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Big and Small in Europe

Functions of the German-Finnish Relations
within the European Union

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1 Introduction¹

When the first international organisation with supranational powers, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), was established in 1951, the three big founding states, Germany, France and Italy, brought a present to the small founders, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg – “*die Morgengabe der Gleichberechtigung und Ebenbürtigkeit*”². The European integration process evolved, every state had a commissioner, chaired the Community in rotation, one vote in the Council and the Community Court applied the rule of law to all of them. Although majority voting has been implemented formally on more and more decisions in recent years, in practice there is a culture of unanimity.³ But has size become irrelevant? Probably not.

Since the first days of the ECSC, the united Europe has been significantly changed. The European Union (EU) has currently 27 member states and the EU-27 has many more small than big member states. By population, 20 states have less than 20 million citizens. At the same time, it seems that the logic of the EU has changed slightly towards more intergovernmentalism, particularly since the Eastern Enlargement.⁴ Due to the sheer quantity of member states, it is becoming increasingly necessary to prepare decision-making in smaller groups. It is worthwhile to seek agreements with potential coalition partners before a meeting of 27. Therefore, bilateral relations gain importance, because these are the preconditions necessary for effective coalition-making. The setting of coalitions is rather seldom big versus small states.⁵ Much more often big and small states share preferences and join the same group. Therefore, bilateral relations of big and small members gain importance for the future development of the European Union. But how much importance does size have in today’s Europe? How do big and small countries interact? That is the point of departure.

Germany is the biggest member of the EU. Moreover, it is the most central state located in the very heart of Europe. Its history is the history of Europe. The contemporary history of Europe has determined no other state’s fate like that of Germany’s. Conversely, what ever has happened in Germany had a visible effect on whole Europe – from the end of the Second World War over the

¹ Many thanks to Prof. Dr. Ulrich von Alemann, my supervisor at the Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, who enabled me to pursue my goals in face of duties in Düsseldorf and supported my research decisively. This work is the result of research trips to Helsinki and Berlin in 2008. As guest of the Ulkopoliittinen instituutti (UPI/Finnish Institute of International Relations), I was able to conduct my research locally in Helsinki in May 2008. Thereafter, I continued my studies in Berlin as visiting researcher at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP/German Institute for International and Security Affairs) in June 2008. In both places, I arranged interviews and collected background material, which are the integral part of this paper. For organising my visits, I thank the Hedwig und Waldemar Hort-Stipendienstiftung that promoted my studies not just financially, but with trust and moral support. I would also like to thank Dr. Hanna Ojanen, who hosted me at UPI and gave me indispensable support, and Dr. Andreas Maurer, who made my stay at the SWP possible. My work benefited enormously from the advice and support I received from the whole staff of UPI and the SWP. I want to express my gratitude to all of them, but I must particularly address Pia Alilontinen, Toby Archer, Hiski Haukkala, Julia Lieb and Jouko Rajakiili. For editorial help, language advice and inspiring ideas, I thank Folkert Garbe, my sister Vera Gassen, Jennifer Hoppe, Riikka Turunen, Aura Vuorenrinne and Genevieve Wickenden. Without their assistance, I would not have been able to finish that paper in a readable format. Moreover, it was decisive that I could arrange my personal interest with my Magister studies at the Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf. Therefore, I thank Prof. Dr. Christoph Nonn and Prof. Dr. Hartwig Hummel, who supervised my writing. Last, but not least, this work would have been impossible without the readiness of my interview partners and the numerous people I met for background discussions. I am particularly grateful for their commitment and expertise. Every one of them shaped the content of this paper.

² Interview with Hans-Dietrich Genscher, FDP, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs ret., 10th June 2008 in Wachtberg-Pech; Author’s translation: The morning gift of equal rights and equality.

³ Cf. Wessels, Wolfgang: *Das politische System der Europäischen Union*. Wiesbaden, 2008. pp. 208-210.

⁴ Cf. Interview with Esko Antola, Jean Monnet Professor/Director of the Centrum Balticum at the University of Turku, 26th May 2008 in Turku; Interview with an official of the Federal Foreign Office, 13th June 2008 in Berlin.

⁵ Cf. Tallberg, Jonas: *Bargaining Power in the European Council*. Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, Report No. 1, 2007. pp. 42-44; Interview with Jari Luoto, State Secretary in the Government Secretariat for EU Affairs of Finland, 28th May 2008 in Helsinki.

Neue Ostpolitik to the German Reunification. Germany is the biggest and most central EU country, and furthermore one of the founding members of the European Union.

On the other hand, Finland is, in the words of Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb, a “smallish country [...] not exactly in the geographic core of the European Union”⁶. In terms of population, Finland is the tenth smallest member state with 5.3 million citizens. In the north-east of Europe, Finland is geographically seen as at the very rim of the Union. Its membership is quite young. Just 14 years ago Finland entered the EU after decades of strict neutrality. Finland is a small, peripheral and relatively young member state of the EU.

Approaching German-Finnish relations from a rationalist point of view, size is an obvious factor, though relative. In terms of population, territorial size, gross domestic product (GDP) or military budget the proportion is variable. Nonetheless, Finland is in every meaning smaller than Germany. Therefore, it seems apparent that size matters. In order to explain both states’ relationship, it might be sufficient to analyse their interests and ask how these correspond. Their relationship would depend decisively on their given preferences as well as their abilities to enforce these. Although both act within an institutionalised frame, the disproportion of population and economical weight would determine their interaction.

Nonetheless, “size is translated”⁷. In order to widen the analytical starting point of this paper, it shall be assumed that a state’s size is interpreted by its foreign policy actors and therefore the relationship of a big and a small state is determined by their interpretation of themselves and their counterparts. Therefore, relations of a big and a small state are not *a priori* determined by their given interests. Significance of the proportion must be traced in the actor’s construction of reality. So a more detailed examination is needed in order to cover aspects that affect identities and perceptions. Consequently, both views shall be kept in mind. Exogenous factors are probably not unimportant as their constellation might shape the actors’ opinion and decision-making. It shall be assumed that given interests and reality constructions compete for explanation in a sense that a policy maker’s preference can be traced back to a given fact or the interpretation of that fact, which is henceforth not predictable.

The main questions of this case study are: How do Germany and Finland interact today? What are the decisive factors that determine their relationship? To what extent are the German-Finnish relations characterised by the big-small proportion? Which positions and policies do both states apply and how do these correspond with their size? To what extent is there conflict due to the proportions? Can their behaviour be explained by their given interests or are their other factors?

First, it seems necessary to outline the common history of both states in chapter 1. The path towards the present situation shall be drawn with a particular emphasis on what is relevant for current politics.

Thereafter, in chapter 2 the present situation shall be examined in detail. Initially, a general overview of German-Finnish relations will be presented. Chapter 2.1 will explain some basic circumstances and structures that are of general relevance for the understanding of the both states’ interaction in a European setting. Additionally, a brief description of the Finnish view on Germany and the German view on Finland shall introduce some basic perceptions. But due to the fact that both states are strongly integrated in European structures, there are hardly any purely bilateral issues left and it is worthwhile to draw a detailed picture of multilateral policies that shape the relationship of Finland and Germany. The major part of this work is an analysis of German-Finnish inter-

⁶ Stubb, Alexander: On becoming Finland’s foreign minister. In: Blue Wings, May 2008. p. 32.

⁷ Tiilikainen, Teija: Finland – An EU Member with a Small State Identity. European Integration, Vol. 28, No. 1, March 2006. pp. 73-87 (73).

action in four selected policy fields. These are Russia, integration policy, security policy and the Baltic Sea cooperation.

(1) Relations with Russia are essential for both. Finland has a common border of 1,300 km. For Germany, its recent history has been decisively influenced by the former Eastern superpower. Moreover, Russia has been the independent variable for the German-Finnish relations over the past two hundred years.

(2) The European integration is a key issue in every meaning and gained importance in recent years due to the ongoing attempt to reform the European Union. Integration policy indicates basic starting points of a state's foreign policy. Therefore, it also marks an important factor for the common understanding of Germany and Finland.

(3) Security policy is naturally a very sensitive issue and evolved as an EU issue since the late 1990s. Finland is involved in military EU cooperation as well as the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Both states maintain a joint EU Battle Group with the Netherlands and have been engaged in NATO missions.

(4) Both countries border the Baltic Sea, which is the geographically binding area for Germany, at the south-western end, and Finland, at the north-eastern. Since the end of the Cold War, cooperation across the region has emerged, but it is still an urgent political issue for the neighbouring states.

Finally, a comprehensive picture of relevant factors and issues of German-Finnish relations shall be made in order to provide a concrete example of a relationship between a 'big' and a 'small' state. The German-Finnish case shall be applied on the context of the present Union and reveal further perspectives for research on this constellation.

Fundamental part of this paper is a collection of qualitative, non-representative expert interviews that have been conducted in May and June 2008 in Helsinki and Berlin. German quotations are translated in footnotes.

2 Implications of the Past

A look on the past does more than just point out some basic facts. Moreover, it will be examined, which implications the past gives for the present, because: "We have our historical experience, which of course is in our minds whatever we do."⁸

2.1 Two World Wars

In 1914, Finland followed into war against Germany as a Russian Grand Duchy. Though, Russia did not establish a functioning conscription system in the previous years and so Finland had no army of its own. After the war break out, it was not intended to deploy Finnish units, because of doubts about their loyalty.⁹ The Russian army increased its presence in Finland, which was regarded as a weak spot for a German invasion.¹⁰ Therefore, Finns became belligerents mostly voluntarily, on both sides.¹¹

⁸ Interview with Juha Korkeaoja, KESK, Chairman of the Defence Committee of the Finnish Parliament, 22nd May 2008 in Helsinki.

⁹ Cf. Wegner, Bernd: Finland. In: Hirschfeld, Gerhard/Krumeich, Gerd/Renz, Irina (Ed.): Enzyklopädie Erster Weltkrieg. Paderborn, 2003. pp. 483-487.

¹⁰ Cf. Upton, Anthony F.: The Finnish Revolution 1917-1918. Minneapolis, 1980. p. 16.

¹¹ Cf. Jussila, Osmo/Hentilä, Seppo/Nevakivi, Jukka: Politische Geschichte Finnlands seit 1809. Vom Großfürstentum zur Europäischen

Finnish-Russian relation had worsened severely in the decades before the First World War and nationalists tended to support Germany. Instead of fighting on the Russian side, about 2,000 Finns secretly went to Germany.¹² The German Empire supported the Finnish cause and created the 27. *Jäger-Bataillon* for Finnish volunteers. In *Hohenlockstedt* (Schleswig-Holstein) they received military training and fought from 1916 on under a Prussian commander against the Tsarist army at the eastern Baltic front. The so called *Jäger* movement has been the back bone of the Finnish armed forces for the following years and is an integral part of Finnish military history. During the Second World War, most of the Finnish commanders were *Jäger*, like Captain Kaarna in Väinö Linna's famous war novel *Tuntematon sotilas*¹³ that almost every Finn knows.

After the Bolshevik revolution and the end of the war on the eastern front, Finland fell into civil war between Red and White guards in early 1918.¹⁴ Lenin agreed on the Finnish independence and Russia did not affect the civil war decisively due to its domestic problems.¹⁵ The Treaty of Brest Litovsk ended the war between Germany and Russia in March 1918. Nonetheless, the German Empire regarded Finland as its interest sphere and supported the White guards. The arrival of the *Jäger* and a German intervention, which considered Finnish nationalist sentiments,¹⁶ had a decisive impact for the White victory.¹⁷ The thriving forces of White Finland among Chairman of the Senate, Pehr Evind Svinhufvud, were firmly pro-German. The Parliament of Finland (*Suomen Eduskunta*) elected Friedrich Karl, brother-in-law of Emperor Wilhelm II, as the first and the last King of Finland, who never went to Finland due to the German defeat in late 1918.¹⁸ During the 1920s and 1930s the German intervention had negative connotations in some Leftist circles of Finland.¹⁹ But the common reception was positive. The Whites won.

In 2007/2008, Finland remembered the 90th anniversary of the end of the civil war. The role of Germany for Finland's first steps to independence is an important part of the Finnish memory. Pictures of White victory parades in May 1918 show Commander in Chief, Carl Gustav Mannerheim, riding along the streets of Helsinki and German soldiers on the side walk.²⁰ The German assistance affected the Finnish attitude towards Germany for the decades to come and is still present in Finland's retrospection.²¹ In contrast to that living memory in Finland, these facts are quite rarely known in Germany.²²

Before the the Second World War began, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 assigned Finland to the Soviet sphere. In the Winter War of 1939/40, Finland fought on its own against the Soviet Union (USSR). After heavy casualties for the Red Army both sides agreed on a ceasefire, which lasted until the German attack on the USSR. In the meantime Finland became economically dependent on Germany.²³ In May 1941, the Finnish leadership decided consciously to join Germany's campaign, in which it had been introduced in advance.²⁴ During the Continuation War

Union. German edition, Berlin, 1999. p. 102-106.

¹² Cf. Singleton, Fred: A Short History of Finland. Cambridge, 1989. pp. 108-109.

¹³ English translation: The Unknown Soldier. First Published in 1954.

¹⁴ Cf. Singleton, 1989. pp. 112-113.

¹⁵ Cf. Upton, 1980. pp. 43-44.

¹⁶ Cf. Kirby, D.G. (Ed.): Finland and Russia 1808-1920. From Autonomy to Independence. A Selection of Documents. London/Basingstoke, 1975. p. 234; Mannerheim, Gustav: Erinnerungen. Zurich, 1952. p. 194.

¹⁷ Cf. Jussila/Hentilä/Nevakivi, 1999. p. 127.

¹⁸ Cf. *ibid.* pp. 143-144.

¹⁹ Cf. Interview with Seppo Hentilä, Professor for Political History at the University of Helsinki, 19th June 2008 in Berlin.

²⁰ See cover of Kolbe, Laura/Nyström, Samu: Helsinki 1918. Pääkaupunki ja sota. Helsinki, 2008.

²¹ Cf. Interview with Seppo Hentilä.

²² Cf. Interview with Petri Hakkarainen, Second Secretary at the Finnish Embassy in Berlin, 5th June 2008.

²³ Cf. Mannerheim, 1952. p. 430.

²⁴ Cf. Jussila/Hentilä/Nevakivi, 1999. p. 220.

1941-44, the German *Wehrmacht* supported the Finnish troops and helped to throw the Red Army behind the borders of 1939. Finland was brother in arms with Nazi Germany. But Finland tried to avoid the role of a German satellite and refused to send troops against Leningrad.²⁵ The United States of America (USA) never declared war on Finland and had an understanding of the Finnish position.²⁶ Mannerheim, Commander in Chief of the Finnish Army, was a reserved supporter of the alliance with Nazi Germany. Although he knew that Nazi Germany ‘sold’²⁷ Finland to the USSR in 1939, the geopolitical situation gave the Finnish government no other choice than fighting on the German side. The Finnish-German *Waffenbrüderschaft* was accompanied with deportations to German concentration camps, war crimes and the recruitment of a Finnish SS unit.²⁸ Adolf Hitler appreciated Finland as the most valuable German co-belligerent.²⁹ In 1942, Hitler visited Finland on the occasion of Mannerheim’s 75th birthday. Secretly, he prepared the inclusion into a German federation after the *Endsieg*, though.³⁰

In summer 1944, the Finnish troops were about to lose the front, when German aircrafts and war materials were sent to support the Finnish army.³¹ The *Gefechtsverband Kuhlmei*, an airforce unit named after its commander, and German anti-tank weapons were regarded as decisive in stopping the Red Army and preventing a Soviet occupation.³² But the coming result of the war was predictable and the Finnish government agreed on a ceasefire with the Soviet leadership. Mannerheim became head of state and Finland had to send the German troops out of its territory to prevent Soviet ‘assistance’ to do so. While the *Wehrmacht* left southern Finland quite calmly, the remaining troops in the northern part fought a war of scorched earth and destroyed Rovaniemi, the capital of Lapland, completely.³³

Finland had lost the war officially and signed the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947, which ruled Finland to pay reparation, to cede territory to the USSR and to accept restrictions of its sovereignty regarding its peacetime armed forces and acquisition of defence material, particularly from Germany.³⁴ Nonetheless, Finland was the only country on the continent, which was involved in the war, but never largely occupied. Finland saved its sovereignty and German assistance was once more decisive. This memory is still alive in Finland and the *Waffenbrüderschaft* is positively associated with Germany.³⁵ The fact that Finland was an ally of Hitler has vanished remarkably well.³⁶

²⁵ Cf. Mannerheim, 1952. p. 432.

²⁶ Cf. TIME: Finland Says No. 24.11.41. <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,801283,00.html> (05.08.08); Loewenstein, Francis L./Langley, Harold D./Jonas, Manfred (Ed.): Roosevelt and Churchill. Their Secret Wartime Correspondence. London, 1975. p. 476.

²⁷ Cf. Mannerheim, 1952. p. 437.

²⁸ Cf. Helsingin Sanomat (International Edition): More than just eight deportations to Nazi Germany. 04.11.03. <http://www2.hs.fi/english/archive/news.asp?id=20031104IE14> (05.08.08); Ahtiainen, Ilkka: Finland and Germany in WW II: Brothers in arms – and partners in crime? In: Helsingin Sanomat (International Edition), 30.09.08. <http://www.hs.fi/english/print/1135239859383> (07.04.09); Müller, Rolf-Dieter: An der Seite der Wehrmacht. Hitlers ausländische Helfer beim »Kreuzzug gegen den Bolschewismus« 1941-1945. Berlin, 2007. p. 29.

²⁹ Müller, 2007. p. 25.

³⁰ Ibid. p. 29.

³¹ Cf. Jussila/Hentilä/Nevakivi, 1999. pp. 230-231.

³² Cf. Mannerheim, 1952. p. 522; Interview with Eero Akaan-Penttilä, KOK, Vice-Chairman of the Grand Committee of the Finnish Parliament, 22nd May 2008 in Helsinki.

³³ Cf. Jussila/Hentilä/Nevakivi, 1999. pp. 240-244.

³⁴ Cf. United States Department of State: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946. Paris Peace Conference. Documents. <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=article&did=FRUS.FRUS1946V04.I0006&isize=M> (25.09.08).

³⁵ Cf. Interview with Seppo Hentilä.

³⁶ Cf. *ibid.*

In Germany, its role in Finland during the Second World War is quite irrelevant. The importance of Nazi Germany's fellow combatants has not been examined even in historiography for a long time.³⁷ The relevance of the war time for a firm pro-German attitude is largely unknown in Germany, while Finns know that "without Germany there could not have been independence in Finland."³⁸

2.2 Cold War

The period of East-West conflict did not allow Germany and Finland to keep full diplomatic relations until 1973. Finland had ended its contacts with Nazi Germany in 1944 and established a trade mission in West Germany in 1948.³⁹ The *Hallstein-Doktrin* proposed that the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) would not have diplomatic contacts to any country, which recognised the German Democratic Republic (GDR). The Finnish case was an especially sensitive issue for the West German government, because Finland would have been the first country outside the direct sphere of the USSR favouring the GDR.⁴⁰ Finland had important economic ties with West Germany, on the one hand. But the USSR and the GDR pushed the Finnish government to recognise the GDR, on the other hand.⁴¹

Finland had to be mindful of its contacts with West Germany. In 1948, the USSR and Finland signed the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Assistance (FCMA). It named explicitly Germany and its allies as possible threats and ruled to allow the Soviet Union to 'assist' Finland in case of an aggression of these.⁴² In practice, Finland had to keep Moscow's opinion in mind in all its Western relations.

A structural change of that situation could be achieved by the *Neue Ostpolitik* and the process which led to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). Détente between East and West and the rapprochement of the two German states allowed Finland to reestablish full diplomatic contacts in 1973. But the way to the final agreement of CSCE in 1975 meant much more for the German-Finnish relations.

Since the social democrats entered the West German government in 1966, the policies of Germany and Finland became closely related in their characters. Finland tried to play the role of a mediator between East and West. And the Brandt government did the decisive steps to rapprochement with the Eastern bloc. As foreign minister in the first Grand Coalition, Willy Brandt soon emphasised the role of Northern Europe.⁴³ In February 1967, the Federal Minister for All-German Affairs, Herbert Wehner, visited Helsinki and explained his party's foreign policy to President Urho Kekkonen.⁴⁴ Wehner knew about Kekkonen's link to the Kremlin, who promised to talk with Leonid Brezhnev about their conversation. In June 1967, Brandt visited Helsinki and held talks with President Kekkonen, Prime Minister Paasio and Foreign Minister Karjalainen.

³⁷ Cf. Speckmann, Thomas: Adolf Hitlers willige ausländische Helfer. In: Die Welt Online, 12.07.08. http://www.welt.de/kultur/article2204338/Adolf_Hitlers_willige_auslaendische_Helfer.html (05.08.08).

³⁸ Interview with Eero Akaan-Penttilä.

³⁹ Cf. Hentilä, Seppo: Neutral zwischen den beiden deutschen Staaten. Finland und Deutschland im Kalten Krieg. Berlin, 2006a. p. 21.

⁴⁰ Cf. *ibid.* p. 9.

⁴¹ Cf. Hentilä, Seppo: Maintaining Neutrality between the Two German States: Finland and Divided Germany until 1973. In: Contemporary European History, 15/2006b. pp. 473-493 (480-483).

⁴² Cf. Hentilä, 2006b. pp. 474-475.

⁴³ Cf. Brandt über Interesse an verstärkten Beziehungen zu Skandinavien; Besuche in Finnland, Norwegen, Schweden. 27.06.67. In: Archiv der Gegenwart, volume XXXVII, pp. 13255-13256.

⁴⁴ Cf. Generalkonsul Kempff, Helsinki, an das Auswärtige Amt. 16. Februar 1967. In: Schwartz, Hans-Peter (Hrsg.): Akten zur auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 1967. 1. Januar bis 31. März. Munich, 1999. pp. 296-298.

Brandt stated explicitly that an understanding for the West German position in the Nordic countries would have a strong effect on others.⁴⁵ The Brandt government immediately supported Helsinki to become the venue of the CSCE.⁴⁶ In Germany, the CSCE process has ever been closely associated to Finland and its very positive efforts.⁴⁷ On the 80th birthday of Kekkonen in 1980, Willy Brandt, then Chairman of the SPD, wrote to the Finnish President: “*Viele Menschen im übrigen Europa wissen Ihre Bemühungen um die Bewahrung des Friedens und die Fortführung der Entspannung auf unserem Kontinent sehr zu schätzen. Der Name der finnischen Hauptstadt bleibt mit diesem mühevollen Werk unlösbar verbunden.*“⁴⁸

A lot of facets about Finnish politics are unknown in Germany. The Finnish role in the CSCE process is one of the first things remembered by German foreign policy makers. On the other hand, the *Neue Ostpolitik*, which was a precondition for the process as a whole, gave West Germany a positive response from Finland. On party level, the social democratic parties of Germany and Finland reanimated their historical links. Willy Brandt and Kalevi Sorsa, one of the most important social democratic politicians in Finland throughout the 1970s and 1980s,⁴⁹ maintained a personal friendship and political cooperation, particularly in the Socialist International.⁵⁰ Today the *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*⁵¹ (SPD) and *Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue*⁵² (SDP) still have a binding heritage.⁵³

The Finnish president Urho Kekkonen realised already in 1970 that an agreement between East and West could potentially allow Finland to recognise both German states or would at least cool down the situation for years.⁵⁴ Kekkonen was the most important post-war president from 1956 to 1982. He had a rather sceptical attitude towards Germany. As a student he visited Germany in 1934 and experienced the rise of the Nazi regime personally. He had very good contacts with the Kremlin and had its support since he became Prime Minister in 1950.⁵⁵ Before the Brandt government, he called the West German policy towards the USSR a ‘war policy’⁵⁶. After mutual recognition, he visited both German states, first the GDR in 1977 and then the FRG in 1979. Nonetheless, he did not assume the GDR as equivalent to the FRG due to its artificial architecture.⁵⁷

The German chancellors Brandt, Schmidt and Kohl acknowledged Finland’s neutrality status and understood its special role, which was totally different from the Soviet satellite states.⁵⁸ While the

⁴⁵ Brandt über Interesse an verstärkten Beziehungen zu Skandinavien; Besuche in Finnland, Norwegen, Schweden. 27.06.67.

⁴⁶ Cf. Brandt, Willy: *Erinnerungen*. Frankfurt am Main, 1989. p. 183.

⁴⁷ Cf. Dr. Hermann Schmitz-Vockenhausen, MdB, Vizepräsident des Deutschen Bundestages: *Eine Fahrt zu guten Freunden. Bundestags-Delegation im neutralen Finnland*. SPD-Pressedienst, P/XXVIII/172, 07.09.73. pp. 1-2.

⁴⁸ SPD: Der SPD-Vorsitzende Willy BRANDT sandte dem Staatspräsidenten der Republik Finnland, Dr. Urho KEKKONEN, zu seinem 80. Geburtstag das folgende Schreiben. Mitteilung für die Presse, 3.9.1980, Nr. 620/80. Author’s translation: Many people in the rest of Europe appreciate your efforts for the perpetuation of peace and the continuation of détente on our continent. The name of the Finnish capital keeps bonded inseparably to that troublesome work.

⁴⁹ Sorsa was party chairman from 1969 to 1975 and Prime Minister of Finland for ten years in four governments between 1972 and 1987.

⁵⁰ Cf. Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands: *Mitteilungen an die Presse*. Der SPD-Vorsitzende Willy BRANDT hat zu seinem 65. Geburtstag am 18. Dezember 1978 Glückwünsche aus aller Welt erhalten. 18.12.1978; Brandt, 1989. p. 433 and p. 437.

⁵¹ Social Democratic Party of Germany.

⁵² Finnish Social Democratic Party.

⁵³ Meeting with Tero Shemeikka, International Secretary of the Finnish Social Democratic Party, 27th May 2008 in Helsinki.

⁵⁴ Cf. Interview with Seppo Hentilä.

⁵⁵ Cf. Sozialdemokratischer Pressedienst: *Quo vadis Kekkonen?* P/VI/11, 13.01.51. pp. 3-4; *Ibid.*: Will Kekkonen Finnlands Nuschke werden? P/VIII/275, 26.11.53. pp. 3-4.

⁵⁶ SPD-Pressedienst: *Finnlands Staatspräsident im Streit der Meinungen. Kekkonen nennt Politik der Bundesregierung „Kriegspolitik“*. P/XXII/23, 01.02.67. p. 5.

⁵⁷ Interview with Seppo Hentilä.

⁵⁸ Cf. *ibid.*; Interview with Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

government in charge managed to deal with the Finnish case, the German opposition created the phrase *Finnlandisierung* (Finlandisation). It meant “a process by which a democratic nation living in the shadow of a militarily powerful totalitarian state gradually submits to the political domination of its neighbor and finally loses its internal freedom.”⁵⁹ The phrase had more of an internal political function in West Germany to blame the social-liberal government, but its use was offending and malicious,⁶⁰ and left a lasting negative imprint in Finland. In Germany the phrase is known, but no more used in politics. Finns connote it with an ignorant and arrogant attitude.⁶¹

Until the end of the Cold War the Finnish Presidents Kekkonen and Koivisto (1982-1994) avoided an all-too close link with West Germany.⁶² It was the most difficult issue in Finland’s foreign policy balancing between East and West. In international relations Finland and Germany kept a low profile of their relationship. Nonetheless the Kohl government was firmly Finland-friendly. Helmut Kohl had a close personal relationship to Ilkka Suominen, Chairman of the conservative *Kokoomus* party from 1979 to 1991.⁶³ Right after the end of the Cold War, they established close links between *Kokoomus* and the German *Christlich Demokratische Union*⁶⁴ (CDU). The generation of the current conservative chairman, Jyrki Katainen, has a German-friendly attitude, which is enrooted in these early cooperation.⁶⁵

Finland had a fairly high reputation in the political leadership of Germany. The “*hohe Staatskunst*”⁶⁶ that Finland featured in the hard times of the Cold War gave it a lasting admiration among top foreign affairs politicians.⁶⁷

2.3 Change of World Order

The end of the Cold War changed the international environment of both countries completely. But the German reunification did not frighten Finland like it did other European states. Main concerns were just about effects on the stability of Europe and Northern Europe in particular.⁶⁸ A two-third majority of Finns was in favour of the German reunification, according to an opinion poll, and a more powerful Germany was not regarded a threat.⁶⁹ Throughout the 1990s, Germany was perceived more as a supporter than as a threat to Finland.⁷⁰

The Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 and the FCMA Treaty of 1948, had restrictions on Germany and were political obstacles for the normalisation of German-Finnish relations. The Finnish president, Mauno Koivisto, contracted out of the Paris Peace Treaty in summer 1990 referring to the new situation of a united Germany. The Kremlin almost did not notice that step, but Koivisto even forgot to inform the British government, which has also been a party of the peace treaty. The Fin-

⁵⁹ Jakobson, Max: Finland in the New Europe. Westport, 1998. p. 85.

⁶⁰ Cf. Kurt Mattick, MdB, Vorsitzender des Ausschusses für innerdeutsche Beziehungen: Finnlandisierung – Ein Spottbild gegen Finnland. Finnische Regierungspolitik alles andere als Kapitulation auf Raten. Sozialdemokratischer Pressedienst, 34. Jahrgang/90, 11.05.79. p. 3.

⁶¹ Cf. Interview with Seppo Hentilä.

⁶² Cf. *ibid.*

⁶³ Cf. Interview with Esko Antola.

⁶⁴ Christian Democratic Union of Germany.

⁶⁵ Cf. Interview with an official of the German Embassy, 8th May 2008 in Helsinki; Interview with Esko Antola.

⁶⁶ Interview with Hans-Dieterich Genscher; Author’s translation: high statecraft.

⁶⁷ Cf. *ibid.*; Genscher, Hans-Dietrich: Erinnerungen. Berlin, 1995. p. 308.

⁶⁸ Cf. Visuri, Pekka/Forsberg, Tuomas: Saksa ja Suomi. Pohjoismainen näkökulma Saksan kysymykseen. Juva, 1992; Auffermann, Burkhard/Visuri, Pekka: Die Nordischen Staaten und die deutsche Herausforderung. Baden-Baden, 1995. pp. 7-9.

⁶⁹ Cf. Forsberg, Tuomas: A friend in need or a friend indeed: Finnish perceptions of Germany’s role in the EU and Europe. UPI Working Paper 24, 2000. p. 7.

⁷⁰ Cf. Interview with Petri Hakkarainen.

nish leadership got rid of the more than 40 year old obligations and caused a minor diplomatic discomfort, which did not become public.⁷¹

While Austria (1989) and Sweden (1990) applied quite early for EC membership, Finland watched carefully on to what happened in Moscow. After the attempted *coup d'état* in 1991, which seemed to prove the wait-and-see strategy right, the Finnish president cancelled the Finnish-Soviet agreement of 1948 unilaterally and on the 27th February 1992 the government decided to propose EC membership. For Koivisto's decision, Germany has been an important factor. The German government promised its active support for a Finnish membership and was regarded as a reliable partner by Koivisto, who had a rather ambivalent relation to the other Nordic countries.⁷²

During 1992, the political relations between Germany and Finland normalised rapidly. Chancellor Kohl visited Finland on 5th March as the first German Chancellor on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Nordic Council in Helsinki.⁷³ He was the first foreign statesman, who had been invited to speak before the Nordic Council, symbolising that foreign policy was no more excluded. The Nordic countries were on the way to the EC and Kohl promised the firm support of Germany. Though, the German Chancellor has also been observed critically and some warned of being too enthusiastic about Germany.⁷⁴ In the following months, the Minister of Defence, Volker Rühle, arranging a major arms deal, and the President of the German *Bundestag*, Rita Süsmuth, mentioning she never spoke that much German abroad, visited Finland.⁷⁵ Both countries enhanced political exchange to a level that was not possible in previous decades.

The quick change of the German-Finnish relationship gives a good example for the persisting good perception of each other, which had to be kept politically under the surface, but came to the forefront as soon as the opportunity opened up. Cultural and economical ties create a historical bow that covered also the Cold War period.⁷⁶ The development also illustrates that although both states had good preconditions for bilateral relations, world politics had a determining impact.

2.4 Together EUropean

On the way to EU membership it became predictable that Finland would “swim to the German camp”⁷⁷. The new situation in Europe made it suitable for Helsinki to pursue the country's future and security in the European Union.⁷⁸ The German leadership was strongly in favour of a Finnish accession. In the negotiation phase for membership, Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel and the decisively involved German top diplomat Hans-Friedrich von Ploetz⁷⁹ had a

⁷¹ Cf. Interview with Seppo Hentilä.

⁷² Cf. Interview with Hans-Dietrich Genscher; Koivisto, Mauno: Witness to History. The Memoirs of Mauno Koivisto, President of Finland 1982-1994. London, 1997. p. 229/241; Interview with Esko Antola.

⁷³ Cf. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: Kohl lobt „Weitsicht und Mut“ der nordischen Staaten. 06.03.92. p. 1; Handelsblatt: Nächstes Jahr Gespräche über EG-Erweiterung. 06./07.03.92. p. 9.

⁷⁴ Cf. Forsberg, 2000. p. 10.

⁷⁵ Cf. Thielbeer, Siegfried: Deutsch-finnisches Waffengeschäft. Rühes Visite normalisiert Militärbeziehung. In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 13.06.92. p. 5; Brendlin, Ulrike: „Finnland soll der Sauerteig der EG werden“. In: Hamburger Abendblatt, 19.09.92. p. 3.

⁷⁶ Interview with Petri Hakkarainen; Interview with Seppo Hentilä.

⁷⁷ Esko Antola, quoted in Forsberg, 2000. p. 9.

⁷⁸ Cf. Tiilikainen, 2006. pp. 76-77.

⁷⁹ Hans-Friedrich von Ploetz was Director of the Directorate-General for European Affairs in the Federal Foreign Office 1993-1994, State Secretary 1994-1998, and Ambassador of Germany to the Russian Federation 2002-2005. In the early 1970s, he served at the German trade mission, later the German Embassy, and married into an eminently respectable Finnish family. Von Ploetz worked in the staff of Foreign Minister Genscher, who valued his knowledge of the Finnish soul. Today von Ploetz is member of the board of trustees of the *Deutsch-Finnische Gesellschaft* (DFG/German-Finnish Association) and chairman of the *Stiftung Deutsch-Russischer Jugendaustausch/Германо-*

personal affiliation to Finland.⁸⁰ Chancellor Kohl assured Germany's firm support for EU membership to the Finnish chief negotiator, Pertti Salolainen.⁸¹ Germany expected that Finland would share its main political goals and would support the German position within the Union.⁸²

Kohl's promise has been kept when the Finnish accession negotiations stagnated under the Greek presidency in 1994, because of a dispute about farm subsidies. Community law does not allow national subsidies for agriculture, except in extreme climates like northern Finland. But for the Finnish government it was crucial getting permission to give financial support to South Finland's farmers. Due to the national importance of agriculture and the fact that the governing *Keskusta* party (Centre Party of Finland, formerly Agrarian Party) had and has a traditional stronghold in rural areas, breaking off negotiations would have been thinkable.⁸³ Although the Greek presidency was not very helpful for the Finnish concerns, it was due to the German foreign minister, Klaus Kinkel, that a special regulation on national agriculture subsidies in southern Finland entered the Finnish accession treaty.⁸⁴ That article is known as 141.

Martti Ahtisaari, President of the Republic of Finland, thanked on the occasion of a visit in Berlin in November 1994: "Germany's political leadership - and indeed, I believe, the whole German nation - has given unreserved support to Finnish membership."⁸⁵ Today, foreign policy makers still know quite well that Germany was the helping hand in this decisive moment and its determined support made Finnish EU membership possible. "The assistance did not come from France, UK or Italy."⁸⁶ It gives Germany a perception of a big state who takes care of the small ones and Finland can rely on in critical situations. It can be assumed that the historical experience of Germany as an ally in two world wars is somehow in line with this perception. This credit and the role of the *Bundesregierung* in Finland's run up for EU membership are rarely known in Germany on the contrary. But its effect for the Finnish policy remains. This suggests that a small state's approach to a bigger one is more grounded on historical experiences than the other way round. The Finnish and the German attitude towards each other seem to be based on different factors, although they share the same history.

The decision to join the EU was confirmed in a referendum in 1994; about 57 percent of the Finns voted in favour of the membership. In the campaign against the accession some critical campaigners warned of the EU as *Großdeutschland* (Greater Germany).⁸⁷ Although the critics could not frighten the voters, there is also a persisting general suspicion of dominance. An article about the first years of membership by Esko Antola of 1999 is titled "From the European Rim to the Core"⁸⁸. And indeed, Finland sought the political centre of the Union for having the best possible influence on coming developments. The leader, whose name is inevitably connected to

⁸⁰ *российский молодежный обмен*. Cf. Munzinger-Archiv: Hans-Friedrich von Ploetz. <http://www.munzinger.de> (06.04.09); Interview with Hans-Dietrich Genscher; Deutsch-Finnische Rundschau: Kuratoriumssitzung in Schwäbisch-Hall. March 2009, volume 41, issue 140. p. 34. Cf. Kinkel, Klaus: Ein finnischer Europäer. Laudatio für den Theodor-Aue-Kulturpreisträger 2005 Ministerpräsident a.D. und Parlamentspräsident Paavo Lipponen. Große Preisverleihung der Aue-Stiftung am 25.5.2005. <http://www.aue-stiftung.org/Laudatio%20Kinkel.pdf> (10.04.09); Interview with Pertti Salolainen, KOK, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Finnish Parliament, 22nd May 2008 in Helsinki.

⁸¹ Cf. Interview with Pertti Salolainen.

⁸² Cf. Koivisto, 1997. p. 241-242; Interview with Pertti Salolainen.

⁸³ Cf. Interview with Esko Antola.

⁸⁴ Cf. *ibid*; Interview with Pertti Salolainen; Interview with Petri Hakkarainen.

⁸⁵ Office of the President of the Republic of Finland: Address by President Martti Ahtisaari at the *Freie Universität* in Berlin, 23rd November 1994. <http://www.tpk.fi/ahtisaari/puheet-1994/P9411.FUE.html> (09.04.09).

⁸⁶ Cf. Interview with Teija Tiilikainen, State Secretary in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 13th May 2008 in Helsinki.

⁸⁷ Cf. Interview with Seppo Hentilä; Forsberg, 2000. p. 11.

⁸⁸ Cf. Antola, Esko: From the European Rim to the Core: The European Policy of Finland in the 1990's. In: Finnish Institute of International Affairs: Northern Dimensions. Yearbook 1999. Helsinki, 1999. pp. 5-13.

this policy, is Paavo Lipponen, Prime Minister of Finland from 1995 to 2003. Lipponen had a very good relationship with Helmut Kohl and an expressive pro-German attitude. He was fluent in German and stressed the German origins of his family.⁸⁹ His European policy was designated pro-integrationist and very close to Germany, which was regarded as almost equivalent to the core of Europe.⁹⁰ It is no coincidence that Lipponen supported the Euro and Finland is the only Nordic country that joined the single currency, which was one of the major European projects of Helmut Kohl.⁹¹ Thus, Lipponen has been criticised for being too pro-German.⁹² Indeed, public opinion was against the Euro and the German-friendly policy of the first years let some other states being suspicious of Finland.⁹³ President Koivisto has been conscious about that perception already when Finland applied for membership: “From Belgium southwards, however, EC members were rather sceptical about the inclusion of the Nordics; the Finns, it was said, were English-speaking Germans.”⁹⁴

The new German government of Gerhard Schröder seemed not to change the good bilateral atmosphere until the first Finnish EU presidency in 1999. Finland’s first presidency was not an easy task due to its overloaded agenda.⁹⁵ The organisational challenge was enormous for the small newcomer. Then, just in the beginning of the presidency, a concrete dispute emerged, because the German government demanded to use German as a working language. It is an official working language, but in practice rarely used as such. Although the Finnish government signaled that it would not be possible to organise German as working language due to capacities, the German representatives insisted on their demand. On top of the dispute, the Finnish Minister for Europe, Kimmo Sasi, said that the German policy under Schröder became more selfish.⁹⁶ Finally, Lipponen and Schröder ended the conflict at the Tampere Summit. But the language dispute was a negative example for a big state’s behaviour and a temporary shift in Germany’s approach on small states that was, at least, perceived as such.⁹⁷

Another divergence in the German-Finnish relationship became visible when Germany did not match the criteria of the Stability and Growth Pact, which sanctions an annual budget deficit higher than three percent. Germany violated the obligations between 2002 and 2005, but reached an exceptional agreement with the Commission and avoided sanctions.⁹⁸ That was particularly sensitive, because Finland emphasised the bindingness of rules in the Community.⁹⁹ During a visit in Berlin in 2002, Prime Minister Lipponen called for strict adherence to the Stability Pact and criticised big member states that were economically careless in good times.¹⁰⁰

⁸⁹ Cf. Interview with Seppo Hentilä.

⁹⁰ Cf. *ibid.*

⁹¹ Cf. *Hamburger Abendblatt*: Streit um Euro-Start schwelt weiter. 10.04.97. p. 2.

⁹² Cf. Forsberg, 2000. p. 11-12.

⁹³ Cf. *ibid.* p. 9-12.

⁹⁴ Cf. Koivisto, 1997. p. 241.

⁹⁵ Cf. Tiilikainen, 2006. p. 82.

⁹⁶ Cf. Blome, Nikolaus: Kalte Dusche für Gerhard Schröder in Tampere. Kritik an deutscher Haltung im Sprachenstreit. In: *Die Welt*, 16.10.99. <http://www.welt.de/data/1999/10/16/646236.html?prx=1> (15.08.08).

⁹⁷ Cf. von Altenbockum, Jasper: Ein Land im “Trotzalter”. Wie die Finnen die Deutschen sehen. In: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 04.09.99. p. 7; Interview with Eero Akaan-Penttilä; Blome, 1999; Interview with Esko Antola.

⁹⁸ Cf. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*: EU gibt Deutschland Zeit bis 2007. 08.11.05. <http://www.faz.net/s/Rub0E9EEF84AC1E4A389A8DC6C23161FE44/Doc~ED2FBE6117A60488CB0AF0A45413799AF~ATpl~Ecommo n~Scontent.html> (19.08.08).

⁹⁹ Cf. Interview with Esko Antola.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. *Helsingin Sanomat* (International Edition): Lipponen defends interests of small EU countries during visit to Berlin. 04.11.02. <http://www2.hs.fi/english/archive/news.asp?id=20021104IE6> (19.08.08).

The Schröder government is remembered rather badly among Finnish foreign policy makers. In general, small member states criticised that Germany prioritised France and Great Britain, and distanced itself from the idea of communality.¹⁰¹ Prime Minister Lipponen warned that the small states could be overrun by a directorate of the big countries.¹⁰² Therefore, Chancellor Merkel has been appreciated for accentuating the traditional sensitivity for small states' needs, like her predecessor Helmut Kohl did.¹⁰³

3 Present German-Finnish Relations

The current relations of Germany and Finland are strongly embedded in European structures. There are very few issues left that are purely bilateral. After introducing to the general characteristics of the German-Finnish relations, a brief first insight into mutual perception shall be given. Four major policy fields, which are of high significance for the bilateral understanding, will be analysed in detail.

3.1 General State of German-Finnish Relations

The consecutive EU presidencies of Finland and Germany, in the second half of 2006 respectively the first six months of 2007, were accompanied with intensive bilateral contacts on all levels. In April 2006, Foreign Minister Steinmeier visited his Finnish colleague, Erkki Tuomioja, and “praised that the relations between Finland and Germany are excellent.”¹⁰⁴ One month later, Prime Minister Vanhanen went to Berlin for a meeting with Chancellor Merkel. Both discussed the main topics of the coming months and expressed their common aspiration for the future of Europe. Merkel emphasised that Finland plays an important role for Europe in education, research and innovation.¹⁰⁵ A few weeks later, on 20th June, President Halonen met the Federal President, Horst Köhler, and Chancellor Merkel. On the occasion of the FIFA World Cup, President Halonen and Prime Minister Vanhanen, were invited to follow the final on 9th July in Berlin. Finally, Chancellor Merkel came to Helsinki on 19th December to meet her Finnish counterpart, Prime Minister Vanhanen. Following this fireworks of visits, it is remarkable that the travel diplomacy between both states on the very political top level is highly dependent on the current agenda – recently on the consecutive EU presidencies, and the FIFA World Cup.¹⁰⁶

Beside the governmental contacts, Federal President Köhler and President Halonen maintain good contacts and visit each other on a regular basis. Horst Köhler was on state visit to Helsinki in 2005. Tarja Halonen travelled to Germany almost annually since her inauguration in 2000. Moreover, both met on the occasion of a series of meetings, which was joined by the presidents of Aus-

¹⁰¹ Cf. Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Helsinki: Finnische Presseartikel. Helsingin Sanomat am 16.1.2007. Kolumne von Olli Kivinen. http://www.helsinki.diplo.de/Vertretung/helsinki/de/downloads/presseartikel/pdf_hs_070116_eu.property=Daten.pdf (26.03.09).

¹⁰² Cf. Blome, Nikolaus/Middel, Andreas: Immer auf die Zwerge. In: Die Welt, 22.10.99. http://www.welt.de/print-welt/article594300/Immer_auf_die_Zwerge.html (26.03.09).

¹⁰³ Cf. Interview with Eero Akaan-Penttilä; Interview with Esko Antola; Interview with Petri Hakkarainen; Interview with Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

¹⁰⁴ Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland: Good cooperation as a basis of Finland's and Germany's consecutive EU presidencies. Press Release, 12.04.06. <http://www.formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=68568&nodeid=15148&contentlan=2&culture=en-US> (13.09.08).

¹⁰⁵ Cf. Bundesregierung: Deutschland und Finnland arbeiten an Europas Zukunft. 09.05.06. <http://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Content/DE/Artikel/2001-2006/2006/05/2006-05-09-deutschland-und-finnland-arbeiten-an-europas-zukunft.layoutVariant=Druckansicht.html> (13.09.08).

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Interview with an official of the German Embassy in Helsinki.

tria, Portugal, Latvia, Germany, Finland, Hungary and Italy to discuss the development of the European Union.

Personal contacts between the heads of governments became more sober after the change of the Finnish government in 2003. Even in Finland, Vanhanen's less international attitude¹⁰⁷ is mentioned and his line is often described as "very pragmatic".¹⁰⁸ Vanhanen has no specific attitude or link to Germany like Lipponen had. His ruling *Keskusta* party has no counterpart in Germany. The German *Zentrumspartei*, which has been an important political factor from the 19th century until 1933, is nowadays a tiny shadow of its past and runs only for some municipality elections. Additionally, there is no party network on the European level. The *Keskusta* party is a member of the European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party, while the CDU respectively the Bavarian CSU (*Christlich-Soziale Union*) joined the European People's Party. Since Johannes Virolainen, who headed the party from 1964 to 1980, no following *Keskusta* chairman had personal links to Germany.¹⁰⁹ The absence of personally affiliated contacts is to a certain extent compensated by the very good relationship between Angela Merkel and Tarja Halonen. President Halonen welcomed Chancellor Merkel on her first participation in the European Council and met her regularly on her state visits in recent years.

The *Kokoomus* ministers in the present government, particularly the Minister of Finance, Jyrki Katainen, but also the newcomer in politics, Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb, as well as Stubb's predecessor, Ilkka Kanerva, have a certain German-friendly attitude.¹¹⁰ Affected by the early cooperation of German and Finnish conservatives in the European People's Party in the early 1990s, this generation of *Kokoomus* politicians is familiar with Germany and its language as well. Stubb impressed his German counterparts during his visit in June 2008 with his perfect German.¹¹¹

On the German side, there are currently less specifically Finnish affiliated politicians in power than Kohl and Kinkel were. Merkel's policy is characterised more by her general approach on small states and her sense for communality. Frank-Walter Steinmeier has been in a political office just since the last elections in 2005 and has no particular relations to the Finnish government.¹¹² Before that he advanced in the fairway of Gerhard Schröder from the Lower Saxony State Chancellery into the Federal Chancellery.¹¹³

For Finland, personal contacts are much more important than the other way round. It is crucial to get information first hand. The contacts between the German chancellor and the French president are always tight due to the pronounced importance of that relationship. In the case of Germany and Finland, personal contacts can fade much more visibly.

Under the political level, there are much more continuing lines in the practical work, though.¹¹⁴ Since the late 1990s, the EU Secretariat in the Prime Minister's Office and the *Bundeskanzleramt* keep regular and tight contacts on working level. Both bodies exchange on all major EU issues and have contacts in a very direct and practical manner.¹¹⁵ The high rank officials meet on EU summits as they accompany the heads of government on these occasions. Additionally, they visit

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Interview with Eero Akaan-Penttilä; Interview with Esko Antola.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Interview with Antti Kaikkonen, KESK, Vice-Chairman of the Grand Committee of the Finnish Parliament, 27th May 2008 in Helsinki.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Interview with Seppo Hentilä.

¹¹⁰ Cf. *ibid*; Interview with Esko Antola.

¹¹¹ Cf. Interview with an official of the Federal Foreign Office.

¹¹² Cf. Interview with Esko Antola.

¹¹³ Cf. Auswärtiges Amt: Bundesaußenminister Steinmeier. Tabellarischer Lebenslauf. 22.11.07. <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/AAmt/Leitung/BM-tab-Lebenslauf,navCtx=51060.html> (26.03.09).

¹¹⁴ Cf. Interview with an official of the German Embassy in Helsinki.

¹¹⁵ Cf. Interview with Jari Luoto.

each other three or four times a year. The EU presidencies were characterised by that good working relationship. There was no major disagreement about the agenda. The important issues in the EU's foreign affairs were managed according to the importance for the chair-holding country. Finland had the responsibility for the further development of the Northern Dimension of the EU and hosted the EU-Russia Summit.¹¹⁶ Germany's presidency drafted the Central Asia Strategy of the EU.¹¹⁷ Furthermore, German officials worked in the Finnish ministries for foreign affairs respectively defence during the presidency in order to support the intensive cooperation between both governments.¹¹⁸

The embassies in Berlin and Helsinki work very politically and representatives of both states have an easy access to German respectively Finnish governmental institutions.¹¹⁹ But whereas the German Embassy has an official at almost every event in Helsinki, it is apparent that Finnish representatives in Berlin are less visible. The embassy in Berlin is embedded in a common complex with the other four Nordic states. In the practical work on EU issues, Finnish officials try to act together with Swedish and Danish colleagues due to practical and strategic reasons.¹²⁰

A rather random factor is accompanied with the consecutive presidencies, which is nonetheless important. Due to the sequence of EU chairmanships, German and Finnish representatives sit next to each other in all meetings of the Council of the European Union. Thomas Kossendey, Parliamentary State Secretary in the Federal Ministry of Defence, appreciated: "*Aus manchem Nebensatz kann man mehr nehmen als aus manchen diplomatisch formulierten Vorlagen.*"¹²¹ And in the words of Juha Korkeaoja, Minister for Agriculture 2003-2007, "it is good to have a German minister close."¹²²

In terms of expertise and knowledge, both countries differ significantly. In Finland, a general understanding of the German policy can be attested to most politicians engaged in EU or foreign policy. That is also a result of the general attention for Germany as a big member state, which is exemplary visible in the news coverage. While there are a couple of Finnish correspondents in Berlin, there is hardly a major German media represented in Helsinki.¹²³ In German politics, the situation is much less concentrated on the Finnish counterpart. On ministerial level, officials responsible for Finland respectively Northern Europe have to advertise internally for the Finnish partner due to the low awareness for its matters.¹²⁴ In the parliament, there are only a few committed representatives, who have mostly a personal affiliation towards Northern Europe in general and a less specific interest in Finland. Nordic features are very often projected on Finland as well. Additionally, most of the party internal appointees for Northern Europe are hardly familiar with

¹¹⁶ Cf. Finland's EU Presidency: EU-Russia Summit and Northern Dimension Summit. http://www.eu2006.fi/media_services/photos/meetings/en_GB/eu_russia_summit/ (24.09.08).

¹¹⁷ Cf. Federal Foreign Office: The EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership. <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Europa/Aussenpolitik/Regionalabkommen/EU-CentralAsia-Strategy.pdf> (24.09.08).

¹¹⁸ Cf. Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland: Good cooperation as a basis of Finland's and Germany's consecutive EU presidencies; Interview with Thomas Kossendey, CDU, Parliamentary State Secretary in the Federal Ministry of Defence, 17th June 2008 in Berlin.

¹¹⁹ Cf. Interview with an official of the German Embassy in Helsinki; Interview with Petri Hakkarainen.

¹²⁰ Cf. Interview with Petri Hakkarainen.

¹²¹ Interview with Thomas Kossendey. Author's translation: From some subordinate clauses you can take more than from some diplomatic formulated proposals.

¹²² Interview with Juha Korkeaoja.

¹²³ Deutsche Botschaft Helsinki: Liste der für Finnland akkreditierten Korrespondenten deutscher Medien. 28.04.08. http://www.helsinki.diplo.de/Vertretung/helsinki/de/02/Botschafter_und_Abteilungen/Presse/seite_korrespondenten.html (03.03.09); The Finnish government gives scholarships for young journalists to get familiar with Finland. Cf. Botschaft von Finnland: Daniel Duben mit Stipendium für junge Journalisten nach Finnland. 26.06.08. <http://www.finnland.de/Public/Print.aspx?contentid=132991&nodeid=37052&culture> (10.01.09).

¹²⁴ Cf. Interview with an official of the Federal Foreign Office.

Finland. So it is up to a few Members of the Parliament (MP) to give more detailed views on Finland. In that sense, the German-Nordic Parliamentarian Group is in a key role. This group maintains regular contacts with Finnish MPs and is one of the oldest of the German *Bundestag*. In that context, it is remarkably that Denmark has no comparable parliamentary friendship group.¹²⁵ All in all, there is a huge asymmetry in knowledge, attention and resources for each other.

3.1.1 Finland through German Eyes

The public perception of Finland in Germany is often related to rather intuitive opinions and general assumptions. The historic ties are familiar only to some few personally interested people. Nokia and the Pisa survey are probably the most popular things that Germans know about Finland. Therefore, the lack of knowledge is not necessarily negative.¹²⁶ A narrow image like that can easily change into a disadvantage, though. In January 2008, Nokia announced the closure of a production plant in Bochum. Thereafter, the Finnish company has been severely criticised in Germany and the whole debate related also to Finland.¹²⁷

German foreign policy makers named very positive features of Finland, though. Particularly, Finnish achievements in terms of innovation and education are highly respected and regarded as a model case for Europe and Germany.¹²⁸ Finland's abilities are fairly recognised as enrichment for Europe.¹²⁹ Kurt Bodewig, Vice-Chairman of the Committee on the Affairs of the European Union, emphasised: "*Finnland ist es gelungen, aus einem eher landwirtschaftlich geprägten Staat zu einem Technologiestandort zu werden. Und die Unterstützung Estlands zeigt, dass Finnland etwas weiterzugeben hat.*"¹³⁰

Finnish EU policy is very much appreciated and often regarded as a positive example for the new member states. Parliamentary State Secretary Kossendey mentioned: "[...] *es kann kleinen und gerade auch jungen Ländern, dazu gehört Finnland nicht so sehr, Mut machen, ihre Rolle selbstbewusst, aber auch europagerecht zu spielen.*"¹³¹ It is worth to underline that Finland is not regarded as a young member state, even though it joined the EU just 14 years ago. Due to its active, self-confident, and skilful policy, Finland enjoys the reputation of an 'old' member state. In that sense, German policy makers have in mind that Finland is a member state with influence on its region, which covers a couple of new member states.¹³² Finland indeed is perceived as a small and periphery state, but with important, valuable characteristics.

Another factor for the perception of Finland is the German foreign policy tradition, which gives small states a special appreciation and respect.¹³³ The German conservatives claim a traditional policy line towards small states that always tries to avoid a feeling of being ignored.¹³⁴ And the

¹²⁵ The Norwegian *Storting* established a friendship group in 2008. Thereby, Denmark and Iceland are the only Nordic countries having no parliamentary friendship group with the German *Bundestag*. Cf. Interview with Franz Thönnies.

¹²⁶ Cf. Interview with Petri Hakkarainen.

¹²⁷ The issue did not directly tangle the bilateral relations. Nokia and the State Government of North Rhine-Westphalia were the main actors. The Finnish Embassy in Berlin received a handful of anti-Finnish messages, though. Cf. Interview with Petri Hakkarainen.

¹²⁸ Cf. Bundesregierung: Deutschland und Finnland arbeiten an Europas Zukunft. 09.05.06.

¹²⁹ Cf. Interview with Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

¹³⁰ Interview with Kurt Bodewig, SPD, Vice-Chairman of the Committee on the Affairs of the European Union of the German Parliament, 18th June 2008 in Berlin; Author's translation: Finland succeeded to become a technology site out of an agricultural formed state. And the support of Estonia shows that Finland has something to hand over.

¹³¹ Interview with Thomas Kossendey. Author's translation: It can encourage small and young countries, Finland does rather not belong to those [young], to play their role self-confident, but also suitable to Europe.

¹³² Cf. Interview with an official of the Federal Foreign Office.

¹³³ Cf. Interview with Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

¹³⁴ Cf. Interview with Thomas Kossendey.

social democrat Franz Thönnies, Parliamentary State Secretary in the Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs and Chairman of the German-Nordic Parliamentary Friendship Group, pointed out: “*Es liegt immer daran, dass die Großen sich durchaus ihrer Größe bewusst sein sollten [...] dass sie den Kleineren nicht den Eindruck vermitteln, sie hätten nichts zu sagen, sondern dass man sie respektiert, sie einbezieht in die Entscheidungen.*”¹³⁵

In general, Finland is regarded as a reliable, loyal, inspiring, and constructive partner, who is part of a stable region. Its ‘anchor function’¹³⁶ is important for whole Europe, though due to its low profile in daily politics it is not among Germany’s priority partners. Finnish affairs are just not constantly important for German foreign policy actors.¹³⁷ An official of the Federal Foreign Office mentioned: “*Wir haben nicht den Fokus wie vielleicht Schweden oder Finnland auf eine ganz konkrete Region. Wir haben die deutsch-französische Zusammenarbeit. Das ist wichtig.*”¹³⁸

But nonetheless, Finland is highly respected in German foreign policy circles due to its astonishing historical, political and economic achievements. In relation to its size, Finland has a quiet prominent reputation. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Federal Foreign Minister from 1974 to 1992, called it “*Bewunderung für ein kleines Volk*”¹³⁹.

3.1.2 Germany through Finnish Eyes

The perception of Germany in Finland is certainly that of a big member state. Eero Akaan-Penttilä, Vice-Chairman of the Grand Committee of the *Eduskunta*, emphasised: “In all these things you have to remember that Germany is a big country. [...] the relations are always very important.”¹⁴⁰ Thus, Germany’s foreign policy might be perceived according to the fact that “big countries are big countries.”¹⁴¹

But the perception of Germany as a big state is also often different to that of the United Kingdom (UK) or France. Juha Korkeaaja, Chairman of the Defence Committee of the *Eduskunta*, described the other two big member states as different ends of a political scale and Germany “has a kind of a third, balancing role”¹⁴². According to Korkeaaja, “Germany has best possibilities, best prognosis to draw and find a common policy to bring together also small countries, better possibilities than France or the UK.”¹⁴³ Pertti Salolainen, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee and former Ambassador to the UK, regarded both states in very different roles. “The British are not really interested in the EU. Quite a lot of them hate the European Union.”¹⁴⁴ And, “the French are often very nationalistic and protectionist, self-centred to EU issues.”¹⁴⁵ This distinctive attitude has not always been attested with the same result. Esko Antola, Jean Monnet Professor at the

¹³⁵ Interview with Franz Thönnies, SPD, Chairman of the German-Nordic Parliamentary Friendship Group/Parliamentary State Secretary in the Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs, 25th June 2008 in Berlin; Author’s translation: It is always important that the big should be aware of their size [...] that they do not suggest to the smaller ones that they have nothing to say, but that they are respected, included into the decision making.

¹³⁶ Interview with an official of the German Embassy in Helsinki.

¹³⁷ Cf. Schmidt, Helmut: *Außer Dienst. Eine Bilanz*. Munich, 2008. p. 28.

¹³⁸ Interview with an official of the Federal Foreign Office. Author’s translation: We do not have the focus on one concrete region like Sweden or Finland. We have the German-French friendship. That is important.

¹³⁹ Interview with Hans-Dietrich Genscher. Author’s translation: Admiration for a small nation.

¹⁴⁰ Interview with Eero Akaan-Penttilä.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴² Interview with Juha Korkeaaja.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁴ Interview with Pertti Salolainen.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

University of Turku and Director of the Centrum Baltikum in Turku, mentioned that in the beginning of the decade, under Schröder, Germany was more in company with France and the UK.¹⁴⁶

Nonetheless, Germany is not just perceived differently due to its policy, but also due to its attitude towards small states. Teija Tiilikainen, formerly State Secretary in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, regarded Germany as “the cohesion force between big and small”¹⁴⁷ and remarked that it “also reminded the other big member states of the fact that we have to keep even the small states on board”¹⁴⁸. Jari Luoto, formerly State Secretary in the Government Secretariat for EU Affairs, mentioned: “We have always appreciated the fact that Germany has been willing to listen to the argumentation of countries like Finland.”¹⁴⁹

For Finnish representatives, cultural, historical, and economical reasons are much more present than for their German counterparts. Salolainen reminded: “We always had good contacts and cooperation with Germany. If you study Finland’s history, you know that when Finland became independent the German troops landed in Hanko and helped the Whites to fight against the Reds. [...] And then in the Second World War we would not have survived without German weapons and German food assistance, although we fought very gallantly in the Second World War. [...] So there are historical reasons.”¹⁵⁰ Tiilikainen pointed out “cultural and historical linkages, value based linkages, make it easier [...] to cooperate”¹⁵¹. Juha Korkeaoja even said: “Europe is mentally and culturally divided. It is the Northern part, where Germany, the Netherlands and the Nordic countries very easily find a common language.”¹⁵² Salolainen summarised: “There are objective reasons and cultural contacts. It is very easy to understand Germany has always been of all the big Western powers the closest to us.”¹⁵³

Germany is regarded as a big state that Finns can rely on in critical moments.¹⁵⁴ The last historic example has been Kinkel’s assistance in the accession negotiations. But there are also recent cases. In late 2007, the European Commission wanted to abandon the national subsidies for southern Finland, which are permitted by article 141 in the Finnish accession treaty. The issue became highly emotional and a threat for Finland’s very specific national interests.¹⁵⁵ In the efforts to persuade the Commission, the Finnish government also turned to Germany, which then supported the concern in Brussels.¹⁵⁶

3.2 Selected Policy Fields

In the following sub-chapters, German-Finnish relations will be examined in four policy fields in order to draw a detailed and differentiated picture of the contents, interests and perceptions in bilateral relations.

¹⁴⁶ Cf. Interview with Esko Antola.

¹⁴⁷ Interview with Teija Tiilikainen.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Interview with Jari Luoto.

¹⁵⁰ Interview with Pertti Salolainen.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Interview with Juha Korkeaoja.

¹⁵³ Interview with Pertti Salolainen.

¹⁵⁴ Cf. Interview with Esko Antola.


¹⁵⁵ Cf. Helsingin Sanomat (International Edition): Vanhanen sees Article 141 as the only way that Finland can secure livelihood of its farmers. 24.10.07. <http://www.hs.fi/english/print/1135231273954> (01.04.09).

¹⁵⁶ Interview with an official of the Federal Foreign Office.

3.2.1 Russia

In 1995, Tuomas Forsberg, Professor of International Relations at the University of Helsinki, published an article with the title “*Finnland und Deutschland*”¹⁵⁷. He used a triangle scheme to illustrate the German-Finnish relationship – in dependence to Russia.¹⁵⁸

Figure 1: Germany-Finland-Russia Triangle



Source: Forsberg, 1995. pp. 154-155.

Forsberg’s basic assumption was that Russia has always been the crucial factor for German-Finnish relations.¹⁵⁹ Indeed, throughout the 20th century, the situation with Russia has been the most important cause for the general condition of the relations between Germany and Finland. Today, this simple calculation has become more complicated.¹⁶⁰ But it expresses the persisting importance. Therefore, the Russia policy of Germany and Finland will be examined briefly regarding their main features and patterns. Thereafter, interaction of both states on Russia will be presented.

3.2.1.1 Germany and Russia

Since the very beginning of Russia’s interest in the Western world, Germany has been the partner for technological modernisation and intellectual inspiration.¹⁶¹ Peter the Great, invited German immigrants to Russia to promote the economical development.¹⁶² Catherine the Great, a German princess, settled colonisers at the Volga to foster the Russian agriculture.¹⁶³ In the 19th century, ethnic Germans had considerable influence in the Russian administration and numbered about one third of its civil servants.¹⁶⁴ Not by incidence, Europeans have been called Germans.¹⁶⁵ In retrospective, the Second World War and the following period of the Cold War seem to be rather discontinuities in the German-Russian relations. After the political world map changed so dramatically between 1989 and 1991, the situation seems to be normalised according to a traditional pattern of beneficial mutual relations.

¹⁵⁷ In: Auffermann, Burkhard/Visuri, Pekka: Die Nordischen Staaten und die deutsche Herausforderung. Baden-Baden, 1995. pp. 141-156.

¹⁵⁸ Forsberg and Visuri pointed to the geopolitical interdependence already in their book *Saksa ja Suomi* from 1992. Additionally, Alpo Rusi referred to the ‘Helsinki-Berlin-Moscow Geopolitical Triangle’ as well. Cf. Rusi, Alpo: Finnish-German Relations and the Helsinki-Berlin-Moscow Triangle. In: Verheyen, Dirk/Soe, Christian (Ed.): *The Germans and Their Neighbors*. Boulder, 1993. pp. 179-198.

¹⁵⁹ Cf. *ibid.* pp. 154-155.

¹⁶⁰ Meeting with Tuomas Forsberg, 22nd May 2008 in Helsinki.

¹⁶¹ Cf. Deutscher Bundestag: Staatsgäste: Rede von Wladimir Putin. 25.09.01. http://www.bundestag.de/geschichte/gastredner/putin/putin_wort.html (01.10.08).

¹⁶² Cf. Nolte, Hans-Heinrich: *Kleine Geschichte Rußlands*. Bonn, 2006. p. 94.

¹⁶³ Cf. *ibid.* pp. 113-115.

¹⁶⁴ Cf. Stent, Angela: *Rivalen des Jahrhunderts. Deutschland und Rußland im neuen Europa*. German edition, Berlin/Munich, 2000. p. 21.

¹⁶⁵ Rede von Wladimir Putin, 25.09.01.

In a historical perspective, two factors have decisively affected German-Russian relations.¹⁶⁶ Firstly, Germany and Russia rarely shared common borders and there have mostly been smaller states between them. Secondly, their economies complement one another. Germany has been traditionally an exporter of manufactured products, while Russia mainly exported raw materials.

Due to those circumstances, there have been long periods of cooperation. And there are even a couple of historic examples when Germany and Russia collaborated against other states. From 1772 to 1795, Poland was parted and incorporated by Prussia, Russia, and Austria. In 1918, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk ruled over the Eastern European people. During the interwar-period the German Empire and the newly emerged Soviet Union cooperated militarily from 1921 onwards. For the Soviet Union, relations to Germany also paved the way back into the European diplomacy. The Treaty of Rapallo of 1922 marked the beginning of a German-Soviet collaboration that led to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939.

On the other hand, Germany and Russia fought devastating wars when their imperialist and totalitarian regimes clashed. In both perspectives, Germany is a decisive factor for the relationship between Russia and Europe. Whenever Germany and Russia collaborated or were at war, Europe had to manage the results. But Germany also had a more positive feature. It had and still has abilities to promote development and prosperity for Russia and their common neighbours. After the first two decades of German post-war relations with Russia, the *Neue Ostpolitik* initiated a period of rapprochement. Finally, the West German *Deutschlandpolitik* succeeded and the Iron Curtain became a historic phrase.

The end of the Cold War changed the circumstances of German-Russian relations fundamentally. Both states sought their role in a new shape. The peaceful withdrawal of the Soviet Union respectively Russia from Germany and Eastern Europe had an important influence on the German policy. Germany saw itself in a special responsibility for Russia and supported the transformation process towards a democracy and a liberal market economy substantially.¹⁶⁷ Chancellor Helmut Kohl supported President Yeltsin stronger and more explicit than any other Western head of government.¹⁶⁸ The social democratic opposition blamed Kohl's relationship to Yeltsin as "*Sauna-Diplomatie*".¹⁶⁹ After the unification, Germany became the biggest creditor of Russia.

At the same time, the Federal government had to prove voices wrong, which warned of the newly united Germany.¹⁷⁰ Therefore, Germany also pursued a policy of multilateralism and proposed enlargement of the EU and NATO eastwards. In 1993, the German Minister of Defence, Volker R  he, lobbied as one of the first Western politicians for NATO membership of the Central and Eastern European states.¹⁷¹

The beginning of the First Chechen war in late 1994 urged the Kohl government to act on the European level, due to its EU chairmanship in 1994, and domestically, due to a critical opposi-

¹⁶⁶ Stent, Angela: Russland. In: Schmidt, Siegmund/Hellmann, Gunther/Wolf, Reinhard (Ed.): Handbuch zur deutschen Au enpolitik. Wiesbaden, 2007. pp. 436-454 (437).

¹⁶⁷ Cf. Stent, 2007. pp. 438-443.

¹⁶⁸ Stent, 2007. p. 443.

¹⁶⁹ Schrotthofer, Klaus: Bundeswehr mu  bleiben. SPD-Fraktionschef Rudolf Scharping pl diert f r eine Fortsetzung der Friedensmission in Bosnien und kritisiert Kohls „Sauna-Diplomatie“. In: FOCUS, Nr. 39, 1996. http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/deutschland-bundeswehr-muss-bleiben_aid_161466.html (01.10.08).

¹⁷⁰ Cf. Jackson, James O./Mader, William/McAllister, J.F.O./Ungeheuer, Frederick: The New Germany Flexes Its Muscles. In: TIME, 13.04.92. <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,975276,00.html> (01.10.08).

¹⁷¹ Cf. Jackson, James O.: In Europe, Could the Bear Be Back? In: TIME, 18.10.93. <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,979419,00.html> (01.10.08).

tion.¹⁷² The German government brought the issue up in top level meetings and tried to convince the Russian leadership with words, not sanctions.¹⁷³ Instead, Germany achieved the paraphing of the first Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between the EU and Russia in December 1994, and pursued the further integration of Russia, particularly participation in the G7 from 1991 onwards and membership in the Council of Europe in 1996.¹⁷⁴ Moreover, Germany tried to introduce common strategic concepts into the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and was decisively involved in the first Common Strategy of the EU that was drafted on Russia in 1999.¹⁷⁵

The Red-Green government of Gerhard Schröder and Joschka Fischer had started with the promise to evaluate the German-Russian relations critically. Both represented the new generation of German politicians, who had not experienced the Second World War on their own. At their first state visit in November 1998, they rejected Russian requests for further credits.¹⁷⁶ Four months later, the Kosovo War started and the German-Russian relationship was at a post-Cold War low. When the Second Chechen War began in mid 1999, the Schröder government criticised the Russian actions much more directly, but followed in practise the line of the Kohl government.¹⁷⁷

The Putin era marked an intensifying German-Russian relationship. Vladimir Putin emphasised the importance of good relations to Germany in the very beginning of his presidency.¹⁷⁸ The 2000 biography of Alexander Rahr titled "*Der Deutsche im Kreml*"¹⁷⁹ referring to Putin's German affiliation.¹⁸⁰ In October 2001, President Putin held a historic speech, partly in German, in the renovated *Reichstag* parliament building: "*Russland hegte gegenüber Deutschland immer besondere Gefühle. [...] Zwischen Russland und Amerika liegen Ozeane. Zwischen Russland und Deutschland liegt die große Geschichte.*"¹⁸¹

From 2000 to 2005, the German-Russian relationship had been deeper and broader than ever before.¹⁸² Both launched the *Petersburger Dialog/Петербургский диалог*, a discussion forum for civil societies, in April 2001. In the run-up to the American-led invasion of Iraq in March/April

¹⁷² Cf. Deutscher Bundestag: Plenarprotokoll Nr. 13/12. 19.01.95. pp. 638-669. <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/13/13012.pdf> (11.10.08).

¹⁷³ Cf. Ibid; Deutscher Bundestag: Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Fraktion der SPD. Drucksache 13/718, 09.03.95. <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/13/007/1300718.pdf> (11.10.08).

¹⁷⁴ Since the 1998 Birmingham Summit, Russia is a member of the then G8. Cf. Bastian, Katrin: Die Europäische Union und Russland. Multilaterale und bilaterale Dimensionen in der europäischen Außenpolitik. Wiesbaden, 2006. p. 166; Elvers, Julia: Der Europarat und die Russische Föderation. In: Holtz, Uwe (Ed.): 50 Jahre Europarat. Baden-Baden, 2000. pp. 213-224 (215-218); Althaus, Christine D.: Russlands Weg in den Europarat. Münster, 1997. pp. 134-139.

¹⁷⁵ Cf. Schäuble, Wolfgang/Lamers, Karl: Überlegungen zur europäischen Politik. 01.09.94. <http://www.cducsu.de/upload/schaeublelamers94.pdf> (11.10.08); Haukkala, Hiski: The Making of the European Union's Common Strategy on Russia. UPI Working Paper 28, 2000.

¹⁷⁶ Cf. Krumrey, Hans-Henning: Kein neuer Aufguß. Antrittsbesuch von Gerhard Schröder in Moskau. Statt Geld will der Kanzler guten Rat nach Russland schicken. In: FOCUS, Nr. 48, 1998. http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/aussenpolitik-kein-neuer-aufguss_aid_174048.html (01.10.08).

¹⁷⁷ Cf. Spiegel Online: Fischer verurteilt russischen "Akt der Barbarei". 08.12.99. <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,55836,00.html> (11.10.08).

¹⁷⁸ Cf. President of Russia, Official Web Portal: Interview with German TV Channels ARD and ZDF. 09.06.00. http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2000/06/09/0000_type82916_129889.shtml (01.10.08).

¹⁷⁹ The German in the Kremlin; Rahr, Alexander: Wladimir Putin. Der Deutsche im Kreml. Munich, 2000.

¹⁸⁰ Putin worked for the KGB in Dresden from 1985 to 1990 and is fluent in German. His daughters visited the German school in Moscow. Cf. Thumann, Michael: Anatomie einer Männerfreundschaft. In: Die Zeit, 09.09.04. http://pdf.zeit.de/2004/38/Putin_2fSchr_9ader.pdf (27.03.09).

¹⁸¹ Rede von Wladimir Putin. 25.09.01; Author's translation: Russia always had special feelings towards Germany. Between Russia and America, there are oceans. Between Russia and Germany, there is the grand history.

¹⁸² Cf. Timmins, Graham: German-Russian Bilateral Relations and EU Policy on Russia: Reconciling the Two-Level Game? In: Gower, Jackie/Timmins, Graham (Ed.): Russia and Europe in the Twenty-First Century. An Uneasy Partnership. London/New York, 2007. pp. 169-184 (175).

2003, Germany, Russia, and France opposed the aggression and, thus, worsened their relations with the USA significantly.¹⁸³ In October 2003, Russia and Germany agreed on a military transit agreement that allowed Germany as the first NATO member transportation of military equipment and personnel over Russian territory to Afghanistan.¹⁸⁴ In September 2005, Germany and Russia proposed the construction of the Nord Stream pipeline through the Baltic Sea – offshore of Poland and the Baltic States.¹⁸⁵ Radosław Sikorski, then Minister of National Defence and present Foreign Minister of Poland, compared the agreement to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939.¹⁸⁶

Chancellor Schröder presented his Russia policy in the reputable magazine *Die Zeit* in 2001 under the title “*Deutsche Russlandpolitik – europäische Ostpolitik*”¹⁸⁷. He ensured the enduring commitment to avoid any German *Sonderweg*. Though, he emphasised the German understanding of being an initiator in the EU’s policy on Russia. In that role, he advertised for broad cooperation and dialogue, deepening economic ties and a European security structure with Russia. Therefore, he pointed out that Russia is a strategic partner of Germany and Europe. Germany together with France pushed forward the creation of the Four Common Spaces with Russia in 2003 and is “particularly eager to drive forward the implementation of the four Common Spaces”¹⁸⁸.

The current Grand Coalition of CDU, SPD and CSU seemed to set a new course in German-Russian relations, although they fixed the ‘strategic partnership’ in their coalition agreement of 2005.¹⁸⁹ While the German interests remained the same, Chancellor Merkel pursued a more factual policy, in absence of a friendship of men (*Männerfreundschaft*), and a revitalisation of German-American relations, which had worsened severely before the Iraq invasion. Chancellor Merkel showed no favour for an axis Moscow-Berlin-Paris. Instead, she visited Warsaw before Moscow.¹⁹⁰

Nonetheless, German-Russian relations have not suffered significantly due to the change of government. Foreign Minister Steinmeier, the former Head of the Federal Chancellery under Gerhard Schröder, is well known in the Kremlin and he claims a leading role in the German Russia policy.¹⁹¹ Frank-Walter Steinmeier proposed a European Eastern policy, like Schröder, with the label *Annäherung durch Verflechtung*,¹⁹² closely related to the social democratic tradition of the *Neue*

¹⁸³ Cf. Sciolino, Elaine: European Leaders Dig In to Defend Their Positions on Iraq. In: The New York Times, 27.02.03. <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D0CEEDD153CF934A15751C0A9659C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=print> (08.10.08).

¹⁸⁴ Cf. Auswärtiges Amt: Truppenstationierungsrecht. Zweiseitige Abkommen. 13.02.08. <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Aussenpolitik/InternatRecht/Truppenstationierungsrecht.html#7> (08.10.08).

¹⁸⁵ Cf. von Salzen, Claudia: Erdgas fließt künftig unter der Ostsee. In: Der Tagesspiegel, 09.09.05. <http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/art771,1998504> (08.10.08).

¹⁸⁶ Cf. Herold, Frank: Die Ostsee-Pipeline und der Hitler-Stalin-Pakt. In: Berliner Zeitung, 02.05.06. <https://www.berlinonline.de/berliner-zeitung/archiv/.bin/dump.fcgi/2006/0502/seite1/0133/index.html> (08.10.08).

¹⁸⁷ German Russia policy – European Eastern policy; Schröder, Gerhard: Deutsche Russlandpolitik – europäische Ostpolitik. In: Die Zeit, 15/2001. http://www.zeit.de/2001/15/Deutsche_Russlandpolitik_-_europaeische_Ostpolitik?page=all (01.10.08).

¹⁸⁸ Federal Foreign Office: “Towards a new EU Ostpolitik? – Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia” – speech by Minister of State Erler at Georgetown University in Washington. 07.02.07. <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Infoservice/Presse/Rede/2007/070207-Erler-EUOstpolitik.html> (08.01.09).

¹⁸⁹ Cf. Gemeinsam für Deutschland. Mit Mut und Menschlichkeit. Koalitionsvertrag von CDU, CSU und SPD. 11.11.05. p. 156.

¹⁹⁰ Raben, Mia: Tango in Warschau. In: Spiegel Online, 02.12.05. <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,druck-387733,00.html> (29.03.09).

¹⁹¹ Cf. Hacke, Christian: Deutsche Außenpolitik unter Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel. In: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte. 43/2006. http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/Z955G0,3,0,Deutsche_Au%DFenpolitik_unter_Bundeskanzlerin_Angela_Merkel.html#art3 (01.10.08); Reitschuster, Boris: Ende der Sauna-Beziehungen. In: FOCUS Online, 03.12.05. http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/steinmeier-in-russland_aid_102153.html (03.10.08).

¹⁹² Cf. Auswärtiges Amt: Interview mit Bundesaußenminister Steinmeier im rbb-Inforadio. 14.10.06. <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Infoservice/Presse/Interviews/2006/061014-SteinmeierRBB.html> (01.10.08).

Ostpolitik respectively Egon Bahr's concept of *Wandel durch Annäherung*.¹⁹³ In March 2008, he referred to President Medvedev's wish for a renewed partnership and urged to take the chance.¹⁹⁴ He proposed four necessary steps to do: (1) An open dialogue about security issues, (2) starting negotiations for a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between Russia and the EU, (3) strengthening dialogue on global future challenges and (4) new impulses to deal with the past. In the last point, he named explicitly the Molotov-Ribbentrop-Pact 70 years ago.

The idea of a strong European Eastern policy is more than just a phrase. The German policy has always been trying to embed its relations with Russia in a multilateral frame and prefers the multilateral approach to the bilateral one.¹⁹⁵ This attitude is apparent in the wider context of German foreign policy since 1949 and its lasting imprint that avoids power politics and unilateralism.¹⁹⁶ The first PCA with Russia from 1994 has been decisively promoted by Germany.¹⁹⁷ In the formulation of the first EU Common Strategy from 1999, the German government has also been intensively engaged.¹⁹⁸ The negotiations for a new PCA should have started during the German EU presidency in 2007. Because of Polish and Lithuanian vetoes, the political decision to open the PCA negotiations was delayed until May 2008. Foreign Minister Steinmeier promoted a more constructive approach and called for 'proposals instead of allegations'.¹⁹⁹

In May 2008, it was Steinmeier, who has been the first Western statesman to meet the new Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, during a one week visit in Yekaterinburg, Moscow and St. Petersburg. Foreign Minister Steinmeier held an important speech in Yekaterinburg at 13th May 2008, in which he proposed the German-Russian Partnership for Modernisation and underlined that Russia is an indispensable partner for Germany and Europe. He also forecasted: „The future is there for countries and societies that vigorously modernise, are innovative and courageously tackle structural change. [...] We are therefore well-advised to perceive openness and plurality of our societies not as a threat but as an opportunity and a sine qua non for peace and growing prosperity.“²⁰⁰ For this process, Russia has the very commitment of Germany.

The first Western destination of Dmitry Medvedev as President of Russia was Berlin on 5th June 2008. In his speech at a meeting with German political and civic leaders, he emphasised the European role of Germany and Russia, who “step by step [...] have built up trust in each other and in so doing have set a unique example for Europe”²⁰¹. Moreover, he accentuated the Russian contribution to the European culture and proposed “building a genuine greater Europe”²⁰², accompanied

¹⁹³ Egon Bahr, one of Willy Brandt's most important advisors on All-German issues, proposed that concept in 1963. Bahr is regarded as one of the ideological fathers of the *Neue Ostpolitik*. Cf. von Bredow, Wilfried: *Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Eine Einführung*. Wiesbaden, 2006. p. 130; TIME: West Germany Looks to the East. 16.03.70. <http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,909069,00.html#> (13.04.09).

¹⁹⁴ Cf. Auswärtiges Amt: Rede von Bundesaußenminister Steinmeier anlässlich der Podiumsdiskussion bei der Willy-Brandt-Stiftung, 4. März 2008. <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2008/080304-BM-Ostpolitik.html> (01.10.08).

¹⁹⁵ Cf. Bastian, Katrin: *Die Europäische Union und Russland. Multilaterale und bilaterale Dimensionen in der europäischen Außenpolitik*. Wiesbaden, 2006. pp. 162-163, 193-194.

¹⁹⁶ Therefore Rittberger, Volker (Ed.): *German Foreign Policy since Unification. Theories and Case Studies*. Manchester/New York, 2001; Schmalz, Uwe: *Deutschlands europäisierte Außenpolitik*. Wiesbaden, 2004.

¹⁹⁷ Cf. Bastian, 2006. p. 163.

¹⁹⁸ Cf. Haukkala, 2000.

¹⁹⁹ Cf. Die Zeit: Krisengespräch in Moskau. 14.05.07. <http://www.zeit.de/online/2007/20/steinmeier-russland> (11.10.08).

²⁰⁰ Federal Foreign Office: Speech by Dr Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, at the Department of International Relations of the Urals State University in Yekaterinburg. 13.05.08. <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2008/080513-BM-Russland.html> (14.05.08).

²⁰¹ President of Russia: Speech at Meeting with German Political, Parliamentary and Civic Leaders. 05.06.08. http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/06/05/2203_type82912type82914type84779_202153.shtml (04.10.08).

²⁰² Ibid.

with a continuation of the Helsinki Process. This new facet in the Russian foreign policy meant an offer to Germany and Europe that was open to pick up.²⁰³ During his visit, President Medvedev has been warmly welcomed by the chairman of the *Ost-Ausschuss der Deutschen Wirtschaft*²⁰⁴, Klaus Mangold, who has firmly advertised for an understanding of Russia in the past.²⁰⁵ Russia is Germany's fastest growing export market.

During the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008, the Federal Government reacted with a firm commitment to Georgia. After an under-cooled meeting with President Medvedev in Sochi on 15th August, Chancellor Merkel proceeded to Tbilisi and underlined the Georgian choice for a future NATO membership.²⁰⁶ But she mindfully did not mention a prospective date.²⁰⁷ Foreign Minister Steinmeier stated that Russia had crossed a line.²⁰⁸ However, at the same time, Germany supported a continuing dialogue with Russia, disagreed on the suspension of the NATO-Russia Council and firmly opposed sanctions on Russia.²⁰⁹ A week after the decision of NATO foreign ministers to suspend the NATO-Russia Council, the Federal Government confirmed to hold the German-Russian government consultations on 2nd October in St. Petersburg.²¹⁰

During the Russian-Georgian conflict, Germany did not give any reason to doubt its loyalty.²¹¹ Nonetheless, the government consultations expressed its commitment to keep the dialogue.²¹² The time schedule was reduced to one day and the atmosphere was still affected by the war in August, but, like the Ambassador of Russia to Germany, Vladimir Kotenev, commented, German-Russian relations are very robust.²¹³ In that respect, Germany is an important bridge to Russia, especially in critical times,²¹⁴ and it gives an example of how constructive the EU-Russia relations could be.²¹⁵

On 20th January 2009, the inauguration day of Barack Obama, Chancellor Merkel expressed her wish that President Obama would find a more cooperative policy towards Russia. She appreciated that the USA signalled to involve Russia into the planned anti-missile-system in Poland and the Czech Republic: "*Ich halte das für notwendig. Das werde ich auch deutlich machen.*"²¹⁶ Germany will be decisive for the future relations of Russia and the West.²¹⁷

²⁰³ Cf. Schröder, Hans-Henning: Medwedew ante portas. Konturen der neuen russischen Außenpolitik. SWP-Aktuell 58, June 2008. pp. 2-3.

²⁰⁴ Committee on Eastern European Economic Relations.

²⁰⁵ Cf. Brössler, Daniel: Mit neuem Stil dem alten Meister folgen. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 06.06.08. p. 8; Ost-Ausschuss der Deutschen Wirtschaft: Vortrag des Russischen Präsidenten Dmitri Medwedew in Berlin. Pressemitteilung, 05.06.08. <http://www.ost-ausschuss.de/presse.html> (15.01.09).

²⁰⁶ Cf. Frankfurter Rundschau: Rückenstärkung für einen schwierigen Freund. 17.08.08. http://www.fr-online.de/in_und_ausland/politik/aktuell/?em_cnt=1547058& (08.10.08).

²⁰⁷ Cf. Westdeutsche Zeitung: Interview mit Hans-Dietrich Genscher. 31.10.08. p. 6.

²⁰⁸ Cf. Frankfurter Rundschau: Neue Töne gegenüber Russland. 18.08.08. http://www.fr-online.de/top_news/?em_cnt=1559730& (08.10.08).

²⁰⁹ Cf. Doemens, Karl: Versteinerte Mienen. In: Frankfurter Rundschau. 16.08.08. http://www.fr-online.de/in_und_ausland/politik/aktuell/?em_cnt=1515687& (08.10.08); Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: Die EU sucht nach Sanktionen gegen Russland. 29.08.08. pp. 1-2.

²¹⁰ Cf. Spiegel Online: Merkel und Steinmeier fliegen nach St. Petersburg. 25.08.08. <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,druck-574236,00.html> (08.10.08).

²¹¹ Cf. Interview with Hans-Dietrich Genscher, 10.06.08.

²¹² Cf. Quenett, Sibylle: Deutsche und Russen reden wieder. In: Frankfurter Rundschau, 03.10.08.

²¹³ Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger: Die zehnten deutsch-russischen Regierungskonsultationen in St. Petersburg – Interview mit dem Botschafter in Berlin. 02./03.10.08. p. 8.

²¹⁴ Cf. Dempsey, Judy: A Role for Merkel as a Bridge to Russia. In: New York Times, 25.08.08. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/25/world/europe/25diplo.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=a+role+for+merkel+as+a+bridge+to&st=nyt&oref=slogin (11.10.08).

²¹⁵ Timmins, 2007. p. 181.

²¹⁶ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: Merkel fordert Ende der amerikanischen Alleingänge. 20.01.09. http://www.faz.net/s/Rub0A1169E18C724B0980CCD7215BCFAE4F/Doc~E95D1E6EFD721400E9087873BB3304A5D~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html?rss_aktuell (20.01.09); Author's translation: I consider that as necessary. And I will make that clear.

²¹⁷ Cf. Stelzenmüller, Constanze: Germany's Russia Question. A New *Ostpolitik* for Europe. In: Foreign Affairs, March/April 2009. pp. 89-

3.2.1.2 Finland and Russia

Finland is a young nation. From the 13th century on, Finland has been explored, civilised, and Christianised by the Swedes. After 1809, it became a Grand Duchy of the Russian Empire. In 1917, it broke free. But from that starting point of independence on, Finns defended their freedom successfully. Through the Second World War and the Cold War, Finland passed the tides of history constitutionally unharmed.

Finland is a small state. Sweden, a grand power in northern Europe until the beginning of the 19th century, has been replaced by Russia as Finland's ruler in 1809. Napoléon I and Alexander I agreed in 1807 to ally against Sweden and to assign Finland to Russia. The Tilsit Treaty is a synonym for an agreement of big powers about the fate of Finland.²¹⁸ So, a look on a map of northern Europe and in history makes clear, who is the determining factor for the Finnish statehood – Russia.

The proximity to Russia is not only a threat. Tsar Alexander I made Finland a Grand Duchy and thereby mentioned for the first time a Finnish nationhood. Johan Vilhelm Snellmann, a student of Hegel, established the Finnish nationalism. Under Russian rule, the Finnish language became official – beside Swedish. Russia has also been a catalyser for Finland's national history.

However, at the end of the 19th century, the period of Russification worsened the relations of the Finnish elites to Russia, and the political leadership of the young state was firmly pro-German due to Germany's function as counterweight to the Russian Empire.²¹⁹ After the Civil War in early 1918 and the Finnish-Russian Treaty of Tartu, which fixed the common border of the inter-war period, Finland had to adjust its foreign policy to new conditions. Russia's respectively the Soviet Union's interest in Finland becomes more apparent on a map of 1920. Then, the Finnish border was just a few kilometres away from Petrograd (Leningrad/St. Petersburg). Accordingly, Russia has a defensive strategic interest in Finland, aimed at avoiding an attack of a foreign force on north-west Russia over Finnish territory.²²⁰ President Paasikivi mentioned in 1948: "Finland herself has no enemies and no-one attacks Finland for its own sake."²²¹

The Finnish leadership of the 1920s had two options: Joining an alliance against the Soviet Union or neutrality.²²² Finland first pursued the former, marked by a Baltic defence agreement of 1922 that has never been ratified,²²³ then the later, marked by the Finnish-Soviet non-aggression pact of 1932. After the Second World War, the options were theoretically the same. In 1975, Urho Kekkonen analysed the situation so that Finland, in an alliance against Russia, would always be the first war site, without influence on the decision of peace or war.²²⁴

In practice, Finland had to seek neutrality and very good relations towards the Kremlin. President Juho Kusti Paasikivi declared right after his inauguration in 1946 that the future foreign policy of Finland had to be designed in such a way that it would never conflict the interest of the Soviet

100.

²¹⁸ Cf. Hämäläinen, Unto: Lipponen biography: From fiery red glow to cool blue dreams. In: Helsingin Sanomat (International Edition), 14.04.04. <http://www.hs.fi/english/print/1076152461062> (14.10.08).

²¹⁹ Cf. Singleton, 1989. pp. 94-106.

²²⁰ Cf. Visuri, Pekka: Neutral Military Security in a Changing Europe. A Finnish Perspective. In: Neuhold, Hanspeter (Ed.): The European Neutrals in the 1990s. New Challenges and Opportunities. Boulder/Colorado, 1992. pp. 49-50.

²²¹ Quoted in Pursiainen, Christer: Finland's Security Policy Towards Russia: From Bilateralism to Multilateralism. Ulkopoliittinen instituutti, Working Paper 14/1999. p. 4.

²²² Cf. Kekkonen, Urho: Finnlands Weg zur Neutralität. Düsseldorf, 1975. pp. 20-21.

²²³ Cf. Jussila/Hentilä/Nevakivi, 1999. pp. 160-161.

²²⁴ Cf. Kekkonen, 1975. p. 89.

Union.²²⁵ The Finnish-Soviet Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) of 1948 was the legal basis for the USSR to intervene in Finland. That threat marked the red line of Finnish politics. In 1948 and 1958, the relations to the USSR cooled down due to the composition of the Finnish government.²²⁶ In 1961, Finland joined the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) as an associate member and not as full member because of the Kremlin's suspiciousness.²²⁷

Paasikivi's successor in the presidential office, Urho Kekkonen, developed that policy, the so called Paasikivi-Kekkonen line, into an active neutral policy and an international commitment.²²⁸ From 1956 on, Finland sent troops for UN missions.²²⁹ In the 1960s, Kekkonen proposed a nuclear-free zone in Scandinavia.²³⁰ In 1969 and 1970, the negotiations for the SALT I agreement between the USA and the USSR took place in Helsinki. Between 1973 and 1975, the CSCE convened in the Finnish capital.

But the foreign policy line of Finland was more than that of Paasikivi and Kekkonen. The whole political leadership of Finland has been and is still characterised by a unique consensus and cohesion in questions of foreign policy.²³¹ In terms of foreign policy that means the recognition of the abilities and the needs which arise abstractly from Finland's "small state identity"²³² and concretely from Russia's influence. In 1863, Johan Vilhelm Snellman, the father of Finnish nationalism, wrote: "[...] a nation should only rely upon itself. This confidence includes a nation's neither asking for, nor trying to reach, anything other than things for the achievement and protection of which it has enough power."²³³ Paasikivi advocated a realistic policy line: "The voice of small states isn't heard in the present concert of big powers. Only big powers play a decisive role at the world stage. The tasks and impact of big powers is due to the circumstances different than those of small states who in realizing the proportions must understand the necessity of reservedness."²³⁴ The political leadership of Finland has a strong sense for realist policy – especially, regarding Russia. At the same time, the belligerent past shadows the historic memory and the public opinion is fairly not Russian-friendly.²³⁵

The end of the Cold War changed Finnish-Soviet relations fundamentally. The Paris Peace Treaty and the FCMA treaty have been cancelled. The Treaty Between the Republic of Finland and the Russian Federation on the Basis for Relations of 20th January 1992 stressed "the significance of the profound historical changes that have taken place in Europe".²³⁶ Furthermore, it named the

²²⁵ Cf. Auffermann, Burkhard: Die Außenpolitik Finnlands 1944-1991 - Ein Sonderfall europäischer Ost-West-Beziehungen in der Ära des Kalten Krieges. Dissertation at the Freie Universität Berlin, 1994. p. 54.

²²⁶ Cf. Jussila/Hentilä/Nevakivi, 1999. pp. 273-274 and 301-305.

²²⁷ Cf. Teräväinen, Erkki: Finland droht Isolierung. Westdeutsche Ansichten über die EFTA-Entscheidung Finnlands. In: Hösch, Edgar/Kalela, Jorma/Beyer-Thoma, Hermann (Ed.): Deutschland und Finnland im 20. Jahrhundert. Wiesbaden, 1999. pp. 133-167.

²²⁸ Cf. Crosby, H. Peter: Friede für Europas Norden. Die sowjetisch-finnischen Beziehungen von 1944 bis zur Gegenwart. Vienna/Düsseldorf, 1981. pp. 385-412.

²²⁹ Cf. Permanent Mission of Finland to the United Nations: Active membership. 10.08.06. <http://www.finlandun.org/doc/en/finun/membership.html> (14.10.08).

²³⁰ Cf. Jussila/Hentilä/Nevakivi, 1999. pp. 333-338.

²³¹ Cf. Interview with Hans-Dietrich Genscher; Maude, George: The Finnish Dilemma. Neutrality in the Shadow of Power. London, 1976. p. 21.

²³² Tiilikainen, 2006.

²³³ Quoted in Tiilikainen, Teija: Europe and Finland. Defining the Political Identity of Finland in Western Europe. Aldershot, 1998. p. 143.

²³⁴ Quoted in Tiilikainen, 2006. p. 75.

²³⁵ Cf. Russell, George: Making the Best of Deference. In: TIME, 30.11.1981. <http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,925049,00.html> (18.10.08); Helsingin Sanomat (International Edition): Report: Russian-speakers often suffer abuse at school and at work. 26.02.09. <http://www.hs.fi/english/print/1135243839112> (06.04.09).

²³⁶ Cf. United Nations: Treaty Series. No. 29173. Finland and Russian Federation. Treaty Between the Republic of Finland and the Russian Federation on the Basis for Relations. Signed at Helsinki 20 January 1992. http://untreaty.un.org/unts/60001_120000/29/10/00056459.pdf

goals of intensive political dialogue on all levels and close economic, societal and cultural relations, especially in the border regions Murmansk, Karelia and St. Petersburg, and the recognition of the Charter of the United Nations as well as the Final Act of the CSCE. The treaty called the parties “shall not use or allow the use of their territory for armed aggression against the other Party”²³⁷ – without any interventional mechanisms similar to the FCMA. During his state visit in Helsinki in July 1992, President Yeltsin apologised that the Soviet Union interfered in Finland’s internal affairs.²³⁸ In the same year, Finland decided formally to apply for EU membership.

The change of World Order 1989-91 also revealed the economic perspective of Russian-Finnish relations. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s economic downfall was accompanied with an extreme decrease of exports from and imports to Finland. The result has been one of the severest economic crises of an industrialised national economy since the Second World War.²³⁹ The Finnish GDP dropped by 14 percent, while the unemployment rate rose from 3 to almost 20 percent. Although the 1990s crisis has also been caused by domestic policies, it points to the economic significance of Finnish-Russian trade relations.²⁴⁰ Finland recovered impressively well by means of a strong reform process, in which Nokia developed from a producer of gumboots to the world leading producer of mobile phones.²⁴¹ The importance of economic ties with Russia points also to the “economics of neutrality”.²⁴² That formula means that Finnish neutrality is not just plausible in terms of security policy, but in economics as well. Finland’s economy needs both Europe and Russia to flourish.

The Finnish EU accession on 1st January 1995 marked a new era of Finnish-Russian relations due to the new multilateral dimension. Joining the Union, Finland accepted the second pillar of the EU, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Then, the First Chechen War made it not just *de jure* a political commitment. During the Cold War period and also in the early 1990s, Finland avoided any serious criticism of Soviet foreign policy.²⁴³ In January 1995, the leading Finnish newspaper *Helsingin Sanomat* called a Finnish participation in an EU policy condemning or even sanctioning Russia a ‘nightmare of EU membership’.²⁴⁴ President Ahtisaari stressed that Chechnya is an internal Russian affair and warned to criticise Russia on the first problems on its way from totalitarianism to democracy. On 16th January, he did not address recent developments in a speech in St. Petersburg.²⁴⁵

Finland excluded the issue from its bilateral relations with Russia and handled it on the multilateral level. By incidence, in January 1995 the Finnish prime minister, Esko Aho, was the first EU statesman visiting Moscow, right after the break out of the First Chechen War. In his memoirs,

(24.10.08). p. 256.

²³⁷ Cf. *ibid.* p. 257.

²³⁸ Cf. *Helsingin Sanomat* (International Edition): Boris Yeltsin remembered as leader who promised to stop interfering in Finnish affairs. 24.04.07. <http://www.hs.fi/english/print/1135226785175> (18.10.08).

²³⁹ Cf. Honkapohja, Seppo/Koskela, Erkki: Finland’s depression. A tale of bad luck and bad policies. In: *Economic Policy*, October 1999, Volume 14, Issue 29. pp. 399-436.

²⁴⁰ Honkapohja and Koskela summarised: “In the absence of bad policies, Finland would have experienced a recession, not a depression.” Honkapohja/Koskela, 1999. p. 423.

²⁴¹ It is notable that the European Council appointed in October 2005 the former Prime Minister of Finland, who had to deal the crisis from 1991 to 1995, Esko Aho, to chair a group of high-level experts that gave proposals to boost Europe’s performance in research and innovation. Cf. European Commission: 2006 – Aho Group Report „Creating an Innovative Europe“ http://ec.europa.eu/invest-in-research/action/2006_ahogroup_en.htm (23.10.08).

²⁴² Maude, 1976. p. 95.

²⁴³ Cf. Pursiainen, 1999. p. 14.

²⁴⁴ Cf. *ibid.*

²⁴⁵ Cf. Office of the President of the Republic of Finland: Speech by Martii Ahtisaari, The President of the Republic of Finland. St. Petersburg, 16.1.1995. <http://www.tpk.fi/ahtisaari/puheet-1995/P9501.PIE.html> (24.10.08).

Aho described the atmosphere as “electrified”²⁴⁶. Aho communicated the Finnish as well as the EU’s position, although the Russian deputy prime minister, Oleg Davidov, tried to convince him not to raise the question to President Yeltsin. The subtitle in Aho’s memoirs is called “Representing EU-Finland in Moscow”.²⁴⁷

After accession, the Finnish government tried to build up its multilateral approach through the initiative for the Northern Dimension of the European Union (NDEU). President Ahtisaari described already in June 1994 that the EU-15 would have a northern dimension.²⁴⁸ Moreover, it was obvious that the enlarged EU became a neighbour of Russia. In September 1997, Prime Minister Lipponen began to set the issue on the agenda with his speech at the Barents Conference in Rovaniemi (Lapland).²⁴⁹ Lipponen concretised his initiative in May 1998 and named Russia as an integral partner. The NDEU should build a framework for the EU’s policy in the area of northern Europe, from north-west Russia to Iceland and from the Barents Sea to the southern coast of the Baltic Sea. It should cover issues of energy, environment, transport, and crime reduction under recognition of particular northern circumstances. In November 1998 the Commission reported on the perspectives of “A Northern Dimension of the policies of the Union”²⁵⁰, whereby the Finnish initiative became an EU policy.²⁵¹ During the German respectively Finnish presidency in 1999, the NDEU has been developed politically. In June 2000, the first action plan has been adopted. The NDEU is a model case of “How to Customize Your Union”²⁵². Today, there are doubts about the practical use of the NDEU, but the main goal of the initiative has been achieved - integrating Russia.

In the preparation for the first EU Common Strategy on Russia in 1999, Finland has also been involved at a very early stage.²⁵³ It is apparent that small states try to channel their dialogue with Russia through the EU.²⁵⁴ However, Finland claims a more self-confident role towards Russia that is also visible in the division of competences between Prime Minister and President. The presidential office takes care of ‘traditional foreign policy’ and is particularly responsible for bilateral relations with Russia.²⁵⁵ The Finnish President, Tarja Halonen, emphasised soon after her inauguration in 2000 that “today there is no longer any talk of Finlandisation; instead, we are more likely to hear our country’s success story being discussed.”²⁵⁶ Halonen proposed a frontrunner position for Finland in the EU’s relations with Russia. Arrangements between Finland and Russia could serve as a positive example “elsewhere along Russia’s border, especially with the Baltic States.”²⁵⁷ Furthermore, she called for patience and support, and assured a special relationship to Russia. At that time, Finland also had difficulties keeping the NDEU on the European agenda and

²⁴⁶ Quoted in: Pursiainen, 1999. p. 15.

²⁴⁷ *ibid.*

²⁴⁸ Cf. Office of the President of the Republic of Finland: Address by President Martti Ahtisaari at the University of Tartu, June 1, 1994. <http://www.tpk.fi/ahtisaari/puheet-1994/P9406.TAE.html> (28.10.08).

²⁴⁹ Cf. Haukkala, Hiski: Introduction. In: Haukkala, Hiski (Ed.): *Dynamic Aspects of the Northern Dimension*. Turku, 1999. pp. 9-20.

²⁵⁰ European Commission: *A Northern Dimension for the policies of the Union*. Brussels, 25.11.98. http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/north_dim/doc/com1998_0589en.pdf (28.10.08).

²⁵¹ Cf. Pursiainen, 1999. p. 19.

²⁵² Ojanen, Hanna: *How to Customize Your Union: Finland and the “Northern Dimension of the EU”*. In: *Finnish Institute of International Affairs*, 1999. pp. 13-26.

²⁵³ Cf. Haukkala, 2000. p. 24.

²⁵⁴ Cf. Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland: Foreign Minister Tuomioja: *Baltic Sea cooperation at a crossroads*. 20.10.04. <http://www.formin.fi/public/?contentid=62591&contentlan=2&culture=en-US> (06.01.09).

²⁵⁵ Cf. Bastian, 2006. pp. 212-214.

²⁵⁶ Office of the President of the Republic of Finland: Urho Kekkonen lecture by President of the Republic Tarja Halonen to the Paasikivi Society on 31.8.2000. <http://www.presidentti.fi/netcomm/news/showarticle.asp?intNWSAID=9673&intSubArtID=6295> (10.01.09).

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

there has been domestic critique on a too strongly Europeanised Russia policy.²⁵⁸ There is an ongoing discussion about the balance between that bilateral relationship and the EU-Russia approach.²⁵⁹

Finland has concrete bilateral issues with Russia. Therefore, Finland has been ambitious to foster EU cooperation programmes implemented in the Finnish-Russian border region. Its bilateral relations to Russia consist of intensive economic development activities with north-west Russia, though.²⁶⁰ The Finnish-Russian land border has one of the world's highest disparities of GDP per capita.²⁶¹ Due to Finland's economic effects on the region, Russian authorities welcome Finnish companies.²⁶² But Finnish-Russian relations are permanently affected by the non-acute, but vast security threat of Russia. A reminder in that sense has been that Russian fighter jets violated Finnish air space several times in recent years.²⁶³ The Finnish government handled the case bilaterally.²⁶⁴ However, in September 2007 the Minister of Defence, Jyri Häkämies, named – rather undiplomatically – the three main security challenges of Finland: “Russia, Russia, and Russia”.²⁶⁵

Beside bilateral cooperation respectively problems, Finland played its European role in a constructive manner. Its second EU presidency was highlighted by the EU-Russia Summit on 24th November 2006. On that occasion, the EU, Russia, Iceland and Norway signed a “Political Declaration on the Northern Dimension Policy” and agreed on the further development of the NDEU.²⁶⁶ Since then, the Northern Dimension has a permanent basis instead of temporary action plans and is a common policy of the partner countries. Russia previously demanded an equal participation.²⁶⁷ Moreover, the NDEU has been embedded into the Four Common Spaces of the EU and Russia. Finland also wanted the EU to launch negotiations on a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Russia.²⁶⁸ Due to concerns from Poland, a mandate could not be given yet to the European Commission.

The Finnish presidency of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 2008 had unexpectedly to deal with Russia – and Georgia. Finland started its chairmanship to “emphasize the historical significance of the Helsinki process”²⁶⁹. The Russian-Georgian War in August 2008 meant a much more concrete task for Finland, although the conflicts in the Caucasus

²⁵⁸ Cf. Bastian, 2006. pp. 224-225.

²⁵⁹ Cf. Helsingin Sanomat (International Edition): Finland neglecting its Russia policy. 01.04.08. <http://www.hs.fi/english/print/1135235224630> (10.01.09).

²⁶⁰ Cf. Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland: Neighbouring Area Cooperation Between Finland and Russia. List of Ongoing Projects. June 2008. <http://www.formin.fi/public/download.aspx?ID=32052&GUID={C3679BCD-CFD4-4381-8850-A7940CA05AE2}> (06.01.09).

²⁶¹ According to the CIA World Factbook: Finland \$ 37,200 (2008 est.), Russia \$ 15,800 (2008 est.). Comparable in relative land border length and disparity in GDP per capita: USA \$ 47,000 (2008 est.), Mexico \$ 14,200 (2008 est.). Cf. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): The World Factbook. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html> (07.04.09).

²⁶² Cf. Ibid.: Governor Yevdokimov: Finnish companies are welcomed to develop the Murmansk Region. 22.05.08. <http://www.formin.fi/Public/Print.aspx?contentid=130597&nodeid=34671&culture=en-US&contentlan=2> (06.01.09).

²⁶³ Cf. Helsingin Sanomat (International Edition): PM Vanhanen to protest violations of Finnish air space by Russian war planes. 20.05.05. <http://www.hs.fi/english/article/1101979596885> (06.01.09).

²⁶⁴ Cf. Interview with Teija Tiilikainen.

²⁶⁵ Quoted in: Helsingin Sanomat (International Edition): Häkämies in Washington: Russia Finland's greatest challenge. 07.09.07. <http://www.hs.fi/english/print/1135230121121> (06.01.09).

²⁶⁶ Cf. Finnische EU-Präsidentschaft: EU, Russland, Norwegen und Island billigten erneuerte Politik der Nördlichen Dimension. 24.11.06. http://www.eu2006.fi/news_and_documents/press_releases/vko47/de_DE/175523/ (06.01.09).

²⁶⁷ Cf. Bastian, 2006. p. 220.

²⁶⁸ Cf. Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland: As the EU-Russia Summit draws near. 19.11.06. <http://www.formin.fi/public/?contentid=83679&contentlan=2&culture=en-US> (06.01.09).

²⁶⁹ Cf. Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland: The Programme of the Finnish Chairmanship of the OSCE 2008. <http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?nodeid=39438&contentlan=2&culture=en-US> (03.04.09).

region have been immanent in advance.²⁷⁰ Foreign Minister Stubb mediated in the shadow of Nicolas Sarkozy, then holder of the EU presidency, and held the dialogue, but managed to adhere to the principles and obligations of the OSCE.²⁷¹ In that function, Finland had to balance between its chairmanship and its bilateral relationship with Russia. Negative consequences for its neighbourhood and Russian attempts to influence the Finnish position were feared.²⁷² Finland offered Helsinki as meeting location for secret talks of Russia and US senior officers, and played its moderating role.²⁷³ However, the OSCE conference in early December 2008 gave an example that Finnish opportunities are limited. Although Foreign Minister Stubb put much diplomatic effort on a joint declaration, the conference ended with an interpretation of the leaving presidency.²⁷⁴ That time the ‘Helsinki spirit’ did not warm East-West relations.²⁷⁵

In the run-up to the OSCE conference in December 2009, the Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, proposed a new discussion about a future security architecture of Europe that could be launched by Finland as a “respected European neutral country”.²⁷⁶ Foreign Minister Stubb supported the idea put forward, but emphasised that Finland would not promote Russian proposals. As chair holder of the OSCE, it would listen to all member countries. At the same time, Stubb pointed out that Finland’s national policy is not neutral due to its political alignment with the EU and “close military cooperation with NATO”.²⁷⁷ On 11th November Prime Minister Vanhanen met his Russian colleague, Vladimir Putin, in Moscow. Putin referred to the good relations: “Finland is without any exaggeration one of our most important partners in Europe. Not only because we are neighbours, but also because the figures of our trade turnover suggest this.”²⁷⁸ Vanhanen has been pleased that the Russian prime minister postponed the implementations of wood tariffs, a highly important issue for the Finnish wood processing industry.²⁷⁹

Finland managed to balance its close relationship with Russia and its commitment to the EU. A fall back to a Cold War scenario is far from desirable. In March 2009, Alpo Juntunen, researcher at the Department of Strategy at the Finnish National Defence College, proposed provokingly that Finland should agree on a military alliance with Russia, which would solve any security problem.²⁸⁰ It was a test and the response predictable. There is not much support for that option anymore.

²⁷⁰ Cf. Huhta, Kari: Collateral damage from Finnish OSCE Chairmanship. In: Helsingin Sanomat (International Edition), 03.06.08. <http://www.hs.fi/english/print/1135236872879> (08.01.09).

²⁷¹ Cf. Richter, Solveig/Zellner, Wolfgang: Ein neues Helsinki für die OSZE? Chancen für eine Wiederbelebung des europäischen Sicherheitsdialogs. SWP-Aktuell 81, November 2008, p. 4.

²⁷² Cf. Helsingin Sanomat (International Edition): Finnish-Russian relations under strain during OSCE Chairmanship. 07.10.08. <http://www.hs.fi/english/print/1135240029652> (08.01.09).

²⁷³ Cf. *ibid.*: USA and Russia meet for secret talks in wake of Georgia war. 22.10.08. <http://www.hs.fi/english/print/1135240436249> (08.01.09).

²⁷⁴ Cf. *ibid.*: No joint declaration for OSCE meeting despite last-ditch efforts. 05.12.08. <http://www.hs.fi/english/print/1135241691873> (08.01.09).

²⁷⁵ Cf. *ibid.*: „Helsinki Spirit“ unlikely to warm East-West relations much at OSCE meeting. 02.12.08. <http://www.hs.fi/english/print/1135241597593> (08.01.09).

²⁷⁶ Quoted in Helsingin Sanomat (International Edition): Stubb to Lavrov: “Finland is not neutral”. 10.11.08. <http://www.hs.fi/english/print/1135240964935> (08.01.09).

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁸ Prime Minister of the Russian Federation: Vladimir Putin held talks with Finland’s Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen. 12.11.08. <http://premier.gov.ru/eng/pressconferences/1093.html> (08.01.09).

²⁷⁹ Cf. Helsingin Sanomat (International Edition): Putin: Russia to postpone implementation of wood tariffs. 13.11.08. <http://www.hs.fi/english/print/1135241062356> (08.01.09).

²⁸⁰ Cf. Helsingin Sanomat (International Edition): Researcher: Russian empire will return, but will not be a threat to neighbours. 06.03.09. <http://www.hs.fi/english/print/1135244080044> (27.03.09).

3.2.1.3 Germany and Finland on Russia

In Väinö Linna's war novel *Tuntematon sotilas*, Captain Kaarna explains to his comrades the logic of German-Russian relations and its consequences for Finland with a metaphor: "German pressure is directed outward, and when that pressure is strong, the East falls back before it and we breathe freely."²⁸¹

That scheme has an explanatory function for the periods of war when the Tsarist Empire collapsed and the Soviets agreed with the *Kaiserreich* on the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1917 or when the *Wehrmacht* launched *Unternehmen Barbarossa* 24 years later. But the relationships of Finland and Germany towards Russia have changed fundamentally. Historically seen, that logic even has no continuation line in the past. One might assume Germany and Finland developed their relations beyond the logic of pressure. Both countries had periods of confrontation with Russia, but learned a cooperative policy towards Russia. The model of Captain Kaarna might fit to some other states' thinking on Russia today.

For Germany and Finland, both states maintain an outstanding relationship with Russia and promote its integration. Germany as well as Finland started right after the collapse of the Soviet Union to assist the new Russia with bilateral means. Furthermore, both have been ambitious to create ties between Russia and the EU. Germany worked on the first PCA with Russia in the critical time of the First Chechen War, and thereby followed a cooperative policy line that Finns did ever since the FCMA. Then, Finland knew that it has been "no longer alone in the world in this thinking"²⁸² and started the Northern Dimension initiative in 1997. Germany showed low public interest in the initiative, but assured its support to Finland in the very early stage of the NDEU.²⁸³ After successful agenda-setting, Finland had problems to keep the NDEU on the agenda and the German-French initiative for the Four Common Spaces with Russia came to the fore.²⁸⁴ Finland in response put more emphasises on its bilateral relations, but nonetheless the meaning of the Four Common Spaces has been in the very interest of Finland. Both states have also been involved in the early steps drafting a Common Strategy of the EU on Russia.²⁸⁵

In practice, Finland and Germany have been recently ambitious to give the Commission a mandate for negotiations on a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. After the Finnish presidency, the consecutive German chairmanship tried to launch negotiations, but failed still due to Poland's veto and Lithuanian support.²⁸⁶

The issue of the Nord Stream pipeline gives another practical example of that common policy line. It is rarely known that the project has been a Finnish idea originally. Finland set it on the list of transeuropean networks and "there was a Finnish stake in the company that made the original plan for the pipeline."²⁸⁷ In 2005, Germany and Russia agreed on the realisation – accompanied with rather negative feedback from Poland and the Baltic States. Finland was supportive for the pipeline, though. In August 2008, Paavo Lipponen, who favoured the issue already as head of

²⁸¹ Linna, Väinö: *The Unknown Soldier*. Reprinted edition (first published 1954), Juva, 2008. p. 12.

²⁸² Halonen, 31.08.00.

²⁸³ Cf. Neubert, Klaus: EU:n „pohjoinen ulottuvuus“. Helsinki, 18.11.98.

²⁸⁴ Cf. Bastian, 2006. pp. 224-225.

²⁸⁵ Cf. Haukkala, 2000. p. 24.

²⁸⁶ Cf. Pavilionis, Žygimantas: Lithuanian Position regarding the EU Mandate on Negotiations with Russia: Seeking a New Quality of EU-Russian Relations. In: *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review*, No. 21, 2008. pp. 174-181.

²⁸⁷ Cf. Interview with Jari Luoto.

government, agreed to serve as an advisor for Nord Stream to promote the implementation of the project.²⁸⁸

Both states share the basic view that the better off Russia is, the better it is for Europe and themselves.²⁸⁹ As well as, the more links between Russia and Europe, the more there is safety and prosperity. Moreover, they believe in the perspective of commonality with Russia. In that respect, Germany and Finland are pragmatic and open-minded. The main reason for that is probably their historical experience of cooperation and exchange with Russia. For example, the Baltic States and Poland did not. Former Foreign Minister Genscher emphasised that Europe has always suffered, when Germany and Russia conflicted. Genscher pointed out that Russia's social prosperity is to the very advantage of Europe.²⁹⁰ From a Finnish point of view, Pertti Salolainen, MP, mentioned: "We wish them be good, because the richer, the more democratic Russia is the better for us."²⁹¹ Juha Korkeaoja, MP, proposed "the Steel and Coal Union and then EC, European Union, which brought together old historic enemies, Germany and France, and guaranteed peace and prosperity for both of these countries, could be a good example for European-Russian relations."²⁹² Germany's government believes that "only through intensive cooperation with Russia will we be able to support and influence the difficult process of transformation."²⁹³

German and Finnish reactions on Russia's proposal of a renewed European security architecture show once more the common aspiration of dialogue. After the OSCE conference in Helsinki on 4th December, Foreign Minister Steinmeier expressed his believe that there are new prospects, also due to a new American administration, to come for a new European security agreement.²⁹⁴ Steinmeier emphasised the OSCE as the right forum for that purpose and advocated the reconvention of the NATO-Russia Council as soon as possible. Germany and Finland, as well as France as then EU chair holder, were important bridges in August 2008 when many commentators saw the time for a new East-West conflict. It is Germany's and Finland's common interest to find a less anachronistic wording and to start a substantial process towards a revised European security agreement on the basis of the OSCE.

Former State Secretary Teija Tiilikainen stressed: "We are quite close to Germany in general related to Russia, because we have noticed in an EU of 27 member states that the relationship with Russia does not at all play the same role in all member states. [...] Germany has always stressed the importance of Russia. [...] that has been the key interest of us two in a constructive manner to bring in Russia."²⁹⁵ Juha Korkeaoja agreed and stressed Germany's approach "means deep, concrete, practical things instead of big speeches".²⁹⁶ The German-Russian partnership for modernisation from May 2008 has been no need to worry for Finland, but the opposite. Pertti Salolainen assured Finnish support, "if you help Russia to become a kind of welfare society and having good

²⁸⁸ Cf. Helsingin Sanomat (International Edition): Ex-PM Paavo Lipponen to serve as adviser to gas pipeline builder. 15.08.08. <http://www.hs.fi/english/print/1135238642998> (12.01.09).

²⁸⁹ Cf. Interview with Hans-Dietrich Genscher; Interview with Juha Korkeaoja; Interview with Pertti Salolainen; Auswärtiges Amt: Speech by Minister of State Erler, 07.02.07.

²⁹⁰ Interview with Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

²⁹¹ Interview with Pertti Salolainen.

²⁹² Interview with Juha Korkeaoja.

²⁹³ Cf. Speech by Minister of State Erler, 07.02.07.

²⁹⁴ Cf. Federal Foreign Office: „Building partnership – for a renewed security policy in the twenty-first century“ – by Frank-Walter Steinmeier. 04.12.08. <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Infoservice/Presse/Interview/2008/081204-BM-OSZE.html> (10.01.09).

²⁹⁵ Interview with Teija Tiilikainen.

²⁹⁶ Interview with Juha Korkeaoja.

business and investment [...] in that sense we see the more contacts we have with Russia and Germany with Russia the better.”²⁹⁷

However, Korkeaaja pointed to the size of Finland respectively Germany.²⁹⁸ As Eero Akaan-Penttilä, Vice-Chairman of the Grand Committee, mentioned: “It is very important for us to know what is the deal between two countries when Russia is the other one. [...] if Germany is discussing something with Russia it is very important for the Finnish colleagues to listen.”²⁹⁹ In the words of former State Secretary Luoto: “[...] here you can see that Germany also belongs to a group of bigger members that would like to have intensive bilateral relations with Russia.”³⁰⁰

Finland is conscious about similarities with Germany regarding Russia, the outstanding position of Germany and Finland within the EU – thereby common ground for cooperation – and much more about the importance of Germany for EU-Russia relations as well as indirectly its own bilateral relationship with Russia. At the same time, there is a special awareness due to Germany’s size. Apparently, Germany’s weight could change the entire European security structure. Some commentators would point to its history of war, some to its *Neue Ostpolitik* and the end of the Cold War. Recently, relevant issues have been less acute. State Secretary Tiikainen mentioned: “[...] these concerns had been related to those cases where we have felt that, in aspiration towards bilateralism, the German-Russia relation has dominated or come to the fore. But these examples are not very many.”³⁰¹ One might assume these cases were during the *Männerfreundschaft* between Schröder and Putin.

There is a small state’s scepticism on bigger powers agreeing and deciding on its fate. Tilsit, Brest-Litovsk, Molotov-Ribbentrop mentions a series of historic examples. Poland and the Baltic States reveal that scepticism much more visibly. Finland is rather undogmatic and drafts less fierce critique, but the logic is the same. In May 2008, EU Commissioner Günther Verheugen went to Moscow and supported Russia’s position on wood tariffs. That issue is of Finnish national interest and Verheugen expressed his opinion that European importers “have been treating Russia as a third-world country.”³⁰² Foreign Trade Minister Väyrynen criticised Verheugen, who has been to Russia as representative of the EU.³⁰³ But it reminded many Finns of a German-Russian scenario.³⁰⁴

To counter the possibility of big states agreeing above small ones heads, Finland favours more multilateral action on Russia. Jari Luoto explained: “Looking from the view of smaller member states there are probably instances where we would like to see more emphasis on what we are doing together, because we know Russia very well ourselves and we understand that it probably works for their benefit”.³⁰⁵ It seems that bilateral relations of big EU states and Russia always give Finland a reason being at least attentive. Finnish representatives acknowledge that there is a

²⁹⁷ Interview with Pertti Salolainen.

²⁹⁸ Cf. Interview with Juha Korkeaaja.

²⁹⁹ Interview with Eero Akaan-Penttilä.

³⁰⁰ Interview with Jari Luoto.

³⁰¹ Interview with Teija Tiilikainen.

³⁰² Quoted in: The Moscow Times: EU Wants Russia Treaty Before Summit. 19.05.08. <http://www.moscowtimes.ru/articles/detail.php?ID=362840&print=Y> (12.01.09).

³⁰³ Cf. Helsingin Sanomat (International Edition): Väyrynen remains hopeful on partial solution to timber tariffs dispute. 27.05.08. <http://www.hs.fi/english/print/1135236693528> (12.01.09).

³⁰⁴ Cf. Interview with Jari Luoto.

³⁰⁵ Ibid.

need for bilateral relations with Russia, as they maintain such themselves intensively. They strongly call for a common line and coordination of national policies, though.³⁰⁶

German foreign policy actors understand that thinking quite well as it fits to a much more general suspicion on Germany due to its bellicose history. It is a wisdom of German post-war foreign policy that Germany needs to tie itself to Europe in order to calm its neighbours – *Europäisches Interesse ist deutsches Interesse*.³⁰⁷ That firm commitment is not just an idealist outburst. It is a rational consequence.³⁰⁸ Moreover, since Germany is reunited and thereby the biggest state in the EU, its size means ever more responsibility.³⁰⁹ Hans-Dietrich Genscher emphasised that small partners deserve a particular respect and mentioned that former German chancellors changed their voice when they talked with representatives of smaller states.³¹⁰ Genscher used to visit The Hague, Brussels or Luxembourg after his travels to the Soviet Union. By means of travel diplomacy, Foreign Minister Steinmeier went to Riga right after his Russia travel in May 2008 and met his Baltic colleagues for consultations.³¹¹ So despite similar policy lines and an intensive exchange on Russia, Finnish and German representatives relate to more general configurations of big and small powers, to history and its consequences.

Beside these basic rules concerning Finland as a small state, German foreign policy actors see it in a key position in terms of Russia. Former Foreign Minister Genscher appreciated that Finnish leaders navigated their country with great accountability through the uncertainties of the Cold War.³¹² Finland is attested a brilliant diplomatic performance throughout its Cold War relationship with Russia and thereby earned the respect of German representatives. Genscher explained that his exchange with President Kekkonen and President Koivisto has been of high relevance to evaluating processes in the Soviet Union and noticing new developments in the East-West relationship.³¹³ Today, Germans still know about Finland's relation to Russia. Kurt Bodewig, Vice-Chairman of the EU Committee, explained: *“Finnland [ist] ein sensibler Sensor, was die Auswirkungen russischer Politik auf Europa angeht und auch umgekehrt. Ich glaube, dieses wichtige Wissen darum, um Koexistenz, ist besonders in der heutigen Situation wieder besonders nachgefragt.”*³¹⁴ In that sense, Finland's Russia know-how is fairly appreciated. German representatives give Finland even a particular role – as link to Russia. Parliamentary State Secretary Thomas Kossendey pointed out: *“Und wenn wir in Europa langfristig weiter erfolgreich [...] Sicherheitspolitik machen wollen, ist ein guter Kontakt, auch ein Verstehen dieser Länder am Rande Europas außergewöhnlich wichtig. Von daher hat Finnland eine ganz extrem wichtige Position, sozusagen als Verbindungsstück [...] zu Russland. Das kann kein anderer leisten an dieser wichtigen Stel-*

³⁰⁶ Cf. Interview with Teija Tiilikainen; Interview with Juha Korkeaoja; Interview with Pertti Salolainen.

³⁰⁷ European interest is German interest.

³⁰⁸ Schmidt, 2008, pp. 10-11.

³⁰⁹ Interview with Thomas Kossendey; Interview with Franz Thönnies.

³¹⁰ Cf. Interview with Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

³¹¹ Cf. Auswärtiges Amt: Enge deutsch-baltische Beziehungen. 20.05.08. <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Europa/Aussenpolitik/080520-riga-steinmeier.html> (12.01.09).

³¹² Genscher, 1995, p. 308.

³¹³ Ibid; Interview with Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

³¹⁴ Interview with Kurt Bodewig; Author's translation: Finland is a sensitive sensor regarding the effects of Russian policy on Europe and the other way round. I believe this valuable knowledge, about coexistence, is particularly demanded in the current situation.

*le.*³¹⁵ Therefore, Finland is perceived as an important and, due to their similar policies, a natural partner for Germany.³¹⁶

On political as well as on administrative level, Finland and Germany maintain intensive contacts about Russia. “It would be quite remarkable, if there were a meeting of the Finnish Prime Minister and the German Chancellor and they were not discussing EU-Russia relations.”³¹⁷ There are doubts about Vanhanen’s personal link to Merkel, but the contacts between President Halonen and Chancellor Merkel might soften the lack of it. Germany is indeed interested in Finland’s expertise on Russia. The German Embassy follows the Finnish Russia policy on a regular basis and its reports are fairly valued in the Federal Foreign Office.³¹⁸ It is particularly appreciated that Finland is a rather undogmatic conversation partner with valuable assessments of Russian interior and foreign policy. Finland’s foreign ministry sends its very top diplomats to Berlin and knows that their ambassadors’ knowledge is interesting for Germany.³¹⁹ Most of recent Finnish Ambassadors to Germany came directly from Moscow. It seems that Finland has a kind of ‘advisory function’ on Russia. And it fits to characteristics assumed on small states.³²⁰ Of course, as Jari Luoto stated, “it is no secret that for many of the other member states Finland is a natural partner to discuss EU-Russia relations, because of our proximity of Russia.”³²¹ At a meeting of the foreign ministers of EU and NATO member states in March 2009, Foreign Minister Stubb has been invited to present his evaluation of the present situation in Russia.³²²

Using knowledge and exchange is probably a worthwhile strategy for Finland in order to have a certain influence on Germany.³²³ Former Foreign Minister Ilkka Kanerva visited Berlin in January 2008 in order to exchange with his German colleague, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, on Finland’s OSCE presidency and relations with Russia. Kanerva proposed a round table of foreign ministry staff members and foreign policy experts of renowned Finnish and German think tanks, to discuss issues about Russia in a different format before the official consultations.³²⁴ That kind of dialogue shall be continued in the future.

From a German perspective it is interesting that Finland has a different appearance than a big state and thereby influence particularly in the Baltic Sea region. Germany appreciated Finland being a valuable partner to promote the start for negotiations on a new PCA with Russia, which was decided in May 2008.³²⁵ The issue of the Nord Stream pipeline ignited strong opposition in the Baltic States and Poland. So Finland could cool down emotions and present arguments more objectively perceived.³²⁶ Former Prime Minister Lipponen just started his job for Nord Stream in Au-

³¹⁵ Interview with Thomas Kossendey; Author’s translation: If we want to make successful security policy in the future, a good contact, also understanding of these countries at the rim of Europe is outstandingly important. Therefore, Finland has an extremely important position, as link to Russia. At this site no one else can perform that.

³¹⁶ Cf. Interview with Rainer Arnold, Speaker for Defence Policy of the SPD Parliamentary Group, 19th June 2008 in Berlin; Interview with an official of the Federal Foreign Office.

³¹⁷ Interview with Jari Luoto.

³¹⁸ Cf. Interview with an official of the German Embassy in Helsinki; Interview with an official of the Federal Foreign Office.

³¹⁹ Cf. Interview with an official of the German Embassy in Helsinki; Interview with Petri Hakkarainen.

³²⁰ Cf. Broman, Matilda: Small State Influence in the European Union ‘Small State Smart State’? Paper presented at ISAs 46th Annual Convention, March 1-5 2005, Honolulu, Hawaii. http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p70459_index.html (14.01.09). p. 2.

³²¹ Interview with Jari Luoto.

³²² Cf. Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland: Foreign Minister Stubb: Window of opportunity in Russian policy. 05.03.09. http://www.finland.de/Public/Unrestricted/Error.html?errmsg=Error+on+ASP.print_aspx%3a+Input+string+was+not+in+a+correct+format (10.03.09).

³²³ Cf. Interview with Antti Kaikkonen.

³²⁴ Meeting with Eija Linnell, Director of the Unit for Policy Planning and Research of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 14.05.08.

³²⁵ Cf. Interview with an official of the Federal Foreign Office.

³²⁶ Cf. Interview with Esko Antola; Interview with Kurt Bodewig.

gust 2008. In response, the Estonian daily newspaper *Postimees* called him a traitor and Finland “pipestan”.³²⁷ Of course, Lipponen acts as private person. However, Finland must be cautious in the way it supports an issue that involves Germany and Russia.

Although Germany and Finland share a common approach on Russia and similar positions on most issues, there is hardly a German-Finnish initiative on Europe’s relationship with Russia. Finland launched the NDEU on its own and Germany promoted the Four Common Spaces concept with France. The EU Common Strategy on Russia has been informally prepared by Germany, France, the UK and Finland. Recently, the Swedish-Polish initiative for an Eastern Dimension gave an interesting example.³²⁸ Neither Finnish nor German foreign policy actors show interest in a joint initiative. For Germany, it seems much more important to seek for consultations with France, the UK, Poland and others. And Finland must be more flexible and independent in its strategies; relying on Germany might be risky because of the lack of mutual need for cooperation. Additionally, Germany, as the bigger state, would be in charge of taking the initiative.³²⁹ Finnish representatives stressed their independent agenda. Furthermore, a joint initiative would not complement two different positions like German-French proposals did in the past. Nonetheless, on both sides one should be conscious that a prospering cooperation with Russia is foremost a priority of Germany and Finland.

3.2.2 *European Integration*

Germany and Finland have followed different paths towards membership in the European Union. Each of them has its own history and evolved interests in integration. In 1996, both governments participated for the first time together in an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) that dealt with institutional questions of the EU. In recent years, the reform process towards the Treaty of Lisbon has continued the urgent discussion about an institutional rearrangement that is more than other issues characterised by national considerations of influence.

3.2.2.1 *German Integration Policy*

The development of Germany’s European policy must be placed in the context of the aftermath of the Second World War. Former Nazi Germany was occupied by the four victorious powers and its Western European neighbours agreed to “take such steps as may be held to be necessary in the event of a renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression”³³⁰. The East-West conflict soon changed the role of the divided Germany. Nonetheless, the reestablishment of relations with its neighbours remained an ever lasting task.

European integration provided the unique opportunity for West Germany to re-establish the country’s sovereignty and to assure its neighbours of its lasting will for peace at the same time – overcoming the burden of past wars and setting a framework for future peace. The alternative to European integration was reunifying Germany first and seeing where the journey would go then – a German *Sonderweg*, again. The Stalin Note of March 1952 made this option a real possibility, no longer keeping it merely a theory.³³¹

³²⁷ Quoted in: Helsinki Times: Estonians vent anger at Finland’s Lipponen over Nord Stream. 15.08.08. <http://www.helsinkitimes.fi> (14.01.09).

³²⁸ Cf. EurActiv.com: Poland, Sweden defend ‘Eastern Initiative’. 26.05.08. <http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/poland-sweden-defend-eastern-initiative/article-172660> (15.01.09).

³²⁹ Cf. Interview with Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

³³⁰ Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence. Brussels, 17.03.48. <http://www.ena.lu> (10.03.09).

³³¹ Even though, Stalin’s intentions were not clear at that time. For latest research see Ruggenthaler, Peter (Ed.): *Stalins großer Bluff. Die Geschichte der Stalin-Note in Dokumenten der sowjetischen Führung*. Munich, 2007.

In his first government declaration, Chancellor Adenauer, strongly Western-minded due to his Cologne roots,³³² emphasised that he would prefer Western integration to national reunification.³³³ In 1951, he signed the Treaty establishing the ECSC against the parliamentary opposition and the West German economy.³³⁴

Concerning the ECSC, Adenauer soon got to know the value of having the Benelux states and Italy involved, because in the post-war order West Germany was still a 'small state' on its own.³³⁵ Most remarkably, the Occupation Statute remained enforced. With other 'small ones' on board it was easier to limit French dominance.³³⁶

The West German government soon proved its will for deeper integration – for a political union. Article 24 (1) of the German *Grundgesetz* allows explicitly the transfer of sovereign rights to international organisations. In May 1952, the six ECSC member states signed the Treaty instituting the European Defence Community (EDC), which proclaimed a 'supranational European organisation' that should incorporate the EDC. In March 1953, an ad hoc Assembly of the ECSC adopted a draft treaty defining the Statute of the European Political Community (EPC).³³⁷ The EPC statute would have provided a supranational architecture for a real political union that was strongly favoured by Adenauer. The refusal by the *Assemblée nationale* in August 1954 dismissed any plans of the EPC to history and its failure was the severest political disappointment in Adenauer's career.³³⁸ Achieving a supranational political union would remain the persisting goal of the German European policy for the coming decades.

De Gaulle's initiative for a political community in the early 1960s revealed a strong divergence between big and small states as well as Germany's role. De Gaulle proposed a 'Europe of States' with France and Germany in the centre.³³⁹ The so called Fouchet plans of 1961/62 drew a strongly intergovernmental design of a European union and would have enhanced competences on foreign policy, economics, cultural affairs and defence.³⁴⁰ The Netherlands and Belgium rejected the proposal due to their suspicion of a Franco-German dominance.³⁴¹ Particularly the Dutch foreign minister was accused by Adenauer of the repeated failure of a political union.³⁴² In January 1963, de Gaulle and Adenauer, who had previously refused any sort of separate bilateral agreement, signed the Élysée Treaty. The Franco-German friendship could easily conflict with the small states' interests and be interpreted as a coalition seeking for dominance.

The pro-integrationist orientation of Germany did not change under the social-liberal governments, but was amended with an Eastern policy of rapprochement. In 1981, the initiative of Foreign Minister Genscher and his Italian counterpart, Emilio Colombo, renewed the call for a politi-

³³² Cf. Schwarz, Hans-Peter: Adenauer. Der Aufstieg. 1876-1952. Stuttgart, 1986. pp. 9-49; Weidenfeld, Werner: Konrad Adenauer und Europa. Die geistigen Grundlagen der westeuropäischen Integrationspolitik des ersten Bonner Bundeskanzlers. Bonn, 1976.

³³³ Cf. Deutsches Historisches Museum: Regierungserklärung des Bundeskanzlers Konrad Adenauer vom 20. September 1949. http://www.dhm.de/lemo/html/dokumente/JahreDesAufbausInOstUndWest_erklaerungAdenauerRegierungserklaerung1949/index.html (10.03.09).

³³⁴ Cf. Schwarz, 1986. pp. 850-851.

³³⁵ Cf. Janning, 2007. pp. 751-752.

³³⁶ Cf. Schwarz, 1986. pp. 852-853.

³³⁷ Draft Treaty embodying the Statute of the European Community. 10.03.53. <http://www.ena.lu> (10.03.09).

³³⁸ Cf. Brunn, Gerhard: Die Europäische Einigung von 1945 bis heute. Bonn, 2004. p. 98; Schwarz, Hans-Peter: Adenauer. Der Staatsmann. 1852-1967. Stuttgart, 1991. pp. 139-143; Poppinga, Anneliese: Konrad Adenauer. Eine Chronik in Daten, Zitaten und Bildern. Bergisch-Gladbach, 1987. p. 98.

³³⁹ Cf. Lettre de Charles de Gaulle à Konrad Adenauer. 23.09.60. <http://www.ena.lu> (10.03.09).

³⁴⁰ Cf. Draft Treaty – Fouchet Plan II. 18.01.62. <http://www.ena.lu> (10.03.09).

³⁴¹ Cf. Brunn, 2004. p. 142.

³⁴² Schwarz, 1991. p. 737.

cal union.³⁴³ A break-through could not be achieved, but the EC prepared the creation of the Single Market and postponed any further development.³⁴⁴

The change of world order has been accompanied with the unforeseen German reunification. Germany's European partners did not unanimously support the reunification, though.³⁴⁵ It was due to American support that the division into two German states could be overcome so quickly. A shift in the French European policy additionally enabled its European coverage. France had an interest to bind Germany deeper into European integration and the German government could easily agree as it had followed a strategy of self-restriction since the 1950s.³⁴⁶

The Treaty of Maastricht was of epochal meaning for Germany.³⁴⁷ Bismarck, Stresemann and Adenauer tried to arrange Germany in its very central position with its European neighbours.³⁴⁸ Wilhelm II and Adolf Hitler pursued a confrontational and aggressive policy that led to the European disasters of the 20th century. The establishment of a political union gave Germany the opportunity to get rid of its past precarious position and let Germany become part of a wider and deeper Europe. A strong European Union was of historical importance for Germany as it solved the key task of German foreign policy – getting along with its neighbours in peace and cooperation.

At the 1991 Intergovernmental Conference on the political union, Germany supported wider and deeper competences, particularly a common foreign and security policy with a defence component.³⁴⁹ The European Parliament should have been strengthened by the introduction of co-decision and approval of the President of the Commission. Qualified majority voting should have become the regular procedure in Council decisions. The European Council should have led the Union's policy with unanimous decision-making. Meeting the objectives that derived from Germany's historical interests, the country stressed the importance of strong European institutions and was willing to support an institutional framework that provided the small states with considerable influence in the decision-making process.

However, the result of Maastricht has not been sufficient from a German point of view. In a concept paper of 1994, the leading heads of the governing CDU/CSU parliamentary group outlined the future challenges for Europe and Germany.³⁵⁰ In the face of a bigger, more differentiated Union, eminent, regressive nationalism and the urgent task of integrating Central and Eastern Europe, strong European solutions were needed. A constitution-like document, orientated towards a federal construction and the principle of subsidiarity, should have reformed the Union's institutions. The EU was to become truly capable of joint foreign actorness. The European Parliament should be developed into a legislative body equal to the Council and the European Commission step by step to a European government body. Democratisation should have been the guiding principle beside enhanced efficiency. Particularly the idea of a core has been publicly discussed, and

³⁴³ Draft European Act submitted by the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Italian Republic. 06.11.81. <http://www.ena.lu> (11.03.09).

³⁴⁴ Cf. Weidenfeld, Werner: Europäische Einigung im historischen Überblick. In: Weidenfeld, Werner/Wessels, Wolfgang (Ed.): Europa von A bis Z. Taschenbuch der europäischen Integration. 9th edition, Berlin, 2006. pp. 13-48 (27-31).

³⁴⁵ Cf. Weidenfeld, Werner: Der „Zwei-plus-Vier“-Vertrag. In: Schmidt/Hellmann/Wolf, 2007. pp. 112-124 (116-117).

³⁴⁶ Cf. Janning, 2007. p. 752.

³⁴⁷ Von Weizsäcker, Richard: Meilenstein Maastricht. In: Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung, 15.04.92, Nr. 42, pp. 385-386 (385).

³⁴⁸ Cf. Baumann, Rainer: Deutschland als Europas Zentralmacht. In: Schmidt/Hellmann/Wolf, 2007. pp. 62-84; Janning, Josef: Europäische Union und deutsche Europapolitik. In: Ibid. pp. 747-762 (747).

³⁴⁹ Gemeinsame Botschaft von Bundeskanzler Dr. Kohl und dem Präsidenten der Französischen Republik, Francois Mitterrand, an den Präsidenten des Ministerrates der Italienischen Republik und amtierenden Präsidenten des Europäischen Rates, Ministerpräsident Giulio Andreotti. 06.12.90. <http://www.ena.lu> (11.03.09).

³⁵⁰ Schäuble, Wolfgang/Lamers, Karl: Überlegungen zur europäischen Politik. 01.09.94.

is ever since a very explosive matter. Further integration of willing states should not be vetoed by others. The Monetary Union has been mentioned explicitly as the core group of the Political Union; France and Germany were to be the core of the core. Germany needed to prove its aim of a strong and capable Europe in order to assure France its commitment. The ideas of that paper can be found in Germany's positions on the 1996 IGC.³⁵¹

After reunification, Germany's political class remained overwhelmingly European-minded.³⁵² In May 2000, Foreign Minister Fischer of the Green Party held a speech in which he mentioned nothing less than a European federation, with real parliamentary structures, as the future European solution.³⁵³ His speech caused not only applause in France.³⁵⁴ In a parliamentary system, asymmetry due to demography would threaten the Franco-German balance. At the IGC on the Treaty of Nice, Germany accepted relative voting weights in the Council that did not reflect the demographic differences.³⁵⁵

In the European Convention, the German government introduced its positions on an institutional rearrangement in a joint Franco-German paper from January 2003.³⁵⁶ In the context of the EU Eastern enlargement, both states called for a balanced strengthening of the institutional triangle as well as a fundamental reform of the Union's external representation. According to the Franco-German proposal, the European Council should elect a chairman with qualified majority for 2½ years. A European foreign minister, appointed by the European Council with qualified majority and approved by the President of the Commission, should chair the Council on external relations and defence, and strengthen coherence in the CFSP. Decisions on foreign affairs should generally be taken with qualified majority voting. Strengthened cooperation should be introduced to military and defence issues. The European Commission should be strengthened. Its President should be elected by the European Parliament and approved by the European Council with a qualified majority. The President of the Commission should guide the general policies of the Commission (in the German document explicitly *Richtlinienkompetenz*) and the Commission should be composed respecting the geographic and demographic balance. The European Parliament should hold legislative power jointly with the Council of the EU. Co-decision procedures should be applied on every issue of majority decision in the Council. The procedure of qualified majority should be introduced as the regular way of voting.

Finally, the Convention Draft of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) was regarded as a good compromise that 'made nobody happy, but everybody could live with'.³⁵⁷ Foreign Minister Fischer emphatically warned about reopening the package. In December 2003, he repeated the German positions on double majority voting, the composition of the Commission, an

³⁵¹ Cf. Erklärung des Bundesaußenministers, Europäischer Rat in Turin – Sondertagung der Staats- und Regierungschefs der Europäischen Union am 29. März 1996. <http://www.ena.lu> (11.03.09); Pressekonferenz mit dem Bundeskanzler, Europäischer Rat in Turin – Sondertagung der Staats- und Regierungschefs der Europäischen Union am 29. März 1996. <http://www.ena.lu> (11.03.09).

³⁵² Cf. Schmalz, Uwe: Deutschlands europäisierte Außenpolitik. Kontinuität und Wandel deutscher Konzepte zur EPZ und GASP. Wiesbaden, 2004. pp. 475-501.

³⁵³ Fischer, Joschka: Vom Staatenverbund zur Föderation – Gedanken über die Finalität der Europäischen Integration. Vortrag an der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin am 12. Mai 2000.

³⁵⁴ The French Interior Minister, Jean-Pierre Chevenement, caused an éclat with his statements: "There is a tendency in Germany to imagine a federal structure for Europe which fits in with its own model. [...] Deep down, it is still dreaming of the Holy Roman Empire. It hasn't cured itself of its past derailment into Nazism." Quoted in: The Independent: Minister apologises for remarks on Germany's 'Nazi Past'. 22.05.00. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/minister-apologises-for-remarks-on-germanys-nazi-past-716164.html> (13.03.09).

³⁵⁵ E.g. Germany (82 million), United Kingdom (59 million), France (59 million), Italy (58 million) with each 29 votes. This principle is as old as the ECSC, though.

³⁵⁶ Deutsch-französischer Beitrag zum Europäischen Konvent über die institutionelle Architektur der Union. Berlin/Paris, 15.01.03.

³⁵⁷ Frankfurter Rundschau: Fischer warnt vor Zusatzwünschen an die EU-Verfassung. 24.07.03.

elected president of the EU and a rotating chairmanship of the Council.³⁵⁸ Further negotiations would in any case be better than the present state. If the Union had to return to Nice, Europe would almost inevitably develop with different velocities and a core might emerge. In the end, the member states agreed on a compromise and signed the TCE in October 2004.

German parliamentary ratification of the TCE, conducted in May 2005, was overwhelmingly positive.³⁵⁹ After the negative outcome of referenda in France and the Netherlands, and the following reflection phase, Germany acted decisively in re-launching the ambitious EU reform. Taking over from the previous Finnish EU presidency, Chancellor Merkel achieved an agreement on the outlines of a new treaty and a mandate of the European Council for an Intergovernmental Conference during the Portuguese presidency.³⁶⁰

The Treaty of Lisbon has been adopted by the German *Bundestag* with 515 to 58 votes. The Federal Council supported the treaty unanimously, the abstention of Berlin being the exception. Political support for the European integration is unquestioned. However, the Federal President did not sign the ratification bill yet, due to an ongoing constitutional complaint.³⁶¹

3.2.2.2 Finnish Integration Policy

During the Cold War, Finnish integration policy remained primarily economic-orientated. Market access to Western Europe was a major goal, while Finland's participation in political arrangements was not suitable due to Soviet sentiments.³⁶² Therefore, Finland became an associate member of EFTA in 1961. It held all economic advantages, but was under no political obligations. The British and Danish accession to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973 meant an economic need for a free-trade agreement with the EEC. The Finnish government signed agreements with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) and the EEC underlining its political neutrality.³⁶³ Finland tried to 'encapsulate'³⁶⁴ its economic integration from political elements. During the 1980's, its integration policy changed slightly. The EC and EFTA began closer cooperation towards a European Economic Space (later European Economic Area) in 1984. At the same time, the Finnish business elite orientated themselves more and more towards the EC.³⁶⁵ Finland became an EFTA full member in 1987 and was therefore able to participate in the EEA negotiations from 1990 onwards. The primacy of good relations to the USSR remained though, and therefore there was continued reluctance to participate within supranational arrangements. It is worth to note that Britain expected Finland to join its economic-orientated integration

³⁵⁸ Cf. Regierungserklärung von Bundesaußenminister Fischer zum Europäischen Rat vor dem Deutschen Bundestag. 11.12.03. <http://www.ena.lu> (12.03.09).

³⁵⁹ Cf. Maurer, Andreas: Vom Verfassungs- zum Reformvertrag. Die Ratifikationsverfahren zum EU-Verfassungsvertrag und die Verhandlungen zum Mandat der Regierungskonferenz 2007. SWP-Diskussionspapier, July 2007. pp. 21-22.

³⁶⁰ Cf. Watt, Nicholas: Europe finally unites after agreeing to treaty. In: The Observer, 24.06.07. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/jun/24/politics.eu> (13.03.09).

³⁶¹ Indeed the final ratification is far from certain. The Federal Constitutional Court could rule the Treaty of Lisbon as incompatible with the German *Grundgesetz*. In that case, the Federal President would probably not sign the bill. Cf. Spiegel Online (International Edition): 'Europe Is Suffering from Too Little Democracy'. 02.11.09. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,606952,00.html> (13.03.09).

³⁶² Cf. Salovaara, Jukka: Finnish Integration Policy – From an Economic to a Security Motivation. In: Finnish Institute of International Affairs: Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy 1993. Helsinki, 1993. pp. 16-23 (16).

³⁶³ Cf. Singleton, 1989. p. 154.

³⁶⁴ Cf. Antola, Esko: The end of Pragmatism: Political Foundations of the Finnish Integration Policy under Stress. In: Finnish Institute of International Affairs: Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy 1991. Helsinki, 1991. pp. 17-22 (18).

³⁶⁵ Cf. Väyrynen, Raimo: Finland and the European Community. In: Cooperation and Conflict, March 1993, vol. 28. pp. 31-46 (34-39).

policy in the run-up for EU membership in 1995.³⁶⁶ And today, there is even an established cooperation of Britain and other liberal economic orientated countries, such as Finland, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden.³⁶⁷

However, Finland changed its integration policy as the international environment did. The rapid downfall of the Soviet Union caused a collapse of trade and the EC/EU became more than ever economically attractive.³⁶⁸ Moreover, the very decisive factor for a reserved position on political integration disappeared. Finland still had a wait-and-see attitude and applied only after Sweden went ahead, the outcome of Maastricht was clear and the USSR's collapse was final, but the step into a review of integration policy was done. In March 1992, Finland applied for EU membership. In the referendum on membership in 1994, support towards integration was basically motivated by aspects of economic benefits, security and stability, and influence as a full member.³⁶⁹ More generally, one could summarise, it was the decision that Finns "are belonging to a bigger society".³⁷⁰

In the first years of membership, Finland exercised an impressively active and supportive role in the political union. The first negotiation round for Finland was the 1996 IGC. Finland's positions on institutional matters emphasised the interests of small states in equality, strong institutions and clear rules; while at the same time supporting democratic and efficient improvements.³⁷¹ The European Parliament should be strengthened in legislative procedures, but not in decision-making on treaty amendments. "[T]he Union's fundamental character as an association of states should be preserved."³⁷² The Commission should have been preserved in its independent status and provided with resources for effective monitoring and sanctioning. 'One commissioner per member state' has been the aim of Finland and there should have been no different classes of commissioners. Related to the CFSP, the Commission should not gain competences. The Council of the EU should remain the central decision-making body on basis of equality of the member states. Finland did not support a change of the existing arrangements for qualified majority voting. The procedure should be extended to other sectors, though. Even on the CFSP and the EU's third pillar, Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCC), increased use of qualified majority voting has not been ruled out. Concerning the CFSP, Finland stressed consistency and visibility, but on an intergovernmental basis. External representation of the EU should be the matter of the state holding the presidency at the time. A permanent office representing the CFSP has been opposed.

The idea of flexibility was already supported by Finland at the 1996 IGC.³⁷³ The first major decision in favour of being in the 'core' of the EU was joining the first wave of states entering the third stage of the Economic and Monetary Union, thereby introducing the European single currency. Beside economic reasons, motivations regarding security and influence have been relevant. The single currency would strengthen solidarity and Finland would be at the table where decisions were taken.³⁷⁴ The government of Prime Minister Lipponen positioned Finland visibly as a pro-

³⁶⁶ Cf. Koivisto, 1997. p. 241.

³⁶⁷ These countries meet frequently to discuss issues before the European Council. Cf. Interview with Jari Luoto.

³⁶⁸ Cf. Salovaara, 1993. p. 18.

³⁶⁹ Cf. Pesonen, Pertti/Sänkiäho, Risto: The Finnish Referendum on Membership in the EU. In: Finnish Institute of International Affairs: Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy 1994. Helsinki, 1994.

³⁷⁰ Interview with Eero Akaan-Penttilä.

³⁷¹ Cf. Finland's points of departure and objectives at the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. Report to the Parliament by the Council of State, 27.02.96.

³⁷² Ibid.

³⁷³ Cf. Antola, 1999. p. 7.

³⁷⁴ Cf. *ibid.*

integrationist member state. Lipponen strongly supported the Euro in contrast to his Nordic counterparts and defended the government's decision against domestic criticism.³⁷⁵ Since then, support for the single currency improved remarkably well, but the public opinion in Finland remained reserved on European issues.³⁷⁶ The Lipponen governments established the image of a small, but active and pro-integrationist EU member.³⁷⁷

In November 2000, Prime Minister Lipponen held a speech at the College of Europe in Bruges at the opening of the academic year.³⁷⁸ He spoke about the future of Europe and explained his plan for further development of the European Union. Basically, he saw Europe confronted with two problems at the time: Firstly, the EU was lacking legitimacy and transparency, and secondly, it was unable to adjust to new, external as well as internal circumstances and shocks. In the context of enlargement, Lipponen proposed to conduct some necessary amendments in the frame of the Treaty of Nice first. At the same time an agenda for further reforms should have been set up. A convention with a broad participation should start a "constitutionalisation process"³⁷⁹ that would be finalised by an Intergovernmental Conference. The speech has been regarded as a response to German and French proposals in the summer of 2000.³⁸⁰ In Finland, Lipponen has been criticised for his quite federalist speech,³⁸¹ but he was one of the frontrunners of the later accelerating debate on a convention. 15 months later, the European Convention convened under chairmanship of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing.

In his speech at the College of Europe, Lipponen already outlined some of his basic positions. He favoured an increased use of qualified majority decisions in the Council, which should require at least half of the member states and half of the population. Lipponen welcomed the increased use of co-decision making and a strengthened European Parliament. He warned of an intergovernmentalism tendency and called for strong institutions, particularly a strong Commission. One Commissioner per member state would be the only feasible solution at the moment, but innovative alternatives for the future must have been realistically taken into account. He also made clear that all changes in the institutional structure would have to "ensure that the fundamental principles of equality and respect of the national integrity of all member states, large or small, are preserved."³⁸²

A government report on the Convention of January 2003, adopted by the Grand Committee, reflected these positions.³⁸³ Some issues have been portrayed as especially critical from a Finnish point of view. Every proposal for enhancing the efficiency of the Commission would be considered as long as the equality of EU members was secured. "The Commission's collegiality and the equality of its members are particularly important to small member states. A more emphatic role for the Commission President might erode this collegiality."³⁸⁴ The issue of rotating presidencies

³⁷⁵ Cf. Zänker, Alfred: Finnland strebt größere Eigenständigkeit an. In: Die Welt, 04.11.07. http://www.welt.de/print-welt/article643828/Finnland_strebt_groessere_Eigenstaendigkeit_an.html (17.03.09).

³⁷⁶ Cf. Gassen, Glenn R./Maurer, Andreas: Von der Peripherie ins Zentrum. Perspektiven finnischer Europapolitik – für Europa und Deutschland. SWP-Diskussionspapier, December 2006. pp. 14-16.

³⁷⁷ Cf. Gawrich, Andrea: Finnland – Musterknabe in der EU? In: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B 47/2004, 15.11.04. pp. 16-21 (20-21).

³⁷⁸ Finnish Government: Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen at the College of Europe, Bruges, Belgium November 10, 2000. <http://www.vn.fi/ajankohtaista/puheet/puhe/fi.jsp?oid=103248> pdf (12.03.09).

³⁷⁹ Ibid.

³⁸⁰ Cf. Helsingin Sanomat (International Edition): Lipponen would tighten integration with an EU constitution. 13.11.00. <http://www2.hs.fi/english/archive/news.asp?id=200011131E3> (02.04.09).

³⁸¹ Interview with Esko Antola.

³⁸² Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen at the College of Europe, Bruges, Belgium November 10, 2000.

³⁸³ Report of the Council of State on Finland's positions concerning the future of Europe and issues arisen during the Convention. 27.01.03. <http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/de/03/cv00/cv00509de03.pdf> (12.03.09).

³⁸⁴ Ibid.

has been particularly sensitive for the country, as “rotation has been the best guarantee of the equality of member states, something that is important to small member states like Finland.”³⁸⁵ Proposals concerning the presidency of the Council would be examined “in an unprejudiced spirit [...] as long as the proposals are based on the equality of member states.”³⁸⁶ Finland rejected the office of an elected president of the EU. The report states: “Most recently the President of France and the Federal Chancellor of Germany have published such a proposal. [...] The proposal for a Union President contains a fresh derogation from the community model in favour of the hegemony of the large member states.”³⁸⁷

From a Finnish point of view, the Convention Draft of the TCE would not have sufficiently safeguarded the small states’ interests. Therefore, Finland was among the states that wanted to reopen negotiations at an Intergovernmental Conference. Together with other small states, Finland demanded extensive changes of the institutional arrangements.³⁸⁸

Finland did not insist on its own commissioner, but rejected the concept of commissioners without voting rights as it would violate the principle of equality of the member states. In return for its position on the composition of the Commission, Finland emphasised the need for safeguarding the role of the Commission within the institutional architecture and the relative influence of small states in the Council. In that respect, Finland refused the quota of three fifths of the Union’s population for a qualified majority and plead emphatically for a 50 percent rule.³⁸⁹ Regarding the Convention proposal on Council presidencies, Finland held a reserved position. Giving up the present system of half-year rotating presidencies and introducing an elected President of the European Council was clearly not favoured. Acceptance of the new president office was linked with a clear definition of the president’s competences. In any case, the new office should not interfere in the responsibilities of the Council of the EU. Similarly, a ‘foreign minister of the EU’ should also not have chaired the Council on foreign affairs.³⁹⁰

Although Finland has been criticised even in its own ranks,³⁹¹ it has been ready to negotiate and offered alternatives. Particularly among the small states, Finland has been influential. Finally, Finland agreed on the IGC’s result as a European compromise. It underlined its active and self-confident European policy, though.

The governments of Matti Vanhanen have been more pragmatic on European policy than the Lipponen governments. But Prime Minister Vanhanen, who was a national parliament representative in the Convention, gave strong support for the TCE.³⁹² The Finnish parliament ratified the Constitutional Treaty at the end of its EU presidency in December 2006. Finland and Estonia have been the only member state that ratified the TCE after the negative referenda in France and the Netherlands.³⁹³ Finland’s ratification has been the most visible sign of its ambitions to end the reflection

³⁸⁵ Ibid.

³⁸⁶ Ibid.

³⁸⁷ Ibid.

³⁸⁸ Cf. Ridderbusch, Katja: Der Basar Europa öffnet seine Pforten. In: Die Welt, 04.10.03. http://www.welt.de/print-welt/article263811/Der_Basar_Europa_oeffnet_seine_Pforten.html (12.03.09).

³⁸⁹ Cf. Prime Minister’s Office: Finland’s EU objectives in 2004. Press Release 32/2004, 30.01.04. <http://www.vnk.fi/ajankohtaista/tiedotteet/tiedote/fi.jsp.print?oid=93279> (12.03.09).

³⁹⁰ Cf. *ibid.*

³⁹¹ Cf. Pekonen, Laura: From the EU model student to the leader of a rebellion. In: Helsingin Sanomat (International Edition), 30.09.03. <http://www2.hs.fi/english/archive/news.asp?id=20030930IE3> (12.03.09).

³⁹² Cf. Balzan, Aleander: Finnish parliament starts EU Constitution ratification process. In: EUobserver, 15.05.06. <http://euobserver.com/9/21586> (17.03.09).

³⁹³ Cf. Beunderman, Mark: Estonia and Finland press ahead with EU constitution. In: EUobserver, 06.04.06. <http://euobserver.com/?aid=21329> (17.03.09).

phase during its own presidency in late 2006.³⁹⁴ Behind the scenes, the Finnish government held bilateral consultations with every member state and handed over the results to the consecutive German presidency.

The Treaty of Lisbon has been approved by the *Eduskunta* with a clear majority of 151 to 27 in June 2008.³⁹⁵ At a seminar on Finland's EU policy in February 2009, Prime Minister Vanhanen repeated: "The EU is a significant channel of influence for Finland. Finland needs to remain in the mainstream of the EU. There is no influence from the margins."³⁹⁶

3.2.2.3 Germany and Finland on European Integration

The development of the European integration has been characterised by a polarity of pro and anti-integrationist approaches. Particularly the UK, which has launched the counter-model to the European Community, EFTA, has been cautious towards deeper cooperation and supranational elements. In stark contrast to the UK, Germany has been firmly in favour of deeper integration and the wording 'United States of Europe' holds no negative connotations among German foreign policy makers.

When Finland applied for EU membership, it was not clear in which direction the country would develop. The decline of the USSR, and thereafter the rapid rapprochement of Russia and Europe, opened the window of opportunity. If the European states had not tied in with the proclamation of the CSCE Charter of Paris 1990 – "A new era of Democracy, Peace and Unity"³⁹⁷ –, Finland would probably have been constrained merely to economic aspects. But soon after accession, the Finnish government under Paavo Lipponen led the country into the political centre of the Europe. The European Union gave Finland the opportunity to consolidate its position in Western Europe.³⁹⁸

Finland and Germany belong to the group of states, which welcome deeper integration and a strong EU in international politics. At the first IGC, in which Germany and Finland were commonly involved in negotiations on the institutional future architecture, both states supported the same principles, stressing the importance of institutions and a strong communitarian system. That was not the result of a coordinated approach and differences already became visible, though. Finland orientated towards other small states, which were more experienced in political processes within the EC/EU, particularly the Benelux countries.³⁹⁹ Germany prioritised its special relationship with France and acted in close coordination with its western neighbour. Germany traditionally emphasised communality though, and therefore came close to the Finnish position. Esko Antola commented: "That is an important point, because you have the federalist vision. [...] But you will not find too many federalists in this country. [...] So that is a difference, Finland stresses strong institutions but not in a federalist sense. [...] We see institutions and the Commission in particular as a defender of the principle of equality between the member states. That is a differ-

³⁹⁴ Finland's EU Presidency: The objective for Finland's EU Presidency: a transparent and effective Union. 30.06.06. http://www.eu2006.fi/news_and_documents/press_releases/vko26_en_GB/162650/ (17.03.09).

³⁹⁵ Cf. Helsingin Sanomat (International Edition): Finnish Parliament approves Treaty of Lisbon. 12.06.08. <http://www.hs.fi/english/print/1135237120718> (02.04.09).

³⁹⁶ Quoted in: Helsingin Sanomat (International Edition): PM calls for clarity in EU policy. 03.02.09. <http://www.hs.fi/english/print/1135243249114> (17.03.09).

³⁹⁷ Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe: Charter of Paris for a New Europe. Paris 1990. http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1990/11/4045_en.pdf (10.04.09). p. 3.

³⁹⁸ Interview with Jari Luoto.

³⁹⁹ Interview with Esko Antola.

ence. We have no aspirations to go further. Germany has this long term vision of Europe, we do not.”⁴⁰⁰ Finland is not decided to support a European federation.⁴⁰¹ Antti Kaikkonen, Vice-Chairman of the Grand Committee, emphasised the pragmatic, non-dogmatic, attitude of the Finnish government.⁴⁰² Step by step, Finland will probably follow deeper integration, but with caution and rationality.⁴⁰³

In the European Convention, the setting of big and small states became ever more evident. The initial proposal of Gerhard Schröder and Jaques Chirac violated the community principle in a series of aspects. According to the German-French plan, the President of the Commission would have been strengthened with extensive competences making him more than *primus inter pares*. He or she would have been legitimated by the Parliament, gaining responsibility for the general policy and more independence in composing the Commission. Finland did not insist on ‘one commissioner per member state’, but the principle of collegiality within the Commission should not be touched. The arrangement of the Commission has been traditionally of particular sensitivity for small countries. In the case of a reduction of the number of Commissioners, as it is meant to be decided by the European Council according to the Lisbon Treaty, the Finnish government is dedicated that the “rotation of Commissioners must be based on equal turns between the Member States”.⁴⁰⁴

The non-dogmatic position of Finland on the rearrangement of the number of Commissioners has been linked with the details of double majority voting. Finland has favoured a quota of 50 percent of member states and population. Germany has supported the Conventional Draft. From the Finnish point of view, the crux of the matter is that the higher the quota is, the easier big states could form a blockade. The quota of member states would have provided the small states with enough influence to stop any big states domination. In the current EU-27, 14 states, no matter how small, could reject any legislative project. But in the arrangement of the Constitutional Draft, simple majority of states and 60 percent of the population, would have enabled the three biggest states, Germany, France and Britain with 200 million, to veto. Therefore, a minimum of four member states has been agreed to as being required for blocking a Council decision.⁴⁰⁵

Furthermore, an elected President of the European Council and a European Foreign Minister would have conflicted with the rotating presidency, which is still another centrepiece in safeguarding the equality of member states. Finland and other small states feared that the big member states could easily influence these offices, as well as the Commission President, and thereby dominate the EU. The newly established posts should not have chaired the Council of the EU and be closely coordinated with the current presidency. The competences of the new offices have not yet been fixed, neither in the TCE nor in the Treaty of Lisbon. Regarding the open institutional questions of the Lisbon Treaty, which were to be cleared until 2009, Finland insisted “that the permanent President of the European Council must act as a consensus-seeking chairman instead of a president pursuing a separate policy. The permanent President must work in close cooperation with the rotating presidency and the European Commission.”⁴⁰⁶ The European foreign minis-

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁰¹ Cf. Interview with Eero Akaan-Penttilä.

⁴⁰² Cf. Interview with Antti Kaikkonen.

⁴⁰³ Cf. Ibid.; Interview with Eero Akaan-Penttilä.

⁴⁰⁴ Finnish Government: Finland’s positions on the institutional questions of the new EU treaty. Press Release 138/2008, 09.05.08. <http://www.government.fi/ajankohtaista/tiedotteet/tiedote/en.jsp.print?oid=228629> (19.03.09).

⁴⁰⁵ Cf. Maurer, Andreas: Die Ausdehnung der Verfahren mit qualifizierter Mehrheit im Rat. In: Lieb, Julia/Maurer, Andreas/von Ondarza, Nicolai (Ed.): Der Vertrag von Lissabon. Kurzkomm. SWP-Diskussionspapier, December 2008. pp. 21-24.

⁴⁰⁶ Finland’s positions on the institutional questions of the new EU treaty. 09.05.08.

ter, now called High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, should act under the mandate of the Council and the rotating presidency “must continue to have a role at all EU levels”.⁴⁰⁷

On institutional questions, Germany and Finland are divided and have ended up in different groupings. Whereas the German Chancellor traditionally coordinates with the French President, Finland joined a summit of small states in March 2003 in order to signal that it felt ignored.⁴⁰⁸ Teija Tiilikainen, who has been the Prime Minister’s delegate to the Convention, explained that there has been real suspicion that the German European policy might have changed: “We had a period when we thought we had lost you. [...] And there we thought for a while that... we noticed that there the big-small constellation was a difficult one.”⁴⁰⁹ Former State Secretary Luoto mentioned in a similar attentive manner: “We drifted apart at some point in the negotiating process and already during the Convention, when we saw that Germany was taking more a position of a big member state when it comes to power sharing and the institutions and when we were talking about the weight of different member states. So at that time Finland was very active, especially with Portugal, Luxembourg, Austria joined by several other member states, in pursuing solutions that were contrary to the thinking of France and Germany. At that time we did have different views and we felt that Germany did not listen as much as it had before to the interest of the small and the medium sized countries.”⁴¹⁰

In the run-up to the 2003 IGC, Germany and Finland held good communication on their differences concerning the future of the EU, though. In August 2003, Foreign Minister Fischer visited Helsinki on the invitation of his Finnish colleague, Erkki Tuomioja. Both have a left-wing biography and shared a common hobby – running. After finishing the 10 km Töölönlahti run hand-in-hand in 53 minutes 42 seconds, both held talks in a sauna.⁴¹¹ Fischer remembered the joint sauna session as one of the most comfortable atmospheres in his diplomatic career,⁴¹² with exchange of minds ‘in a very constructive manner’.⁴¹³

In the end, both states agreed on the IGC compromise. Thereby, it is particularly important that Germany and Finland held the same starting point concerning the role of the EU Parliament, the Commission and the Court of Justice. Tiilikainen explained: “I think in most cases we had a good common understanding. [...] We had some differences in opinion, but the main thing is that we agreed on the basics. Neither of us, Germany or Finland was willing to challenge the communitarian way of decision making, the role of the Commission and the Parliament. So that is why it was easy to discuss and it was easy to understand each other, because it was not the only model of thinking about the EU’s decision making. We shared this and in general we agreed with each other. At some stages, I mentioned this, dividing line is a too strong word, but the differences emerged. But I think we managed to go with them.”⁴¹⁴

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁸ Cf. Middel, Andreas: Die „sieben Zwerge“ der EU fühlen sich übergangen. In: Die Welt, 14.03.03. http://www.welt.de/print-welt/article475472/Die_sieben_Zwerge_der_EU_fuehlen_sich_uebergangen.html (20.03.09).

⁴⁰⁹ Interview with Teija Tiilikainen.

⁴¹⁰ Interview with Jari Luoto.

⁴¹¹ Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland: German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer: EU evolves only through compromises. 24.08.03. <http://www.formin.fi/public/?contentid=60018&contentlan=2&culture=en-US> (20.03.09).

⁴¹² Cf. Fischer, Joschka: Die rot-grünen Jahre. Deutsche Außenpolitik vom Kosovo bis zum 11. September. Cologne, 2008. p. 323.

⁴¹³ Handelsblatt: Bundesaußenminister in Finnland. Fischer: Kein Bundeswehreinsatz ohne UNO-Mandat. 24.08.03. <http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/fischer-kein-bundeswehreinsatz-ohne-uno-mandat;655490> (20.03.09).

⁴¹⁴ Interview with Teija Tiilikainen.

From a German perspective, it has been firmly welcomed that Finland did not blockade the whole process, but maintained a constructive approach. Kurt Bodewig, MP, commented: „*Es war ein Anliegen der Kleineren, ein stärkeres Gewicht zu bekommen. [...] Sie haben Interessen wahrgenommen, aber haben das nicht destruktiv gemacht. Das muss ich deutlich sagen, die Finnen haben immer versucht den Prozess weiter laufen zu lassen.*“⁴¹⁵ Bodewig mentioned that, in face of negotiations and conflicts of interest, the whole process must proceed and not be stopped by few.⁴¹⁶ Axel Schäfer, spokesman of the SPD parliamentary group on EU affairs, stated that small states can give important contributions to Europe and should not use a blockade as their single option. “[...] *es ist wichtig, dass man eigene Vorschläge macht. Nicht wir blockieren, wie wir das bei Irland und Dänemark an zwei Stellen erlebt haben. Ich denke, Finnland ist da anders. Und das ist hilfreich.*“⁴¹⁷

In general, Finland is regarded as a very enriching member state. Hans-Dietrich Genscher stressed that Finland always belonged to Europe.⁴¹⁸ It is perceived as an old member state, although it joined the Union merely 14 years ago.⁴¹⁹ Finnish European policy is appreciated, as it has supported the development of the Union. Axel Schäfer mentioned: “*Finnland ist ein Land, das sich doch sehr überzeugend auf die Integration eingelassen hat.*“⁴²⁰ Kurt Bodewig stressed that the common view of Europe makes the proportion of big and small irrelevant, and that Finland understood the philosophy of a common Europe as a chance.⁴²¹

The common aspiration of a strong Union is a binding element for both countries. Politically, ratification of the TCE has been no problem. After the failure of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, it became Finland’s and Germany’s responsibility to re-launch the reform process. In June 2006, the European Council decided to solve the reform crisis until the end of 2008.⁴²² The German presidency was tasked with reporting on possible future developments in the first half of 2007. The prior Finnish presidency was not in charge of bringing the reform process back on track, but had “a particular responsibility to ensure the continuity of this process.”⁴²³ Finland intended to “bring the passive period of reflection on the Constitutional Treaty to a close and start active discussions on the future of the Treaty with the Member States and EU Institutions.”⁴²⁴ Therefore, the Finnish government held bilateral talks and gave a visible signal by initiating ratification of the TCE. The consecutive German presidency then achieved the break through with a mandate for an IGC in the Portuguese presidency. Finnish foreign policy makers were satisfied with the role Finland played and praised Angela Merkel’s performance. Teija Tiilikainen stated “that the German role was crucial, because we could not do that much yet then. It was already the time where we should keep a low profile and somehow keep the thinking and the idea of a new treaty alive, but we could not do much more. It was up to Germany then to create the final atmosphere, the final consensus and the support from everybody that we should move forward to a new treaty. And it was very well done,

⁴¹⁵ Interview with Kurt Bodewig; Author’s translation: It was a concern of the smaller ones to get more weight. [...] They represented interests, but did not do that in a destructive manner. That I must say explicitly, the Finns have always tried to keep the process in motion.

⁴¹⁶ Ibid.

⁴¹⁷ Interview with Axel Schäfer, Speaker for European Policy of the SPD Parliamentary Group, 26th June 2008 in Berlin; Author’s translation: [...] it is important, that one makes own proposals. Not we blockade, as we have seen twice by Ireland and Denmark. I think Finland is different. And that is supportive.

⁴¹⁸ Cf. Interview with Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

⁴¹⁹ Interview with Thomas Kossendey; Interview with an official of the German Embassy in Helsinki.

⁴²⁰ Interview with Axel Schäfer; Author’s translation: Finland is a country that has engaged in integration very convincingly.

⁴²¹ Cf. Interview with Kurt Bodewig.

⁴²² Council of the European Union: Brussels European Council 15/16 June 2006. Presidency Conclusions. Brussels, 17.07.06. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/90111.pdf (21.03.09).

⁴²³ Ibid.

⁴²⁴ The objective for Finland’s EU Presidency: a transparent and effective Union. 30.06.06.

it was a success. The position of Ms Merkel was crucial, I think so. The way she came to European publicity with the idea of having a new treaty and also gaining support and consensus at the European level.”⁴²⁵ Jari Luoto commented in the same way, but mentioned that already there the German government carefully watched what Finland was doing: “So we were quite content with the role that we had by pursuing these bilateral negotiations we held and then handing over as results. And although there were doubts at the beginning of the German presidency about what we were doing during the Finnish presidency, I think in the end we all agreed that it was useful to have this dialogue. It was beneficial for the final outcome which is clearly a good remarkable achievement by the German chancellor.”⁴²⁶

Esko Antola, who held close contacts to the German Embassy and has been invited to exclusive events, commented more directly: “Merkel saw it as a possibility to make herself a European leader. So Germans wanted to have the big issues like the Intergovernmental Conference and warned Finland to be not too active, because it was a German issue. [...] This was an interesting situation, Germany warned us, told us, do not be too active in this IGC issues, because it is reserved for us.”⁴²⁷

From a German point of view, it has been clear that Finland was not able to initiate the needed revitalisation of the reform process and Germany did so by the demand of Europe.⁴²⁸ Kurt Bodewig, MP, explained: „*Es war eine vorbereitende Arbeit. Die Finnen haben das Thema auf der Tagesordnung gehabt, aber nicht in der Intensität Deutschlands. Ich glaube, das ging auch nicht. Um ein solches großes Rad zu drehen, braucht man ein anderes Gewicht im europäischen Konzert als dies ein Land mit Randlage auch haben kann.*“⁴²⁹

The implementation of the Lisbon Treaty has become uncertain due to the Irish rejection. In Germany the ratification is also far from completed. The Federal Constitutional Court still could stop the Treaty. As long as the treaty is delayed, the open institutional questions will be postponed as well. But the practical arrangement of the Commissioner rotation and the tasks of the new offices, the President of the European Council and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, will be important tests also for German-Finnish relations. In early 2008, the speculation about candidates for the position of the new President of the European Council made clear that the small states have no interest in a strong President.⁴³⁰ The more he or she gains power the more the Commission and the Parliament will lose. Pertti Salolainen, MP, emphasised: “Because the basic philosophy behind all this [...] is that we feel that the Commission protects better and in a more balanced way the rights of the small nations. The Commission must deal in a rightful way with the big and the small ones, whereas all other bodies may have too much pressure from the big ones. We want strong institutions and clear rules how to operate, because we feel that they protect best the interests of the small nations.”⁴³¹

⁴²⁵ Interview with Teija Tiilikainen.

⁴²⁶ Interview with Jari Luoto.

⁴²⁷ Interview with Esko Antola.

⁴²⁸ Interview with Axel Schäfer.

⁴²⁹ Interview with Kurt Bodewig; Author's translation: It was a good preparatory work. The Finns had the topic on their agenda, but not as intensive as Germany. I think that was not possible, too. In order to turn such a big wheel, one needs a different weight in the European concert than a country in periphery position can have.

⁴³⁰ Cf. The Economist: The other presidential race. 17.04.08. http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11049338 (21.03.09).

⁴³¹ Interview with Pertti Salolainen.

Thus, also in the future Germany's approach towards Finland and other small states will be carefully examined. "The role of Germany has been and is very crucial for the future of Europe."⁴³² Expectations in Finland are partly high. Germany is perceived as more predictable and accessible than other big member states.⁴³³ Pertti Salolainen expressed his hope: "[...] we noticed that Angela Merkel had a positive role, we would really like that Germany would take a stronger leadership in some issues in the European Union, to put some more common sense in the whole thing. Germany has a special responsibility. We want a strong Germany to lead the European Union to the right path."⁴³⁴

3.2.3 European Security Policy

The question of a European security policy emerged soon after the Second World War. The Western European Union (WEU) as well as the plans for the European Defence Community (EDC) can be regarded as the first attempts to establish joint European action in defence and security affairs. NATO dominated the security structure of Western Europe until the end of the Cold War and thereafter. However, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) opened up opportunities for common efforts within the EU.

3.2.3.1 German Security Policy

In order to understand the German position on a common European defence policy, one has to go back to the question of West German rearmament in the 1950s. After the Second World War, the priority of the Allied Powers, especially of France, was to guarantee that Germany could never again be a threat for world peace. But rising East-West tensions and a vast Soviet predominance of conventional forces in Europe made a West German rearmament reasonable. On 24th October 1950, the French Prime Minister, René Pleven, took the initiative and presented the concept of a European army that would have enabled a European control over newly deployed German troops.⁴³⁵ Two years later, the founding members of the ECSC agreed to establish the European Defence Community (EDC) that should have been under the European Political Community (EPC). But finally the *Assemblée nationale* refused to ratify the plans and so the EDC as well as the EPC failed. Chancellor Adenauer gave strong support for the creation of a European army and the failure of the EDC has been one of the worst moments in his political career.⁴³⁶

West Germany's main goal was the deployment of troops and integration into the Western alliance as soon as possible, preferably within a European pillar of NATO. Thus, parallel to the plans for the EDC, the West German government started negotiations on NATO membership in early 1950.⁴³⁷ The country's policy always meant Europe *and* America. So, after the failed attempt of the EDC, West Germany became a member of the North Atlantic Alliance as well as member of the former Brussels Pact, the Western European Union, to meet French interests.⁴³⁸ The message was clear: West Germany was willing not just to subordinate itself in a common security organisation – explicitly in Article 24 (2) of the German *Grundgesetz*. The West German government also wanted to integrate its army into a European and an Atlantic frame, particularly because of political aspects.

⁴³² Interview with Antti Kaikkonen.

⁴³³ Cf. *ibid*; Interview with Petri Hakkarainen; Interview with Pertti Salolainen.

⁴³⁴ Interview with Pertti Salolainen.

⁴³⁵ Cf. Déclaration de René Pleven sur la création d'une armée européenne. 24.10.50. <http://www.ena.lu> (22.01.09).

⁴³⁶ Cf. Brunn, 2004. p. 98; Schwarz, 1991. pp. 139-140; Poppinga, 1987. p. 98.

⁴³⁷ Cf. Brunn, 2004. p. 93.

⁴³⁸ Cf. Brandstetter, Gerfried (Ed.): Die Westeuropäische Union. Einführung und Dokumente. Vienna, 1999. p. 18.

West Germany, however, did not support de Gaulle's vision of a Europe that proposed itself, dominated by France, as counterpart to American influence and NATO. The Fouchet plans of 1961/62 failed due to Belgian and Dutch refusals.⁴³⁹ After that attempt to institutionalise de Gaulle's concept among the members of the European Economic Community (EEC), the Élysée Treaty between France and Germany of 1963 raised suspicion in America and other European states. These countries feared the treaty would constitute a Franco-German predominance against NATO.⁴⁴⁰ Facing that critique, the German parliament ratified the treaty with a preamble that assured the priority of the North Atlantic Alliance.⁴⁴¹

A European dimension in West German security policy came back on the agenda in the 1980s. In November 1981, the German foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and his Italian colleague, Emilio Colombo, submitted a draft European Act proposing "a common foreign policy, to act in concert in world affairs so that Europe will be increasingly able to assume the international role incumbent upon it by virtue of its economic and political importance"⁴⁴² and furthermore "the security of Europe must be guaranteed by joint action on security policy."⁴⁴³ At the end of the 1980s reform process, mostly due to British and French reservations,⁴⁴⁴ the Single European Act of 17th February 1986 stated "members of the European Communities, shall endeavour jointly to formulate and implement a European foreign policy".⁴⁴⁵

West Germany wanted a European security and defence policy enhancing West Europe's cohesion and giving America a single phone number. In that respect, the German position "Europe and America" differed to the French "Europe" and to the British "America".

But a German-French agreement on ESDP issues has been the precondition for any development of that policy field.⁴⁴⁶ Furthermore, both have started a long series of initiatives and opened their bilateral cooperation to other EC/WEU members. Thus, they developed the French-German Brigade into Eurocorps – "A force for Europe and NATO"⁴⁴⁷. In the run-up to the Maastricht Treaty, Germany and France worked on a common statement that proposed the WEU as "canal"⁴⁴⁸ between the Political Union and NATO. Moreover, the Union should have acted as one on questions like disarmament. Germany in particular wanted to integrate the WEU completely and make it complementary to NATO.⁴⁴⁹ The Maastricht Treaty, however, did not meet these proposals and mentioned "the eventual framing of a common defence policy".⁴⁵⁰

⁴³⁹ Cf. Brunn, 2004. pp. 138-142.

⁴⁴⁰ Cf. Lehmann, Hans Georg: Deutschland-Chronik 1945 bis 2000. Bonn, 2002. pp. 182-184.

⁴⁴¹ Cf. Gesetz zu der Gemeinsamen Erklärung und zu dem Vertrag vom 22. Januar 1963 zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Französischen Republik über die deutsch-französische Zusammenarbeit, 15.06.63. <http://www.ena.lu> (22.01.09).

⁴⁴² Draft European Act submitted by the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Italian Republic, 06.11.81. <http://www.ena.lu> (22.01.09). Preamble.

⁴⁴³ Ibid. Part One: Principles.

⁴⁴⁴ Cf. Islam, Rana Deep: Die Avantgarde der europäischen Sicherheit. Deutsch-französische Zusammenarbeit auf dem Gebiet der Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik 1979-1986. Duisburg, 2006.

⁴⁴⁵ Cf. The Single European Act, 17.02.86. Article 30.

⁴⁴⁶ Cf. Weske, Simone: Deutschland und Frankreich – Motor einer Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik? Baden-Baden, 2006. pp. 27-40.

⁴⁴⁷ Eurocorps. <http://www.eurocorps.org/en/home/> (27.01.09).

⁴⁴⁸ Gemeinsames deutsch-französisches Papier zur Sicherheitspolitischen Zusammenarbeit im Rahmen der Gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der Politischen Union vom 4.2.1991. <http://www.ena.lu> (22.01.09).

⁴⁴⁹ Cf. Guérin-Sendelbach, Valérie: Frankreich und das vereinigte Deutschland. Interessen und Perzeptionen im Spannungsfeld. Opladen, 1999. pp. 116-117.

⁴⁵⁰ Treaty on European Union. 07.02.92. Preamble.

In 1996, both states agreed on a joint German-French security and defence concept that also included claims for the coming IGC.⁴⁵¹ It repeated the intention to promote the integration of the WEU into the EU, but described tasks comparable to the Petersberg tasks. Additionally, Germany and France underlined their aspiration of a European armaments policy, which led to the establishment of the *Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d'Armement* (OCCAR) in February 1997.⁴⁵²

Since West Europe's territory was no longer being threatened, not just the ESDP started to develop, but the German security policy shifted like a landslide. During the Cold War, the armed forces of Germany were only meant to defend its own territory under NATO command. Therefore, its equipment did not change significantly in the 1990s. However, in the new security environment after the end of the Cold War and after a decisive rule of the Federal Constitutional Court in 1994, the *Bundeswehr* began to participate largely in UN and NATO missions.⁴⁵³ Under mandate of the United Nations, German armed forces contributed to IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1995 onwards. In 1999, the Kosovo War, and with it the German engagement, marked Germany's first war participation since the Second World War – under NATO mandate, but without UN authorisation, and thereby against international law. It became evident that Germany would follow the Northern Alliance, if necessary and reasonable, and that it was willed to take responsibility for the continent's security.

In face of the Kosovo War, which demonstrated once more Europe's dependence on America in questions of its own security issues, the Cologne Council agreed in June 1999 that “the CFSP must be backed by credible operational capabilities”⁴⁵⁴ and approved institutional arrangements that have been put forward by the following Finnish presidency. The event leading to that breakthrough, the British-French agreement of St. Malo, showed that Germany and France have not been the most decisive actors in the ESDP, though. France and Britain emphasised the priority of military forces.⁴⁵⁵ “After a moment of hesitation, Germany quickly joined in”⁴⁵⁶ and seized the opportunity of its presidency to strengthen the civil dimension.⁴⁵⁷ Germany held good results with its *Zivilmacht* concept⁴⁵⁸, so it aimed to shape the EU additionally as a civil power. Furthermore, Germany opposed the wording ‘preemptive’ in NATO and EU, and achieved that the concept of ‘prevention’ entered the European Security Strategy, adopted in December 2003.⁴⁵⁹

Another milestone in Germany's recent military development has been its participation in ISAF. Germany's ISAF efforts demonstrate, on the one hand, the shift in German defence and security policy towards global engagement – the Minister of Defence, Peter Struck, stated at the time: “*Die*

⁴⁵¹ Cf. Gemeinsames deutsch-französisches Sicherheits- und Verteidigungskonzept gebilligt bei der 16. Sitzung des Deutsch-Französischen Verteidigungs- und Sicherheitsrates am 9. Dezember 1996 in Nürnberg. <http://www.ena.lu> (27.01.09).

⁴⁵² Cf. Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d'Armement: OCCAR at a glance. <http://www.occar-ea.org/Unternehmen> (27.01.09).

⁴⁵³ Hellmann, Gunther: Sicherheitspolitik. In: Schmidt/Hellmann/Wolf, 2007. pp. 605-617 (611-612).

⁴⁵⁴ Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council, 3 and 4 June 1999. Annex III. http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/kolnen.htm (27.01.09).

⁴⁵⁵ Joint Declaration on European Defence. British-French Summit, Saint-Malo, 3-4 December 1998. <http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/news/2002/02/joint-declaration-on-eu-new01795#> (27.01.09).

⁴⁵⁶ Bertram, Christoph/Schild, Joachim/Heisbourg, Francois/Boyer, Yves: Starting Over. For a Franco-German Initiative in European Defence. A joint study by the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. Berlin, November 2002. p. 25.

⁴⁵⁷ Wagner, Wolfgang: Die Außen-, Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik der Europäischen Union. In: Schmidt/Hellmann/Wolf, 2007. pp. 143-154 (149); Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council, 3 and 4 June 1999. Annex III.

⁴⁵⁸ In that context *Zivilmacht* means states aiming on ‘civilised’ international politics. Cf. Maull, Hanns W.: Deutschland als Zivilmacht. In: Schmidt/Hellmann/Wolf, 2007. pp. 73-84 (74).

⁴⁵⁹ Cf. Guertner, Gary L.: European Views of Preemption in US National Security Strategy. In: Parameters. US Army War College Quarterly. Summer 2007, Vol. XXXVII, No. 2. pp. 31-44; Wagner, 2007. p. 149.

*Sicherheit Deutschlands wird auch am Hindukusch verteidigt.*⁴⁶⁰ On the other hand, it reveals German characteristics due to its history. Germany emphasises the need for civil crisis management that it applies in its northern sector of Afghanistan. It regards the relatively calm situation in the north as result of its civil component and avoids the use of military force as far as possible. Also, it showed “how distant Germany remains from normality when it comes to the military.”⁴⁶¹ In the context of increased attacks on German soldiers in 2008, the Minister of Defence, Franz Josef Jung, refused to use the word ‘war’ with reference to Afghanistan.⁴⁶²

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the USA on 11th September 2001, Germany’s attitudes towards the use of military force became visible in its position on the Iraq War. Right after 9/11, Chancellor Schröder assured Germany’s ‘*uneingeschränkte Solidarität*’⁴⁶³ to the United States. But already on 19th September 2001, Schröder stated that solidarity would mean taking risks, though not joining adventures.⁴⁶⁴ Unlike Germany’s commitment to the US intervention in Afghanistan, the Iraq War and its prehistory showed the limits of Germany’s solidarity. Germany refused to take part in the American aggression against Iraq, opposed it and thereby challenged the new way of American leadership.⁴⁶⁵ On the 39th Munich Conference on Security Policy in February 2003, Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer told Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld publicly: “I am not convinced.”⁴⁶⁶

At the European Convention, Germany and France acted as forerunner in the area of the ESDP once more. In November 2002, Dominique de Villepin and Joschka Fischer renewed their governments’ aspiration for a common defence. They proposed a declaration on solidarity and common security with the perspective of a European Security and Defence Union (ESDU).⁴⁶⁷ The principle of enhanced cooperation should be introduced for the ESDP. Additionally, de Villepin and Fischer called for improved military capabilities, particularly by means of a European armaments policy. They proposed the creation of a European defence agency and a European armaments market. These ideas have influenced the TCE significantly, as it would introduce ‘permanent structured cooperation’ and a solidarity clause. The EDA was established by a Council agreement in July 2004.

In cooperation with Britain, Germany and France have also been ambitious to foster the Battle Group concept.⁴⁶⁸ Moreover, they have been the biggest supporters of its implementation. On the

⁴⁶⁰ Former Minister of Defence, Peter Struck, quoted in: Spiegel Online: Bundeswehr bleibt ein Jahr länger in Afghanistan. 20.12.02. <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,228174,00.html> (27.01.09); Author’s translation: Germany’s security will also be defended at the Hindukush.

⁴⁶¹ Kulish, Nicholas: Efforts to Restore Shine to Medal Tarnished by Nazis. In: New York Times, 20.03.08. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/20/world/europe/20cross.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=bundeswehr&st=nyt (27.01.09).

⁴⁶² Cf. tagesschau.de: Bundeswehr-Einsatz in Afghanistan. Ein „Krieg“ oder ein „Krisenszenario“. 03.09.08. <http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/afghanistan584.html> (27.01.09).

⁴⁶³ Unlimited solidarity. Deutscher Bundestag: Erklärung der Bundesregierung zu den Anschlägen in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika. Plenarprotokoll 14/186, 12.09.01.

⁴⁶⁴ Regierungserklärung des deutschen Bundeskanzlers, Gerhard Schröder, zu den Anschlägen am 19. September 2001 vor dem Deutschen Bundestag in Berlin. Published in: Internationale Politik, December 2001. <http://www.internationalepolitik.de/archiv/jahrgang2001/dezember01/regierungserklärung-des-deutschen-bundeskanzlers--gerhard-schroder--zu-den-anschlagen-in-den-usa-am-19--september-2001-vor-dem-deutschen-bundestag-in-berlin--auszuge-.html> (27.01.09).

⁴⁶⁵ Cf. Kaim, Markus: Die deutsche NATO-Politik. In: Jäger, Thomas/Höse, Alexander/Oppermann, Kai (Ed.): Deutsche Außenpolitik. Sicherheit, Wohlfahrt, Institutionen und Normen. Wiesbaden, 2007. pp. 87-105 (92).

⁴⁶⁶ At the 39th Munich Conference on Security Policy. <http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/2003/index.php?sprache=en&> (27.01.09).

⁴⁶⁷ Propositions conjointes franco-allemandes pour la Convention européenne dans le domaine de la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense. 21.11.02. <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/02/cv00/00422en2.pdf> (27.01.09).

⁴⁶⁸ Cf. The battlegroups concept – UK/France/Germany food for thought paper. Brussels, 10 February 2004. In: Institute for Security Studies: Chaillot Paper. Nr. 75, February 2005.

Military Capability Commitment Conference in November 2004, Germany committed to four Battle Groups, for two as lead nation.⁴⁶⁹ In 2006, Germany led the second EU mission designed after the Battle Group concept, EUFOR Congo, and during its EU presidency 2007, the German-Dutch-Finnish Battle Group was the first one to be on stand-by.

The 2006 White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the *Bundeswehr* reflected that for “several years, the Bundeswehr has consistently followed the path of transitioning to an expeditionary force [...] Effective security planning thus calls for preventive, efficient and coherent cooperation at national and international level, successfully tackling the root causes.”⁴⁷⁰ Meanwhile, Germany is still strongly in favour of a European army. In the run-up to the EEC’s 50th anniversary in 2007, Chancellor Merkel stated that a constitution and an army are Europe’s future goals.⁴⁷¹ In May 2008, Foreign Minister Steinmeier renewed the idea and mentioned a ‘structured cooperation’ to be the best future opportunity.⁴⁷² France would be Germany’s key partner.

In the future, Germany’s security policy will probably prioritise NATO. The ESDP is designed to be complementary to the Northern Alliance, as it is fixed in the Berlin plus agreement. On practical NATO issues, Germany has been non-dogmatic and first of all interested in stability and cooperation, particularly with Russia that seems still being perceived as the alliance’s enemy by some member states. The German government promoted the Eastern enlargement in the 1990s as security strategy of integration to enhance mutual reliability and long-term peace.⁴⁷³ Parallel, it has tried to connect NATO and Russia through the NATO-Russia Council. In the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia, Germany has firmly opposed to close that channel.⁴⁷⁴ Months before the conflict, Germany did not give its support for quick NATO membership of Georgia and the Ukraine, although the Bush administration pushed for accession.⁴⁷⁵

3.2.3.2 Finnish Security Policy

Since Finland left the Russian Empire and became independent in 1917, the Finnish security policy had basically two options regarding its biggest neighbour and thereby its biggest security threat – alliance against the Soviet Union or neutrality. After the Second World War there was practically no choice any more. Finland had to seek neutrality – or become a Soviet satellite. During the Cold War period, Finnish Defence Forces have not been integrated into a military alliance, neither NATO nor the Warsaw Pact. In practice, its armed forces were meant to keep foreign forces out of Finland. Like the FCMA insisted, the Soviet Army would have supported them, if necessary. From the 1950s on, President Kekkonen’s idea of active neutrality meant a supportive membership in the United Nations. In UN peace keeping missions, Finland has been contributing since 1956. Military interventions with UN mandate were excluded.⁴⁷⁶

⁴⁶⁹ Cf. Military Capability Commitment Conference. Brussels, 22 November 2004. Declaration on European Military Capabilities.

⁴⁷⁰ Federal Ministry of Defence: White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr. October 2006. pp. 4-8.

⁴⁷¹ Cf. Die Zeit: Eine Armee für Europa. 23.03.07. <http://www.zeit.de/online/2007/13/eu-armee> (28.01.09).

⁴⁷² Cf. Kramer, Sarah: Steinmeier fordert eine europäische Armee. In: Tagesspiegel, 06.05.08. <http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/art771,2525734> (28.01.09).

⁴⁷³ Cf. Kaim, 2007. p. 90.

⁴⁷⁴ Cf. Deutsche Welle: NATO-Russian Relations Still on Hold Despite Germany’s Efforts. 10.10.2008. <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,3705391,00.html> (28.01.09).

⁴⁷⁵ Cf. Schmitz, Gregor Peter: Germany Puts the Brakes on US Expansion Plans. In: Spiegel Online, 28.03.08. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,544109,00.html> (06.04.09).

⁴⁷⁶ Cf. Permanent Mission of Finland to the United Nations: Finland as a Peacekeeping Nation. 11.08.06. <http://www.finlandun.org/public/default.aspx?nodeid=35897&contentlan=2&culture=en-US> (19.01.09).

After the fall of the Iron Curtain, Finland gradually changed its security doctrine. It had already joined EFTA as full member in 1986 and the Council of Europe in 1989. But applying for EU membership in 1992 brought security policy consequences with it. Finns generally felt closer to the Western world than to the Eastern sphere.⁴⁷⁷ For President Koivisto, security was the major reason for joining the Union.⁴⁷⁸ Most Finns shared that view; it was one of the main arguments for accession in the 1994 referendum.⁴⁷⁹ In August 2000, President Halonen stated: “In the view of a majority of our people, the multidimensional security that EU membership brings was and is more suitable for Finland than the guarantees of military security that NATO, which is based on collective defence, offers.”⁴⁸⁰

Moreover, by the Treaty of Maastricht, Finland accepted the second pillar of the EU, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The Treaty refers explicitly to “the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence”.⁴⁸¹ In March 1994, Prime Minister Esko Aho reported to the *Eduskunta* that obligations arising from EU membership would not conflict with the core of Finnish policy of neutrality, namely “military non alliance and independent, credible defence”.⁴⁸² Aho declared that Finland, as a member of the EU, could decide on the future development of the CFSP.

The Intergovernmental Conference of 1996 dealt with the relationship of the EU and the Western European Union (WEU). The Treaty of Maastricht mentioned the WEU as “an integral part of the development of the Union”⁴⁸³, but left concrete measures open. At the IGC, a group of states, among them Germany, proposed a full integration of the WEU – thereby introducing collective military security to the EU. This has been rejected by Finland, Great Britain, Denmark and others.⁴⁸⁴ Finally, the Treaty of Amsterdam included the Petersberg Tasks that were adopted by the WEU Ministerial Council in 1992. A Finnish-Swedish memorandum contributed to a great extent to include “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making”.⁴⁸⁵ The proposal of the two Nordic countries was especially attractive, because it mentioned the “primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for international peace and security under the Charter as well as to the necessity to have a UN or an OSCE mandate for peacekeeping and crisis management.”⁴⁸⁶ Thereby, Finland showed that it was willing to support a European crisis management in accordance with the UN, but not a military alignment. Finland’s active policy must also be seen in the context of scepticism about the neutrals’ role within the ESDP.⁴⁸⁷

⁴⁷⁷ Cf. Prime Minister Esko Aho: The opening of the Finland-Institut in Berlin. 26.08.94. In: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1994. pp. 60-62.

⁴⁷⁸ Koivisto, 1997. p. 246.

⁴⁷⁹ Cf. Pesonen/Sänkiahio, 1994. pp. 52-59.

⁴⁸⁰ The President of the Republic of Finland: Urho Kekkonen lecture by President of the Republic Tarja Halonen to the Paasikivi Society on 31.8.2000.

⁴⁸¹ Treaty on European Union. Article J.4 (1).

⁴⁸² Prime Minister’s Office: Statement by the Prime Minister to Parliament on the negotiation result with the European Union, 4 March 1994. <http://www.valtioneuvosto.fi/toiminta/selonteot/selonteot/en.jsp?oid=130195> (19.01.09).

⁴⁸³ Treaty on European Union. Article J.4 (2).

⁴⁸⁴ Cf. Archer, Clive: Finland, Sweden, the IGC & Defence. ISIS Briefing Paper No. 8, January 1997.

⁴⁸⁵ Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts. 02.10.07. Article J.7 (2).

⁴⁸⁶ The IGC and the Security and Defence Dimension towards an Enhanced EU Role in Crisis Management. Memorandum from Finland and Sweden, 25 April 1996.

⁴⁸⁷ Cf. Ojanen, Hanna: Finland and the ESDP. ‘Obliquely forwards’? In: Archer, Clive (Ed.): New Security Issues in Northern Europe. The Nordic and Baltic States and the ESDP. London, 2008. pp. 56-77 (p. 59).

In context of the Kosovo conflict and the change in Great Britain's European policy regarding the ESDP, the first Finnish EU presidency in 1999 was an especially delicate matter. President Ahtisaari was particularly involved in the negotiations to end the conflict and repeatedly gave an outstanding diplomatic performance. For this he was supported by the United States and Russia as well as by Germany and France.⁴⁸⁸ Not by coincidence, Ahtisaari received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2008 and so contributed to the international reputation of Finland. The Kosovo conflict also accelerated the development of the ESDP since the Cologne Summit in June 1999. At the end of the consecutive Finnish presidency, at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, the EU agreed to build up military and civil capacities within the frame of UN, OSCE and the Council of Europe.⁴⁸⁹ From a Finnish point of view, that was in line with the Amsterdam reforms.⁴⁹⁰ At the same time, Finland contributed to the Kosovo Force (KFOR) with up to 820 soldiers.⁴⁹¹ The Helsinki Headline Goals meant the first practical step towards ESDP. Although the public opinion in Finland was quite reserved, the Finnish presidency led the Union in that critical situation and expressed its will and ability to build up European military and civil capabilities.⁴⁹²

The Convention's draft of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) should have introduced a couple of improvements to the ESDP. During the Intergovernmental Conference on the TCE in 2003/2004, the Finnish foreign minister, Erkki Tuomioja, together with his Swedish colleague, Laila Freivalds, pointed out their main objectives in a document titled "We want a stronger EU security policy".⁴⁹³ They demanded for stronger European commitment towards global security that would require a repertoire of diplomacy, development aid, trade, civil and military crisis management as well as prevention. Tuomioja and Freivalds opposed 'structured cooperation'.⁴⁹⁴ The EU should have been "a political alliance with reciprocal solidarity, not [...] a military alliance with binding defence guarantees."⁴⁹⁵ Obligations of mutual assistance, which would be introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, have been examined very carefully.⁴⁹⁶ Unanimous decision-making is of particular sensitivity, although it is evident that Finland would not stop or keep out of common efforts to help another member.⁴⁹⁷

In June 2004, the European Council endorsed the Headline Goal 2010, which was in line with previous Finnish-Swedish demands. Finland welcomed the establishment of the European Defence Agency (EDA) and started its participations in EU Battle Groups with Sweden, Norway and

⁴⁸⁸ Cf. Office of the President of the Republic of Finland: Operation Balkans. The article appeared in the Finnish Suomen Kuvalehti magazine on June 18, 1999. Translation. <http://www.tpk.fi/ahtisaari/eng/press/sken.html> (19.01.09).

⁴⁸⁹ Cf. European Council: Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December 1999. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm (19.01.09).

⁴⁹⁰ Cf. Tiilikainen, Teija: Finland – An Active Member of the Common European Security and Defence Policy. FES 04/2001. http://www.etla.fi/files/929_FES_01_4_defence_policy.pdf (19.01.09). p. 62.

⁴⁹¹ Cf. Kosovo Force: Brothers in Arms – The Finnish. http://www.nato.int/kfor/chronicle/2002/chronicle_08/18.htm (19.01.09).

⁴⁹² Cf. Tiilikainen, 2001. pp. 61-63.

⁴⁹³ Freivalds, Laila/Tuomioja, Erkki: We want a stronger EU security policy. 11.11.03.

⁴⁹⁴ Structured cooperation gives a group of member states an opportunity for closer military cooperation. See Heise, Volker/von Ondarza, Nicolai: Gemeinsame Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik (GSVP). In: Lieb, Julia/Maurer, Andreas/von Ondarza, Nicolai (Ed.): Der Vertrag von Lissabon. Kurzkomentar. SWP-Diskussionspapier, December 2008. p. 51.

⁴⁹⁵ Freivalds/Tuomioja, 11.11.03.

⁴⁹⁶ Cf. Tiilikainen, Teija: The Mutual Assistance Obligation in the European Union's Treaty of Lisbon. Publications of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 4/2008. <http://formin.finland.fi/public/download.aspx?ID=31019&GUID={CBE72111-E266-4B99-AE82-155E57BBD337}> (10.04.09).

⁴⁹⁷ Cf. Helsingin Sanomat (International Edition): Tiilikainen's views on EU security guarantees cause confusion in Parliament. 17.04.08. <http://www.hs.fi/english/print/1135235648221> (06.04.09).

Estonia respectively with Germany and the Netherlands. The German-Dutch-Finnish Battle Group has been the first one on stand-by in the first half of 2007.⁴⁹⁸

Finland's second EU presidency in 2006 had to process several important ESDP issues.⁴⁹⁹ Controlling the ongoing development of capabilities for the Headline Goal 2010 and tackling some issues related to the EDA were scheduled. Moreover, Finland had to manage the German-led EU-FOR Congo mission that has been accomplished without major incidents. The Lebanon War in July and August 2006 emerged rather unpredictably for the Finnish EU presidency, though. The developments in the Middle East and the EU's member states' reactions gave an example of what kind of influence Finland can have in major crises. Javier Solana as well as the foreign ministers of Germany, Great Britain and France started for the Middle East. Finally, Paris, Berlin and Rome gave major European commitments to build up the UN peacekeeping mission. Finland had been contributing to the existing UNIFIL mission and was willing to send 250 soldiers for an enhanced force.⁵⁰⁰ As chair holder of the Union it had to organise EU actions.⁵⁰¹ Nonetheless, Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja complained publicly that foreign policy decision-making in the EU has been especially problematic for small member states.⁵⁰²

Finland's relationship towards NATO has been discussed several times in recent years. Since 1995, the Finnish position has been to keep all doors open, also called 'NATO option'.⁵⁰³ Full membership is not scheduled so far, but major figures of Finnish politics raise the issue from time to time.⁵⁰⁴ In any case, a referendum on NATO membership would be probable, though not required, and the majority of Finns is still opposed to membership.⁵⁰⁵ In practice, Finland joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme in 1994 and the Partnership and Review Process (PARP) in 1995, thus creating preconditions for full membership.⁵⁰⁶ Finnish troops have contributed to NATO missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Afghanistan.

On NATO enlargement, Finland has been pragmatic and foremost interested in stability, so in the run-up for the first enlargement of NATO for former members of the Warsaw pact in 1999.⁵⁰⁷ Previously Helsinki has hosted an American-Russian summit that dealt with the issues ahead.⁵⁰⁸

⁴⁹⁸ Cf. Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland: Finland, Germany and the Netherlands planning to continue battle group cooperation. Press Release, 21.10.05. <http://formin.finland.fi/Public/default.aspx?contentid=65125&nodeid=17389&contentlan=2&culture=en-US> (19.01.09).

⁴⁹⁹ Cf. Finland's EU Presidency: Letter by the Minister of Defence, Seppo Kääriäinen, to his colleagues. 30.06.06. http://www.eu2006.fi/news_and_documents/other_documents/vko27/en_GB/1152013368714/_files/75498378884743646/default/kaariainen_letter.pdf (19.01.09).

⁵⁰⁰ Finland even lost a soldier through an Israeli air strike during the Lebanon War. Cf. Helsingin Sanomat (International Edition): President approves Lebanon force. 11.09.06. <http://www.hs.fi/english/print/1135221561490> (21.01.09).

⁵⁰¹ Cf. Aittokoski, Heikki/Nousiainen, Anu: It's Finland's war too. In: Helsingin Sanomat (International Edition), 08.08.06. <http://www.hs.fi/english/article/Its+Finlands+war+too/1135220976425> (21.01.09).

⁵⁰² Cf. Helsingin Sanomat (International Edition): Foreign Minister Tuomioja criticises EU for „wrong kind of transparency“. 08.08.06. <http://www.hs.fi/english/print/1135220973226> (21.01.09).

⁵⁰³ Cf. Ries, Tomas: Finland and NATO. National Defence College, Finland, November 1999. http://www.mil.fi/perustietoa/julkaisut/finland_and_nato/chapter_9.dsp (07.04.09).

⁵⁰⁴ Cf. Helsingin Sanomat (International Edition): Former President Ahtisaari: NATO membership would put an end to Finlandisation murmurs. 15.12.03. <http://www2.hs.fi/english/archive/news.asp?id=20031215IE6> (21.01.09); Ibid.: Stubb NATO comments raise questions. 02.09.08. <http://www.hs.fi/english/print/1135239120512> (21.01.09).

⁵⁰⁵ Cf. Ibid.: Halonen and Niinistö: NATO decision up to the people. 24.01.06. <http://www.hs.fi/english/print/1135218481728> (21.01.09); Ibid.: Finns still wary of joining NATO. 12.05.08. <http://www.hs.fi/english/print/1135241691820> (21.01.09).

⁵⁰⁶ Cf. Vaahtoranta, Tapani/Forsberg, Tuomas: Post-Neutral or Pre-Allied? Finnish and Swedish Policies on the EU and NATO as Security Organisations. UPI Working Paper 29, 2000. p. 16.

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁸ Cf. Erlanger, Steven: Russian Envoy Describes Helsinki Summit as Crucial. In: New York Times, 18.03.97. <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0DEEDE1338F93BA25750C0A961958260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=print> (21.01.09).

The second enlargement in 2004 has also been followed with interest to Russia's reaction.⁵⁰⁹ And finally, the Bucharest NATO Summit in April 2008, which announced future membership of Georgia and Ukraine and therefore was commented with severe warnings from Russia, has been carefully examined in Helsinki.⁵¹⁰

In the meantime, Finland is aware of its three major security issues – “Russia, Russia, and Russia”⁵¹¹ – and thus maintaining a conscript system that would provide wartime strength of 520,000 soldiers.⁵¹² Moreover, it still has the largest artillery of Western Europe and so far has not joined international agreements banning infantry land mines as well as cluster bombs.⁵¹³ The Finnish Defence and Security Report 2009, however, stated that Finland has strong reasons to consider NATO membership.⁵¹⁴ This would probably result in a shift of the Finnish position on the ESDP as well.

3.2.3.3 Germany and Finland on European Security Policy

Both states have been firmly supportive of the development of the ESDP. Germany sought to integrate its military capabilities into a European defence organisation from the early 1950s onwards. Since the 1990s, German military tasks have shifted towards crisis management, with the principle of integration still being valid. To this day there can not be any unilateral German military action. Therefore, Germany is dedicated to a European crisis management. Finland basically continued its tradition of international engagement, though there has been a shift from UN to NATO led missions. European crisis management is a complementary element in Finnish efforts for multilateral conflict management. Finland has been supportive for this kind of conflict management principle and European joint actions have much potential for a small state.

In regards to the relationship of the EU and NATO, Finland and Germany have been pragmatic. Finland welcomes America's presence in Europe and NATO provides opportunities to enhance interoperability with Western countries through the Partnership for Peace programme. From a German perspective, there has never been doubt about the added value of NATO and a European security dimension. Unlike others, Germany and Finland are experienced to deal with both institutions. Juha Korkeaoja, Chairman of the Defence Committee, appreciated: “Germany is a kind of balancing power in the European Security and Defence Policy. [...] And for Finland this is, what we very much want to have. [...] we know that from our perspective, good cooperation between US, Russia and Europe is essential. We need these three and I think Germany has in a way a similar approach. [...] NATO is for peace and stability.”⁵¹⁵ In ways of complementing, German representatives do not regard Finland's position as a problem. Thomas Kossendey, Parliamentary State Secretary in the Federal Ministry of Defence, mentioned that Finland's neutrality has caused little difficulties due to its open and clear policy.⁵¹⁶ Of course, Article 5 of the NATO Treaty would make a difference, but he appreciated Finland's contribution. Regarding the ESDP, the spokesman of the SPD Parliamentary Group on defence issues, Rainer Arnold, noted: “*Ich glaube nicht, dass*

⁵⁰⁹ Cf. Pursiainen, Christer/Saari, Sinikukka: Et tu Brute! Finland's Nato Option and Russia. UPI Report 1/2002. pp. 36-39.

⁵¹⁰ Cf. Helsingin Sanomat (International Edition): Foreign Affairs Committee chairman: Listen to Russia's comments on NATO. 07.04.08. <http://www.hs.fi/english/print/1135235379370> (21.01.09); Ibid.: Vanhanen: NATO statements by Russia no cause for concern. 08.04.08. <http://www.hs.fi/english/print/1135235409823> (21.01.09).

⁵¹¹ Ibid.: Häkämies in Washington: Russia Finland's greatest challenge. 07.09.07.

⁵¹² Finnish Defence Forces: Continuous training. 19.08.08. http://www.mil.fi/perustietoa/esittely/tehtavat/index_3_en.dsp (21.01.09).

⁵¹³ Cf. Helsingin Sanomat (International Edition): NEWS ANALYSIS: In a changing world, Finland's artillery stays the same. 05.08.08. <http://www.hs.fi/english/print/1135238365526> (21.01.09).

⁵¹⁴ Cf. ibid.: Defence policy report: Finland “strongly” considering NATO. 26.01.09. <http://www.hs.fi/english/print/1135243035667> (29.01.09).

⁵¹⁵ Interview with Juha Korkeaoja.

⁵¹⁶ Cf. Interview with Thomas Kossendey.

die Neutralität Finnlands ein Problem für die ESVP ist. [...] Das hat nichts mehr mit dem praktischen Vorgehen der Finnen zu tun.“⁵¹⁷ Kurt Bodewig, MP, described: „Die ESVP ist für mich kein Dogma, sondern es wird durch die Praxis ausgelebt. [...] Das ist etwas, das konkret wächst. Und da wird Finnland sich mit Sicherheit einbringen.“⁵¹⁸

Asked for the German position on a Finnish request for NATO membership, with reference to the NATO Summit in Bucharest and the German opposition to a quick integration of Georgia and the Ukraine, German representatives did not reply unanimously. Thomas Kossendey mentioned: *“Was Finnland angeht, wäre es durchaus eine Frage des russischen Interesses, aber diese innenpolitischen Probleme [like in Georgia and the Ukraine] sehe ich nicht in dem Maße. [...] Das wird sich dann zu entscheiden haben, aber ich glaube schon, dass Länder, die durch ihre Mitgliedschaft die Sicherheit Europas erhöhen können, nicht vor der Tür gelassen werden.“*⁵¹⁹ Rainer Arnold, MP, has been more decided: *„Da gibt es überhaupt keine Diskussion. [...] wenn die Finnen dies wollen, sind die Türen meilenweit offen, aus deutscher Sicht.“*⁵²⁰

But the consequences of a military threat to Finland are regarded similarly. Parliamentary State Secretary Kossendey underlined Germany’s commitment: *“Wir wären natürlich nicht nur willens, sondern auch in der Verpflichtung, Hilfe zu geben. Da gibt es aus meiner Sicht gar keine Frage. Und wir würden es auch tun. Obwohl das natürlich eine relativ theoretische Geschichte ist. [...] Aber ich glaube schon, dass die Finnen darauf vertrauen könnten, dass die Deutschen an ihrer Seite wären.“*⁵²¹ Rainer Arnold said: *„Ich denke, dass Finnland behandelt würde wie ein NATO-Mitglied. Die Bindungen sind so eng und auch die geostrategischen Interessen der NATO insgesamt sind dort so ausgeprägt, dass die NATO nicht zuschauen würde, wenn Finnland um Hilfe ersucht.“*⁵²²

An issue of disagreement between the two countries is in the area of military alignment, though. Germany would like to make the EU a European pillar of common defence within the Northern Alliance. Unilateral action plays absolutely no role in German considerations.⁵²³ From the European Defence Community to the proposal of a European Security and Defence Union (ESDU), Germany has been in favour of a European army. It would further strengthen the country’s military and political integration. Finland, on the other hand, is keeping to its policy of military non-alignment and opposes a common defence dimension within the EU. Also a permanent structured cooperation is a matter of concern. The former Foreign Minister of Finland, Erkki Tuomioja, responded in April 2003 to the proposal of a ESDU that the EU “trademark” in this field should not be passed over to the exclusive use of only a few members.⁵²⁴ On a visit to Helsinki one month

⁵¹⁷ Interview with Rainer Arnold; Author’s translation: I do not think that Finland’s neutrality is a problem for the ESDP. [...] That has nothing to do with the practical action of the Finns.

⁵¹⁸ Interview with Kurt Bodewig; Author’s translation: The ESDP is no dogma to me, but it is done in practice. [...] That is something that develops concretely. And Finland will certainly contribute to it.

⁵¹⁹ Interview with Thomas Kossendey; Author’s translation: Concerning Finland, it would indeed be a question of Russian interest, but I do see internal problems [like in Georgia and the Ukraine] with that extent. [...] That will have to be decided then, but I think that countries, which can enhance the security of Europe with their membership, will not be left outside the door.

⁵²⁰ Interview with Rainer Arnold; Author’s translation: There is no discussion. [...] if the Finns want that, the doors are wide open, from German perspective.

⁵²¹ Interview with Thomas Kossendey; Author’s translation: We would naturally not just be willing, but also compelled to provide assistance. In my opinion, there is no question. And we would do that. Even though, that is naturally a relatively theoretic issue. [...] But I think that the Finns could rely on the Germans being on their side.

⁵²² Interview with Rainer Arnold; Author’s translation: I think that Finland would be treated like a NATO member. Linkages are so close and also the geostrategic interests of NATO in general are so far developed that NATO would not merely watch, if Finland would request help.

⁵²³ Interview with Rainer Arnold; Interview with Thomas Kossendey.

⁵²⁴ Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland: Foreign Minister Tuomioja: Finland does not support European defence union. Press Release, 30.04.03. <http://formin.finland.fi/Public/Print.aspx?contentid=59264&nodeid=34646&culture=en-US&contentlan=2> (30.01.09).

later, the German Minister of Defence assured that “Finland is most warmly welcome to join”⁵²⁵ closer EU defence cooperation.

Finally, the TCE, then the Treaty of Lisbon, would enable a permanent structured cooperation in the ESDP.⁵²⁶ Although a group of willing states could hardly exclude other members, acting autonomously with an EU label could seriously threaten the unity of the EU. Thomas Kossendey stated that conflict situations must be avoided in which some countries feel non-consulted or ignored and pointed out that Lisbon has to be exercised in reality.⁵²⁷ In this question, he also expressed his general sense for communality. As Kossendey mentioned: “*Aber wichtig wird auch in Zukunft sein, dass [...] das eine Gemeinschaftsaktion ist. Wenn die Kleinen sich lediglich als Vassallen der Großen empfinden, dann wird das eine schwierige Sache in Europa werden. Dann wird Europa auseinander brechen. Zumindest was die Gemeinsamkeit solcher Aktionen angeht, das kann nicht in unserem Interesse sein.*”⁵²⁸ Rainer Arnold, MP, agreed that small states shall not be left behind; it would split Europe and thereby weaken the EU’s appearance.⁵²⁹

Juha Korkeaoja underlined: “[...] we are supporting the main stream, but we hope and we work and we seek acceptance for those special needs we have because of our special role as a neighbour of Russia and our non-aligned status.”⁵³⁰ Former State Secretary Tiilikainen appreciated: “Germany has promoted for instance the idea that what ever we do in order to enhance the union’s actorness in international relations, [...] we have to keep the EU united; we have to keep everybody on board.”⁵³¹ Finland opposed permanent structured cooperation, but finally it also takes trust in Germany. The effects of permanent structured cooperation could be an important test for the German-Finnish relationship.⁵³²

Military relations began to normalise after Finland left the Paris Peace Treaty and the FCMA, which restricted it in maintaining military contacts with Germany. In 1993, Jaakko Blomberg, then Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, commented: “By nullifying these limitations on its sovereignty, Finland, as a co-belligerent of Germany, closed the book for its part on the Second World War.”⁵³³ In June 1992, Volker Rühle visited Helsinki as the first Federal Minister of Defence and agreed with the Finnish government on an arms deal of former GDR stocks.⁵³⁴ Finland has been the first non-NATO state to receive arms of the former National People’s Army. Exchange of officers and broad contacts on military level have been started. Finland expected and welcomed “a growing German contribution to cooperation and reform in the region.”⁵³⁵ Germany was eager to bring the Central and Eastern European states into the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and widen cooperation.⁵³⁶ Finland joined the

⁵²⁵ Quoted in: Helsingin Sanomat (International Edition): Germany offers Finland possibility to participate in closer EU defence cooperation. 13.05.03. <http://www2.hs.fi/english/archive/news.asp?id=20030513IE11> (20.02.09).

⁵²⁶ Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community. 13.12.07. Protocol (No 10) on permanent structured cooperation established by Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union.

⁵²⁷ Interview with Thomas Kossendey.

⁵²⁸ Ibid; Author’s translation: Though, it will be important that it is a joint action in the future as well. If the small ones perceive themselves as being vassals of the big ones, it will be a difficult thing in Europe. Then, Europe will break apart. At least concerning the communality of such actions, this can not be in our interest.

⁵²⁹ Interview with Rainer Arnold.

⁵³⁰ Interview with Juha Korkeaoja.

⁵³¹ Interview with Teija Tiilikainen.

⁵³² Interview with Esko Antola.

⁵³³ Blomberg, Jaakko: Finland’s Evolving Security Policy. In: NATO Review (Web Edition), no. 1, Feb. 1993, vol. 41. pp. 12-16. <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1993/9301-3.htm> (30.01.09).

⁵³⁴ Among these 90 T-72s and 300 artillery guns of 122mm. Cf. Thielbeer, FAZ, 13.06.1992.

⁵³⁵ Blomberg, NATO Review, Feb. 1993.

⁵³⁶ Foreign Minister Genscher and US Secretary of State Baker initiated the NACC in 1991.

NACC in 1992 as observer and the PfP programme in 1994. Since 1995, German and Finnish troops have jointly been engaged in a series of NATO missions – IFOR, SFOR, KFOR and ISAF. Finland wanted to find good reliable partners with enough capacities. Former State Secretary Jari Luoto stated: “Therefore it was quite natural for us to look for Germany.”⁵³⁷ In 2002, Finland procured 124 Leopard 2A4 battle tanks from Germany; an arms deal that simply would have been unimaginable 15 years ago.⁵³⁸

Today, military-political contacts are relatively close and both states exchange frequently on security issues.⁵³⁹ However, Finland seeks military cooperation with its Northern partners first.⁵⁴⁰ In 2009, Finland presides over the Nordic defence cooperation. In EU security policy as well as in military missions, particularly Sweden plays a major role due to its similar neutral status and the Baltic States are becoming more integrated through the Nordic states’ efforts. This cooperation finds its expression in the Battle Group of Sweden, Norway, Estonia and Finland. Juha Korkeaoja, MP, emphasised: “But the next, we have two combinations Nordic and then German-Dutch-Finnish.”⁵⁴¹ Tiilikainen explained: “Germany is a very reliable partner for Finland. [...] So you have for a long time been a natural partner for cooperation for our peacekeepers. [...] We knew that, we do not want to take any risk in order that it would function. The Battle Group concept is something new. There was still the assumption when we were committed to these two troops that they could be sent anywhere. This was a well reasoned decision.”⁵⁴²

For Finland, it was reasonable to seek for a bigger state as being its partner with capabilities and influence in NATO and the ESDP. Finnish military history might also have an effect.⁵⁴³ The *Jäger* movement and German assistance in the early moments of Finnish armed forces are still common knowledge in Finland.⁵⁴⁴ From a German perspective, it is noticeable that Finns seek German assistance in foreign missions.⁵⁴⁵ Moreover, Finnish representatives appreciate Germany’s efforts to find compromises in the development of the ESDP and enhance the comprehensive foreign and security policy instruments. Teija Tiilikainen emphasised: “There we have France and the UK, who have been more oriented towards strengthening military security. Whereas Germany, due to its history and starting points, has been more interested in a comprehensive security policy, showing also interests to other types of security policy. So very important, though different to France and the UK, but if we took a look at what we have now in the form of ESDP, I think that Germany has played a crucial role.”⁵⁴⁶

Germany’s characteristics and differences to France and Britain are well understood in Finland. In situations like the Lebanon War 2006, Eero Akaan-Penttilä, MP, mentioned: “Then the big states have to be able to act. It is not up to small states to say. It is up to the big ones and the small ones

⁵³⁷ Interview with Jari Luoto.

⁵³⁸ Cf. Ministry of Defence of Finland: Finland has signed a contract with Germany for the procurement of Leopard main battle tanks. Press Release, 17.09.02. http://www.defmin.fi/?981_m=1110&l=en&s=279 (02.02.09).

⁵³⁹ Cf. Interview with Thomas Kossendey; Interview with an official of the German Embassy in Helsinki; Interview with an official of the Federal Foreign Office.

⁵⁴⁰ In 2009 the Nordic countries launched a new defence co-operation, the Nordic Supportive Defence Structures (NORDSUP) agreement. Cf. Ministry of Defence of Finland: The launch of new Nordic defence co-operation. Press Release, 21.01.09. http://www.defmin.fi/?588_m=3839&l=en&printer=1&s=8 (03.02.09).

⁵⁴¹ Interview with Juha Korkeaoja.

⁵⁴² Interview with Teija Tiilikainen.

⁵⁴³ Interview with an official of the German Embassy in Helsinki.

⁵⁴⁴ Cf. Finnish Defence Forces: History of the Defence Forces. Germans leading the armed forces. 19.08.08. http://www.mil.fi/perustietoa/esittely/historia/index_4_en.dsp (02.02.09).

⁵⁴⁵ Meeting at the German Army Office, 22nd August 2008 in Cologne.

⁵⁴⁶ Interview with Teija Tiilikainen.

follow in a way.”⁵⁴⁷ When the big member states, Germany, France and Britain, go forward and lead, Germany, from a Finnish point of view, can be seen as a stakeholder for Finland.⁵⁴⁸ Due to its similar approach on crisis management, it is fairly welcomed that Germany is a “stabilising power in this European combination with countries like France and the UK”⁵⁴⁹, like Juha Korkeaaja called it.

Especially, Germany’s commitment to multilateralism is important. Korkeaaja explained: “Germany is in a key position to keep the EU as one unit [...]. I think it is also in German interest that the European Union acts as one and is not divided to different national groups. And the proposal of a joint European army [...], my interpretation is that it is a signal of desire to have even more clearly a European hand instead of national hands or forces or military.”⁵⁵⁰ The ESDP is especially vulnerable to tensions between big and small members.⁵⁵¹ A joint action by France, Britain and Germany could easily split the EU and even other bigger states like Italy fear a dominance of these three countries. In this context, Finland is particularly pleased that Germany is among these three.

For Germany, Finland is one partner among many. Its priority is certainly towards France. However, Germans know that Finland is a valuable partner. Thomas Kossendey appreciated: „Überall wo wir mit den Finnen zu tun hatten, ging es präzise, klar, ordentlich und gut voran. Da kann man nichts Negatives sagen.“⁵⁵² Rainer Arnold agreed: „Dort wo deutsche Soldaten mit finnischen zusammenarbeiten sind die Erfahrungen extrem positiv. Finnen sind sprachgewandt, können alle Englisch, auch runter zu den Mannschaftsdienstgraden. Sie haben eine militärische Kultur, die unseren Prinzipien der inneren Führung nicht so ganz fremd ist. Insofern ist diese Zusammenarbeit absolut positiv.“⁵⁵³ These statements have also been strengthened by personal discussions with German officers, who have been on missions with Finnish soldiers in Kosovo and Afghanistan.⁵⁵⁴ Finland is not an unknown partner just due to its size. On the contrary, Finland has a fairly high reputation among German defence politicians and military personnel.

Especially Finland’s experience in UN missions had an impact on German expert opinions. It is regarded as an important additive to the ESDP. As Thomas Kossendey mentioned: „Es gibt in der Tat wenige Länder, die so intensive und vielfältige Erfahrungen gemacht haben, wie die Finnen. Die Finnen haben auch aufgrund ihrer Mittlerrolle [...] zwischen Ost und West, Stichwort Helsinki, auch einen ganz besonderen Vertrauensvorschuss bei vielen Ländern. Und wir wären gut beraten, das auch im europäischen Sinne zu nutzen.“⁵⁵⁵ Kurt Bodewig, MP, pointed to Finland’s international engagement as one of its main characteristics: “Das eine ist, dass Finnland mit der Neutralität, aber trotzdem mit internationalem militärischem Engagement, ein wichtiges Zeichen setzt [...]. Das schafft mit diesem Label der Neutralität noch ein zusätzliches Gewicht für die

⁵⁴⁷ Interview with Eero Akaan-Penttilä.

⁵⁴⁸ Cf. Interview with Esko Antola; Interview with Juha Korkeaaja; Interview with Antti Kaikkonen.

⁵⁴⁹ Interview with Juha Korkeaaja.

⁵⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁵¹ Cf. Schwarzer, Daniela/von Ondarza, Nicolai: Drei Zylinder für einen neuen Integrationsmotor? Voraussetzungen und Herausforderungen für eine britisch-deutsch-französische Führungsrolle in der ESVP. SWP-Diskussionspapier, September 2007. pp. 42-44.

⁵⁵² Interview with Thomas Kossendey; Author’s translation: Everywhere when we had to deal with Finns, the proceedings happened precisely, clearly, ordered and well. There is nothing negative to say.

⁵⁵³ Interview with Rainer Arnold; Author’s translation: When German soldiers work together with Finnish, experiences are extremely positive. Finns are lingually talented, all speak English, also the lower soldier ranks. They have a military culture, which is not so different to our *Prinzip der inneren Führung*. In this respect, this cooperation is absolutely positive.

⁵⁵⁴ Meeting at the German Army Office.

⁵⁵⁵ Interview with Thomas Kossendey; Author’s translation: Indeed, there are few countries like Finland that made so many intensive and manifold experiences. The Finns enjoy considerable trust in many countries, due to their moderating role [...] between East and West, keyword Helsinki. We are well advised using this in a European sense as well.

*Wichtigkeit im Kosovo oder in anderen Bereichen.*⁵⁵⁶ Therefore, Finland is regarded as a member who can especially contribute to the ESDP's reputation. Its active, strong and intensive commitment, as Thomas Kossendey mentioned, is a model case for other small members.⁵⁵⁷

Towards concrete cooperation, Germany welcomes Finland because of its experience and notable efforts in crisis management. Finland is regarded as a partner who uses all its instruments and does not prefer military means. Rainer Arnold mentioned: *„Ich denke, dass der Ansatz, den ganzen Baukasten der Mittel zu haben, bei den Finnen auch politisch sehr stark gesehen wird. Also Militär als letztes Mittel, aber die anderen Dinge der Prävention, der fairen wirtschaftlichen Bedingungen, der Diplomatie [...].“*⁵⁵⁸ Thomas Kossendey also pointed to the common thinking: *„[...] man muss auch aufpassen, ob man von den Philosophien zusammenpasst. Da passt nicht jeder mit jedem zusammen. Wie unterschiedlich man Dinge angehen kann, sieht man in Afghanistan.“*⁵⁵⁹

German representatives emphasised that Finland's contribution to the ESDP could be, first of all, its experiences and its reputation. There is a rather realistic view within the military needs. Thomas Kossendey mentioned it is important to include small states and there could even be some leading tasks for them, but due to military infrastructure the big states are the main actors.⁵⁶⁰ Rainer Arnold stated: *„[...] wenn da mal 10, 20 Soldaten mit dabei sind, ist das für den Einsatz nicht besonders relevant. Dann liegt die Bedeutung wirklich im politischen Signal, das aber trotzdem wichtig ist für uns.“*⁵⁶¹ Finland should develop some niche capabilities and enhance cooperation with its Baltic and Nordic neighbours. Moreover, there are also possibilities for future cooperation. Arnold mentioned air transport capabilities that could be used by Finland.⁵⁶² Finland could contribute helicopters in return. Germany is realistic about what can be performed by Finland and thus interested in an efficient team work.

3.2.4 Baltic Sea Region

Finland and Germany hold no common border. Indeed, there are several hundred kilometres between the German and the Finnish coastlines. However, the Baltic Sea has been the binding link throughout history. Particularly the *Hanse* is an often named synonym of trade and cultural exchange. The region constitutes a common environment that changed dramatically in the past. During the Cold War, the Iron Curtain divided the region. For twenty years, there are new opportunities of regional cooperation and prosperity.

⁵⁵⁶ Interview with Kurt Bodewig; Author's translation: Finland's neutrality gives an important signal even through its international military engagement [...]. This gives additional weight to the importance in Kosovo or other areas, with its label of neutrality.

⁵⁵⁷ Cf. Interview with Thomas Kossendey.

⁵⁵⁸ Interview with Rainer Arnold; Author's translation: I think that the approach, having the whole tool box of instruments, is also politically strong for the Finns. Thus, military as last resort, but other things of prevention, fair economic conditions, diplomacy.

⁵⁵⁹ Interview with Thomas Kossendey; Author's translation: [...] one must be careful, if philosophies harmonise. Not everyone harmonises with everyone. How different one can approach things, can be seen in Afghanistan.

⁵⁶⁰ Interview with Thomas Kossendey.

⁵⁶¹ Interview with Rainer Arnold; Author's translation: [...] when 10, 20 soldiers participate, it is not especially relevant for the mission. Then the meaning is really a political signal, which is nonetheless important for us.

⁵⁶² That area of cooperation has been promoted by Germany for many years. Cf. Stütze, Walter: Die deutsche Position zur ESVP und zu einem europäischen Sicherheitsinstrument. In: Hoyer, Werner/Kaldrack, Gerd F. (Ed.): Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik (ESVP). Der Weg zu integrierten europäischen Streitkräften? Baden-Baden, 2002. pp. 156-165 (161).

3.2.4.1 Germany and the Baltic Sea Region

Germany has been important to the Baltic Sea region for a long time. Since the early Middle Ages, Germans had moved eastwards and settled along the southern coast of the Baltic Sea.⁵⁶³ Expansionist ambitions stopped in 1410 for a first time, when a Polish-Lithuanian army defeated the Teutonic Order in the Battle of Grunwald (Lithuanian: *Žalgiris*, German: *Tannenberg*), which is of high importance in Polish and Lithuanian historic memory.⁵⁶⁴ The medieval *Hanse* is a synonym of cultural and economic heritage, whilst being one of hegemony throughout the Baltic Sea and beyond at the same time. In 1900, the German Empire reached from Hadersleben over Lübeck, Stettin, Danzig and Königsberg to Memel, some 1000 km air distance.⁵⁶⁵ Furthermore, ethnic Germans were important minorities in the Baltic provinces of the Russian Empire.

In 1919, the Treaty of Versailles ruled minor German areas at the Baltic Sea to Denmark, Poland and Lithuania. The end of the Second World War marked a historical break of German history in the Baltic Sea region. Between 1944 and 1947, about 14 million ethnic Germans fled or were expelled from their former home lands in Central and Eastern Europe to areas western of the Oder-Neisse line.⁵⁶⁶

Then, the East-West confrontation shadowed the Baltic Sea region for the next 40 years. In 1949, the West German coast reached from Flensburg to Lübeck, some 140 km air distance, and the Iron Curtain began beyond Lübeck. Therefore, the Baltic Sea was almost out of reach for West Germany. The *Bund der Vertriebenen* (BDV), which represents the interests of refugees and expellees from former Eastern German territories, promoted revanchism. The political class of West Germany could not ignore them, but there was not more than rhetoric about the former German territories. In the German-Polish Treaty of 1970, West Germany accepted the Oder-Neisse line and so approved the Federal Government in November 1990.⁵⁶⁷

After mutual recognition of the FRG and the GDR, both states joined first initiatives to establish international regimes on environmental issues in the Baltic Sea region, namely the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, which led to the establishment of HELCOM.⁵⁶⁸ However, the significance of HELCOM remained rather declaratory in the context of the *détente*.

Until 1990, the Baltic Sea region existed merely as historical memory. Then the reunification of Germany opened new horizons. Germany's Baltic coast was no longer divided by the inner German border, its eastern neighbours became democracies and the Soviet Union did no longer overshadow the region. In March 1992, the German foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and his Danish colleague, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, convened with the foreign ministers of Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia and Sweden as well as the European Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs in Copenhagen to establish the Council of Baltic Sea States

⁵⁶³ Although it is questionable, if the wording 'Germans' is appropriate. There has not been any nationalist identity in that period. Cf. Hellmann, Manfred: *Die Deutschen im Europäischen Nordosten*. In: Rothe, Hans (Ed.): *Deutsche im Nordosten Europas*. Cologne, 1991. pp. 1-19.

⁵⁶⁴ Cf. Lerski, George J.: *Historical Dictionary of Poland, 966-1945*. Westport/Conn., 1996. pp. 181-182.

⁵⁶⁵ Today: Haderslev, Lübeck, Szczecin, Gdańsk, Калининград, Klaipėda.

⁵⁶⁶ Noack, Hans-Joachim: *Die Deutschen als Opfer*. In: Aust, Stefan/Burgdorff, Stephan (Ed.): *Die Flucht. Über die Vertreibung der Deutschen aus dem Osten*. Bonn, 2003. pp. 15-20 (16).

⁵⁶⁷ Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Volksrepublik Polen über die Grundlagen der Normalisierung ihrer gegenseitigen Beziehungen. 07.12.70. Article I; Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Republik Polen über die Bestätigung der zwischen ihnen bestehenden Grenze. 14.11.90. Article 1-3.

⁵⁶⁸ Broms, Bengt: *Multilaterale Abkommen im Ostseeraum*. In: Auffermann, Burkhard (Bearbeiter des Schwerpunktthemas): *Umfassende Sicherheit im Ostseeraum. Militärpolitik Dokumentation*, issue 83/84, 1991. pp. 49-57.

(CBSS) “as an overall regional forum to focus on needs for intensified cooperation and coordination”.⁵⁶⁹

The first proposal for a new cooperation of Baltic Sea states dates back to 1987. In the campaign for state parliamentary elections in Schleswig-Holstein, Björn Engholm, later prime minister from 1988 to 1993, introduced a future concept for the northern German state, which mentioned a *Neue Hanse*. In his first government declaration of June 1988, Engholm said: “*Das Mare Balticum, die Ostsee, als Region einer aufblühenden wirtschaftlichen und kulturellen Begegnung – das ist eine unserer großen Visionen. Ich halte es nicht für unreal. Unser Land steht als Partner dafür bereit.*”⁵⁷⁰ In the following years, Engholm campaigned for a Baltic Sea council. However, it was Federal Foreign Minister Genscher who initiated the decisive steps. The wording *Neue Hanse* was no more used. Especially Denmark, but also the young Baltic States, rejected it due to negative associations of German dominance. The medieval *Hanse*, with influence from Novgorod to London and its centre in Lübeck, was rather an opponent of Denmark.⁵⁷¹

Suspicion of German hegemony has, needless to say, also some more recent causes. Therefore, Björn Engholm, as well as Hans-Dietrich Genscher, avoided any reason for suspicion and acted in coordination with Danish party colleagues.⁵⁷² In the following years, Germany tried to keep a low profile. During the 1990s, various organisations developed to promote the Baltic Sea cooperation. For Germany it has been attractive to integrate in regional organisations and delegate its Baltic Sea activities to international, supranational and subnational levels.⁵⁷³ Germany prefers particularly the EU as the central actor, with its enlargement being favoured, first the Northern enlargement, then the Eastern.⁵⁷⁴ While Foreign Minister Genscher chaired the first CBSS meeting with his Danish colleague in March 1992, Chancellor Kohl visited Helsinki and called for a European approach on Eastern Europe.⁵⁷⁵ Thus, the establishment of a CBSS secretariat was first delayed by Germany and then limited on coordination tasks.⁵⁷⁶ From a German point of view, the CBSS as a regional grouping is a complementary element for EU efforts and its Eastern foreign policy. Particularly, it offered a forum including Russia regionally.⁵⁷⁷

The northern German states have to be mentioned separately in the context of Baltic Sea cooperation. Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern have a genuine interest in the region’s prosperity. Particularly Schleswig-Holstein has welcomed the Finnish accession at strengthening the Baltic Sea cooperation and claimed a Union approach towards the Baltic Sea

⁵⁶⁹ Council of Baltic Sea States: 1992 CBSS 1st Ministerial Session – Copenhagen Declaration. <http://www.cbss.st/documents/foundingdocs/dbaFile751.html> (10.02.09).

⁵⁷⁰ Quoted in: Burchardt, Rainer/Knobbe, Werner: Björn Engholm. Die Geschichte einer gescheiterten Hoffnung. Stuttgart, 1993. p. 208; Author’s translation: The Mare Balticum, the Baltic Sea, as region of prosperous economic and cultural encounter – that is one of our big visions. I do not consider it as unreal. Our state is a partner for that.

⁵⁷¹ Cf. Vares, Peeter/Zurjari, Olga: The Sharp Angles of Baltic Independence: Actors in International Politics. In: Joenniemi, Pertti (Ed.): Cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region. Washington, DC, 1993. pp. 9-22 (15); Joenniemi, Pertti: Regionalization in the Baltic Sea Area: Actors and Policies. In: Ibid. pp. 161-178 (167-168).

⁵⁷² The social democrat Björn Engholm with Svend Auken, then chairman of the Danish social democrats and the liberal Hans-Dietrich Genscher with Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, also a liberal. Cf. Burchardt/Knobbe, 1993. p. 209; Saldik, Heribert: Deutsche Außenpolitik in der Ostseeregion. Global Governance auf subnationaler Ebene. Frankfurt, 2004. p. 61.

⁵⁷³ Cf. Saldik, 2004.

⁵⁷⁴ Cf. *ibid.* pp.111-134; Heimsoeth, Hans-Jürgen: Die deutsche Ostseeratspräsidentschaft. In: Jahn, Detlef/Werz, Nikolaus (Ed.): Politische Systeme und Beziehungen im Ostseeraum. Munich, 2002. pp. 282-293 (282).

⁵⁷⁵ Cf. Hamburger Abendblatt: Kohl: EG muss Osteuropas Aufbau steuern. 06.03.92. p. 4.

⁵⁷⁶ Cf. Schultheiß, Wolfgang: Wie weit liegt Bonn von der Ostsee entfernt? Der Stellenwert Nordeuropas und des Ostseerates im Rahmen deutscher Außenpolitik. In: Wellmann, Christian (Ed.): Kooperation und Konflikt in der Ostseeregion. Kiel, 1999. pp. 23-34 (30).

⁵⁷⁷ Cf. Schultheiß, 1999. pp. 30-32; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 22.06.98.

region in 1994.⁵⁷⁸ Although there have also been doubts about the real results of regional cooperation,⁵⁷⁹ Schleswig-Holstein and Hamburg are leading board members of the Baltic Sea States Subregional Co-operation (BSSSC) and active participants in the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference (BSPC). Schleswig-Holstein chairs *Ars Baltica*, a cultural network, and maintains liaison offices in Gdansk, Kaliningrad, Vilnius, Riga, Tallinn and St. Petersburg. The Prime Minister of Schleswig-Holstein, Peter Harry Carstensen, stated in his first government declaration in May 2005 that exports to Baltic Sea states got more important than to the USA and the markets of Russia are just ‘in front of the door’.⁵⁸⁰ In practice, the northern German states possess important operational capacities for regional cooperation and have a strong role due to the very practical work of Baltic Sea cooperation.⁵⁸¹ Particularly, Schleswig-Holstein has been the motor for German policy in the Baltic Sea region. In the run-up to the founding of the CBSS, Germany proposed to involve these states directly in CBSS meetings;⁵⁸² it was clear that Baltic Sea cooperation was in their natural interest and furthermore the *Länder* themselves would not awaken feelings of German hegemony like a federal approach.⁵⁸³ Today, the Federal Government coordinates its policy with the three northern states and consults them on every Baltic Sea issue.⁵⁸⁴

The Federal Government generally kept a low profile and could have been more active.⁵⁸⁵ Even though, the new capital Berlin symbolised a move towards north-east and, therefore, inspired some suggestions about change,⁵⁸⁶ German foreign policy persisted in its Western orientated political culture. Particularly in the Council of the CBSS, the German foreign ministers, Klaus Kinkel (1992-1998) and Joschka Fischer (1998-2005), did not show deep interest.⁵⁸⁷ In August 1999, the Minister for European Affairs of Schleswig-Holstein, Gert Walter, complained in an article for the weekly FOCUS: “*Der Ostseeraum gehört zu den Zukunftsregionen Europas. Ob alle Deutschen das mit der nötigen Klarheit sehen, bezweifle ich. Die norddeutschen Bundesländer, allen voran Schleswig-Holstein, fühlen sich häufig genug wie Rufer in der Wüste.*“⁵⁸⁸ And so, Germany supported the Finnish NDEU initiative almost silently in the Luxembourg European Council in 1997, its 1999 EU presidency and its CBSS presidency in 2000/01.⁵⁸⁹ Regarding the latter, Germany was reluctant to chair the CBSS for a long time.⁵⁹⁰ After the start of an institutionalised Baltic Sea cooperation in 1992, Germany passed its leadership position on to other states of the region.

⁵⁷⁸ Cf. Walter, Gerd: Das klare Ja der Finnen. In: Sozialdemokratischer Pressedienst, 49. Jahrgang/199, 17.10.94. pp. 2-3.

⁵⁷⁹ Cf. Hauck, Christian: Wende von Nordost nach Süden. Schleswig-Holsteins „Aussenpolitik“. In: Das Parlament, Nr. 14, 29.03.04. <http://www.das-parlament.de/2004/14/inland/001.html> (14.02.09); Statistisches Amt für Hamburg und Schleswig-Holstein: Statistische Berichte. Ein- und Ausfuhr des Landes Schleswig-Holstein 2007. 13.03.08. http://www.statistik-nord.de/uploads/tx_standuments/G_III_1_GIII_3_j07_S_SB1.pdf (10.04.09).

⁵⁸⁰ Landesregierung Schleswig-Holstein: Regierungserklärung von Ministerpräsident Peter Harry Carstensen am 25. Mai 2005 im Schleswig-Holsteinischen Landtag. http://www.schleswig-holstein.de/STK/DE/Service/Rede/PDF/2005/050525__stk_regierungserkl_C3_A4rung.html (12.02.09). p. 11.

⁵⁸¹ Cf. Interview with an official of the Federal Foreign Office; Interview with Jari Luoto.

⁵⁸² Cf. Burchardt/Knobbe, 1993. p. 209.

⁵⁸³ Cf. Joenniemi, 1993. p. 168.

⁵⁸⁴ Interview with an official of the Federal Foreign Office.

⁵⁸⁵ Interview with Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

⁵⁸⁶ Cf. Schultheiß, 1999. pp. 33-34.

⁵⁸⁷ Cf. Saldik, 2004. pp. 64-65.

⁵⁸⁸ Walter, Gerd: Der Ostseeregion gehört die Zukunft. In: FOCUS, Nr. 32, 1999. http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/standpunkt-der-ostseeregion-gehoert-die-zukunft_aid_180601.html (12.02.09); Author’s translation: The Baltic Sea region is one of the future regions in Europe. If every German sees this with the necessary clarity, I doubt. The Northern German states, first of all Schleswig-Holstein, often feel like heralds in the desert.

⁵⁸⁹ Cf. Interview with Jari Luoto; Neubert, 18.11.98; Federal Foreign Office: Priorities of the German Presidency of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) 2000-2001. <http://www.infobalt.de/2002/2001/cbss/GermanPresidency-priorities.htm> (09.04.09).

⁵⁹⁰ Saldik, 2004. p. 65.

CBSS Summits, initiated by Sweden in 1996, have not been visited by a German Chancellor since 2002. The Baltic Sea region is obviously not among the priorities of the Federal Government. The CBSS Summit in Riga in June 2008 was attended by all heads of government, except Angela Merkel and Vladimir Putin. Foreign Minister Steinmeier has set a new emphasis on Baltic Sea policy, though. Steinmeier joined the Ministerial Meeting in 2007 and participated in the CBSS Summits in 2006 and 2008 as Vice-Chancellor. In Riga, he proposed a 'ring of partner schools' and an intensified cooperation in education to foster the development of a shared Baltic Sea identity.⁵⁹¹

The 16th annual meeting of the BSPC in Berlin in August 2007 brought the Baltic Sea on the agenda of the *Bundestag*.⁵⁹² The parliamentary groups of SPD and CDU/CSU introduced an ambitious proposal calling on the Federal Government to strengthen the Baltic Sea cooperation.⁵⁹³ Parliamentary State Secretary Franz Thönnies, member of the Standing Committee of the BSPC and Chairman of the BSPC Working Group on Labour Market and Social Welfare, has been particularly ambitious to promote the goals of the BSPC. The Federal Government underlined its commitment to the BSPC with participation of four government members, among them the Minister for the Environment, Sigmar Gabriel, and the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, Franz Müntefering.⁵⁹⁴ In a statement on the resolution adopted at the 16th BSPC, the Federal Government outlined its main positions.⁵⁹⁵ It favours a qualitative improvement of the regional dialogue due to 'limited resources'.⁵⁹⁶ The EU Baltic Sea Strategy is expected to enhance coordination of EU activities and provide attention for the region's needs in Brussels. Furthermore, the Federal Government supported the incorporation of energy and climate issues to the CBSS priorities and welcomed the BSPC's working group on labour and social affairs with a German chairman. The Integrated Maritime Policy of the EU has been supported within the European Council and the Federal Government proposed dealing with maritime policy also regionally in the CBSS.⁵⁹⁷ Thereby, maritime security is a special German concern.⁵⁹⁸ Pollution, and eutrophication particularly, have been issued within HELCOM and the drafting of the Baltic Sea Action Plan has been supported. Emphasis is put on practical implementation and binding rules.⁵⁹⁹

⁵⁹¹ Cf. Federal Foreign Office: Improving cooperation among Baltic Sea countries in the education sector. 05.11.08. http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Laenderinformationen/Daenemark/081105-moeller,_page=1.html (03.03.09).

⁵⁹² Cf. Deutscher Bundestag: Plenarprotokoll Nr. 16/109, 06.07.07. <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/16/16109.pdf> (13.02.09).

⁵⁹³ Cf. Deutscher Bundestag: Ostseekooperation weiter stärken und Chancen nutzen. Drucksache Nr. 16/5910, 04.07.07. <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/059/1605910.pdf> (17.02.09).

⁵⁹⁴ Cf. Nordic Council: Sustainable Development in the Baltic Sea Region: Social Welfare, Maritime Policy, Energy Security. 16th BSPC Conference Report, Copenhagen, 2007. pp. 44-45. http://www.norden.org/bspcnet/seiten/bspc16_docs/16%20BSPC%20Final%20report%20proof%20version.pdf (13.02.09).

⁵⁹⁵ Auswärtiges Amt: Stellungnahme zu den in der Resolution der Ostseeparlamentarierkonferenz 2007 enthaltenen Forderungen an die Regierungen der Ostseeanrainerstaaten sowie der Ostseepolitik allgemein. 30.05.08.

⁵⁹⁶ The Federal Government regards the CBSS as valuable organisation and is firmly interested in a reform of the CBSS in order to enhance its performance. Cf. Steuer, Helmut/Rinke, Andreas: Ostseerat muss sich neu erfinden. In: Handelsblatt, 04.06.08. <http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/ostseerat-muss-sich-neu-erfinden;1438954> (14.02.09).

⁵⁹⁷ Chancellor Merkel gave support and opened a major international stakeholders' conference on maritime policy in Bremen during the German EU presidency. Cf. Federal Government: Speech by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel at the European Conference "The Future Maritime Policy of the EU: A European Vision for Oceans and Seas". 02.05.07. http://www.bundesregierung.de/nn_6566/Content/EN/Reden/2007/05/2007-05-02-rede-merkel-eu-meereskonferenz.html (07.03.09).

⁵⁹⁸ German report on maritime safety attached to 11th BSPC resolution. Deutscher Bundestag: Bericht der Bundesregierung zur "Maritimen Sicherheit auf der Ostsee". Drucksache 14/9487, 03.06.02. <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/14/094/1409487.pdf> (27.02.09).

⁵⁹⁹ Also previous governments emphasised the need for joint action on ship security and maritime environmental protection. E.g. Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit: Bundesumweltminister Jürgen Trittin fordert engere Kooperation der Ostsee-Anrainer. BMU-Pressedienst 175/01, 10.09.01.

The Baltic Sea region is not a priority of German foreign policy. And therefore, Chancellor Merkel is rarely handling the issue. However, under the political top level, Germany is participating fairly, with Chancellor Merkel intervening where needed. When Nicolas Sarkozy tried to install an exclusive Mediterranean Union, Merkel rejected the proposal and saved also the Baltic Sea region's interests.⁶⁰⁰

3.2.4.2 *Finland and the Baltic Sea Region*

The cultural orientation of Finland has traditionally been westwards, although there has been influence from competing powers throughout history. In the 12th century, when southern Finland has been explored, Catholic influence came via Sweden, England and German areas, and orthodox influence from Novgorod and Kiev. Sweden became the predominant power, though.⁶⁰¹ Since the 13th century, Sweden colonised and dominated Finland; thus, bringing European civilisation and the Roman Church.⁶⁰² However, rivalries in the Baltic Sea continued, then between Swedes, Danes, the Teutonic Order, the Hanse, Poland-Lithuania, Novgorod, and, starting with the reign of Peter the Great, Russia. Finland has been influenced by all of these developments, foremost the rise of Russia as a Baltic, and, since the Great Northern War in the early 18th century, as a European superpower. After the Russian period from 1809 to 1917, Finland orientated itself westwards again. Nonetheless, it could not change its geography. Finland's historical neighbourhood is the Baltic Sea region. Its cultural heritage came via the sea from central Europe. Today, Finland is undoubtedly a part of the Western industrialised world. However, the Baltic Sea region and Finland had to deal with combating and rivalling forces throughout its history.

The first attempts of a Baltic Sea cooperation can be traced back to the post World War I period, when Finland tried to weaken Soviet hegemony with cooperation of the Baltic States, Poland and Finland. Between 1919 and 1926, Estonia, Latvia, Poland and Finland met on more than 40 regional conferences.⁶⁰³ In 1922, the four states signed a common defence agreement, which was never ratified by Finland though.⁶⁰⁴ The limits of that strategy were evident.

During the Cold War, balancing between East and West applied to Finland's foreign policy in the Baltic Sea as well. Sweden, West Germany and the Soviet Union were its most important trading partners and Finland was in a unique position in East-West trade.⁶⁰⁵ In 1973, Finland signed agreements with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) and the EEC underlining its political neutrality.⁶⁰⁶ Economically, Finland needed and continues to need both its Western and its Eastern partners, while the Western ones remain more important.⁶⁰⁷

On environmental issues, Finland began cooperation with the Soviet Union in order to protect the Gulf of Finland in the late 1960s.⁶⁰⁸ Then, rapprochement between East and West opened up new perspectives. In the context of Kekkonen's active neutrality, Finland invited the Baltic Sea coun-

⁶⁰⁰ The French plan could have overshadowed the Baltic Sea cooperation and weakened Brussels' attention for the region. Cf. Süddeutsche Zeitung: Die Mittelmeerunion kommt. 14.03.08. <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/401/436147/text/> (13.02.09).

⁶⁰¹ Cf. Singleton, 1989. pp. 19-21.

⁶⁰² Cf. *ibid.* pp. 21-24.

⁶⁰³ Saldik, 2004. p. 58.

⁶⁰⁴ Cf. Jussila/Hentilä/Nevakivi, 1999. pp. 160-161.

⁶⁰⁵ Cf. Prime Minister's Office: The Baltic Sea region as Finland's economic environment. Prime Minister's Office Publications, 22/2007. p. 37.

⁶⁰⁶ Cf. Singleton, 1989. p. 154.

⁶⁰⁷ Cf. Maude, 1976. p. 95.

⁶⁰⁸ Velner, Harald A.: Die Kommission zum Schutz der Meeresumwelt der Ostsee. In: Auffermann, Burkhard (Bearbeiter des Schwerpunktthemas): Umfassende Sicherheit im Ostseeraum. Militärpolitik Dokumentation, issue 83/84, 1991. p. 60.

tries to Helsinki for a conference on environmental protection.⁶⁰⁹ On the 22nd March 1974, the then seven coastal states signed the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (Helsinki Convention). It entered into force in 1980 and set up the Helsinki Commission (HELCOM), seated in the Finnish capital as governing body of the Helsinki Convention. HELCOM is of main interest to Finland, as it suffers directly from bad environmental conditions.

The idea of a new Baltic Sea cooperation, initiated by Björn Engholm in 1987, got new conditions with the decline of the Soviet Union. In 1990, Finland remained politically reserved and emphasised the importance of including Russia due to the overall situation, but it showed its principle interest.⁶¹⁰ The prospect of a revived Baltic Sea was firmly supported by the Finnish economy. A report of the Finnish Policy and Business Forum in 1990 stated that partners for cooperation were being selected with a map, instead of political teaching books.⁶¹¹ The conclusion would be a strengthening of regional cooperation.

Starting point for structured debate about new regionalism was the international conference on “The New Hansa – The Revitalisation of Northern Europe” in Kotka 1990.⁶¹² Prominent participants from the field of politics, science, culture and economy debated on concepts and visions for the region. Soon thereafter, in January 1991, the Speaker of the *Eduskunta*, Kalevi Sorsa, convened the first Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference (BSPC) in Helsinki. Parliamentarians from all over the Baltic Sea met and drafted a resolution supporting the “establishment of a Baltic Sea Council for planning cooperation in economic and cultural affairs and in sustainable development.”⁶¹³ Both conferences were affected by the struggles of independence in the Baltic States.⁶¹⁴ And therefore, the Finnish hosts tried not to displease Russia on that issue. However, Finland did underline its pro-active policy in that uncertain time.

The German-Danish initiative that led to the Copenhagen Declaration and thereby the establishing of the CBSS was strongly supported and welcomed by Finland. It organised the first presidency of the CBSS 1992/1993.⁶¹⁵ The idea of a *Neue Hanse* and thereby the role of Germany were less suspicious to Finland, while other states were quite cautious about possible German claims in the Baltic Sea region.⁶¹⁶ For Finland, the political development of Baltic Sea cooperation offered new opportunities for its foreign policy as well as its economy.⁶¹⁷ The creation of a homogeneously area of market economy and democracy was a unique prospect in the history of the Baltic Sea, which had been characterised by East-West conflict for so long – Rome vs. Constantinople, Sweden vs. Russia, NATO vs. Warsaw Pact. Confrontation should come to an end it was believed. In Tartu 1994, President Martti Ahtisaari mentioned: “Viewed from Helsinki, the Baltic Sea now really has two shores.”⁶¹⁸

⁶⁰⁹ Saldik, 2004. p. 54.

⁶¹⁰ Cf. Williams, Leena-Kaarina: Zur Konstruktion einer Region. Die Entstehung der Ostseekooperation zwischen 1988 und 1992. Berlin, 2007. pp. 95-96.

⁶¹¹ Quoted in: Ecke, Dieter: Mare Balticum: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen. In: NORDEUROPAforum, Nr. 4, 1991. pp. 22-25 (22).

⁶¹² Williams, 2007. pp. 123-128; Hamburger Abendblatt: Für eine neue Hanse in Nordeuropa. 31.05.90. p. 7.

⁶¹³ Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference: The 1st Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference. http://www.bspc.net/seiten/arc_resolutions.htm (27.02.09).

⁶¹⁴ Cf. Williams, 2007. p. 125, pp. 163-166.

⁶¹⁵ Council of Baltic Sea States: 1. Finnish Presidency (1992-1993). <http://www.cbss.st/documents/cbsspresidencies/1finnish/> (17.02.09).

⁶¹⁶ Cf. Popinski, Roman: Die Neue Hanse und Osteuropa. Auf der Suche nach der neuen Ordnung. In: NORDEUROPAforum, Nr. 4, 1991. pp. 19-21 (20).

⁶¹⁷ Ibid; Ecke, 1991. p. 23.

⁶¹⁸ Address by President Martti Ahtisaari at the University of Tartu, June 1, 1994.

Finland also put forward the integration of the Baltic Sea region into the European Union. In that respect, the Finnish government has always been cautious about the appearance of a Nordic coalition. In the run-up to EC application in 1992, President Koivisto believed strongly that there should be no Nordic bloc within the EU that would spark regional rivalries between North and South of Europe.⁶¹⁹ President Ahtisaari stated in Berlin 1994 that an enlarged Union would have a northern dimension, but not a Nordic bloc.⁶²⁰

Finland also differed from the Swedish approach on the Baltic Sea. While Sweden was more reluctant to support other applicants in the early 1990s and was expected to give less emphasis on the EU, Finland favoured enlargement over the whole Baltic Sea from the beginning on.⁶²¹ In 1994, President Ahtisaari assured Estonia: “Finland supports EU membership for Estonia and the other Baltic countries at the earliest possible moment.”⁶²² In the late 1990s, Sweden preferred the CBSS and, thereby, aspired a leading role in the Baltic Sea region via the CBSS.⁶²³ It initiated the first summit in 1996 and the establishing of the CBSS Secretariat in Stockholm in 1998 should have underlined the Swedish claim.⁶²⁴

For Finland it has been more promising to differ from the Swedish policy and to ‘customize’⁶²⁵ the Union for a European approach on the Baltic Sea region. In 1997, Finland launched its initiative for a Northern Dimension of the European Union (NDEU) – without involving Sweden. Finland campaigned for the proposal on its own. Right after the countries of the region, it consulted the southern member states to avoid any misinterpretation of being an opponent to the Mediterranean cooperation.⁶²⁶ The Finnish government convinced the other member states that the NDEU was of interest for the whole of Europe, especially since Russia became a direct neighbour of the EU with the Finnish accession in 1995.⁶²⁷ The NDEU enhanced the Union’s actorness in the Baltic Sea region and offered a new framework including Russia and the Baltic States.⁶²⁸ Finland decisively put the initiative forward during its first presidency in 1999. Thereafter, Finland hosted a series of forums on the NDEU to foster the practical arrangement of the initiative.⁶²⁹ The second Finnish EU presidency made it a permanent EU policy with Russia as an equal partner.

Since the EU Eastern enlargement of 2004, the Nordic and the Baltic States consult on EU issues regularly.⁶³⁰ However, the so called “NB6”⁶³¹ do not have a political heavy weight. Their interests differ on major issues like Russia, NATO and the role of the EU. Furthermore, the regional grouping has kept a low profile in order to avoid a Nordic bloc. Poland and Germany are frequently invited to join these meetings. For Finland, its Nordic and Baltic neighbours are priorities of national foreign policy.⁶³² Estonia is an outstanding close partner due to its cultural and geo-

⁶¹⁹ Koivisto, 1997. pp. 241-242.

⁶²⁰ Address by President Martti Ahtisaari at the Freie Universität in Berlin, November 23, 1994.

⁶²¹ Cf. Koivisto, 1997. p. 242; Novack, Jennifer: The Northern Dimension in Sweden’s EU Policies: From Baltic Supremacy to European Unity? In: Ojanen, Hanna (Ed.): The Northern Dimension: Fuel for the EU? Helsinki, 2001. pp. 78-106 (82).

⁶²² Address by President Martti Ahtisaari at the University of Tartu, June 1, 1994.

⁶²³ Cf. Novack, 2001. p. 82.

⁶²⁴ Cf. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: Stockholm Sitz des Ostsee-Sekretariats. 22.06.98. p. 7.

⁶²⁵ Ojanen, 1999.

⁶²⁶ Cf. Interview with Jari Luoto.

⁶²⁷ Cf. Bastian, 2006. p. 67.

⁶²⁸ Cf. Ojanen, 1999. p. 17.

⁶²⁹ Cf. Gassen, 2006. p. 18.

⁶³⁰ Cf. Der Spiegel: Nordischer Block. 10.05.04. p. 101.

⁶³¹ Interview with Jari Luoto.

⁶³² Cf. Helsingin Sanomat (International Edition): New Foreign Minister sees Russia as opportunity, not a threat. 07.04.08. <http://www.hs.fi/english/print/1135235378962> (27.02.09).

graphical proximity.⁶³³ EU enlargement on all Baltic Sea states, except Russia, has been particularly important for Finland and the enlargement has been expected to support the economic and political development of the region as it is Finland's economic environment.⁶³⁴

The region is among the priorities of Finnish foreign policy. In March 2008, President Halonen hosted the fifth Presidential Forum, where the state and the future of the Baltic Sea were discussed.⁶³⁵ Halonen explained: "Finland has a special interest in developing Baltic Sea cooperation, since over 80% of our foreign trade is shipped through the Baltic Sea."⁶³⁶ Russia must be involved in regional cooperation as its significance in the area has increased in recent years and environmental problems could not be solved without Russian commitment. President Halonen stressed the importance of environment and maritime safety, and mentioned that "[above] all this requires political will, since technical problems are easier to resolve".⁶³⁷ Furthermore, cooperation needs to be improved and the Swedish presidency in the second half of 2009 could draw the EU's attention to Baltic Sea matters. Finland would presumably support the Swedish efforts.

An enhanced EU policy for the Baltic Sea region could be achieved by the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region which is currently being prepared by the European Commission. It shall be presented at the end of June 2009 and will be a major priority of the Swedish EU presidency. Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb, who has previously been Member of the European Parliament from 2004 to 2008, had particular success in preparing the "European Parliament resolution on a Baltic Sea Region Strategy for the Northern Dimension"⁶³⁸ being rapporteur. Already in early 2008, Finland issued its thinking and kept a constant dialogue with all Baltic Sea EU members.⁶³⁹

On 1st January 2008, President Halonen and Prime Minister Vanhanen sent a letter to the heads of state and heads of government of all Baltic Sea countries and called for strong political commitment "to save the sea and to put into practice the programmes that we have all approved."⁶⁴⁰

3.2.4.3 Germany and Finland on the Baltic Sea Region

The Finnish coast is almost 900 kilometres away from the German border. Geographically, both states are far away from each other. But in terms of economy and politics, Finland could be settled in the middle of the Baltic Sea – bordering Sweden to the north-west, Denmark to the west and Germany to the south-west. The water way makes distance almost irrelevant. At the same time, that sea is the environment in which both states interact. And since the 1990s, that region is open for real neighbourhood.

⁶³³ Prime Minister's Office: Opportunities for Cooperation between Estonia and Finland 2008. Prime Minister's Office Publications, 17/2008. <http://www.vnk.fi/julkaisukansio/2008/j07-suomen-ja-viron-j10-opportunities/pdf/en.pdf> (10.04.09).

⁶³⁴ Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland: Minister Lehtomäki: The Baltic Sea region – new challenges and opportunities in the context of enlargement. 21.10.03. <http://formin.finland.fi/Public/default.aspx?contentid=60411&nodeid=39793&contentlan=2&culture=en-US> (03.03.09); Prime Minister's Office: The Baltic Sea region as Finland's economic environment. Prime Minister's Office Publications, 22/2007. <http://www.vnk.fi/julkaisukansio/2007/j22-baltic-sea/pdf/en.pdf> (10.04.09).

⁶³⁵ Office of the President of the Republic of Finland: President Halonen: Russia should be involved in Baltic Sea cooperation. Press Releases and News, 11.03.08. <http://www.tpk.fi/netcomm/news/showarticle.asp?intNWSAID=68704&intSubArtID=27478> (03.03.09).

⁶³⁶ Ibid.

⁶³⁷ Ibid.

⁶³⁸ European Parliament: Draft Report on a Baltic Sea Region Strategy for the Northern Dimension. 07.08.06, 2006/2171. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/pr/624/624336/624336en.pdf (03.03.09).

⁶³⁹ Interview with Jari Luoto.

⁶⁴⁰ Office of the President of the Republic of Finland: President Halonen and Prime Minister Vanhanen's letter to the heads of state and heads of government of the countries bordering the Baltic Sea. 01.01.08. <http://www.presidentti.fi/netcomm/news/ShowArticle.asp?intNWSAID=67522&intSubArtID=27109&intGID=9&LAN=FI&contlan=&Thread=&intThreadPosition=0&intShowBack=1&strReturnURL2=> (05.03.09).

Basically, both states share the same opinion about the region. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a revived exchange between bordering states was in the very interest of Germany and Finland. Therefore, both countries made efforts to establish dialogue and cooperation. In 1992, the German government launched the CBSS initiative jointly with Denmark. And Finland used its international reputation to start dialogue in Kotka in 1990 and Helsinki in 1991.

A positive example of joint action is the Baltic Sea Forum, which was founded in Helsinki in 1992, then called Pro Baltica Forum, as a German-Finnish initiative to support the economic, political and cultural integration of the Baltic Sea region.⁶⁴¹ Today it is seated in Hamburg. Chairman of the Board is Kurt Bodewig, Member of the *Bundestag* and former Federal Minister of Transport. Martti Ahtisaari, one of the initiators, is Honorary Chairman. The Baltic Sea Forum brings together the elite of economy, politics, culture and science, and performs significant efforts to strengthen the region's civil society. In 2008, the non-governmental organisation was asked by the UN to apply for official advisor status.⁶⁴²

Independence and stabilisation of the Baltic States was favoured both by Germany and Finland. However, they did keep an eye on the Russian neighbour. Russia itself has been included in their initiatives from the beginning. The European Union also played a major role for both of them. Germany pursued the integration of the former Warsaw Pact states into Europe; the Baltic Sea cooperation has complemented that strategy regionally. Finland joined the Union in 1995 and called for fast accession of the Baltic States to consolidate the new regional order.

In practical issues there is hardly disagreement. In the preparation of the EU Baltic Sea Strategy, both countries highlighted the need for efforts to strengthen environmental protection and economical competitiveness, to improve transport infrastructure and maritime security, to enhance the functioning of the internal EU market and the cohesion around the Baltic Sea.⁶⁴³ Both want effective implementation of adopted agreements, supported by EU action, instead of new structures. Getting Russia and other third states involved is an important common goal.

Finnish as well as German representatives point to the future role of the Baltic Sea region. President Halonen emphasised Finland's aspiration in Hamburg in 2008: "Our aim is a clean Baltic Sea and an economically strong and prosperous Baltic Sea region."⁶⁴⁴ Parliamentary State Secretary Thönnies opened the 16th BSPC in Berlin in 2007 with similar enthusiasm: "*Eine sichere und saubere Ostsee, eine ökonomisch starke und innovative Ostseeregion, stabile Gesellschaften mit sozialer Verantwortung, ein zukunftssträchtiges und nachhaltiges Netzwerk der Zusammenarbeit in der Region und eine enge Zusammenarbeit mit Russland, das sind die Maximen für eine erfolgreiche Entwicklungsstrategie im Ostseeraum.*"⁶⁴⁵

⁶⁴¹ Cf. Baltic Sea Forum: The Network in the Baltic Sea Region. <http://www.baltic-sea-forum.org/download/BSF-Image.pdf> (14.02.09).

⁶⁴² Cf. Maass, Stephan: Baltic Sea Forum soll die Vereinten Nationen beraten. In: Die Welt, 08.01.08. http://www.welt.de/welt_print/article1529392/Baltic_Sea_Forum_soll_die_Vereinten_Nationen_beraten.html (14.02.09).

⁶⁴³ Cf. Preparation of the EU's Baltic Sea Strategy: Finland's objectives for the priorities of the Strategy. Finnish Non-Paper, 25.02.08. <http://www.euroregionbaltic.eu/downloads/file87.pdf> (28.03.09); Preparing an EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region – A Contribution from Germany. 25.09.08. [http://www.strategia-baltyk.ukie.gov.pl/WWW/baltyk.nsf/47E191BD12F38121C12574EA00502416/\\$FILE/Germany.pdf?open](http://www.strategia-baltyk.ukie.gov.pl/WWW/baltyk.nsf/47E191BD12F38121C12574EA00502416/$FILE/Germany.pdf?open) (28.03.09).

⁶⁴⁴ Office of the President of the Republic of Finland: Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Tarja Halonen at the Überseeclub in Hamburg, 8 May 2008. <http://www.presidentti.fi/netcomm/news/showarticle.asp?intNWSAID=69481&intSubArtID=27682> (06.03.09).

⁶⁴⁵ Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference: Eröffnungsrede anlässlich der 16. Ostseeparlamentarierkonferenz am 27.8.07. [http://www.bspc.net/seiten/bspc16_docs/Greeting%20Thonnes%20\(ge\)%2016%20BSPC%20Berlin.pdf](http://www.bspc.net/seiten/bspc16_docs/Greeting%20Thonnes%20(ge)%2016%20BSPC%20Berlin.pdf) (05.03.09); Author's translation: A safe and clean Baltic Sea, an economically powerful and innovative Baltic Sea region, stable societies with social responsibility, a promising and sustainable network of cooperation in the region and a close cooperation with Russia, these are the maxims for a successful development strategy in the Baltic Sea region.

Although Finland and Germany basically share the same positions on Baltic Sea issues, a significant asymmetry is evident. Finland's focus is foremost on the Baltic Sea. Particularly, the increasing eutrophication threatens its direct environment. It is urging for significant action to fight pollution: "The state of the Baltic Sea is alarming."⁶⁴⁶ For Germany it is one neighbourhood of many. The present situation is understood, but it just does not hold the same urgency. Finally, the issue is processed on different levels politically. In Finland, the Baltic Sea cooperation is a matter of the President and the Prime Minister. In Germany, the Baltic Sea is rather a second class matter of the Foreign Minister.

From a Finnish point of view, Germany is one of the most important Baltic Sea states. Former State Secretary Tiilikainen emphasised that Germany plays a major role and is the economic motor of the region.⁶⁴⁷ Its significance in the Baltic Sea cooperation is fairly understood and former State Secretary Luoto asserted: "We have seen the importance that Germany is taking part actively in the cooperation around this region."⁶⁴⁸ Esko Antola underlined: "You can not envisage the Baltic Sea region as a European region without the commitment of Germany."⁶⁴⁹

Moreover, even a partly German leadership in the Baltic Sea region seems to be favourable from a Finnish perspective. Pertti Salolainen, MP, responded: "This is one area where I really appeal to Germany that they should take a much stronger role in the EU, so that EU will start funding all kinds of programmes that will protect the Baltic Sea."⁶⁵⁰ Antti Kaikkonen, MP, agreed: "It would be good, because Germany is the biggest country. And the Baltic Sea region needs some leadership right now, because there are a lot of different ideas and emotions and too little concrete work."⁶⁵¹

But despite the role Germany is given, its interest in the region is perceived as being rather low. Esko Antola asked suggestively: "How to get to see Germany its Baltic Sea dimness?"⁶⁵² Antti Kaikkonen referred to Germany "as the biggest country, could take a stronger role. It could be so important for the whole region." Teija Tiilikainen pointed out: "[...] we would like to get more German attention, also at the governmental level to the issues and concerns of the Baltic Sea region."⁶⁵³

The Finnish call for more German commitment basically has three aspects. Firstly, Germany's own weight is decisively important. Secondly, Germany is necessary to get the region's big players, Russia and Poland, into cooperation. Thirdly, without Germany, the EU would probably not care about the Baltic Sea region. Teija Tiilikainen emphasised: "[...] the Nordic countries Finland and Sweden in particular, see that there is also a competition going on in the European Union about or between all these regional projects and EU's attention to the South, to the East. [...] We need firmly you in order to get Russia to take its role, because it is also responsible together with us. So we need a stronger EU policy and in order to achieve that we need the firm interest and attention of Germany."⁶⁵⁴ And Jari Luoto commented in the same tone: "[...] we need to have issues which are important for the Baltic Sea region on board when we are discussing EU-Russia relations. [...] And we certainly do hope that Germany will take actively part in the development

⁶⁴⁶ Preparation of the EU's Baltic Sea Strategy: Finland's objectives for the priorities of the Strategy. Finnish Non-Paper, 25.02.08.

⁶⁴⁷ Interview with Teija Tiilikainen.

⁶⁴⁸ Interview with Jari Luoto.

⁶⁴⁹ Interview with Esko Antola.

⁶⁵⁰ Interview with Pertti Salolainen.

⁶⁵¹ Interview with Antti Kaikkonen.

⁶⁵² Interview with Esko Antola.

⁶⁵³ Interview with Teija Tiilikainen.

⁶⁵⁴ Ibid.

of this [EU Baltic Sea] strategy.”⁶⁵⁵ Esko Antola pointed out that Russia is a decisive factor: “The Baltics do not even want to hear of Russia as a Baltic Sea country. [...] Then it is Finland and Germany who share the view of Russia, because of historical reasons, as a Baltic Sea country and that we should accommodate Russia and try to link them into Baltic Sea cooperation to follow the rules. There we have a common interest. And we are alone in the European Union.”⁶⁵⁶

Pushing the Baltic Sea forward, Finland needs partners. The most plausible grouping would be with the Nordic and the Baltic States. And Finland indeed maintains extensive contacts with these states, most visibly in “NB6” meetings, but they are neither united on the main issues, Russia, NATO and future of the EU, nor are they politically strong enough. Antti Kaikkonen mentioned: “The Baltic States are in every sense very small states. They grow fast in economy, but they do not have a big role. [...] we have of course a strong cooperation with those states, but Germany is economically in another level.”⁶⁵⁷ With reference to Poland and Russia, he added: “[...] it has more meaning what Germany says than what Finland says. In Finland we know quite well that we are not a big country.”⁶⁵⁸ Teija Tiilikainen referred: “Poland is a problem and Russia. They are at a very different level, for instance with environmental issues. [...] All of us are needed, but somehow I think that Germany would... It is not enough, if Finland, Sweden and... Here I would like to stress the role of size. Because the more Germany gives its example and shows interest towards the region, the more we get the attention of others. If Germany does not pay attention to the concerns and challenges of the Baltic Sea region, others think there is no reason for them either.”⁶⁵⁹

Finland desperately seeks for German commitment to Baltic Sea issues. And that need is a critical point in the bilateral relationship, although Finns understand that the region has a different importance for Germany. Petri Hakkarainen, staff member of the Finnish Embassy Berlin, commented: „*Da kommt man wieder dazu, dass Deutschland ein großes Land ist. In dem Sinne ist die Ostsee nur ein Thema von vielen. Das versteht man auch von der finnischen Seite. Trotzdem wäre es für uns wichtig, dass das etwas höher eingestuft wäre.*“⁶⁶⁰ Asked if Germany has a kind of backyard policy, former State Secretary Luoto responded: “We do not think that it is backyard thinking. [...] It is in our interest and probably we would always work for more active participation of Germany. But in many ways you can also have the understanding that they have also other concerns.”⁶⁶¹

However, it is watched that Germany uses its influence in critical moments, when a small member state and even a regional coalition could hardly change Brussels’ agenda. Eero Akaan-Penttilä, MP, explained Germany’s role: “For instance now when president Sarkozy came with the idea of a new Euro-Mediterranean Union and suggested that only a part of the EU members would be in and all the neighbourhood countries around the Mediterranean. So it was Merkel and Germany, and Sarkozy had to go to her and have a chat with her and after that Sarkozy somehow found out that the EU is going to do something as a whole. It means that all the member states must be within the cooperation. That was due to Merkel that Sarkozy found that very simple idea. And now the Mediterranean questions are going better forward.”⁶⁶² From a Finnish point of view, it

⁶⁵⁵ Interview with Jari Luoto.

⁶⁵⁶ Interview with Esko Antola.

⁶⁵⁷ Interview with Antti Kaikkonen.

⁶⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁹ Interview with Teija Tiilikainen.

⁶⁶⁰ Interview with Petri Hakkarainen; Author’s translation: There you again get to the fact that Germany is a big country. In that sense, the Baltic Sea is one topic of many. That is understood by the Finnish side. Nonetheless, it would be important for us, if it were rated higher.

⁶⁶¹ Interview with Jari Luoto.

⁶⁶² Interview with Eero Akaan-Penttilä.

was followed with appreciation that Germany took responsibility in that critical development. Luoto asserted that the German chancellor is aware about the region's importance: "It has been visible in the way she has taken part in the development of the Union's maritime policy, [...]. So I think she has a political understanding of this region. But that is an issue where Finland constantly would like to influence countries like Germany and Poland for that matter, [...]."⁶⁶³

Contacts to the northern German states have special importance for Finland and their commitment is valued fairly due to the very practical work in Baltic Sea cooperation.⁶⁶⁴ In Hamburg, Finland maintains its only consulate general in Germany. On her visit to Hamburg in May 2008, President Halonen pointed to the severe environmental condition of the Baltic Sea and stated: "Both Finland and Germany have a Baltic identity. Here in Hamburg you know very well that Germany's contribution to cooperation in the Baltic Sea region is very important. I hope that the northern Länder can convince the German Federal Government of the importance of safeguarding the future of the Baltic Sea."⁶⁶⁵

A good link to the northern German states is probably an important strategy, but the Federal Government remains the key player and Berlin's attention a challenge for Finnish representatives: "*Es wäre für Finnland und die ganze Ostseeregion ganz wichtig, wenn wir auch mal von Berlin ein politisches Signal von der Bundesebene gekommen würden und eine starke Unterstützung von der Bundesregierung. Und dann könnte man das wieder an die Länder outsourcen.*"⁶⁶⁶

From a German point of view, Finland plays an outstanding important role as partner in the region. An official of the Federal Foreign Office explained: "*Finnland hat eine ganz wichtige Rolle als Partner in der Ostsee, weil Finnland in den vergangenen Jahren sehr viele Ostseekooperationsprojekte angestoßen hat. [...] gerade die Nördliche Dimension der EU oder die Umweltzusammenarbeit, die Helsinki Kommission, das sind finnische Initiativen, wo Finnland sehr viel Werbung gemacht hat und sehr daran interessiert ist, alle Ostseeanrainer und darüber hinaus mit einzubeziehen.*"⁶⁶⁷ Referring to Finland's engagement in environmental protection, Parliamentary State Secretary Thönnies asserted: "*Die Finnen sind da ein starker Motor, die natürlich ein Interesse daran haben, ein saubereres Meer vor der Haustür zu haben.*"⁶⁶⁸ Moreover, its role regarding Russia is fairly valued: "*Und wenn man die Ostseepolitik, die zu einem großen Teil die Politik der Nördlichen Dimension beinhaltet, betrachtet, dann ist Finnland ein wichtiges Land, das die Integration von Russland in die Politik der Nördlichen Dimension auch ermöglicht.*"⁶⁶⁹ Finnish initiatives and its active role have been remembered impressively well. Axel Schäfer, MP, noted: "*Gerade die Nördliche Dimension hat noch einmal gezeigt, wie intelligent, auch von der*

⁶⁶³ Interview with Jari Luoto.

⁶⁶⁴ Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland: Speech by Ms Paula Lehtomäki, Minister for Foreign Trade and Development of Finland, at the delegation of the European Commission. Berlin, 21.10.03. <http://www.finnland.de/public/default.aspx?contentid=118359&contentlan=33&culture=de-DE> (06.03.09).

⁶⁶⁵ Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Tarja Halonen at the Überseeclub in Hamburg, 8 May 2008.

⁶⁶⁶ Interview with Petri Hakkarainen; Author's translation: It would be very important for Finland and the whole Baltic Sea region, if we also received a political signal from the federal level from Berlin and strong support from the Federal Government. And then it could be outsourced to the Länder again.

⁶⁶⁷ Interview with an official of the Federal Foreign Office; Author's translation: Finland has a very important role as partner in the Baltic Sea, because Finland has initiated many Baltic Sea cooperation projects in past years. [...] particularly the Northern Dimension of the EU or the environmental cooperation, the Helsinki Commission, that are Finnish initiatives, for which Finland made a lot of advertisement and is very interested in involving all Baltic Sea countries and beyond.

⁶⁶⁸ Interview with Franz Thönnies; Author's translation: The Finns are a strong motor in that respect, which naturally have an interest in having a clean sea in front of the door.

⁶⁶⁹ Interview with Franz Thönnies; Author's translation: And when you look at Baltic Sea politics, which includes the policy of the Northern Dimension for a big part, then Finland is an important country that also enables the integration of Russia into the policy of the Northern Dimension.

*Struktur her, ein kleines Land Politik bestimmen kann. Die gesamte Ostseekooperation wäre ohne Finnland in dieser Art und Weise nicht zustande gekommen.*⁶⁷⁰

Finland's influence on the whole region is a major characteristic asserted to it. Kurt Bodewig stated: *„Ich glaube, dass Finnland einen unabhängigen Vermittlerstatus dort hat. [...] Finnland hat sowohl nach Skandinavien Wirkungskreise wie auch eine intensive Förderung der baltischen Staaten. Ich glaube, dass am östlichen Ende der Ostsee damit auch ein Land vorhanden ist, das vermittelt, das zusammenbringt, nicht trennt.*⁶⁷¹ Franz Thönnies pointed out that Finland has never been a country that tried to dominate the region, due to its history, but got used to being a useful mediator: *„Die Finnen hatten nie so eine Vormachtstellung und standen auch zu sehr unter dem Einfluss von anderen. [...] Die Schweden versuchen das manchmal heute noch, bestimmender Faktor zu werden, Orientierungsfaktor besonders für die baltischen Länder. Die Finnen haben die Rolle nie gehabt und haben immer eine Mittlerrolle übernommen.*⁶⁷²

Finland is indeed a unique partner from a German perspective. Kurt Bodewig stated that the traditionally positive relations between Germany and Finland mean a particular factor.⁶⁷³ It is probably the most German-friendly country in the region. It has neither fear of German domination – which is clearly not aspired by Germany – nor is it famous for its nationalist egoism, but for its international reputation. Particularly Finland's attitude towards Russia is an exception among the bordering countries of the Baltic Sea. Finland is the only country that has been truly supportive for the German-Russian pipeline project. There rarely has been a visible German-Finnish initiative, because Denmark and Poland remain the countries Germany has to agree with first. Hans-Dietrich Genscher emphasised that Germany's interest in Finland is mainly due to its role in the Baltic Sea region.⁶⁷⁴ In the future, with growing integration of the region, Finland will probably become even more important.

Nonetheless, the Baltic Sea region remains a low priority issue in German foreign policy for the moment. Wishes for more German commitment and criticism that Germany might be reluctant or even slowing down regional cooperation have been raised several times in the past.⁶⁷⁵ Confronted with the Finnish point of view, German representatives did not agree. Kurt Bodewig explained the German contribution: *„Ich glaube, wir haben sowohl auf der Regierungsseite im Ostseerat wie auf der Parlamentsseite in der Ostseeparlamentarierkonferenz sehr deutlich gemacht, dass Deutschland sich einbringt. Man kann das erkennen. Die Ostseeparlamentarierkonferenz hat zurzeit zwei Arbeitsgruppen, in einer stellt ein Deutscher den Vorsitz, in der anderen die Stellvertretung. Wir halten uns nicht raus, sondern beteiligen uns.*⁶⁷⁶ Franz Thönnies mentioned that it is important

⁶⁷⁰ Interview with Axel Schäfer; Author's translation: Particularly the Northern Dimension has shown how intelligent, also in the structure, a small country can determine politics. The whole Baltic Sea cooperation would not have established itself in this way without Finland.

⁶⁷¹ Interview with Kurt Bodewig; Author's translation: I think that Finland has a status of an independent mediator. [...] Finland has influence in Scandinavia as well as an intensive support for the Baltic States. I think that therefore, at the Eastern end of the Baltic Sea, a country exists that mediates, that brings together, does not divide.

⁶⁷² Interview with Franz Thönnies; Author's translation: The Finns never had a position of supremacy and have been too much under influence of others. [...] Sweden sometimes tries becoming the decisive factor even today, orientation factor particularly for the Baltic States. The Finns never had that role and have always acted as a mediator.

⁶⁷³ Interview with Kurt Bodewig.

⁶⁷⁴ Interview with Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

⁶⁷⁵ Interview with an official of the Federal Foreign Office; Schultheiß, 1999. p. 29.

⁶⁷⁶ Interview with Kurt Bodewig; Author's translation: I think we have made very clear that Germany contributes on a governmental level in the Council of Baltic Sea States as well as on a parliamentary level in the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference. You can see that. The Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference currently has two working groups, in the one a German is chairman, in the other substitute. We do not keep out ourselves, but participate.

that Germany advanced cooperation in the decisive moments and pointed to the Baltic Sea pipeline that would bring Europe and Russia closer to each other.⁶⁷⁷

Referring to the absence of Chancellor Merkel at the CBSS Summit in Riga, Bodewig commented: *„Ich bin zufrieden, weil unmittelbar nachdem Steinmeier Außenminister wurde, hat er am Ostseerat teilgenommen als sichtbares Zeichen. Davor war sieben Jahre Deutschland weder auf Ebene des Ministers noch des Staatssekretärs vertreten. Das war schon ein ganz gutes Zeichen.“*⁶⁷⁸ Franz Thönnies agreed: *„Ich glaube nicht, dass das Gewicht darauf gelegt werden muss, ob nun Frau Merkel oder Herr Putin da sind, was natürlich gut wäre. Sondern wichtig ist, was eingebracht worden ist in den Reformprozess des Ostseerates, [...]“*⁶⁷⁹

Kurt Bodewig responded to the Finnish calls for more commitment: *„[...] Vielleicht sind die Erwartungen höher in diesem Bereich als Deutschland sie auch erfüllen kann. Wir haben als großer Staat in der globalen Wahrnehmung auch andere Aufgaben.“*⁶⁸⁰ Franz Thönnies explained that Germany is not aspiring leadership, but equal partnership in the region: *“Es ist notwendig, als gleichberechtigte Partner aufzutreten. Diese Frage der gleichberechtigten Partner wird von den kleineren Ländern auch sehr sensibel gesehen, so dass es sich verbietet, eine Führungsrolle zu übernehmen, weil die Würde mit Sicherheit dazu beitragen, dass sofort wieder Skepsis aufkäme und eine gute Vertrauensbasis, die jetzt da ist, ins Wanken geriete.“*⁶⁸¹

Baltic Sea issues are highly affected by the disproportion of the both countries. Although there is good basis for mutual understanding and a common interest towards each other, both states have strongly different views on each other. Interestingly, no Finnish representative seemed to appreciate the current German contribution, but called for more engagement. Germany makes efforts on a lower political level. Additionally, it is not completely understood. Germany is a country with many neighbourhoods and it must be careful about its appearance, particularly towards Denmark and Poland, which have suffered so much by German domination in the past. The region is not among Germany's priorities. The more it would be unwise to worsen German reputation with an overemphasised political claim. However, the Federal Government took a leading role in the Mediterranean Union issue and represented the region's interests towards the Union's South. No one blamed Germany for that.

4 Conclusions

Since the Cold War order has changed, both states re-established a close relationship. Today Germany and Finland are members of the European Union. Particularly during the consecutive EU presidencies in late 2006 and early 2007, foreign policy leaders met frequently. On the one hand, it became evident that meetings on the political top level depend very much on the current European agenda. On the other hand, both countries also maintain links that are less dependent on current issues. The Prime Minister's Office and the Federal Chancellery hold a regular exchange

⁶⁷⁷ Interview with Franz Thönnies.

⁶⁷⁸ Interview with Kurt Bodewig; Author's translation: I am satisfied, because just after Steinmeier became Foreign Minister he participated in the Council of Baltic Sea States as a visible signal. Before that, Germany had not been represented for seven years neither on minister level nor on state secretary level. That was a real good signal indeed.

⁶⁷⁹ Interview with Franz Thönnies; Author's translation: I do not think that it must be emphasised whether Ms Merkel or Mr Putin are there, although that would be good of course. But important is what has been brought into the reform process of the Council of Baltic Sea States.

⁶⁸⁰ Interview with Kurt Bodewig; Author's translation: Maybe expectations are higher in that area than Germany can fulfil. We also have other tasks as a big state from a global perception.

⁶⁸¹ Interview with Franz Thönnies; Author's translation: It is necessary to act as equal partners. This issue of equal partners is considered very sensitively by small countries, so that it is forbidden to take a role as leader, because it would for sure contribute immediately to scepticism, which would rise again, and a good basis of trust, which is existent at the moment, started wavering.

on all major EU policies. On the parliamentary level, there has also been a traditional channel in form of the German-Nordic Parliamentary Group for many decades. Personal contacts have been very good throughout recent history – Brandt-Sorsa, Kohl-Lipponen, Fischer-Tuomioja, Merkel-Halonen. These can change from time to time. It must be emphasised that particularly in the early 1990s the political leadership of Germany was firmly Finland-friendly. Chancellor Kohl as well as his foreign ministers, Genscher and Kinkel, promoted the Finnish EU accession decisively. A mutually favourable perception remains. However, the asymmetry in knowledge and attention for each other is immanent. In that respect, size matters a lot. Germany has many neighbours. France and Poland are probably the most important ones. Contrary, Finland has its focus, inevitably by its geography, on the states along the Baltic Sea region. Sweden, Germany and Russia are the most significant partners. The peripheral position of Finland enhances that concentration, because the country has no comparable neighbours to the north. Nonetheless, Finland enjoys, regarding its size and peripheral situation, a relatively high attention and a very good reputation in Berlin.

The examination of four relevant policy fields drew a varied and detailed picture. In the area of Russia policy, both states have an outstanding position among the 27 EU members. Germany has held good contacts to Russia throughout most of its history. Since the end of the Cold War, German governments pursued a Russia-friendly policy aimed at integration, modernisation and democratisation. Germany was able to bring Russia into a dialogue with NATO, to promote participation in the then G8 and a partnership with the EU. Finland developed a comparably constructive approach. In the post-war order, the country's bilateral relationship towards its eastern neighbour had to be designed according to the imperative of good relations with the Soviet Union. Finland applied an active strategy of neutrality. Its moderating role in the Helsinki Process is famous and branded the country with international reputation. As EU member, Finland continued its cooperative policy. Particularly, its Northern Dimension initiative is a renowned example. The common interest in good relations between Russia and Europe as well as the USA is a binding element in the German-Finnish relationship. Finns know about the decisive role of Germany in the East-West atmosphere and appreciate that Germany was a thoughtful actor, committed to multilateralism and cooperation instead of confrontation. Contrary, Germans see Finland in a key position as one of the most experienced states in dealing with the Eastern giant. Accordingly, Finnish 'Russia know-how' is truly valued. Brandt emphasised the role of Northern Europe for East-West rapprochement. Genscher watched Finnish-Russian relations carefully and considered Finnish interpretations of new developments. Today, Finns are still one of the most important conversation partners for Germany regarding Russia. In that respect, the German-Finnish relationship is indeed characterised by the disproportion in size. Germany knows that it does not have to follow a Finnish advice and Finland is much more depended on what the Federal Government does than the other way round. Therefore, it is apparent that Finnish foreign policy makers mentioned that they carefully watch what Germany and Russia are talking about. Moreover, Finland tries to bring in its expertise as far as possible in order to have a certain influence. There is a kind of suspicion due to the imperative of a possible German-Russian agreement to the disadvantage of smaller countries. For Germany, Finland is not just 'small' in that issue. There are other countries that enjoy by far not that appreciation and access in Berlin. The historical experience and the present knowledge about Russia make Finland quite a 'big' partner.

The positions on European integration and the institutional questions of the recent EU reform process revealed a significant divergence between Germany and Finland. On the first sight, both countries have a historically motivated interest in the development and strength of the European Union. Germany solved the strategic dilemma of its central position between East and West Europe by integrating into a wider and deeper political union. Finland anchored itself in the West-

ern world to which it had always the closest ties in terms of culture, economic development and political thinking. Therefore, both states favour integration. However, Germany and Finland have different ideas of Europe due to considerations of influence. Germany as the biggest state in the EU-27 will almost automatically remain with considerable influence. For Finland, the small, peripheral state of 5.3 million people could easily be overruled. After the Swedish and the Russian rule over Finland, the country has no interest in being a province of a European empire. Thus, Finnish governments, Lipponen as well as Vanhanen, understood themselves as 'small' and formulated their interests quite often explicitly as small states' interests. At the European Convention, the 2003/2004 IGC during the negotiations of the institutional questions of the Treaty of Lisbon, Germany and Finland had contrary positions. Particularly, the introduction of a president of the EU and a European foreign minister, the arrangement of the Commission and the role of the rotating presidency were critical issues that followed the logic of a big versus small cleavage. Finland tried to keep the reform process in motion, but positioned itself in a coalition of small states at the same time. Thereby, it also relied on the German attitude to listen to the small states. That has been appreciated in the past and was missed then. Traditionally, Germany was not regarded as a usual big state, but a state using its influence for the well-being of the whole Union. There is even the expectation of a thoughtful leadership. Finally, both states agreed on the TCE. Germany valued the Finnish constructive approach, giving impulses and ideas instead of vetoes. A conflict of big and small states, and thereby Germany and Finland, remains immanent. The issue of the re-launch of the reform process during the Finnish and German presidencies revealed that Germany sees itself in a leading position. Finland was satisfied to play a mediating role. The German government watched carefully that it remained only mediating, though. For the future, it will be decisive whether Germany plays its European-orientated role suitable for small states or accentuates the Franco-German motor, particularly within a core. Finland is determined to defend a small state's interests.

In the field of European security, both states have a different starting point first of all. Germany has been NATO member for more than 50 years, while Finland stays consciously outside the Northern Alliance. Moreover, Germany supported the creation of a European pillar within NATO since its rearmament in the 1950s. Finland repeated its opposition of a military alliance and enhanced cooperation of a group willing to advance joint security and defence efforts within the EU, as it was mentioned by Germany and France at the Convention. However, the shape of the present ESDP is pretty much what both states can agree on and support. Finland was particularly supportive for European crisis management. In order to prove suspicion of the neutrals' role wrong, the country called for strong military and civil capabilities. Germany also emphasised the need for the civil component of the ESDP and gave efforts to the multilateral security dimension due to self-restriction on unilateral action. Finnish representatives acknowledged that Germany is one of the leading actors in the development of the ESDP. The German approach has been appreciated. Moreover, the country's function as counterweight to France and the UK was emphasised. During the Lebanon War 2006, the limited influence of Finland became evident. Finns welcome that Germany is among the big states, which go forward in such a situation. From a German perspective, the Finnish contribution to European security efforts was strongly welcomed. German foreign policy makers stated that the status of military non-alignment does not mean any problem. Germany's support for a Finnish NATO membership is likely, although it would probably depend on the over-all situation, particularly regarding Russia. In the case of a military attack on Finland, German defence experts said that support would be expectable. In that respect, Germany is conscious about its responsibility not only for the NATO states' security, but also for that of all EU states. A distinction between NATO and non-NATO countries within the EU was not emphasised.

In the area of European security policy, Finland's engagement and experience within the UN was pointed out. The country's knowledge and international reputation could contribute to the importance of the whole ESDP. Therefore, the Nordic country is given a role that is more important than its size might suggest. Nonetheless, German representatives also emphasised the limits of Finnish participation. Finland should develop niche capacities in order to bring in most effectively. Germany is willing to take responsibility and a leading position within European security efforts. Referring to security issues, the big-small proportion is fairly existent. However, Germany is playing its role in a European way, underlining its responsibility and the need for joint action. German plans for the ESDP were adjusted to the demands of countries like Finland. Nonetheless, the realisation of enhanced cooperation within the ESDP will be a test for bilateral relations. The Nordic country played an active role that makes the development of a European security dimension probably easier, but it is determined to safeguard its special needs.

Baltic Sea cooperation is an area of mutual interest on the first sight. In both countries there is a kind of historical memory of a prosperous region and they want to tie in with the idea of a new Baltic Sea era. For Finland, its only coastal waters are the vitally important water way the country needs to trade and exchange with Western Europe. For Germany, or more precisely northern Germany, the region is a neighbourhood with manifold future opportunities. The Baltic Sea also functioned as a regional forum for interaction of Russia and the West, NATO and the EU. In that respect, the region's cooperation is also secondary to the relations with Russia, Poland and Denmark. Therefore, the huge asymmetry in attention for the Baltic Sea region is apparent. While the President and the Prime Minister of Finland call for needed political commitment, related issues are a matter of the German Foreign Minister seconded to other, more important tasks. Finnish policy makers see themselves in an urgent situation with limited opportunities on their own. They called for German support and leadership in the region. In that area, it has been mentioned more explicitly than in any other policy field: We are small, we need your leadership. Finland is not able to put the Baltic Sea cooperation forward on its own, although it has been active in promoting joint action since the early 1970s. Germany is regarded as a big state that could do much more. However, the country is not willing to take a visible leading role. There is hardly a German politician who denies the Baltic Sea region being a European future region. But they do not see necessity for more German engagement and refer to the current activities. On the other hand, the German policy is not only a result of the low priority of the region, but also of the self-interpretation of Germany. Because it is so big and has a past in which it used its power to the disadvantage of its neighbours, the country remains careful about being a leader. However, the intervention of Angela Merkel in the Mediterranean Union issue showed that Germany is ready to take a stance as leader towards the rest of the EU. Finland is fairly regarded as a country that gives strong impulses to the Baltic Sea cooperation. Moreover, it is appreciated due to its similar approach that emphasised the EU, the integration of Russia and cooperation of equals, free of hegemonic considerations. Additionally, German policy makers are conscious about the outstandingly German-friendly attitude of Finland. The bilateral relationship is characterised by Finland's call for more commitment and German reluctance to take a more active role, though.

All in all, the fact of size is immanent. Foreign policy makers of both states are conscious about that and it has consequences for their thinking. A rationalist perspective points to important factors for the bilateral relationship. First of all, it explains the big asymmetry between both states in terms of knowledge and attention. Furthermore, it reveals the preconditions that explain Finnish suspicion of a German-Russian agreement and a Franco-German predominance in the EU. Then, it gives some evidence for the German reluctance towards the Baltic Sea region and the Finnish efforts for regional cooperation. Additionally, the sheer capacities Finland or Germany can con-

tribute to the ESDP are important. However, a rationalist point of view does not fully serve to understand the complexity of German-Finnish relations. Germany gives Finland an extraordinary role in EU Russia policy. The country's experience and advice is fairly valued. In security issues, Finnish knowledge is appreciated as well. In the area of EU constitutional affairs, the active and constructive attitude of the Finnish negotiators as well as the country's support for integration is truly welcomed. Finland is regarded as a small, constructive and intelligent partner. It must be emphasised that the newcomer from 1995 is regarded as an 'old' member state. On the other hand, the country also cultivates its 'small state identity'. Germany is perceived as a big state with a sense for small states. The ability to listen to others and interpreting its size as responsibility are characteristics that are not given *a priori*, but the result of German history and perception. Hence, history is an important factor for the German-Finnish relationship in general. In retrospective, both states also seem to cultivate their historical interpretations. Germany has been the helping hand since the First World War that Finns still can rely on. Finland is the smart active neutral that mediated between East and West, and is still convincing with its intelligence, knowledge and experience. However, Germany is not an ally by nature. There were considerable reasons for German assistance. Similar preferences mean good preconditions that Germany will remain a friend of Finland, though. Additionally, Finland should feel invited to remind Germany any time of its European commitment, because this is the strongest insurance for German unilateralism. On the other hand, Germany should focus its attitude towards small states. The key goal of German foreign policy for the last 60 years has been the creation of a united Europe. Frictions with small states are an important indicator, if that goal is compatible with the current foreign policy. During the Schröder era, there have been reasons for reserved perceptions of Germany. In the EU-27, it is more than ever important to take small states' interests into consideration. Germany and Finland are a kind of model couple of big and small in Europe. They give a good example that a self-confidently active small state and a responsibly leading big state can interact very constructively for the future of Europe.

Abbreviations

BDV	<i>Bund der Vertriebenen</i> /Federation of Expellees
BSPC	Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference
BSSSC	Baltic Sea States Subregional Co-operation
CDU	<i>Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands</i> / Christian Democratic Union of Germany
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
COMECON	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
CSU	<i>Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern</i> /Christian-Social Union of Bavaria
DFG	<i>Deutsch-Finnische Gesellschaft</i> /German-Finnish Association
EC	European Community
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDA	European Defence Agency
EDC	European Defence Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EPC	European Political Community
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESDU	European Security and Defence Union
EU	European Union
FCMA	Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance
FDP	<i>Freie Demokratische Partei</i> /Free Democratic Party
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
GDP	Gross domestic product
GDR	German Democratic Republic
IGC	Intergovernmental Conference
KESK	<i>Suomen Keskusta</i> /Centre Party of Finland
KOK	<i>Kansallinen Kokoomus</i> /National Coalition Party
MP	Member of the Parliament
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NDEU	Northern Dimension of the European Union
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PCA	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PJCC	Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters
SDP	<i>Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue</i> / Finnish Social Democratic Party
SPD	<i>Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands</i> / Social Democratic Party of Germany
SWP	<i>Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik</i> / German Institute of International and Security Affairs
TCE	Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
UK	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UN	United Nations
UPI	<i>Ulkopoliittinen instituutti</i> /Finnish Institute of International Affairs
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics