Emerging Powers in Regional Architecture

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Introduction

The recent revaluation of the Group of 20 (G 20) into a summit of the heads of state and the restructuring of the International Monitoring Fund (IMF) in favour of developing countries like China and India emphasize that global governance is becoming more inclusive. The broad range of old and new security threats from climate change to non-proliferation, organised crime and terrorism will foster collaboration both on the global and regional level. The emergence of new actors and the variety of old and new challenges therefore point to the creation of a non-polar world order rather than to a system of multi-polarity.

In contrast to the political dynamics following the economic and financial crisis of 2008/09 which have increased the global importance of emerging powers, there still exists no common understanding in the academic debate of what constitutes an emerging power. Most definitions of emerging powers point to their economic growth rates or their future economic potential. In the 1980s and 1990s the countries of East and South East Asia were regarded as emerging powers until the financial crisis of 1997 dampened these aspirations. Today, countries like Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC) are regarded as the new emerging powers. The concept of BRIC dates back to the Goldman Sachs report of 2003 which extrapolated the economic and demographic potential of these four countries. The predictions were that these countries will be wealthier in 2050 than many developed countries of today. This economic rise would therefore have far reaching implications for the global economic order.

In contrast to the “Tiger” economies of East and South East Asia whose authoritarian governments shared certain norms and initiated a discourse on Asian values, the BRIC countries are a diverse group in nearly every aspect. On the global level, Russia and China are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and are recognized nuclear powers of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In contrast to this India and Brazil are demanding a permanent seat in the UNSC since many years. Brazil gave up its military nuclear program and joined the NPT in 1998. India was the first country outside the NPT to conduct a nuclear test in 1974 and refuses to sign the treaty, however, since the civilian nuclear deal with the United States in 2008 India has achieved a special status and can be recognized at least as a de facto nuclear power.

Economically, Russia was included in the G 8 process whereas Brazil, China, and India together with Mexico and South Africa belonged to the five Outreach (O 5) countries that were brought closest to the G 8 with the Gleneagles summit in 2005. Therefore the BRIC countries were sometimes enlarged with South Africa to become BRICS or with South Africa and Mexico to become BRICSAM.

Moreover, some of the BRIC countries have difficult bilateral relations, for instance Russia and China and India. Domestically, China and Russia are authoritarian regimes which do not follow the Western liberal understanding of democracy. In contrast to this, Brazil, India, and South Africa have emphasized their common democratic traditions when they formed the India, Brazil, South Africa Initiative (IBSA) in 2003. Another format within the BRIC group is the joint initiative of Russia, India, and China (RIC) whose heads of state have also established a common forum with their first summit in 2006. Although it is difficult to find common interests, BRIC became a political reality with the first summit of the four countries in Yekaterinburg in Russia in June 2009.

The debate about emerging powers has overshadowed the debate about regionalism that was virulent in the 1990s. The restructuring of the international system after 1990 was accompanied by a rise of regional organisations and new groupings. In contrast to the developments of regional organisations in Europe and especially the EU the new

4 On the differences of the BRIC see Armijo, Leslie Elliott, The BRICs Countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) as Analytical Category: Mirage or Insight? In: Asian Perspective, Vol. 31, No. 4, 2007, pp. 7-42.
forms of cooperation after the end of the Cold War in Africa, Asia and Latin America were often described as open or soft regionalism. The main focus of the new organisations was on closer economic and political cooperation in order to increase economic interdependence. The European Union (EU) was often cited as a model. But its legal basis which includes the transfer of national sovereignty to supranational institutions makes the EU more to an exception rather than a rule in the field of regional cooperation.

So far, there is hardly a connection between the discourses on emerging powers and regionalism. The debate about regional powers focuses to a great extent on the problems of definitions and concepts and the analysis of single regional powers. Only few studies look at the specific relationship in a comparative perspective between regional powers and their respective regional institutions. On the one hand, Kappel argues in favour of the close (economic) linkages between regional powers and their respective regions in regard to their global ambitions. On the other hand Hurrell is more critical on the link between the global aspirations of states and their success as regional powers.

Without going deeper into the theoretical debate the paper will look at the relationship between emerging powers and regional architecture. The debates about emerging and regional powers overlap therefore the focus seems to be put well on the BRICS with Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa irrespective of their economic and political differences. There is a long debate about the problems of defining regions. For the sake of the argument regional architecture will be understood as selective regional organisations in which the BRICS have a membership.

In order to give at least some tentative answers to this relationship the focus in the brief analysis of the BRICS will be on three different kinds of question. First, in how far are regional organisations important for the status of emerging powers, i.e. for their economic rise? The share of intraregional trade and their regional investment can be used as indicators. Second, in how far do emerging powers act as provider of collective goods for instance in the field of security or economic development? Thirdly, in how far do these developments generate support from the region for the global ambitions of emerging powers?

Brazil

Brazil has a long but not always consistent record on promoting regional cooperation in Latin America. The “South Americanization” of its foreign policy started can be traced back to the late 1970s but became more effective only in the 1990s. Since that time Brazil has initiated and participated in a variety of regional institutions like Mercosur in 1991, the community of South American States in 2004 which was renamed into UNASUR in 2007. With the creation of the Banco del Sur in 2007 and the Iniciativa para la Integracion de le Infrastructura Regional Sudamericana (IIRSA) Brazil underlined again its interest in promoting regional cooperation.

Despite the variety of regional organisations and initiatives, there seems hardly to be a clear strategy of priorities. Brazil does not seem to have an interest to consolidate or strengthen regional institutions like Mercosur and has ratified the fewest number of Mercosur resolutions. Moreover, Brazil

11 Daniel Flemes, Thorsten Wojczewski, Contested Leadership in International Relations: Power Politics in
does not seem to be willing to take the costs for integration.\textsuperscript{12} Brazil has an economic preponderance in the region but its intraregional trade with Mercosur is only about 10.4 percent. The regional investments of Brazilian companies in Mercosur are 7.9 percent.\textsuperscript{13}

Besides its attempts to promote regional economic cooperation, Brazil has also tried to act as a regional security provider. It became active in regional conflict mediation for instance in Venezuela and Bolivia in 2003. In 2008 president da Silva suggested the creation of a South American Defence Council in order to establish a defence alliance and a closer cooperation of regional armament industries.\textsuperscript{14}

In order to increase its regional and international clout Brazil is also giving development assistance to other developing countries. Brazil is therefore pursuing a strategy of “ideational leadership”\textsuperscript{15} in South America. Its regional strategy is motivated first by its global emerging power ambitions\textsuperscript{16} and secondly by its interests to contain the influence of the United States in the region. The United States are promoting a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) which also includes South America.\textsuperscript{17} Various South American countries like Chile, Columbia and Peru have already signed bilateral free trade agreements with the U.S. Furthermore, Brazil’s self proclaimed leadership role is also contested by neighbouring countries like Argentina and Venezuela.

In the case of Brazil, the political dimension of the regional architecture seems to be much more important compared to the economic dimension. Brazil’s economic cooperation in the region does not seem to have a huge impact on its domestic development. But for Brazil’s global ambitions as an emerging power, the regional architecture may help to stress its international leadership role.

13 See Kappel 2010, p. 30.
16 See Flemes 2010, p. 110.
17 Burges 2006, p. 38.

\textbf{Russia}

With the demise of the Soviet Union, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, and the independence of the Central Asian Republics (CAR) Russia was also forced to reconsider its strategy towards its neighbourhood. The creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in 2001 was therefore a remarkable development for Russia’s new foreign policy. The idea of a common organisation in Central Asia was launched by China with the Shanghai Five Group in the mid 1990s in order to settle border disputes with the CAR and Russia.\textsuperscript{18}

With the inclusion of Uzbekistan in 2001 the Shanghai Five became the SCO.

Russia’s motives in the creation and participation of the SCO were mainly driven by its security interests both on the regional and global level. For Russia, SCO was important first for the reconstruction of its relationship with China after the independence of the CAR. Second, in contrast to China, Russia envisaged SCO as an alternative to Western institutions and as an institution to balance growing Western influence in Central Asia. Finally, it helped to limit China’s activities in the region.\textsuperscript{19}

SCO remains important because it offers a forum to discuss the mutual security concerns with China. Furthermore, it has established institutional mechanisms like the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) to deal with extremist activities and drug trade. Finally possibilities for Russia to cooperate in infrastructure development, especially in the field of energy opened up.\textsuperscript{20}

So far, the framework of the SCO has not been able to address Russia’s soft security concerns with China, especially in regard to illegal migration to and through Russia. Additionally, Russia has been reluctant towards China’s plans already suggested in 2002 to establish a SCO Free Trade zone. This would benefit Chinese companies and would in-

19 Troitskiy 2007, pp. 32-34.
20 Troitskiy 2007, p. 36.
crease China’s role in Central Asia which is not in Russia’s interest.\textsuperscript{21}

Russia’s cautious approach towards SCO is especially visible when looking at other regional organisations. Militarily, Russia is focusing on the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) that includes Armenia and Belarus besides the five former Soviet members of SCO. In the economic field Russia is promoting its interests in Central Asia through the Eurasian Economic Community (EURASEC).\textsuperscript{22} Interestingly, available trade figures show a different picture. The total share of SCO at Russia’s overall trade has increased from 8.80 percent in 2000 to 12.54 percent in 2009. The increase of nearly 50 percent is probably due to the expansion of the trade with China. In contrast to this, the share of the EURASEC of Russia’s total trade has decreased during the same period from 11.08 percent in 2000 to 3.80 percent in 2009.\textsuperscript{23} The figures indicate that regional economic cooperation is still moderate. Russia’s ambitions as emerging power derive from its previous position in the Cold War and its energy resources rather than from new forms of regional collaboration.

\section*{India}

India has always been active in multilateral institutions on the global arena but has been rather reluctant to engage in regional cooperation. First, the conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir has blocked regional cooperation although all South Asian countries shared the problems of underdevelopment. Second, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi pursued a regional policy in the 1970s and 1980s that understood South Asia as part of India’s national security. Domestic conflicts in neighbouring countries should therefore only be settled with the support of India and not by the intervention of outside, i.e. extra-regional powers.\textsuperscript{24} It was therefore the initiative of Bangladesh in the late 1970s that led to the creation of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 1985. India’s attempts to act as a regional hegemon have not been successful. The intervention in Sri Lanka after 1987 was the most comprehensive approach to mediate in the civil war. The intervention was a political and military disaster so that Indian troops had to withdraw in spring 1990.\textsuperscript{25}

India’s economic reforms after 1991 also created a new momentum for SAARC. South Asia was no longer seen as a part of India’s national security but was more regarded as a part of India’s growing market. The Gujral doctrine of the mid 1990s emphasized the concept of non-reciprocity.\textsuperscript{26} India was reluctant to interfere again in domestic conflicts in neighbouring countries but was promoting instead closer regional economic cooperation. In order to promote this process India was willing to grant unilateral political and economic concessions to the smaller neighbours. India and Sri Lanka became the main engines to promote closer economic cooperation that led to the creation of SAARC Free Trade Arrangement (SAFTA) in 2006. At the SAARC summit of 2007 in Delhi the Indian prime minister announced unilateral concessions for the LDC in SAARC.

The most important shift in India’s regional policy was probably her return to Asian regionalism in the 1990s that was promoted by Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and his “Look East” policy.\textsuperscript{27} Nehru had been a strong advocate for Pan Asian thinking but the border war with China in 1962 ended these illusions. In the late 1960s Indira Gandhi refused to join ASEAN because of the pro Western orientation of the newly formed group which was incompatible with India’s idea of non-alignment at that time. India was therefore left out from the activities of Asian regionalism since the 1980s. Since the 1990s India became more and more integrated into the network of ASEAN regionalism. India became a full dialogue partner, a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and is negotiating a free trade agreement with ASEAN. India also joined the East

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{21} Troitskiy 2007, p. 42.
\bibitem{22} Troitskiy 2007, p. 35.
\bibitem{23} For all trade statistics see IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics (accessed November 29, 2010).
\bibitem{25} S.D. Muni, Pangs of Proximity. India and Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Crisis, New Delhi 1993.
\bibitem{26} See Gujral, I. K., A Foreign Policy for India, 1998.
\bibitem{27} See Rao, Narasimha P. V., India and the Asia-Pacific: Forging a New Relationship, Singapur 1994 (Singapore Lecture Series).
\end{thebibliography}
Asia Summits (EAS) and finally became a member of the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM).

Since the 1990s India has also extended its activities to other regions. In 1997 India was active in the creation of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IORARC) and Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC). Both initiatives started to enhance economic cooperation among the member states. In the meantime, BIMSTEC has established a working group on Counter-Terrorism and Transactional Crimes.

Because of the lingering conflict between India and Pakistan, security cooperation in South Asia remained weak. SAARC has established a Terrorism Convention already in 1987 but the diverging definitions of terrorists and freedom fighters between India and Pakistan have prevented any substantial progress. In recent years India has intensified its bilateral security cooperation with neighbouring countries. In 2003 India launched operations in Bhutan against militant groups that operate in India’s northeast. The new government of the Awami League in Dhaka was more inclined to act against Islamist and militant groups that were operating against India and had found refuge in Bangladesh. India and Myanmar are also operating militarily along the border against militant groups in India’s Northeast. In order to end the civil war in Nepal, India facilitated talks between the political parties and the Maoists that led to an agreement against the ruling monarchy in 2006.

India is often promoting its democratic achievements since 1947. It is nowadays regarded as the biggest democracy and is emphasizing its democratic traditions in her relations with the EU and the United States. However, India has been very reluctant to pursue a policy of promotion of democracy in her foreign policy. Since 2000 India became engaged in global talks between the UN Democracy Fund but still has only a limited interest to promote democratic governance in neighbouring countries like Myanmar.

The regional architecture in South Asia has always been too weak or even counter-productive, given the conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir, to support India’s global ambitions as emerging power. Again, domestic reforms like the economic liberalisation after 1991 have helped to improve India’s international status not the attempts for regional cooperation. SAARC still plays a very minor role for India’s economic development. The share of SAARC in India’s total trade has even been slightly decreasing from 2.47 percent in 2000 to 2.13 percent in 2009. Indian investment in SAARC is only 1.6 percent of her total investment.

China

China’s engagement in regional organisations will be analysed in Southeast and Central Asia.

Southeast Asia

China became an active player in the Asia-Pacific region only after 1990. In 1991 China joined the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in order to strengthen its economic development. 80 percent of China’s foreign trade and 90 percent of its foreign direct investment came from the countries of Asia Pacific.

China also became a promoter for regional cooperation in Southeast Asia. At the summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1997 China proposed the creation of ASEAN plus 3 in order to intensify economic cooperation between China, Korea, and Japan with Southeast Asia. Besides strengthening economic cooperation with Southeast Asia ASEAN plus 3 was the first attempt to establish institutional linkages with South Korea and Japan. Despite the high economic interdependence in Northeast Asia the creation of regional organisation has been prevented by bilateral disputes and historical resentments.

In 1998 China proposed closer cooperation among the central banks of the region in order to deal with the repercussions of the Asian financial crisis. The new government of the Awami League in Dhaka was more inclined to act against Islamist and militant groups that were operating against India and had found refuge in Bangladesh. India and Myanmar are also operating militarily along the border against militant groups in India’s Northeast. In order to end the civil war in Nepal, India facilitated talks between the political parties and the Maoists that led to an agreement against the ruling monarchy in 2006.

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crisis which resulted in the Cheng Mai Agreement in May 2000. In 2000 China suggested a China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) and hosted the preparatory meeting of the Boao Asian Forum which was regarded to be an equivalent for the World Economic Forum in Davos. Moreover, China was willing to become more engaged in the process of regional cooperation and offered concessions for the Free Trade Agreement for poorer ASEAN countries like Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar.

ASEAN which started in the late 1960s as a regional organisation that was also directed the expansion of communism in Southeast Asia was also critical about the political and security repercussions of China’s economic rise. In the early 1990s China raised territorial claims in the South China Sea that created concerns among ASEAN. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was established in order to discuss security issues with outside powers including China but also the United States, the European Union, and India. At the ARF meeting in 1995, China agreed to negotiate the dispute over maritime boundaries in the South China Sea. In 1999 China signed the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty (SEANFZ) and joined the ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). In 2002 China signed the Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea.

At first sight ASEAN plus 3 seems to be a successful model to incorporate the different national interests. China has used the institution to promote its economic interests vis-à-vis the region whereas Southeast Asian countries have been successful to tame China’s territorial claims. However, China’s announcement in summer 2010 that the South China Sea belongs to its core interests illustrated that regional cooperation in Southeast Asia has to be further intensified.

Given China’s economic rise since the 1980s, it is not astonishing that intra-regional trade figures are high even if the share of ASEAN plus 3 in China’s overall trade has decreased from 33.14 percent in 2000 to 27.08 in 2009. Nevertheless China’s economic success is largely due to its domestic reforms which have allowed the country’s integration into the global economy.

**Central Asia**

China’s interest in the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) was driven mainly by security concerns. In 1996 China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan started a process of security cooperation with the Shanghai Five group that became the SCO in 2001. The strategic significance for China was first in confidence building measures with the neighbouring countries in Central Asia, second in fighting non-state security threats like terrorism, extremism, and separatism especially among the Muslim population in the Western parts of China, and thirdly to improve regional economic cooperation by infrastructure projects. SCO follows an intergovernmental approach and functional cooperation was only slowly introduced in 2005 with the creation of the SCO Business Council.

China’s motives in the creation of the SCO have been more proactive than defensive. China now has a greater interest in promoting a free trade area in SCO which is seen sceptically by the other members like Russia which will not be able to compete with China’s economic dynamics. With regard to the security cooperation the SCO seems to have a high functionality for China. It has allowed to manage relations with Russia and the CAR without confrontation and to address its own security concerns. Economic considerations have only played a minor role in China’s approach towards SCO. The SCO member states only have a share of 2.77 percent of China’s total trade.

31 Min Ye 2005, p. 25.
South Africa

Since the end of the Apartheid regime and the democratic transition in 1994 South Africa has become an important regional and global player. Under the leadership of Nelson Mandela, South Africa gained international reputation as an advocate of democracy, human rights, and non-proliferation.40 More than other of the BRIC countries South Africa has not only been active but also successful to promote and introduce its political, economic, and security norms and interests within regional organisations. This responsibility for regional affairs was regarded as a reaction for the support and solidarity that the government of the African National Congress (ANC) received from the African countries during his struggle against the Apartheid regime.41

Similar to India’s position in South Asia, South Africa is also a regional power by default if the economic indicators are compared. For instance, South Africa’s GDP is twice as large as the rest of the SADC countries combined. But again, the region is not attractive for South Africa’s economy. The share of SADC of South Africa’s total trade increased from 5.84 percent in 2000 to 7.89 percent in 2009. An even more modest picture appears if the trade figures between South Africa and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) are analyzed. NEPAD only has 3.78 percent of South Africa’s total trade compared the AU which has a share of 12.32 percent.

The low economic interaction has not hindered the South African governments to become active in shaping regional institutions. South Africa’s ideas became important for the development and work of regional organisations in the immediate neighbourhood like the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and on the continental level like the African Union (AU). From the beginning South Africa’s foreign policy promoted democracy and human rights. It was also among the first countries in Africa to re-conceptualize the notion of sovereignty. In contrast to the traditional understanding of non-interference and state impunity South Africa propagated the idea of responsibility and accountability in order to avoid massive human rights violations and genocide. These ideas were taken up at the United Nations but also found entrance in regional organisations like the AU which declared the promotion of democracy and human rights to one of its core principles. The security architecture of the AU with the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the African Standby Force (ASF) was also strongly influenced by South Africa’s ideas.42

South Africa has been an important player in setting regional norms with the NEPAD initiative in 2001 which advocated democracy and good governance and a regular monitoring of these norms.43 The peer review mechanism binds the member states to the idea of “pan African market liberalism”. South Africa’s engagement for its regional power status is also underlined by the fact that it takes a great share of cooperation costs for instance the maintenance of the Pan African Parliament, the NEPAD secretariat or voluntary contributions to the solidarity fund of the AU.44

Conclusion: Emerging Powers in Regional architecture: A blessing or a curse?

It is sometimes argued that emerging powers have a strong regional economic backing in order to promote their global aspirations.45 All of the BRICS countries can certainly be regarded as regional powers in their respective regions but it is unclear whether this linkage is necessary for their global aspirations. The definition of BRICS highlights their economic growth and future potential but their success is more dependent on domestic reforms or on integration into the global economy

45 See Kappel 2010
rather than on the regional (economic) architecture. The figures for intraregional trade and regional investment indicate that the region is still not a very relevant framework. Although emerging powers are often regarded as regional powers there is not an automatic link between both levels. Emerging (economic) powers would therefore have the same status even without their region.

Moreover, regional engagement of emerging powers is not very rewarding for their own ambitions. Even when they provide regional public goods like security, investment or market access they hardly do get the benefit of support for global aspirations. Emerging powers except for Russia and China as P 5 members, are always contested powers in their respective regional framework similar to the case of Brazil and Venezuela, India and Pakistan, or South Africa and Nigeria. The political and economic investment therefore seems hardly to be very lucrative. But if regional powers are powerful according to economic, demographic and military indicators and are investing in regional collective goods why are neighbouring states reluctant to recognize their regional and global ambitions?

First, most regional and emerging powers lack the capacities to transform their economic resources into foreign policy capabilities. Economic growth rates or military superiority do not automatically translate into influence or followership in neighbouring countries even less so in the era of globalisation and economic interdependence. Secondly, it is often overlooked that there are different levels of analysis at play. In the economic and military sphere material imbalances between states can easily be identified and may lead to inferences of power and influence. In the political sphere, however, which deals with questions of recognition and followership states meet on the basis of sovereignty and equality as defined by international law so that the question of followership does not arise. Therefore, the transfer of such a rationalistic argument that equates imbalances with dependency and influence does not correspond with the political rationality of sovereign equality in the international and regional organisations in which big and small countries have the same voice despite all their material differences.

The regional architecture is therefore probably often more of a curse because the investments of regional/emerging powers to provide regional public goods is mostly not rewarded by respective returns like recognition of regional leadership or support for global ambitions or a permanent seat in the UNSC. But in an era of economic and political interdependence, neighbours do matter whether you like them or not. The engagement in regional architecture therefore remains important in order to cope with trans-national challenges like migration, terrorism, drug and human trafficking and environmental issues irrespective of the economic benefits. Nevertheless, it is not a necessary condition for the global aspirations of emerging powers.