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## **The State of Defence Cooperation in Europe**

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## Introduction

The Euro-Atlantic security architecture is changing. The U.S. retreat from Europe and the strategic reorientation to Asia have sound the alarm bells in European capitals and raised the urgency of the issue of European defence. European Union and NATO Member States had to acknowledge that they had to do more to assure Europe's defence in the future. Although the demand for greater burden-sharing in the Alliance is not new, it could not have come at worse a time. Against the backdrop of the financial crisis and reduced funds allocated to defence, European states are faced with the challenge of raising their military capabilities to counteract the U.S. shift in focus at times where they lack the financial means to do so. Further, European states have scrapped military capabilities in an uncoordinated manner and thereby increased capability gaps. Thus, the chronically underdeveloped military capabilities across Europe are in danger of decaying further not only due to reduced defence budgets but also because of a lack of cooperation and coordination among the Europeans.

To deal with this dilemma, the EU and NATO have introduced the concepts of 'Pooling & Sharing' (P&S) and 'Smart Defence' respectively. The idea is that Member States can collectively save money and retain their capabilities by seeking savings in collaboration with one another, focus their defence funds on key projects, and specialise in distinct military tasks. By cooperating in the procurement and maintenance of future generations of weapons, sharing training facilities, and scrapping outdated military equipment, Member States save money and increase the military efficiency of their defence equipment.

This working paper records the most prominent initiatives and assesses their progress and achievements so far. This shall contribute to a better understanding of what works, and what does not – so far. It assesses the existing cooperation through the lens of three predefined layers: 1) EU/NATO level initiatives, 2) multilateral initiatives, and 3) bilateral initiatives. The sections will discuss both, the declared goals of these initiatives and how they developed.

## EU & NATO Initiatives

### EU Level Initiatives

#### Pooling & Sharing: What is P & S?

The term Pooling and Sharing is an EU-led concept used to describe different types of defence cooperation in Europe. In the Council conclusions on military capability development of December 2010, the EU states declared that P&S was a solution with which they planned to save money and increase the military efficiency of their resources. NATO is pursuing similar aims with its Smart Defence initiative, officialised at the Alliance's summit in Chicago in May 2012.

**Pooling:** National capabilities are provided to other Member states via a multinational structure which pools those capabilities and coordinates their use. The European Air Transport Command is an example of a pooled capability. Pooling can also be used in the development, procurement, maintenance and usage of equipment. This way, a capability can be acquired jointly which one state on its own could not afford to maintain due to high costs. An example is the procurement and maintenance of AWACS aircraft.

**Sharing:** If one or more countries make a capability or specific equipment available to other Member States or take on one task for others, they "share" the capability. If this occurs over the long-term, Member States can save this capability. An example is the air policing of the Baltic airspace through NATO Allies, as the Baltic States do not have to set up an air force on their own.

The so-called "**Ghent Initiative**" (November 2010) is generally recognized as the starting point for P&S. Following a German-Swedish initiative, EU defence ministers identified at the 2010 Ghent Ministerial Meeting several projects on which they could cooperate by pooling and sharing defence capabilities to reduce costs and avoid duplication. The goal of the initiative was to maintain and enhance national military capabilities and simultaneously improve interoperability, military efficiency, sustainability, and cut costs. Following the initiative, the European Defence Agency (EDA) should provide a framework and support for P&S opportunities. It was tasked to generate proposals on how European P&S could be facilitated by identifying common areas and projects where Member States could cooperate.<sup>1</sup> The overall goal is to

<sup>1</sup> Cf. "Council Decision 2011/411/CFSP of 12 July 2011 defining the statute, seat and operational rules of the European

support European capability improvement by collectively addressing European capability gaps.

As a result, the EDA had initiated several P&S projects to tackle such critical capability shortfalls (cf. Table 1). While some projects have advanced in 2012, notably the Air-to-Air Refuelling Project and the European Satellite Communication Procurement Cell, others lack the political support from Member States, such as the Intelligence, Surveillance Reconnaissance Project or the Naval Training Programme. They have hence not progressed. In 2012/2013, four new projects were launched by the EDA, thereby expanding the P&S portfolio: the Cyber Defence project, the Route-Clearance Counter-IED project, the European Air Transport Training and the EDA projects on the NH90.

In proposing a “**Code of Conduct on Pooling & Sharing**” (November 2012), the EDA has aimed to provide an important impetus for further progress. The aim is to develop a systematic approach to cooperative efforts of EU Member States. The Code asks Member States to systematically consider cooperation in national defence planning from the outset and for the whole life-cycle of a capability. Also, it requests from Member States to share opportunities that could be open to P&S as well as to take into account the joint use of existing capabilities to improve the effectiveness and interoperability, and to increase potential savings. Regarding investments, the Code puts forward the idea that P&S projects should be given a higher degree of protection from potential cuts and for necessary investment in R&T for the development of future capabilities. Additionally, the Code aims for more coherence and transparency in cooperative capability development, the EDA facilitating the process by acting as a platform for information exchange. Finally, an annual state of play in P&S initiatives and an analysis of European defence capabilities are to be submitted by the EDA.

Yet, the Code is only politically binding, not legally. While the Member States have signed it, it is up to them to effectively implement it – political will hence remains in high demand. However, there are strong indications that progress in terms of palpable projects or initiatives are marginal.

The following table offers an overview over the projects launched within the Ghent-Initiative and their progress in 2013.

Defence Agency and repealing Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP“, <[http://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/documents/EDA\\_Council\\_Decision.pdf](http://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/documents/EDA_Council_Decision.pdf)>, retrieved 30.10.2013.

**Table 1: Ghent Projects (2013)**

Ghent Projects (2013)	Process	Progress 2012/2013
Air-to-Air Refuelling <sup>2</sup> (AAR)	AAR is a critical enabler for air power projection and a force multiplier. A considerable shortfall of this capability persists in Europe. Also, there is a substantial fragmentation of fleets (too many types, too small fleets). In terms of operational capacity and costs, this entails reduced overall efficiency. The main goals are to increase the overall refuelling capacity and make the procurement and use of this capability more affordable for participating states.	A Lol was signed by ten European states in November 2012. <sup>3</sup> They also agreed to set up a multi-role tanker transport capability until 2020.
Cyber Defence <sup>4</sup>	EDA is developing ad-hoc projects on training exercises, capability development and R&T, and deployable cyber defence kits for Headquarters.	The aim is to launch these projects by the end of 2013. EDA is preparing a roadmap for Cyber Defence Technologies and has established a liaison arrangement with the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn.
European Air Transport Fleet (EATF)	The aim is to develop solutions on how to make better use of existing and future military airlift assets. EDA supports transport training and seeks to establish a European Advanced Airlift Tactics Training Course (EAATTC).	
European Air Transport Training (EATT)	EATT is a block training event aiming at supporting interoperability and tactical awareness between tactical airlift users in the area of operations and training. The first multinational EATT exercise took place in June 2012.	
European Multimodal Transport Hubs	EDA has launched an analysis to assess how the cost-effectiveness of strategic transport assets, infrastructure in support of military, civil and disaster relief operations could be improved.	
European Satellite Communication Procurement Cell (ESCPC)	The ESCPC enables European militaries to buy Satcom services through cost effective schemes and to pool satellite communications.	The framework contract was signed in September 2012: Astrium is the first provider of satellite communications for MoDs. Hence, this project entered its initial operational capability. Five European states participate (FR, IT, POL, RO, UK) on pay-per-use basis, others can join. Governmental institutions may also make use of ESCPC.
Helicopter Training Programme (HTP)		The project is advancing. The range of tasks and the complexity of the project have increased. The Defence Ministers signed a program arrangement for life exercises covering the next ten years. EDA developed a sub-project consisting of a European Helicopter Tactics Instructors Course (EHTIC) to support further interoperability.
Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR)		No Member State has been willing to pursue ISR related P&S yet.

<sup>2</sup> EDA (3.05.2012): Factsheet Air-to-Air Refuelling, <<http://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/publications/publication-details/pub/factsheet-air-to-air-refueling>>, retrieved 15.10.2013.

<sup>3</sup> Benelux countries, Greece, Hungary, Poland, France, Norway, Portugal, and Spain.

<sup>4</sup> Hale, J. (24.05.2013), EDA Study Cites Cyber Training, Education, Gaps, in: Defence News.

Ghent Projects (2013)	Process	Progress 2012/2013
Maritime Surveillance (MARSUR) Networking		The network now counts 18 participating states and is to be fully operational by 2014. The project has been adopted as a Category B project within the EDA framework in 2012.
Medical Support/Medical Field Hospitals	Medical field hospitals/Multinational Modular Medical Units receive more attention as they are a scarce and expensive resource and thus well suited to P&S.	15 states have signed a DoI in March 2012. The project is ahead of schedule; the identification of common standards and training facilities are progressing with the aim of reaching operational capability by 2015.
Military SATCOM	In the period 2018-2025, military satellite communication assets will need to be replaced. Thus, the EDA launched a P&S proposal for the five European states that operate this military satellite communication tool to pool and share their future assets.	EDA presented its project 'Secure Telecom by Satellite' at a high-level seminar in June 2013 and action plans were discussed.
Military Transport Education Initiative		No update found.
Multinational Joint Headquarters Ulm	It will be used for multinational crisis management operations, potentially also as a framework for EU Battlegroups and NATO Rapid Response Force missions	The Commando in Ulm has been set up as Multinational Joint Headquarters Ulm (July 2013). 17 countries have yet to accept the invitation to contribute personnel..
Naval Logistics & Training		No update found.
Naval Reconnaissance/Pooling Maritime Patrol Aircrafts		No update found.
Naval Training	The goals are to improve the sharing of existing capabilities and the use of niche capabilities.	The project lacks participation from other European states.
NH90 Projects	This project offers the opportunity to provide substantive savings and to increase the effectiveness of the overall European NH90 fleet by sharing technical data and reducing logistic supply chains.	
Pilot Training	EDA is working on the harmonization of regulatory frameworks regarding a military pilot licensing system.	
Route Clearance Counter-IED (CIED)	This project could provide significant savings and operational benefits.	
Smart Munitions	The aim is to strengthen the EDTIB regarding ammunition. A working group was set up in mid 2012 to implement the roadmap on precision-guided ammunition.	The Baltic States agreed on a joint ammunition procurement program. Other states could join this program at a later stage.

## NATO Initiatives

In 2011, NATO has introduced the concept of “Smart Defence”, which has similar objectives as P&S. The general idea is again that the Alliance’s members can collectively save money while maintaining capabilities if they collaborate with each other. Specifically, smart defence has three main components: Prioritisation, cooperation and specialisation. The first refers to aligning national capabilities more closely to NATO capability goals, while the second key point refers to the pooling of military capability among Allies to save money and enhance interoperability. Yet it is the third component – specialisation – which is the most difficult to achieve as it directly impacts on member states’ sovereignty.<sup>5</sup> NATO’s potential role to achieve a coherent set of capabilities would especially be in coordinating the specialisation process. But ultimately the implementation depends upon active member state engagement. This is the key challenge facing deeper defence collaboration: Member states choose what projects they want to undertake. It is thus essentially a bottom-up approach.

Currently, there are **28 multinational Smart Defence projects** covering a wide range of capabilities (cf. Table 2).

However, most projects are rather ‘light’: Instead of focusing on critical and expensive capabilities, the Alliance’s members opted for cooperation on maintenance of equipment and joint training.<sup>6</sup> The joint procurement of critical equipment has not yet moved up on the states’ agendas.

In addition, Smart Defence has given renewed impetus to four ongoing *strategic programmes*.<sup>7</sup> The first is a programme on NATO’s **Missile Defence** capability. The goal is to develop a Ballistic Missile Defence system as a collective capability and thus jointly achieve better protection from ballistic missiles than any Ally

could provide alone. At this moment, the U.S. provide the majority of assets, while European Allies add complementary assets such as Patriot missiles and radar-carrying ships. **Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS)** is a second strategic programme. The AGS is meant to use drones with sophisticated surveillance systems to provide i.a. real-time information on theatres of operation from high altitude. **NATO Air Policing** is the third strategic programme. It aims to build NATO’s experience in the Baltic States and develop air policing on a regional basis. This programme is particularly relevant as many Allies are faced with the challenge of replacing aging aircraft over the next decade. The pooling and sharing of existing and future air assets is especially useful as it avoids additional defence spending on capabilities that are already available in the Alliance. The fourth strategic programme is the **Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR)** programme. It aims at improving the collection, processing and sharing of key information coming from various national surveillance assets.

While Smart Defence aims at pooling countries’ buying power to build up shared capabilities, the **Connected Forces Initiative (CFI)** is focused on a series of measures in the field of education, training, exercises and technology.<sup>8</sup> The political declaration providing the conceptual basis for the initiative was first agreed upon at the Chicago summit in 2012. The CFI is meant as a reinforcement of Smart Defence. It is characterized by three different components: Education and training (focus on Centres of Excellence), more live exercises (particularly involving NATO Response Forces) and a better use of technology.<sup>9</sup>

The CFI remains a vague concept. The emphasis is on strengthening the interoperability of Allied Forces. To this end, the lessons learned from Allies’ and partners’ operations are meant to be applied to update and improve existing concepts and doctrines.<sup>10</sup> Also, the CFI is dependent upon active engagement and implementation of Member States. It remains to be seen to what extent governments succeed in implementing a coherent approach to strengthening interoperability.

<sup>5</sup> Giegerich, B. (2012): NATO’s Smart Defence: Who’s Buying?, *Survival*, 54(3), p. 70; cf. Major, C. & Mölling, C. (May 2013): Synergies between EU and NATO? Specialisation as the litmus test for “Smart Defence“ and “Pooling and Sharing“, FRS NORDIKA programme, <<http://www.frstrategie.org/barreFRS/publications/notes/2013/201312.pdf>>, retrieved 15.10.2013.

<sup>6</sup> Major, C., Mölling, C. & Valasek, T. (2012): Smart but too cautious: How NATO can improve its fight against austerity, CER Policy Brief, <[http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2012/pb\\_nato\\_21may12\\_2-5150.pdf](http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2012/pb_nato_21may12_2-5150.pdf)>, retrieved 15.10.2013.

<sup>7</sup> NATO Media Backgrounder (October 2013): Multinational Projects, <[http://www.nato.int/nato\\_static/assets/pdf/pdf\\_2013\\_10/20131018\\_131022-MediaBackgrounder\\_Multinational\\_Projects\\_en.pdf](http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2013_10/20131018_131022-MediaBackgrounder_Multinational_Projects_en.pdf)>, retrieved 5.11.2013

<sup>8</sup> Viereck, K. (2013): Connected Forces Initiative: Reshaping Priorities, <<http://www.act.nato.int/article-2013-1-4>>, retrieved 6.11.2013.

<sup>9</sup> Willschick, A. (3.03.2013): The Connected Forces Initiative: NATO’s (Im)practical Road to Interoperability, <<http://atlantic-council.ca/portfolio/the-connected-forces-initiative-natos-impractical-road-to-interoperability/>>, retrieved 6.11.2013.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

**Table 2: Multinational Projects NATO**

Project Name	Process
Alliance Defence Analysis and Planning for Transformation (ADAPT)	Provide contributing states with access to common analytic expertise in defence planning; contribute to interoperability, balance of defence investment decisions and efficiencies via economies of scale.
Centres of Excellence as Hubs of Education and Training	Specific centres of excellence will be given a lead role in education and training within their areas of expertise for the benefit of all nations with more efficient, effective and affordable training.
Computer Information Services (CIS) E-Learning Training Centres Network	Assist nations to develop personnel to plan, install and maintain computer networks through national CIS training institutions.
Counter IED – Biometrics	Provide comprehensive strategy for common standards and multinational training in countering IEDs.
Defensive Aids Suite (DAS)	Bring together systems to counter threats posed to aircraft operating in a combat environment; increased allied interoperability, increased operational flexibility within fleets and cost savings.
Deployable Contract Specialist Group	Creation of a pool of contract specialists with expertise in NATO procedures to establish and monitor contracts in theatres of operation.
Development of Personnel Reserve Capabilities	Develop cost-effective personnel reserve capabilities that can be used domestically or in multinational operations; includes multinational training and educational programmes.
Dismantling, Demilitarization and Disposal of Military Equipment	Ensure that demilitarized equipment will no longer be used in offensive or defensive capacity, provide procedures for the efficient logistics support of dismantling and disposal requirements.
Establishment of a Multinational Geospatial Support Group (GSG)	Provide enhanced standardized geospatial information to NATO planning and operations.
Female Leaders in Security and Defence	Develop human resources by integrating diversity and gender perspectives into strategic planning, capabilities development and force preparedness; promote the role of women as key contributors to innovative approaches to defence and security.
Harbour Protection	Provide deployable multinational harbour protection capability to protect vessels and infrastructure; based on a modular system that can be tailored to specific operational situations.
Immersive Training Environments	Share development and use of advanced computer systems for the training of soldiers, airmen and sailors.
Individual Training and Education Programmes	Provide more efficient, effective and affordable training for personnel assigned to NATO peacetime and crisis establishment training institutions.
Joint Logistics Support Group (JLSG HQ)	Save manpower and resources with the establishment of a trained multinational joint logistics support group headquarters, providing more efficient logistics at theatre level.
Multinational Aviation Training Centre (MATC)	Provide training to helicopter pilots and ground crews.
Multinational Cooperation on Munitions (Munition Life-Cycle Management)	Enable more flexible exchange of munitions.
Multinational Cyber Defence Capability Development (MNCD2)	Facilitate the development of cyber defence capabilities within NATO nations to prepare for, prevent, detect, respond to and recover from attacks.
Multinational Joint Headquarters Ulm	Deployable multinational joint headquarters, contribute to NATO and EU operations.
Multinational Logistics Partnership – Mine Resistant Ambush Vehicle (MRAP) maintenance	Facilitate economies of scale on maintenance of deployed equipment.
Multinational Logistics Partnership for fuel Handling	Optimize provision of fuel to deployed forces through multinational partnership.
Multinational Military Flight Crew Training	Shared use of basic and undergraduate pilot and flight crew training.
NATO Universal Armaments Interface	Facilitate the flexible use of available munitions across the Alliance.
P&S Multinational Medical Treatment Facilities	Develop standardized modular medical facilities.
Pooling CBRN Capabilities	Pool existing national CBRN protective capabilities to create a multinational CBRN battalion framework and conduct multinational training and exercises; improve interoperability through training and exercises.
Pooling Maritime Patrol Aircraft	Create multinational pool of maritime patrol aircraft, enabling more flexible use of available assets.
Pooling of Deployable Air Activation Modules (DAAM)	Create deployable airbase by pooling components required for deployable airfields in support of operations.
Remotely controlled robots for clearing roadside bombs	Promote joint procurement of best remotely controlled robots for route clearance and facilitate multinational cooperation on deployment.
Theatre Opening Capability	Build joint expeditionary capability for cooperation in establishment, operation and conduct of cargo handling in forward nodes.



## Multilateral Defence Initiatives

As mentioned previously, European states engage in several bilateral and multilateral P&S initiatives which they pursue independently from their NATO and EU projects. Generally, most initiatives build upon existing cooperation frameworks. They can be divided into regional clusters (NORDEFECO, Visegrád 4) and into clusters based on the Member States' will to cooperate (Weimar Triangle).

### Weimar Triangle

In April 2010, France, Germany and Poland launched the Weimar Triangle CSDP initiative. They proposed reforming the EU Battlegroups (BGs), setting up an EU headquarters, reinvigorating EU-NATO relations through concrete projects, and jointly develop military capabilities on EU level.<sup>11</sup> In January 2011, the three countries submitted the initiative to the EU High Representative (HR) Catherine Ashton, who subsequently tasked the EEAS to come up with proposals. In July 2011, the HR then presented her CSDP report which picked up most of the Weimar proposal. Besides, the three Weimar countries were joined by Italy and Spain ("Weimar Plus"). The five again submitted a joint letter to the HR September 2011, supporting the Weimar proposals.<sup>12</sup>

Yet, although all EU Member States except the UK welcomed the initiative, they did not push for its implementation. The activation of the EU Operations Centre in 2012 is a modest success of this cooperation. But apart from that most of the agreed upon goals have so far not been reached. The French MoD Le Drian revived the initiative in 2012, but no other concrete steps are to date known. Weimar Triangle states will continue their cooperation in the Battlegroup, which they set up in the first half of 2013.

### Weimar Plus

In November 2012, the Foreign Affairs Ministers and Ministers of Defence of Germany, France, Poland, Spain and Italy (Weimar Plus) signed a Declaration on European Defence<sup>13</sup> to support an ambitious European

policy in the realm of security and defence. A main issue addressed is to strengthen cooperation efforts on high added-value capacities, such as air-to-air refuelling. To achieve this goal, they propose the adjustment and extension of the European Air Transport Command (EATC) to include other Member States. Also, they want to reinforce the EDTIB. Moreover, synergies in defence related R&T activities are to be strengthened, with the support of the EDA.

### NORDEFECO

In 2009, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden signed the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFECO) MoU. The initial goal was to expand military and industrial cooperation in the region. The MoU merged three previously existing cooperative frameworks. Nordac (1994) had been initiated to enhance closer cooperation in developing, procuring and maintaining defence material. Nordcaps (1997) was a framework used to organize peace support education and training for joint military peace support missions between the Scandinavian countries. Nordsup (2008) was an effort to identify more than 140 areas where cooperation among the Scandinavian states is possible and necessary to retain defence capabilities. The Baltic States were officially invited to join NORDEFECO in 2011, yet they still have to adhere.

NORDEFECO states continue to cooperate in a wide range of capabilities. The Nordic countries have signed an agreement on joint tactical air transport cooperation. So far, the principal aim is to cooperate more closely on the maintenance of airlift assets<sup>14</sup>. This Nordic Tactical Air Transport (NORTAT) wing would enhance the availability of aircraft.<sup>15</sup> Also, NORDEFECO is assessing the possibility of setting up a joint Nordic command and control system for tactical air transport, and further, launch a joint Nordic air transport command.<sup>16</sup> Yet, the set-up of a Nordic Air Wing that

Defence of France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain" (15.11.2012), <<http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/631176/publicationFile/174180/121115-BMWeimarPlusParis-Kommunique.pdf>>, retrieved 7.08.2013.

<sup>14</sup> For example, Lockheed Martin C-130J Super Hercules, operated by Norway and Denmark.

<sup>15</sup> O'Dwyer, G. (21.06.2013): Proposed Nordic Joint Tactical Air Transport Wing Progresses, Defence News, <<http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130621/DEFREG01/306210012/Proposed-Nordic-Joint-Tactical-Air-Transport-Wing-Progresses>>, retrieved 30.06.2013.

<sup>16</sup> De Larrinaga, N. (7.11.2012): Nordic nations sign transport aircraft cooperation agreement, Jane's Defence Weekly.

<sup>11</sup> Major, C., Wassenberg, F. (September 2011): Warsaw's Ambitious CSDP Agenda, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Comment, <[http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2011C25\\_mjr\\_wsb\\_ks.pdf](http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2011C25_mjr_wsb_ks.pdf)>, retrieved 5.11.2013.

<sup>12</sup> Major, C (December 2012): Viele europäische Soldaten, aber keine europäische Armee, Genshagener Papiere, Nr. 10.

<sup>13</sup> "Meeting of the Foreign Affairs Ministers and Ministers of

could potentially share the surveillance of Nordic airspace is unlikely in the near future.<sup>17</sup> Additionally, several joint Nordic logistic initiatives are under review.<sup>18</sup>

In January 2013, Sweden proposed a Nordic Defence Pact as a means to strengthen Nordic defence cooperation. A Nordic Declaration on Solidarity has already been signed in 2011, but the proposed Nordic Defence Pact would go further. The idea is to pool and share military equipment and capabilities so as to effectively create joint air, naval and land forces units to take on Nordic defence roles. The proposal has been received positively by other Nordic states. Though the general prospect of a broader Nordic defence agreement is a possibility, it is however rather something envisaged for the long-term: As Finland's defence minister Carl Haglund pointed out, this type of agreement would require a treaty-based formal defence agreement because fundamental capabilities would be affected, i.e. the Navy or the Air Forces.<sup>19</sup> Also it is unclear how aligned countries Denmark and Norway could be included in such a Defence Pact.

On a more practical basis, Sweden has proposed to establish a joint Nordic Battalion Force (NBF) to be activated in 2016. As it would act as a regional force, it could thus be a separate force to the Swedish-led EU Nordic Battlegroup. The proposal was brought forward following a long period of politically induced reductions of national defence capabilities in response to reassessments of the perceived military threats. The NBF could contribute to the protection of Nordic territories, but it would require the signing of defence agreements and has therefore been met with scepticism by other Nordic states.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>17</sup> O'Dwyer, G. (21.06.2013): Proposed Nordic Joint Tactical Air Transport Wing Progresses, Defence News, <<http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130621/DEFREG01/306210012/Proposed-Nordic-Joint-Tactical-Air-Transport-Wing-Progresses>>, retrieved 30.06.2013.

<sup>18</sup> O'Dwyer, G. (17.07.2013), Nordic Logistics Collaboration Stalls, Defence News, <<http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130717/DEFREG01/307170018/Nordic-Logistics-Collaboration-Stalls>>, retrieved 20.07.2013.

<sup>19</sup> Staalesen, A. (15.01.2013): Nordic Countries might share guns, Barents Observer, <<http://barentsobserver.com/en/security/2013/01/nordic-countries-might-share-guns-15-01>>, retrieved 12.11.2013.

<sup>20</sup> O'Dwyer, G. (25.07.2013): Sweden Proposes Nordic Battalion Force Plan, Defence News, <<http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130725/DEFREG01/307250013/Sweden-Proposes-Nordic-Battalion-Force-Plan>>, retrieved 28.07.2013.

Another cooperation initiative is the "Cross-Border Training" agreement between the air forces of the Nordic Countries: The respective air wings can conduct short joint exercises on each other's territory, without the explicit permission from their respective governments.<sup>21</sup> Although this is not a P&S project, it can be regarded as a development of the SVENORDA-cooperation from the Cold War days. This cooperation allowed the respective air forces<sup>22</sup> to land at each other's airbases in case of an emergency.

The launch of the Joint Nordic Defence Industry Cooperation Group (JNDICG) is an interesting development, though not directly associated with NORDEFECO. It was established in February 2013. The principal goal is to support and strengthen cooperation among the countries' procurement agencies and governments and to bolster the competitiveness of the Nordic defence industry.

The statutes of NORDEFECO do not mention the maintenance of a sustainable Nordic industrial base as a goal. Yet, theoretically, the option exists to add an industrial cooperation dimension to enable JNDICG and NORDEFECO to engage more effectively with each other, and thereby improve industrial cooperation.<sup>23</sup>

A first step in harmonizing defence industrial cooperation would be to develop a more synchronized approach to the planning of new procurement programs. But increased harmonization among the Nordic states, where two are NATO-member states, three are EU-Member States and one is outside the EDA, is complicated, to say the least.

### Visegrád Group

Established in 1991, the aim of the Visegrád Group (also V4: Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland) was to promote closer cooperation among the countries following the break-up of the Soviet Union. The Visegrád Group played a particularly important role during the talks with NATO and the EU. In the mid-1990s, the intensity of cooperation has decreased. The framework was revived again since the turn of the century, yet cooperation in defence related matters is still rather vague.

For instance, V4 countries are still identifying areas for potential cooperation, but specific projects have

<sup>21</sup> In northern Scandinavia, it involves Norway's, Sweden's and Finland's air forces, and in the south, Sweden's and Denmark's.

<sup>22</sup> Finland was excluded from this cooperation due to the military-political circumstances of the Cold War.

<sup>23</sup> Defence News (11.02.2013): Interview with Frank Bill.

not yet been initiated. Though certain recent initiatives concerning joint training and exercises are taking shape, in most areas identified for cooperation, no projects have been started.<sup>24</sup> The long foreseen Visegrád Battlegroup (V4BG) is an exception, and it is to reach full operational capability in 2016. Nevertheless, several operational and technical difficulties have appeared. A major obstacle to cooperation is the wide gap in military expenditures and capabilities between the four countries. The gap could prove to be a problem for defence cooperation, because the harmonisation of defence planning, procurement schedules and objectives is difficult with regard to the different means available.<sup>25</sup>

An important step to further P&S in the region could be the Visegrád Battlegroup. Since the V4 have similar equipment that will need to be replaced on similar timelines, the joint procurement of equipment would not only lead to savings but could also increase the interoperability of their forces.<sup>26</sup> To achieve this, industrial cooperation among the V4 could be valuable. However, industrial cooperation is highly underdeveloped – to some extent because the defence industries suffer from underinvestment and old infrastructure. Consequently, V4 countries prefer to cooperate with external partners, and cooperation within the V4 framework is only regarded as a “second best” option.<sup>27</sup>

## BENELUX

Defence cooperation among Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg has existed for a long time. The Declaration on cooperation in the field of defence, signed in April 2012, has given a new impetus to deepen and widen BENELUX defence cooperation.

The Belgian-Dutch naval cooperation is the benchmark for the renewed BENELUX defence cooperation. However, cooperation now incorporates many other elements. In the area of education and training most progress has been made, with the decision to establish a joint para training school (Schaffen, Belgium) by the end of 2013.<sup>28</sup> In air policing, progress has also been made, as the protection of the BENELUX air space is to become a shared activity of Belgium and the Netherlands.

However, despite these successes, BENELUX defence cooperation remains structured on a project-by-project basis.<sup>29</sup> Though many cooperation projects bear a lot of potential, they are still in the planning or feasibility phase. Also considerable work still needs to be done on more difficult areas of cooperation, such as common training and maintenance of the NH-90 helicopter and a Joint and Combined Helicopter Command.<sup>30</sup> Additionally, more tangible medium to long term results could be achieved if defence procurement plans were aligned among the three states. If the BENELUX countries would for example procure the same platform (e.g. future replacement of M-frigates and F-16, as well as procurement of transport aircraft), the integration of training, maintenance, logistics and the collocation of equipment would allow for deeper cooperation and cost-sharing.

<sup>24</sup> Madej, M. (June 2013): Visegrad Group defense cooperation: what added value for the European capabilities?, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, note n°19/2013, <<http://www.frstrategie.org/barreFRS/publications/notes/2013/201319.pdf>>, retrieved 20.07.2013.

<sup>25</sup> Muzyka, K. (25.04.2013): Problems emerge as the Visegrad group pushes ahead with battlegroup, in: Jane's Defence Weekly.

<sup>26</sup> Suplata, M. (April 2013): The Visegrad Battlegroup: Building new capabilities for the region, GLOBSEC Policy Brief, <<http://www.globsec.org/globsec2013/uploads/documents/Policy%20Papers/PB5.pdf>>, retrieved 3.08.2013.

<sup>27</sup> Madej, M. (June 2013): Visegrad Group defense cooperation: what added value for the European capabilities?, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, note n°19/2013, <<http://www.frstrategie.org/barreFRS/publications/notes/2013/201319.pdf>>, retrieved 20.07.2013.

<sup>28</sup> Biscop, S., Coelmont, J., Drent, M. and Zandee, D. (April 2013): The Future of the BENELUX Defence Cooperation, Clingendael/Egmont Report, <<http://www.egmontinstitute.be/speechnotes/13/130513-Future-Benelux-Defence-Cooperation.pdf>>, retrieved 25.06.2013.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

## Bilateral Defence Initiatives

There are many bilateral defence cooperation initiatives, but only a few have been successful and have led to tangible results. The following bilateral defence initiatives are promising examples.

### Franco-British Defence Cooperation

The Declaration on Defence and Security Cooperation signed in 2010 between France and the UK identifies 13 areas in which they seek to further cooperation. They agreed to establish expeditionary forces under alternating command, jointly use aircraft carriers, cooperate on nuclear research, jointly develop UAS, jointly train pilots, and jointly maintain the A400M, among other projects identified.

However, the two countries have different ambitions: The British want to keep the initiative a bilateral instrument, while the French are more open to the idea of inviting other EU Member States to join and develop it into a European defence framework.<sup>31</sup> Some came to the conclusion that cooperation among the two partners had come to a 'strategic pause', as the cooperation process was slowed down by last year's French elections and the strategic review of the French *Livre Blanc*. Also, the signature of a Letter of Intent between France and Germany in June 2012 has raised concerns in London.

Despite these developments, some success can be attributed to the bilateral initiative, notably the setting up of the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) has made some progress with several exercises (Flanders, EPIAS, Corsican Lion, Joint Fire and Joint Warrior planned for autumn 2013 etc.). The exercises are likely to increase the interoperability between the two armed forces. It is expected that the CJEF is to reach full operational capability by 2016. It is envisaged to be used as an 'initial entry force' (high spectrum) with modular land, sea and air capacities.<sup>32</sup> Following a February 2012 summit, the cooperation in

<sup>31</sup> O'Donnell, C. M. (July 2013): The trials and tribulations of European defence co-operation, Centre for European Reform (CER), <<http://www.cer.org.uk/publications/archive/policy-brief/2013/trials-and-tribulations-european-defence-co-operation>>, retrieved 16.08.2013.

<sup>32</sup> Drent, M., Homan, K. & Zandee, D. (May 2013): Bold Steps in Multinational Cooperation: Taking European Defence Forward, Clingendael Report, <<http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Bold%20Steps%20in%20Multinational%20Cooperation.pdf>>, retrieved 20.07.2013.

this area received new input with the decision to establish a combined joint expeditionary headquarters.<sup>33</sup>

Also, cooperation in the nuclear domain is advancing with the EPURE nuclear testing site in Valduc and the TEUTATES technological development centre in Aldermaston. The process and site construction is ongoing and is expected to be finished by 2016.

At a meeting of Defence ministers in July 2012, cooperation on Future Combat Air Systems (FCAS) was restated: The plan to jointly develop an unmanned FCAS envisaged by Dassault and BAE is still on the table and a joint demonstrator for the unmanned FCAS is expected in 2020.

Yet, a considerable setback was the end of the project to jointly develop aircraft carriers, following the dismissal of British plans to fit an aircraft carrier with catapults<sup>34</sup>. This decision de facto inhibits further interoperability in this key strategic area, because French planes will not be able to land on British carriers. An integrated carrier force that was supposed to be operational by 2020 is therefore also impeded. The British decision suggests that Franco-British cooperation is out-balanced by budgetary constraints and the special relationship with the U.S.<sup>35</sup>

Cooperation on the A400M, air refuelling and satellite communication have also run into obstacles, as several political, technological and budgetary constraints complicate the cooperation process. Among others, reconnaissance is a point of disagreement: While both Britain and France consider operating the observation drone Watchkeeper, it has been delayed. Also, the status of the joint development of the MALE drone Telemos between Dassault and BAE is unclear.

<sup>33</sup> Gomis, B., (2013): Entre Londres et Berlin: le difficile rééquilibrage stratégique français et son impact sur la PSDC, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, note n°20/13, <<http://www.frstrategie.org/barreFRS/publications/notes/2013/201320.pdf>>, retrieved 20.08.2013.

<sup>34</sup> Védérine, H. (14.11.2012): Report for the President of the French Republic on the consequences of France's return to NATO's integrated military command, on the future of transatlantic relations and the outlook for the Europe of Defence, <<http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/global-issues/defence-security/french-defence/international-organization/nato/france-and-nato/article/hubert-vedrine-report-submitted-to>>, retrieved 16.06.2013.

<sup>35</sup> Gomis, B., (2013): Entre Londres et Berlin: le difficile rééquilibrage stratégique français et son impact sur la PSDC, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, note n°20/13, <<http://www.frstrategie.org/barreFRS/publications/notes/2013/201320.pdf>>, retrieved 20.08.2013.

### German-Dutch Defence Cooperation

The German and Dutch Ministers of Defence signed a Declaration of Intent (DoI) in May 2013. The overall aim is to strengthen and increase the existing defence cooperation. The integration of the Dutch 11th Airmobile Brigade into the German Division Schnelle Kräfte (DSK) by January 2014 is one of the major steps taken that is likely to facilitate interoperability and common planning. Further, the ground-based air and missile defence units are to deepen their cooperation, with the aim of establishing a German-Dutch staff and expanding cooperation in maintenance. Also, there is a potential for strengthening cooperation in the field of maintenance, education and training of helicopters, as both countries are partners in the NH-90 programme. Furthermore, regarding submarine construction, the two countries seek to work more closely together. Moreover, seeing that both countries are currently in the planning phase for the procurement of a MALE UAS, several opportunities for cooperation could arise, should they decide to acquire the same system.<sup>36</sup>

### German-Polish Defence Cooperation

The German and Polish Ministers of Defence signed a DoI to enhance maritime cooperation in May 2013.<sup>37</sup> The cooperation in the field of submarines and the establishment of a DEU-POL Submarine Operating Authority are the most interesting elements.<sup>38</sup> 28 projects are listed in the annex of the DoI – among others, cooperation on operational activities, joint training, exercises, and education, exchange of knowledge and personnel, logistic support and capability development, and procurement of selected naval platforms and weapon systems.

Seeing that the Polish Navy has not yet been a priority in the Polish military modernization plans, new

submarines would face funding challenges.<sup>39</sup> As an unconfirmed report suggests, the German Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support (BAAIN) is considering leasing two of the Deutsche Marine's U212A submarines to Poland. In this case, a common operating authority could facilitate such an arrangement: Poland would not incur the costs of procuring new submarines, could even save money by decommissioning old ones, while Germany could save operating expenses as it would only have to maintain four instead of the six planned deliveries.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>36</sup> "Declaration of Intent between the Federal Minister of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Minister of Defence of the Kingdom of the Netherlands on the further Enhancement of Bilateral Relations in the Field of Defence" (28.05.2013).

<sup>37</sup> "Declaration of Intent between the Federal Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Minister of National Defence of the Republic of Poland on Enhanced Maritime Cooperation" (27.05.2013), <<http://augengeradeaus.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/DEU-POL-Marine-DoI.pdf>>, retrieved 07.08.2013.

<sup>38</sup> Defence Industry Daily (22.07.2013): German Submarines for Poland?, <<http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/german-submarines-for-poland-015457/>>, retrieved 7.08.2013.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

## Conclusion

Cooperation has been generally accepted as the best solution – but European States do not implement it in a joint spirit. The political incentive to cooperate is often missing, and most European states have not yet engaged into substantial efforts supporting coordination and cooperation on EU or NATO level. Some of the currently highlighted cooperation frameworks have existed for years, such as among the Nordic States or the Benelux countries. Others have been spurred by the financial crisis, such as between France and the UK.

The Pooling & Sharing and Smart Defense initiatives caused much hope, initially. Yet, resulting outcomes from the various initiatives are not yet adequate to the size of the problems. New efforts like the Gent initiative again rely on traditional methods of multinational defence cooperation, which haven't been very effective do far. Hence, the new projects will not add much to the approximately one hundred others that already exist.

The idea that individual states can initiate successful projects to improve collective capabilities for defence (bottom-up-approach) has not proven successful so far. Governments hold up the premise of national sovereignty and thus focus their activities on the national horizon instead of a common one, i.e. a European defence policy that supports EU and NATO. Thus, states are limiting a priori the bandwidth of potential joint projects to particular military capabilities they are interested in, instead of facing the question which contribution to common objectives they could make.

The Franco-British Lancaster House Treaty constitutes an exception only in some parts: both states agreed on considerable dependencies. But old limits are apparent: joint acquisitions or imports from the partner remain exceptions. National capital is invested in favour of the own industry. This would be blocking future common projects like the development of UAVs.

A patchwork of bi- and multilateral cooperation initiatives has emerged in Europe. Recent multilateral cooperation frameworks either prosper while getting (over-)ambitious or they develop new branches with solid but very limited project-based cooperation, leaving policy aside, or they wither. Either way, these projects undermine the objective of a commonly EU- or NATO framed defence policy and capability. The only political high level cooperation that bore some fruit were Lancaster House and NORDEFECO. In Lancaster

House, two heavy weights have created and added value across a whole range of assets. In contrast, NORDEFECO is a valuable contribution of lightweights, which are nonetheless willing to commit.

The short-term perspective suggests that bilateral cooperation initiatives work better because it delivers palpable outcome. The BENELUX countries and the German bilateral cooperation initiatives with the Netherlands and Poland offer potential benefits not only for themselves. They could also act as examples of successful joined procurement efforts or the joined leasing of equipment.

Yet, in a long-term perspective bilateral cooperation may be not enough or even counterproductive. Increased military effectiveness and economic efficiency can only surface if Member States pursue durable commitments and build sustainable structures of cooperation. The instant success of small but palpable projects risks diverting the ever more limited resources and political attention from the thorny question of how to achieve sustainable and long-term multilateral cooperation. Such multilateral cooperation is not an aim in itself but born out of necessity because bilateral cooperation does not suffice when huge efforts need to be made in terms of investment (UAVs), capabilities (C-17 Initiative/SALIS or EATC) or political solidarity (EUFOR Atalanta).

**Table 3: Important P&S Initiatives, 2010-2013**

Cooperation Framework	Goals	Status 2010/11	Progress *)	Status 2011/12 (May 2012)	Progress	Status 2012/2013 (July 2013)
Weimar Triangle (1992): Germany, France, Poland	In the military realm: Battlegroups, Capability development Permanent integrated civil-military planning and command capability.	No concrete successes in terms of tangible cooperation projects achieved. Modest success as planning capability has been established.	☐	Weimar Battlegroups 2013 – had been agreed upon prior to the initiative. France has lost its interest in the initiative after the Polish EU Council Presidency 2011. None of the agreed upon goals has so far been reached.	↗/≈	French MoD Le Drian revived the initiative in 2012.
Weimar Plus (2012): Germany, France, Poland, Spain, Italy						Member States seek to support an ambitious European policy in the realm of security and defence. One of the major issues mentioned is to step up cooperation efforts on high added-value capacities, such as drones and air-to-air refuelling.
NORDEFECO (2009): Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Iceland	Joint training, common procurement, exercises, role sharing	Agreement on joint Nordic Exercise Strategy for military training and exercise (2012-2017); official proposal for Baltic States to join NORDEFECO.	↗/≈	Common procurement of new howitzers (Norway and Sweden) and a common transport aircraft, talks about the use of the Finnish airspace for the training of Swedish pilots.	↗	Creation of Nordic Tactical Air Transport (NORTAT) wing. Potential amendment of NORDEFECO charter to add industrial cooperation dimension.
Visegrád Group (V4) (1991): Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Rep	Cooperation in the defence sector	Agreement to set up Battlegroup by 2016; slow steps towards formulating common V4 defence and security policy.	≈	The V4 will put in place a Battlegroup in 2016. Talks about the joint procurement of machine guns, agreed upon cooperation in air operations, CBRN, training of helicopter pilots, cooperation regarding logistics and aircraft.	≈	Further talks on joint logistics, CBRN defence, helicopter pilot training, joint construction of armoured vehicles and munitions, integrated command and control systems.
Franco-British Defence Cooperation “Lancaster House Treaty” (November 2010): France, UK	Concrete measures in thirteen areas, among others expeditionary forces under alternating command, common usage of aircraft carriers and nuclear research facilities; training and instruction of pilots, and maintenance of A400M, Development of UAS	Problems emerged regarding drones and armament projects, and the planned combined aircraft carrier capability.	↗	Expeditionary brigade trains together. Cooperation in nuclear testing has begun. Obvious problems regarding drones, joint sea based air power capability and armament projects.	≈	Successful training of French-British Combined Joint Expeditionary Brigade in October 2012. No joint development of aircraft carriers, therefore no interoperability in this area. Joint development of UAS is on hold.

Cooperation Framework	Goals	Status 2010/11	Progress *)	Status 2011/12 (May 2012)	Progress	Status 2012/2013 (July 2013)
Franco-German Defence Cooperation (1963): Germany, France	Deepen cooperation in the defence sector	Cooperation slowed down.	≈	Gained new momentum with the Declaration of the 6 <sup>th</sup> of February 2012; signing of declaration of intent on cooperation in joint procurement of tanks and artillery, and potentially missile defence. Cooperation regarding CSAR and heavy helicopters planned.	≈	Proposal by Germany and France (July 2013) with view to preparing the European Council on Security and Defence in December 2013. Cluster 1: Increase the effectiveness, visibility and impact of CSDP; cluster 2: increase the development of military capabilities; cluster 3: strengthen Europe's Defence Industry.
Dutch-German Defence Cooperation (2012): Netherlands, Germany	Integration of Air Mobile Brigade, intensify cooperation of ground-based air and missile defence units, knowledge-sharing on submarine construction	n.a.	≈	n.a.	↗	Ambitious roadmap for intensifying Army, Navy, Air Force cooperation.

\*) ↗: new development / increase in cooperation, ≈: no new developments / stagnation in cooperation, □: decrease in / end of cooperation, \*\*\*: no information available.