regime change,” explained a White House official. US Secretary of State Blinken made similar comments on the same day. “I think the President, the White House made the point last night that, quite simply, President Putin cannot be empowered to wage war or engage in aggression against Ukraine or anyone else,” declared Blinken. “We do not have a strategy of regime change in Russia or anywhere else ... It’s up to the Russian people.” However, the United States have “a strategy to strongly support Ukraine ... to put unprecedented pressure on Russia ... to make sure that we’re providing all of the humanitarian support that we can, and ... to reinforce NATO.” This position was reiterated by US Permanent Representative to NATO Julianne Smith on March 27. “Let me be clear ... the US does not have a policy of regime change towards Russia, but ... Putin cannot be empowered to wage war,” she emphasized.

Also on March 27, Russia carried out a missile attack near the Polish NATO border – an area where Western weapons were reportedly being brought into Ukraine.

125 “Lavrov slams all-out sanctions spree, says West’s values ‘aren’t worth a red cent’,” TASS, March 25, 2022 [https://tass.com/politics/1427557].


128 “Remarks by President Biden on the United Efforts of the Free World to Support the People of Ukraine,” Website of the White House, March 26, 2022 [https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/03/26/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-united-efforts-of-the-free-world-to-support-the-people-of-ukraine/].


On the same day, March 27, in a detailed interview, Zelenskyy laid out Ukraine’s position regarding potential negotiations with Russia. Kyiv, he said, was ready to talk about security guarantees and neutrality. However, such guarantees could not “become just another paper like the Budapest Memorandum,” he stressed. The document “should be signed by all of the security guarantors” and “ratified by the parliaments of the guarantor countries.” In addition, it was “imperative that there be a referendum in Ukraine,” since such a change in status would require a constitutional amendment, which could only be implemented relatively quickly, that is within a few months, by means of a referendum, explained Zelenskyy. Yet, as long as Russian troops were in Ukraine, no security guarantor would sign such a document, nor would a potential Ukrainian referendum be legitimate. Zelenskyy also expressed skepticism regarding the Polish push for a peacekeeping mission in Ukraine. This had been “entirely Poland’s idea” and he did not “completely understand the proposal at the moment.” Ukraine did not need “a stagnant conflict on [its] territory,” he explained. Further, the Ukrainian President rejected Russian claims that Kyiv possessed biological or chemical weapons. “We’d love to, but there’s nothing here,” he stated. If he had been in power when Ukraine “signed away all its interests,” he “would not have given up everything.” Asked about the Ukrainian war aims, Zelenskyy explained that Kyiv wanted to “minimize the number of deaths and reduce the duration of this war” as well as bring about a withdrawal of the Russian troops to the “compromise territories,” that is to where they were before the February 24 attack. “I understand that forcing Russia to completely let the territory go is impossible, it would lead to World War III,” he declared.133

On March 28, Biden qualified his controversial remarks in Poland that Putin could not remain in power. He had merely expressed his “moral outrage” and “personal feelings” about Putin’s “actions” and his “brutality.” He “wasn’t … articulating a policy change.” Putin “shouldn’t remain in power. Just like … had people shouldn’t continue to do bad things. But it doesn’t mean [that Washington has] a fundamental policy to do anything to take Putin down in any way,” Biden emphasized. Putin’s behavior was “totally unacceptable,” he said. But the way to deal with this was to “keep NATO completely united and to help Ukraine where we can.” After repeated inquiries about a possible US regime change policy, Biden pointed to the escalation risks of such a strategy: “The last thing I want to do is engage in a land war or a nuclear war with Russia,” the US president stressed. People like Putin should not “be ruling countries, but they do” and he had merely expressed his indignation about this. Asked to clarify his statement that a Russian use of chemical weapons would “trigger a response in kind,” Biden said that such an act would “trigger a significant response.” He refused to say what exactly that meant, however, because “then Russia knows the response.”134

### De-escalatory

| Biden’s controversial remarks did not result in an escalation of Russian nuclear rhetoric. On March 28, Kremlin spokesperson Peskov did emphasize that Biden’s statements about Putin were “alarming,” a “personal insult” and “unacceptable.” “It’s not for the United States’ president to decide who is going to be and who is the president of Russia, it is the people of Russia who decide it during elections,” he explained. However, in the same interview Peskov also clarified and revised previous nuclear threats, citing Russian doctrine. “Any outcome” of Russia’s operation in Ukraine “of course, is not a reason for usage of a nuclear weapon,” he said. Russia, he said, had a security concept that “very clearly states that only when there is a threat for the existence of the state in our country, we can use

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and we will actually use nuclear weapons to eliminate the threat for the existence of our country.” “Let’s keep these two things separate... the existence of the state and the special military operation in Ukraine,” Peskov said. “They have nothing to do with each other.”

Nevertheless, the Kremlin spokesman also recalled “the initial statement of [Putin] ... when he ordered the operation on the 24th February,” in which he warned various states “not to interfere in affairs between Ukraine and Russia during this operation.” “Everyone understands what he meant [by that],” Peskov declared. When asked if that meant Putin would use nuclear weapons if a third country intervened in Ukraine, he said, “I don’t think so,” although Putin had made it clear that no one should interfere. If anyone did, Peskov explained, Russia had “all the possibilities to prevent that and punish all those who are going to interfere.” However, “no one is thinking about using, not even about the idea of using a nuclear weapon.”

Asked about a scenario in which Russia might send troops to or bomb a NATO country, Peskov remained cautious: “If it’s not a reciprocal act, so if they don’t make us do that, we cannot think about that and we do not want to think about that.” 135

At negotiations in Istanbul on March 29, Ukrainian representatives submitted a proposal on what Ukrainian neutrality, one of Moscow’s key demands, might look like. Accordingly, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Turkey, Germany, Canada, Poland, and Israel would have to offer a pledge mirroring NATO’s Article 5 to respond to any attack on Ukraine’s sovereignty. Ukrainian negotiator David Arakhamia called this a “Ukrainian NATO” that would ensure a “fortified neutrality status.” 136

At first sight, the Russian side appeared to react favorably to the Ukrainian proposal, with Russian Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin presenting the Istanbul negotiations as a reason to “radically ... reduce military activity in the Kiev and Chernigov direction.” This measure was meant to “increase mutual trust and create the necessary conditions for further negotiations,” he explained. 137 This was “not a ceasefire,” however, stressed Presidential Administration member Medinsky. 138

On the same day, Pentagon spokesman Kirby confirmed that some Russian troops were indeed withdrawing from the Ukrainian capital. However, Kirby did not interpret this as a full-fledged withdrawal, but rather as a redeployment in preparation for the next offensive. “We believe that this is a repositioning, not a real withdrawal, and that we all should be prepared to watch for a major offensive against other areas of Ukraine,” he explained. The threat to Kyiv was not over, he added. 139

135 “Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov on Ukraine and the West: ‘Don’t push us into the corner’,” YouTube account of PBS NewsHour, March 29, 2022 [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6xHmgTRkn6M], and “No one in Russia is thinking about using nuclear weapons, Kremlin spokesman says,” TASS, March 29, 2022 [https://tass.com/politics/1428619].


137 Daria Markina, “Russia says it will "drastically reduce" military assault on Kyiv and Chernihiv,” CNN, March 29, 2022 [https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-putin-news-03-29-22/h_05b5d5f7d38ed2bd90c0be7f3481f4a].

138 “It’s now 10 p.m. in Kyiv. Here are the latest developments in the war in Ukraine,” CNN, March 29, 2022 [https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-putin-news-03-29-22/h_7b383b79948b68802fde94f4d50e].

The reaction of the states expected to underpin Ukraine’s neutrality, however, remained cautious. According to media reports, France seemed open to some kind of guaranteed neutrality status, but not to a mutual assistance clause along the lines of NATO’s Article 5. Similarly, British Justice Minister Dominic Raab stated in a March 30 interview that the United Kingdom would “not ... replicate unilaterally the NATO commitments that apply to NATO members.” The bottom line: “Ukraine is not a NATO member” and London would not risk a direct military confrontation with Russia, he explained. The British government had provided a lot of military support, including training for Ukrainian troops as well as anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, and it would always consider “other ... forms of support,” stressed Raab.

In turn, Berlin appeared cautiously supportive of the Ukrainian proposal. Chancellor Scholz had “signaled a general readiness [to provide security guarantees],” said German government spokesperson Steffen Hebestreit on March 30. Nevertheless, it would be necessary to consider carefully how such security guarantees would be formulated. He did not want to speculate about a possible “military component,” Hebestreit explained. In line with Raab, he also emphasized that Berlin did “not want to become a military actor in this war.” Baerbock expressed similar caution. It was important to understand, what a direct confrontation with Russia would mean, she stressed. This would be “a third world war, ... a direct military confrontation between Russia and the NATO alliance area, and we are experiencing right now that [Putin] ... has stopped at virtually nothing,” she continued. Therefore, everything possible needed to be done to prevent further escalation. However, she said, there would be a response to any use of chemical weapons, though she would not speculate about that, but rather do “everything to ensure that it does not come to that.” Germany would provide full support “in all the areas in which we can support without running the risk that this war spills over to other European countries,” added Baurbock. Thus, “if guarantees are needed, Germany will be there and provide guarantees.”

Meanwhile, further efforts were made to deliver Soviet weapons to Ukraine from European countries’ stockpiles. On March 30, US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Celeste Wallander explained that the United States had “focused on getting countries that hold Soviet legacy systems, including S-300 systems — that have spare parts, missiles, different parts of that S-300 — who are willing to send that to Ukraine.”

On the same day, March 30, a spokesman for the Russian Defense Ministry, Igor Konashenkov, confirmed recent Russian troop movements were indeed part of a planned redeployment in preparation for a new phase in the conflict focused on the Donbass region.

At the first stage of the special military operation ..., it was planned to force the enemy to concentrate his forces, means, resources and military equipment to hold large settlements in these areas,

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141 Tweet by @BBCr4today, Twitter, March 30, 2022 [https://twitter.com/BBCr4today/status/1509091505708989894?s=20&t=a_UaAO5UwgPvjQohNg].


including Kyiv, to tie them up on the battlefield and without storming these cities, ... inflict such a defeat on the armed formations of the Kyiv regime that would not allow it to use these forces in the main direction of operations of our armed forces – in the Donbas. All of these goals have been met.\textsuperscript{145}

Russia’s military reorientation was accompanied by more moderate rhetoric. In a speech to representatives of the Russian business community on \textbf{March 31, Putin} called the Western sanctions an “economic war.” Their goal, he claimed, was to “reduce Russia’s development” and to curb the country’s rights to be free and independent – a formulation that could be classified as more moderate than previous statements. Unlike previous declarations, in which Russian representatives had accused the West of attacking Russia’s existence, this time Putin simply said that Russia did not want to “dance to a foreign tune, ... give away [its] national rights, [its] traditional values.”\textsuperscript{146}

Meanwhile, the West focused on expanding assistance to Ukraine. On \textbf{March 31}, following a videoconference bringing together states supporting Kyiv, British Defense Secretary \textbf{Ben Wallace} noted that 35 countries now wanted to support Kyiv. “There will be more lethal aid going into Ukraine,” Wallace said, but some states, led by the United States, had also promised more financial support. In light of the Russian bombing of Ukrainian cities, Kyiv now needed longer-range artillery, Wallace explained. In addition, Ukraine was looking for equipment to defend its coast and “armored vehicles of some types, not necessarily tanks, but certainly protective vehicles ... and more anti-air [systems].”\textsuperscript{147}

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\textbf{40.} & \textbf{De-escalatory} \\
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Against this background, US intelligence officials concluded Russia was not doing anything to prepare for using nuclear weapons. There had not been "any activity by the Russians that would change [the US] assessment or ... strategic deterrence posture," a senior US Pentagon official stated in a \textbf{March 31} briefing. There was “no indication at this time that [Russia is] preparing to use those kinds of weapons.”\textsuperscript{148} & \\
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\textbf{April 2022: Fading momentum}

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\textbf{41.} & \textbf{De-escalatory} \\
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Nevertheless, the US military took no chances and on \textbf{April 1} canceled the initially postponed test of a Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile. According to US Air Force spokeswomen \textbf{Ann Stefanek}, this decision “was due to the same reasons as when it had been first delayed.” The Air Force was “confident in the readiness of the strategic forces of the United States,” Stefanek & \\
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\end{tabular}
\end{table}


\textsuperscript{146} “Rede von Wladimir Putin vor Vertretern der russischen Wirtschaft am 31.03.22 (Speech by Vladimir Putin to representatives of the Russian economy on March 31, 2022),” YouTube account of Phoenix, March 31, 2022 [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SwRzRrzw_2I].


Arms deliveries, however, remained unaffected by these apparent de-escalation efforts. On April 1, a US official announced that the US government would soon begin working with allies to facilitate the delivery of Soviet tanks to Kyiv. It was in this context that Germany agreed to a transfer of 56 BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles from stockpiles of the Eastern German National People’s Army now in possession of the Czech Republic.

On April 2, Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malýar declared that the entire Kyiv region had now been "liberated." In the days following the Russian withdrawal, an increasing number of reports of killings and other atrocities committed by Russian troops in the temporarily occupied areas surfaced. As early as April 3, Human Rights Watch said it had documented "laws-of-war violations against civilians in ... the Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Kyiv regions." Zelensky went further, accusing Russia of "genocide."

Gruesome images from the Kyiv suburb of Bucha in particular also triggered an international outcry. In Germany, reports about alleged war crimes sparked a debate about a potential embargo on Russian gas and seemed to facilitate the provision of military support for Ukraine. "There must be a reaction," declared Defense Minister Lambrecht on April 3. "Such crimes cannot remain unanswered," she added, promising to examine what needed to be done to provide additional military assistance to Ukraine and calling for a discussion among EU member states on a potential freeze of gas imports from Russia.

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152 Robin Alexander and Klaus Geiger, "Ukraine bittet Scholz direkt um Panzer, doch diesers ängst (Ukraine asks Scholz directly for tanks, but Scholz hesitates)," Welt, April 6, 2022 [https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article238015209/Ukraine-Krieg-Ukraine-bittet-Scholz-direkt-um-Panzer-doch-diesers-zeogert.html].


154 Daniel Boffey and Martin Farrer, "They were all shot": Russia accused of war crimes as Bucha reveals horror of invasion," The Guardian, April 3, 2022 [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/03/they-were-all-shot-russia-accused-of-war-crimes-as-bucha-reveals-horror-of-invasion].


157 Daniel Boffey and Martin Farrer, "They were all shot": Russia accused of war crimes as Bucha reveals horror of invasion," The Guardian, April 3, 2022 [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/03/they-were-all-shot-russia-accused-of-war-crimes-as-bucha-reveals-horror-of-invasion].

158 "Es muss eine Reaktion geben (There has to be a reaction)," Tagesschau, April 3, 2022 [https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/bab/bab-lambrecht-zu-butsch-101.html].
Similarly, Baerbock promised at a conference meant to organize support for Moldova on April 4 that Germany would once again “step up support for the defense of Ukraine” because “Bucha and Mariupol show that this is a matter of life and death for millions of people in Ukraine.” Therefore, she noted, Germany was “now also looking at systems that [it had] not delivered so far and [was] discussing whether technical problems that [occurred] during delivery and use cannot be solved after all.” Apart from that, the European Union would once again “significantly tighten” sanctions, the foreign minister concluded. 159 Indeed, on the same day the Council of the European Union condemned “in the strongest possible terms the reported atrocities committed by the Russian armed forces,” and added that the European Union stood “in full solidarity with Ukraine” and would “continue to firmly support Ukraine and ... advance, as a matter of urgency, work on further sanctions against Russia.” 160

Biden spoke with similar outrage as his European partners, calling Putin “brutal” and a “war criminal” on April 4. On the US side, however, this signified no notable change in rhetoric from previous statements of the US President. Biden also stressed the need to “gather all the detail” to bring those responsible to justice at a war crimes trial; 161 and promised to consider additional sanctions. 162

On the following day, April 5, UN Secretary General Guterres also declared that he would “never forget the horrifying images of civilians killed in Bucha” and called for “an independent investigation to guarantee effective accountability.” “The war in Ukraine must stop,” he added and directly called out Russia: “We are dealing with the full-fledged invasion, on several fronts, of one Member State of the United Nations, Ukraine, by another, the Russian Federation – a Permanent Member of the Security Council – in violation of the United Nations Charter, and with several aims, including redrawing the internationally-recognized borders between the two countries.” 163

At NATO, too, Allies focused on mobilizing additional support for Ukraine. On the eve of a two-day meeting of NATO foreign ministers on April 5, Stoltenberg stressed that Moscow was not giving up its ambitions in Ukraine despite the partial withdrawal of Russian troops near Kyiv. NATO foreign ministers would now discuss what more they could do to help Ukraine prepare for the next Russian offensive.

> In the coming weeks, we expect a further Russian push in eastern and southern Ukraine. To try to take the entire Donbas and to create a land-bridge to occupied Crimea. ... Allies are determined to provide further support to Ukraine. Including anti-tank weapons, air-defense systems and other equipment. ... The repositioning of the Russian troops will take some time, some weeks, but

159 “Baerbock: ‘Kriegsverbrechen dürfen nicht ungesühnt bleiben’ [Baerbock: ‘War crimes must not go unpunished’].” YouTube account of AFP Deutschland, April 4, 2022 [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xblMi0R-0EY].


161 Aamer Madhani, Zeke Miller and Chris Megerian, "Biden: Putin should face war crimes trial for Bucha killings,” AP News, April 5, 2022 [https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-crimes-biden-putin-84767d1c3c35a7a36f2f70ceacc3fa0].


after that, we are afraid that we can see a big Russian offensive in Donbas with the aim to take Donbas. In that window, it is extremely important that NATO Allies provide support.164

Stoltenberg, however, remained vague about specific systems that the Alliance might deliver. For “operational reasons,” he said, it would be better to “actually provide support” than to announce every specific weapon system.”165 In a press briefing on the same day, US Ambassador to NATO Smith provided some more detail, explaining that “two-thirds of the Allies” were offering lethal support and all Allies were supplying humanitarian and economic aid. Yet, these were “sovereign decisions … not taken by NATO,” she stressed. There would be “no NATO pressure.”166 Some specifics did trickle through however. Thus, media reported on April 5 that the Czech Republic had provided Kyiv with T-72 tanks and BVP-1 infantry fighting vehicles. Nonetheless, both Czech Defense Minister Jana Cernochova and a Defense Ministry spokesperson refused to confirm or deny this transfer.167

In comparison, Berlin remained relatively hesitant. German media reported on April 6 that the Ukrainian government had directly asked the Chancellor’s Office for the delivery of 100 Marder infantry fighting vehicles at the end of March. However, the German government had then taken the position that such weapon types could only be delivered in lockstep with allies, and Washington had not yet supplied tanks.168 On April 5, Ukrainian Ambassador Andriy Melnyk still requested Marder, Leopard and Gepard tanks from Germany,169 Scholz however stuck to his position. Berlin would “put in place everything that is right and makes sense” to help “ensure that Russia does not win this war,” he told parliament the next day. Yet, this support was limited by what was “feasible in view of the decisions of our allies and … the capabilities of the Bundeswehr.”170

We act on the question of what we export, … what we finance, in coordination with our friends and allies within the EU and NATO … We provide military support in the same way [as our friends and allies] and nobody jumps the gun. … I believe that it would be a grave mistake, particularly on this issue, if Germany were to adopt a special role and a special path.171

164 “Press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg ahead of the meetings of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs on 6 and 7 April 2022,” Website of the North Atlantic treaty Organization, April 5, 2022 [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_194325.htm].

165 “Press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg ahead of the meetings of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs on 6 and 7 April 2022,” Website of the North Atlantic treaty Organization, April 5, 2022 [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_194325.htm].


170 “Scholz: Kein Diktatfrieden für die Ukraine (Scholz: No dictated peace for Ukraine),” t-online, April 6, 2022 [https://www.t-online.de/nachrichten/deutschland/innenpolitik/id_91968394/scholz-kein-diktatfrieden-fuer-die-ukraine.html].

Overall, the West was nonetheless moving towards providing more extensive military support to Kyiv. At a NATO foreign ministers’ meeting in Brussels on April 7, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Kuleba once again requested heavy weapons.172 British Foreign Secretary Truss answered this call swiftly, announcing after the meeting that NATO member states had agreed to “supply new and heavier equipment.” She explained: “We agreed to help Ukrainian forces move from their Soviet-era equipment to NATO standard equipment, on a bilateral basis.” In the same vein, Blinken confirmed that the US government would examine what “new systems” could be supplied to Ukraine.173

At the same time, NATO leaders started prefacing upcoming posture changes. For instance, Stoltenberg emphasized the need to ensure that NATO could “protect and defend all NATO allies” even “in a more dangerous world.” The Alliance was “in the midst of a very fundamental transformation” as it had to “move from tripwire deterrence to something which is more about deterrence by denial or defense,” he added.174

Meanwhile the German government appeared increasingly split. According to media reports from April 7, Chancellor Scholz’s office was continuing to delay a decision on tank deliveries, arguing that first an agreement had to be reached with allies. A German observer also pointed out rumors that concerns over a potential military escalation and hopes Germany might still be able to return to the agreement had to be reached with allies. A German observer also pointed out rumors that concerns over a potential military escalation and hopes Germany might still be able to return to the status quo ante after the war were shaping discussions at the Chancellery.175 By contrast, Economics Minister Habeck, Foreign Minister Baerbock, as well as politicians from the liberal FDP and the conservative opposition party CDU supported expanding military assistance.176

### 42. Warning

| The German government was not alone to worry about a potential escalation. Indeed on April 7, the foreign ministers of the G7 countries and EU Foreign Affairs Representative Borrell adopted a statement warning against “any threat or use of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.” They reminded Russia of its “obligations under international treaties” and stressed that “any use by Russia of such a weapon would be unacceptable and result in severe consequences.”177 |

European states nonetheless went ahead with heavy weapon deliveries. According to reports from April 8, the Czech Republic supplied additional heavy military equipment to Ukraine, including 10 tanks and other infantry fighting vehicles.178 Kyiv had also obtained a S-300 air defense system from Slovakia.

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172 Jon Helney, “Ukraine tells NATO: Donbas battle will be like second world war,” The Guardian, April 7, 2022 [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/07/ukraine-calls-for-weapons-weapons-from-western-allies].

173 Henry Foy, Max Seddon and Andres Schipani, “Nato states agree to supply heavy weapons to Ukraine,” Financial Times, April 8, 2022 [https://www.ft.com/content/1c0e6e15-c8fe-4a84-99dc-12b6836bf016].

174 Edward Malnick, “Jens Stoltenberg: We need a beefed-up NATO to face down threats to European security,” The Telegraph, April 9, 2022 [https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/04/09/jens-stoltenberg-need-beefed-up-nato-face-threats-european-security/].

175 By contrast, Economics Minister Habeck, Foreign Minister Baerbock, as well as politicians from the liberal FDP and the conservative opposition party CDU supported expanding military assistance.176

176 Ralf Fücks, “Putin muss diesen Krieg verlieren (Putin must lose this war),” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, April 4, 2022 [https://zeitung.faz.net/faz/politik/2022-04-04/deutschland-muss-mehr-fuer-die-ukraine-tun/744179.html?GEPC=s5].

177 Hans von der Burchard, “Scholz holds up German tank deliveries to Ukraine,” Politico, April 7, 2022 [https://www.politico.eu/article/scholz-holds-up-german-tank-delivery-to-ukraine/].

177 G7 Foreign Ministers' Statement on Russia’s War of Aggression Against Ukraine, Website of the US Embassy & Consulates in Italy, April 7, 2022 [https://it.usembassy.gov/g7-foreign-ministers-statement-on-russia’s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine/].

Prime Minister Eduard Heger confirmed, while emphasizing that this did “not mean that the Slovak Republic has become a part of the armed conflict in Ukraine.”179 According to a statement by US President Biden, the United States would “reposition the Patriot missile system to Slovakia in return” in order “to enable this transfer and ensure the continued security of Slovakia.”180

Meanwhile, things still did not appear to be moving in Berlin. On April 8, Defense Ministry spokeswoman Christina Routsi explained that a previously considered delivery of 100 Marder tanks would not go ahead because this equipment was “simply indispensable” for the German armed forces to fulfil their constitutional defense tasks, as well as NATO obligations.181

Also on April 8, Medvedev once again engaged in threatening rhetoric, describing Western economic sanctions as an “act of aggression” against Russia on his Telegram channel.182

This did not deter further Western arms deliveries. On April 10, Lithuanian defense chief Valdemaras Rupšys announced Lithuania would soon train Ukrainian troops on Lithuanian territory to enable them to use modern military equipment. “We are ready to train their instructors to prepare them to work with the equipment that we ourselves operate,” Rupšys said.183 At an EU foreign ministers’ meeting on April 11, the European Union also increased its military assistance by an additional 500 million euros, bringing its total military support to Ukraine up to 1.5 billion euros.184 Invoking the “terrible images” from Ukraine, Baerbock had declared ahead of the EU meeting that Ukraine needed “further military material, especially also heavy weapons.” There was no time for excuses, but for “creativity and pragmatism,” she had added.185

Moscow appeared unimpressed. On April 11, Kremlin spokesperson Peskov warned against the increasingly probable accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO. “We have repeatedly said that the alliance remains a tool geared towards confrontation and its further expansion will not bring stability to the European continent,” Peskov stressed.186 The following day, on the 61st anniversary of Soviet cos-

179 "Slovakia says it has given S-300 air defence system to Ukraine," Al Jazeera, April 8, 2022 [https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/8/slovakia-says-it-has-given-s-300-air-defence-system-to-ukraine], and Tweet by @eduardheger, Twitter, April 8, 2022 [https://twitter.com/eduardheger/status/1512386024399376389?s=20&t=Qg97otRaBYqGuEvWE8Yw].

180 "Statement from the President on Delivery of Air Defense Systems to Ukraine," Website of the White House, April 8, 2022 [https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/08/statement-from-the-president-on-delivery-of-air-defense-systems-to-ukraine/].


184 Matthias Kolb, "EU erhöht Waffenhilfe auf 1,5 Milliarden Euro (EU increases arms aid to 1.5 billion euros)," Süddeutsche Zeitung, April 11, 2022 [https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/waffen-ukraine-eu-aussenminister-1.5565119].

185 "Die Ukraine braucht schwere Waffen (Ukraine needs heavy weapons),” Tagesschau, April 11, 2022 [https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/ukraine-waffen-baerbock-eu-aussenminister-101.html].

186 Isabel van Brugen, "Russia Warns Sweden, Finland Against Joining NATO," Newsweek, April 11, 2022 [https://www.newsweek.com/russia- warns-sweden-finland-against-joining-nato-1696947].
monaut Yuri Gagarin’s flight to space, Putin once again referred to sanctions, stressing that it was impossible to isolate Russia. Despite “complete” isolation, the Soviet Union had become the first country to carry out a mission in space, he pointed out and added that it was “impossible to severely isolate anyone in the modern world – especially such a vast country as Russia.”

In a media interview on April 13, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Oleg Syromolotov repeated claims by Moscow that Ukraine had been seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. Ukraine had the technical capability to accomplish this, he said. “A scenario in which nuclear material could be brought to Ukraine from third countries” could not be ruled out either, added Syromolotov. There was also “a very real threat of chemical terrorism from the fascist nationalists operating under the auspices of the current Kiev regime and the units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine controlled by them.” On the same day, US officials once again warned that any Russian use of chemical weapons in Ukraine would trigger a “proportional” response, though not a US military intervention in Ukraine.

Meanwhile, according to NATO and EU officials, there was a growing willingness among the member states of both institutions to supply more heavy weaponry to Ukraine. Indeed, following a phone call with Zelenskyy, Biden announced on April 13 “an additional $800 million in weapons, munitions, and other security assistance” for Ukraine. “This new package of assistance will contain many of the highly effective weapons systems we have already provided and new capabilities tailored to the wider assault we expect Russia to launch in eastern Ukraine,” the US president said. It included “artillery systems, artillery rounds, and armored personnel carriers.” In addition, Biden declared, he had “also approved the transfer of additional helicopters” and the US would continue “to facilitate the transfer of significant capabilities from our Allies and partners around the world.” On the same day, US State Department spokesperson Ned Price contextualized continued US assistance to Ukraine, suggesting that “the nature of the conflict [was] changing” as Russia was refocusing on southern and eastern Ukraine after having lost the battle of Kyiv. Security assistance for Ukraine would need “to adapt to that changing reality to provide our Ukrainian partners with precisely what they need to fortify their positions in the east, in the south, to continue to beat back this Russian onslaught.”

At the same time, news outlets reported that a new US intelligence guidance from the Administration would allow the US government to “significantly expand the intelligence it [was] providing to Ukraine’s forces” to assist them in a possible new Russian offensive in the East. However, no information would be

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187 Guy Faulconbridge, “Putin says peace talks with Ukraine are at dead end, goads the West,” Reuters, April 12, 2022 [https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-flies-into-russian-far-east-ukraine-talks-with-belarusian-leader-2022-04-12/].

188 "Олег Сыромолотов: среди беженцев с Украины могут быть террористы (Oleg Syromolotov: there may be terrorists among refugees from Ukraine)", RIA Novosti, April 13, 2022 [https://ria.ru/20220413/syromolotov-1783159363.html?x_tr_sl=ru&x_tr_tl=de&x_tr_hl=de&x_tr_pto=wapp].


190 Felicia Schwartz, Henry Foy and John Reed, “US sends Ukraine more weapons and intelligence to repel Russian offensive,” Financial Times, April 14, 2022 [https://www.ft.com/content/9f31d808-a209-46f1-a7d2-1bc443aae98d].


provided “that would enable the Ukrainians to strike targets on Russian territory,” US officials stressed.\(^\text{193}\)

Russia swiftly condemned this significant additional Western support for Ukraine. For example, Ryabkov warned on April 13 that “attempts to slow down our special operation, inflict maximum damage on the Russian contingents and formations of the [Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics] will be severely suppressed.” The West should be warned “that US-NATO weapons transports passing through Ukrainian territory are considered by us as legitimate military targets,” he emphasized. He also repeated allegations that the United States had developed biological weapons in Ukraine and blamed Washington for the failure of bilateral negotiations on nuclear strategic stability.\(^\text{194}\)

On April 14, the flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, the Moskva, sank. Per Ukrainian sources, the ship was hit by Ukrainian Neptune missiles, a claim that Western intelligence sources tentatively supported. The Russian side, in turn, claimed that the ship was sunk by a fire and an explosion on board.\(^\text{195}\)

On the same day, more became known about Russia’s reaction to increased Western military support for Ukraine. Reports emerged that Russia had sent a two-page diplomatic protest note “On Russia’s concerns in the context of massive supplies of weapons and military equipment to the Kiev regime” to the United States and other governments probably as early as April 12. In this demarche, Moscow reportedly warned against the supply of “most sensitive” weapons, notably multiple launch rocket systems. “We call on the United States and its allies to stop the irresponsible militarization of Ukraine, which implies unpredictable consequences for regional and international security,” the document reportedly read, and accused the United States of “pressuring other countries to stop any military and technical cooperation with Russia, and those with Soviet-era weapons to transfer them to Ukraine.”\(^\text{196}\)

In the United States, in turn, the demarche was publicly presented as a sign that military support for Ukraine was working. Western weapons appeared to be “having an effect” in Ukraine, noted an anonymous US official. Indeed, Andrey Kortunov, an expert close to the Kremlin, confirmed that Moscow viewed Western arms deliveries with growing concern. “It seems the United States and the West in general are right now testing the limits of Russian tolerance when it comes to weapons deliveries,” he suggested. “It’s clear that these volumes are already so significant that they can affect the course of the hostilities, and this is raising concerns.” Although Russia had thus far avoided attacking arms shipments outside Ukraine, there were “still fears regarding strikes that may hit the territory of NATO member countries,” explained Kortunov. “One certainly does not want to create a pretext for some further escalation.”\(^\text{197}\)

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\(^\text{194}\) “Сергей Рябков: США пытаются спровоцировать в России дефолт (Sergei Ryabkov: US is trying to provoke a default in Russia),” TASS, April 13, 2022 [https://tass.ru/interviews/14365393].


Indeed, on **April 14**, **Kirby** acknowledged the risks of weapons deliveries to Ukraine. The United States did “[not] take any movement of weapons and systems going into Ukraine for granted.” Therefore, Washington was “very careful about how much information [it] put out there” and sought “to modulate that activity on any given day.” Also: “I think the less we say about that, the better,” Kirby concluded. In a similar vein, German Vice Chancellor **Habeck** revealed concerns among some NATO states that arms deliveries could expand the war. “Heavy weapons are synonymous with tanks, and all NATO countries have so far ruled this out to not become targets themselves,” he explained. British media suspected a link between the Russian protest note and the backpedaling from Habeck, who had previously supported increased military assistance.

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<td>More Russian warnings occurred on <strong>April 14</strong>, as <strong>Medvedev</strong> once again pointed out the risks of Sweden and Finland joining NATO, which would “more than double” “the length of the alliance’s land borders with Russia.” Consequently, these borders would “have to be strengthened” and “no non-nuclear status of the Baltics [would] be possible.” Hence: “The balance must be restored,” stressed Medvedev. Specifically, this would mean “considerable” naval, ground and air defense forces, “increased tensions along the borders, Iskanders, hypersonic weapons, and nuclear-armed ships ... at arm’s length” from Sweden and Finland, he elaborated. “No sane person” could want this.</td>
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<th>44.</th>
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<td>Meanwhile on the same day, <strong>April 14</strong>, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director <strong>William Burns</strong> put into perspective nuclear escalation concerns. Asked about his agency’s risk assessment of a possible use of tactical nuclear weapons, he explained that though the situation had to be taken seriously, no “practical evidence” indicated Russian preparations for such a scenario. <strong>President Biden is deeply concerned about avoiding a third world war, about avoiding a threshold in which ... nuclear conflict becomes possible. ... Russian military doctrine holds that you could escalate to de-escalate. ... Some Russian leaders have talked about a circumstance in which ... NATO would intervene militarily on the ground in Ukraine. ... That’s not something, as President Biden has made very clear, that’s in the cards, but ... given the potential desperation of President Putin and the Russian leadership, given the setbacks that they’ve faced so far militarily, none of us can take lightly the threat posed by a potential resort to tactical nuclear weapons or low-yield nuclear weapons. ... While we’ve seen some rhetorical posturing on the part of the Kremlin about moving to higher nuclear alert levels, so far we haven’t seen a lot of practical evidence of the kind of deployments or ... military dispositions that would ... reinforce that concern. But we watch for that very intently.</strong></td>
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199 Hans von der Burchard, “Germany’s Habeck warns tank deliveries to Ukraine could turn West into Russian ‘target,’” *Politico*, April 15, 2022 [https://www.politico.eu/article/berlin-bickers-over-tanks-for-ukraine-amid-warnings-that-west-could-become-target/].


201 Polina Ivanova and Henry Foy, “Russia warns of nuclear expansion in Baltics if Finland and Sweden join Nato,” *Financial Times*, April 14, 2022 [https://www.ft.com/content/4e29c6d-a268-4dcb-8f80-093d2b5e6a08].

202 “CIA Director William Burns Speaks at Georgia Tech,” *YouTube account of Georgia Tech*, April 14, 2022 [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yVWzer7TPPO (from 55:42)], and David E. Sanger and Julian E. Barnes, “CIA Director Airs
Against this background, **Chris Coons**, a Democratic Senator close to Biden, caused confusion by calling for a discussion on the circumstances in which a direct US intervention in Ukraine might be possible.203 “It is important that on a bipartisan and measured way we in Congress and the administration come to a common position about when we are willing to go the next step and to send not just arms but troops to the aid in defense of Ukraine,” declared Coons. “If the answer is never then we are inviting another level of escalation in brutality by Putin.”204 However, the statement was quickly walked back. Coons had merely tried to make clear that the West had to draw red lines regarding a potential use of chemical or nuclear weapons by Russia, said an associate of the Senator. Later Coons himself clarified that he was not calling for the deployment of US troops to Ukraine. According to Congress observer **Andrew Desiderio**, the Senator’s statements did “not [represent] any sort of shift on Capitol Hill” either.205

Tapping into such concerns over a potential Russian chemical or nuclear weapons use, **Zelensky** warned on **April 15** that the whole world should be prepared for this scenario. It was unclear whether Russia’s threats were “real information, but it [could] be truth,” he said. Russia “could do it,” human lives meant nothing to Moscow;206

Meanwhile, a US Defense Intelligence Agency official acknowledged Washington was concerned Moscow might escalate out of desperation, confronted with the West’s increasing military assistance and political unity, media reported on **April 18**. Russian Iskander missiles posed a particular concern, a US Air Force officer suggested, as they could be armed with nuclear warheads and had “performed surprisingly well” in the war.207 Yet in media reports from **April 19**, other US officials appeared particularly keen to question any escalation concerns, qualifying CIA Director Burns’ already cautious statements from a few days before. Burns’ assessment had not been based “on any new intelligence or other evidence that Russia was preparing to use nuclear weapons, but rather on a prudent analysis of Russia’s situation” and nuclear doctrine, which set a “lower,” though “still pretty high,” threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. “Nothing we’ve seen suggests they’re on the precipice,” the anonymous officials reportedly emphasized. On the contrary, Russian officials had emphasized that there was currently no “existential” threat to Russia — the prerequisite for nuclear use in Russian doctrine. Moreover, any first nuclear strike by Moscow presumably would remain a limited “warning shot” to which NATO could respond in a variety of non-nuclear ways, US officials said. Given NATO’s conventional superiority vis-à-vis Russia, Putin was unlikely to risk further escalation, added one official.208


205 Alexander Ward and Quint Forgey, "Putin will only stop when we stop him," Politico, April 18, 2022 [https://www.politico.com/newsletters/national-security-daily/2022/04/18/putin-will-only-stop-when-we-stop-him-00025901].


On April 19, Pentagon spokesperson Kirby further qualified escalation concerns. Aside from Putin’s initial nuclear threats, there had been little comparable rhetoric since. Consequently, he explained, Washington was “actively monitoring [this] every single day,” but remained “comfortable” that it had “an appropriate strategic deterrent posture in place and there [was] no need to make any changes to it.”²⁰⁹

Possibly in light of this assessment, Western arms deliveries continued. Per media reports, Western governments were now “focused on sending longer-range weapons like howitzers, antiaircraft systems, anti-ship missiles, armed drones, armored trucks, personnel carriers and even tanks.”²¹⁰ Around April 18 and 19, the United States ignored Russian warnings and conducted four transport flights with military assistance for Kyiv.²¹¹ The United Kingdom also announced that it had provided additional military support, including “anti-tank and anti-ship missiles and long-range artillery” worth 588 million US dollars. And contrary to earlier concerns, Russia refrained from attacking supply lines outside of Ukraine, US media reported.²¹²

Nonetheless, Western governments attempted to limit escalation risks. US officials reportedly remained reluctant to provide intelligence and weapons, such as “rocket artillery, ground attack aircraft, and medium range drones,” that could enable Ukraine to expand the war onto Russian territory. Western governments also apparently sought to keep certain arms deliveries under wraps. France, for example, merely stated that it had provided military support amounting to 100 million euros without providing further detail.²¹³ Some observers also suggested Poland had decided against providing MiG jets to Ukraine to avoid provoking Russia, though a senior US official stressed the United States had “never opposed European nations sending MiGs to Ukraine.”²¹⁴

Continued Western military assistance to Ukraine did not have a direct impact on Russian rhetoric. On April 19, Lavrov merely repeated previously voiced complaints about the West and Ukraine. Asked whether Russia was considering to use tactical nuclear weapons, he pointed out that Moscow had initiated both the June 2021 Putin-Biden statement and the January 2022 P5 declaration that a nuclear war could not be won and must never be fought. However, he refused to comment on Zelenskyy’s warning about a potential Russian use of nuclear weapons.²¹⁵


²¹¹ “World Bank slashes global growth forecast; Ukraine says Russia’s major offensive in the Donbas has started,” CNBC April 19, 2022 [https://www.cnbc.com/2022/04/18/russia-ukraine-live-updates.html].


On April 19, the Ukrainian General Staff announced the beginning of a Russian offensive in eastern Ukraine. Russian representatives confirmed this. Lavrov spoke of “an important moment in this entire special operation” with the aim to achieve the “complete liberation of the Donetsk and Luhansk republics.” Shoigu declared that Russia was “gradually” implementing its plan to “liberate the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics.”

Meanwhile, Germany remained cautious about escalation risks. After a video conference with the G7 countries as well as representatives from the EU, NATO, Poland and Romania on April 19, Scholz reiterated that there would be no direct NATO intervention in Ukraine, though he also promised further military and financial support for Ukraine.

[Germany and its allies] will continue to support Ukraine, financially and also militarily. ... At the same time, it is our duty to prevent the war from spreading to other countries. Therefore, NATO cannot and will not intervene directly in the war. ... Initially, we supplied Ukraine with weapons from our own stockpiles. ... [But] the possibilities we have [in this respect] are reaching their limits. That is why we are setting up a special fund so that our army will finally be well equipped. ... We will always maintain our ability to defend Germany and the territory of our NATO Allies against a Russian attack. ... That is why, in a second step, we have made it possible for Ukraine to buy military equipment from industrial production in our countries. ... Our common goal is to continue to strengthen the Ukrainian military so that it can continue to resist the attack. We have asked the German defense industry to tell us what material it can supply in the near future ... and we will provide [Ukraine] with the money needed to buy it. ... [This will include] anti-tank weapons and air defense equipment ... [and] also other things such as ammunition and what can be used in an artillery battle. In addition, we are ready to support our NATO partners who still have weapon systems that come from Russian production ... and can be used immediately [by Ukraine].

The following day, the former leader of the German social democratic party (SPD) Sigmar Gabriel linked Scholz’s hesitancy regarding heavy weapons for Kyiv to agreements with allies and escalation concerns. The German government, like other NATO Allies, including the United States and the United Kingdom, feared that “with the delivery of these weapons [notably tanks] they themselves will enter this war and will have to reckon with the other side, with Putin, trying to fend off such tanks by using tactical nuclear weapons.” This is a risk NATO did not want to take, Gabriel declared.

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216 "Lawrow sieht neue Phase im Ukraine-Krieg (Lavrov sees new phase in Ukraine war)," Tagesschau, April 19, 2022 [https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/europa/ukraine-kaempfe-luhansk-mariupol-109.html].


and … make those who in the frenzy of rabid and aggressive rhetoric are trying to threaten our country think twice,” he added.219 Per the Russian Defense Ministry, however, the missile was still in a “testing program” and would only become part of the Russian armed forces’ arsenal “after [its] completion.”220

### De-escalatory

In any case, the Pentagon appeared unimpressed by the test.221 Russia had “properly notified the United States under its New START treaty obligations that it planned to test this ICBM,” read a statement by Press Secretary Kirby. Such tests were “routine” and “not a surprise.” Consequently, Washington did “not deem the test to be a threat to the United States or its allies.”222

Media reports from the same day however suggested a higher level of US escalation concerns than Biden Administration officials tended to let on. According to Pentagon sources, Defense Secretary Austin received regular briefings from Head of US Strategic Command Charles Richard on the status of Russia’s nuclear arsenal. In this context, there were more concerns about a potential Russian nuclear use “than at any time since the end of the Cold War,” officials revealed, though any nuclear scenario remained extremely unlikely.223

Media reporting on the Russian leadership did not help to alleviate these concerns. In an April 20 report, a US outlet cited ten anonymous “Kremlin insiders,” according to whom only a small part of the Russian elite viewed the invasion of Ukraine as a “catastrophic mistake.” Therefore, Putin’s position of power was secure, although the war was lasting longer than Russia’s foreign intelligence service, the FSB, had expected, these sources suggested. The Kremlin was now focused on achieving a limited victory in the east of Ukraine to avoid looking “hopelessly vulnerable and weak in the face of the threat seen from the US and its allies.” Some sources also believed “Putin could turn to a limited use of nuclear weapons if faced with failure in a campaign he views as his historic mission.”

German Chancellor Scholz once again explained his hesitancy regarding the delivery of heavy weapons on April 22. In line with previous statements, he warned of the danger of being drawn into the war referring to nuclear escalation risks, although he refused to state that a delivery of German tanks would lead to nuclear war. Echoing concerns raised by US representatives, he also underscored the pressure the Russian regime was under in light of Western sanctions. Perhaps in view of this situation, Scholz explained that although he had warned Putin against using chemical or biological weapon, no one had “a plan to attack Russia militarily or to bring about a change of government from the outside.”

219 “Putin congratulates Armed Forces on successful launch of Sarmat ICBM,” TASS, April 20, 2022 [https://tass.com/defense/1440607].


In this situation, we need a cool head and well-considered decisions, because our country bears responsibility for peace and security throughout Europe. I do not think it is justified for Germany and NATO to become parties to the war in Ukraine ... I said very early on that we must do everything to avoid a direct military confrontation between NATO and a highly armed superpower like Russia, a nuclear power. I am doing everything I can to prevent an escalation that would lead to a third world war. There must be no nuclear war. ... There is no textbook for this situation in which one could read about the point at which we are perceived as a party to this conflict. ... [Therefore,] it is all the more important that we carefully consider and closely coordinate every step we take. ... Russia is in dramatic trouble, the sanctions are causing enormous damage to Russia’s economy, the string of military defeats can no longer be glossed over by any government propaganda. ... Putin is under tremendous pressure.

Meanwhile, government officials from the Baltic states and Ukraine expressed little concern about a potential use of nuclear weapons by Moscow. According to media reports, Ukrainian officials thought Putin was “bluffing” in order to “distract from Russia’s military failures and give NATO nations an excuse to limit their support for Kyiv.” Baltic officials, in turn, pointed out that Russian nuclear weapons had always been there. There had been more concern “about the Chernobyl nuclear plant when the Russians occupied it,” than about the Kremlin’s threats.

In a strong show of solidarity, US Defense Secretary Austin and Secretary of State Blinken visited Ukrainian President Zelenskyy and his foreign and defense ministers in Kyiv on April 24 and pledged more than 322 million US dollars additional military aid. The following day, Blinken declared that “in terms of Russia’s war aims, Russia has already failed and Ukraine has already succeeded” because Moscow had failed to take Kyiv and to “take away [Ukraine’s] sovereignty and independence.”

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<td><strong>Austin</strong> went further, declaring that the United States now wanted “to see Russia weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine,” a statement some observers interpreted as an expansion of NATO’s goals.</td>
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By contrast, on the same day Josep Borrell dampened expectations regarding an EU import ban on Russian oil and gas. “At the moment, we in the EU do not have a unified position on this question,” he explained.

225 Melanie Amann and Martin Knobbe, “Es darf keinen Atomkrieg geben (There must be no nuclear war),” Spiegel, April 22, 2022 [https://www.spiegel.de/politik/olaf-scholz-und-der-ukraine-krieg-interview-es-darf-keinen-atomkrieg-geben-a-ae2acf8-8125-4bf5-a273-fbcd0bd8791c].


228 “Russia failing in its war aims, Antony Blinken says after Ukraine visit - BBC News,” YouTube account of BBC News, April 25, 2022 [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=82NWq-wm42I].


In a lengthy April 25 interview, Lavrov somewhat dialed back previous nuclear threats. Although there was a real danger of nuclear war, Russia continued to stand behind the principle of the January 2022 P5 statement that nuclear war was inadmissible, he explained.

All five [UN Security Council] leaders signed the declaration on the inadmissibility of nuclear war. This is our principled position. ... Now the risks are very significant. I don’t want to artificially inflate these risks. ... The danger is serious, real. It cannot be underestimated. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, there were not many “written” rules. But the rules of conduct were clear enough. Moscow understood how Washington behaved. Washington understood how Moscow behaved. Now there are few rules. ... At the same time, the other instruments of arms control and non-proliferation have been practically destroyed. ... The United States rejected almost all contacts because we were forced to defend the Russians in Ukraine.

Moreover, Lavrov complained that arms deliveries to Kyiv were “pouring oil on the fire.” The countries involved wanted to “force the Ukrainians to fight with Russia to the last soldier.” Like this, they hoped, this conflict would drag on “longer, so that Russia ... would suffer more and more,” Lavrov declared, emphasizing that these Western supplied weapons would “be a legitimate target for Russian forces.” “Warehouses, including in the west of Ukraine, have become such a target more than once,” he stressed. “How else? NATO is essentially going to war with Russia through a proxy and arming that proxy,” added Lavrov.

Western countries appeared largely unimpressed by Lavrov’s remarks. “If Russia threatens the Third World War, then it is a clear sign that Ukraine is succeeding,” commented Latvian Foreign Minister Edgars Rinkēvičs on the same day. “We should not give in to Russian blackmail but double down our support to Ukraine and sanctions against Russia,” he added.

Boris Johnson made similar comments, explaining that he did not see a risk of Moscow using nuclear weapons, even if the Russian military experienced further defeats. “Given the massive Russian backing for what [Putin] is doing, given the apparent obliviousness of the Russian media about what is really happening in Ukraine, the paradox is that Putin has far more political space to back down, to withdraw,” explained Johnson. His Minister of the Armed Forces James Heappey added, Lavrov’s nuclear allusions were the “sort of bravado” that had been his “trademark over the course of 15 years or so.” There was no “imminent risk of escalation,” Heappey stressed. “What the West is doing to support its allies in Ukraine is very well calibrated,” though “it suits the Kremlin’s narrative to claim that...”
they are somehow in a confrontation with NATO," he added. The risk of nuclear war was "vanishingly small." Nor did Heappey see any particular risk of escalation should British weapons be used against targets in Russia. "There are lots of countries around the world that operate kit that they have imported from other countries; when those bits of kit are used we tend not to blame the country that manufactured it, you blame the country that fired it," he explained.

In comparison, the US reaction to Lavrov’s statements was somewhat more cautious. Thus, Mark A. Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, condemned Russia’s nuclear saber rattling as "completely irresponsible," adding that "any time a senior leader of a nation-state starts rattling a nuclear saber, than everyone takes it seriously." Still, Western countries appeared increasingly determined to support Ukraine. On April 26, more than 40 countries gathered for defense talks at the US air base in Ramstein, Germany, to coordinate the delivery of military assistance to Ukraine. In this context, German Defense Minister Lambrecht promised Berlin would "facilitate the delivery of Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft guns to Ukraine," – a noticeable change in direction from Germany’s previous hesitancy regarding the delivery of heavy weapons. US Defense Secretary Austin even expressed optimism that Ukrainian could win the war if it had "the right equipment." According to subsequent media reports, US officials including Sullivan and Burns however qualified Austin’s statements about a Ukrainian victory and the need to weaken Russia in behind the scenes discussions with allies. The White House merely wanted "to force Putin to understand that he could not win the war." Anonymous official sources also confirmed that Biden had asked Blinken and Austin to tone down their rhetoric, worrying they were setting "unrealistic expectations" talking about winning in Ukraine.

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235 “Lavrow schließt Verhandlungslosung für Ukraine bei Waffenlieferungen aus (Lavrov rules out a negotiated solution for Ukraine on arms deliveries.), Welt, April 26, 2022 [https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article238383059/Lawrow-Keine-Verhandlungslosung-fuer-Ukraine-bei-Waffenlieferungen.html].


In an April 27 briefing, Pentagon spokesperson Kirby condemned Russian nuclear rhetoric, including Lavrov’s recent remarks, as “irresponsible,” but refused to speculate on a potential Russian nuclear use.

*Raising the specter of nuclear confrontation is irresponsible. It’s certainly not what you would expect from a modern nuclear power... Certainly, nobody wants to see, or nobody should want to see it escalate into the nuclear realm. And there’s no reason that it should. Mr. Putin can do the right thing right now by ending the war, moving his forces out of Ukraine, sitting down in good faith with President Zelensky and coming up with a negotiated settlement... I’m not going to again, speculate here about what Russia may or may not do with [tactical nuclear weapons] or any other system... we’re monitoring [the nuclear threats] every single day as best, we can. And we continue to see nothing that gives us cause to change our strategic nuclear deterrent posture. And we’re confident that in our ability to defend the homeland from that perspective, as well as our allies and partners.*

In addition, Kirby confirmed Austin’s earlier statement that Washington did “[not] want to see Russia in a position to be able to do [something like the invasion of Ukraine] again.” Instead it wanted “to see Ukraine win” and “able to defend itself.” Russia should not be allowed to remain “in a position going forward, where they haven’t suffered consequences for this unprovoked invasion,” Kirby stressed.  

On the same day, Putin issued another veiled nuclear threat, warning third parties against interfering in the war in Ukraine. This would trigger an immediate reaction.

*If someone intends to intervene on what is happening from the outside and creates unacceptable strategic threats for us, then they should know that our response to oncoming strikes will be swift, lightning fast. We have all the tools for this, ones that no one can brag about, and we won’t brag—we will use them if needed—and I want everyone to know this. All the decisions have been made in this regard.*

The following day, on April 28, US Ambassador to Russia John Sullivan showed himself and Washington undeterred by this renewed Russian threat making, instead confirming the new broader US goals in the war as laid out by previous US statements. Accordingly, Washington would “do all” it could to ensure that the Russian decision to invade was “a strategic defeat for [Putin] and his government, and not a victory for him in Ukraine.” While Russia’s nuclear rhetoric was not new, it had recently escalated in “a dramatically irresponsible way,” noted Sullivan. Washington by contrast was not engaging in “irresponsible rhetoric with respect to nuclear weapons” and was “prepared to deter...”


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In parallel, also on \textbf{April 28, Biden} however appeared to implicitly acknowledge Russian concerns over external interference in Ukraine. Even before the war he had “made clear” that Washington would “not send US troops to fight Russian troops in Ukraine, but … would provide robust military assistance” and “try to unify the Western world against Russia’s aggression,” he explained. “Despite the disturbing rhetoric coming out of the Kremlin, the facts are plain for everybody to see,” Biden declared. “We’re not attacking Russia; we’re helping Ukraine defend itself against Russian aggression,” including with significant intelligence and military assistance.

Yet, Biden rejected Russian claims that the war in Ukraine was a “life-or-death struggle” and a Russia-NATO “proxy war.” These statements were concerning, explained Biden, because they showed “the desperation that Russia is feeling about their abject failure in being able to do what they set out to do in the first instance.”

\textit{Instead of saying that the … Ukrainians, equipped with some capability to resist Russian forces, are … [causing Moscow’s military failures in Ukraine], they’ve got to … tell their people the United States and all of NATO is engaged … in taking out Russian troops and tanks. … It’s an excuse for their failure. But … no one should be making idle comments about the use of nuclear weapons. … It’s irresponsible.}

Asked whether he was concerned that Russia might start acting as if it was engaged in a proxy war with Washington, Biden said the United States was “prepared for whatever they do.” However, the United States would only send military assistance, not troops, to Ukraine.\footnote{“Remarks by President Biden on the Request to Congress for Additional Funding to Support Ukraine,” Website of the White House, April 28, 2022 [https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/04/28/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-request-to-congress-for-additional-funding-to-support-ukraine/].}

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The same day, \textbf{April 29, Lavrov} qualified his earlier statements about the risks of nuclear war. His words had been taken out of context. In fact, he had stressed that Russia had been “champions of making pledges by all nuclear countries never to start a nuclear war” and had repeatedly insisted on such a declaration with other nuclear powers. Lavrov meant the declarations by Russia and the United States, as well as by the P5 states, that a nuclear war could not be won, which he claimed had grown out of Moscow’s initiative. Referring to a statement by Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki that Warsaw would “welcome” a deployment of US nuclear weapons to Poland, Lavrov declared that it was Western states, like Poland and Ukraine, that were using dangerous nuclear rhetoric.\footnote{246 “Remarks by President Biden on the Request to Congress for Additional Funding to Support Ukraine,” Website of the White House, April 28, 2022 [https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/04/28/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-request-to-congress-for-additional-funding-to-support-ukraine/].}

\section*{De-escalatory}

We never were playing with such dangerous [nuclear rhetoric]. ... We should all insist on the statements made by the P5, never ever there could be a nuclear war. But to make sure that this is the case, the West must discipline speakers like our Ukrainian and Polish colleagues who see no danger in playing with such very, very risky words.

In addition, Lavrov clarified that Russia did not see itself at war with NATO, but that Western arms deliveries were a legitimate military target for Russian forces once they reached Ukrainian territory.

We do not see ourselves at war with NATO because this is exactly another step ... to increase the risks of what we just discussed. Unfortunately, NATO it seems considers itself to be at war with Russia. NATO and the European Union leaders ... they bluntly, publicly and persistently say Putin must fail, Russia must be defeated. ... As soon as these [Western] weapons are reaching Ukrainian territory, they are fair game for our special operation.

Lavrov made similar remarks again on May 1, claiming that his nuclear statements had been misrepresented by Western media.

The Western mass media and Western politicians misrepresent what Russian institutions say. When they talk about [nuclear] threats and ask me how real these threats are, I always answer like this: Russia has never stopped making agreements that will ensure that war will not emerge. We proposed to our American colleagues to repeat what Gorbachev and Reagan had said in 1987 and to accept a declaration confirming that a nuclear war would have no winners. We could not convince the Trump administration, but the Biden administration agreed. And in 2021 in Geneva, Putin and Biden accepted that declaration on our initiative. There was also a proposal by Putin to convene a summit of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, but the United States and Britain put the brakes on it.

May 2022: Backpedalling to the official doctrine

On May 2, a senior adviser to Zelenskyy, Andriy Yermak, stated that he personally did not believe Russia would use a nuclear weapon.

The people who make these decisions want to live–and if they start to use nuclear weapons it will be the end, not just for some soldier ... It will be a new nuclear war and nobody knows who would be alive after this.

248 “Full interview with Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov,” YouTube account of Al Arabiya English, April 29, 2022 [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_DwOZOaJfY4 (from 19:13)].


In the meantime, nuclear escalation remained a concern in Washington. On May 3, news outlets in the United States reported on an intelligence assessment for the White House on the risk of Russia using nuclear weapons. An anonymous intelligence official told journalists that while Putin’s threats were becoming less credible through their constant repetition, escalation had become “a true danger” as Moscow was increasingly dissatisfied with its war effort and Western weapons deliveries were turning the tide of the war against Russia. Valery Gerasimov, Russia’s military chief, had recently visited Ukraine, potentially with the purpose of informing the generals on the ground of future war plans, US officials speculated. “At this point, no one thinks that nuclear escalation will occur on the battlefield or originate in Ukraine,” said one US policymaker. “But if nuclear escalation occurs, they [Russian generals in Ukraine] need to know what measures are expected from them during the shock period that the use of a WMD [weapon of mass destruction] would provoke. Do they attack? Do they hunker down and prepare for retaliation? Do they withdraw to Russia to defend the state?” According to media reports, US officials appeared particularly concerned about a nuclear demonstration strike. This is “definitely part of Russia’s repertoire,” explained a US Strategic Command official. As Putin would find himself in a situation where he was “back against the wall,” with “no prospects of salvaging the war,” and feeling “the bite of economic sanctions,” it would be “shock” that “might be what he needs to survive.” It was “counterintuitive, but he could get to the place where stopping the fighting is his priority, through any means necessary,” a US official concluded.251

Events on the ground did little to dispel concerns in Washington. On May 4, Belarus launched “unannounced combat drills,” likely in response to US and NATO exercises planned in Europe over the course of the month of May. UK intelligence suggested the exercise aimed to “deter Ukrainian forces,” although it did not pose a concrete threat to Kyiv.252

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<td><strong>Also on May 4, the Russian defense ministry announced</strong> it had simulated nuclear strikes in Kaliningrad. Around 100 Russian servicemen practiced “electronic launches” of nuclear-capable Iskander mobile ballistic missile systems, also carrying out a maneuver to change their position in order to avoid “a possible retaliatory strike,” the ministry added.253 It remained unclear, whether this was just a routine exercise, or whether it involved any political signaling.</td>
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Meanwhile, questions on the size and intent of US military aid to Ukraine resurfaced. A *New York Times* article claiming on May 4 that “US intelligence” was “helping Ukraine kill Russian generals” caused a stir. The article cited anonymous US officials saying that US intelligence had enabled Ukraine to kill Russian generals.254 Biden officials immediately pushed back. On the same evening, National Security Council spokesperson Adrienne Watson called the story’s headline “misleading and the way it is framed ... irresponsible.” She explained: “The United States provides battlefield intelligence to help the Ukrainians defend their country. We do not provide intelligence with the intent to kill Russian generals.”255


These disclaimers notwithstanding, on May 5, anonymous US officials were quoted by NBC News saying that US intelligence had enabled Kyiv to sink Russia’s Moskva vessel by identifying the ship and its location prior to the Ukrainian attack. However, the officials stressed that the US government “did not know in advance that Ukraine was going to target the Moskva … and was not involved in the decision to strike. Maritime intelligence is shared with Ukraine to help it defend against attack from Russian ships.”256 In a subsequent statement, Pentagon spokesperson Kirby stressed that the US government did “not provide intelligence on the location of senior military leaders on the battlefield or participate in the targeting decisions of the Ukrainian military.” Rather: “Ukraine combines information that we and other partners provide with the intelligence that they themselves are gathering on the battlefield, and then they make their own decisions and they take their own actions.”257 In response to the NBC story on the Moskva, Kirby also said that the US government was “not involved in the Ukrainians’ decision to strike the ship or in the operation they carried out.” Washington had had “no prior knowledge” of Ukraine’s intent to target the ship. “The Ukrainians have their own intelligence capabilities to track and target Russian naval vessels, as they did in this case,” Kirby concluded.258

According to an anonymous official, President Biden also became involved on May 6, when he called CIA Director Burns, Director of National Intelligence Haines, and Defense Secretary Austin to express his concerns over the leaks, which “undermined the US goal of helping Ukraine.”259

| Russian officials nonetheless continued to march back Putin’s nuclear narratives. On May 5, Russian Ambassador to the US Anatoly Antonov explained that nuclear weapons could only “be used in response to the use of WMD against Russia and its allies, or in the event of aggression against our country, when the very existence of the state is jeopardized.” The decision to raise the alert level of Russia’s deterrent forces had been “misinterpreted” by the West. As had been explained by Shoigu, the alert had been “only about the work shifts of strategic forces commands which began to perform combat duties with reinforced personnel.” This meant that Russia had “increased its vigilance against the backdrop of extremely confrontational statements by Western countries, including NATO member states that possess nuclear weapons,” clarified Antonov. He concluded: Russia did not “threaten the United States and its European allies, but, on the contrary, is making every effort to prevent the escalation of the Ukrainian crisis. … We are compelled to warn of the emerging risks associated with the intervention of NATO states into the Russian special military operation.”

In contrast, the “current generation of NATO politicians clearly does not take the nuclear threat seriously,” Antonov complained, pointing at what he saw as “a flurry of blatant misrepresentation of Russian officials’ statements on our country’s nuclear policy.” Moreover, he reiterated claims that


259 Shane Harris and Dan Lamothe, “Intelligence-sharing with Ukraine designed to prevent wider war,” The Washington Post, May 11, 2022 [https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/05/11/ukraine-us-intelligence-sharing-war/].
Ukraine had intended to obtain nuclear weapons and had a biological weapons program, while criticizing Poland’s openness to host US nuclear weapons.

Nevertheless, Antonov also highlighted Russia’s interest in reaching “agreements that will guarantee that a catastrophic confrontation will not be unleashed,” pointing to Moscow’s efforts to restate that there could be no winners in a nuclear war with Biden and the other P5 states. Further, he stressed the importance of the New START agreement as a “universally recognized gold standard in the sphere of maintaining strategic stability and transparency between the major nuclear powers,” claiming that “Russia has repeatedly drawn the attention of the United States that it is important to continue the joint work on an agreement that could replace New START and accommodate new realities of international security and development of military technologies.”

59. De-escalatory

The same narrative was peddled in Moscow. On May 6, the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Deputy Spokesman Alexey Zaitsev reaffirmed the fact that Russia would not use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, but would do so only in accordance with the scenarios set out in its nuclear doctrine. “Scenarios for Russia’s possible use of nuclear weapons are clearly spelled out in Russian doctrine. They are not applicable to tasks set in the special military operation in Ukraine,” emphasized Zaitsev. “Russia adheres to the principle that there can be no winners in a nuclear war and it must not be unleashed.”

60. Warning

In Washington, former officials emphasized the “game changing” nature of a Russian nuclear employment. On May 6, former nuclear policy Pentagon official Leonor Tomero told US outlets that Russian nuclear use would “galvanize the whole world” against Moscow. “We should make clear that it would have devastating consequences,” she stressed. Civilian victims in particular would create a “strong push” for a direct US intervention.

61. Warning

Against this background of nuclear signaling and counter-signaling, it was unclear whether France’s actions were intentional or not. On May 7, an inauguration ceremony took place for the recently re-elected French president Emmanuel Macron. The celebrations symbolically focused on deterrence with a troops review including forces linked to nuclear deterrence.

62. Warning

In Washington, the intelligence community remained cautious. On May 7, CIA Director Burns warned that Putin was “in a frame of mind in which he doesn’t believe he can afford to lose.” The intelligence community saw no “practical evidence at this point of Russian planning, deployment or even poten-

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261 “Russia has no intention to employ nuclear weapons in Ukraine, says diplomat,” TASS, May 6, 2022 [https://tass.com/politics/1447783] and “Russia says it won’t use nuclear weapons in Ukraine,” Reuters, May 6, 2022 [https://www.reuters.com/video/watch/idOV621306502022RP1].

262 Felicia Schwartz and Demetri Sevastopulo, “How the west became less anxious about Russia’s nuclear threat,” Financial Times, May 6, 2022 [https://www.ft.com/content/41fc6e5d-6e39-440d-9712-c1f7c517f99b].

Other former officials also underlined the "dramatic nature" of a Russian nuclear use. On May 9, former US Secretary of State and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger noted that a Russian nuclear use would be a game changer requiring a significant US response, and that the US government would better think now about what to do in such a scenario. Both sides had to "understand" the "inner red line" of the "opposite number." It was unclear for how long the conventional escalation could continue. At some point, one side would decide that additional conventional escalation would strain "society to a point that will limit its fitness to conduct international policy as a great power in the future." Kissinger did not know when that point would be reached, but subsequent escalation would involve "moving into a category of weapons that in 70 years of their existence have never been used." He concluded: "If that line is crossed, that will be an extraordinarily significant event. Because we have not gone through globally what the next dividing lines would be. One thing we could not do in my opinion is just accept it."265

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<td>Some evidence suggests that Moscow also sought to signal restraint. On May 9, Russia celebrated the 77th anniversary of the end of World War II with a Victory Day Parade in Moscow. On May 7, media had reported that the Russian Defense Ministry had announced a fly-past maneuver with a Il-80 nuclear-command airplane. However, this component of the parade was cancelled &quot;due to the weather,&quot; according to Kremlin spokesperson Peskov – although the weather in Moscow was sunny and clear. In in speech at the military parade, Putin drew parallels between World War II and Russia's war in Ukraine, and again blamed the West, notably NATO, and the government in Kyiv for the situation. The Alliance's expansion had &quot;forced&quot; Russia to launch &quot;a pre-emptive strike at the aggression.&quot; Russian soldiers in Ukraine were &quot;defending today what [their] fathers, grandfathers and great-grandfathers fought for. The wellbeing and security of their Motherland was their top priority in life,&quot; said Putin. And yet, the Russian leader neither mentioned nuclear weapons nor announced a general mobilization, as some observers had expected him to do.269</td>
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264 William Burns, "Transcript: Vladimir Putin 'doesn't believe he can afford to lose' — William Burns, CIA director," Financial Times, May 7, 2022 [https://www.ft.com/content/bd87fafd-1f9c-4dcd-af64-940cf9495ce5].

265 Henry Kissinger, "We are now living in a totally new era’ — Henry Kissinger," Financial Times, May 9, 2022 [https://www.ft.com/content/cd88912d-506a-41d4-b38f-0c37cb7f0e2f].


267 Isabel van Brugen, "Russia Cancels Military Flyovers on Victory Day Amid 'Adverse Weather'," Newsweek, May 9, 2022 [https://www.newsweek.com/russia-cancels-military-flyovers-victory-day-may-9-adverse-weather-1704656].

268 "Victory Parade on Red Square," Website of the President of Russia, May 9, 2022 [http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/68366].

269 Holly Ellyatt, "All-out war on Ukraine? Putin could be gearing up for something big this 'Victory Day'," CNBC, May 9, 2022 [https://www.cnbc.com/2022/05/06/putin-could-look-to-declare-victory-in-ukraine-by-may-9-victory-day.html].
In Washington, US intelligence officials warned that the conflict would be prolonged and escalation remained possible. On May 10, Director of National Intelligence Haines provided another intelligence assessment of the ongoing war in a Testimony on Global Threats and National Security for the Senate Armed Services Committee. Putin was “preparing for prolonged conflict” during which he still intended to “achieve goals beyond the Donbas” as he “most likely” also judged that had “a greater ability and willingness to endure challenges than his adversaries.” Putin was “probably counting on US and EU resolve to weaken,” Haines explained. In this context, she dampened hopes of a negotiated solution as long as both sides “believe they can continue to make progress militarily.” However, she warned, “Putin faces a mismatch between his ambitions and Russia’s current conventional military capabilities.” Therefore, “the next few months could see us moving along a more unpredictable and potentially escalatory trajectory. At the very least, ... the dichotomy will usher in a period of more ad hoc decision-making in Russia.” Current trends increase “the likelihood that President Putin will turn to more drastic means,” including “potentially escalatory military actions,” continued Haines.

However, Haines interpreted Russia’s nuclear rhetoric as an attempt “to deter the United States and the West from increasing lethal aid to Ukraine and to respond to public comments of the US and NATO Allies that suggest expanded Western goals in the conflict. If Putin perceives the United States is ignoring his threats, he may try to signal to Washington the heightened danger of its support to Ukraine by authorizing another large nuclear exercise involving a major dispersal of mobile, intercontinental missiles, heavy bombers, strategic submarines,” she elaborated. But: Putin “would only authorize the use of nuclear weapons if he perceived an existential threat to the Russian state or regime,” she noted. “That could be the case in the event that he perceives that he is losing the war in Ukraine and that NATO, in effect, is either intervening or about to intervene., which would obviously contribute to a perception that he is about to lose the war in Ukraine,” explained Haines. She also emphasized that “with tensions this high there’s always an enhanced potential for miscalculation, unintended escalation, which we hope our intelligence can help to mitigate.”

In line with this assessment, the White House appeared concerned about pushing Moscow into a corner. On May 10, Biden expressed the fear that Putin had miscalculated, expecting NATO to fall apart, and now remained without a “way out.” The Russian President was a “very, very, very calculating man.” He was now faced with European and transatlantic unity. “And the problem I worry about now is that he doesn’t have a way out right now, and I’m trying to figure out what we do about that,” Biden said.

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272 “Remarks by President Biden at a Democratic National Committee Fundraiser,” Website of the White House, May 9, 2022 [https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/05/10/remarks-by-president-biden-at-a-democratic-national-committee-fundraiser-4/].
On the same day, however, Macron somewhat dampened this notion of European and transatlantic unity. There would be no quick path to EU membership for Ukraine, a process that would “take several years, and most likely several decades.” The Europeans were working to “preserve the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine so that peace returns to our continent.” It was “up to Ukraine alone to define the conditions for negotiations with Russia” and the Europeans’ “duty” was “to stand with Ukraine to achieve the ceasefire, then build peace.” “We will then be there to rebuild Ukraine as Europeans, always,” Macron stressed. Yet, he also added that Europe was “not at war with Russia” and warned of humiliating Putin “because in the end, when peace returns to European soil, we will need to build new security balances and we will need, together, to never give in to the temptation of humiliation, nor the spirit of revenge, because these have already in the past wreaked enough havoc on the roads to peace.” Some observers interpreted this comment as a sign that France wanted to find a compromise solution by making concessions to Russia.

Meanwhile, similar statements came from Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi on May 11. “We must continue to support Ukraine and put pressure on Moscow, but also … begin to ask ourselves how to build peace. The negotiation process is very difficult, but the first point is how to build this negotiation process,” explained Draghi. Yet, “this peace must be the peace that Ukraine wants, not a peace imposed by a certain type of ally or by others,” he emphasized.

Media reports from May 11 provided some additional detail on earlier coverage of US intelligence sharing with Ukraine. US and Ukrainian officials had reportedly confirmed that Washington was providing “information about the location and movements of Russian forces … in real-time, … [including] satellite imagery and reporting gleaned from sensitive US sources.” As per its intelligence-sharing guidance, the US government however was not supplying intelligence that could be used to target “senior military officers or ministers” or “targets outside Ukraine’s borders.” Doing so, Washington sought to avoid becoming involved in attacks on Russia, which was also the reasoning behind rejecting the Polish proposal to supply Ukraine with MiGs. Moreover, officials stressed, the US did not tell Ukraine to attack particular Russian targets but “would share information about the location of, say, command and control facilities — places where Russian senior officers often tend to be found.” The final decision to strike a particular target lay with Ukraine. If by contrast Washington provided “targeting information to a foreign party … [it would be] acting as a proxy” according to its own definition, explained former US official Scott R. Anderson.

66.

From Moscow, Medvedev continued his “cautioning” stance on May 12. “NATO countries pumping weapons into Ukraine, training troops to use Western equipment, sending in mercenaries and the exercises of Alliance countries near our borders increase the likelihood of a direct and open conflict between NATO and Russia,” he noted. “Such a conflict always has the risk of turning into a full-fledged nuclear war,” Medvedev said. “This will be a disastrous scenario for everyone.”

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274 Shane Harris and Dan Lamothe, “Intelligence-sharing with Ukraine designed to prevent wider war,” The Washington Post, May 11, 2022 [https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/05/11/ukraine-us-intelligence-sharing-war/].

The Ukrainian government nevertheless rejected the Franco-Italian narrative on a need to accommodate Russia. "We want the Russian army to leave our land — we aren’t on Russian soil," Zelenskyy stressed on May 12. "We won’t help Putin save face by paying with our territory. That would be unjust." France’s attempts to find a “way out for Russia” were “in vain,” he added. On the same day, Foreign Minister Kuleba similarly questioned hopes for negotiations to bear fruit quickly. The conditions for negotiations were determined on the battlefield and “now that we feel more confident in the fight, our position in the negotiations is also getting tougher,” he explained. “The real problem is that Russia does not show the desire to participate in real and substantive negotiations.” Kuleba also called for further weapons deliveries, notably rocket launcher systems and aircraft.

The Russian government meanwhile continued to emphasize the need to avoid a direct clash with NATO. On May 12, Kremlin spokesperson Peskov noted that “all want to avoid” a direct Russia-NATO clash, Russian media reported. "Russia [wants to avoid it] and, statements to this effect have been repeatedly made by NATO and, most importantly, by Washington, including at the highest level: such statements have been made by President Biden,” he stated.

On May 13, NATO announced that “NATO Allies and partners were taking part in a series of long-planned military exercises stretching from the High North to the Balkans to enhance the readiness and interoperability of NATO forces.” NATO Spokesperson Oana Lungescu explained that “these are regular exercises, planned well before Russia’s brutal and unjustified invasion of Ukraine, but they help to remove any room for miscalculation or misunderstanding about our resolve to protect and defend every inch of Allied territory.”

In parallel, officials on both sides of the Atlantic presented their views on the balance between conflict and negotiations. On May 13, US Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs Karen Donfried responded to Draghi’s call for negotiations, explaining that the US focus remained “on strengthening Ukraine’s hand as much as possible on the battlefield, so that when the time does come Ukraine has as much leverage as possible at the negotiating table.” According to later comments from an anonymous US official, the Administration was at that point not worried about statements urging negotiations over


278 Matthew Karnitschnig, "Europe’s leaders fall out of key on Ukraine," Politico, May 16, 2022 [https://www.politico.eu/article/europes-leaders-fall-out-of-key-on-ukraine/].

279 Clemens Wergin, "Wenn sie uns den Krieg aufdrängen, dann schlagen wir zurück’ ([If they force war on us, we’ll fight back]," Welt, May 12, 2022 [https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/pluss238707129/Ukrainer-Aussenminister-Kuleba-Wenn-sie-uns-den-Krieg-aufdraengen-dann-schlagen-wir-zurueck.html].

280 "Kremlin warns against attempts to interfere in Russia’s special operation in Ukraine," TASS, May 12, 2022 [https://tass.com/politics/1449925].

281 “Long-planned NATO exercises across Europe get underway,” Website of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, May 13, 2022 [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_195250.htm#:~:text=In%20Esto%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%2
Ukraine by European leaders. Such debates “were not new” but “allies also understand what’s at stake here” and European unity remained at unprecedented levels, the official told journalists.283

In fact on the same day, on May 13, a phone call took place between US Secretary of Defense Austin and Russian Defense Minister Shoigu. According to a Pentagon readout of the call, Austin “urged an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine and emphasized the importance of maintaining lines of communication.”284 The call was reportedly initiated by Austin and the first of its kind since the beginning of the war; previous attempts apparently had been declined by the Russian side.285 On the same day, another call took place between German Chancellor Scholz and Putin, reportedly initiated by the German side.286 “Of course sooner or later you have to come to the point where there have to be diplomatic initiatives again,” commented German government spokesperson Hebestreit.287

The German government’s position vis-à-vis Ukraine, however, remained somewhat unclear. In an extraordinary meeting of the German defense committee on May 13, Scholz reportedly explained that there was an agreement with the United Kingdom, France and the United States not to deliver Western-made tanks to Ukraine, which would include German Leopard tanks.288 According to statements by members of parliament who attended the meeting, which was closed to the public, weapons deliveries also would not go beyond the types of weapons that had already been announced. Further, Scholz announced the phone call with Putin, though not without emphasizing “that the goal [must be] reestablishing the territorial integrity of Ukraine.” FDP spokesperson for defense policy Markus Faber caused a stir, reportedly leaving the meeting early together with a number of members of parliament from his party to express his frustration with Chancellor Scholz’s vague answers during the session. In light of strong criticism for this step, which was seen as openly undermining Scholz, Faber later resigned from his position as defense policy spokesperson.289

283 Matthew Karnitschnig, “Europe’s leaders fall out of key on Ukraine,” Politico, May 16, 2022 [https://www.politico.eu/article/europes-leaders-fall-out-of-key-on-ukraine/].


Followed by his phone call with Putin, Scholz further declared on May 13 that "there must be a ceasefire in Ukraine as quickly as possible." Yet, in a subsequent interview on May 15, he elaborated that Germany wanted to "help Ukraine defend itself." Berlin wanted to ensure together with its allies that "Russia lays down the weapons and withdraws its troop from Ukraine." This was why Germany imposed wide-ranging sanctions, explained Scholz. The Russian invasion attempt "must fail," stressed the Chancellor. Only Ukraine could negotiate for itself. Asked about the risk of nuclear use, Scholz explained that it made "no sense to speculate about this." However, he warned against ignoring citizens' fears and stressed that Berlin would not take "any decisions that could lead to a direct confrontation between NATO and Russia." Echoing Macron’s earlier statements, Scholz also dampened hopes of a quick path to EU membership for Ukraine - "there are clear criteria for joining the EU," he said. A very different tone was struck by Estonian Prime Minister Kallas, however, who explained that "peace can’t be the ultimate goal," and that "a peace that allows aggression to pay off" remained unacceptable.

These national debates notwithstanding, on May 14, the G7 foreign ministers issued a Statement on Russia’s war against Ukraine pledging to "uphold [their] engagement in the support of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, including Crimea, and all states."

Military developments also impacted the political environment. On May 14, Russia conducted drills with Su-27 fighter jets near Kaliningrad. Later on, on May 16, Ukrainian forces remaining in a besieged steel plant in Mariupol surrendered to Russian forces as part of a secretly negotiated deal between the belligerents. Wider peace talks were however stalling, despite Russian indications that Moscow might be willing to accept a neutral status for Ukraine following the “Austrian model” as a compromise, media reported. According to news reports, Kyiv was increasingly focusing on re-establishing control over Russian-held territories, including those seized in 2014. Against this backdrop, British officials reportedly warned that "any attempt to take back areas such as Crimea" would come with "a much greater threat of the use of chemical or nuclear weapons." There also seemed to be concerns that Russia could incorporate captured territories into the Russian state through staged referenda and deem "any Ukrainian counterattack there ... an attack on Russia itself" justifying potential nuclear use. According to US and Ukrainian officials, a Ukrainian request for multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS) had raised escalation concerns in this context.

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290 Tweet by @Bundeskanzler, Twitter, May 13, 2022 [https://twitter.com/Bundeskanzler/status/1525079306514440194].

291 Sven Böll, Florian Harms and Miriam Holstein, “Russland hat keines seiner Kriegsziele erreicht” ("Russia has not achieved any of its war aims"). T-online, May 15, 2022 [https://www.t-online.de/nachrichten/deutschland/id_92182048/-russland-hat-keines-seiner-kriegziele-erreicht-olaf-scholz-nach-putin-telefone.html].


293 Statement on Russia’s war against Ukraine - G7 Foreign Ministers,” Website of the German Foreign Office, May 14, 2022 [https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/newsroom/g7-russia-war-aginst-ukraine/2531274].


Meanwhile, Moscow adopted a moderate tone vis-à-vis Sweden and Finland’s accession to NATO. On May 16, Putin explained that although Russia had “no problems” with Sweden and Finland, the expansion of NATO military infrastructure to those countries would “certainly evoke a response” on the part of Russia, even if there was “no direct threat to Russia in connection with NATO’s expansion to these countries.”

Undeterred by this statement, Finland and Sweden submitted official letters requesting to join NATO on May 18.

In Washington, the bipartisan consensus on helping Ukraine militarily remained strong. On May 19, the US Senate passed an aid package worth 40 billion US dollars for Ukraine. This aid “goes far beyond charity,” explained Republican Senator Mitch McConnell. “The future of America’s security and core strategic interests will be shaped by the outcome of this fight,” which was why there should be a “bipartisan supermajority” for this package. In this context, media cited US officials suggesting that the White House was considering to send more advanced anti-ship missiles, notably the Harpoon and Naval Strike Missile, to Ukraine, possibly through a European ally. However, according to an anonymous US official, European countries did not want to send Harpoons to Ukraine first, fearing a Russian reaction should these missiles sink a Russian vessel.

Instead, there were more indications, some European states were keen to see a rapid end of the conflict. On May 19, media reported of a four-point peace plan the Italian government had submitted to UN Secretary General Guterres, which would require Ukraine to become a neutral country with security guarantees.

UK and US officials, however, took a stance against calls for quick ceasefire negotiations and concessions. On May 19, UK Foreign Secretary Truss declared that she did “not agree with this idea of an exit ramp” voiced by Macron. “Putin must lose in Ukraine and we must see its sovereignty and territorial integrity restored, on this we are very clear,” she explained. The United Kingdom was “not looking for regime change,” but it wanted to “make sure that Russia [was] no longer capable of committing these acts of aggression.” With regard to Russia’s nuclear rhetoric, Truss noted that Moscow’s “various threats … such as those against Sweden and Finland” could not be “taken into consideration.” And: “What we have to do is support Sweden and Finland in joining NATO, and continue to supply arms to Ukraine to help them regain their territory,” she elaborated. In a similar vein the US Ambassador to NATO Julianne

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298 “Putin Says Russia Has No Problem With Sweden or Finland,” YouTube account of Bloomberg Markets and Finance, May 16, 2022 [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wcA_kSD1oFA].
302 Tommaso Ciriaco, “La pace in 4 tappe. Sul tavolo dell’Onu arriva il piano del governo italiano (Peace in 4 stages. The plan of the Italian government reaches the UN table),” La Repubblica, May 19, 2022 [https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2022/05/19/news/piano_pace_governo_italiano_4_tappe-350167027/].
**Smith** stated on **May 20** that the US government wanted to see “a strategic defeat for Russia.” She added: “We want Russia to leave Ukraine, we want Russia to stop the violence, stop these indiscriminate brutal attacks on civilians.”

In a guest op-ed on **May 21** in the *New York Times*, Republican Senator **Mitt Romney** argued that “Russia’s use of a nuclear weapon would unarguably be a redefining, reorienting geopolitical event.” Romney suggested that Putin might escalate should he lose in Ukraine and thus fail to achieve “his life’s ambition” to restore Russia’s great power status and face “significant internal challenges to his leadership.” And: “In such a circumstance, he may be able to convince himself that the United States and the West are the reason he invaded Ukraine and that the propaganda he has deployed to justify this immoral invasion was true from the beginning,” wrote Romney. Nevertheless, the West should not “avoid provoking Russia” but rather “continue to give Ukraine all the support it needs to defend itself and win.” For the scenario of a potential nuclear use, the US and NATO Allies “should develop and evaluate a broad range of options,” Romney argued.

European governments, however, appeared split on what military equipment to deliver. On **May 22**, Parliamentary State Secretary in the German Ministry of Defence **Siemtje Möller** explained that Germany was not delivering Marder tanks because of an agreement among Western countries not to deliver any Western style infantry fighting vehicles or battle tanks. The statement, which was thought by analysts to be a voluntary or involuntary leak of an internal agreement among NATO Allies on the kinds of weapons they would not deliver to avoid becoming embroiled in the conflict, was not confirmed by either the German government or by NATO spokespeople. Yet, such an agreement would explain why the Germany Chancellery seemed to be blocking the delivery of such vehicles, despite the Foreign Minister Baerbock and Economics Minister Habeck reportedly advocating such a step, media speculated. Czech officials, however, denied the existence of such an understanding. Going on record on **May 27**, Czech Deputy Defense Minister **Jan Havranek** explained that there was “no such thing as an informal agreement or ‘ban’ on delivery of particular weapon systems. The Czech government would not support or be part of any such thing.” In a joint press conference with Czech Minister of Foreign Affairs **Jan Lipavský** on the same day, British Foreign Secretary **Liz Truss** also denied rumors of a NATO agreement to that effect.

Meanwhile, some encouraging signals came out of Berlin. On **May 26**, **Scholz** called Russia a “major nuclear power” engaged in “imperialism” and noted that it was “clear” that Putin would “only seriously negotiate a peace” when he would realize “that he cannot break Ukraine’s defenses.” Scholz reaffirmed Germany’s support for Ukraine, while at the same time emphasizing that he will not do anything “that could make NATO a party to the conflict.” The reason: “That would mean a direct confrontation between

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305 Mathis Feldhoff, “Panzer aus Deutschland: Wer lügt? (Tanks from Germany: who is lying?)”, *ZDF*, May 25, 2022 [https://www.zdf.de/nachrichten/politik/nato-panzer-waffen-ukraine-krieg-russland-100.html].


307 Tweet by @janHavranek2, *Twitter*, May 27, 2022 [https://twitter.com/janHavranek2/status/1530168599608012800].

308 “Right Now - UK Foreign Secretary Liz Truss meets Czech foreign minister Jan Lipavsky in Prague,” *YouTube account of Newsfeed, gerade jetzt*, May 27, 2022 [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s9ECjPlAfKzo (ab 11:20)].
However, the debate on what military aid to deliver continued in Washington. On **May 27**, Pentagon speaker *Kirby* commented on the potential delivery of multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS) to Ukraine, which the US was “mindful and aware” of “these public and private requests from Ukraine but that the decision had not been made.” **US outlets wrote** that the White House was likely to send advanced systems, including possibly the MLRS and the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) to Ukraine. However, it was reportedly only considering short-range ammunition options with a range of up to 45 miles, which would reach further than previously delivered M777 howitzer shells with a range of 15 miles, but fall short of the MLRS’ maximum range of 190 miles. Yet, the US government reportedly had already provided funding to Ukraine for the purchase of a Soviet Smerch MLRS with a range of 50 miles from a US allied country. **

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<td>Meanwhile, despite – or maybe because – of the ongoing conflict, Russia went ahead with the testing of various systems. On <strong>May 28</strong>, it test-launched a nuclear-capable hypersonic Zircon cruise missile, which reached a range of about 1,000km.</td>
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<td>Yet, Russian mid-level officials continued to downplay Moscow’s nuclear narratives. On <strong>May 29</strong>, Russia’s ambassador to the United Kingdom <em>Andrey Kelin</em> confirmed that Russia would not use nuclear weapons over Ukraine. According to Russian doctrine, tactical nuclear weapons were “not used in conflicts like [the one in Ukraine] at all,” he explained. As per its “very strict provisions,” tactical nuclear weapons would mainly be used “when the existence of the state is endangered.” This had “nothing to do with the current operation,” which remained a “limited conventional operation” as indicated by Russia not increasing the number of its forces in Ukraine, he added.</td>
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In Washington, the debate on the range of missiles to be delivered to Kyiv continued. On **May 30**, *Biden* told reporters that the US government was “not going to send to Ukraine rocket systems that can strike into Russia.” The statement, which seemed to conflict with previous media reports according to which

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312 "Госиспытания в России гиперзвуковой ракеты 'Циркон' с надводного носителя завершены (State tests in Russia of the 'Zircon' hypersonic missile from a surface carrier are completed)," TASS, May 31, 2022 [https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/14774757?utm_source=co&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=tc&utm_referrerst=co].


the White House was likely to send MLRS to Ukraine, was subsequently explained by an anonymous Admin-
istration official. Accordingly, a decision on MLRS was still outstanding but “nothing is on the table
with long-range strike capabilities,” said the official.315 “Ukraine will get new shipments of precision-
guided missiles with longer ranges than Ukrainians have now, but not rockets that can strike deep into
Russia,” summed up Michael McFaul, the Obama Administration’s ambassador to Russia.316 Medvedev
reportedly called Biden’s statement “reasonable” explaining that Russia would have attacked whoever
took the “criminal” decision to strike Russian cities.317

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<td>Finally, the White House attempted to settle the debate in a very public manner. On May 31, President Biden clarified what the US “will and will not do in Ukraine” in an Op-Ed, promising advanced rocket systems to Ukraine but emphasizing that the US would not intervene in the conflict directly. Regarding Russia's nuclear threats, the US President emphasized the lack of concrete Russian steps towards using nuclear weapons. Yet, he also confirmed previous leaks suggesting that it was the US position that any use of nuclear weapons would have “severe consequences.”</td>
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I've decided that we will provide the Ukrainians with more advanced rocket systems and munitions that will enable them to more precisely strike key targets on the battlefield in Ukraine. ...

We do not seek a war between NATO and Russia. As much as I disagree with Mr. Putin, and find his actions an outrage, the United States will not try to bring about his ouster in Moscow. So long as the United States or our allies are not attacked, we will not be directly engaged in this conflict, either by sending American troops to fight in Ukraine or by attacking Russian forces. We are not encouraging or enabling Ukraine to strike beyond its borders. We do not want to prolong the war just to inflict pain on Russia. ...

If Russia does not pay a heavy price for its actions, it will send a message to other would-be aggressors that they too can seize territory and subjugate other countries. It will put the survival of other peaceful democracies at risk. And it could mark the end of the rules-based international order and open the door to aggression elsewhere, with catastrophic consequences the world over.

I know many people around the world are concerned about the use of nuclear weapons. We currently see no indication that Russia has intent to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, though Russia’s occasional rhetoric to rattle the nuclear saber is itself dangerous and extremely irresponsible. Let me be clear: Any use of nuclear weapons in this conflict on any scale would be completely unacceptable to us as well as the rest of the world and would entail severe conse-
quences.318


316 Tweet by @McFaul, Twitter, May 30, 2022 [https://twitter.com/McFaul/status/1531367206948261888].


June 2022: Bringing Belarus into the nuclear fold?

According to subsequent media reporting on June 1, the Biden Administration had been conducting tabletop exercises to assess potential US responses should Russia use tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine or the Black Sea region. Reportedly, it also considered a potential Russian nuclear test. According to intelligence officials, the risk of nuclear use remained low but was “higher than what anyone was projecting before the invasion.” US officials further emphasized that any US response to the use of nuclear weapons would “almost certainly be nonnuclear,” the goal being to “signal immediate de-escalation” but ensure international condemnation. This could mean some mix of economic, diplomatic and military measures.319

On the other side of the Atlantic, decisions on weapons deliveries intermingled with energy concerns. On May 31, media reported EU leaders had reached an agreement to ban the import of Russian oil to the European Union “in principle.”320 However, “Russia’s pipeline oil exports to the EU [would be allowed] to continue temporarily, while seaborne shipments are blocked by the end of the year.” There would also be further exceptions for Hungary and the Czech Republic.321 On the same day Slovak President Zuzana Čaputová announced that Bratislava would provide howitzers to Ukraine “within the next few days,” in addition to the S-300 air defense system and de-mining equipment it had already supplied to Kyiv.322 In parallel, German Chancellor Scholz declared the German government would backfill military vehicles for Greece to send Soviet-era tanks to Ukraine. “This will now be discussed in very concrete terms between the defense ministries and can then also be implemented quickly,” he explained.323

Meanwhile, discussions on the NATO-Russia Founding Act resurfaced with US Ambassador to NATO Smith stating on June 1 that the Founding Act did not constrain “decisions that we’re taking as it relates to force posture and Central and Eastern Europe.”324

Debates on weapons deliveries also continued. On the same June 1, media reported the US government might sell MQ-1C Gray Eagle drones to Ukraine, which could be used for “multiple deep strikes on the battlefield against Russia for the first time.”325 While this was not confirmed by the White House, Biden formally announced further military assistance for Ukraine worth 700 million US dollars on the same day, including the HIMARS, an advanced rocket system and munition with a 48 miles range – one of the


321 Jacopo Barigazzi and Barbara Moens, “EU leaders agree on Russian oil embargo,” Politico, May 31, 2022 [https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-leaders-agree-on-russian-oil-embargo/].


shorter-range option. According to anonymous US officials, the decision was made only after Ukrainian leaders promised not to strike targets within Russia with these systems. The following day, media reported that UK officials had asked the US government for permission to supply Ukraine with the MLRS, a similar US-made rocket system. According to anonymous sources privy to internal discussions, the United States had in fact decided to send the HIMARS partly to encourage allies to provide similar systems. Meanwhile, in an address to the parliament of Luxembourg on June 2, Zelenskyy called for more weapons and sanctions against Moscow, declaring that Russia now controlled 20 percent of Ukrainian territory.

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<td>Returning to nuclear issues, on June 2, US President Joe Biden stressed the importance of discussions on the future of arms control, writing: “Our progress must continue beyond the New START extension. Even as we rally the world to hold Russia accountable for its brutal and unprovoked war on Ukraine, we must continue to engage Russia on issues of strategic stability. Today—perhaps more than any other time since the Cold War—we must work to reduce the risk of an arms race or nuclear escalation.”</td>
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<td>On June 3, Medvedev responded to the US decision to provide advanced rocket systems to Ukraine in an interview, emphasizing that attacks on Russian territory could trigger retaliation against countries supplying these weapons. “If, God forbid, these weapons are used against Russian territory then our armed forces will have no other choice but to strike decision-making centers,” he stressed. “Of course, it needs to be understood that the final decision-making centers in this case, unfortunately, are not located on the territory of Kyiv.” Medvedev also alluded to the risk of nuclear apocalypse suggesting that “the Horsemen of the Apocalypse are already on their way and all hope now is with Lord God the Almighty.”</td>
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Against this backdrop, transatlantic views on dealing with Russia remained split. On June 3, Macron reiterated his warning against humiliating Russia. Asked about escalation risks, he stated that the situation was “worrying,” which was why he “put so much time and energy into it … [losing] count of the conversations [he had] had with Vladimir Putin since December.” His bottom line: “We must not humiliate...

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329 “Speech by the President of Ukraine in the Chamber of Deputies of Luxembourg,” Website of the President of Ukraine, June 2, 2022 [https://www.prezident.gov.ua/en/news/promova-predsedent-ukrayini-v-palati-deputativ-lyussemburgu-75533].

330 Joe Biden, “Message from the President on ACA’s 50th Anniversary,” Website of the Arms Control Association, June 2, 2022 [https://www.armscontrol.org/armscontrol2022/POTUSmessage].

Russia so that the day the fighting stops, we can build a way out through diplomatic channels,” he added, stating that “it is the role of France, to be a mediating power.”332 This was followed by a swift reaction from Ukraine’s Kuleba, who declared such “calls to avoid humiliation of Russia can only humiliate France and every other country that would call for it. Because it is Russia that humiliates itself.” Thus: “We all better focus on how to put Russia in its place,” he added. “This will bring peace and save lives.”333

On the same day a call for MiGs for Ukraine resurfaced in the United States. California National Guard adjutant David Baldwin described the Soviet-era jets as "the best immediate solution to support the Ukrainians," although “US or western fighters are options that should be explored as soon as possible” as well.334

Few days later, Western states started moving towards delivering long-range options to Ukraine. On June 6, UK Defense Secretary Ben Wallace confirmed the United Kingdom would send the M270 MLRS with a range of 80 km. “As Russia’s tactics change, so must our support to Ukraine. These highly capable multiple-launch rocket systems will enable our Ukrainian friends to better protect themselves against the brutal use of long-range artillery,” he stated, emphasizing that “Ukraine can win” with international support.335 On June 8, US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark A. Milley announced that the US and UK military would train Ukrainian soldiers to use the multiple-launch rocket systems delivered to them by these two states. “We’ve got to start this thing with a program that is rational and deliberate and gets them trained to a standard where they become effective,” explained Milley, emphasizing that “it will do no good to just throw this weapon system into the battle,” Given that “you’ve got to be trained on it to get the maximum effective use out of the weapon as a precision system.”336 Finally, on June 9, US Ambassador to NATO Smith emphasized once again that there was “no pressure” on weapons deliveries within NATO, although “we’ve seen many, many NATO allies individually come forward and provide security assistance.”337

Meanwhile, with the war in Ukraine seemingly reaching a deadlock, the Kremlin’s rhetoric became increasingly prodigal. On June 9, Putin likened himself to Peter the Great, noting that the tsar “did not take anything” in the great northern war against Sweden, but only “returned” to Russia. Hence: “It seems that it has also fallen to us to return and strengthen [the sovereignty of the country and its ancestral territories], and if we proceed from the fact that these basic values form the basis of our existence, we will certainly succeed in meeting the challenges that are before us,” he added.338

333 Tweet by @DmytroKuleba, Twitter, June 4, 2022 [https://twitter.com/DmytroKuleba/status/1533073469570793777].
334 Lara Seligman, “U.S. general calls on West to send fighter jets to Ukraine ‘as soon as possible’,” Politico, June 3, 2020 [https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/03/u-s-general-west-should-send-jets-to-ukraine-asap-00037173].
338 Andrew Roth, “Putin compares himself to Peter the Great in quest to take back Russian lands,” The Guardian, June 10, 2022 [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/10/putin-compares-himself-to-peter-the-great-in-quest-to-take-back-russian-lands], and “Путин заявил, что Петр I в годы Северной войны у Швеции ничего не отторгл, он возвращал” [Putin said that Peter I did not take anything away from Sweden during the Northern War, he returned]” TASS, June 9, 2022 [https://tass.ru/obschestvo/14870521].
Statements related to nuclear arms control ran parallel to such bluster. On June 11, Russian ambassador to the United States Anatoly Antonov called on Washington and Moscow to start discussing a replacement for the New START treaty, which would expire in 2026. It was “in the national interest of the United States” to have military and diplomatic contacts on strategic stability, said Antonov. “Time is running out,” he emphasized, yet “if the Americans do not need the relationship that we offer, we will not run after them.” Whereas currently the US government did not appear ready to resume talks, Moscow could wait for the US side to “mature,” Antonov explained.

Certain nuclear narratives retained their own dynamic however. On June 12, Polish member of the European Parliament and former Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski reportedly stated that “Russia has violated [the Budapest] memorandum and therefore the West can give Ukraine the opportunity to defend its independence,” including with nuclear warheads. These remarks were condemned by Chairman of Russia’s State Duma Vyacheslav Volodin on June 13, who declared that “Sikorski provokes a nuclear conflict in the center of Europe. He does not think about the future of either Ukraine or Poland. If his proposals are implemented, these countries will disappear, as well as Europe,” Volodin added.

“With such deputies, the Europeans will have much more serious problems than those they have already faced today [refugees, record inflation, energy crisis],” he also stated.

In Washington, some worried that the bipartisan consensus on Ukraine was slowly collapsing. For instance, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Philip Breedlove warned on June 13 of “a growing group of appeasers in Washington,” as “we are now, I believe, entering into a phase where we’re contemplating playing this game with Ukraine’s chips and thinking about Ukraine making large concessions in order to move forward,” he explained.

US allies continued to work together on supplying Ukraine, despite some diverging views on a potential end-game. On June 15, representatives from 50 states met up to agree on further military support for Ukraine. The US Department of Defense subsequently announced additional security assistance for Kyiv worth 1 billion US dollars, including in the field of more advanced systems, notably “additional ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems; ... [and] two Harpoon coastal defense systems.”

On the same day, Macron suggested that the West must “have the lucidity to note that [it is] not waging war on Russia. The only desirable outcome of the conflict is either a military victory for Ukraine or at some point a discussion because the fire will have ceased, which allows for an agreement between

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340 Tweet by @nexta_tv, Twitter, June 12, 2022 [https://twitter.com/nexta_tv/status/1535839743975510016].


343 Paul McLeary and Quint Forgey, “Biden’s summer travel schedule has one missing stop,” Politico, June 15, 2022 [https://www.politico.com/newsletters/national-security-daily/2022/06/15/bidens-summer-travel-schedule-has-one-missing-stop-00039923].

Ukraine and Russia.” Although he no longer warned of a humiliation of Russia, he still emphasized that “at some point we’ll have to talk.”

Despite this Western stance, Chinese President Xi Jinping offered the most unambiguous declaration of support to Russia since the invasion of Ukraine, vowing to support Moscow’s “sovereignty and security.” China was willing to “push for the steady and long-term development of bilateral pragmatic cooperation,” Xi said, and “mutually support Russia on core interests and matters of paramount concern, such as sovereignty and security,” as well as achieve “closer strategic cooperation.” Xi also told Putin that the “Ukraine crisis” should be “reasonably resolved.”

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<th>72. Warning</th>
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<td>By now, arms control had become a frequent talking point. On June 16, Kremlin spokesperson Peskov emphasized the need for discussions with the United States on an extension of the New START treaty. This was “a topic that cannot be avoided.” One could “of course, like an ostrich, try to bury your head in the sand, referring to a special military operation, but it is Russia and the United States that should discuss this topic.” Hence: “It should have been discussed yesterday. And this discussion is important not only for the peoples of our two countries, but also for the whole world, for global security.” Mixed signals rendered it almost impossible for outside observers to gauge the level of political support for Ukraine. On the one hand, for instance, US media reported on June 16, 2022 [<a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/china-xi-gives-most-direct-backing-putin-invasion-ukraine/">https://www.politico.eu/article/china-xi-gives-most-direct-backing-putin-invasion-ukraine/</a>] that no one could press such decisions. Nevertheless, a US official also reiterated Washington’s position that no one could pressure Ukraine “to make concessions, as some Europeans are. We would never ask...”</td>
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345 “Герр в Украине: в Румынии, Эммануэль Макрон не подтвердил поездку в Киев и упомянул новейшие разработки” (War in Ukraine: in Romania, Emmanuel Macron does not confirm a visit to Kyiv but wants “new discussions”), “La Dépêche”, June 15, 2022 [https://www.ladepeche.fr/2022/06/15/guerre-en-ukraine-en-roumanie-emmanuel-macron-ne-confirme-pas-de-visite-a-kiev-mais-veut-des-nouvelles-discussions-10367107.php].

346 Stuart Lau, “China’s Xi gives most direct backing to Putin since invasion,” Politico, June 15, 222 [https://www.politico.eu/article/china-xi-gives-most-direct-backing-putin-invasion-ukraine/].

347 Mikhail Dobrunov, “В МИДе пояснили, что США не применяют ядерное оружие из-за Украины” (The Foreign Ministry hopes that the United States would not use nuclear weapons because of Ukraine), “RBC”, June 15, 2022 [https://www.rbc.ru/politics/15/06/2022/62a9c0439a79473b4aec362c], and “Разговор Путина и Си, обещание генсека НАТО и интервью Рябкова (The conversation between Putin and Xi, the promise of the NATO Secretary General and Ryabkov’s interview),” Rossiya-I, June 15, 2022 [https://smotrim.ru/video/2426585?utm_source=player&utm_campaign=blocked_embed (from 01:04:29)].

348 Песков заявил, что Россия и США не избежат обсуждения продления СНВ (Peskov said that Russia and the United States cannot avoid discussing the extension of START),” RIA Novosti, June 16, 2022 [https://ria.ru/20220616/snv-179563195.html], and “России, США и Китая не избежать обсуждения продления СНВ, в том числе и в парламентах” (Russia, the United States and China will not avoid discussing the extension of START, including in parliaments), “Reuteris”, June 16, 2022 [https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-us-must-discuss-nuclear-treaty-extension-ria-quotes-kremlin-2022-06-16/].
them to cede territory.”³⁴⁹ On the other hand, on the same June 16, Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi, Macron and Scholz for the first time since the beginning of the war visited Kyiv. In a joint press conference with Romanian President Klaus Iohannis they all expressed their support for Ukrainian (and Moldovan) EU membership;³⁵⁰ and on the following day, the European Commission formally recommended to the European Council to confirm “Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia’s perspective to become members of the EU.”³⁵¹

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<td>In turn, Moscow’s nuclear rhetoric softened. On June 17, when asked about Russia’s nuclear allusions, Putin claimed Moscow was only responding to Western threats. “Of course, we can hear such [nuclear] rhetoric. Where does it come from? It comes from their own [the West’s] statements. One irresponsible politician blurs out something, and another one follows suit at a very high level. For example, top foreign ministry officials talk profusely on this subject. Are we going to keep silent? We reply accordingly. Following our reply, they start finding fault with us and saying that Russia is making threats. We are not threatening anyone. However, everyone should know what resources we have, and what we will use, if need be, to defend our sovereignty. This is an obvious thing.”³⁵²</td>
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<th>74.</th>
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<td>US officials also appeared less concerned with the dangers of nuclear escalation. Hence, on June 17, US Strategic Command announced that the US military had successfully launched “scheduled missile test flights of four unarmed Trident II (D5LE) missiles ... from an Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine off the coast of southern California.”³⁵³</td>
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The German government once again stressed its commitment to Ukraine on June 18. In an interview, Chancellor Scholz pledged that the G7 states would “support Ukraine for as long as necessary,” noting that “Putin obviously hopes that everything will fall into place once he has conquered enough land and the international community will return to business as usual.” But: “That is an illusion,” he stressed.³⁵⁴

With the review conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to be held in August, Russian diplomats sought to signal that they wanted the war in Ukraine kept as far as possible from the proceedings. On June 18, the Russian embassy in the United States wrote on Telegram that “Washington plans to raise topics at [the review conference] that do not relate to the essence of the NPT problem.” This was “a serious mistake that will aggravate an already difficult situation in the context of the tasks facing the

³⁵³ Tweet by @US_STRATCOM, Twitter, June 16, 2022 [https://twitter.com/US_STRATCOM/status/1537848521910525952].
international community to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.” The Russians “urged” their “colleagues” not to “forget” the NPT’s “key role” in “ensuring global security and stability.” It was “important” to “work on creating the conditions for a non-confrontational and depoliticized dialogue.”

Money line: “We hope that Washington and its allies will have enough political will and common sense to put the interests of preserving the NPT above opportunistic goals.” Moscow was “determined to cooperate with all interested countries” to strengthen the treaty.355

The NATO leadership reiterated its position on the balance between assistance and escalation. In an interview with German media on June 19, Stoltenberg promised that “NATO will continue supporting Ukraine in its self-defense,” but emphasized that NATO “is not a part of the conflict.” NATO would “help the country, but it would not send NATO soldiers to Ukraine.” Asked about the risk of nuclear war, Stoltenberg explained that NATO “does not see a higher alert level of the Russian nuclear forces.” However, “Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling is dangerous and irresponsible,” he stressed. “Putin must know: A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,” added the Secretary General. NATO was sending a “clear signal to Russia” that it protects all its member states, he concluded. He evaded a question about how realistic NATO membership for Ukraine was.356

In an article published on the same day, Boris Johnson laid out four priorities for the further war efforts. Accordingly, the West must 1) “ensure that Ukraine receives weapons, equipment, ammunition and training more rapidly than the invader, and build up its capacity to use our help”; 2) “help preserve the viability of the Ukrainian state” through “funding and technical help”; 3) “develop the alternative overland routes that already exist” to bypass Russia’s naval blockade and keep Ukraine’s economy afloat; and 4) get food out of Ukraine. Johnson added that all of this served the overall purpose of strengthening “the hand of our Ukrainian friends to finish this war on the terms that President Zelensky has laid out. That should be the definition of success. The Ukrainian people have been clear they will not be forced into accepting less than that.”357

Meanwhile, an increasing number of reports suggested that Ukraine now had insufficient weaponry to withstand the Russian offensive.358 Conversely, throughout the month of June, Russian forces had made slow but steady advances in the Eastern Luhansk and Donetsk regions.359

Escalation between NATO and Russia seemed to emerge from a different domain. Over the weekend of June 18 and 19, the Lithuanian government partially blocked Russian railway transports across its ter-


357 Boris Johnson, "Boris Johnson: We will never be secure if we turn our backs on valiant Ukraine," The Times, June 18, 2022 [https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/boris-johnson-we-will-never-be-secure-if-we-turn-our-backs-on-valiant-ukraine-education-commission-9sd52bxq].

358 Tim Lister, Denis Lapin and Julia Kesaieva, "Western support for Kyiv must not cease, say NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson," CNN, June 20, 2022 [https://edition.cnn.com/2022/06/19/europe/ukraine-russia-war-stoltenberg-johnson-intl-gbr/index.html].

ritories to the Russian Kaliningrad enclave under EU sanctions. Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev condemned this decision on 21 June, warning of "serious consequences" and stating that "appropriate measures ... will be taken in the near future" and that the "consequences will have a serious negative impact on the population of Lithuania."^360

Statements from Moscow suggested an ongoing Russian debate on the need for arms control negotiations with the United States. On June 20, Medvedev pushed back on Peskov’s call for New START negotiations with the US government, suggesting that first "Washington should truly appreciate the need for a strategic arms dialogue and ask Moscow for it." He noted: We don’t have any relations with the USA now. They are at zero degrees. And you don’t need to defrost them today. And there is no need to negotiate with them yet. This is bad for Russia. Let them run or crawl themselves and ask for it. And they appreciate it as a special favor."^361

A number of concurrent developments are worth noting. On June 21, the German government made its weapons deliveries to Ukraine to date public. Accordingly, deliveries already included 500 stinger rockets and the government was inter alia still planning to supply 30 Gepard tanks. On the same day, Putin announced that the Russian military would deploy the new nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile Sarmat by the end of the year. At the same time, media reports suggested that Ukrainian officials were concerned that US bipartisan support for military assistance to Ukraine might be waning amid rising energy prices and other domestic concerns in the United States. However, support for Ukraine remained strong. On June 23, the European Parliament adopted a resolution calling on EU Heads of State and Government to grant EU candidate status to Ukraine. On the


361 “Зампред СБ счел неподходящим время для переговоров с США по СНВ (Deputy Chairman of the Security Council considered the time unsuitable for negotiations with the United States on START),” Izvestia, June 20, 2022 [https://iz.ru/1352528/2022-06-20/zampred-sb-schel-nepodkhodящим-vremia-dlia-peregovovorov-s-shha-po-sna].

362 “Welche Waffen liefert Deutschland an die Ukraine – und welche sollen noch folgen? (What weapons is Germany supplying to Ukraine – and which ones are to follow?)” Spiegel, June 21, 2022 [https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/ukraine-bundesregierung-hebt-geheimhaltung-bei-waffenlieferungen-auf-a-7e6156e-252a-48eb-b3b-b23502a8cc52], and “Militärische Unterstützungsleistungen für die Ukraine (Military assistance to Ukraine),” Website of the German Federal Government, September 6, 2022 [https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/themen/krieg-in-der-ukraine/lieferungen-ukraine-2054514].

363 Nataliya Vasilyeva, “Putin threatens to deploy new nuclear missile by year end – and it could hit Britain within three minutes,” The Telegraph, June 21, 2022 [https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/06/21/vladimir-putin-threatens-unleash-satanii-nuclear-missile-year/].

364 Lara Seligman, Paul McLeary and Quint Forgey, “The war is not even half-over: In Washington, Ukraine’s leaders beg for aid,” POLITICO, June 22, 2022 [https://www.politico.com/newsletters/national-security-daily/2022/06/22/the-war-is-not-even-half-over-in-washington-ukraines-leaders-beg-for-aid-00041436].

same day, the European Council granted EU candidate status to Ukraine. EU leaders also promised continued "military, financial, humanitarian and political support" for Ukraine.\footnote{EU response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Website of the European Council, September 8, 2022 [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-response-ukraine-invasion/].} Also on June 23, the Pentagon announced military assistance for Ukraine worth 450 million US dollars, including four additional HIMARS.\footnote{“$450 Million in Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine,” Website of the US Department of Defense, June 23, 2022 [https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3072799/450-million-in-additional-security-assistance-for-ukraine/].}

Military developments in Ukraine remained impossible to predict. On June 24, Ukrainian forces were reported to have started withdrawing from Severodonetsk, one of "the last remaining strongholds in the Luhansk region." An anonymous US defense official however pointed out that Russian forces were "just eking out inch by inch of territory here" paying significant costs for "very small, very incremental gain."\footnote{Lara Seligman et al., “After Roe’s fall, the Pentagon has no answers for female service members,” Politico, June 24, 2022 [https://www.politico.com/newsletters/national-security-daily/2022/06/24/after-ros-fall-the-pentagon-has-no-answers-for-female-service-members-00042320].}

On the same June 24, Russian rhetoric again intensified. Foreign minister Lavrov reportedly declared that the West was preparing for war with Russia. "Hitler rallied a significant part, if not most, of the European nations under his banner for a war against the Soviet Union," and “now, the EU together with NATO are forming another—modern—coalition for a standoff and, ultimately, war with the Russian Federation,” said Lavrov.\footnote{Jon Jackson, "Kremlin Official Sees NATO Preparing for War With Russia," Newsweek, June 24, 2022 [https://www.newsweek.com/kremlin-official-sees-nato-preparing-war-russia-1718934].}

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In the same vein, on June 25 at a meeting with Belarusian President Lukashenko in St. Petersburg, Putin announced the transfer of nuclear-capable Iskander-M missiles to Belarus, as well as the re-equipping of Belarusian SU-35 planes to carry nuclear weapons. The move was depicted as a reaction to Lithuania’s alleged plan “to stop transit from Russia to Kaliningrad” and to US and NATO exercises with nuclear capable aircraft. Lukashenko noted that Lithuania’s “plan to stop transit from Russia through Belarus to Kaliningrad” was “akin to declaring some kind of war.” When asking for adapting Belarusian aircraft for nuclear use, he was not “talking about what we will transport tomorrow or whether they will transport nuclear weapons,” but he remembered “1941, when we were lulled to sleep,” Lukashenko said. Putin answered that Russia was “obliged” to take care of the security of Belarus, and proposed that “the Belarusian army is armed with a fairly large group of Su-25 aircraft, they could be re-equipped accordingly.” Hence, “within the next few months we will transfer to Belarus the Iskander-M tactical missile systems, which, as you know, can use both ballistic and cruise missiles, both in conventional and nuclear versions.”\footnote{“Встреча с Президентом Беларуси Александром Лукашенко (Meeting with President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko),” Website of the President of Russia, June 25, 2022 [http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/68702].} \\
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The G7 states immediately responded to Moscow’s decision. On June 26-28, G7 leaders and representatives of the European Union met for a Summit in Germany. During a virtual address at the Summit, Zelenskyy asked for more military assistance and suggested the war should end “before winter sets in.” In a joint statement of support for Ukraine on June 27, the G7 leaders promised to “continue to provide financial, humanitarian, military and diplomatic support and stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes” and condemned Russian nuclear rhetoric. The G7 reiterated their “condemnation of Russia’s unjustified use of nuclear rhetoric and signaling.” Russia had to “abide by its international commitments, including those which ban the use of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.” The G7 urged “Russia to behave responsibly and exercise restraint, and reiterate that any use of such weapons would be unacceptable and met with severe consequences. In this regard we express serious concern after the announcement by Russia that it could transfer missiles with nuclear capabilities to Belarus.”

The Russian government denied it was planning to also deploy nuclear weapons to Belarus. Responding to the G7’s expression of “serious concern” over the transfer of nuclear-capable missiles to Belarus, on June 28, Kremlin spokesperson Peskov denied the Kremlin was planning to station nuclear weapons in Belarus. “The president didn’t talk about it. He talked about complexes that are technically capable of carrying different types of weapons,” he stressed.

In Washington, preparations went ahead for additional support for Ukraine. On June 27, US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan confirmed that the US government was “in the process of finalizing a package that includes advanced air defense capabilities” for Ukraine. Asked about Zelenskyy’s remark that the war should end by the winter at the G7 Summit, Sullivan stated that the Ukrainian President “was very much focused on trying to ensure that Ukraine is in as advantageous a position on the battlefield as possible in the next months as opposed to the next years because he believes that a grinding conflict is not in the interest of the Ukrainian people.” Sullivan also confirmed the Russian forces were facing “limitations.” He noted: “Russia faces limitations in terms of its ability to resupply and to fill out its battalion tactical groups. Those limitations are real. They have an impact on Russia’s capacity to achieve its ultimate strategic aims in this conflict, which we do not believe are limited to the Donbas, certainly are not limited to Luhansk.”

In Brussels, information started to emerge on how NATO planned to strengthen its Eastern Flank, while European Allies continued to be split on how to best support Kyiv. At a pre-Summit press briefing on

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374 “Путин не говорил Лукашенко о передаче Минску ядерных ракет, заявил Песков (Putin did not tell Lukashenko about the transfer of nuclear missiles to Minsk, Peskov said),” RIA Novosti, June 28, 2022 [https://ria.ru/20220628/rakety-1798609427.html].

June 27, NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg announced that the Alliance would significantly increase its troop presence on the Eastern flank, increasing “the number of [NATO] high readiness forces … to well over 300,000.” On the same day media reported of an Eastern European defense official arguing that “when it comes to weapons aid, there is room to do 10 times more” and “when it comes to sanctions, then there is room to do much more,” suggesting Eastern European Allies preferred stronger support for Ukraine still.

| 78. Meanwhile, the US military seemed bent to return to its normal testing pattern for new missiles. On June 28, it conducted an unsuccessful hypersonic missile flight test. Nevertheless, “the information gathered from this event will provide vital insights,” stressed Pentagon spokesman Tim Gorman. “Experiments and tests, both successful and unsuccessful, are the backbone of developing highly complex, critical technologies at tremendous speed,” he stressed in a statement, suggesting also that “delivering hypersonic weapons remains a top priority and the Department remains confident that it is on track to field offensive and defensive hypersonic capabilities on target dates beginning in the early 2020s.” Russian analyst Alexei Ramm reportedly blamed the failure on the complexity of the tested system. |

On June 29-30, a NATO Leaders Summit took place in Madrid. At the summit, the Alliance formally invited Finland and Sweden to join the Alliance. Allies also “committed to deploy additional robust in-place combat-ready forces on [the NATO’s] eastern flank, to be scaled up from the existing battlegroups to brigade-size units where and when required” and announced a New Force Model under which over 300,000 troops would be available at high readiness. This was a significant increase from the Alliance’s existing high-readiness NATO Response Force (NRF) with 40,000 troops. On June 29, Biden moreover announced significant additional US deployments to Europe including “more destroyers, air defense systems and … troops.” According to a White House Fact Sheet from June 29 this would include the following:

- *Establishment of a permanent V Corps Headquarters Forward Command Post in Poland …*
- *Commitment to maintaining an additional rotational Brigade Combat Team in Europe, which the United States will position in Romania, with the ability to deploy subordinate elements for training and exercises across the eastern flank.*


Enhanced rotational deployments in the Baltic region including armored, aviation, air defense, and special operations forces...

An agreement to work with Spain to increase the number of U.S. destroyers stationed in Rota from four to six.

Two squadrons of F-35 aircraft to the United Kingdom.

Stationing of additional air defense and other enablers in Germany and Italy. 382

In addition, various Allies declared what their contributions to the New Force Model would be. On June 29, the German Ministry of Defense announced it would “assign 15,000 troops, including an armored division with two brigades, 65 combat and transport aircraft, 20 warships and special forces units,” while the British Ministry of Defense promised “one brigade, an unspecified number of multi-role aircraft and warships, including an aircraft carrier.” 383 Various Allies also made public statements on how they would implement the promised strengthening of the NATO Battlegroups.

Berlin announced an increase in the Bundeswehr presence in Lithuania to around 1,500 troops, the pre-assignment of an additional 3,500 troops permanently stationed in Germany to reinforce Lithuania in case of need, and the prepositioning of ammunition there. London, in addition to reinforcing the British troops deployed in Estonia up to 1,700 soldiers, will pre-assign a 1,000-strong contingent permanently stationed in the UK. Canada has also pledged to increase its commitments to the battlegroup in Latvia with the pre-assignment of forces up to the size of a brigade. ... President Emmanuel Macron announced a similar pre-assignment of French forces to the battlegroup in Romania. 384

More information emerged on NATO’s efforts in Eastern Europe. On June 30, SHAPE announced that France had deployed the MAMBA surface-to-air missile defense system as well as an air defense command post to Romania ... since May 16.” As such, it was the latest country to strengthen the Alliance’s air and missile defense posture at the Eastern flank since the beginning of the war. According to Deputy Chief of Staff Operations at Allied Air Command Christoph Pliet, “besides the French deployment to Romania, Germany and the Netherlands have deployed PATRIOT batteries to Slovakia and the United States sent two PATRIOT batteries to Poland in April 2022. These deployments are critical augmentations enhancing the Alliance’s IAMD posture in a changed geopolitical environment.” 385


At the Madrid Summit, Allies also adopted a new Strategic Concept, which strongly condemned Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and described the Russian Federation as “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.” On Moscow’s nuclear threats, the document noted that Russia was “modernizing its nuclear forces and expanding its novel and disruptive dual-capable delivery systems, while employing coercive nuclear signaling.” Also: “The Russian Federation’s violations and selective implementation of its arms control obligations and commitments have contributed to the deterioration of the broader security landscape,” it added. On NATO’s own nuclear capability, the Concept stated that “NATO’s deterrence and defense posture is based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defense capabilities, complemented by space and cyber capabilities.” Overall: “The fundamental purpose of NATO’s nuclear capability is to preserve peace, prevent coercion and deter aggression. Nuclear weapons are unique. The circumstances in which NATO might have to use nuclear weapons are extremely remote. Any employment of nuclear weapons against NATO would fundamentally alter the nature of a conflict. The Alliance has the capabilities and resolve to impose costs on an adversary that would be unacceptable and far outweigh the benefits that any adversary could hope to achieve.”

In the Madrid Summit declaration, Allies also pledged to “continue to counter Russia’s lies and reject its irresponsible rhetoric,” apparently alluding to Moscow’s nuclear threats.

The Kremlin responded reiterating its position on Finland and Sweden joining NATO. On June 29, Putin explained that Russia did “not have territorial issues and disputes [with those two countries].” Hence: “We have nothing that could bother us in terms of Finland’s membership and Sweden to NATO,” declared Putin. “If they want [to join NATO] – please. Only they should clearly understand that there were no threats to them before, but now, if military contingents and infrastructure are deployed there, we will have to respond in a mirror manner and create such threats to the territories from which threats are created to us,” he added.

Overall, Moscow’s rhetoric appeared to become less belligerent. On June 30, Putin declared that a “multipolar system of international relations” was “being actively formed,” and announced that Russia was “open to dialogue on ensuring strategic stability, preserving non-proliferation regimes for weapons of mass destruction and improving the situation in the field of arms control.” However, there were currently “unfortunately … no tangible plans” for strategic stability talks, the Russian leader noted.

Western support for Ukraine in turn remained strong, but many asked themselves how long this would last. On June 30, Biden announced another assistance package for Ukraine worth 800 million US dollars, “including a new advanced Western air defense system for Ukraine, more artillery and ammunition, counter-battery radars, additional ammunition for the HIMARS multiple launch rocket system we’ve already given Ukraine and more HIMARS coming from other countries as well.” When asked how long the US government would continue supporting Ukraine, Biden explained that the United States and NATO

386 “NATO 2022 Strategic Concept,” Website of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, June 29, 2022 [https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/].


388 “Путин предупредил о зеркальном ответе на размещение баз НАТО в Финляндии и Швеции (Putin warned of a mirror response to the deployment of NATO bases in Finland and Sweden),” TASS, June 29, 2022 [https://tass.ru/politika/15077991].

would “stick with Ukraine as long as it takes to, in fact, make sure that they are not defeated ... by Russia.” Still, at the NATO Summit, Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas reportedly expressed concern over growing war fatigue. “We can't be tired, because we have to help Ukraine defend their country,” she was quoted as saying.

July 2022: Nuclear narratives loose steam

On July 5, NATO allies signed the Accession Protocols for Finland and Sweden, which then had to be ratified by every Ally.

In Ukraine, the outcome of hostilities remained unclear. On July 5, media reported that although Russian forces had now occupied most of the Luhansk province, they had done so at a high price. The question was whether the Russian troops would be able to quickly regather their strength in order to capture the rest of the Donbas, which could then “free up its forces to grab even more land and dictate the terms of any peace agreement,” or whether Ukrainian forces could “pin the Russians down for a protracted period [and] build up the resources for a counteroffensive.” According to a Ukrainian officer the high number of casualties and territorial losses were starting to negatively impact the morale of Ukrainian troops. Meanwhile, Senate Armed Services Committee Chair Jack Reed suggested US supplied multiple-rocket launcher systems "could be decisive in terms of stopping the Russian assault and maybe even regaining momentum."

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<td>Against this background, Medvedev once again alluded to Russia’s nuclear capability. Referring to calls “to create tribunals or courts for a so-called investigation of Russia’s actions,” he suggested on July 6 that “the idea of punishing a country that has one of the largest nuclear potential is absurd. And potentially poses a threat to the existence of humanity.”</td>
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393 Alexander Ward and Quint Forgey, “NATO is unified now. Will ‘war fatigue’ set in later?,” Politico, July 1, 2022 [https://www.politico.com/newsletters/national-security-daily/2022/07/01/war-fatigue-is-coming-everywhere-00043793].


399 “Against this background, Medvedev once again alluded to Russia’s nuclear capability. Referring to calls “to create tribunals or courts for a so-called investigation of Russia’s actions,” he suggested on July 6 that “the idea of punishing a country that has one of the largest nuclear potential is absurd. And potentially poses a threat to the existence of humanity.”


At times, it remained unclear whether information releases on Russia’s military acquisitions were intentional political signals or just ordinary developments. For instance, on July 8, the Belgorod submarine capable of carrying a Poseidon strategic nuclear drone was delivered to the Russian Navy. An official press statement however called the Belgorod a “research submarine” and made no mention of the Poseidon drone.

In Washington, support for Ukraine remained strong. On July 8, a senior Pentagon official declared that “the President has decided to provide another round of presidential drawdown authority [including] four high-mobility artillery rocket systems.” Ukraine had been “successfully striking Russian locations in Ukraine, deeper behind the front lines, and disrupting Russia’s ability to conduct that artillery operation,” the official declared. Asked about Russia’s war goals, the official explained that “the objective remains the same, which is to prevent the existence of a sovereign, independent Ukraine.” Only “the specific military objectives have shifted,” the official stated. “On Russia’s broader intentions, … we take very seriously the threats that Russia poses to NATO allies and the NATO alliance, and that is why, at the Madrid Summit last week, the United States announced this set of significant additions to our posture and capability in Europe,” the official added.

In Moscow, the leadership was employing harsh words, but keeping away from nuclear narratives. In a speech on July 7, Putin once again blamed the “collective West” for the war in Ukraine and declared that Russia had “not started anything in earnest yet” in Ukraine. He concluded: “We are not rejecting peace talks, but those who are rejecting them should know that the longer it goes on, the harder it will be for them to negotiate with us.”

80. De-escalatory

However, another Russian official again played down Moscow’s nuclear narratives. On July 7, Valentina Matviyenko, speaker of the Russian Federation Council, stated that it was “unacceptable to even talk about the possibility of a nuclear war at all.” “Any sane person, especially a politician and statesman, understands that a nuclear war, if God forbid it happened, generally means the end of human civilization,” she added. “Russia views nuclear weapons only as a deterrent,” Matviyenko explained.

“We have clearly and strictly prescribed those exceptional cases when it can be used only in response to [God forbid that this never happens] a nuclear attack.” Also: “We behave like a civilized country, and we do it openly, we declare this publicly and strictly follow our obligations, and we are doing everything to ensure that nothing like this happen,” she stressed. She also referred to alleged Ukrainian attempts to obtain a nuclear weapon, stating that this would be “like giving a grenade to a madman.”


400 “Meeting with State Duma leaders and party faction heads,” Website of the President of Russia, July 7, 2022 [http://en.kremli.ru/events/president/transcripts/68836].
In Ukraine, political leaders were less than keen to negotiate on Moscow’s terms. On July 9, Ukrainian Minister of Defense Oleksii Reznikov tweeted that “HIMARS have already made a HUUUGE difference on the battlefield.” Over the following weekend, however, the Russian forces continued attacks on three fronts, in the Northeast, East and South of Ukraine, media reported on July 11.

The following day, July 12, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zakharova once again alluded to the risk of nuclear escalation. “After provoking an escalation of the Ukrainian crisis and unleashing a violent hybrid confrontation with Russia, Washington and its allies are dangerously teetering on the brink of an open military confrontation with our country, which means a direct armed conflict between nuclear powers. Clearly, such a confrontation would be fraught with nuclear escalation,” Zakharova noted. At the same time, she denied Russia was threatening the use of nuclear weapons, criticizing a statement by Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida as “anti-Russian.” She said: “It is unacceptable to try to distort the logic of deterrence, which is what Russia’s official statements on nuclear issues are based on, for propaganda reasons, as well as to depict us as a country threatening to use nuclear weapons.”

The Biden Administration displayed strong support for the government in Kyiv. On July 12, Jake Sullivan pointed out that Russia had “already substantially failed to achieve its strategic objectives in Ukraine ... to take Kyiv, the capital; to end Ukraine as a country; to eliminate Ukrainian identity from the map; and to subsume Ukraine to within Russia.” Although Russia had also “been able to grind out, kilometer by kilometer, inch by inch, some territory in the east,” he stressed that “the Ukrainians [had] made Russia pay a dear price for that [and] the sanctions have made Russia pay a dear price for that.” Further Sullivan affirmed that the US government would “continue to work with the Ukrainian military and Ukrainian government on a strategy that ultimately achieves their objectives, both on the battlefield and at the negotiating table ... for as long as it takes.” Asked about the extent to which the Biden Administration would support Ukraine in reclaiming territory occupied by Russia, Sullivan only reiterated that “the fundamental purpose of [the US] strategy is to put the Ukrainians in as strong a position as possible on the battlefield so that they are in as strong a position as possible at the negotiating table when diplomacy comes.” Also: “As President Zelenskyy himself has said: Ultimately, this conflict will have to be pursued through diplomacy. And that’s where the United States’ thrust and purpose — that’s where the nature of our policy stands and will go,” added Sullivan. US support for Ukraine was not limited in terms of time, but by “a benefit-risk analysis” regarding in terms of “exactly the types of systems [that the US government is] prepared to provide.” Sullivan further pointed out “the severe costs that Russia has had to endure on the battlefield as it tries to grind out territory in the east,” which “is coming at a cost to the sustainment of its own weapons.” To illustrate these costs, he pointed to the fact that “the Iranian government is preparing to provide Russia with up to several hundred UAVs,” which he thought was “pretty newsworthy and noteworthy.”

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81. Warning

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401 Tweet by @oleksiireznikov, Twitter, July 9, 2022 [https://twitter.com/oleksiireznikov/status/1545847314044129287?s=20&d=0WReKYVbEnjaoZaw5_J0Q].


403 “US, allies teetering on brink of military confrontation with Moscow, says diplomat,” TASS, July 12, 2022 [https://tass.com/politics/1478711].

Both Russia and the United States made public advances in missile technology. On **July 12**, the head of Roscosmos Dmitry Rogozin declared that Russia’s Sarmat, “the world’s most powerful nuclear missile with a global range is preparing for new tests and serial production.”\(^{405}\)

**Warning**

US weapons systems appeared to be making an impact on Ukraine’s battlefield. On **July 13**, media reported of a series of Ukrainian strikes “against high-value targets such as ammunition depots and command posts since multiple-launch rocket systems known as Himars began arriving from the US” in June. “The occupiers have already felt very well what modern artillery is,” Zelenskyy commented on the attacks. “They will not have a safe rear anywhere on our land,” he added.\(^{407}\) However, on **July 14**, media reported that Russia had “stepped up long-range missile attacks far from the frontlines in eastern Ukraine over the past few weeks.”\(^{408}\)

The first signs of a nearing crisis at the Zaporizhzhia power plant emerged. On **July 15**, the president of the Ukrainian nuclear agency Energoatom Pedro Kotin suggested Russian forces were storing weapons at the Zaporizhzhia power plant. “The occupiers bring their machinery there, including missile systems, from which they already shell the other side of the river Dnipro and the territory of Nikopol,” he said.\(^{409}\)

Russia seemed to be reacting to Ukraine’s enhanced military capabilities. On **July 16**, Shoigu reportedly “gave the necessary instructions to further increase the actions of groups in all operational areas in order to exclude the possibility of the Kyiv regime launching massive rocket and artillery strikes on civilian infrastructure and residents of settlements in Donbas and other regions.”\(^{410}\) Two days later, on **July 18**, he directed Russian forces in Ukraine “to prioritize the use of high-precision armament for eliminating the missile and artillery means” of the Ukrainian forces.\(^{411}\)

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405 Post on Telegram channel of Dmitry Rogozin, *Telegram*, July 12, 2022 [https://t.me/rogozin_do/3313].


Nuclear narratives returned to the foreground, but in a much more muted fashion. On July 18, Lavrov picked up a statement by German Air Force chief Ingo Gerhartz. At the end of June, Gerhartz had had warned Putin of competing with the West and suggested that "credible deterrence" required "both the means and the political will to implement nuclear deterrence if necessary." The fact that "no one in NATO and the EU reprimanded ... Gerhartz" for these remarks, indicates that Europe "is complacently forgetting Germany’s role in its history," claimed Lavrov. He also noted that "NATO instructors and gunners of the MLRS are already, apparently, directing the actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the national battalions directly ‘on the ground.’" He concluded: "I hope that among the Europeans there are responsible politicians who are aware of the consequences this is fraught with," added Lavrov.

Support for Ukraine remained high. On July 18, EU foreign ministers pledged military assistance for Ukraine worth another 500 million euros. "Ukraine needs more arms; we will provide them," explained Josep Borrell.

Russia seemed bent to enhance its control over the territory it had occupied. On July 19, Kirby warned Russia was beginning to lay the "the groundwork to annex Ukrainian territory that it controls, in direct violation of Ukraine's sovereignty ... installing illegitimate proxy officials in areas of Ukraine that are under its control." If Russia proceeded with its apparent "annexation plans," the United States would "respond swiftly and severely and in lockstep with [its] allies and partners," he stressed. "Russia will face additional sanctions and become even more of a global pariah than it is now," Kirby noted. The United States would “remind” Putin that Russia “may prove unable to hold this territory.”

Indeed, on July 20, media reported of an interview with Lavrov, in which he declared Western deliveries of long-range weaponry to Ukraine were contributing to expand the geographical scope of Russia’s military operation. "Now the geography has changed [compared to March when Russia scaled back its war goals],” he explained. "It’s not just Donetsk and Luhansk, it’s Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and several other territories. And this process continues, consistently and persistently." Moscow “cannot allow the part of Ukraine that Zelensky will control or whoever replaces him to have weapons that will pose a direct threat to [Russian] territory and the territory of those republics that have declared their independence, those who want their own future,” he added.

Meanwhile Austin showed himself unimpressed by Lavrov’s statements, declaring he was sure the “Ukrainian leadership will be pleased to hear Lavrov’s confirmation of the effectiveness of not only that system [the HIMARs], but how they’re using that system.” Washington and its allies had known Putin


413 Sergey Lavrov, "Об инсценировках как методе политики Запада (About dramatizations as a method of Western policy), Izvestia, June 18, 2022 [https://iz.ru/1366164/sergei-lavrov/ob-instcenirovkakh-kak-metode-politiki-zapada].

414 Foreign Affairs Council, 18 July 2022, Website of the European Council, July 18, 2022 [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/En/meetings/Fac/2022/07/18/].


416 "Лавров: поставки дальнобойного оружия Киеву расширят географию спецоперации (Lavrov: deliveries of long-range weapons to Kyiv will expand the geography of the special operation)," RIA Novosti, July 20, 2022 [https://ria.ru/20220720/spetsoperatsiya-1803701411.html].
had "greater ambitions," he added and also confirmed that Ukraine would receive “four additional HIMARS advanced rocket systems for a total of 16 ... [and] additional GLMRS ... rockets that ... are used on a HIMARS” as part of the next military assistance package.  

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| Against this background, US military officials noted fighter jets could be supplied, but clarified the restricted nature of nuclear deterrence. On the same July 20, US Air Force Chief of Staff Charles Q. Brown declared the United States might be willing to provide fighter jets to Kyiv. “There’s U.S. [fighter jets], there’s Gripen out of Sweden, there’s the Eurofighter or the Rafale. So there’s a number of different platforms that could go to Ukraine,” explained Brown.  

Asked what the United States would do if Putin decided to use a tactical nuclear weapon inside Ukraine, he declared that this was a policy question “for the President to decide.” The US military's responsibility was “to provide the President options.” Whatever these options might be, “it’s all about deterrence. The goal is not to get into a conflict broader than the conflict that’s already going on today and definitely not into a nuclear conflict,” Brown stressed. “Because of our strategic deterrence we provide umbrella security with many of our allies and partners and we’ve got to be responsible about how we do that ... there’s a range of options that you could do but by the same token there’s a lot of risk,” he explained. The US government would need to make sure that these options would not lead it down a “slippery slope that we can’t recover from.”  

The upcoming NPT review conference spurred additional statements. On July 21, Adam Scheinman, the US Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation, wrote that Washington will “spare no effort to not only preserve but also strengthen” the NPT. He noted the January 2022 P5 statement affirming that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” Yet he added that “Russia’s unjustified war against Ukraine, dangerous actions, and escalatory nuclear rhetoric seriously call into question its commitment to that January joint statement.”  

In Washington, some worried about declining support for Ukraine. Also on July 21, Democratic lawmaker Brendan Boyle suggested that bipartisan and public support in the United States to invest extensive resources in defending Ukraine might be waning as “the shock [of the war] has worn off” and domestic issues, including soaring price and supply chain issues, have been growing. “I would very much caution anyone who assumes that this [Congressional] unity will last forever and that the support of the American people will last forever,” he stressed, suggesting US support for Kyiv was already being challenged by roughly “a third” of Republican Congress members. This “movement will grow” as long as the West faces an “inflation crisis,” he explained.


418 "Fireside Chat with General Charles Q. Brown," YouTube account of The Aspen Institute, July 20, 2022 [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S3BO6RP9eDw].


However, on July 22, Jake Sullivan rejected such concerns about the staying power of the United States, pointing to the 40 billion US dollars military assistance package for Ukraine already passed by Congress, which would allow US support to continue for a "considerable amount of time." Even if public attention for the war might diminish eventually, sufficient executive/elite support to continue this policy of supporting Ukraine would likely remain beyond that package as well, he added. Sullivan also believed this to be true for European countries, despite the growing energy crisis across the continent. Asked about his overall assessment of the current state of the conflict, Sullivan explained that Putin had "not [been] able to achieve [his] basic strategic objectives ... which were to seize the capital city of Kyiv and to end Ukraine as a going concern." Russia was now "facing significant difficulties constituting the kind of force necessary for them to achieve the objectives which have not fundamentally changed," partially due to "the fact that [the United State has] ... provided an enormous amount of sophisticated weaponry and training [to Ukraine]." As for the US objectives with respect to Ukraine, Sullivan elaborated that the White House wants "to see a sovereign independent viable Ukraine that ... can repel any future Russian aggression;" put the Ukrainians in "the strongest possible position on the battlefield so that they are in the strongest possible position at the negotiating table;" "ensure that Putin is stymied in his goal to weaken and divide the West;" and finally, "ensure that Russia's invasion of Ukraine is ... a strategic failure for Putin," meaning that he should both "be denied his objectives in Ukraine and ... pay a longer term price in terms of the elements of [Russia's] national power." Nevertheless, Sullivan also admitted that "there are certain capabilities [Biden] has said he is not prepared to provide," including long-range missiles with a range of 300 kilometers, because the Administration wanted to "ensure that we do not end up in a circumstance where we're heading down the road towards a third world war." 422

Other announcements in Washington buttressed Sullivan's claims. On the same July 22, the Pentagon "announced $270 million in additional security assistance for Ukraine," including the previously announced additional four HIMARS. 423 White House spokesperson Kirby reportedly also confirmed the US government was considering whether it could supply fighter jets to Ukraine, although this would "not" be "something that would be executed in the near-term." 424 Conversely, the Administration reportedly had refrained from approving a Ukrainian request for long-range drones. According to anonymous officials, this was due to "a number of concerns, ranging from the potential loss of advanced technology from the battlefield to the need to train Ukrainians to operate the drones." 425

On July 24, Lavrov suggested Russia was aiming for regime change in Ukraine, stating, "we are determined to help the people of eastern Ukraine to liberate themselves from the burden of this absolutely unacceptable regime" and "will certainly help the Ukrainian people to get rid of the regime, which is absolutely anti-people and anti-historical." 426

422 "Closing Fireside Chat with Jake Sullivan," YouTube Account of The Aspen Institute, July 22, 2022 [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K0M4vYSPU04].
Pressure mounted for the US government to supply Ukraine with longer-range weapons. Returning to Washington from a trip to Kyiv, Democrat House Armed Services Committee chair Adam Smith said President Zelenskyy had urgently asked for more assistance to help Ukraine recapture Russian occupied territories before the cold winter months, media reported on July 25. “The next three to six weeks are crucial,” Smith explained. Given this time constraint and in light of Russia’s brutal tactics, “there’s pressure mounting from a lot of people to try to get [the Biden Administration] to change their mind on [their refusal to provide longer-range missiles and drones to Kyiv],” Smith noted. “The administration is not prepared to do that at this point,” he explained, “but there are good arguments being made.” On July 26, media reported on a number of calls on the Administration by Republican lawmakers, including from Michael Waltz and Joni Ernst, for increased US and NATO allied support to Zelenskyy, who they believed would not be able to win the war without such further support.428

On July 25, the MiG debate resurfaced once again with Slovakian Defense Minister Jaroslav Nad suggesting Slovakia could provide eleven of the Soviet era jets to Ukraine at the end of August. However, this would only be possible if allies provided financial compensation or replacement aircraft to Slovakia.429

The situation in Ukraine seemed to escalate. On July 28, an explosion in Eastern Ukraine reportedly killed Ukrainian prisoners of war in a Russian detention facility. The Ukrainian and Russian side accused each other of attacking the site. Russian Defense Ministry spokesperson Igor Konashenkov claimed, Kyiv had targeted the location with HIMARS.430 On July 31, media reports suggested the war in Ukraine was “moving to the south, where a potentially decisive phase of the conflict will play out ... as Ukraine says it is mounting a counteroffensive to take back the Southern port city of Kherson.”431 The next day, anonymous US officials denied Russian claims that the Ukrainian prisoners of war had been targeted with HIMARS. Accordingly, the site did not have “the indications it would have if it was hit with HIMARS.”432

The US Administration enhanced its support of Ukraine. On July 29, Blinken announced military assistance for Ukraine worth 550 million US dollars, including additional HIMARS ammunition.433

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428 Alexander Ward and Quint Forgey, “We’re approaching a crisis over Taiwan,” Politico, July 26 [https://www.politico.com/newsletters/national-security-daily/2022/07/26/were-approaching-a-crisis-over-taiwan-00047921].

429 Tweet by @haynesdeborah, Twitter, July 25, 2022 [https://twitter.com/haynesdeborah/status/1551542980913373186].


August 2022: Everything was misunderstood?

On August 1, the acting deputy head of Kyiv’s military intelligence Vadym Skibitsky commended the intelligence support provided by the United States and Britain to Ukraine, including to target Russian agents. “As far as military intelligence is concerned [Britain and the United States have provided] almost everything from information to equipment,” he explained. While Washington was “not providing direct targeting information, which would potentially undermine their case for not being direct participants in the war, … there was a level of consultation between intelligence officials of both countries prior to launching missiles that would allow Washington to stop any potential attacks if they were unhappy with the intended target,” he reportedly stated.434

Also on August 1, a senior US official was cited by the New York Times as claiming that Biden “personally told President Xi Jinping that if China entered the war in Ukraine on Russia’s side, Beijing would be risking access to its two most important export markets — the United States and the European Union.” And: China “responded by not providing military aid to Putin — at a time when the US and NATO have been giving Ukraine intelligence support and a significant number of advanced weapons that have done serious damage to the military of Russia, China’s ostensible ally,” anonymous officials reportedly added. Finally, senior US officials still believed that Putin was “quite prepared to consider using a small nuclear weapon against Ukraine if he sees his army facing certain defeat,” the article noted.435

The US bipartisan consensus on Ukraine faced a lonely challenger. Junior Republican Senator Josh Hawley wrote on August 1: “Until our European allies make the necessary commitments to their own national defense, we must not put more American lives at risk in Europe while allowing China’s power to grow unchecked,” he stressed. “US resources are not unlimited,” he explained, and the United States’ main adversary was China, not Russia.436

Discussions on potential arms control negotiations returned. On August 1, the NPT Review Conference started at the UN in New York. The White House released a statement just ahead of the conference, stating that it was “ready to expeditiously negotiate a new arms control framework to replace New START when it expires in 2026. But negotiation requires a willing partner operating in good faith. And Russia’s brutal and unprompted aggression in Ukraine has shattered peace in Europe and constitutes an attack on fundamental tenets of international order. In this context, Russia should demonstrate that it is ready to resume work on nuclear arms control with the United States.”437

In the context of the conference, numerous actors condemned Russia’s nuclear rhetoric. Britain, the United States, and France released a ministerial statement condemning “those who would use or threaten to use nuclear weapons for military coercion, intimidation, and blackmail. Such actions are profoundly dangerous and contrary to the purposes of the NPT and the UN Charter.”438 At the conference,

434 Dominic Nicholls, “Britain helps Ukraine hunt for Russian spies eyeing Western military aid,” The Telegraph, August 1, 2022 [https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/08/01/britain-helps-ukraine-hunt-russian-spies-eyeing-western-military/].


438 “Joint ministerial statement by the UK, US and France on the importance of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” Website of the UK Government, August 1, 2022 [https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/continued-importance-of-the-nuclear-non-
Antony Blinken called out Moscow’s “reckless, dangerous nuclear saber-rattling.” Russia’s aggression was “a brazen violation of international law,” and “contrary to the rules-based international order that we all seek to uphold.” It was also “contrary to the assurances that it provided to Ukraine in 1994 in the so-called Budapest Memorandum,” assurances that were “vital to giving Ukraine the confidence” to give up nuclear weapons. There was no place in the world for “nuclear deterrence based on coercion, intimidation, or blackmail,” he stressed.439 Similar statements came on August 1-2 from, for instance, Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister Mykola Tochytskyi;440 German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock;441 Swedish Foreign Minister Ann Christin Lindé;442 Belgian Foreign Minister Hadja Lahbib;443 Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida;444 the EU;445 Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland Marcin Przydacz;446 and Dutch Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Thijs van der Plas.447

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<td>Meanwhile, Russian representatives rejected these accusations. Moscow “consistently follows” the NPT’s “letter and spirit,” starting “from the premise that there can be no winners in a nuclear war and it must never be unleashed,” Putin declared on August 1.448</td>
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In its prepared statement from August 2, Russia argued that the fact that “the international security and strategic stability situation has been deteriorating rapidly” was not its fault. Moscow had been and remained committed to “freeing the world from the threat posed by WMDs.” Russia had been...
committed to security and stability, but these "positive achievements" had been "devalued" by the "US policy of ignoring Russia's red lines in the field of security." Nuclear powers had to "behave with restraint and responsibility" and Moscow was "strongly convinced that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." Hence, it would not deploy INF systems where the United States refrained from doing so. Also, it had "significantly reduced the role of nuclear weapons in its defense policy, which is purely defensive in nature and is aimed at protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country." Regarding Ukraine, Russia wanted to "strongly reject all allegations." The Ukrainian "regime" had come to power "as a result of a coup" and persecuted the Russian-speaking population. For eight years, "Ukrainian nationalists were killing civilians on this territory with near impunity and preparing a large-scale military invasion of the republics that, in fact, broke away from Ukraine."449

Subsequently, the Russian delegation also took the floor in a right of reply to talk about the nuclear dimension of the Ukraine crisis. First, Moscow stated that it was fulfilling its obligations with the Budapest Memorandum, including "a commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons." This was "fully implemented with respect to Ukraine, including in recent months." Second, the Russian delegation underlined the defensive nature of Russia's nuclear doctrine. A nuclear reaction would occur "solely as a response to aggression involving weapons of mass destruction" or when a conventional attack threatened "the very existence of the state." But: "None of these two hypothetical scenarios is relevant to the situation in Ukraine." Third, the Russians noted that their warning was related to a conflict with NATO potentially leading to nuclear exchanges. "Any military confrontation between nuclear rivals must be prevented, since it is fraught with the risk of escalation to the nuclear level," the argument went. A NATO intervention in Ukraine "would be able to trigger one of the two emergency scenarios described in our doctrine. We obviously stand for preventing this, but if Western countries try to test our resolve, Russia will not back down. And this is not the language of threats at all, but a statement of what is possible — such is the logic of deterrence."450

Media reports from August 2 noted that Russian diplomat Alexander Trofimov rejected "utterly unfounded, detached from reality and unacceptable speculations that Russia allegedly threatens to use nuclear weapons, particularly in Ukraine." However, Moscow could decide to use its nuclear arsenal in response to "direct aggression" by NATO countries. Yet, Russia would only use nuclear weapons in response to weapons of mass destruction or a conventional weapons attack that threatened the existence of the Russian state. "None of these two hypothetical scenarios is relevant to the situation in Ukraine," the Russian delegate said. However, he accused NATO countries of a "fierce hybrid confrontation" against Russia that now "dangerously balances on the edge of open military clash." Such a clash would "be able to trigger one of the two emergency scenarios described in our doctrine," Trofimov said. "We obviously stand for preventing this, but if Western countries try to test our resolve, Russia will not back down."451


Also on August 2, the Russian Defense Ministry responded to Skibitsky’s statements on military intelligence sharing between the United States and Ukraine. “All this undeniably proves that Washington, contrary to White House and Pentagon claims, is directly involved in the conflict in Ukraine,” a statement reportedly read. “It is the Biden administration that is directly responsible for all Kiev-approved rocket attacks on residential areas and civilian infrastructure in populated areas of Donbas and other regions, which have resulted in mass deaths of civilians.”

Pressure from the Baltic states on supporting Ukraine continued. On August 2 and 3, Estonian foreign minister Urmas Reinsalu reportedly called for significant additional military assistance for Kyiv, both in a phone call with his US counterpart Blinken and talking to the media. “The price tag of aggression now is not high enough,” he reportedly told journalists. “The war will not end by itself. The war will only end if Putin ends the war;” and this will only happen once “the price tag is ... threatening [Putin’s] power mechanisms,” Reinsalu added. “Now we have to show the aggressor our determination and the fact that our willpower is stronger than Putin’s.”

On August 3, media reported of Ukrainian strikes with US HIMARS on “several Russian bases and arms warehouses” near Kherson. The Ukrainian counteroffensive in the South of the country seemed to be taking shape.

On August 4, US officials reportedly warned, Russia might “try to frame” Ukraine for the killing of Ukrainian prisoners of war at the end of July. “We have reason to believe that Russia would go so far as to make it appear that Ukrainian HIMARS were to blame before journalists arrive,” an anonymous official was quoted as saying. On the same day, media reported Western officials believed severe shortages likely would slow down the Russian military, thereby opening up a window of opportunity for Ukraine. “The Russians are exhausted, and you don’t want to give them time to regroup and rest,” suggested Democrat US lawmaker Elissa Slotkin.

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<td><strong>On August 5, Russia</strong> reiterated the defensive nature of its nuclear arsenal at the NPT Review Conference. Moscow was “consistently reducing the place and role of nuclear weapons in its Military Doctrine.” Russia’s policy was “aimed exclusively at protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country.”</td>
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452 “Russia says United States is directly involved in Ukraine war,” Reuters, August 2, 2022 [https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-says-united-states-is-directly-involved-ukraine-war-2022-08-02/].


In the following days there were growing concerns, intensified fighting near the Russian-controlled Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant could lead to a nuclear accident. On August 8, White House spokesperson Karine Jean-Pierre called "on Russia to cease all military operations at or near Ukrainian nuclear facilities and return full control to Ukraine." Arms control prospects continued to appear unencouraging. On August 8, Russia announced that it was temporarily withholding permission for New START inspections, blaming the United States for creating difficulties in air transportation for Russian inspectors, but also the pandemic situation in the United States. However, the inspections had already been suspended since 2020, and the US government had nonetheless been able to assess that Russia was in compliance with its treaty obligations.

The tone at the NPT Review Conference also remained harsh. On the same August 8, Russia stated US nuclear deployments in Europe had a "significant negative factor for international and European security, but also increase the risk of nuclear conflict and generally hampered nuclear disarmament efforts." Moscow said the weapons should be withdrawn, the infrastructure eliminated, and the NATO "joint nuclear missions" had to be stopped. In another statement it accused Ukraine of having committed "several criminal acts in the form of artillery and rocket attacks" on the Zaporizhzhia power plant. Russia had "evidence confirming that the Kiev regime is the organizer and executor of these crimes" and was "ready to share them with the international community."


462 "Заявление МИД России о ситуации с Договором о мерах по дальнейшему сокращению и ограничению стратегических наступательных вооружений (ДНСВ) (Statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry on the situation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START))," Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, August 8, 2022 [https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1825525/].


In Washington, the US government boosted its support for Ukraine. On August 8, the Pentagon announced security assistance for Ukraine worth another 1 billion US dollars. Commenting on this additional aid, Colin Kahl said it was meant “to help the Ukrainians repel the Russian offensive in the east, and also to address evolving developments in the south and elsewhere.” So far, the Russians had “achieved none of Vladimir Putin’s objectives at the beginning of the war …. to overrun the entire country, to engage in regime change in Kyiv, to snuff out Ukraine as an independent, sovereign and democratic nation,” he added. In this context, Kahl confirmed “the HIMARS effectiveness,” which had “made it more difficult for the Russians to move forces around the battlefield.” This slowed down the Russian forces, “made it harder for them to resupply their forces.” Asked why the new assistance package did not include more HIMARS, he stated that the United States had already sent 16 systems, “which is actually quite a lot.” Hence: “These are not systems that we assess you need in the hundreds to have the type of affects they are. These are precision guided systems for very particular types of targets and the Ukrainians are using them as such,” he explained. Further, he confirmed that it was “not inconceivable that down the road, Western aircraft could be part of the mix on that, but the final analysis has not been done” and this was a question for the long term.

On August 9, the Ukrainian delegation responded to the Russian accusations regarding the Zaporizhzhia power plant at the NPT Review Conference. Russia had “attacked Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure, including its critical facilities, thus creating unprecedented nuclear safety and security threats to Ukraine and the international community.” There was “no doubt” that “all Russian actions [were] of deliberate, coordinated, and well-planned nature.” Thus, “Russia’s nuclear terrorism has no limits,” the delegation concluded and called “on the international community to close the sky over the nuclear power plants of Ukraine and to provide air defense systems.”

Also on August 9, US President Biden signed the instruments of ratification for Sweden and Finland’s accession to NATO.

On the same day, media reported, the Biden Administration was considering but hesitating to send advanced MQ-1C Gray Eagle drones to Ukraine, for fear the technology could fall into Moscow’s hands.

In parallel, information emerged suggesting Ukraine had started a counteroffensive that would involve Crimea. On August 9, media reported of several explosions in Russian-annexed Crimea at a Russian air


Meanwhile, concern over the safety of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant remained. On August 10, meeting in Berlin, the foreign ministers of the G7 called on Russia to "immediately withdraw its troops from within Ukraine's internationally recognized borders and respect Ukraine’s territory and sovereignty" and "immediately hand back full control to its rightful sovereign owner, Ukraine, of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant as well as of all nuclear facilities within Ukraine's internationally recognized borders to ensure their safe and secure operations." On the same day, Ukraine accused Russia of firing rockets from the Zaporizhzhia power plant, killing and wounding two dozen people in Marhanets. Russia had previously claimed that Ukraine was using the town to shell Russian forces at the plant.

Kyiv also appeared concerned over recent statements regarding Crimea. On August 11, the Ukrainian government reprimanded Ukrainian officials who had told US media that Kyiv was behind attacks on the Russian-controlled peninsula. "It’s frankly irresponsible," Zelensky stated, adding that "war is definitely not the time for vanity and loud statements. The fewer details you divulge about our defense plans, the better it will be for the implementation of those defense plans." According to Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar the concerned officials were being investigated. "A leak like this


472 Isabelle Khurshudyan, Liz Sly and Adela Suliman, "Crimea airfield blast was work of Ukrainian special forces, official says," The Washington Post, August 10, 2022 [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/08/10/ukraine-russia-crimea-beach-blast/].

473 Susie Blann, "Ukraine says 9 Russian warplanes destroyed in Crimea blasts," AP News, August 11, 2022 [https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-zelensky-kyiv-crimea-81a08f92d6b483275d44a3928cb3c33].

474 “G7 foreign ministers urge Russia to hand Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant back to Ukraine,” Reuters, August 10, 2022 [https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/g7-foreign-ministers-urge-russia-hand-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-plant-back-ukraine-2022-08-10/].

disrupts the plans of the Ukrainian armed forces since the enemy adjusts its actions and uses this information against us,” explained Malyar.476

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<td>The US military apparently returned to its normal pattern of testing nuclear-capable missiles. On <strong>August 16</strong>, the US Air Force successfully conducted a scheduled test launch of the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile.477</td>
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On **August 16**, Putin offered more comments on the rationales behind the war in Ukraine, but refrained from inserting a nuclear dimension. He claimed that “the outlines of a multipolar world order” were “taking shape” but “Western globalist elites” opposing this development were provoking “chaos, fanning long-standing and new conflicts and pursuing the so-called containment policy, which in fact amounts to the subversion of any alternative, sovereign development options.” Hence: “The United States and its vassals grossly interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign states by staging provocations, organizing coups, or inciting civil wars. By threats, blackmail, and pressure, they are trying to force independent states to submit to their will and follow rules that are alien to them. This is being done with just one aim in view, which is to preserve their domination,” he added. Putin also accused the West of “deliberately undermining the European security system and knocking together ever new military alliances" as NATO was “crawling east and building up its military infrastructure.” “They need conflicts to retain their hegemony,” he explained and “it is for this reason that they have destined the Ukrainian people to being used as cannon fodder ... and continued to pour weapons, including heavy weapons, for use by the Kiev regime.” It was in this context, he suggested, that Russia had “taken the decision to conduct a special military operation in Ukraine, a decision which is in full conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.” Thus: “It has been clearly spelled out that the aims of this operation are to ensure the security of Russia and its citizens and protect the residents of Donbass from genocide,” he added, but “the situation in Ukraine shows that the United States is attempting to draw out this conflict.”478

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| On the same **August 16**, Shoigu again downplayed the nuclear dimension of the conflict. He declared that “in Ukraine, Russian military personnel are confronted by the combined forces of the West, who control the leadership of this country in a hybrid war against Russia,” pointing at Western financial assistance, weapons, training and intelligence provided to Kyiv. Somewhat cryptically, he also claimed that the “special military operation has dispelled the myth of the 'superweapon' that the West is supplying to Ukraine and which is capable of radically changing the situation at the front.” These weapons “have not had a significant impact on the situation.” Further, he pointed out the “huge loss of personnel of the armed forces and formations of the territorial defense of Ukraine.” Shoigu also dismissed Western concerns over a potential use of nuclear or chemical weapons as “information provocations” to divert attention from an alleged US biological weapons program in Ukraine. “From a military point of view, there is no need to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine to achieve

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Also on **August 16**, there were reports of new explosions at an ammunition depot on the Russian-occupied peninsula of Crimea. Both Russian and Ukrainian officials blamed the strike on Ukrainian saboteurs.\(^{480}\) *Zelenskyy* did not assume responsibility for the attack but warned "all our people in Crimea, in other regions in the south of the country, in the occupied areas of Donbas, in the Kharkiv region to be very careful. Please do not approach the military objects of the Russian army and all those places where they store ammunition and equipment, where they keep their headquarters."\(^{481}\)

Yet, Ukraine indeed seemed to be behind the attacks in Crimea. On **17 August**, an anonymous Ukrainian official leaked a government report confirming Ukrainian responsibility for previous strikes on Russian military targets on Crimea.\(^{482}\) On the same day Ukrainian Defense Minister *Oleksii Reznikov* told *Voice of America* that Kyiv had “no … restrictions” targeting “temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine where the enemy is,” including with Western supplied weapons. According to an official source from the Biden Administration, the White House had greenlit Ukrainian attacks on Crimea. "We don’t select targets, of course, and everything we’ve provided is for self-defense purposes," said the official. But: “Any target they choose to pursue on sovereign Ukrainian soil is by definition self-defense” and "Crimea is Ukraine."\(^{483}\) The following day, Reznikov explained Kyiv was hitting targets far behind the front lines in an attempt to weaken Russian forces, while it was waiting for the required arms and ammunition to liberate occupied territories. As there were mixed messages as to whether Western weapons had been used in attacks on Crimea, Reznikov "neither confirm[ed] nor den[ied] Ukrainian involvement in the Crimea attacks," though "striking such targets does form a part of Ukraine’s current military strategy, and Ukraine lacks weapons systems with the range to reach targets in Crimea from Ukrainian-controlled territory.” At the same time, he suggested that "for our American partners it’s an absolutely convenient situation, because we didn’t use American weapons." Meanwhile Ukrainian presidential advisor *Mykhailo Podolyak* explained that "Ukraine’s Western backers have been involved in training the special forces that are responsible for the attacks" and spoke of a new strategy of "de-occupation" in which

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\(^{481}\)“For us to expel the occupiers from Ukraine, every day must make it more and more difficult for Russia to wage a war - address by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy,” *Website of the President of Ukraine*, August 16, 2022 [https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/shob-mi-viginali-okupantyv-z-ukrayini-rosiyi-maye-stavati-ski-77081].


US HIMARS “are being used to strike similar targets but are confined by their maximum 50-mile reach.”

On 18 August, the Russian Defense Ministry announced it had deployed “3 MiG-31i [fighter jets] with Kinzhal hypersonic missiles ... to Chkalovsk airfield in Kaliningrad Region as part of additional strategic deterrence measures.”

On August 19, the Pentagon nonetheless announced additional military assistance for Ukraine worth 775 million US dollars, including for the first time 15 Scan Eagle drones and additional HIMARS ammunition, which led media to speculate, whether the long-awaited Ukrainian counteroffensive in the South was finally coming. On the same day, the head of the National Security Council of Ukraine Oleksiy Danilov acknowledged Kyiv was indeed trying to retake the Russian-occupied peninsula of Crimea.

In Germany, the debate on weapons deliveries and associated escalation risks continued. On August 21, three German MPs of all government coalition parties, Kristian Klinck, Alexander Müller and Sara Nanni, published an opinion piece suggesting that giving in to Russia's blackmail attempts would make future nuclear threats “more likely” and calling for additional military assistance for Kyiv. The article caused a controversy in Berlin. The following day, Chancellor Scholz’s office “took note” but warned of escalating the war. The Defense Ministry declared that the German Armed Forces had reached a limit in trying to retake the Russian-occupied occupied peninsula of Crimea which led them to speculate they would not be further weakened. Such escalation concerns at least to some degree still appeared to exist across the Atlantic too. Indeed, on August 22, media outlets suggested that the Biden Administration might have supplied additional weapons types to Kyiv, notably High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles, but refrained from making those deliveries public.
De-escalatory

De-escalation also appeared to be on Russian minds. In an interview on **August 22**, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov confirmed a restrictive approach to any potential use of nuclear weapons. Referring back to Lavrov’s statement from April 25 that the nuclear risks were real but should not be “inflated,” he noted that “one of the most important tasks ... is to maintain adherence by all the nuclear five states to the postulate of the inadmissibility of any war between countries possessing nuclear weapons.” In this context he condemned the NATO countries’ “destructive course” to “ignore” Russian “red lines” and “get involved in a confrontation with Russia in Ukraine, balancing on the brink of direct armed conflict.” This was “extremely risky” and “fraught with further escalation, up to a military clash of nuclear powers with dire consequences,” he explained. “This must be prevented.” He then also referred to Russian doctrine, which clearly laid down that “Russia hypothetically allows a nuclear response only in response to aggression using WMD against us or our allies, or aggression using conventional weapons, when the very existence of the state is threatened.” Hence: “The key word in both scenarios is *aggression*,” meaning that “the use of nuclear weapons by Russia is possible only in response to an attack - for self-defense in emergency circumstances,” he explained. “There is no place for conjectures or fantasies here.”

Finally, Ryabkov added, Moscow remained “open in principle to serious, pragmatic and result-oriented interaction aimed at reducing tensions and risks, preventing a dangerous escalation and arms race, and strengthening strategic stability, including through arms control.” The START Treaty “ideally should be replaced by a new agreement or agreements.” However, he blamed the United States on the lack of progress in this regard. The resumption of bilateral strategic talks between Moscow and Washington was unlikely due to the latter’s “deliberately destructive course.”

On **August 23**, escalation concerns notwithstanding, the German government agreed to supply Slovakia with 14 Leopard tanks to enable Bratislava to provide 30 of its infantry fighting vehicles to Kyiv, confirmed Slovak Defense Minister Jaroslav Nad.

Six months after the launch of Russia’s large-scale invasion, on **August 24**, Ukraine celebrated its Independence Day. On the occasion, the Pentagon announced “approximately $3 billion in additional security assistance,” including “additional National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS)” and Puma drones. Unlike previous assistance announcements, these weapons however would “[not] come from existing US military stockpiles but rather ... be made by industry” and serve long-term needs, the US government declared. More support came from US allies on the same day. The United Kingdom announced an additional military assistance package worth 54 million pounds sterling, while Prime Minister Boris Johnson reaffirmed his country’s support during a visit to Kyiv. "What happens in

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Ukraine matters to us all, which is why I am here today to deliver the message that the United Kingdom is with you and will be with you for the days and months ahead, and you can and will win,” Johnson said.497

On August 25, Biden confirmed continued US support for Ukraine in a phone call with Zelensky. Both leaders also called on the Kremlin to return full control of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant to Ukraine and for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) access to the plant.498 On the same day, concerns over the safety of the plant resurfaced as two reactors were disconnected from the electricity grid due to fires and Russian shelling, according to the Ukrainian nuclear energy agency Energoatom.499 Zaporizhzhya was reconnected to the Ukrainian power grid the following day.500 However, shelling around the plant continued, with Russia and Ukraine blaming each other.501

In Geneva on August 25, there were nonetheless some cooperative signals from Russia’s Deputy Permanent Representative Andrey Belousov, who called on the nuclear powers to “intensify” their interactions. The P5 was “currently the only format in which the nuclear-weapon states discuss a range of issues directly related to the NPT,” and “under certain favorable circumstances, this format could become a prototype for a multilateral arms control and disarmament negotiation process,” said Belousov.502

Still, the NPT Review Conference came to an end without a final document on August 26, as Russia blocked consensus over passages expressing “grave concern for the military activities” near the Zaporizhzhya power plant and stressed “the paramount importance of ensuring control by Ukraine’s competent authorities.”503 Belousov blamed other nations for attempting to “settle scores with Russia” by raising issues that were “not directly related to the treaty.”504 Western officials meanwhile sharply criticised Russia for blocking the compromise.505


502 “Russian envoy believes dialogue between five nuclear weapon states should be intensified,” TASS, August 26, 2022 [https://tass.com/politics/1498425].


There were further cooperative signals from Moscow on August 31, as Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov signalled that Russia was prepared to hold a meeting of the New START bilateral consultative commission.® The following day, however, a White House spokesperson told the media that the first step would need to be to “resume inspections under the existing New START Treaty.”®

September 2022: Placing annexed provinces under a nuclear umbrella?

On September 1, Rafael Grossi announced the establishment of a permanent IAEA presence in Zaporizhzhya, adding that it was “obvious that the plant and physical integrity of the plant have been violated several times.”®

On the same day, Russia launched the weeklong Vostok 2022 military exercise with China as well as other allies.®

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<td>Meanwhile, also on September 1, Macron promised continued support for Ukraine, stressing that Russia could not “win this war militarily” and that “we need to prepare for a long war.” The French President explained: “We want to establish conditions that will enable Ukraine, at a time of its choosing, to either achieve a military victory or a negotiated peace, in terms that would not simply be those it would be forced to accept if we abandoned it to its fate.” However, Ukraine’s supporters had to “act in a way that avoids escalation and prepares peace.” In detail: “Avoiding escalation is, in my view, France’s role: avoiding any nuclear escalation, or any geographical escalation. So we must do everything possible for countries not to get engaged in the conflict carelessly, leading to geographical extension. And we must do everything we can through our diplomacy to stop civil nuclear power, or nuclear threats, leading to a vertical escalation,” Macron said.®</td>
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506 “Senior diplomat signals Russia, US may start discussing New START commission talks,” TASS, August 31, 2022 [https://tass.com/politics/1500495].


Amid renewed reports of Zaporizhzhya being cut off from the power grid, UN Secretary General **Guterres** called for a demilitarized zone around the nuclear plant on September 6. According to reports from the following day, shelling near the plant continued.

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<td>On the following day, <strong>September 7</strong>, the US air force conducted another test launch of the Minuteman III missile. According to Pentagon spokesperson <strong>Pat Ryder</strong>, the US government had “transmitted a prelaunch notification pursuant to the Hague Code of Conduct, and notified the Russian government in advance pursuant to treaty obligations.”</td>
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On the same **September 7** in Moscow, **Putin** once again condemned Western sanctions as “economic, financial and technological aggression of the West,” all the while stressing that these measures were having no significant effect on Russia. “I am talking about a real aggression; there is no other word for it,” he emphasized.

In Kyiv, in turn, Ukrainian defense chiefs **Valeriy Zaluzhnyi** and **Mykhailo Zabrodskyi** warned of nuclear escalation risks, stressing that there was “a direct threat of the use, under certain circumstances, of tactical nuclear weapons by the Russian Armed forces.” It was “impossible to completely rule out the possibility of the direct involvement of the world’s leading countries in a limited nuclear conflict, in which the prospect of World War Three is already directly visible,” they added. Despite these apparent escalation concerns, in the same text Zaluzhnyi and Zabrodskyi confirmed earlier Ukrainian attacks on Crimea. Accordingly, Kyiv’s forces had conducted missile strikes on the Russian Saki airbase on the peninsula on August 9. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, which reportedly killed one person and destroyed several Russian aircraft, Ukraine had not formally confirmed its role.

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In a similar vein, still on September 7, Washington confirmed that its military assistance had contributed to the sinking of Russian ships. According to media reports, Undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, William LaPlante, had stated that the United States had "worked with an undisclosed country to train Ukrainian forces on firing anti-ship Harpoon missiles over Memorial Day weekend," that is during the last days of May 2022. Few days later, the Ukrainians had sunk a Russian naval supply ship using these missiles and another unspecified ship later on, LaPlante confirmed.\(^51^8\)

Meanwhile, Western support for Kyiv continued. On September 8, the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, consisting of the United States and allies, met in Ramstein to discuss further military assistance to Ukraine. In this context, Biden and Austin approved additional military aid for Ukraine worth 675 million US dollars, including “105-millimeter howitzers, artillery ammunition, vehicles, anti-armor weapons and guided rockets.”\(^51^9\) In this context, Austin stressed Washington’s resolve to support Kyiv on the long run. “We will work together to upgrade our defense industrial basis to meet Ukraine’s requirements for the long haul,” he explained.\(^52^0\) In parallel, Blinken visited Ukraine and pledged a separate package of more than 2 billion US dollars of additional military assistance for Ukraine and 18 "other regional security partners potentially at risk of future Russian aggression," reiterating that Washington would support Kyiv “as long as it takes.”\(^52^1\) While Administration officials reportedly still believed there was Congressional backing for these far-reaching measures, they also expressed some concern that more critical, notably Republican voices “could grow louder if the conflict stretches into next year and gas prices spike again.”\(^52^2\)

Following these announcements and amid reports of further Ukrainian advances, on September 8, Russia called an emergency meeting at the UN Security Council “to discuss threats to peace caused by foreign governments supplying arms and military goods to Ukraine.”\(^52^3\) At the meeting, Moscow’s ambassador to the UN Vasily Nebenzya claimed that Western weaponry was “not playing a decisive role on the


\(^{52^0}\) “$2.8 Billion in Additional U.S. Military Assistance for Ukraine and Its Neighbors,” Website of the US Department of State, September 8, 2022 [https://www.state.gov/2-8-billion-in-additional-u-s-military-assistance-for-ukraine-and-its-neighbors/] and “U.S. approves up to $675M in further military aid to Ukraine,” AP News, September 8, 2022 [https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-biden-germany-lloyd-austin-db464d8a50e9e49ea418a1092a3b8b].


battlefield regardless of what the Ukrainians and their vassals are saying,” but warned of potential diversion of Western-supplied weapons to smugglers.”524 He had convened the meeting to highlight the cynicism and mendacity of Western countries, he explained. Several other member states however questioned the need for the meeting, with US representative Richard M. Mills, Jr., characterizing it as a Russian attempt to distract from a UN meeting on forced displacements amid Russian abuses in Ukraine the day before. “We will not stop our support to Ukraine just because Russia is frustrated that its attempt at regime change has not gone to plan,” stressed Mills.525

On the same September 8, CIA Director Burns told a public conference audience in Washington that Putin’s war was not going according to plan and would do “long-term damage” to Russia’s economy and “generations of Russians.” Right now, “Putin’s bet” was that he was going to be “tougher than the Ukrainians, the Europeans, the Americans,” Burns explained and stressed that the Russian President was “wrong about that.”526 Indeed, on September 10, Ukrainian forces liberated the key town of Izium in another sign that Ukraine’s counteroffensive was fast advancing. Yet the Russian Defence Ministry characterized the development as a planned withdrawal.527

The situation around Zaporizhzhya continued to cause concern. On September 11, it was the subject of a phone call between Putin and Macron, during which Putin reportedly reiterated accusations that Ukraine was shelling the plant, while Macron called on Russia to “withdraw their heavy and light weapons and that the IAEA’s recommendations be followed to ensure safety at the site.”528 On the same day, Kyiv began shutting down the last reactor in operation at the plant.529


Meanwhile, Ukraine shared another list of weapons requirements with US lawmakers, media reported on September 12. The list included “the Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS,” which the Biden administration had previously refused to deliver, arguing that the system with a 190-miles range could be used to strike targets on Russian territory and thus potentially spark an escalation of the conflict.530

Indeed, amid the fast Ukrainian advances on the ground, escalation concerns were once again on the rise. On the same September 12, former US National Security Adviser John Bolton told the media that the world was now “a lot closer” to nuclear weapons use. Yet, “the potential risk of the use of a nuclear weapon [by Russia was] not so much to change the battlefield but to strengthen Putin’s position at home.” And: Putin was in “more trouble now than he’s been since the invasion,” Bolton explained.531 The following day, former US and NATO official, Rose Gottemoeller, expressed a similar view, noting that, in light of the Ukrainian advances, Russia would “strike back now in really unpredictable ways,” which could include “a nuclear strike of some kind.” She was particular concerned over a potential nuclear demonstration strike aimed at terrifying Ukraine and its allies. While “the Ukrainians [might] seem well prepared to stay the course ... we will all have to be ready to stay the course, come what may,” she stressed. Yet, a Western response to Russian nuclear use could be carried out with cyber or conventional, rather than nuclear, means, she explained.532 Current US officials also confirmed that “the Russians are in trouble” and that “the question will be how the Russians will react.”533 Yet, despite these apparent escalation concerns, US officials confirmed to media that US and UK officials, including Jake Sullivan and Mark Milley, had advised Ukraine as it planned its counteroffensive.534

Also on September 13, in another phone call with Putin, Scholz “urged the Russian President to find a diplomatic solution as soon as possible, based on a ceasefire, a complete withdrawal of Russian troops and respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine.” Further he “stressed that any further Russian annexation moves would not go unanswered and would not be recognized under any circumstances.”535

Meanwhile, Western support for Kyiv continued unabated. On September 14, Ursula von der Leyen reaffirmed EU support to Ukraine in her 2022 State of the Union Address. “I want to make it very clear
— the sanctions are here to stay. This is the time for us to show resolve, not appeasement," she declared, announcing that the EU would provide 100 million euros of aid to rehabilitate Ukrainian schools, "bring Ukraine into our European free roaming area," and "work with Ukraine to ensure seamless access to the Single Market." "Putin will fail and Europe will prevail," she concluded. The following day, the German Defence Minister Lambrecht announced Berlin would "send two multiple rocket launching systems, 200 rockets and 50 armored personnel carriers" to Kyiv. In parallel, the Pentagon announced another 600 million US dollars of security assistance for Ukraine, including additional HIMARS ammunition. "We will support the people of Ukraine for as long as it takes," reaffirmed Blinken in a statement. "The capabilities we are delivering are carefully calibrated to make the most difference on the battlefield and strengthen Ukraine’s hand at the negotiating table when the time is right," he added. However, media noted that the announcement did not include the long-range systems like ATACMS that Ukraine had requested.

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<td>On the same September 14, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova explicitly warned Washington against sending longer-range missiles to Ukraine. This would &quot;be crossing a red line&quot; and would make the United States &quot;a direct party to the conflict,&quot; she said.</td>
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Also on September 14, Former Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO, Richard Shirreff, reportedly warned that NATO was not ready to fight a war with Russia in a potential "worst case" scenario.

In Washington, officials highlighted US contributions to Ukraine’s air and missile defense. On September 16, Pentagon spokesperson Patrick Ryder announced that the United States would supply two National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS) to Kyiv, "within the next two months or so," which would "further contribute to protecting Ukrainians from enemy air threats, to include aircraft,


539 "$600 Million in Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine,” Website of the US Department of Defense, September 15, 2022 [https://www.state.gov/600-million-in-additional-u-s-military-assistance-for-ukraine/].


unmanned aerial vehicles and missiles.” On the same day, the Commander of the US Air Forces in Europe, James B. Hecker, confirmed in an interview that the US air force was “sharing information about Russian air-launched missiles and other airborne threats with their Ukrainian counterparts in real time.”

Meanwhile, there were further concerns over potential war crimes committed by Russian forces in their ongoing war. On September 15, a Ukrainian official stated that a mass grave had been discovered in the recently liberated town of Izium.

Still on the same September 15, Putin and China’s Xi Jinping met in Uzbekistan at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit. At this first meeting between the two leaders since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Putin acknowledged Beijing had “questions” and “concerns” regarding the “Ukrainian crisis,” which he pledged to clarify. Observers interpreted the statement as an indication that Chinese support for the Russian regime was not unconditional.

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| Conversely, at a news conference the following day, September 16, Putin took a less cautious stance. Referring to the Ukrainian counteroffensive, he suggested to wait and see “how it unfolds” and implied that the Russia could intensify recent attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure. “Recently, Russian Armed Forces delivered a couple of sensitive blows to that area. Let’s call them warning shots,” he said. “If the situation continues like that, our response will be more impactful.” Moscow’s main goal was “to liberate the entire territory of Donbass,” he added. On the same day, Russia conducted nuclear drills dubbed Umka-2022 in the Arctic Ocean opposite from Alaska, firing cruise missiles from submarines. Per the Russian Defence Ministry, the goal of the drill was to test the “ability and readiness to defend the Russian arctic by military means.”

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| Against this backdrop, Biden warned Putin against nuclear use on the same September 16. When asked what he would say to Putin if he were “considering using chemical or tactical nuclear weapons,” Biden responded: “Don’t. Don’t. Don’t. You will change the face of war unlike anything since

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545 “Mass grave of more than 440 bodies found in Izium, Ukraine, police say,” Reuters, September 15, 2022 [https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/mass-grave-more-than-440-bodies-found-izium-ukraine-police-2022-09-15/].


Nuclear concerns of a different kind arose on September 19, when "a powerful Russian missile exploded less than 900 feet from the reactors at the South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant ... narrowly avoiding a possible nuclear calamity," according to Ukrainian officials. The head of the Ukrainian energy company Energoatom, Petro Kotin, characterised the incident as "nuclear terrorism."550

Meanwhile in Washington, congressional support for Ukraine aid remained intact. On September 19, Chuck Schumer, the Senate Majority Leader called for military assistance worth an additional 12 billion US dollars. “Mass graves, attacks that target civilians, and other unspeakable acts reinforce how critical aid like this is, and how it actually helps change what is happening on the ground in a way that can save innocent lives,” he explained.551

From September 19 to 23, world leaders came together under the shadow of the war in Ukraine at the United Nations General Assembly. While UN Secretary General Guterres condemned the war as having “unleashed widespread destruction with massive violations of human rights and international humanitarian law,” both Erdogan and Macron “cast themselves as would-be peacemakers,” and Putin did not attend.552

Instead, the Kremlin launched what media called “a tightly choreographed display” to annex four partially occupied regions of Ukraine. On September 19-20, representatives of the occupying authorities in the Ukrainian regions of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizka announced referenda to “join” the Russian Federation.553

Commenting on the developments via Telegram on September 20, Medvedev assessed that the step was “of great importance” and issued a new veiled nuclear warning. Accordingly, Russia could defend itself with “all the forces of self-defense” in case of an encroachment of its territory and “not a single future leader of Russia, not a single official [would] be able to reverse these decisions [to annex the Ukrainian territories].”554

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Conversely, Western officials strongly condemned the Russian decision. On **September 20**, [Jake Sullivan](https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/178) stressed that the United States would never recognize Russia’s claims to any purportedly annexed parts of Ukraine” and rejected “Russia’s actions unequivocally.” On the same day, the Defence Minister of Norway, **Bjorn Arild Gram** promised long-term support for Ukraine. “We have to help Ukraine as long as it takes,” he explained. There would now be “a confrontational Russia for a long time.” He also expressed nuclear escalation concerns in the context of Russian losses in Ukraine. “A weakened Russia doesn’t necessarily mean a less dangerous Russia, because they are more dependent on their nuclear capabilities now, so we have to continue to monitor this in the High North,” said Gram.

On the following day, **September 21**, [Putin](https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/178) took another escalatory step, announcing a “partial mobilisation” of 300,000 additional troops for the war in Ukraine. In the same speech, he once again accused the West of attempting “to weaken, divide and ultimately destroy” Russia and particularly condemned “plans to organize the delivery of long-range offensive weapons to Ukraine, which could be used to deliver strikes at Crimea and other Russian regions. ... Washington, London and Brussels are openly encouraging Kiev to move the hostilities to our territory,” he lamented. “They openly say that Russia must be defeated on the battlefield by any means.”

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<th>Escalatory</th>
<th>97. When mentioning nuclear weapons in his September 21 speech, Putin accused the West of nuclear blackmail and vowed to “make use of all weapon systems available to us” in case of “a threat to the territorial integrity” of Russia and “to defend Russia.”</th>
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<td>They [the West] have even resorted to the nuclear blackmail. I am referring not only to the Western-encouraged shelling of the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant, which poses a threat of a nuclear disaster, but also to the statements made by some high-ranking representatives of the leading NATO countries on the possibility and admissibility of using weapons of mass destruction – nuclear weapons – against Russia.</td>
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<td>I would like to remind those who make such statements regarding Russia that our country has different types of weapons as well, and some of them are more modern than the weapons NATO countries have. In the event of a threat to the territorial integrity of our country and to defend Russia and our people, we will certainly make use of all weapon systems available to us. This is not a bluff.</td>
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554 Post on Telegram channel of Dmitry Medvedev, *Telegram*, September 20, 2022 [https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/178].


556 Alexander Ward et al., “If other countries did as much ... the war would be over,” *Politico*, September 20, 2022 [https://www.politico.com/newsletters/national-security-daily/2022/09/20/if-other-countries-did-as-much-the-war-would-be-over-00057820].


558 “Address by the President of the Russian Federation,” *Website of the President of Russia*, September 21, 2022 [https://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69390].
Ukrainian officials immediately declared these threats ineffective. “Threatening with nuclear weapons... to Ukrainians? Putin has not yet understood who he is dealing with,” tweeted Zelenskyy adviser Mykhailo Podolyak on September 21.\(^{560}\)

| 98. Western representatives showed themselves similarly unimpressed by Putin’s renewed nuclear rhetoric. The speech demonstrated that the war was “not going according to President Putin’s plans,” explained Stoltenberg on the same day, adding that “the only way to end this war is to prove that President Putin will not win on the battlefield.” Stoltenberg acknowledged that the mobilization of additional Russia troops escalated the conflict, but also stressed that NATO would support Ukraine for the “long haul.” Regarding Putin’s nuclear rhetoric, Stoltenberg emphasized that the allies would “not engage in that same kind of reckless and dangerous nuclear rhetoric” and that the Alliance would “make sure that there is no misunderstanding in Moscow about the seriousness of using nuclear weapons.” That was the reason why the Alliance had been “so clear” in its “communications with Russia about the unprecedented consequences, about the fact that the nuclear war cannot be won by Russia,” added Stoltenberg.\(^{561}\)

**Biden** strongly condemned Russian behavior in a speech at the UN General Assembly on the same **September 21**, which observers interpreted as an attempt to rally both international and domestic support for continued assistance to Ukraine, but sought to downplay the nuclear aspects.\(^{562}\) Concretely, Biden accused Russia of “shamelessly violating the core tenets of the United Nations Charter;” of “organizing a sham referenda to try to annex parts of Ukraine;” of making “overt nuclear threats against Europe” and showing “a reckless disregard for the responsibilities of the non-proliferation regime.”\(^{563}\)

| 99. On nuclear issues, Biden also called on all countries to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, stressed that the United States was “ready to pursue critical arms control measures,” and reiterated that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” The five permanent members of the Security Council had just reaffirmed that commitment in January, Biden said. “But today, we’re seeing disturbing trends. Russia shunned the Non-Proliferation ideals embraced by every other nation at the 10th NPT Review Conference. And again, today, as I said, they’re making irresponsible nuclear threats to use nuclear weapons,” the US President said. However, he refrained from any warnings or counter-threats.\(^{564}\)

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559 “Address by the President of the Russian Federation,” Website of the President of Russia, September 21, 2022 [http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69390].

560 Tweet by @Podolyak_M, Twitter, September 21, 2022 [https://twitter.com/Podolyak_M/status/1572590669683638279].


On the same day, there were calls in Washington for further support for Ukraine. According to media reports, a bipartisan group of 17 lawmakers, including Andy Harris, Brian Fitzpatrick, Marcy Kaptur, and Mike Quigley, sent a letter to Austin demanding that the Pentagon “speed up its months-long review of whether to supply Ukraine with Gray Eagle drones.”

Amid these renewed tensions, hopes for arms control progress were damped. US Undersecretary for arms control Bonnie Jenkins told media that resuming nuclear arms control talks with Russia would be challenging. Moscow had not yet shown that it was “ready to resume work on nuclear arms control with the United States” as Biden had called for in August. "Nothing has happened since then," Jenkins explained and added that she was concerned by current allusions to nuclear weapons. “We want to impress upon them [Russia] the gravity of the situation, and not getting to that point,” she stressed.

Russian threat making however continued. On September 22, Lavrov once again claimed the West was already involved in the war against Ukraine through its military assistance for Kyiv.

The position of the states that are pumping Ukraine with weapons and combat equipment and training its armed forces is particularly cynical ... The goal is obvious ... – to drag out the hostilities as much as possible ... in order to exhaust and weaken Russia. This implies the direct involvement of Western countries in the Ukrainian conflict, which is turning them into its party. ...

We have no illusions that today the armed forces of Russia ... are opposed not only by the neo-Nazi units of the Kiev regime but also by the war machine of the “collective West.” NATO is supplying the Ukrainian armed forces with real-time intelligence information using modern systems, aircraft,


ships, satellites and strategic drones. Ukraine is incited to defeat Russia on the battlefield (as EU officials openly say) and Russia must be deprived of any sovereignty by way of punishment.\(^{568}\)

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<th>Escalatory</th>
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<td>In parallel, Medvedev issued another nuclear threat on the same September 22, explaining that “any Russian weapons, including strategic nuclear weapons and weapons based on new principles, could be used” to protect “all the territories that have joined [Russia].” The West, he said, needed “to understand that Russia has chosen its own path.” There was “no way back.”(^{569})</td>
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Western intelligence officials provided some context to the Russian rhetoric. Anonymous sources told reporters that Russia’s military was “divided over how best to counter Ukraine’s unexpected battlefield advances” with “Putin … himself giving directions directly to generals in the field, … Russian officers arguing among themselves and complaining to friends and relatives back home about decision-making from Moscow,” and “significant disagreements on strategy with military leaders struggling to agree on where to focus their efforts to shore up defensive lines.”\(^{570}\)

In Ukraine, the Russian threats appeared to spark concern. On the same September 22, the deputy military intelligence head of Ukraine, Vadym Skibitskyi, warned Russia might consider nuclear use in order to “stop our offensive activity and to destroy our state.”\(^{571}\) At the same time, media reported Ukraine was “asking urgently for modern tanks,” notably the “more modern American-made M-1 Abrams and German-made Leopard tanks” to consolidate its gains in the face of Russia’s partial mobilization. Yet, both Washington and Berlin “hesitated to provide the tanks, in part due to the training and logistics challenges involved.”\(^{572}\)

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<th>102.</th>
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| Russia’s rhetoric also caused concern in Western capitals. On September 23, media reported that for several months, Washington had “been sending private communications to Moscow warning Russia’s leadership of the grave consequences that would follow the use of a nuclear weapon.” Yet, US officials reportedly also emphasized that Putin’s recent threats were only the latest in a long series of similar statements since the beginning of the invasion and that there was still “no indication Russia [was] moving its nuclear weapons in preparation for an imminent strike.”\(^{573}\) Still, some US officials “noted a change in the tone, scope and seriousness of Mr. Putin’s latest threats” and expressed concern over a potential tactical nuclear weapons use by Putin “perhaps in a demonstration blast over

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\(^{569}\) Post on Telegram channel of Dmitry Medvedev, Telegram, September 22, 2022 [https://t.me/s/medvedev_telegram].


\(^{572}\) Lara Seligman, Paul McLeary and Erin Banco, “These are not rental cars': As Ukraine pleads for tanks, the West holds back,” Politico, September 22, 2022 [https://www.politico.com/news/2022/09/22/ukraine-requests-american-tanks-counteroffensive-00058303].

the Black Sea or Arctic Ocean, or in Ukrainian territory,” media reported on September 24. However, these sources also stressed that there was “no evidence yet” that Putin was “moving those weapons or preparing such a strike.”

Another implicit Russian nuclear statement followed on the same September 24. At a press conference after the UN General Assembly, Lavrov declared that “the entire territory of the Russian Federation, which is confirmed and can be further confirmed in the Russian Constitution, [was] certainly under the state’s full protection,” and that “all laws, doctrines, concepts, strategies of the Russian Federation apply to its entire territory.” On potential nuclear use scenarios, Lavrov pointed at the Russian doctrine: “As for the Russian Federation, the president and other Kremlin representatives have stated this on numerous occasions, we have our nuclear security doctrine, it is a document available to the public, everything is written down in it. I invite you to look once again at absolutely clearly specified cases when our use of nuclear weapons is allowed.”

Ukrainian representatives reacted with outrage. On September 25, Kuleba declared that Moscow’s “irresponsible statements on the possible use of nuclear weapons” were “absolutely unacceptable.” “Ukraine won’t give in,” he added. “We call on all nuclear powers to speak out now and make it clear to Russia that such rhetorics put the world at risk and will not be tolerated.” In a similar vein, Zelenskyy noted that Putin was trying to “scare the whole world” with his nuclear threats but that the world was “deterring … and containing this threat. We need to keep putting pressure on him and not allow him to continue.”

Meanwhile Washington issued further warnings to Moscow. On September 25, Jake Sullivan stressed that “the possible use of nuclear weapons for the first time since the Second World War” was “a matter that we have to take deadly seriously” and which would trigger “catastrophic consequences.” The US government had “communicated directly, privately and at very high levels to the Kremlin that any use of nuclear weapons will be met with catastrophic consequences for Russia, that the US and our allies will respond decisively, and we have been clear and specific about what that will entail,” Sullivan said. Sullivan also stressed that Moscow could not dissuade Western military assistance for Ukraine with its threats. “Nothing that Russia has done with this mobilization of troops, with the sham referenda in the occupied regions” would “deter” the United States from “providing Ukraine with the necessary means and technologies they need to defend themselves.”

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575 “All potential new Russian territories will be under state’s protection — Lavrov,” TASS, September 24, 2022 [https://tass.com/politics/1512901].

576 Tweet by @DmytroKuleba, Twitter, September 25, 2022 [https://twitter.com/dmytrokuleba/status/1573795699598282753].


day, Zelenskyy announced that the United States had supplied the previously announced advanced air defense system NASAMS to Ukraine.  

On the following day, Peskov refused to comment on Sullivan’s warning. “There are channels for dialogue, but they are quite sporadic, though they at least allow for some urgent reports on each other’s positions,” he only explained. These contacts were at the “proper level,” he said.

In the context of these high tensions, UN Secretary General Guterres strongly warned against the use of nuclear weapons and expressed concern over recent nuclear rhetoric on September 26. Decades after the Cold War’s end, the world could once again hear the “rattling of nuclear sabres.” The “era of nuclear blackmail” had to end. “The idea that any country could fight and win a nuclear war is deranged. Any use of a nuclear weapon would incite a humanitarian Armageddon,” Guterres said. He urged “all States to use every avenue of dialogue, diplomacy and negotiation to ease tensions, reduce risk and eliminate the nuclear threat.”

On September 26, media reported of three leaks on two Nord Stream gas pipelines from Russia to Germany in the Baltic Sea. On the same day, Denmark’s Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, Sweden’s Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson and Poland’s Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki stated that the leaks were likely the result of sabotage.

Meanwhile, Russian nuclear rhetoric continued. On September 27, Medvedev issued another strongly worded threat and questioned whether the West would respond to Russian nuclear use, but also recalled that the preconditions for nuclear use were laid down in Russia’s nuclear doctrine. Rus-

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581 “Contacts between Russia and US are at ‘proper level’ — Kremlin,” TASS, September 26, 2022 [https://tass.com/politics/1513489].

582 “Senior diplomat says Russia didn’t change its doctrinal approaches to nuclear weapons,” TASS, September 26, 2022 [https://tass.com/politics/1513565].


sia had “the right to use nuclear weapons if necessary,” he said. “In predetermined cases. In strict accordance with the Fundamentals of State Policy in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence. If we or our allies are attacked using this type of weapon. Or if aggression with the use of conventional weapons threatens the very existence of our state.” He also noted that Russia would “do everything to prevent the appearance of nuclear weapons in our hostile neighbors. For example, in Nazi Ukraine, which is directly controlled today by NATO countries. It is pointless to count on the reason and political will of the Kyiv regime. But there is still a fragile hope for common sense and a sense of self-preservation of the enemy countries condoning them. They understand that if the threat to Russia exceeds the established danger limit, we will have to respond. Without asking anyone’s permission, without long consultations. And it’s definitely not a bluff.” If Russia was “forced to use the most formidable weapon against the Ukrainian regime,” he believed that “NATO will not directly intervene in the conflict even in this situation” as “overseas and European demagogues are not going to perish in a nuclear apocalypse.”

107. De-escalatory

In Western capitals, concern over nuclear use was rife, but officials were still pointing out that they saw no Russian preparations. On September 27, media reported that according to US officials, Western intelligence services were “stepping up efforts to detect any Russian military moves or communications that might signal that Vladimir Putin has ordered the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine,” though such warnings might come “too late.” Reportedly, “over the past week, flight-tracking radar websites [had also] shown multiple U.S. Air Force RC-135 Rivet Joint electronic surveillance planes circling [Kaliningrad], ostensibly collecting data.” Yet, so far there was no evidence of Russia preparing for nuclear use, explained US Strategic Command spokesperson Joshua Kelsey. “We take these threats very seriously, but we have not seen any reason to adjust our own nuclear posture at this time,” he said. According to another US official, Russia would “never use a strategic nuclear weapon” but rather “short-range weapons” with lower yields. Preparations for the use of such smaller nuclear weapons could be difficult to detect for Western intelligence services, despite overall good penetration of the Russian system, officials reportedly told media.

On the same day, Poland’s Foreign Minister Zbigniew Rau called for a “devastating” NATO response in case Russia used nuclear weapons. “NATO should respond decisively and firmly,” he explained, but added that “the response should be conventional.” He said: “To the best of our knowledge, Putin is threatening to use tactical nuclear weapons on Ukrainian soil, not to attack NATO, which means that NATO should respond in a conventional way. But the response should be devastating.”

Another warning from the UN came on September 27. At the UN Security Council, UN Undersecretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo reiterated Guterres’ “appeal for all nuclear-armed states, including the Russian Federation, to recommit to the non-use and progressive elimination of nuclear weapons.”

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585 Post on Telegram channel of Dmitry Medvedev, Telegram, September 27, 2022 [https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/181].


Meanwhile, Kyiv sought to show resolve. Also on September 27, Podolyak stressed that Ukraine would not give in to Russia’s nuclear threats. “The world’s nuclear powers should warn Russia that any use of strategic or tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine would be met with concrete action, and that Kyiv lacked the technology to respond symmetrically itself,” he told media, stressing that Kyiv would “continue [its] work to de-occupy [its] territory regardless.” On the same day, French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna visited Kyiv.590

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<td>Moscow, in turn, blamed the West for nuclear tensions, but seemed bent to walk back some of the earlier escalation. On September 28, Zakharova claimed that the West talked “with ease” about nuclear weapons and used “manipulative methods in order to pull us into this agenda.” Western countries were “engaged in total destruction,” she added. Allegedly, there had been “many attempts to dialogue with the United States. But what Washington has brought it all to is a world on the brink of catastrophe,” she claimed.591</td>
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In Ukraine, according to media reports from September 28, US officials were seeing first “small numbers” of Russian troops mobilized under Putin’s partial mobilization order arriving, but expected that it would be “difficult” for the Kremlin to generate the 300,000 forces it had aimed for.592

Western military assistance for Ukraine continued. On September 28, the national armaments directors of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group came together to discuss how to supply aid for Ukraine on the long-term. According to media reports, “officials in Europe’s east” were continuing “to push France and Germany to arm Kyiv, giving Ukraine the firepower it needs and smaller countries enough time to regrow their arsenals.”593 In Washington, the Pentagon announced another 1.1 billion US dollars of additional military aid for Ukraine, including funds for 18 HIMARS and HIMARS ammunition.594 The aid reportedly was geared towards fulfilling Ukraine’s long-term needs, with the HIMARS likely to arrive in “a few years.”595


591 “US uses all kinds of manipulations to drag Russia into nuclear agenda — diplomat,” TASS, September 28, 2022 [https://tass.com/politics/1514473].


Further US statements appeared to be geared to confirm unwavering US support for Ukraine and push back on Medvedev’s claims of lacking Western resolve. On the same September 28, State Department spokesperson Ned Price explained that the results of the “sham referenda” held by Russia in four Ukrainian regions were “completely fabricated” and announced “additional measures” as well as continued support for Kyiv.

The United States will never recognize Russia’s attempts to annex parts of Ukraine. ... We will continue to work with allies and partners to bring even more pressure on Russia and the individuals and entities that are helping support its attempted land grab. ... At the same time, we will not be deterred from supporting Ukraine, and ... we will continue to provide security assistance to Ukraine so it can defend itself and its sovereign territory for as long as it takes. Price also reiterated that the response to a potential Russian nuclear use would be “real” and “extraordinary.”

When it comes to the contingency planning that we’ve engaged in for the potential use of a nuclear weapon by Russia in Ukraine, we have spoken very clearly of the implications for Russia were that to happen. We’ve used a number of adjectives. We have said there would be catastrophic, severe, strong, profound implications for Russia. All of those are accurate. We are – we stand by all of those descriptors. The point that we have made both publicly and privately to the Russians is that the consequences would be real, and they would be extraordinary.

In a similar vein, White House spokesperson Karine Jean-Pierre emphasized that Washington would “continue to stand with the Ukrainian people and provide them with the security assistance they need to defend themselves for as long as it takes.” Asked about Medvedev’s claim that NATO would not respond to a Russian use of nuclear weapons, Jean-Pierre at first evaded the question, emphasizing that this was “Putin’s war.” After repeated questions, she declared: “We take Russia’s threat to use nuclear weapons seriously. ... But we have not seen any reason to adjust our own nuclear posture. And to be clear, we will not be deterred from supporting Ukraine.” In addition, she recalled statements by other administration officials warning that Russian nuclear use would trigger “catastrophic, severe, and decisive” consequences. These consequences would “be real” and “extraordinary.” Jake Sullivan had also “communicated [this] privately to the Russians, and they understand what the consequences will be,” she added. “We are not going to lay them out here in public.”

Also on September 28, there were reports of calls inside the Biden administration to rally the world, notably China and India, against Russia in case it used nuclear weapons. Washington “could let Mr. Putin know what a disastrously bad idea any use of nuclear weapons would be,” one official told reporters.
Meanwhile, additional statements confirmed sabotage had caused the damage on the gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea few days earlier. On September 28, Josep Borrell said that the leaks at the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines were likely “the result of a deliberate act” and warned that “any deliberate disruption of European energy infrastructure is utterly unacceptable and will be met with a robust and united response.” On the same day, Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre announced that Norway’s military would “be more visible at Norwegian oil and gas installations.” The following day, NATO issued a statement declaring that “all currently available information” suggested that these leaks were “the result of deliberate, reckless, and irresponsible acts of sabotage.” The statement added: “We, as Allies, have committed to prepare for, deter and defend against the coercive use of energy and other hybrid tactics by state and non-state actors. Any deliberate attack against Allies’ critical infrastructure would be met with a united and determined response.”

Amid tensions, Russia sent some cooperative signals on arms control talks. On September 29, Zakharova declared Moscow was open to consider resuming New START inspections and that “the possibilities for holding a face-to-face session of the bilateral advisory commission are being studied.”

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<td><strong>At a ceremony on September 30, Putin</strong> finally announced the formal annexation of four Ukrainian regions: Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhya. In the speech, Putin once again claimed that the West wanted to destroy Russia and was “waging a hybrid war” against Moscow, blamed the pipeline leaks in the Baltic Sea on “Anglo-Saxons,” and contended that the United States had created a “precedent” by using nuclear weapons in the Second World War.</td>
</tr>
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The West ... continues looking for another chance to strike a blow at us, to weaken and break up Russia, which they have always dreamed about, to divide our state and set our peoples against each other, and to condemn them to poverty and extinction. ... 

The United States is the only country in the world that has used nuclear weapons twice, destroying the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan. And they created a precedent. Recall that during WWII the United States and Britain reduced Dresden, Hamburg, Cologne and many other German cities to rubble, without the least military necessity. ...They had only one goal, as with the nuclear bombing of Japanese cities: to intimidate our country and the rest of the world.


Reactions to the annexation were swift. Zelenskyy declared that Ukraine was applying for fast-track NATO membership on the same day. The United States and the United Kingdom announced additional sanctions against Russian officials also on September 30.

October 2022: Threats and warnings everyday

Journalists revealed on October 3 that in an effort to overcome Biden Administration resistance to providing Ukraine with a set of long-range rocket systems, the government in Kyiv was offering full and ongoing access to its list of intended Russian targets. At issue were the Army Tactical Missile Systems, or ATACMS, surface-to-surface missiles that can fly around 300 kilometers, about four times the distance of the HIMARS rockets. The US government so far had not approved these weapons, but announced funding for 18 more HIMARS. “We essentially described exactly what specific targets we need to hit on our territory which are not reachable with what we have now,” said a senior Ukrainian official. Ukraine had given assurances that it would not use HIMARS against Russian territory, and had held its word, the Ukrainian official continued. However, the Administration argued the ATACMS were “low reward and high risk,” a US official told journalists. “We believe that we’re providing the Ukrainians with the range of capabilities that are commensurate with the fight that they’re executing based on the requirements that they’ve identified for us,” the Pentagon’s Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy explained.

The same day, British media had reported that NATO had warned members, Russia was set to demonstrate its willingness to use nuclear weapons by carrying out a test on Ukraine’s border. The UK newspapers’ allegations notwithstanding, a NATO official told reporters that the alliance had not observed changes in Russia’s nuclear posture, while a Western diplomat said that NATO had not issued such warnings.

On October 4, on a trip to Warsaw, Baerbock said that Putin’s nuclear threats were “irresponsible” and had to be taken “seriously,” but were also an attempt to “blackmail” the West, as “we know from the more than past 200 days of this brutal war of aggression.”

605 “We are taking our decisive step by signing Ukraine’s application for accelerated accession to NATO - address by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy,” Website of the President of Ukraine, September 30, 2022 [https://president.gov.ua/en/news/mirobimo-svij-viznachalnij-krok-pidpisuyuchi-zayavku-ukrayi-78173].


### 111. De-escalatory

In Moscow, Peskov dismissed the allegation that Russia was preparing to use a nuclear weapon on the same October 4. "The Western media, Western politicians and heads of state are engaging in a lot of exercises in nuclear rhetoric right now," he claimed. "We do not want to take part in this."  

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### 112. De-escalatory

Other Russian officials also downplayed the nuclear rhetoric. On October 6, Russian ambassador to the United States Anatoly Antonov said on Russian television that the United States and NATO had an "ill sense of fear in the context of [Russia’s] possession of nuclear weapons." At the Foreign Ministry, spokeswoman Maria Zakharova told journalists that "Washington and other Western capitals" could be interested in "dangerous escalation" that could be "blamed" on Russia. "This is being done within the framework of Washington’s policy, harmful to international security and strategic stability, of securing global dominance at any cost regardless of the risks of provoking a direct armed clash between the largest nuclear powers, which would be fraught, as we all understand, with catastrophic consequences," Zakharova said. However, she repeated that there could be no winners in a nuclear war and "it should never be unleashed." Western media was following "hints" by politicians or the intelligence services and was trying to create a public narrative. Every Russian statement was "turned inside out."  

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### 113. Warning

On the other side of the Atlantic, US policymakers seemed worried about nuclear escalation. In New York, Biden said at a Democratic fundraiser on October 6 that the United States had not "faced the prospect of Armageddon" since Kennedy had been mired in the Cuban missile crisis. Putin was "not joking" when he talked about "potential use of tactical nuclear weapons or biological or chemical weapons, because his military is, you might say, significantly underperforming," Biden said. "I’m trying to figure out what is Putin’s off ramp?" he added. "Where does he find a way out? Where does he find himself in a position that he does not only lose face but lose significant power within Russia?" Biden concluded: "We have the threat of a nuclear weapon if, in fact, things continue down the path they are going."  

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### 114. De-escalatory

However, the Pentagon saw no signs of Russia planning to use a nuclear weapon any time soon. For now, the United States had no reason to change its strategic posture, US officials told reporters on Friday, October 7, after Biden’s comment. White House spokeswoman Jean-Pierre agreed that

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611 "US, NATO have ill sense of fear over Russia’s possession of nuclear weapons – ambassador,” TASS, October 6, 2022 [https://tass.com/politics/1518457].

612 "US wishes to fan tensions over nuclear arms, blame Russia — MFA,” TASS, October 6, 2022 [https://tass.com/politics/1518807].


there were no signs of an imminent nuclear threat, adding that Biden was addressing Russia’s “reckless and irresponsible” rhetoric. Also, multiple US officials told journalists that Biden’s statement was not based on any new intelligence about Putin’s intentions. It was still “not probable” that Russia would use nuclear weapons, US policymakers assessed. On October 9, Pentagon spokesperson Kirby confirmed on US television that Biden’s comments had not been based on “fresh intelligence or new indications that Mr Putin has made a decision to use nuclear weapons,” Kirby said.

Earlier on, in Kyiv, Zelenskyy told British journalists on October 7, that Russian officials were starting to “prepare their society” for nuclear use, which was “very dangerous.” However, while Moscow was beginning to “communicate,” Russia was “not ready” to use nuclear weapons. “They don’t know whether they’ll use or not use it” but it was “dangerous to even speak about it.” However, Zelenskyy believed that Putin understood that the “world will never forgive” a Russian nuclear strike. “He understands that after the use of nuclear weapons he would be unable any more to preserve, so to speak, his life, and I’m confident of that,” Zelenskyy said.

The weekend of October 8-9 came with significant conventional escalation in Ukraine. Shortly before dawn on October 8, a huge explosion took place on the Kerch bridge linking Crimea to the Russian mainland. In response, Russia launched a series of missile attacks across Ukraine. By midday the same day, some 80 missiles had been fired at infrastructure in a dozen cities, according to Ukrainian authorities. On October 10, Russia launched its heaviest missile barrage in months. Ukraine’s extensive network of local air defenses, largely older Soviet S-300 systems, intercepted 41 of the 75 Russian missiles.


Kyiv’s armed forces said. In Moscow, Putin said that Kyiv had “put itself on a par with the most odious terrorist groups,” which had prompted the subsequent “massive strike with precision-guided weapons on Ukrainian infrastructure – energy infrastructure, military command and communications.”

On October 11, Zelensky asked for additional air-defense systems, and said he had reiterated his request when talking over the phone to Biden on October 10. At the White House, Kirby said that the Biden Administration was working to deliver the first two of eight National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems that Washington had promised Kyiv in September. Kirby noted that the two systems would arrive “in the very near future.”

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<th>116. warning</th>
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<td>A virtual meeting of the G7 with Zelenskyy took place on the same day, October 11. Where the Ukrainian leaders asked for more weapons, the G7 pledged in a joint statement continued “financial, humanitarian, military, diplomatic and legal support … for as long as it takes.” They reaffirmed that “any use of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons by Russia would be met with severe consequences.” More important, the G7 agreed that they “welcomed” Zelensky’s “readiness” for a “just peace,” that included Ukraine’s territorial integrity and ensured its “recovery and reconstruction.”</td>
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In Moscow, Lavrov said Russia was open to dialogue with Western nations on Ukraine but had yet to receive any proposals for a meeting. The Kremlin would not turn down a meeting between Putin and Biden, Lavrov affirmed. In Washington, however, State Department spokesperson Ned Price explained the Administration had “very little confidence” the Russian offer was legitimate, given that Lavrov’s comments came within hours of Russia’s missile strikes. “We see this as posturing. We do not see this as a constructive, legitimate offer to engage in the dialogue and diplomacy that is absolutely necessary to see an end to this brutal war of aggression,” Price said. In Brussels, US ambassador to NATO Julianne Smith confirmed to reporters that, as a consequence of Russia’s barrage of missiles, sending air defense systems to Ukraine was at the top of everyone’s agenda. At the same time in Moscow, Medvedev was writing that the fastest way to bring the conflict in Ukraine to a “point of no return” was

622 “Russia strikes Kyiv, multiple Ukrainian cities; many dead,” AP, October 10, 2022 [https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20221010/p2g/00m/0in/019000c].

623 “Putin vows tough response if Kiev continues terror attacks on Russian territory,” TASS, October 10, 2022 [https://tass.com/politics/1520393].


625 “Zelenskyy asks for ‘air shield’ as G7 pledges continued support,” Al Jazeera, October 11, 2022 [https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/11/g7-leaders-ukraine-president-to-hold-talks].


to "arms the psychos in Kiev" with long range weapons. He warned the "elderly leaders in Washington" and "NATO upstarts" to "use their softened brains at least sometimes."628

### Warning

| 117. | Meanwhile, NATO said it would go ahead with its annual nuclear preparedness exercise dubbed "Steadfast Noon" the following week, in which NATO air forces practiced the use of US nuclear bombs based in Europe with training flights, but without live weapons. Cancelling the drills because of the war in Ukraine would send a "very wrong signal," Stoltenberg stressed on October 11. "It's an exercise to ensure that our nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure and effective," he explained, adding NATO's military strength was the best way to prevent any escalation of tensions.629 |

On October 12-13, the NATO Defense Ministerial took place in Brussels. Western officials told journalists that NATO was developing a 10-year plan to rebuild the Ukrainian defense industry. "We will be looking at defense planning requirements to get Ukraine fully interoperable with NATO," said a NATO official. "It's about shifting away from Soviet equipment ... to NATO-compatible Western equipment." US officials continued to show strong support for Ukraine: "We will do as much as we can for as long as we can and we will do as much as it takes for as long as it takes," to help Ukraine push Russian troops out of their country, US Joint Chiefs of Staff Chair Mark Milley told reporters.630

| 118. | In Moscow on the same October 12, the Kremlin scolded Western policymakers for engaging in "provocative" rhetoric. "We express our daily regret that Western heads of state, in the United States and Europe, engage in nuclear rhetoric every day," Peskov said of Biden's "Armageddon" comments. "We consider this a very harmful and provocative practice."631 |

### De-escalatory

| 119. | US Defense Secretary Austin, speaking to reporters at NATO headquarters on October 12 confirmed once again that the United States was monitoring any indications of a worrying change in Russia's nuclear posture that would suggest Putin might move ahead with a nuclear strike. "We've not seen any indicators at this point that would lead us to believe that," Austin said.632 |

Also in Brussels on October 13, following the NATO Defense Ministerial, fifteen allies announced a European air-defense network led by Germany. Called the Joint Air Defense Initiative, and known more commonly as European Sky Shield Initiative, it had been accelerated by Russia's missile attacks against

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628 [Tweet by @MedvedevRussiaE, Twitter, October 11, 2022](https://twitter.com/MedvedevRussiaE/status/1579878720164474880?src=20&t=BSAyyWegYNJqO-1PMKmQRA)


Ukraine. It was intended to standardize an air-defense network of short, medium and long-range missiles and radars for use in defending against a potential attack by Russia.633

In addition, NATO coordination of missile defense systems for Ukraine bore fruit. Germany announced the first delivery of a new air defense system, and France and Spain pledged new donations to knock Russian missiles and Iranian drones.634

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<td>NATO's nuclear planning group was scheduled to meet on <strong>October 13</strong>. On the eve of the meeting, an anonymous senior NATO official told journalists that a Russian nuclear strike would change the course of the conflict and “almost certainly be drawing a physical response from many allies, and potentially from NATO itself.” Any use of nuclear weapons by Moscow would have “unprecedented consequences” for Russia, the official said. Moscow appeared to be using its nuclear threats mainly to deter NATO and other countries from directly entering its war on Ukraine, he added.635</td>
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<td><strong>Stoltenberg</strong> underlined this message one day later, <strong>October 13</strong>, after the NPG meeting. Asked what NATO would do if Russia launched a nuclear attack, Stoltenberg said: “We will not go into exactly how we will respond, but of course this will fundamentally change the nature of the conflict. It will mean that a very important line has been crossed.” He added that “even any use of a smaller nuclear weapon will be a very serious thing, fundamentally changing the nature of the war in Ukraine, and of course that would have consequences.”636</td>
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<td>On the same <strong>October 13</strong>, EU foreign policy chief <strong>Josep Borrell</strong> also warned Putin not to cross that threshold. “Any nuclear attack against Ukraine will create an answer, not a nuclear answer but such a powerful answer from the military side that the Russian Army will be annihilated,” he said in a speech in Bruges, Belgium.637</td>
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637 Lorne Cook, “NATO chief warns Russia not to cross ‘very important line’,” *AP News*, October 13, 2022 [https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-nato-government-and-politics-moscow-4b8db123007d6de5c1f859bb8134b7dd5].
123. | Warning
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Medvedev reacted to this statement the following day, **October 14**. Neither Americans nor Europeans wanted to die for Ukraine in "a nuclear apocalypse." Hence, they would respond to a Russian nuclear use in a "careful and balanced" manner, Medvedev argued.638

In Moscow, **Peskov** said that Russia was ready to "negotiate" to achieve its goals, but its aims had not changed. "The direction has not changed, the special military operation continues, it continues in order for us to achieve our goals," Peskov was quoted as saying. "However, we have repeatedly reiterated that we remain open to negotiations to achieve our objectives." Yet, Peskov added that he did not see any prospects for talks with the West in the near future because of its "hostile" attitude towards Russia.639

124. | Warning
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Also in Moscow, **Alexander Venediktov**, the deputy secretary of Russia’s Security Council, noted that Kyiv was well aware that Ukraine joining NATO “would mean a guaranteed escalation to World War Three.” Such an attempt would be “suicidal” for existing NATO member states, he said.640

125. | De-escalatory
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Meanwhile in France, **Macron** seemed to confirm doubts about Western resolve, stating in a televised interview that Paris would "evidently" not use nuclear weapons in response to a Russian nuclear attack on Ukraine. "France has a nuclear doctrine, that is based on the vital interests of the country and which are clearly defined. These would not be at stake if there was a nuclear ballistic attack in Ukraine or in the region,” the French president said. Both political opponents and French analysts criticized the statement, noting that ambiguity was the better approach.641

On **October 14**, in Washington, National Security Council spokesperson **Kirby** said that Russia’s "routine" Grom drills would involve large scale maneuvers of its strategic nuclear forces. He thought Moscow "probably" believed that the exercises would “help it project power,” but stressed that it was widely known that Russian units trained "extensively at this time of year." The United States would “monitor that accordingly,” he added. A US defense official nevertheless noted that Russia’s nuclear rhetoric and its decision to proceed with its Grom exercise “while at war with Ukraine” was “irresponsible.” NATO’s annual nuclear exercise had been planned before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, **Western officials** repeatedly emphasized, having been held regularly around the same time of the year for over a decade. Fourteen NATO nations were involved in the drill, which include fighter jets capable of carrying nuclear warheads but no nuclear weapons. US defense officials also underlined in advance that there would be no "special messaging" around the exercise, arguing that Russia was playing a "reckless and irresponsible" saber rattling game, but that Washington would not do the same.642

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638 "Medvedev dismisses EU foreign policy chief's nuclear strike remark as ‘paranoia’," **TASS**, October 14, 2022 [https://tass.com/politics/1522547].


641 Clea Caulcutt, "Macron under fire for saying France wouldn’t respond in kind if Russia launched nuclear attack on Ukraine," **Politico**, October 13, 2022 [https://www.politico.eu/article/france-emmanuel-macron-nuclear-attack-russia-ukraine/].
In Astana on October 14, Putin seemed to be striking a softer tone, saying he saw no need for continued massive air strikes against Ukraine and that the troop mobilization would soon end. There was "no need for massive strikes" now because most of the designated targets had been hit and "we have not set ourselves the task of destroying Ukraine."  

On October 16, Sullivan told US media that the seriousness of nuclear weapons use did not depend on the size of the weapon. "The use of a nuclear weapon on the battlefield in Ukraine is the use of a nuclear weapon on the battlefield in Ukraine and we are not going to slice the salami," he explained.

On October 17, NATO’s Steadfast Noon nuclear exercises commenced. The drills were a "routine, recurring training activity" that had been planned before Russia invaded Ukraine. Hence, the exercise was "not linked to any current world events," a NATO statement read. The exercise ran until 30 October 2022, taking place mostly in Belgium, the UK, and the North Sea. It involved US B-52 bombers as part of 60 total aircraft participating in training flights. Also among the aircraft involved in the drills were fourth and fifth generation fighter jets, as well as surveillance and tanker aircraft, the alliance said in a press release.

Meanwhile in Luxembourg, EU foreign ministers agreed on a mission to train 15,000 Ukrainian troops in Poland and Germany from November 2022.

The next day, October 18, Kremlin spokesman Peskov made another nuclear allusion. Asked by reporters whether the four annexed Ukrainian regions were under Moscow’s nuclear umbrella, he explained: "All these territories are inalienable parts of the Russian Federation and they are all protected. Their security is provided for at the same level as [it is for] the rest of Russia’s territory."

On the same day, October 18, Stoltenberg said that Medvedev was wrong when he claimed (on 27 September 2022) that NATO would not risk nuclear war and would not join the war even if Moscow struck Ukraine with nuclear weapons. "He is not right," Stoltenberg noted. "We have stated clearly that there will be severe consequences." NATO had "many ways to respond." All NATO allies agreed

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642 Phil Stewart, "Is this a drill? Upcoming Russian nuclear exercises a challenge for the West," Reuters, October 14, 2022 [https://www.reuters.com/article/instant-article/idAFKBN2R824E].


646 Sabine Siebold, "EU set to train 15,000 Ukrainian troops, provide more arms funding for Kyiv," Reuters, October 17, 2022 [https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-set-train-15000-ukrainian-troops-provide-more-arms-funding-kyiv-2022-10-17/].

on the seriousness of the use of any nuclear weapons, he stressed, adding that this had been clearly conveyed to Russia.\footnote{\textit{NATO Secretary General interview at Berlin Foreign Policy Forum, 18 OCT 2022,} \textit{YouTube Accound of NATO News}, October 18, 2022 [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RXK0jH1560&t=803s], and Joel Gehrke, \textit{"NATO chief hints allies would intervene in war if Russia uses nuclear weapons in Ukraine,} \textit{Washington Examiner}, October 18, 2022 [https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/restoring-america/courage-strength-optimism/nato-chief-hints-allies-would-intervene-in-war-if-russia-uses-nuclear-weapons-in-ukraine].}

One day later, on \textbf{October 19}, Putin declared martial law in the four occupied regions of Ukraine, moved to put the economy on a wartime footing, and imposed restrictions in more than two dozen areas across Russia. Moscow also ordered the evacuation of Kherson. Analysts concluded that the Kremlin was struggling to mobilize necessary resources and was enhancing its control over Russia.\footnote{Andrew E. Kramer and Neil MacFarquhar, \textit{"Putin Declares Martial Law in 4 Illegally Annexed Ukrainian Regions,} \textit{The New York Times}, October 19, 2022 [https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/19/world/europe/russia-putin-ukraine-martial-law.html].}

On \textbf{October 20}, Zelenskyy thanked Scholz for the delivery of the Iris-T air defense system. The first system had arrived a week earlier. Three additional systems were scheduled for delivery.\footnote{Zach Schonfeld, \textit{"Zelensky: Russia targeted Ukraine energy grid in 'new massive strike,'} \textit{The Hill}, October 23, 2022 [https://www.yahoo.com/news/zelensky-russia-targeted-ukraine-energy-13004295.html].}

On \textbf{October 21}, at the initiation of the US side, Austin and Shoigu spoke over the phone for the first time since May 2022. “Austin emphasized the importance of maintaining lines of communication amid the ongoing war against Ukraine.”\footnote{Tweet by @GMA, \textit{Twitter}, October 20, 2022 [https://twitter.com/GMA/status/1583053444008804353?s=20&t=MsV-LkXah119ZxhZx1A].}

During the \textbf{October 22-23} weekend, Russian armed forces withdrew from Kherson under Ukrainian pressure, but Russia used long-range options to target power plants and heating stations across Ukraine. “The geography of this new massive strike is very wide,” Zelenskyy said on \textbf{22 October}.\footnote{“Readout of Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III’s Phone Call With Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu,” Website of the \textit{US Department of Defense}, October 21, 2022 [https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3195784/readout-of-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-phone-call-with-russian-min/].}

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\textbf{130. Warning} & \\
In Washington, Blinken told US media that the Administration was watching Russia’s nuclear threats “very, very carefully,” but had found no reason to change its nuclear posture toward Moscow yet. Washington had been “very clear” with Putin “directly and privately” about the “severe consequences that would follow from any use of a nuclear weapon,” Blinken stressed. He also noted that Washington wanted to have “the strongest possible hand at a negotiating table if one emerges,” since Zelenskyy had said he believed diplomacy would play a part in ending the war eventually.\footnote{\textit{"Readout of Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III’s Phone Call With Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Shoigu,” Website of the US Department of Defense, October 21, 2022 [https://www.defence.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3195784/readout-of-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-phone-call-with-russian-min/].} & \\
\hline
\textbf{131. Escalatory} & \\
In the early morning of \textbf{October 23}, Russian Defense Minister Shoigu wrote on Telegram that Ukraine could escalate the conflict with a dirty bomb. “The purpose of the provocation is to accuse
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Russia of using weapons of mass destruction in the Ukrainian theatre of operations and thereby launch a powerful anti-Russian campaign in the world aimed at undermining confidence in Moscow.”

More: “The calculation of the organizers of the provocation is that if it is successfully implemented, most countries will react extremely harshly to the ‘nuclear incident’ in Ukraine,” the post said. “As a result, Moscow will lose the support of many of its key partners.”

On the afternoon of Sunday, October 23, the Russian Ministry of Defense requested phone calls with the US, British, French, and Turkish counterparts. Shoigu told his counterparts that Ukraine could be planning to use a “dirty bomb,” but provided no evidence to back his claims. During the call with French Defense Minister Sébastien Lecornu, Shoigu pointed to a “rapidly deteriorating” situation in Ukraine, according to the Russian readout of the call. He conveyed “his concerns about possible provocations by Ukraine with the use of a dirty bomb,” the Russian ministry said without giving any further detail. In the phone call between Shoigu and the UK Defense Minister, Ben Wallace, the Russian official “alleged that Ukraine was planning actions facilitated by Western countries, including the UK, to escalate the conflict in Ukraine,” the British read-out stated.

According to the same read-out, Wallace “refuted” Shoigu’s claims and “cautioned that such allegations should not be used as a pretext for greater escalation.” Subsequent to his phone conversation, Austin also noted publicly that he had “rejected any pretext for Russian escalation and reaffirmed the value of continued communication amid Russia’s unlawful and unjustified war against Ukraine.”

During the night to October 24, the US, UK, and French foreign ministers issued a common statement, “rejecting Russia’s transparently false allegations about Ukraine.” The three governments remained “committed to continue supporting Ukraine’s efforts to defend its territory for as long as it takes.” The common statement further read: “Our countries made clear that we all reject Russia’s transparently false allegations that Ukraine is preparing to use a dirty bomb on its own territory. The world would see through any attempt to use this allegation as a pretext for escalation. We further reject any pretext for escalation by Russia.”

As the phone calls became public, Kuleba wrote on Twitter that “Russian lies about Ukraine allegedly planning to use a dirty bomb [were] as absurd as they [were] dangerous.” Ukraine was “a committed

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NPT member,” and it neither had any dirty bombs not planned to acquire any. “Russians often accuse others of what they plan themselves,” Kuleba concluded.660

In Washington, NSC spokesperson Adrienne Watson rejected Shoigu’s allegations, calling the accusations of Ukraine preparing to use dirty bombs “transparently false.” Watson added that the world would “see through any attempt” by Russia to use the allegation to escalate the invasion of Ukraine.661

In Kyiv, Zelensky noted in his nightly address that if Russia called and said that Ukraine was “allegedly preparing something,” this meant “one thing: That Russia “has already prepared all this,” Zelensky said. “I believe that now the world should react in the toughest possible way,” he said.662

A few hours later, Kuleba noted that he had phoned Blinken. “We both agreed Russia’s dirty bomb disinformation campaign might be aimed at creating a pretext for a false flag operation,” the Ukrainian official noted. “We also discussed further practical steps to boost Ukraine’s air defense. Secretary affirmed the US spares no effort to this end.”663

In Washington, an anonymous US official told journalists that Russia turning to Iranian drones and Putin’s “increasingly escalatory references to nuclear weapons” indicated that “a desperate Russia was looking for other tools ... to use.”664

On the same day, Stoltenberg also confirmed this position, telling journalists that Russia’s claims were “absurd.” Yet, NATO was concerned that such statements were “part of a pattern we have seen before from Russia — in Syria, but also at the start of the war, or just before the war started in February. And that is that Russia is accusing others [of] doing what they intend to do themselves,” Stoltenberg continued.665

Meanwhile in Washington, a group of 30 Democratic lawmakers urged Biden to alter the US strategy towards Ukraine and pursue negotiations with Moscow.666
Also on October 24, the commander of Ukraine’s ground forces General Oleksandr Syrsiyi confirmed the apparent concerns, telling journalists that the world should be worried about Russian President Vladimir Putin’s threat to use nuclear weapons. Ukraine was however winning the conventional war against Russia, he stressed.667 Indeed, the Ukrainian military assessed Russia was pulling out the occupation administration from Kherson and preparing its forces to defend the province.668

On the same day, Kuleba talked to IAEA Secretary General Grossi over the phone and invited the Agency to send experts to Ukrainian facilities to check whether there was any illegal activity.669

### Escalatory

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<th>nevertheless doubled down on its allegations. Still on October 24, Moscow put forces on alert to respond to a potential chemical, biological or nuclear weapons attack, according to the Russian Ministry of Defense.670</th>
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<td>In addition, Igor Kirillov, the head of the Radiation, Chemical and Biological Defense Forces of the Russian Armed Forces, posted a presentation on Telegram. In the video, Kirillov briefed that Kyiv was planning a false-flag operation that would involve launching a dirty bomb or low-power nuclear warhead on its own soil. “The detonation of a radiological explosive device will inevitably lead to radioactive contamination of the area over an area of up to several thousand square meters,” Kirillov said.671</td>
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<tr>
<td>In the evening of October 24, Russia doubled down once again, sending a letter on its assertion about Kyiv to the United Nations, and diplomats said Moscow planned to raise the issue with the Security Council at a closed meeting on the following day. “We will regard the use of the dirty bomb by the Kyiv regime as an act of nuclear terrorism,” Russia’s UN Ambassador Vassily Nebenzia wrote to Guterres and the Security Council.672</td>
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### De-escalatory

| At the very same time, Russian officials also played down the nuclear threat. Also in Moscow, the director of Russia’s foreign intelligence service SVR, Sergey Naryshkin, told the media that Russia |

667 Ian Pannell and Teddy Grant, “We are and should be worried” of Putin’s nuclear threat, Ukrainian general says: Exclusive,” ABC News, October 24, 2022 [https://abcnews.go.com/International/worried-putins-nuclear-threat-ukrainian-general-exclusive/story?id=91962124].


671 Lara Seligman, “West rejects Russia’s ‘dirty bomb’ claim as Moscow activates counter-WMD forces,” Politico, October 24, 2022 [https://www.politico.com/news/2022/10/24/russia-dirty-bomb-moscow-wmd-forces-00063115], and “Минобороны России привело в готовность силы и средства для работы в условиях радиоактивного заражения (The Russian Defence Ministry has put forces and equipment on standby to work in radioactively contaminated conditions),” Kommersant, October 24, 2022 [https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5632591].

found extremely worrisome the Western rhetoric regarding the possibility of using nuclear weapons. It was very clear that Zelenskyy wished to possess nuclear weapons and “the world should not let this happen.” However, asked whether Russian rhetoric “left room” for the possibility of using nuclear weapons, he said “no, absolutely not.”

### Warning

Meanwhile in Washington, US officials argued Moscow’s allegations were another Russian attempt to prepare the ground for their own actions. “We have seen a pattern in this conflict, in this war, in the lead-up to this war, where the Russians have engaged in mirror imaging,” Ned Price, the State Department spokesman, said. “The Russians have accused the Ukrainians, the Russians have accused other countries of what it itself was planning. That is our concern.” But he also cautioned: “We’ve been very clear with the Russians [...] about the severe consequences that would result from nuclear use,” Price said. “There would be consequences for Russia whether it uses a dirty bomb or a nuclear bomb.”

### De-escalatory

Yet at the same time, Western officials relativised concerns. A Pentagon official told journalists that the US government had no indication that Russia was preparing to deploy nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. “We continue to see nothing in the way of preparations by the Russian side for the use of nuclear weapons,” White House national security spokesman John Kirby also confirmed to reporters on the same day. Also on the same day, October 24, two Western officials told journalists that they believed the threats were a means to maintain fears in the west of a potential nuclear event in Ukraine, given the orchestrated nature of the warning, and to test how western capitals would respond.

In parallel some communication channels reportedly remained open. On the same day, October 24, Mark Milley, the US chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, spoke with his Russian counterpart, Valery Gerasimov, the chief of the Russian General Staff; and Gerasimov called Antony Radakin, the head of the UK military, according to the Russian ministry of defense.

Finally, US officials reaffirmed continued Western support for Ukraine. Austin talked over the phone with Ukrainian Minister of Defense Oleksii Reznikov to “reaffirm the unwavering US commitment to support Ukraine’s ability to counter Russian aggression.” Austin rejected the “false allegations by Russia that they wished to possess nuclear weapons and “the world should not let this happen.” However, asked whether Russian rhetoric “left room” for the possibility of using nuclear weapons, he said “no, absolutely not.”

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677. Henry Foy et al. “West sees Russia’s ‘dirty bomb’ claims as pretext for possible Ukraine escalation,” Financial Times, October 24, 2022 [https://www.ft.com/content/b5eaeec3-91db-4035-b2c1-a7c06a9ba5].

about Ukraine and any attempt to use them as a pretext for further Russian escalation of its unlawful and unjustified war against Ukraine.” Kuleba also wrote on Twitter that he had a discussion with Blinken on “ways to end Russia’s nuclear blackmail.”

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<th>137.</th>
<th>Warning</th>
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<tr>
<td>The Russian warnings were met by US rebukes. On <strong>October 25, Biden</strong> warned Russia against using nuclear weapons. “Let me just say: Russia would be making an incredibly serious mistake for it to use a tactical nuclear weapon,” Biden said in response to a reporter’s question about whether Russia was preparing a dirty bomb. “I’m not guaranteeing you that it’s a false flag operation yet, don’t know, but it would be a serious, serious mistake.”</td>
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<td>On the same day, <strong>Austin</strong> speaking to <strong>Stoltenberg</strong> also condemned “Russia’s false claim that Ukraine is preparing to use a dirty bomb on its own soil.” Washington rejected “any attempt to create pretexts for Russian escalation.”</td>
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According to press reports, **US intelligence officials** were divided about Russia’s intentions. Some believed that the repeated threats were a bluff. Others thought they were preparations to use a small nuclear device in order to warn adversaries to stay away.

Meanwhile in Vienna, the **IAEA** announced it was preparing an inspection in Ukraine to follow up on Russian allegations.

Against the backdrop of this level of apprehension, the previously mentioned group of **30 progressive Democratic lawmakers** in Washington retracted their letter from the day before, calling on Biden to engage in direct talks with Moscow on a ceasefire in Ukraine.

Also on **October 25**, the **Pentagon** made public that Russia had notified the United States that its annual nuclear exercise would run October 26-29 and that it would include launches of nuclear capable missiles. Russia was conducting a “routine annual exercise” and “complying with its arms control obligations and its transparency commitments,” the Pentagon noted. Also, the Pentagon’s spokesperson noted

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680 Tweet by @DmytroKuleba, Twitter, October 24, 2022 [https://twitter.com/DmytroKuleba/status/1584662313415901185?s=20&t=1cUlJfTIAIkEbMa.2j3xKg].


682 Tweet by @SecDef, Twitter, October 25, 2022 [https://twitter.com/secdef/status/1584712525815373825?s=43&t=7Gnwh9ynAGHDSh6HWhShg].


that the US government had no “indication that Russia has made a decision to employ those types of [nuclear] capabilities, nor have we seen any need to change our own strategic forces posture.”

On the same day, German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier arrived in Ukraine, where he would meet Zelenskyy on his first visit since Russia invaded in February. “My message to the Ukrainians is that we are not only standing by your side. We will continue to support Ukraine, economically, politically and also militarily,” Steinmeier said after his arrival.

In New York, the UN Security Council met. “We’ve seen and heard no new evidence,” Britain’s Deputy UN Ambassador James Kariuki told reporters after the meeting, referring to Russia’s “transparently false allegations.” He added: “This is pure Russian misinformation of the kind we’ve seen many times before and it should stop.” Russian representatives saw the meeting in a different light. “We’re quite satisfied because we raised the awareness,” Russia’s Deputy UN Ambassador Dmitry Polyanskiy told reporters. “I don’t mind people saying that Russia is crying wolf if this doesn’t happen because this is a terrible, terrible disaster that threatens potentially the whole of the Earth.”

The nuclear rhetoric was taking place against the backdrop of Russian forces having been driven back in earlier weeks from the southern region of Kherson. Russia’s military was preparing to defend the largest city under its control in Ukraine. The Russian authorities had been encouraging residents to flee to the eastern bank of the Dnipro river, as Russian forces appeared to be strengthening their regrouping.

“The heaviest of battles is going to take place for Kherson,” Ukrainian officials told Western journalists.

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**Warning**

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<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>October 26</td>
<td>Putin monitored a series of nuclear drills described by Shoigu as simulation of a</td>
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<td>“massive nuclear strike” in retaliation for a nuclear attack on Russia. A Yars land-</td>
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<td>based intercontinental ballistic missile was test-fired from the northern Plesetsk</td>
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<td>launch site. A Russian nuclear submarine in the Barents Sea also launched a Sineva</td>
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<td>ICBM at the Kura firing range on the far-eastern Kamchatka Peninsula, and Tu-95</td>
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<td>strategic fired cruise missiles at practice targets. The exercise, which involved</td>
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<td>multiple practice launches of ballistic and cruise missiles, was a success, Moscow</td>
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<td>said. Putin also repeated the dirty bomb claim. “We know about the plans to use the</td>
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|            | so-called dirty bomb for provocations,” he said.

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In a Pentagon briefing on the following day, Austin however stressed that the US government had not seen anything to indicate Russia was using the exercise as a cover to launch a nuclear strike. He added that the Administration was concerned about the conflict in Ukraine escalating but said there were still no indications Russia was planning to use a nuclear weapon.\footnote{Putin monitors practice launches by Russia’s nuclear forces, “AP News,” October 26, 2022 [https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-europe-moscow-sergei-shoigu-752933fd7c59c22226ef377363955de8].}

After Shoigu called his Chinese and Indian counterparts to discuss the allegation, which Ukraine and its Western allies had strongly rejected, India’s defense minister Rajnath Singh tweeted that he pointed out to Shoigu that “the nuclear option should not be resorted to by any side as the prospect of the usage of nuclear or radiological weapons goes against the basic tenets of humanity.”\footnote{Lloyd J. Austin, “Press Conference,” Website of the US Department of Defense, October 27, 2022 [https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3202353/secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-holds-a-press-conference/].}

There appeared to be continued concern in Washington. On October 26, Blinken repeated that the Administration had “communicated directly and very clearly to the Russians, President Putin about the consequences” of using nuclear weapons. The State Department’s spokesperson suggested the message had not been conveyed to Putin directly, but to other Russian officials. The “dirty bomb” allegations were “another fabrication and something that is also the height of irresponsibility coming from a nuclear power,” Blinken said. Also: “The reason this particular allegation gives us some concern is because Russia has a track record of projecting, which is to say, accusing others of doing something that they themselves have done or are thinking about doing,” Blinken said.\footnote{“Putin monitors practice launches by Russia’s nuclear forces,” AP News, October 26, 2022 [https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-europe-moscow-sergei-shoigu-752933fd7c59c22226ef377363955de8], and “India defence minister warns against using nuclear weapons in Ukraine,” Gulf News, October 26, 2022 [https://gulfnews.com/world/asia/india/india-defence-minister-warns-against-nuclear-weapons-in-ukraine-1.91519512].}

Concern was also rife in Poland, where Deputy Defense Minister Marcin Ociepa claimed that faced with military setbacks, the Kremlin “may reach for nuclear or chemical weapons.”\footnote{Jennifer Hansler and Kylie Atwood, “Blinken says the consequences for using a nuclear weapon have been conveyed to Putin,” CNN, October 27, 2022 [https://edition.cnn.com/2022/10/26/politics/blinker-putin-nuclear-consequences/index.html].}

On October 27, Putin denied the Kremlin had any intentions to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. “We have no need to do so,” Putin told international foreign policy experts at the Valdai club. “There is no sense in [using nuclear weapons] for us, neither political, nor military.” Moscow had “never said anything proactively about Russia potentially using nuclear weapons,” Putin claimed. Condemning once again Liz Truss’ statement from February 27, he claimed that “all” Russia had done “was hint in response to statements made by Western leaders. He also repeated unsubstantiated allegations that Ukraine was preparing a false flag attack involving a radioactive bomb that it would try to pin on Russia.\footnote{“Putin monitors practice launches by Russia’s nuclear forces,” AP News, October 26, 2022 [https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-europe-moscow-sergei-shoigu-752933fd7c59c22226ef377363955de8].}

Warning

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On October 28, in Moscow, Shoigu announced that the draft was over and that no more enlistment notices would be sent to men to fight in Ukraine. Speaking at a meeting with Putin, the Russian Defense Minister said 82,000 troops had already been deployed to Ukraine, and the rest were undergoing training. Putin told Shoigu that there was a need “to make corrections” in the design of the Russian army and asked the defense minister to quickly prepare the “necessary decisions.”

On the same day, Stoltenberg noted in Brussels that a “victorious Russia” would “be bad for all of us in Europe and North America, in the whole of NATO, because that will send a message to authoritarian leaders — not only Putin but also China — that by the use of brutal military force they can achieve their goals.”

On October 29, Russia’s Black Sea flagship vessel, the Admiral Makarov, was damaged and possibly disabled during a Ukrainian drone attack on the Crimean port of Sevastopol, media reported. Three Russian ships were apparently hit. In the wake of the attack, Russia announced that it was pulling out of the UN brokered deal that allowed Ukrainian grain and fertilizer to be shipped through the Black Sea. In addition, on October 31, Russian missile strikes took out critical infrastructure in several Ukrainian cities, leaving 80 percent of Kyiv without water supplies. Putin told journalists that the attack was “partly” a response to Ukraine’s actions in Sevastopol, and warned that the strikes were “not all we could do.”


699 Ivan Nechepurenko, “Russia’s defense minister says the recent draft is finished, and no more are planned,” The New York Times, October 28, 2022 [https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/28/world/europe/russia-draft-war.html].


The UN sought to continue the flow of grain without Russian support. Turkey also remained committed to the deal. In Moscow, Peskov said on October 31, that it would be risky for Ukraine to continue exporting. Russia could not "guarantee" the "safety of shipping in these areas," the spokesperson said.\footnote{Nigel Hunt, Reuters, "UN's Black Sea grain deal continues without Russia," Reuters, October 31, 2022 [https://www.reuters.com/world/uns-black-sea-grain-deal-continues-without-russia-2022-10-31/].}

### 142. Warning

In an interview for a Russian state television documentary on the Cuban missile crisis on the following day of October 30, Lavrov said the current crisis bore similarities with 1962. Today Western weapons in Ukraine threatened Russia, he claimed. "I hope that in today's situation, President Joe Biden will have more opportunities to understand who gives orders and how," but "this situation is very disturbing," he added. "The difference is that in the distant 1962, Khrushchev and Kennedy found the strength to show responsibility and wisdom, and now we do not see such readiness on the part of Washington and its satellites," he said. Yet Lavrov also noted that Russia and Putin's "readiness" for negotiations remained "unchanged."\footnote{Guy Faulconbridge, "Russia’s Lavrov needles Biden over Cuban missile crisis and Ukraine," Reuters, October 30, 2022 [https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-lavrov-needles-biden-over-cuban-missile-crisis-ukraine-2022-10-30/].}

### 143. Warning

The following day, UK Foreign Secretary James Cleverly told UK lawmakers that Russia would face severe consequences if it used nuclear weapons. Putin “should be clear that for the UK and our allies, any use, at all, of nuclear weapons would change the nature of the conflict. There would be severe consequences for Russia,” Cleverly said. Claims that Ukraine was preparing a dirty bomb attack were “absurd” and Putin's nuclear rhetoric was "irresponsible talk." He concluded: "No other country is talking about nuclear use. No country is threatening Russia or President Putin."\footnote{William James and Alistair Smout, "UK warns Russia of severe consequences if nuclear weapons used in Ukraine," Reuters, October 31, 2022 [https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/uk-warns-russia-severe-consequences-if-nuclear-weapons-used-ukraine-2022-10-31/].}

### November 2022: The sudden demise of nuclear rhetoric

In early November, further details on the background of recent Western concern were revealed. On November 1, British defense officials made public that Russia had deployed air-launched hypersonic missiles to a base in Belarus by mid-October. UK analysts had spotted on satellite imagery MiG-31K jets, as well as a possible canister containing Kinzhal hypersonic missiles at Machulishchy Airfield, just outside of Minsk. Given that stationing the jets in Belarus did not increase the number of targets that could be reached in Ukraine, UK officials believed that Moscow had carried out the deployment "mainly" as a "message to the West."\footnote{Arthur Scott-Geddes, "Russia deploys hypersonic missiles to Belarus in ‘message to the West’," The Telegraph, November 1, 2022 [https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/11/01/russia-deploys-hypersonic-missiles-belarus-message-west/].}

### 144. De-escalatory

In addition, on November 2, US journalists reported that senior Russian military leaders had recently held conversations to discuss when and how Moscow might use a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine. Putin had not been part of the conversations. The intelligence about these Russian discus-
sions was circulated as a National Intelligence Council product inside the US government in mid-October. American officials were "profoundly concerned" about these "intense discussions" in Russia – "especially if Russia’s army in the south of Ukraine were to collapse." The risk of further escalation remained "troublingly high," Biden Administration officials and US allies told journalists, but they also said that the phone calls between Western and Russian counterparts in late October had helped ease some of the nuclear tensions. White House spokesperson Kirby said that the Administration had no indications that Putin had decided to use a nuclear weapon, but that "we have grown increasingly concerned about the potential as these months have gone on." The United States, he said, continued to monitor Russia’s nuclear signaling "as best we can."

Anonymous US officials also told journalists that Russia was unlikely to be cowed into a complete retreat anytime soon, even as Ukraine’s battlefield victories put Moscow’s forces on the back foot. And as Russia exhausted its troops and its conventional arsenal, the danger was rising of Moscow turning to more-insidious tactics and weapons to beat back Ukraine’s counteroffensives, officials said. “The practical effect of their depletion of their conventional forces is unfortunately an even greater reliance on their nuclear forces,” a senior defense official had already told reporters at the end of October, media reports revealed.

Meanwhile, Russia continued to walk back its nuclear rhetoric. On November 2, the Russian Foreign Ministry published a statement refuting any nuclear use. Nuclear war could not we won and had to be avoided. Russia’s doctrine mandated only “defensive goals” and did not permit an “expansive interpretation.” The world’s “top priority” was to avoid a clash of nuclear powers that could lead to “catastrophic consequences.” The other “nuclear five” were urged to “give up the dangerous attempts to infringe on vital interests” of others.

Also on the same day in Moscow, Russia rejoined the agreement allowing the shipment of Ukrainian grain through the Black Sea – participation it had suspended the weekend before after blaming Ukraine for an attack on Russian warships in Sevastopol. It was unclear why the Kremlin reversed course so quickly, but President Vladimir V. Putin said in televised remarks that the agreement was tied to Ukraine’s ensuring the safety of Russian vessels. “Russia retains the right to leave these agreements if these guarantees from Ukraine are violated,” he said. Russian officials noted that they had received “written guarantees” over the safety of Russian vessels. Ukrainian officials suggested that Russia had reconsidered after seeing that other parties, including Turkey and the UN, were committed to continuing with or without Moscow’s involvement.

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In contrast, also in Moscow, Secretary of the Russian Security Council Nikolai Patrushev said the West was using a possible provocation with a nuclear weapon to recruit additional counties to its coalition against Russia.713

In New York, the UN Security Council rejected the establishment of a formal inquiry into Russia’s accusation that the United States and Ukraine had biological weapons programs in Ukraine. Only China voted with Russia in favor of a UNSC resolution. The United States, Britain and France voted against it, while the remaining 10 council members abstained.714 The following day in Vienna, the IAEA said that its inspection had not found evidence of illegal nuclear activity at three sites that figured in Russia’s allegations against Ukraine either.715

Nonetheless, on the same November 3, a Western official told journalists that support for the war remained “fairly consistent in the Russian leadership group and debate is over the means.” Hence, Western officials did not see “at this stage that debates within the top of the Russian system over the conduct of the war reflect any serious threats to Putin’s position.”716 Another Western official told reporters that there had been “spectacular changes in the territorial control” of Ukraine as Russian troops struggled to fight with a dwindling supply of low-quality weapons. Moscow’s retreat from Kherson had almost been completed. “The most glaring failure in Russia’s inventory is its increasingly critical shortage of artillery ammunition,” the official said. “In the Russian way of war, artillery enables everything else.”717

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<th>146.</th>
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<td>Still, Moscow’s officials continued to walk back nuclear rhetoric. In London, Russian ambassador Kelin repeated his claim that Russia would not use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. “We will not use nuclear weapons because they are designed for other purposes,” he told journalists. “A nuclear war cannot be won and it should never be fought. And we stick strongly to this statement.” The “world” had “every assurance” that Russia was not going to use tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine, he added.</td>
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<td>In Moscow, Peskov had noted before that Western leaders’ engaged in nuclear rhetoric daily and underscored that Russia had no desire to partake in this exercise, Russian media reported. He also reiterated that Moscow could use nuclear weapons only in accordance with its nuclear doctrine.718</td>
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713 “Запад использует ядерную провокацию для набора коалиции, заявил Патрушев (West uses nuclear provocation to recruit coalition, says Patrushev),” Ria Novosti, November 3, 2022 [https://ria.ru/20221103/patrushev-1828870675.html].


716 Tweet by @shashj, Twitter, November 3, 2022 [https://twitter.com/shashj/status/1588169649459695616?s=20&ref-tweetId=1588169649459695616&ref src=twitter].


718 “Moscow to eschew use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine, Russian envoy reiterates,” TASS, November 3, 2022 [https://tass.com/politics/1532329].
On November 4, with German Chancellor Scholz visiting Beijing, Chinese leader Xi Jinping expressed criticism towards Russia’s nuclear rhetoric. The international community should “jointly oppose the use of, or threats to use, nuclear weapons,” a statement read. The world should also “advocate that nuclear weapons cannot be used, a nuclear war cannot be waged, in order to prevent a nuclear crisis” in Europe or Asia, Xi added. However, Xi also asked “asked” Germany and Europe to “play an important part in calling for peace and facilitating negotiations.” China’s outgoing Premier Li Keqiang told the press: “We cannot afford any further escalation.” Referring to Scholz who was standing next to him, Li said: “Both of us hope the crisis ends soon.” Scholz referred to our meeting with Xi: “We have agreed that threatening nuclear attacks is irresponsible and dangerous,” Scholz told reporters. “I have told President Xi the importance for China to exert its influence on Russia.”

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<td>Meanwhile Western support for Ukraine and a clear line vis-à-vis Russia’s nuclear rhetoric continued. Concluding a two-day meeting in Northern Germany, the <strong>G7 foreign ministers</strong> expressed “unwavering commitment” to Ukraine’s defense. Russia’s “irresponsible nuclear rhetoric” was “unacceptable,” the statement read. “Any use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons by Russia would be met with severe consequences.” The G7 pledged to continue to aid Ukraine, to impose costs on Russia, and to establish a coordination mechanism to rebuild Ukraine. “We’re aligned, we’re united and we’re working together as never before,” <strong>Blinken</strong> told journalists.</td>
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In Washington, the **Pentagon** announced that it was setting up a new command to oversee how the United States and its allies trained and equipped the Ukrainian military. The Defense Department also unveiled a new package of $400 million in security assistance, bringing the total since Russia invaded to $18.9 billion. The command would ensure that Washington was “postured to continue advising and training the Ukrainian military.” The Pentagon’s spokesperson said, suggesting that the US government was not expecting that the conflict would end soon. The additional assistance included funding for refurbishing 45 tanks from the Czech Republic, which would arrive in Ukraine by the end of December 2022.

In Moscow, **Putin** used a National Unity Day appearance to announce that 318,000 soldiers had been recruited to join the Russian Army before recruiting had stopped, with 49,000 of those already trained and equipped the Ukrainian military. The Defense Department also expressed “unwavering commitment” to Ukraine’s defense. Russia’s “irresponsible nuclear rhetoric” was “unacceptable,” the statement read. “Any use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons by Russia would be met with severe consequences.” The G7 pledged to continue to aid Ukraine, to impose costs on Russia, and to establish a coordination mechanism to rebuild Ukraine. “We’re aligned, we’re united and we’re working together as never before,” **Blinken** told journalists.

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<td>There was also renewed nuclear rhetoric coming from Russia. <strong>Medvedev</strong> claimed that Russia was fighting “crazy Nazi drug addicts” in Ukraine backed by Westerners who he said had “saliva running down their chins from degeneracy.” He went on to stress that Moscow had various weapons and</td>
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Back in Berlin, Scholz said on November 5, that his and Xi’s joint statement opposing the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine had been reason enough for the visit. “Because the Chinese government, the president and I were able to declare that no nuclear weapons should be used in this war, that alone made the whole trip worthwhile,” Scholz said during an SPD event.

In Washington, US media reported that the Biden Administration had been privately encouraging Ukraine’s leaders to signal an openness to negotiate with Russia and drop their public refusal to engage in peace talks unless President Vladimir Putin was removed from power. The request was not aimed at pushing Ukraine to the negotiating table, but rather a calculated attempt to ensure the government in Kyiv maintains the support of other nations facing constituencies wary of fueling a war for many years to come. “Ukraine fatigue is a real thing for some of our partners,” said one US official.

On November 6, US media reported that US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan had been engaged in confidential conversations with Russian counterparts over the preceding months. He had talked to Yuri Ushakov, a foreign-policy adviser to Putin, and to his direct counterpart in the Russian government, Nikolai Patrushev. The aim had been to guard against the risk of escalation and keep communications channels open, and not to discuss a settlement of the war in Ukraine, US officials told journalists.

In Kyiv, Zelenskyy put forward in his nightly address on November 7, a set of conditions for negotiations – the same the G7 had listed on 11 October 2022: the restoration of his country’s territorial integrity, compensation for the damage caused by Russia’s war and prosecutions for war crimes. However, he did not repeat his prior refusal to negotiate with a Russian government led by Putin.

On November 8, Ukraine held exercises to prepare for a potential Russian nuclear attack. According to Ukrainian officials, drills included running through ways to ensure effective communication of all emergency services, and action plans for evacuations, should officials be in danger.

723 Medvedev says Russia is fighting a sacred battle against Satan, Reuters, November 4, 2022 [https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/medvedev-says-russia-is-fighting-sacred-battle-against-satan-2022-11-04/], and Post on Telegram channel of Dmitry Medvedev, Telegram, November 4, 2022 [https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/206].

724 Andreas Rinke, “Xi opposing nuclear weapons in Ukraine was reason enough to visit China, Scholz says,” Reuters, November 5, 2022 [https://www.reuters.com/world/scholz-xi-opposing-nuclear-weapons-ukraine-russia-reason-enough-visit-china-2022-11-05/].


could “send all enemies” to hell, though this was “not” its task. Russia had to “stop the supreme ruler of Hell, whatever name he uses - Satan, Lucifer or Iblis.”
On the same day, India’s foreign minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar met with Lavrov in Moscow. India “strongly advocates a return to dialogue and diplomacy,” the Indian diplomat said, as the global economy was “simply too interdependent” for a conflict not to have “major consequences” in other parts of the world. However, India would expand economic ties with Russia and continue to buy oil from Moscow, he noted, as India’s “fundamental obligation” was to ensure that Indian consumers had the “best possible access on the most advantageous terms to international markets.”

On November 9, Shoigu and Sergei Surovikin, the commander of Russian forces in Ukraine, announced a withdrawal from Kherson. In Moscow, Zakharova said that the Kremlin was “open to negotiations” and had never “refused to have them.” But negotiations had to “take into account the realities” that were “emerging at the moment.” Also in Moscow, individuals close to the Kremlin speculated to Western reporters that the withdrawal was aimed at enabling a “stabilization” of the front line that could set the stage for a ceasefire agreement.

In Washington, rumors about potential negotiations were ripe. Media reported that some US and Western officials were “eyeing the expected winter slowdown in fighting as an opportunity for diplomacy to begin between Russia and Ukraine.” Indeed, US Joint Chiefs of Staff chair Milley told an audience in New York that Russia’s retreat in preparation for reestablishing defensive lines south of the Dnieper and a spring offensive provided “a window of opportunity for negotiation.” However, both parties would have to reach a “mutual recognition” that military victory was not “achievable.” However, by the evening of November 9, other European and US officials were telling reporters that serious peace talks between Ukraine and Russia were “unlikely in the near future” as both sides thought continued fighting would strengthen their eventual negotiating positions — for the moment, terms of a settlement that both Ukraine and Russia would accept were hard to envision. In addition, Ukraine’s population was not disposed to accept a compromise, even if leaders were prepared to make concessions. In turn, Biden told reporters that it remained to be seen “whether or not there’ll be a judgement made as to whether or not Ukraine is prepared to compromise with Russia.”


731 “Russia ready to conduct talks with Ukraine based on realities — MFA,” TASS, November 9, 2022 [https://tass.com/politics/1534305].


733 Courtney Kube, Carol E. Lee and Josh Lederman, “Some U.S. and Western officials think neither side can win and see winter as a shot at diplomacy in Ukraine-Russia war,” NBC News, November 9, 2022 [https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/ukraine-russia-war-winter-diplomacy-cn56190].


On November 10, US journalists revealed a disagreement at the highest levels within the US government over whether negotiations in Ukraine were due. Milley had made the case in internal meetings that the Ukrainians had achieved about as much as they could reasonably expect on the battlefield before winter set in, and should try to cement their gains at the bargaining table. Other senior Biden officials, while believing a negotiated peace would come in due time, argued that neither side was ready to negotiate, that a pause would give Russia a chance to regroup when Ukraine was having momentum, and that Washington should not be seen as pressuring Kyiv.737

In this context, Milley elaborated on his November 9 New York speech in an interview on the following day: There was great uncertainty about the future, and he saw “some possibilities here for some diplomatic solutions.”738 There were also members of the Administration beyond those at the Pentagon who believed neither side could win militarily and that the winter provided an opportunity to reach a political settlement to end the war, a US official told journalists.739 At the White House, however, Sullivan said it was ultimately up to the Ukrainians on when the timing was right. But the US goal was to put Ukraine in the strongest possible position for talks;740 and Biden said he did not think the conflict could be resolved “until Putin gets out of Ukraine.”741

In the meantime Western support for Ukraine continued. Also on November 10, the Pentagon announced that it would send another $400 million to Ukraine, but not advanced drones. The shipment would include an air defense system (AADS) and ammunition for HIMARS.742 However, despite pleas from Ukraine and members of Congress, the Administration did not budge on sending Gray Eagle MQ-1C drones, due to concerns that these weapons could escalate the conflict, US officials told journalists. The Administration did not want the Kremlin to believe that the United States was providing weapons that could strike targets in Russia.743


At the same time on Capitol Hill, House Republicans were discussing how to alter a Ukraine aid package in a way that was acceptable to the party’s populist wing after midterm elections had granted a majority to the GOP. Journalists reported that many Republicans were looking to cut much of the economic assistance, while keeping or even increasing the military component.744 The government in Kyiv held a similar assessment vis-à-vis the future of US aid for Ukraine.745

In Kyiv, Ukraine’s defense minister Oleksii Reznikov told reporters that he did not think Russia would use nuclear weapons. “I don’t think they will use it. But again, when you have a monkey with a grenade for a neighbor you have to estimate all kinds of risks. But I think this is not a pragmatic and practical step for them,” Reznikov said.746

On November 11, Ukrainian troops entered Kherson after Russia had withdrawn its soldiers. Moscow thereby lost the only regional capital it had managed to capture in nine months of war. Having crossed the Dnipro River, the Russian forces blew up the Antonivsky Bridge.747 US officials told reporters that pushing the Russians further would be “very costly and difficult.” Ukraine was going to have to fight across the river, which was an extremely difficult military maneuver, the official said.748 In turn, Sullivan told reporters on Air Force One that the Administration would not “pressure” Ukraine. “Nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine,” he said. The Administration believed in a “just peace.” In turn, Russia was doubling down on its rhetoric, which was not a “sign of seriousness about negotiating.” Finally, the US government was still doing “everything” it could to “put Ukraine in the best possible position on the battlefield so that when they make their determination to proceed, they’re in the best possible position at the negotiating table.”749

On November 14, CIA director William Burns met with Sergei Naryshkin, the head of Russia’s foreign intelligence service, in Ankara. The meeting had been requested by Washington, Peskov said. US officials stated that they had briefed the leadership in Kyiv beforehand, and that the purpose of the meeting was not to discuss the negotiations option, but to convey a “message on the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons by Russia, and the risk of escalation to strategic stability.” It remained unclear whether this was the main or even real reason of the meeting.750 On November 17, Turkish President Erdogan told reporters that Ankara’s intelligence agencies believed there was agreement at the Burns-Naryshkin meeting.


meeting that “as of now, neither party will have any attempts at nuclear weapons.” He believed nuclear weapons use might “lead to a new world war.” Erdogan concluded: “Let’s not allow for it.”

In Washington, reacting to Milley’s comments about possible opportunities for negotiations, US officials told reporters that they had conveyed to their Ukrainian counterparts that they did not expect talks to happen immediately, and that the Administration would continue to support Kyiv as it launched the next phase of advances on the battlefield. Reports revealed that the split within the Administration was real. There was a broad sense within the Defense Department that the winter could offer an opportunity to discuss a political settlement. Conversely, political appointees, especially within the NSC, seemed wary of giving the impression that Washington was pushing Kyiv into concessions.

In Indonesia, Biden met Chinese leader Xi Jinping. Subsequently, the White House said that the two leaders jointly condemned Russia’s threats of using nuclear weapons in Ukraine, arguing that “nuclear war should never be fought and can never be won.” A Chinese spokesperson said Xi was “highly concerned” about the conflict in Ukraine. The Chinese leader had told Biden that “nuclear weapons should not be used and nuclear wars should not be fought,” Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who was at the meeting, told reporters.

On November 15, Russian missiles struck targets in four Ukrainian cities. Russia fired at least 85 missiles, Ukrainian sources reported, most of them aimed at power facilities in Kharkiv, Kyiv, Lviv and Zhytomyr. While around 70 X-101 and X-555 missiles were shot down, a total of 15 energy targets were damaged, and many cities were blacked out. The power grid had already been battered by earlier attacks that had destroyed forty percent of the country’s energy infrastructure.

On the same day, a Russian-made missile fell in the eastern part of Poland, killing two – the exact circumstances remained unclear for hours if not days, including who had fired the missile and from where. Warsaw said it was investigating and raising the level of its military preparedness. G7 and NATO leaders in Bali met to discuss the situation. Biden called Duda to express his condolences. Russia denied any involvement. Polish Foreign Minister Zbigniew Rau summoned the Russian ambassador to Warsaw. One day later, on November 16, it became increasingly clear that the missiles were Russian-made SA-10 systems operated by Ukraine. Within two days, Western and, ultimately, even Ukrainian leaders seemed to accept this assessment.

751 “Turkish president says neither Russia nor U.S. to resort to nuclear weapons,” Xinhua, November 17, 2022 [https://english.news.cn/20221117/23a8d82e1822421a9d499108ee1cd245/chtml].


Still on November 15, in Bali, the G20 continued to negotiate a final declaration, attempting to bridge the gap between the Russian unwillingness to be called out and Western desire to denounce Moscow’s actions. Lavrov claimed that “all problems” were “on the Ukrainian side,” who “categorically” refused “to hold any talks and comes up with conditions obviously unrealistic and inadequate to this situation.” Zelenskyy addressed the meeting, reiterating conditions for ending the conflict, among them a complete withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukrainian territory. After Macron met with Xi, the French government said they had agreed to call for the “respect of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine” and to express “deep concern over Russia’s choice to continue the war in Ukraine.” However, Western sources reported that China had joined Russia to oppose using “war” to describe Ukraine’s invasion in the G20 communiqué. China’s readout of Xi’s meeting with Macron merely stated that China advocated “cease-fire, cessation of fighting and peace talks.”

On the next day, November 16, Milley upheld his view on the endgame in Ukraine. Ukraine’s military was unlikely to force out Russia “unless the Russian army completely collapses,” he told reporters. “The probability of a Ukrainian military victory, defined as kicking the Russians out of all of Ukraine, to include [..] Crimea, the probability of that happening anytime soon is not high, militarily,” he said. “There may be a political solution,” he concluded. US and allied support had not diminished and Kyiv’s success in countering Russia’s invasion put it in a better position to begin talks. “The Russian military is suffering tremendously. So, you want to negotiate at a time when you’re at your strength and your opponent is at weakness.”

In Bali, the G20 declaration noted that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which it called “war,” was hurting the global economy, pressuring Moscow to end the war – the notable fact being that China signed on to it, a subtle shift in Beijing’s messaging on Ukraine. The meeting between Lavrov and Chinese foreign minister Wang Yion on Tuesday, November 15, had also suggested that China was becoming more guarded about the war. “China has noted that Russia recently reaffirmed its established position that nuclear war must not and cannot be fought, and this is a rational and responsible stance by Russia,” Wang said according to the Chinese summary.
On **November 17**, Russian missiles and shells continued to hit Ukrainian positions – and especially energy infrastructure – in several regions, including Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Odesa. On the positive side, the UN-brokered **grain-export deal** was extended for another four months, although Russia said its demands were yet to be fully addressed.762

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<td>In Moscow, Peskov explained that “on Russia’s behalf, no one has ever speculated on the issue” of using nuclear weapons, as “such matters” were “unacceptable per se.” In contrast, speculations were “made in European capitals and other places, stirring up tension in a potentially dangerous realm, where it is unacceptable,” he claimed and added: “If you have noticed, no one from the Russian side is discussing this topic and has not discussed it.”763</td>
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The Russian-occupied regions of Crimea and the Donbas had to be returned to Ukraine before any Kyiv-Moscow peace deal, Zelensky told a Singapore gathering virtually from Kyiv on the same **November 17**. “Unless we liberate our whole territory, we will not bring peace,” he said.764 On the following day, he told a Canadian conference in a recorded statement that Russia was seeking a “short truce” with Ukraine, but he opposed the proposal because it would allow Moscow to regroup and attack again. An “honest peace” could only be achieved by the “complete demolition of Russian aggression.”765

In Washington, Kirby insisted the Administration was not trying to force Kyiv to cede territory. Nobody from the US was “prodding or nudging [Zelensky] to the table,” Kirby said. However, Kirby also refused to refute Milley’s analysis vis-à-vis Ukraine’s chances to successfully push back against Russian occupation.766

Ukraine’s Zaporizhia power plant was hit by shelling on **November 19 and 20**, the IAEA said, warning that such attacks risked causing a nuclear disaster. Russia and Ukraine blamed each other for the attack on the facility, which is in Russian-controlled territory. **Rafael Grossi**, the IAEA head, warned “whoever is behind this” that “you’re playing with fire.”767


On November 23, Russia again pounded Ukraine’s energy facilities, with missiles rocking Kyiv, Dnipro, Lviv, Odesa and other cities, plunging large areas of the nation into darkness and shutting down water systems. Ukraine’s air defenses reportedly shot down 51 of 70 Russian cruise missiles and five drones.\(^768\)

In Washington, US officials told journalists that the Administration assessed that Russia could use chemical weapons in Ukraine first before resorting to nuclear strikes. The US government was working to ensure that allies were prepared for such an event and on acquiring detection systems to address possible chemical attacks. However, the officials also pointed out that there was no intelligence suggesting that such an attack in Ukraine was imminent. The working assumption was that in case of continued battlefield losses or a complete collapse of the Russian army, Moscow might resort to employing chemical weapons – and would attempt to do so in a concealed manner to avoid identification.\(^769\)

Meanwhile, NATO allies became embroiled in a debate about possible Patriot deliveries to Poland. After a stray Ukrainian missile had crashed in Poland, Berlin had offered Warsaw a Patriot system and Eurofighters to help secure its airspace, defense minister Christine Lambrecht said on November 21 in Berlin.\(^770\) Later on, a German official argued Berlin thought this would be “an offer that was too good to be refused,” and would help convince Poles that Germany is a reliable ally. After the Polish defense minister Mariusz Blaszczak and president Andrzej Duda immediately accepted the German offer, Jarosław Kaczyński, the leader of Poland’s governing Law and Justice party, rejected it two days later.\(^771\) Consequently, Blaszczak asked Germany on November 23 to send the units to Ukraine instead. Yet, Lambrecht said on November 24 that sharing Germany’s Patriot units outside NATO would require prior discussion within the Alliance. From Brussels, Stoltenberg replied that such deployments should be the decisions of individual nations, taking into account rules around final users. On November 25, the Polish president Andrzej Duda said it was Germany’s decision where its Patriot units were deployed, adding that it would be better for Poland’s security if they were stationed on Ukrainian territory near the border, manned by Ukrainian troops. In Berlin, a spokesperson told reporters the German government was “talking” to “allies” about how to “handle” Poland’s “suggestion.”\(^772\) Subsequent media reports suggested that the kerfuffle had more to do with Polish domestic politics or with Warsaw’s unwillingness to become dependent on Berlin than with the war in Ukraine.\(^773\) Analysts later on speculated that since Poland was in an electoral campaign and PIS support had been slipping, Kaczyński had used criticism of Germany in order to reinforce his base.\(^774\)


\(^773\) Wojciech Koź, “Poland plays politics with German Patriot missile offer,” Politico, December 1, 2022 [https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-plays-politics-german-patriot-missile-offer/].
On November 26, British journalist Owen Matthews published a series of allegations with respect to China’s role within the Ukrainian crisis. The claims were built upon leaks from a source “with longstanding close ties to the top levels of China’s political and military leadership.” According to this source, the Russians had presented the invasion as a “limited operation to recover a lost Russian province.” The source claimed that the public Sino-Russian agreement from February 4 on “friendship without limits” was accompanied by a secret annex which included mutual security assurances – but excluded territories recently annexed in wartime. Surprised by the scale of the invasion and Putin’s nuclear rhetoric, Beijing sought to “avoid nuclear escalation.” Hence, Chinese officials grew worried by the possibility – albeit mostly of symbolic value – of Poland supplying fighter jets. Beijing struck a deal with Washington: If the United States stopped the MiG deal, Chinese military officials would work to persuade their Russian counterparts to nullify a potential decision by Putin to use nuclear weapons by refusing to implement it on an operational level if it did not follow a direct attack against Russian soil. Later on, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi conducted shuttle diplomacy to align Beijing with Washington for the mid-November Bali declaration, and Weng had already pledged to NATO leaders since early September that China would use its leverage to “dissuade Putin from using nukes.” Given the singular source of the report, its veracity remained questionable.775

Meanwhile, there were no cooperative signs coming out of Moscow. After two days of continued Russian missile attacks against Ukrainian infrastructure and various cities, on November 28 Peskov said that the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant would remain under Russian control – Russian forces were not preparing to leave, despite reporting to the contrary.776 On the same day, Russia unilaterally postponed the New START consultations. The Bilateral Consultative Commission had been due to meet on the next day in Cairo.777 On November 29, Ryabkov explained that the decision had been taken at the political level, as the US side had shown no interest to “take note” of Russia’s “signals” and “acknowledge” its “priorities,” suggesting that Moscow had desired broader consultations on arms control, while Washington had insisted on a restricted discussion of technicalities surrounding New START.778 Also in Moscow, Medvedev warned NATO against providing Ukraine with Patriot missiles. If NATO were to “supply the Ukrainian fanatics with Patriot systems along with NATO personnel, they would immediately become a legitimate target of our armed forces,” Medvedev wrote on Telegram.779

On November 30, Kuleba weighed in on the Patriot debate, saying that Ukraine needed Patriot missiles to protect its civilian infrastructure. He would be working with the German government on this issue, he

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778 “Russia had no choice but to nix New START Treaty talks, says senior diplomat,” TASS, 29 November 2022 [https://tass.com/politics/154339].

added. Zelenskyy told a US gathering per digital link that the war would end when Ukraine achieved victory or when Moscow decided it felt "weak, they are isolated and they don't have any partners on that. Let us have faith that this will end in the next few months." In Berlin, Scholz said that Russia could no longer win the war in Ukraine on the battlefield. He also noted that Germany had taken Russia's nuclear rhetoric seriously, but had not been cowed by it.

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<td>Meanwhile, Moscow appeared intent on demonstrating resolve. Shoigu said on television that Russia would pay special attention to building infrastructure for its nuclear forces in 2023, and it would work to improve the combat capabilities of its missile forces and that facilities were being built to accommodate new missile systems. At the Russian Foreign Ministry, Lavrov stressed that it was &quot;necessary to avoid any military clash between nuclear powers, even with the use of conventional weapons. The escalation may become uncontrollable.&quot;</td>
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Also in Moscow, Naryshkin confirmed that the discussion with Burns on November 14 had not been about negotiating over Ukraine but about nuclear weapons policy – as Elizabeth Rood, the chargé d'affaires at the US embassy in Moscow, had earlier stated.

December 2022: Nuclear diversion from conventional destruction

On December 1, in Washington, Biden and Macron sought to present a united front by meeting each other halfway on their Ukraine priorities during the French President's state visit to the United States. Biden said he would talk to Putin, but only in consultation with NATO allies and only if the Russian leader indicated he was "looking for a way to end the war." Macron said France would increase its military support for Ukraine and "will never urge Ukrainians to make a compromise that will not be acceptable for them." The two leaders agreed that Ukrainian battlefield gains would constitute important leverage in any talks with Moscow.

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782 "Germany's Scholz: Russia cannot win war in Ukraine on the battlefield," Reuters, 30 November 2022 [https://www.reuters.com/article/germany-security-scholz-idAFS8N2ZK0DE].


785 "Putin’s spy chief says he discussed Ukraine with CIA director,” Reuters, 30 November 2022 [https://www.reuters.com/article/ukraine-crisis-idINL8N3Q3M3N].

On the same day, Moscow sought to explain the recent cancellation of the New START BCC. Lavrov said that Russia was willing to play a responsible part in nuclear arms control but it was impossible to discuss nuclear stability while ignoring the Western goal in Ukraine to "defeat Russia on the battlefield, or even destroy Russia." One day later, at the White House, Kirby called the cancellation of the BCC meeting "deeply regrettable," saying it had "nothing to do with the war in Ukraine."

On December 2, Scholz called Putin for an hour, vowing to continue military support for Ukraine and urging the Russian leader to find a solution that would involve the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine. Putin blamed Western nations for what he called a destructive policy of arming the Ukrainian military, and argued that Russia’s missile strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure were a consequence of Kyiv’s attacks against Russian facilities, particularly in Crimea.

On December 3, in Kyiv, US Deputy Secretary of State Victoria Nuland told reporters that it was US warnings that had convinced Putin not to cross the nuclear threshold in Ukraine. Russia had “already made itself an outcast,” Nuland said, but “we have explained that the use of nuclear weapons will have a response and consequences of an incomparable level. Our response was united, and after that, Russia switched to a fundamentally different weapon, launching attacks on the energy infrastructure.” She rephrased: “After all this talk about nuclear Armageddon, it had not happened not because of “tough warnings,” but because “no one on this side of the border was planning it.”

Moscow meanwhile challenged this Western messaging. Zakharova wrote on her Telegram channel that “nuclear Armageddon” had not happened not because of “tough warnings,” but because “no one on this side of the border was planning it.”
On the same day, Macron said in a televised interview from the United States that security "guarantees to Russia" were an "essential point" in any peace talks. "We need to prepare what we are ready to do, how we protect our allies and member states, and how to give guarantees to Russia the day it returns to the negotiating table," Macron said. One point that needed to be addressed was Moscow’s “fear that NATO comes right up to its doors, and the deployment of weapons that could threaten Russia.”

Ukrainian, Eastern European and even German politicians and officials countered that Russia’s aggression had not been caused by the absence of security guarantees.

On December 5, the G7 price cap on Russian seaborne oil came into force, as the West was trying to limit Moscow’s ability to finance its war in Ukraine. In reaction, Moscow announced it would forbid domestic companies from selling Russian oil under any price cap.

On the same day, Ukraine executed an attack into Russian territory, targeting two military bases hundreds of miles inside the country with unmanned drones. One drone hit the Engels-2 air base, near the southwestern city of Saratov, and hosting Russian strategic bombers. A separate explosion at the Dyagilevo military base in the city of Ryazan damaged two planes, killed three people and wounded six others, Russian media reported.

Washington sought to distance itself from the attack. At the State Department, Price said that the US government was "not enabling Ukraine to strike beyond its borders." A few hours later, Blinken said that the Administration had "neither ‘encouraged nor enabled the Ukrainians to strike inside of Russia.” But the Administration was determined to equip the Ukrainians to “defend themselves and to defend their territory.” US media outlets also reported that the US military had secretly altered both the software and hardware of HIMARS rocket launchers sent to Ukraine to prevent the country from firing long-range into Russian territory in order to reduce the risk of a wider war with Moscow.

792 “Diplomat slams Nuland’s words about Western influence on decisions during special op,” TASS, December 4, 2022 [https://tass.com/world/1545339?utm_source=twitter.com&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=smm_social_share].


796 America Hernandez, "Russia to ban oil sales under price cap, Kremlin says," Politico, December 5, 2022 [https://www.politi-co.eu/article/russia-to-ban-oil-sales-under-price-cap-kremlin-says/], and “Global oil market currently in better state than two months ago — Russian deputy PM,” TASS, December 4, 2022 [https://tass.com/economy/1545483].


German media outlets revealed that Jake Sullivan had told Jens Plötner, the foreign policy advisor of Scholz, already in October 2022 over the phone that the White House would welcome German deliveries of the Leopard 2 tank, but that Washington was not pushing Germany towards this decision. The German government did not refute these claims.  

Meanwhile on the same December 5, Moscow targeted multiple Ukrainian cities with missiles, including Kyiv. Explosions were reported in several parts of the country, including the cities of Odesa, Cherkasy and Kryvyi Rih. More than 60 of the around 70 missiles were shot down, the Ukrainian government stated.

In New York, at the UN Security Council, Russia and the United States accused each other of not wanting to seriously negotiate over the conflict in Ukraine. "We confirm our willingness to conduct negotiations," Russia's UN Ambassador Vassily Nebenzia said, but added that the aim of the negotiations should be to "eradicate the root causes that forced us to start our special military operation." The Western weapons deliveries were creating "an ongoing war of the West against Russia" that left Moscow no options but to "continue the aims" of its "operation." In contrast, the US deputy envoy Lisa Carty said that Russia's targeting of Ukraine's infrastructure was evidence that Putin had no interest in "negotiation or meaningful diplomacy."

| 154. Another nuclear warning from Moscow came on December 7. Putin acknowledged in Moscow that Russia's invasion "might be a long process" and warned of the "growing" threat of nuclear war. "Such a threat is growing, it would be wrong to hide it," Putin warned. The Russian leader said Moscow would "protect its allies" by "all available means at our disposal, if necessary," added that there was a "significant result" from territorial gains, but stressed that there would be no need to mobilize more troops. Putin also stated that Russia had not transferred its nuclear weapons to other territories and was not planning to do so. With respect to nuclear use, Putin's comments were rather convoluted, suggesting the Russian leadership thought launch-on-warning was necessary because of US abilities to eliminate a majority of Russia's nuclear arsenal in a first-strike: "As for the idea that Russia wouldn't use such weapons first under any circumstances, then it means we wouldn't be able to be the second to use them either – because the possibility to do so in case of an attack on our territory would be very limited," he said. "Nevertheless, we have a strategy... namely, as a defense, we consider weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons – it is all based around the so-called retaliatory strike," he said. "That is, when we are struck, we strike in response." And yet, he also noted: "We have... |

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802 Konrad Schuller, "USA für Lieferung deutscher Kampfpanzer an Ukraine (USA for delivery of German battle tanks to Ukraine)," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, December 6, 2022 [https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/usa-setzte-sich-fuer-lieberung-von-leopard-2-panzer-an-ukraine-ein-18514370.html].


not gone crazy. We are aware of what nuclear weapons are," he said. "But we are not going to brandish these weapons like a razor, running around the world."  

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| In Washington, State Department spokesman Price sought to avoid escalation. He said that the Administration believed that "any loose talk of nuclear weapons" was "absolutely irresponsible." All nuclear powers had agreed that "a nuclear war is something that must never be fought and can never be won." Hence, "any rhetoric" was irresponsible—whether it was "nuclear saber-rattling or even raising the specter of the use of tactical nuclear weapons."  

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| In Brussels, Stoltenberg repeated the NATO stance. Russia's nuclear rhetoric was "reckless" and "dangerous." Also, "Russia must know that any use of nuclear weapons would totally change the character, the nature, of the conflict." However, he admitted that Moscow's nuclear rhetoric during the autumn had "increased concerns among NATO Allies and others about the potential use of these weapons."  

In Berlin, Scholz added that "one thing" had changed: Moscow had "stopped threatening to use nuclear weapons" because the international community, including China, had "drawn a red line" at Russia. Germany was committed to aiding Ukraine, but did "everything to avoid a direct war between Russia and NATO." Such a conflict had "only losers—on the entire planet."  

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| However, Russian's nuclear rhetoric continued unabated—with statements in all directions. On December 8, US outlets asked the Russian envoy to Washington to comment on Putin's latest nuclear statements. Antonov argued that "Russia takes seriously its special responsibility as a leading nuclear power to maintain global security and stability and prevent armed conflicts, especially nuclear ones." The US government was not "listening to the substance of our arguments," Antonov noted. Russia's statements about the danger of escalation was not saber-rattling but "classic deterrence in extreme geopolitical circumstances." He concluded: "It works. It is in the world's best interest that it continues to work, preventing a potential nuclear catastrophe."  

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807 “Ukraine war. Germany’s Scholz says nuclear weapons risk has diminished,” Euronews, December 8, 2022 [https://www.euronews.com/2022/12/08/ukraine-war-germanys-scholz-says-nuclear-weapons-risk-has-diminished].  


809 “Russia, as nuclear power, takes maintaining stability seriously — envoy to US,” TASS, December 9, 2022 [https://tass.com/politics/1548187], and Tom O’Connor, “Russia Ambassador Says Putin Nuclear Deterrence ‘Works’—Biden Would Do Same,”
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<td>Russia’s leader was less forthcoming. On <strong>December 9</strong>, on the sidelines of the Eurasian Economic Union summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, <strong>Putin</strong> said it was potentially “worth thinking” about “adopting the ideas developed by our US counterparts, their ideas of ensuring their security” with respect to “a disarming first strike.” Russia was “just thinking about it” as US officials “weren’t shy to openly talk about it during the past years.” Washington had a “theory of a preventive strike” and was “developing a system for a disarming strike” on the basis of its air- and sea-based cruise missiles. Putin claimed that Russia had already commissioned hypersonic weapons capable of carrying out such a strike, while the United States had not yet deployed such systems. “If the potential adversary believes that it can use the theory of a preemptive strike and we don’t, it makes us think about the threats posed by such ideas in other countries’ defensive posture,” he said. Putin also elaborated on his December 7 comment on nuclear retaliation. “When the early warning system receives a signal about a missile attack, we launch hundreds of missiles that are impossible to stop,” he said, smiling. “Enemy missile warheads would inevitably reach the territory of the Russian Federation. But nothing would be left of the enemy too, because it’s impossible to intercept hundreds of missiles. And this, of course, is a factor of deterrence.” Later on, he also raised the possibility of a settlement in Ukraine. The special military operation was still going according to plan, but the “settlement process,” while “difficult” and long, would have to be according to “the realities that are taking shape on the ground.”</td>
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<td>From US Strategic Command, <strong>Austin</strong> said Putin’s repeated threats were irresponsible. Nuclear powers had a “profound responsibility to avoid provocative behavior and to lower the risk of proliferation and to prevent escalation and nuclear war.” On the same day in Washington, an <strong>Administration official</strong> viewed Putin’s comments as “saber-rattling” and another veiled warning that he could use nuclear weapons in Ukraine.</td>
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British media reported that the **Pentagon** had indicated to Kyiv that it was not bent of preventing Ukraine from attacking Russian soil. A Pentagon official was quoted saying that the Administration was not telling Ukraine what to do or not do. The Pentagon had “changed its perspective following the recent intensification of Russian missile strikes on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure” and had “become less concerned regarding the risk of escalation.” It remained unclear, how reliable these leaks were.

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<td>Other Russian officials were even more aggressive. On <strong>December 10</strong>, <strong>Konstantin Gavrilov</strong>, the head of the Russian delegation in Vienna on arms control, commented to British tabloids that Washington green-lighting Ukrainian attacks on Russian territory was “playing with fire, risking a full-scale war</td>
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On **December 12**, the G7 repeated its commitment to support Ukraine in its fight against Russia "for as long as it takes" and set up a donor platform to funnel money to Kyiv. Besides the aid required during the war, financial institutions needed to be established to aid reconstruction, the G7 agreed. "The reconstruction of Ukraine will be a human task that is perhaps comparable to the Marshall Plan," Scholz said in Berlin. In Brussels, the EU agreed to put another $2.1 billion in 2023 into a fund used to pay for military support for Ukraine.

"The reconstruction of Ukraine will be a human task that is perhaps comparable to the Marshall Plan," Scholz said in Berlin. However, the German chancellor also noted that if Russia ended the war, its citizens needed another future to aspire to, and economic cooperation should return. But this was a prospect for the future, while currently sanctions were being tightened.

In London, British defense minister Ben Wallace told parliament that he was "open minded" about supplying Ukraine with longer-range weapons if Russia carried on targeting civilian areas. Britain also had "potential weapons systems that are longer and should the Russians continue to target civilian areas and try and break those Geneva Conventions, then I will be open minded to see what we do next."

On **December 13**, Western media reported that Ukrainian forces were stepping up efforts to isolate and degrade the Russian military in and around Melitopol, ahead of what was widely expected to be the next major phase of the war, a Ukrainian offensive to drive Russian forces from southern Ukraine.

In Paris, an international donor conference racked up around $1.1 billion promises of financial and in-kind support for Ukraine.

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814 Will Stewart and Abul Taher, "Vladimir Putin sends nuclear threat after Ukraine reportedly gets the green light from the US to launch drone strikes in Russia following attacks on Ukrainian cities," Mail on Sunday, December 11, 2022 [https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-11525195/Vladimir-Putin-sends-nuclear-threat-Ukraine-gets-green-light-drone-strikes-Russia.html].


818 Elizabeth Piper, "UK minister is "open minded" over sending longer-range weapons to Ukraine," Reuters, December 12, 2022 [https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/uk-minister-is-open-minded-over-sending-longer-range-weapons-ukraine-2022-12-12/].


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In Washington, US officials said the Pentagon was poised to approve sending a Patriot surface-to-air missiles battery to Ukraine. It remained unclear who would organize the around 70-90 troops with months of training that would operate the system.161

From Moscow, Peskov immediately said that US-delivered Patriot batteries would “definitely” be a target for Russian forces. The Russian embassy in Washington wrote that the United States was “responsible for the prolongation and escalation of the Ukrainian conflict.”162

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<td>US officials also upkept their nuclear signaling. On the same December 13 and also in Washington, Julianne Smith, the US ambassador to NATO, was asked about Moscow’s potential use of tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine. She said the Administration would “continue to signal to Russia” that if this happens “there will be unprecedented consequences.” She characterized Moscow’s nuclear rhetoric as “loose talk” and “dangerous.”163</td>
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On December 15, Zakharova commented in Moscow on the possible US delivery of Patriot systems. “Any weapons systems supplied to Ukraine, including the Patriot, along with the personnel servicing them, have been and will remain legitimate priority targets for the Russian armed forces,” she declared. Washington had “effectively become a party” to the war by providing Ukraine with weapons and training its troops. Patriot deliveries would be “another provocative move by the US” and broaden its involvement in the hostilities, “entailing possible consequences.”164

In response, Pentagon spokesman Pat Ryder said that Washington was not “going to allow comments from Russia to dictate the security assistance that we provide to Ukraine.”165 Also in Washington, another Pentagon spokesperson said that the United States was to sharply increase in the number of Ukrainian troops it instructed at the Grafenwoehr base in Germany.166 US media also revealed that the Administration was weighing sending to Ukraine other weapons such as Joint Direct Attack Munition kits, which convert unguided aerial munitions into smart bombs, and Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bombs, which would significantly extend Ukraine’s strike range.167


166 James Keaten, “Russia: US air defense systems could be targets in Ukraine,” AP, December 15, 2022 [https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-politics-donetsk-government-united-states-eed3a0fc72e8197182e7bdc73ade45e].


Ukrainian officials engaged in what appeared to be a broad, coordinated effort to warn against complacency among Western allies and highlight the continuing threat Russia poses to Ukraine. Defense minister Oleksii Reznikov told British media that the Kremlin was preparing a broad new offensive in January or February. This message was underlined by comments from Zelenskiy, from Valerii Zaluzhnyi, the head of the armed forces, and from Oleksandr Syrskyi, the chief of ground forces. For instance, Russia was “trying to start the next wave of the offensive probably in February, like last year. That’s their plan,” Reznikov said. A major new Russian attack, including “another go at Kyiv,” could come “in February, at best in March and at worst at the end of January,” Zaluzhny said.828

These Ukrainian comments notwithstanding, Kirby told reporters at the White House on December 16 that the US government did not see signs that Russia would renew its attempt to seize Kyiv soon.829

On the same day, Russia launched more than 70 missiles on Ukraine in its second mass strike in a matter of days, damaging energy infrastructure in Kyiv, the capital, and elsewhere. Ukrainian forces shot down 60 of 76 missiles, officials said, as more than half of the missiles targeted the capital.830

Also, US media reported that an Administration official had told members of Congress in late November that Ukraine had the military capability to retake Crimea, but some officials were concerned that threatening Russia’s hold on the peninsula could push Putin to use nuclear weapons. Another US official told journalists that Ukraine had no “near-term objective” to retake Crimea and that a military offensive was “not imminent.” Crimea was a “red line,” a former US official told reporters.831

From Delhi, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi phoned Putin and reiterated his call for dialogue and diplomacy as being the only way forward in the context of ongoing conflict in Ukraine.832

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<td><strong>Biden Administration officials kept reiterating the message to Russia on the costs of nuclear use. On December 18, Burns emphasized India’s and China’s role in reducing nuclear dangers stemming from Russia. He told reporters that it had been “been very useful that Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Modi in India [had] also raised their concerns about the use of nuclear weapons as well.” Burns thought that was “also having an impact on the Russians.” He also noted that he thought the saber-rattling was “meant to intimidate.” The US government did not see “any clear evidence today of plans</strong></td>
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830 Hanna Arhirova, Vasilisa Stepanenko, and Jamey Keaten, “Russia launches another major missile attack on Ukraine,” AP, December 16, 2022 [https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-kyiv-5d3e5e5e93b6402d5214b3c094fa1c].


to use tactical nuclear weapons.” The Administration had “made very clear, the president has made very clear to the Russians what the serious risks of that would be.”

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| Yet Russian leaders also kept stressing their nuclear options. On December 19, Putin emphasized the potentially nuclear dimension of Russia’s relationship with Belarus. He visited Belarus and discussed with Lukashenko the need to withstand Western economic pressure and maintain close military ties. Putin said they had discussed a “unified defense space,” without describing what that would entail, and that they would continue joint military exercises. Putin added that there was room for further cooperation on Su-24 warplanes that had been modified to carry tactical nuclear weapons. It was now possible “to continue the implementation” of Lukashenko’s earlier proposals on these planes, which would mean “the training of the crews of warplanes of the Belarusian army, which have already been modified for the possible use of air-based ammunition with a special warhead,” he noted. Putin also stressed that this had not been the Russian approach to military cooperation, as it was the US government who conducted such activities together with its NATO partners. However, given the precarious security situation, such coordination was particularly important. Lukashenko noted that Belarus had deployed the Russian-made Iskander mobile ballistic missile system with a range of up to 500 kilometers and that Belarus and Russia were training Su-24 crews to operate nuclear munitions. This was no threat to anybody, but security concerns emerged from the West and he had to protect Belarus.

On December 21, Zelenskyy visited Washington. US money was not “charity” but an “investment in the global security and democracy that we handle in the most responsible way,” Zelenskyy told Congress. In Moscow, Peskov’s reaction was that the expansion of Western weapon supplies to Ukraine had led to “an aggravation of the conflict and, in fact, does not bode well for Ukraine.” In Beijing, Medvedev met Xi and discussed, among other topics, also “the conflict in Ukraine.”

Beijing had “always stood on the side of peace and on the side of the UN Charter” when it came to “the Ukraine issue,” Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told Blinken in a call on December 23, according to Beijing’s readout of the discussion. China worked towards “persuading peace and promoting talks.”

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837 Eduardo Castillo, “Kremlin warning: More US arms to Ukraine will aggravate war,” AP, December 22, 2022 [https://ap-news.com/article/russia-ukraine-biden-0cc0e65be3a807e3d99f5853b51fe].

838 Nicolas Canut and Zoya Shvetalovitch, “China says it’s ‘on the side of peace’ over war in Ukraine,” Politico, December 23, 2022 [https://www.politico.eu/article/china-ukraine-war-peace-beijing/].

163
### Nuclear signaling continued. Medvedev wrote on December 25 in an article for Rossiiskaya Gazeta that “the only thing” that stopped the West from directly engaging in the war against Russia was nuclear deterrence. “And in the event that a real threat arises, it will act on them,” he noted.  

Russian officials kept emphasizing “negotiations,” but their remarks revealed that they were, at least publicly, not willing to accept anything but surrender. On December 25, Putin said that he was ready to “negotiate with everyone involved in this process about acceptable solutions,” but Moscow did not appear ready to move away from maximalist goals. The next day, December 26, Lavrov said an agreement required the “elimination of threats to Russian security” from the four annexed territories.

On December 26, Ukraine again launched a drone attack on the Engels air base in Russia. Three troops were killed, the Kremlin stated. Analysts concluded that these strikes reflected an assessment by Ukraine’s political and military leaders that there was little risk of Moscow escalating its war in retaliation. The Russian military was already fighting at the limits of its conventional capabilities, Ukrainians told reporters, and the Kremlin’s hints of using nuclear weapons rang hollow in Kyiv.

US officials clarified that Washington and Kyiv had agreed that Ukraine would not strike targets in Russia with US-provided weapons, but that the Administration would not object to Ukraine targeting Russia with its own weapons.

### The up-and-down on the nuclear ladder continued. On December 27, Lavrov slammed the West for falsely accusing Russia of planning to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. “We have repeated again and again that there can be no winners in a nuclear war, and it should never be unleashed,” he asserted. He said Russia had taken note of changes in the US nuclear doctrine, including the possibility of a “disarming strike,” and urged the West to “exercise maximum restraint” and be “extremely sensible” when it comes to nuclear weapons.

Russia’s military was working on new plans to cut off foreign supplies of weapons and ammunition to Ukraine, Lavrov told reporters in Moscow on December 28. Moscow was going to achieve its goals in Ukraine thanks to “patience” and “perseverance,” and its “absolute priority” were the four annexed regions.

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As the year was coming to an end, cities across Ukraine were targeted by a wave of Russian missile strikes on December 29, in one of the largest bombardments since the war began. Ukraine’s military said 69 missiles were launched, with air defences intercepting 54 of them. The next day, December 30, Russia launched another aerial barrage at Ukraine, but the Ukrainian military said it had intercepted all of the attacks. Russia again rained missiles and exploding drones on Kyiv and other cities on December 31. Air defenses shot down 12 of at least 20 cruise missiles. In his New Year’s address, Putin said Russia was fighting to secure “peace and security guarantees,” while the West was using Ukraine “to weaken and split up Russia,” but he did not utter other warnings or threats. He also repeated his narrative that the West was trying to destroy Russia. “The West lied about peace while preparing for aggression,” he said. “They are cynically using Ukraine and its people to weaken and divide Russia.”

January 2023: Leopards freed; Moscow’s nuclear rhetoric silent

On January 1, at least around 90 Russian soldiers, were killed in a Ukrainian attack in Makiivka, a Russian-occupied town in the Donbas region. It was one of the worst losses for Russia since the start of its invasion and Ukraine had used the US HIMARS system to conduct the attack. Separately, the latest barrage of Russian strikes on Kyiv, Ukraine’s capital, caused electricity and heating shortages. Ukraine’s defense ministry said the air force had shot down nearly 40 Iranian-made drones overnight.

Meanwhile, further Western military assistance was forthcoming. Macron promised Zelenskyy in a January 4 phone call to provide Ukraine with AMX-10 RC armored fighting vehicles to prepare for “a possible Russian offensive” in the spring. These fighting vehicles have a shorter range and are lighter and less protected than the Leclerc, the system Ukraine had asked for in December. One day later, the White House announced that it planned to send Ukraine 50 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, “a tracked armored combat vehicle that carries an auto cannon and a machine gun.” German chancellor Scholz, in turn, declared that Berlin would provide 40 Marder Infantry Fighting Vehicles and a Patriot air defense system. The decision was the result of weeks of coordination between the three capitals and a decision had been made after New Year’s, reporters learned.


The Russian reaction was swift. A statement of the Russian embassy in Berlin decried the new vehicles as "another step toward an escalation of the Ukrainian conflict."\(^{853}\)

Mediation attempts came from Ankara. In a phone call also on January 5, Turkish President Erdogan urged Putin to declare a unilateral cease-fire in Ukraine, the first time Turkey called for such a step without asking Kyiv to make a similar commitment.\(^{854}\) Indeed, on the same day, Putin announced "a cease-fire along the entire line of contact in Ukraine from 12:00 on January 6, 2023 to 24:00 on January 7, 2023," to allow local residents "to attend church services" on Orthodox Christmas and urged Kyiv to reciprocate.\(^{855}\) The move followed a statement calling for this step on the same day by Patriarch Kirill I, who heads the Russian Orthodox Church and is close to the Kremlin.\(^{856}\) Yet, Ukrainian officials and analysts described the announcement as a Russian propaganda stunt, and Kyiv refused to accept the ceasefire as fighting continued unabated with both sides blaming each other.\(^{857}\)

On January 6, media reported that Russian hackers going by the name "Cold River" had attacked three US nuclear research laboratories at a time of intense Russian nuclear threats in August and September 2022. It remained unclear, however, what they had sought to achieve and whether they had been successful.\(^{858}\)

Meanwhile, NATO Allies focused on further military support for Kyiv. Also on January 6, the Pentagon unveiled additional military assistance for Kyiv worth 3 billion US dollars. Part of the package were the Bradley infantry fighting vehicles announced the day before. In addition, the package for the first time included 18 155mm self-propelled Howitzers.\(^{859}\) "We absolutely agree that Ukraine does need tanks," Laura Cooper, the assistant secretary of defense for Russia, noted. "This is the right time for Ukraine to

\(^{852}\) Matthias Gebauer und Marina Korbaki, "Germany Moves Forward with Tank Deliveries to Ukraine," Spiegel, January 6, 2023 [https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/forty-marders-for-kyiv-germany-moves-forward-with-tank-deliveries-to-ukraine-a-3ac7ce39-3ead-4425-be7e-c722800b59f].


\(^{855}\) "President’s instructions to Russian Federation Armed Forces,” Website of the President of Russia, January 6, 2023 [http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/70330].

\(^{856}\) Anatoly Kurmanaev and Oleg Matsnev, "Comments by Kremlin allies suggest that Putin's cease-fire order was motivated by domestic concerns," The New York Times, January 6, 2023 [https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/01/06/world/russia-ukraine-news/comments-by-kremlin-allies-suggest-that-putins-cease-fire-order-was-motivated-by-domestic-concerns?smid=url-share].


\(^{859}\) "More Than $3 Billion in Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine," Website of the US Department of Defense, January 6, 2023 [https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3261263/more-than-3-billion-in-additional-security-assistance-for-ukraine/].
take advantage of its capabilities, to change the dynamic on the battlefield.” The aid was aimed at enabling Ukrainians to “not only defend their territory but hopefully take back territory,” said Pentagon spokesperson Patrick Ryder.860

There were some indications that Western states might be willing to go further. On January 9, an anonymous Western source told reporters that the United Kingdom had for several weeks been considering to send 10 Challenger 2 main battle tanks to Ukraine, which would “mark a significant step-up in Western support to Ukraine” and up the pressure on other Allies to make similar decisions.861 US officials, in turn, said Washington was considering to provide Stryker armored combat vehicles for the first time in its next assistance package.862 On the following day, Pentagon spokesperson Patrick Ryder announced that Ukrainian troops would begin a several months-long training to operate Patriot systems at Fort Sill in Oklahoma “as soon as next week.”863

At the same time, however, Republican Senator J.D. Vance raised questions on the level of US resources spent on Kyiv. “The four Ukraine supplemental spending bills passed since the escalation of the Ukraine/Russia conflict in February of 2022 amount to arguably the 4th largest discretionary appropriations bill,” he wrote in a letter dated January 9 to the Office of Management and Budget, for which he requested signatures. In the letter, Vance called for further information on the security assistance for Ukraine to be made public “to allow Representatives and Senators to make a determination on the wisdom of additional expenditure in this area.”864

Berlin, in turn, remained sceptical of further stepping up military aid, despite media reports of mounting pressure from Polish and French officials to provide Leopard tanks to Ukraine.865 On January 9, Scholz pointed to already significant existing German military assistance for Kyiv and once again stressed that...

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Berlin would only make such a decision together with its Allies, notably its transatlantic partner Washington. Anything else would be “irresponsible in such a dangerous situation,” he explained.866 The following day, Baerbock visited Kharkiv and met with her Ukrainian counterpart Kuleba, who once again called for Leopard battle tanks but received no such commitment from the German Foreign Minister.867

Discussions on Western battle tank deliveries did not abate however. In a press conference on January 11, Scholz spokesperson Steffen Hebestreit explained that such UK considerations had not changed the German position. He also denied that any partner countries had officially requested a joint delivery of Leopard tanks to Kyiv.868 Yet Finnish parliamentarians were reportedly “discussing whether to send Kyiv Leopards of their own;”869 and Polish President Andrzej Duda claimed, “a company” of Leopard tanks for Ukraine would be transferred “as part of international coalition building.” Such a decision had already been taken in Poland, he stated. Media however pointed out that any such decision to export the German-made tanks would need to be greenlit by Berlin.870

In Germany, meanwhile, there were some signs of diverging views in the governing coalition. On January 12, Green Economy Minister and Vice Chancellor, Robert Habeck, said Berlin should not “stand in the way” if other countries decided to support Ukraine, regardless of Germany’s own decision, thereby confirming his support for other governments sending Leopard tanks to Kyiv.871

Pressure to support Ukraine more quickly and with more advanced weaponry continued to mount. On the same January 12, US media reported that military officials were concerned delays on a plan to send small precision-guided bombs to Kyiv could render the weapons useless as fighting among Russia and Ukraine continued at a fast pace. The Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bomb (GLSDB) manufactured by Boeing would give Ukraine weapons with twice the range of the already supplied HIMARS munitions and somewhat heavier load than the also already provided Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) munitions. Washington still refused sending the ATACMS, twice heavier precision rounds with the ability to destroy Russian targets nearly 200 miles from the front lines. But there seemed to be few escalation concerns about the GLSDB, just bureaucratic hiccups preventing a fast delivery.872 In Lon-

870 Hans von der Burchard et al., “Never mind Britain: Germany looks for US to lead the way on battle tanks to Ukraine,” Politico, January 11, 2023 [https://www.politico.eu/article/brtian-germany-us-battle-tanks-ukraine-war/].
871 Laura Pitel, Guy Chazan, and Ben Hall, “Why Olaf Scholz is reluctant to send battle tanks to Ukraine,” Financial Times, January 13, 2023 [https://www.ft.com/content/f9e0e5e0-a924-469d-bea7-3cd8eb172c02].
872 Jack Detsch, “Pentagon Balks at Sending Ukraine Long-Range Bombs,” Foreign Policy, January 12, 2023 [https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/12/russia-ukraine-war-pentagon-balks-long-range-bombs/].
In Germany, political pressure was being felt. On January 16, Christine Lambrecht, the German defense minister, resigned after months of criticism over her Ukraine policy. On the following day, Biden and Scholz talked over the phone, discussing their “steadfast support” for Kyiv. Reportedly, the German Chancellor told the US President that he would agree to supply Leopards only if Washington provided Abrams tanks. The next day, January 18, NATO defense ministers began a two-day meeting in Brussels to assess aid needs for Ukraine. To put pressure on Germany, officials from Poland and Finland told journalists that their countries would donate Leopards from their own stockpiles if Berlin issued licenses for the re-export – though official requests remained outstanding. On October 18, Charles Michel, the President of the European Council, said “the time [was] now” to send tanks to Ukraine. “They urgently need more equipment,” he stressed. Also, the European Parliament passed a resolution calling on Germany to form a European alliance to deliver Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine “without further delay.”

In Washington, after months of discussions with Ukrainian officials, the Biden Administration was starting to concede that Kyiv may need weapons that can strike Crimea, even if such a move could escalate the conflict, anonymous US officials told reporters on January 18. The Pentagon had assessed that Ukraine’s position in any future negotiations would be stronger if its military could show Russia that its control of Crimea could be threatened. Administration officials also noted that fears that Russia would retaliate using tactical nuclear weapons had eased, though they cautioned that the risk remained. Ukrainian officials were worried that their country could not survive years of conflict while Russia continued to strike its cities and infrastructure, so it had become essential for Kyiv to put Russia’s control of Crimea at risk.

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Meanwhile, the tank thriller continued. On the same **January 18**, attending the World Economic Forum in Davos, **Scholz** told a number of US lawmakers that Berlin would only deliver Leopard tanks if Washington agreed to send the M1 Abrams. Conversely, **US officials** continued to insist that the M1 Abrams tanks, with their needs for specific fuel, frequent maintenance and spare parts, transport and training, were ill-suited to the battlegrounds in Ukraine. The officials also noted that the Administration worried that American tanks would be seen as a sign of escalation.879

On **January 19**, **Austin** visited Germany, where he publicly praised the government as a “staunch defender of our allies and values.” Standing next to Austin, Germany’s new defense minister, **Boris Pistorius**, gave no hint of whether Germany would ultimately allow the tanks to move ahead.880 Reportedly, no agreement could be found at a heated meeting between **Austin** and **Wolfgang Schmidt**, the head of the German Chancellery, on the same day. Subsequently, Sullivan phoned his German counterpart **Jens Plötner** to express US discontent with Berlin’s stance.881 On the following day, at a meeting of the **Ukraine Defense Contact Group** at Ramstein, still no decision could be reached on sending Leopard 2 main battle tanks to Ukraine, despite pleas from President **Volodymyr Zelenskyy** to do so. Yet, **German** and **US officials** sought to downplay the disagreements and several countries promised to send more military aid. For instance, the **US government** pledged to send a package worth around 2.5 billion US Dollars, including 90 Stryker combat vehicles.882

Pressure continued to build up on the German Chancellory. Republican Senator **Lindsey Graham**, who was in Kyiv on **January 20**, urged Germany to deliver the tanks.883 Polish Foreign Minister **Zbigniew Rau** tweeted that arming Ukraine was not “some kind of decision-making exercise” and that Ukraine paid a price in blood because of the hesitation over Leopard deliveries.884 On **January 21**, the **foreign ministers of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania** called on Germany to deliver Leopards to Ukraine.885 **Baerbock** said on **January 22** that she would not “stand in the way” of Poland sending Leopard tanks to Ukraine, despite the Administration worried that Berlin would only deliver Leopard tanks if Washington agreed to send M1 Abrams.886

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881 Stefan Kornelius, “Die USA sind wütend auf Scholz [The United States are angry at Scholz],” Süddeutsche Zeitung, January 22, 2023 [https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/kampfpanzer-usa-bundeskanzler-scholz-1.5736789?reduced=true].


884 Tweet by @RauZbigniew, Twitter, January 20, 2023 [https://twitter.com/RauZbigniew/status/161647868407287811?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw].

Ukraine. In Washington, the new Republican chairman of the US House Foreign Affairs Committee, Michael McCaul, argued publicly that the Administration should send at least one M1 Abrams to Ukraine to persuade Germany to greenlight the Leopards. In Warsaw, Morawiecki told reporters on January 23 that Poland would ask Germany for permission to send Leopards to Ukraine but suggested that his government would deliver them with or without Germany’s approval – thereby restating a claim he had already made on January 18. On the same January 23, Sullivan and Plötner spoke three times over the phone, and Sullivan, Austin and Milley met Biden at the White House to get final negotiating guidance. Pistorius meanwhile told journalists in Berlin that a decision would come “soon.” On January 24, Poland formally asked Germany for permission to transfer its Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine – Berlin retorted that a decision would indeed come “soon.”

Throughout the entire episode, Russian officials sought to dissuade the West, and especially Germany, from delivering the tanks to Ukraine. On January 19, Peskov said in Moscow that it would be “extremely dangerous” for Germany to supply tanks. “It will mean bringing the conflict to a whole new level which, of course, will not bode well from the point of view of global and pan-European security,” he told reporters.

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<td>On the same January 19, nuclear rhetoric returned to Moscow. Medvedev warned NATO that Russia’s defeat in Ukraine could trigger a nuclear war. “The defeat of a nuclear power in a conventional war may trigger a nuclear war,” Medvedev wrote on Telegram. “Nuclear powers have never lost major conflicts on which their fate depends,” he concluded. Asked if Medvedev’s remarks signified that Russia was escalating the crisis, Peskov said: “No, it absolutely does not mean that.” Peskov said Medvedev’s remarks were in full accordance with Russia’s nuclear doctrine, as it allowed for a nuclear strike after “aggression against the Russian Federation with conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is threatened.”</td>
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On January 22, Vyacheslav Volodin, the chairman of Russia’s lower house, the State Duma, threatened Europe and the United States with “global catastrophe” over their continued military support for Ukraine. Additional arms deliveries would lead to retaliation with “more powerful weapons,” he stated. Nuclear powers had not used WMD in local conflicts in the past because their citizens and territorial integrity had not been threatened. Foreign politicians had to understand that “this could end in a global

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886 James Politi, Courtney Weaver, Laura Pitel and Guy Chazan, “Transatlantic ‘growing pains’: how Olaf Scholz made Joe Biden shift on tanks for Ukraine,” Financial Times, January 26, 2023 [https://www.ft.com/content/ea1cd074-c912-4dd7-9977-72ac41da0a52].


On **January 25**, the tank debate came to a first conclusion. **Germany** agreed to send Ukraine 14 Leopard 2 tanks from the Bundeswehr, mere hours before the **United States** pledged to send 31 M1 Abrams tanks. Earlier in the day, **Biden** and **Scholz** had spoken over the phone to coordinate the announcement. The US President also called **Sunak**, **Macron**, and **Meloni**. This was “not an offensive threat to Russia,” Biden emphasized during the announcement at the White House. “If Russian troops return to Russia, where they belong, this war would be over today.”

The Russian reaction was swift. The Russian ambassador in Berlin, **Sergei Nechayev** said that Germany’s “extremely dangerous decision” would take the conflict “to a new level of confrontation” and lead to “permanent escalation.” Also, it destroyed “the remnants of mutual trust, [caused] irreparable damage to the already deplorable state of Russian-German relations, and [casted] doubt on the possibility of their normalisation in the foreseeable future.” In Moscow, **Peskov** noted that the deliveries were a “losing scheme” that would burden Europe without strengthening the Ukrainian military.

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892 “Песков заявил, что все накачивающие Киев вооружениями страны несут за это ответственность,” [Peskov said that all countries pumping weapons into Kyiv are responsible], *Tass*, January 23, 2023 [https://tass.ru/politika/16861059].


894 “Ambassador Anatoly Antonov’s answer to a media question,” [Facebook Page of the Embassy of Russia in the USA], January 25, 2023 [https://www.facebook.com/RusEmbUSA/posts/pfbid0rjYBbKeeJGMSRvqvlvAmXEjthUVRm7vetqYR5w4VBNZbQgCZKwF77Z7YdGzWw].


As Western states made public when battle tanks might arrive in Ukraine, Moscow showed its discontent both on the battlefield and through harsher statements. The US Administration stated that it would not send Abrams from the Pentagon’s stock, but would acquire them first—which would take months if not years. On January 26, UK defense minister Alex Chalk said Britain would start training Ukrainian tank crews the following week, aiming to have the 14 Challenger 2 delivered by the end of March. In Berlin, Pistorius noted that Germany also planned to deliver a first company of Leopards by the end of March. In response to these developments, Peskov said that Moscow “categorically disagreed” that Western deliveries did “not mean involvement of these countries or the alliance in the hostilities ongoing in Ukraine.” In contrast: “Moscow views everything that has been done by the alliance and the capitals I have mentioned as direct involvement in the conflict,” he added. On the same day, Russia also launched 55 missiles at targets across Ukraine, 47 of which were shot down.

Analysts within the US government still believed Ukraine had few chances to recapture Crimea. On January 26, senior Department of Defense officials told House Armed Services Committee lawmakers in a classified briefing that the Pentagon did not believe Ukraine had the ability to force Russian troops out of Crimea. Among the briefers were Laura Cooper, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for Russia and Douglas Sims, director of operations on the Joint Staff. This assessment mirrored a statement by the Joint Chiefs chair Milley during the January 20 meeting at Ramstein that, in 2023, it remained “very, very difficult to militarily eject Russian forces” from occupied Ukraine. “That doesn’t mean it can’t happen. Doesn’t mean it won’t happen, but it’d be very, very difficult.”

Meanwhile further background on the Western debates surrounding military assistance for Ukraine trickled into media reports. A senior European diplomat provided context on the theory of escalation underlying these internal discussions: After Russia’s invasion, the Western allies had agreed on an “unwritten policy,” not to supply Ukraine with a fully comprehensive package of weapons out of fear that “we would trigger a big response from Russia,” a “strong Russian reaction, including nuclear.” The West should provide its support gradually, assessing the Russian response at every step. “You may call this a process of getting [Putin] accustomed,” the diplomat said. The delivery of aircraft was therefore “only a matter of when,” the diplomat predicted.

Sources within the German Chancellery, in turn, told journalists that Scholz’s reluctance to deliver weapons without US backing was grounded in a belief that this could spur escalation. Behind closed doors, the German leader was venting against those who were arguing for tank deliveries. After Amy Gutman, the US ambassador to Germany, had said in mid-September that Washington had “big expectations” from Berlin regarding weapons deliveries, Scholz had relied on scenario-analyses circulating within the Chancellery involving Russian sabotage against gas pipelines, cyber-attacks, or even nuclear use. Hence, Scholz now wanted to spread the risks by engaging the United States directly. He wanted the West to “cook the frog” (Putin) slowly and carefully in order to “avoid a global war.” In addition, electoral considerations also played a role, officials told journalists, with the German public divided and

fearful. In various European capitals, Scholz’ approach was seen as both German unwillingness to assume responsibility and reluctance to accept a more independent European foreign policy.903

One deliveries-debate concluded, the next one commenced. On January 26, Western officials told reporters that Washington had told Kyiv that supplying aircraft is a “no-go, for the moment.” An internal debate about supplying Ukraine with jet fighters had already been underway for a while, however, pushed by Ukrainian officials with support from Baltic states. Against this backdrop, Dutch foreign minister Wopke Hoekstra told the Dutch parliament on January 20 that his Cabinet would look at supplying F-16 fighter jets, if Kyiv requested them. “We are open-minded, there are no taboos,” he had explained.904 Yet, alongside announcing that Germany would send the Leopard-2 on January 25, Scholz ruled out providing fighter jets, citing the need to prevent further military escalation. “There will be no fighter jet deliveries to Ukraine,” he said. Deputy US national security adviser Jon Finer, in turn, said on January 26 that the Administration would be discussing fighter jets “very carefully” with Kyiv and its allies.905 “We have not ruled in or out any specific systems,” he added. However, an official at the Defense Department told journalists the next day he did not think “we are opposed,” as a campaign inside the Pentagon to send fighter jets to Ukraine was gaining momentum.906 Mykhailo Podolyak, an adviser to Zelensky, said on January 28 that Kyiv and its Western allies were engaged in “fast-track” talks on possible deliveries of military aircraft and long-range missiles.907 Yet, Scholz doubled down on his skeptical position talking to reporters on the same day. “The question of combat aircraft does not arise at all,” he stressed. “I can only advise against entering into a constant competition to outbid each other when it comes to weapons systems.”900

The fighter jet discussion did not abate, however. Andriy Yermak, a top aide to Zelensky, said on January 30 that Poland would be willing to provide its F-16s to Ukraine in coordination with NATO.909 Asked by a reporter on the same day if Washington would transfer warplanes to Kyiv, Biden responded: “No.” When asked about Biden’s remark, a US official explained that there had been “no serious, high-level


906 “Ukraine says pilots would need six months for F-16 combat training,” Reuters, January 27, 2023 [https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-says-pilots-would-need-six-months-f-16-combat-training-2023-01-27/].


discussion about F-16s." Yet, "by definition, nothing is excluded," Macron told a press conference on the same day. Indeed, French officials noted that the possibility was on the table, but that a decision was unlikely in the immediate future. On January 31, British prime minister Sunak said he believed it was "not practical" to provide Ukraine with British fighter jets, but pledged to accelerate support to enable "decisive gains" against Russia. On the same day, Biden answered that he was "going to talk" to Zelenskyy when asked again about his administration potentially sending fighter jets to Ukraine.

Russia responded by cautioning against escalation risks. On January 30, Peskov warned that the West was "encouraging" Ukraine’s demands and professed its "readiness to provide such weapons." It was a "dead-end situation" that would lead to "significant escalation," and to "NATO countries more and more becoming directly involved in the conflict," though it did not "have the potential to change the course of events and will not do so," Peskov said.

Against this tense backdrop, US-Russian exchanges on the future of arms control continued. Asked if Moscow could envisage there being no nuclear arms control treaty after 2026, Russia’s deputy foreign minister Sergei Ryabkov told reporters on January 30: "This is quite a possible scenario." One day later, the US State Department sent a report to Congress stating that Russia had violated New START by refusing to allow on-site inspections and rebuffing Washington’s requests to meet to discuss its compliance concerns. In reaction, Antonov told journalists that it was Washington who was violating the treaty by "illegitimately" withdrawing more than 100 strategic weapons from treaty accounting. Given the "hybrid war" the West was waging against Russia, it was "unjustified, untimely and inappropriate" to invite the US inspectors to Russian strategic facilities. However, Moscow intended to continue to “abide” by New START’s “central limits, continue to share notifications and related data.”


911 Leila Abboud et al, "France open to sending fighter jets to Ukraine," Financial Times, January 31, 2023 [https://www.ft.com/content/4678ec97-bdff-4dfa-9507-dd6f6cb3d4c4?sharetype=blocked].

912 Sam Blewett, "UK says it is 'not practical' to give Ukraine British fighter jets," The Independent, January 31, 2023 [https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/ukraine-downing-street-cabinet-rishi-sunak-prime-minister-b2272778.html].


914 "Kremlin: More Western arms for Ukraine will only lead to escalation," Reuters, January 31, 2023 [https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/kremlin-more-western-arms-ukraine-will-only-lead-escalation-2023-01-30/].


917 "Посол РФ заявил, что Москва соблюдает ДСНВ на протяжении всех лет в отличие от Вашингтона" (The Russian ambassador said that Moscow has complied with the START Treaty continuously over the years, unlike Washington), TASS, February 1, 2023 [https://tass.ru/politika/16932853].
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