The Responsibility to Protect – From Evasive to Reluctant Action?

The Role of Global Middle Powers
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R2P – Not Evasive but Still Reluctant Action
Malte Brosig
Introduction: The development of German R2P thinking

The international community was determined to prevent future mass atrocities after the horrifying events in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia shocked the world in the 1990s. Early on in the process, Germany joined the debate about the responsibilities of governments and/or the international community for the protection of populations. Klaus Naumann, a Federal Armed Forces (Bundeswehr) general, was a member of the Canadian-sponsored International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). The ICISS was appointed in 2000 and was tasked with working on the nexus between sovereignty, responsibility, protection and intervention. Its final report, ‘The Responsibility to Protect’, was published in December 2001 and effectively structured the international debate about the principles that would form the core of Responsibility to Protect (R2P): paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 United Nation (UN) World Summit Outcome Document. The World Summit concluded the deliberations about the ‘responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’, stating that if a government is unable or unwilling to keep
its citizens safe from harm in such a situation, the international community has to take over this obligation.²

Given Germany’s past, this commitment to the protection of civilians might come as a surprise. It is understandable only in the context of the country’s development after the Second World War. The Federal Republic’s foreign and security policy after 1945 centred on multilateral self-commitment and non-military conflict regulation. Owing to the historical legacy of aggressive German expansionism that spurred two world wars, the country’s political elite subscribed to a solid consensus based on firm integration into Western institutions such as the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The most important foreign policy goal of the Bonn Republic was to avoid international isolation at all costs, and conceding sovereignty to international institutions such as the EU helped to achieve this goal. Corresponding with the multilateral approach to international politics is the preference for peace building rather than war fighting, which resonates deeply with the German general public.³

This elite consensus has remained remarkably stable over time. Even after unification in 1990, when some observers feared the re-emergence of great-power attitudes and behaviour in the Berlin Republic, there has been no fundamental shift of the basic assumptions and aspirations of German foreign and security policy. The much-discussed decision to participate in the Kosovo war in 1999 – the first time that German soldiers were engaged in battle since 1945 – can be explained by Germany’s preference for acting in concert with its NATO partners. But it was only the threat of mass atrocities (ethnic cleansing) that convinced the Federal Government to resort to arms. Note, however, that the coalition government, consisting at that time of the Social Democrats and the Green Party, nearly collapsed because of this step: Federal Chancellor Schröder took the risk of a vote of no-confidence in Parliament, which has to approve any military mission that is likely to include fighting.

It is probably fair to say that only a progressive government in Berlin could overcome the deep-seated reluctance of the Germany public towards participation in an armed international intervention. It would have been much harder for a conservative government to make a convincing case for Bundeswehr participation in the Kosovo campaign because it would have faced massive political resistance from inside as well as outside the German Bundestag. Of course, the Schröder government had to deal with widespread criticism within its own political camp, but it could count on a loyal
opposition in the Bundestag. This explains why political pressure did not build up, as was expected by many observers in Berlin at the time. Even though NATO’s campaign did produce much collateral damage among civilians, the Schröder government could stick with it until Yugoslav president Milosevic finally agreed to surrender authority over Kosovo.

**R2P principles in Germany’s political debate: Promoting the new concept**

Triggered by the events in Kosovo, the debate about Germany’s international responsibilities and role after unification intensified. Owing to positive experiences with shared sovereignty and rule-based behaviour in Europe, Berlin was happy to contribute to the international community’s approach to tie sovereignty privileges to the performance of a specific government. Another aspect of the Kosovo case showed that only the UN could provide universally accepted legitimacy for armed international intervention with a humanitarian background. Thus, the discussion in Berlin about the protection of civilians against mass atrocities committed (or ignored) by governments centred on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) – the only institution that is deemed legitimate to interfere with the sovereignty of nation states.

This was acknowledged in a White Paper titled ‘German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr’ published in 2006 (one year after the World Summit), which explicitly refers to R2P:

The international law doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect has developed as a result of the lessons learned from the intervention in Kosovo 1999. Even if the states that have adopted this doctrine are probably still not in the majority, the debate about the Responsibility to Protect is increasingly impacting on the ways of thinking in western countries. In the long term, this will affect the mandating of international peace missions by the United Nations Security Council as legitimating under international law is crucial especially when military force is used. Germany accepts its share of the responsibility to strive for world peace and international security within the framework of the United Nations. As the third-largest contributor in monetary terms after the USA and Japan, Germany currently shoulders just under nine percent of the UN budget and of the budgets for international peace
missions and additionally makes obligatory and voluntary payments to sub-organisations and special organisations.\textsuperscript{4}

R2P is supported by Germany in its general work on crisis prevention through human rights policy and development policy, by strengthening regional and international organisations and by financial and political support of the work of the UN secretary-general’s special advisers (on the Responsibility to Protect and on the Prevention of Genocide).\textsuperscript{5} Germany was the first UN member state to invite the newly appointed UN Secretary-General Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect Edward Luck for official consultations in early 2008.\textsuperscript{6} Furthermore, Germany is a member of the Group of Friends on Responsibility to Protect – an informal group of states from developed and developing countries that seeks to advance the R2P principles in international politics. With a current share of about eight per cent of the UN budget for peacekeeping measures, Berlin is the fourth-largest financial contributor to UN peace missions.\textsuperscript{7}

Although Germany has integrated R2P in its foreign and security policies, actively promotes the new principle and provides substantial financial contributions to UN peace missions, its staff deployment to international operations is notably low. Germany’s share of deployed military personnel in current UN missions amounts to 0.28%; in missions led by the EU it is 0.79% and in NATO missions it is 4.75%.\textsuperscript{8} These contributions appear negligible when compared to the contributions of other countries to UN missions, including developing nations such as Bangladesh, Ghana or Pakistan. Moreover, Germany’s self-image as a consistent promoter of R2P was seriously undermined when Berlin abstained in the vote on UNSC Resolution 1973 in the Libya crisis in March 2011. In order to shed some light on these contradictions, we will take a closer look at some cases that are representative of Germany’s contradictory policy in different R2P situations.

**Case studies: Germany’s conflicting positions in different R2P situations**

The case studies discuss Germany’s policy in Kosovo (from 1999), Darfur (from 2003) and Libya (2011). Kosovo provides an example of a long-term and broad-based German engagement in an R2P situation, accompanied by massive investments in personnel and material resources. Given the geo-
graphic proximity, Berlin’s interest in stabilising Kosovo appears to be quite obvious. Darfur, in Eastern Sudan, provides an example of the more reserved approach Berlin shows towards participation in international R2P missions in regions that lie outside its core area of interest, namely Europe. Libya, finally, is the most recent and probably prominent example of applied R2P principles. The UNSC authorised the use of force in order to protect civilians against threats emanating from armed forces controlled by Libya’s long-ruling dictator Colonel Gaddafi. Germany did not vote in favour of this decision, thereby isolating itself from its Western allies and compromising its support for R2P.

Table 1: International interventions in R2P situations since Kosovo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>International Peacekeeping Mission</th>
<th>International personnel</th>
<th>German personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>from</td>
<td>Kosovo/</td>
<td>KFOR (NATO)</td>
<td>5,576</td>
<td>872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>UNMIK (UN)</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EULEX Kosovo (EU)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,584</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from</td>
<td>Darfur/</td>
<td>AMIS (AU)</td>
<td>Max. 7,000</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>UNAMID (UN)</td>
<td>24,630</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MINURCAT (UN)</td>
<td>4,760</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EUFOR TCHAD/RCA (EU)</td>
<td>3,700</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>UNOCI (UN)</td>
<td>9,989</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from</td>
<td>Dem. Republic</td>
<td>MONUSCO (UN)</td>
<td>20,555</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>of Congo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Unified Protector (NATO)</td>
<td>Max. 8,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>UNMISS (UN)</td>
<td>7,900</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>UNSMIS (UN)</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kosovo (from 1999)

The territorial conflict between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), pursuing an independent Republic of Kosovo, and Serbian authorities from the Republic of Yugoslavia began to escalate in 1998. Clashes between the KLA and the Yugoslav forces led to massive human rights violations and deportations of Kosovo Albanians. The conflict resulted in the death of over 1,500 Kosovo Albanians and forced 400,000 people from their homes. The international community became deeply concerned about the escalating conflict, its humanitarian consequences and the risk of contagion: it had not been able to prevent the killing of tens of thousands of civilians in Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995. Owing to concerns about the replay of such mass atrocities in Kosovo, NATO opted for military intervention in the spring of 1999. However, the Alliance proved unable to obtain undisputed authorisation by the UNSC. Accordingly, the intervention became highly controversial within the international community.

Germany decided to participate in NATO’s Operation Allied Force, prioritising the prevention of mass atrocity crimes over indisputable compliance with international law. In February 1999, the German Bundestag approved the government’s request for military contributions to the operation. Federal Chancellor Schröder announced Berlin’s support for air strikes against Yugoslav armed forces. He justified Germany’s participation by referring to the necessary prevention of imminent human rights abuses, and stated that military action was not directed against any side, but had as its goal the protection of the lives of civilians. Thus, Schröder made the Kosovo intervention a classic case of R2P. The German Bundestag overwhelmingly supported this position. Only one out of five parties represented in parliament at that time (the leftist party PDS, now Die Linke) voted against participation in NATO’s operation for reasons of ‘manifest violations of international law and inevitable collateral damage among civilians’.

Operation Allied Force ended with the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1244 in June 1999, which authorised UN member states and relevant international organisations to deploy an international security presence in Kosovo. NATO established a multinational Kosovo Force (KFOR) comprising up to 50,000 military personnel to provide security within the region. The German Bundestag approved a Bundeswehr contribution of up to 8,500 soldiers to KFOR, thus becoming the largest provider of troops.
872 out of 5,576 soldiers, Berlin is currently the second-largest contributor to KFOR.\textsuperscript{17} In addition to KFOR, the UN established an international civilian presence, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which in 2002 had some 9,000 staff. In 2011, 182 staff continued to serve with UNMIK, including five from Germany.\textsuperscript{18} After the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo in 2008, the EU established the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo). EULEX Kosovo assists administrative and judicial authorities as well as law-enforcement agencies in their progress towards sustainability and accountability.\textsuperscript{19} EULEX Kosovo comprises 2,584 civilians, including 109 from Germany.\textsuperscript{20}

**Darfur (from 2003)**

A civil war between the Government of Sudan and allied militia on one side and various armed rebel groups on the other erupted in Darfur in 2003. Since then, tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of people have died and at least 1.8 million people have been internally displaced.\textsuperscript{21} The protection of civilians in this brutal conflict has been a top priority for the international community. Intensive diplomatic and political efforts to bring all parties into a peace process have somewhat moderated the conflict. However, it still remains one of the bloodiest since the Second World War, and the international community has mandated several armed missions with the aim of protecting Darfur’s people.

The African Union (AU) took the initiative and established a peacekeeping operation called the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in 2004, which by 2005 comprised some 7,000 soldiers.\textsuperscript{22} Germany supported the mission with personnel as well as financial and logistical aid, such as providing air transport for the regular exchange of African contingents, delegating logistics officers, and deploying five police officers for training purposes as well as allocating 25 million euros to AMIS.\textsuperscript{23} After multiple political efforts had failed to stop the fighting, UNSC Resolution 1769 (2007) authorised the AU–UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), whose core goal is the protection of civilians. AMIS merged with UNAMID on 31 December 2007, creating a hybrid mission of both the AU and the UN. Up to now, UNAMID has been the largest peacekeeping mission in terms of deployed personnel, currently encompassing 24,630 troops. German assistance to UNAMID is comparable
to its support of AMIS, relying more on financial contributions than on seconding personnel.

Intensifying cross-border attacks from Eastern Chad, the Central African Republic and Sudan added to the continuously deteriorating humanitarian situation in Darfur and threatened to further destabilise the whole region. The international community tried to address this situation with UNSC Resolution 1778 (2007). The resolution authorised the deployment of the Mission des Nations Unies en République Centrafricaine et au Tchad (MINURCAT), which was intended to contribute to the protection of civilians and to promote human rights, the rule of law and regional peace, as well as to facilitate humanitarian assistance. From 2008 to 2009, the EU supported MINURCAT by a military component named the EU Military Operation in Eastern Chad and North Eastern Central African Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA). Germany contributed to MINURCAT by financial means and to EUFOR Tchad/RCA by deploying four out of a total of 3,700 military personnel. When MINURCAT was terminated in 2010, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon referred to it as a remarkably successful R2P mission: ‘MINURCAT has been an unusual and unique United Nations peacekeeping operation in that it was devoted solely to contributing to the protection of civilians, without an explicit political mandate.’

With regard to the devastating humanitarian situation in Darfur, the low deployment of German personnel to humanitarian missions in the region stands in stark contrast to Berlin’s declared policy of support for R2P principles. This discrepancy cannot be explained by a preference for crisis prevention and peace building with non-military means. In Kosovo, Berlin has demonstrated that it is willing and able to contribute on a large scale and for a long time to robust international missions in R2P situations. Hence, Germany’s R2P policy appears to be shaped more by regional preferences than by objective requirements, thereby provoking accusations of inconsistency and selectivity.

Libya 2011

Mass protests began in Libya in February 2011. They were directed against the regime of Colonel Gaddafi, which had lasted for more than 40 years. The protests soon turned violent following brutal repression by the regime. The city of Benghazi in Eastern Libya became a stronghold of the armed rebels. In
early March 2011 Gaddafi’s troops moved quickly towards Benghazi, threatening to crush the rebellion and to punish the population. Gaddafi himself announced that he would exterminate his political opponents and their supporters. In response to the impending mass atrocities, the UNSC took preventive action by issuing Resolution 1973 (2011), which explicitly referred to the R2P principles as the main reason for action.

The resolution authorised member states, acting nationally or through regional organisations, to take all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack in Libya. This would have to be accomplished by air power since a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory was strictly ruled out.\(^{27}\) In support of UNSC Resolution 1973, NATO started to take robust action to protect civilians under threat of attack in Libya and enforced a no-fly zone.\(^{28}\) Operation Unified Protector lasted until 31 October 2011 and succeeded in preventing mass atrocities against civilians. Gaddafi himself was captured and killed by armed rebels shortly before the operation ended.

UNSC Resolution 1973 was adopted by a vote of ten in favour to none against, but with five abstentions (Brazil, China, Germany, India and the Russian Federation). Instead of aligning itself with its NATO allies in support of the forceful application of R2P principles, Germany decided to abstain, thereby raising fresh doubts about its sincere commitment to the protection of people under threat of mass atrocities. In the voting procedure on UNSC Resolution 1973, UN Ambassador Peter Wittig tried to explain Germany’s position. Emphasising Berlin’s concern for the plight of the Libyan people and its support of the UNSC in stopping the violence in Libya, Wittig stated that the Federal Government still saw enormous risks in UNSC Resolution 1973. These risks involved:

- the likelihood of a large-scale loss of life, which should not be underestimated
- the risk for countries participating in the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1973 to run into a protracted military conflict that could draw in the wider region
- the possibility of failure when implementing UNSC Resolution 1973, making a quick and efficient military intervention impossible\(^{29}\)

In an official statement on Germany’s decision, Federal Foreign Minister
Guido Westerwelle stated that Berlin supported the elements of UNSC Resolution 1973. He argued, however, that an alternative to military intervention existed, and referred to increasing political pressure and harsh sanctions. Westerwelle continued to emphasise Germany’s interests in assisting democratic developments in Northern Africa by political, economic and humanitarian – that is, non-military – means.\(^\text{30}\)

Although both statements signalled support for UNSC Resolution 1973 as well as for the need to protect the Libyan population against mass atrocities, they still stressed non-military measures. However, given the imminent threat the people of Benghazi faced by the advancing troops of Gaddafi, the reluctance to use force seemed somewhat naïve at best. It is doubtful that political pressure or sanctions could have prevented the killing of civilians had the Libyan forces entered Benghazi. Internationally, Berlin’s decision received much criticism from traditional German allies, including France and the United Kingdom, and the decision continues to be hotly debated by experts in Germany and abroad. While some argue that not all criteria for a military intervention based on R2P were met in the case of Libya, others stated that Germany’s behaviour was inconsistent with and juxtaposed to its values and would lead Germany into political isolation.\(^\text{31}\)

**The bumpy road ahead: German contributions to the development of R2P**

The case of Libya has demonstrated that the conceptual foundations of R2P are far from clear. Probably the most important question concerns the problematic connection between the protection of a population – the task R2P was designed for – and regime change. One of the major criticisms of NATO’s intervention in Libya was the one-sided support for the anti-Gaddafi forces, culminating in a joint letter by United States (US) President Obama, United Kingdom (UK) Prime Minister Cameron and French President Sarkozy in April 2011. The letter explicitly stated that the replacement of Gaddafi was inevitable in order to protect the Libyan people: ‘So long as Gaddafi is in power, NATO and its coalition partners must maintain their operations so that civilians remain protected and the pressure on the regime builds.’\(^\text{32}\)

This statement raises a tricky question of what exactly the UNSC authorises when it approves all necessary measures in the context of R2P. Does this refer only to prevention in situations where genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity seem imminent? If NATO had succeeded in averting the seizing of Benghazi by Gaddafi’s troops but then discontinued its military operations, there would have been the danger of retribution in the weeks, months or even years to follow. The Gaddafi regime already had a long record of killing dissidents both at home and abroad, and it would have been easy to identify the opposition groups in Benghazi as well as in the rest of the country. Furthermore, it cannot be ruled out that the regime would have used the opportunity for a general purging of opposition groups. It is unclear whether the UNSC would have authorised another R2P mission in that event – and this would have been even more questionable if NATO or any other coalition would have taken on such a repeat mission.

Thus, one of the main lessons that can be drawn from the Libya case is that the UNSC has to be very clear to what temporal and territorial extent it agrees to issue an R2P mandate. With its long-standing focus on conflict prevention and peace building, Germany seems well prepared to contribute much more to the conceptual clarifications needed. Raising these issues in the UNSC, where Germany will be a non-permanent member until the end of 2012, would be very much in line with previous work it has done in the UN Peacebuilding Commission.

Another aspect of improving R2P relates to more strategic dimensions. The first brings up the question of improving coordination between the mandate-giver and the mandate-taker – the UNSC and NATO in the case of Libya. Much criticism has focused on the way NATO informed, or rather did not inform, its mandating agency, the UNSC. The unwillingness of the three permanent members of the UNSC that are engaged in NATO (France, the UK and the US) to share information with the other members of the Council has raised much concern. This coordination clearly has to improve in order to maximise support for international intervention in future R2P situations. Improvement does not necessarily mean a higher degree of formalisation or institutionalisation of the process as following a predetermined sequence of political consultations could prove to be inadequate in a situation of clear and present danger (for example, Benghazi in March 2012).

When mass atrocities occur, or seem likely to occur, it is not enough to argue about the appropriate sequence of events. Better coordination, rather, refers to proper reporting to and consultation with the political authorities responsible for legitimising R2P interventions.

A military operation the size of Unified Protector cannot be operated out
of New York unless an effective UN military headquarters is created – and no military organisation is likely to agree to this. However, ignoring the mandating agency for weeks or even months is not a good strategy. It should be in the interest of the mandate-taker to report back to the UNSC as soon as and as frequently as possible. If this does not happen, support for a specific mission in order to protect civilians – as well as for subsequent missions – may fade away. It can therefore be argued that the people of Syria are paying the price for NATO’s under-reporting on Libya.

A second strategic dimension concerns cooperation with other relevant organisations besides the mandate-giver and the mandate-taker. It has been rightly noted that regional security and political organisations such as the League of Arab States (LAS) and the AU played a crucial part in convincing the UNSC to issue Resolution 1973.\textsuperscript{34} The next step should be to improve communication and interaction with these organisations once a resolution has been passed.

Failure to do this is likely to increase the risk that these organisations become alienated – as was the case with the AU in Libya – with dire consequences for future R2P situations. Improving cooperation also paves the way for a possible engagement of regional organisations in the political reform of a country once the military mission is completed.

However, bringing in regional organisations may provoke new conflicts. As demonstrated in the case of Libya, a country may be a member of more than one regional organisation.\textsuperscript{35} Libya’s role in the AU and its standing in the LAS differed considerably under Gaddafi’s regime. Whereas the AU relied heavily on financial contributions from Libya, Gaddafi’s influence in the LAS was much weaker. Accordingly, the AU’s position on Libya was considerably softer, as demonstrated by its request for political negotiations between Gaddafi and his opponents, whereas the LAS was instrumental in convincing the UNSC to authorise military intervention.

Future R2P situations might replay a scenario of overlapping memberships and contradicting loyalties, or simply different proposals for a solution.\textsuperscript{36} Usually, it would be desirable to have a clear ranking of the authority of different regional organisations, but politically this is unrealistic. However, since multilateralism is one of the main pillars of Germany’s foreign and security policy strategies, Berlin could contribute to raising awareness of the potential problems that an increasing role of regional organisations in R2P situations might create.
The next steps in Berlin

Even though the behaviour of the Federal Government in the case of Libya may have created a different impression, Berlin claims to be firmly committed to R2P principles.37 There is some evidence supporting this claim: Berlin is currently discussing whether to transfer the competence for R2P from a more conceptually oriented division within the Federal Foreign Office to a more operationally engaged unit. This could imply that the work of the Special Representatives for the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect might be funded differently in the future.

Until 2011, Germany contributed only indirectly to their work, but this changed in 2012 when the Federal Government decided to fund the office of the two special representatives directly. This year’s funding was earmarked for the UN secretary-general’s report on R2P. The report focuses on Pillar III of R2P, elaborating on the responsibility of the international community to act promptly and decisively in situations where governments are neither willing nor able to protect their citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity.38

Regarding the establishment of national focal points for improving the inter-agency coordination of measures in R2P situations, the Federal Government is considering if and how the introduction of this instrument might contribute to more coherent action in such situations. The guidelines that are currently being developed by the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect will be an important input into this discussion.39 However, for the moment, the Federal Government is not planning to establish an institution equivalent to the US administration’s Atrocities Prevention Board. Berlin is confident that it can deal with R2P situations within the existing framework of inter-agency cooperation or cross-departmental working groups.40

Beyond these institutional questions, Berlin should capitalise on the political momentum that was gained by its decision to vote with the democratic BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) countries in the case of Libya. By positioning itself as a bridge-builder between Western countries and these emerging powers, Germany could hold a key position in contributing to the development of the conceptual and strategic dimensions of R2P.

Brazil and India (and South Africa) agree on the necessity to clarify what R2P means and how it can be effectively and legitimately applied. Some important questions in this regard have been raised by the Brazilian initiative
on protecting responsibly. So far, the Federal Government’s reaction to this initiative has been remarkably muted. Several recent initiatives in the *Bundestag* as well as in the European Parliament suggest, however, that there is political support for the advancement of R2P.

**Endnotes**

2. UN World Summit Outcome, A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005, p 30.
3. This preference is probably best demonstrated by the Action Plan ‘Civilian Conflict Resolution, Crisis Prevention and Post-Conflict Peace-Building’, which was passed by the Federal Government in 2004. The plan defines crisis prevention as a cross-sectoral political task and explicitly refers to safeguarding the livelihoods of people in crisis regions as an important goal of German foreign policy. Available online: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/384232/publicationFile/4346/Aktionsplan-En.pdf.
5. Reply of the Federal Government to a written question by MP Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul (SPD), BT-Drs. 17/6712, 29 July 2011, p 3f.
8. Data as of August 2011. It should be noted, however, that Berlin contributes to international missions that do not explicitly address R2P situations but whose mandate includes a humanitarian component, such as EU NAVFOR Somalia (275 out of 1,466 mission staff). Center for International Peace Operations, International and German Personnel in Peace Operations. Available online: http://www.zif-belin.org/fileadmin/uploads/analyse/dokumente/veroeffentlichungen/International_Personnel_2011_EN.pdf.
A draft resolution was submitted to the UNSC by Belarus, India and the Russian Federation arguing that such unilateral use of force constitutes a flagrant violation of the UN Charter and demanding the immediate cessation of use of force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (S/1999/328, 26 March 1999). The draft was not adopted by the UNSC.

German Bundestag, Minutes of plenary proceedings (Plenarprotokoll), 14/22, 25 February 1999.


German Bundestag, Minutes of plenary proceedings (Plenarprotokoll), 14/30, 25 March 1999.

UNSC Resolution 1244, 10 June 1999.


33 See also the report of the UN Secretary-General on ‘Early warning, assessment and the responsibility to protect’ (A/64/864), 14 July 2010.
35 Sudan’s double membership in the AU and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) provides another example. Whereas the OIC emphasises the developmental needs of Darfur, the AU – as the UN – focuses on the political dimensions of the conflict.
36 Of course (sub-) regional organisations may cooperate very well with each other, thus maximising their leverage in a political crisis, as demonstrated by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the AU in the post-electoral conflict in Côte d’Ivoire in 2010–2011.
37 Germany’s ambassador to the UN emphasised this at the Security Council in November 2011: ‘This Council has only recently reaffirmed that it is the responsibility of the authorities concerned to protect their own populations. Germany firmly supports this principle of the Responsibility to Protect, including the responsibility of the International Community, through this Council, to take appropriate action should the authorities concerned fail in their duty to protect civilians, and let me add: we should now not start to step back from, or compromise, our commitments that all of us have undertaken by endorsing the Principle of Responsibility to Protect’. S/PV.6650, 9 November 2011, p 28.
38 German Bundestag, Minutes of plenary proceedings (Plenarprotokoll), 17/180, 23 May 2012, p 21463f.
39 The Global Centre is an independent organisation that concentrates on
improving the practical application of the R2P principles by the international community. Available online: http://globalr2p.org/advocacy/FocalPoints.php [accessed 13 July 2012].

40 German Bundestag, Minutes of plenary proceedings (Plenarprotokoll), 17/180, 23 May 2012, p 21463f.


42 Parliamentary motion by Alliance 90/Green Party (Schutzverantwortung weiterentwickeln und wirksam umsetzen), Drs. 17/9584, 9 May 2012, and European Parliament recommendation to the Council on the UN principle of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P), B7 0191/2012, 28 March 2012.