

Working Paper

Research Division EU Integration
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
German Institute for International
and Security Affairs



*Cathleen Berger, Marcel Humuza and Sara
Janssens*

Training in the EEAS:

How to Live Up to the Potentials of the
Lisbon Treaty

SWP Working Papers are online
publications of SWP's research
divisions which have not been
formally reviewed by the
Institute. Please do not cite
them without the permission of
the authors or editors.

Ludwigkirchplatz 3-4
10719 Berlin
Phone +49 30 880 07-0
Fax +49 30 880 07-100
www.swp-berlin.org
swp@swp-berlin.org

**Working Paper FG 1, 2013/ 02, July 2013
SWP Berlin**

Table of Contents

Executive summary	2
Introduction.....	4
The Potentials of the Lisbon Treaty	6
First Strength: Double/Triple-hatting the High Representative	6
Second Strength: An Administrative Foundation for Comprehensive Approaches	7
Third Strength: Joint Staff Categories	8
Fourth Strength: Sense of Ownership of the Member States	8
The Challenges of the Institutional Compromise.....	9
First Challenge: Semi-merged Competences and Instruments	9
Second Challenge: Lack of an Esprit de Corps	10
Third Challenge: Diverging National Attitudes	11
Value of Training and Status Quo at EU Level	12
Tackling the Challenges through Training	12
Training Objectives: Knowledge, Individual Working Culture, Coordination Reflex	13
Status Quo of Training at EU Level.....	15
Overview of Existing Models of Training	17
Model I: Training at a Diplomatic Academy	18
First Asset: Extensive Socialisation and Interdisciplinary Training.....	18
Second Asset: Intensive EU-specific Training	19
Third Asset: Fostering an Individual Working Culture by Means of Thematic Modules	20
Fourth Asset: Strengthening Intercultural Competencies, Supporting Coordination Reflexes.....	20
Summary.....	20
Model II: Training on the Job	21
Main Feature: Short Induction, Mentoring and Comprehensive on-going Training	21
First Asset: Close Monitoring and Strongly Fostering an Individual Working Culture.....	22
Second Asset: Knowledge Transfer based on a System of Career Incentives	23
Third Asset: Effective EU-specific Training.....	24
Fourth Asset: Cost-Effectiveness, especially for Smaller Countries	24
Summary.....	25
Model III: Training as a ‘Mixed Bag’	26
Main Feature: Combination of Substantive Induction Courses and Work Experience	26
Summary.....	27
Three Models and their Usability for Training for the EEAS.....	28
Living up to its Potentials: Recommendations for Successful EEAS Training	31
Centralised Extensive Induction for New Recruits	31
Short, also Centralised, Introduction for Senior Officials	32
A Network System for Common Activities	32
Widening the Mutual Opening of Training Schemes	33
European-wide Individual Development Plans for On-the-job Training	33
Alignment of National Rotation Systems and Establishment of a Regular European Conference on Training	33
A Mentoring Scheme Based on “Cross-Grouping” Staff Categories	34

*Cathleen Berger is research assistant to the Director of research (Executive Board) at SWP.
Marcel Humuza and Sara Janssens are recent graduates of the Postgraduate Programme in European Studies
in Berlin.*

Executive summary

The Lisbon Treaty created the European External Action Service (EEAS) as the new diplomatic service of the EU under the authority of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Affairs. The service and the High Representative are supposed to make the EU external representation more coherent, visible and effective. Yet, both have to stake out their roles within a complex institutional environment with strong EU actors (the Member States, the Commission and the European Parliament). The review of the EEAS in mid-2013 will deliver first insights into the work of the service. It will, of course, cause a well-known debate on the development of the Union's external action, in particular with regard to competencies, procedures and ownership within the EEAS.

This paper focuses on another interesting and important aspect often put aside in those discussions: training of diplomats from EU institutions and Member States. We assume that training could improve the output of EU diplomacy. Training cannot solve all the problems or provide for all the means necessary to streamline the Union's external action. Yet, it is perceived as an important asset to the individual diplomat and therewith to the entire EEAS and its institutional environment.

Our main question is: *Which training scheme could contribute the most to the output of EU diplomacy considering the potentials and challenges of the EEAS?* We therefore analyse existing methods of training in different Member States: the extensive induction phase organised by the diplomatic academy of the German Foreign Office; the on-the-job training applied in the British as well as the Danish case; a mixed model chosen by the Belgian Foreign Office.

In conclusion, we opt for an EU-tailored variation of a mixed model of training. This could help to foster knowledge of EU diplomacy as well as an adequate working culture at the level of the individual diplomat. It could also strengthen the reflex of coordination and cooperation between those diplomats as well as between institutions and Member States. This mixed model combines substantial induction courses with working experience. It can make use of both, the socialising effects of an academy as well as the flexibility, individualisation and cost-efficiency of on-the-job training. Under such a model, new staff could undergo an extended period of induction while more experienced staff is only shortly introduced to the structures of the EEAS and then directly starts to work in their respective posts. A mentoring system and on-going training for all staff members

could then be used to enhance their general knowledge, and to establish a common working culture.

This more sophisticated training system would not have to be based on a diplomatic academy. Yet, the fragmentation of training measures and the organisational structures would have to be overcome by merging different programmes, institutional entities, their staff and training networks.

Introduction

The European External Action Service (EEAS) took up its work on 1 January 2011.¹ While hopes of the Lisbon Treaty may have been dimmed to some extent by the compromise found in the Council decision and the somewhat shaky start of the EEAS, the upcoming review of the EEAS mid-2013² will offer a solid possibility to reconsider the status quo and refocus on the original hopes stirred by the Lisbon Treaty.

In the discussion accompanying both, the establishment of the EEAS and the ongoing review process, scholars tend to focus either on the output of EU external action or the (inter-) institutional arrangements.³ Yet, little attention has been paid to aspects of staffing policy and in particular the role of training.⁴ The same holds true for the EU institutions and the member states, respectively, which have been more concerned with finding their own staff “adequately” represented on the highest levels in the EEAS structure than their overall training.⁵

In our paper we concentrate on the issue of training methods assuming that training could improve the output of EU diplomacy.⁶ Training is perceived as an

¹ Official Journal of the European Union: *Council Decision of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service*. EU: 2010/427/EU, 2010. In the following referred to as “Council decision”.

² Cf. Article 13 (3), *Council Decision establishing the EEAS*.

³ The establishment of the EEAS is discussed e.g. by: Jozef Bátora: A Democratically Accountable European External Action Service: Three Scenarios, In: *European Integration online Papers* 14/13, 2010; Simon Duke: Providing for European-Level Diplomacy after Lisbon: The Case of the European External Action Service, In: *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 4, 2009, pp. 211-233; Mark Furness: The European External Action Service: A New Institutional Framework for EU Development Cooperation, In: *Discussion Paper* 15/2010, Bonn: Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, 2010. Julia Lieb, Martin Kremer: Empowering EU Diplomacy. The European External Action Service as an opportunity for EU foreign policy, *SWP-Aktuell* 2, 2010. Literature concentrating on the review process is only starting to be published, input can be found among others in: Steven Blockmanns: EEAS reloaded: Recommendations for the 2013 review, In: *CEPS Commentary*, 12.12.2012; Niklas Helwig, Paul Ivan, Hrant Kostanyan: *The new EU foreign policy architecture. Reviewing the first two years of the EEAS*, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2013.

⁴ Among the few contributions broaching the role of training are: Mai'a K. Davis Cross: Building a European Diplomacy: Recruitment and Training to the EEAS, In: *European Foreign Affairs Review* 16, 2011, pp. 447-464; Simon Duke: Diplomatic Training and the Challenges Facing the EEAS, In: *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 7 (1), 2012, pp. 95-114; Sieglinde Gstöhl: European Union Diplomacy: What Role for Training? In: *EU Diplomacy Papers*, 3/2012.

⁵ For a more detailed assessment of the negotiation process and the different positions of the actors involved see e.g.: Ramón Jáuregui Atondo: The European Parliament: A major Player in the Negotiations on the Creation of the European External Action Service, In: *ARI Real Instituto Elcano* 147/2010, 2010, pp. 1-6; Kolja Raube: The Construction of the European External Action Service, In: *ARENA. Centre for European Studies*, 2009, pp. 1-24.

⁶ Aspects, such as staff policies or recruitment will not be reflected in the analysis.

important asset to the individual diplomat and therewith to the entire EEAS and its institutional environment. Yet, we admit that training cannot solve all the problems or provide for all the means necessary to streamline EU external action. Training schemes and efforts find their limitations in questions, such as concerns of sovereignty, specific (national) interests and aims as well as legal or budgetary restraints.

We will start by highlighting the potentials of the Lisbon Treaty, outlining the original motivations and good intentions in the institutional arrangement. Thereafter, we test those against the challenges that arise in practice due to the final compromise stipulated in the Council decision establishing the EEAS. Putting these two pictures together – potentials and challenges – we identify different objectives through which training may contribute to the output of EU diplomacy. Namely, training for the EEAS should be offered with regard to general knowledge, an individual working culture and a coordination reflex. We then present three models of training. We consider a diplomatic academy model, a training on-the-job model, and a mixed model that includes both academy learning and learning by doing. These models are derived from existing training schemes in the Member States. We assess the practicability of each model for training on the EU level and highlight the respective advantages and downsides. This, ultimately, leads us to a set of recommendations, which may prove beneficial to the further development of the EEAS.

The Potentials of the Lisbon Treaty

“In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.”⁷

With that, the EU has set itself an ambitious agenda for its external action. The EU aims to foster peaceful relations, strengthen its voice in the world, stabilise its neighbourhood, and contribute to prosperity and sustainable development. In the narrower sense of these ambitions, EU diplomacy aims to consolidate its role as a mediator and negotiator, to enter the international stage as a more neutral force due to the prior consensus of its position among the 28 Member States, and to convey the image of a civilian power (contrary to realist, national interests). While this may seem pointed, exaggerated or like a typical example of big, but empty words to some observers, it sets out the ideals for which the EU strives in its external relations. It casts the net in which the potentials are rooted. Naturally, these ambitions need to be embedded in a capable institutional setting – a condition the Lisbon Treaty potentially meets.⁸

First Strength: Double/Trippl-hatting the High Representative

Merging different elements of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as well as the formerly scattered foreign policy procedures and instruments into the office of the High Representative is supposed to grant the EU its ‘one voice’.⁹ The High Representative is, therefore, assigned with competences in the realm of the

⁷ Article 3 (5) TEU. Official Journal of the European Union: *Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union*. EU (Lisbon): C 83/01 1, 2010.

⁸ For a general presentation and an analysis of the institutional setting of the EEAS, cf.: Cathleen Berger: *The European External Action Service. Increasing Coherence in the Crisis Management of the European Union?*, Marburg: Tectum Verlag, 2012; Julia Lieb, Martin Kremer: *Der Aufbau des Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienstes: Stand und Perspektiven*, In: *integration (3)*, 2010.

⁹ The former shortcomings of EU external action have been widely lamented, see e.g.: Asle Toje: *The EU Security Strategy Revised: Europe Hedging Its Bets*, In: *European Foreign Affairs Review* 15, 2010, pp. 171-190; Gerrard Quille: *The European External Action Service and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)*, In: Ettore Greco, Nicoletta Pirozzi, Stefano Silvestri (eds.): *EU Crisis Management: Institutions and Capabilities in the Making*. Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2010, pp. 55-78; Jonas Paul: *EU Foreign Policy After Lisbon. Will the New High Representative and the External Action Service Make a Difference?*, In: *CAP Policy Analysis 2/2008*, 2008.

Council and competences in the Commission cabinet.¹⁰ This should allow for better coordination and a more unified and stable external representation of the EU. ‘Double/Triple-hatting’ thus means combining the former position of the High Representative with competences and instruments from Council and Commission so as to harmonise approaches of CFSP, Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), humanitarian aid, enlargement, trade, and development policies as well as in a wider sense questions of energy and environment policies. In other words, the office of the High Representative is meant to bridge the gap between intergovernmental and supranational decision-making modes.

Second Strength: An Administrative Foundation for Comprehensive Approaches

The administrative foundation, in the form of the EEAS, may substantially back the wide range of tasks the High Representative has to fulfil. The EEAS has the potential to be the basis with which successful coordination can be ensured, by employing the comprehensive array of foreign policy instruments and backing the decision-making process spurred by the High Representative.¹¹ Thanks to the right of initiative¹², the High Representative may issue proposals and function as an agenda-setter. The access to both, Council and Commission instruments potentially enables the High Representative, and thus the EEAS, to reasonably combine all the relevant policies into a streamlined, comprehensive approach. The EEAS, with its permanent mandate as an administrative body in-between the overall institutional setting of EU external representation, is supposed to guarantee continuity in the external representation of the EU and facilitate smart decision-making in spite of changing leadership. Though not a foreign service as such, the EEAS and its approximately 130 delegations around the world may provide the necessary administrative foundation for the EU level of foreign policy.

¹⁰ Cf. Article 17 (4) in combination with Article 18 (4) and 27 TEU. The concept of ‘double-hatting’ has been used to describe the new balance which the position of High Representative has to strike. When the post was introduced with the coming into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, it was closely linked to the Council (first hat). Since it now also contains functions within the Commission, it is described as wearing a second hat. The fact that the High Representative is also chairing the Council on Foreign Relations has been referred to as “carrying an umbrella”. We employ ‘triple-hatting’ instead, as all three functions have formerly been conducted by three different actors.

¹¹ Cf. Article 27 (3) TEU.

¹² Cf. Article 22 (2) TEU.

Third Strength: Joint Staff Categories

As stipulated in Article 27 (3) TEU, the EEAS comprises officials from the Council, the Commission, and the Member States. It thus merges different staff categories which were formerly separate. In some cases the different staff even worked against one another in the past. Including these diverse backgrounds of staff in one body may enrich their respective work patterns. Their diverging experience should be an asset to EU diplomacy, from which staff can mutually benefit, if it is shared and nurtured sensibly. This strength relates to the development of an *esprit de corps* or a European diplomatic culture. An *esprit de corps*, as we understand it, includes two dimensions, firstly, it means sharing common values and a common view on European diplomacy. And secondly, it refers to a certain sense of loyalty towards the EEAS and identification with the European level of diplomacy. The development of such an *esprit de corps* also builds on adjustments in the national attitudes of the Member States and is therefore closely connected to the fourth strength.

Fourth Strength: Sense of Ownership of the Member States

A sense of ownership or shared representation of and within the EEAS on the part of the Member States should develop as a result of joining the different staff categories. By deploying their national officials to the EEAS, Member States should feel like an essential part of the EU level of diplomacy, able to keep track of EU policies and developments.

Additionally, as a result of the rotating principle, staff returning from their terms within the EEAS carries their extended knowledge of EU policies and the attitudes of other EU members into the national foreign services. Thus, their European experience may enhance their respective national culture and contribute to a more general European diplomatic tradition.¹³

¹³ Cf. similar argumentation in: Almut Möller, Julian Rappold: Deutschland und der Europäische Auswärtige Dienst. Perspektiven einer Europäisierung der Außenpolitik, In: *DGAPanalyse (12)*, 2012, here p. 17.

The Challenges of the Institutional Compromise

As rosy as the picture looks when we are only considering the potentials of the new institutional setting, the High Representative and the EEAS also face particular challenges. The Council decision defines the EEAS as a “functionally autonomous body”¹⁴. It has neither been attached to the Council nor the Commission, thus, it is technically separate from the existing EU institutions. Moreover, it was neither conceived as an agency nor as a new institution. In terms of its staff and financial regulations, the EEAS is treated as an institution; in terms of its political dimension and the conduct of external action, its design resembles that of an EU agency.¹⁵

Although the design as functionally autonomous may still live up to the original hopes and potentials, it faces three main challenges: (1) competences and instruments were only partly merged, (2) the inclusion of different staff categories does not naturally foster an *esprit de corps* and (3) diverging (national) diplomatic attitudes towards third parties hinder coherence.

First Challenge: Semi-merged Competences and Instruments

When former Commission General Directorates (DGs) and Council Secretariat were merged into the EEAS, DG development aid, DG enlargement and ENP as well as the DGs and working groups for other policies with an external dimension, such as trade, energy and environment, remained within the realm of the Commission. Thus, while competences, structures and instruments were supposed to be merged, this was only partly realised.

To make matters worse, while policy fields remain separate on the Commission level, their distinction is sometimes blurred in the actual conduct of the field. One illustrative example is the ENP. Stefan Füle is the designated Commissioner, yet, the format of the Union for the Mediterranean, which forms part of the southern

¹⁴ Article 1, Council decision.

¹⁵ Official Journal of the European Union: *Regulation (EU, EURATOM) No 1080/2010 of 24 November 2010 amending the Staff Regulation of Officials of the European Communities and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of those Communities*. EU: 1080/2010; *Regulation No 1081/2010 of 24 November 2010 amending Council Regulation No 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities, as regards the European External Action Service*. EU: 1080/2010, 2010; as for the function and design of EU agencies: cf. Edoardo Chiti: *An Important Part of the EU's Institutional Machinery: Features, Problems and Perspectives of European Agencies*, In: *Common Market Law Review* 46. 2009, pp. 1395-1442.

ENP, is headed by the EEAS and/or the High Representative.¹⁶ Thus, their portfolios partly overlap. That means, instead of concentrating all the prior competences for external action in the EEAS, several competences are not merged and remain with the Commission.

The same goes for the wide range of foreign policy instruments. Those instruments clearly associated with the EEAS are planned and managed within the EEAS, their operational budget, however, is decided and adopted by the Commission.¹⁷ Anything related to humanitarian or development aid, like the European Development Instrument, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, the Instrument for Stability, or the Civil Protection Financial Instrument are directly managed and made available by the Commission. Closely connected to the management of instruments is the fact, that whenever the respective policies are concerned, it is the relevant Commissioners that are in charge of the external representation of the EU. In other words, the High Representative is limited to the external representation on the level and in the realm of Foreign Ministers – minus the financial instruments.

Second Challenge: Lack of an *Esprit de Corps*

The second challenge is the need for an *esprit de corps*. The first major transfer of staff took place on 1 January 2011. Staff, then, mainly came from the Council Secretariat, former Commission DGs, and other agencies and bodies that were transferred into the EEAS, e.g. the CPCC or the CPMD.¹⁸ National officials should eventually make up one third of the overall staff.¹⁹ They were and are only slowly nominated. There are currently a total of 3,346 staff members in the EEAS, 1,443 of these at Headquarters in Brussels, 1,903 in the EU Delegations. 336 of them are seconded national experts.²⁰

The different origins of staff, both institutionally and nationally, are supposed to enrich the EEAS' culture. But, in the delegations, for instance, the staff question turned out problematic. As the former Commission delegations were turned into EU delegations, their staff remained largely the same. This led to significant problems with regard to the integration of national diplomats and Council

¹⁶ Council of the EU: *Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States on the Northern Co-Presidency of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)*, Council document 6981/12, Brussels, 27.02.2012, here p. 2.

¹⁷ Article 9, Council decision.

¹⁸ CPCC stands for Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, CPMD refers to the Crisis Planning and Management Directorate.

¹⁹ Article 6, Council decision.

²⁰ Chief Operating Officer (European External Action Service): *2012 EEAS Staffing Report*, Document EEAS/sms Ares D(2012) 902431, Brussels: 24.7.2012, here p. 3.

officials within the delegations as well as in terms of financing, accountability, and the right to issue directions. Many of the former Commission officials kept their old working routines, but technically had to handle new tasks. Moreover, while new staff was deployed to the EU delegations, “old” staff from the other DGs of the Commission, i.e. from those that were not transferred to the EEAS, continue to be present in the delegations, too. Their sense of belonging, their loyalties are rooted in old structures, shifting them to the EEAS on a legal (institutional) level, does not inspire an *esprit de corps*. Naturally, this goes for the Member States as well, which in some cases fear a ‘competence creep’ on the Commission side.

Third Challenge: Diverging National Attitudes

The third challenge ranges on the Member State level and contains two facets. It refers to the diverging diplomatic attitudes of the Member States. Firstly, the Member States follow diverse strategies and base their approaches towards third parties on different historical foundations. Their ideas, how and with whom diplomatic relations should be strengthened, differ, which is why consensus in CFSP is often difficult. Moreover, this, too, hinders the development of an *esprit de corps*.

Carrying these different ideas into their term in the EEAS, the rotating national staff has to adjust significantly to fit into the more European approaches adopted by former Commission staff. Their origins as career diplomats separate them further from the more administratively oriented working routines of former Commission staff.

Secondly, national attitudes differ widely with regard to their commitment to the EEAS. For instance, smaller Member States hope for a strong EEAS, the bigger Member States try to narrow its competences. The smaller Member States advocate more task-sharing through the EEAS, since they are less able to uphold a comparably strong, world-wide external representation. Especially with regard to visa policies or consular assistance, smaller Member States could benefit from an EEAS that is allowed to act in their place. The bigger Member States fear for their own influence and are wary of an EEAS that is perceived as a 29th foreign ministry.²¹ Thus, they aim to limit the EEAS to the role of a service provider. It will be up to the staff working in the EEAS to build a common basis, accommodate diverging interests, and consolidate diverging attitudes.

²¹ For assessments of the different attitudes see among others: Reviewing Member States’ Commitment to the European External Action Service, in: *EPIN Working Paper 34*, November 2012; Rosa Balfour, Kristi Raik (eds.): *The European External Action Service and national Diplomacies*, in: *EPC Issue Paper 73*, March 2013.

Value of Training and Status Quo at EU Level

Tackling the Challenges through Training

Many of these shortfalls were also highlighted by a declaration issued on 15 November 2012 by the foreign ministers of France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain, in the conclusions of the “Future of Europe” group, which was made up of 12 EU Member States as well as a follow-up comprising 14 Member States. In all cases, foreign ministers of some of the EU Member States pointed to shortcomings in the planning and decision-making processes as well as the coordination and consultations mechanisms between Commission and EEAS. The latest recommendation of the European Parliament on the EEAS review also points to these problems.²² Yet, as indicated above, several of these challenges can be met with adequate training. While training may not change the institutional structures and procedures, it may improve the working conditions in the given surroundings. There will not be one single solution to answer to all the criticism. And, as mentioned previously, we will not consider staff policies and recruitment. However, we believe, that a tailor-made training scheme for the EEAS can effectively address the three mentioned challenges.

- Semi-merged competences and instruments: Training may increase the knowledge of the respective structures and sensibilise staff for their smooth conduct and functioning.
- Lack of *en esprit de corps*: Training may support the learning and identification process of delegated staff members, contributing to the formation of a new and common *esprit de corps* by respecting their respective backgrounds and assets. In addition, training can address the differences in knowledge and skills that exist between the different staff given their diverse origin and training backgrounds.

²² Declaration of the Foreign Affairs Ministers and Ministers of Defence of France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain, Paris: 15 Nov. 2012; Non-paper on the European External Action Service from the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden, 8 Dec. 2011; Non-paper on Strengthening the European External Action Service from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, 1 Feb. 2013; European Parliament: Recommendation to the High Representative, the Council and to the Commission on the 2013 review of the organisation and functioning of the EEAS, (2012/2253(INI)), Strasbourg: 26 Apr. 2013.

- Diverging national attitudes: Training may help highlight the differences resulting from specific national and institutional backgrounds and mediate between them.

Training Objectives: Knowledge, Individual Working Culture, Coordination Reflex

Considering the heterogeneous composition, the vast array of tasks and the ambitious purpose of the EEAS, joint professional diplomatic training is therefore necessary to establish a common diplomatic culture. Although the importance of training is stressed in various academic contributions, only few develop concrete recommendations. Among the most common recommendations is the establishment of an European diplomatic academy, be it literally, virtually or focussing on knowledge transfer.²³

While an actual academy has been notably encouraged by the European Parliament²⁴, authors like Gstöhl suggest creating a virtual academy as an interim solution instead. Others, like Duke, limit their perspective on the near future and thus, argue for programmes that focus on the transferral of knowledge. Generally, scholars have underlined different aspects of the particular needs of the EEAS, yet, what all the assessments seem to have in common are three main aspects: the heterogeneity of staff, the specificities of EU diplomacy, and the ambitious objectives formulated in the Lisbon Treaty for both, High Representative and EEAS.

Bearing in mind the potentials as well as the challenges of the Lisbon Treaty and the institutional structure outlined above, we adopt a differentiated approach. Namely, we identify different objectives of training and analyse by which methods as well as institutional set-ups they could be achieved. We assume three main objectives for which training should be provided:

- to increase the general knowledge, in particular of EU foreign policy structures and procedures,
- to strengthen a working culture at the individual level,
- to initiate the development of a coordination reflex.

²³ Cf. e.g. Jörg Monar: The Case for a Diplomatic Academy of the European Union, In: *European Foreign Affairs Review* (5), 2000, pp. 281-286; Josep Lloveras Soler: The New EU Diplomacy: Learning to Add Value, In: *EUI Working Papers 2011/5*, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, 2011; Sieglinde Gstöhl: European Union Diplomacy: What Role for Training?, In: *EU Diplomacy Papers* (3), 2012; Simon Duke: Diplomatic Training and the Challenges Facing the EEAS, In: *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* (7/1), 2012, pp. 95-114.

²⁴ Gerardo Galeota Quecedo: *Report on a common Community diplomacy*. European Parliament. Brussels (Report to the European Parliament, A5-0210/2000), 24. July 2000.

By increasing the knowledge of EU foreign policy structures and procedures, training can contribute to live up to the potentials of the Lisbon Treaty. In other words, if the staff deployed to the EEAS is unable to cater to the need for more coherence and coordination in EU external action, simply because they lack the necessary knowledge to efficiently work with the existing structures and procedures, they may hinder their own success.

Apart from improving the understanding of different competences and instruments, training can increase awareness of political, cultural, and historical differences between the Member States. By strengthening a (individual) working culture, training can trigger positive effects for overall cooperation, as increased sensitivity for the work and background of the respective colleagues is beneficial to everyday work. Therefore, on this level, training can, among others, strengthen intercultural, mediation, language and technical skills. As a specific feature of the EU, the particulars of “EU diplomacy” need to be clarified, too. First and foremost among these particulars is the increased need for coherence and cooperation, as competences are mixed and a much wider array of actors is involved in the decision-making process. By addressing these issues through training, a common understanding of EU diplomacy can develop. In addition, emphasising the ambitions and potential added value of the Lisbon Treaty, in particular the EEAS, as well as the appreciation of common goals can promote both, the individual motivation of staff and their loyalty towards the EEAS. This, eventually, will contribute to the development of an *esprit de corps*.

The objective to initiate the development of a coordination reflex points to working routines, i.e. instead of putting national or Commission interests first, a familiarisation and exchange between all actors involved needs to be encouraged. If you are used to coordinating with your peers, the traditional “national/Commission reflex” may be cushioned and turned into a coordination reflex.

Thus, providing training for all these objectives can work in favour of all the potentials identified earlier on, namely: the double/tripple-hatted nature, the capability to draft comprehensive approaches, the development of an *esprit de corps*, and the sense of ownership of the Member States. Thereby different institutional set-ups as well as different training methods may be needed to address these objectives. Some issues might be better solved through an academy, others through a network approach and some knowledge might be better gained through induction, other through practical experience.

In the following chapter, we will present existing training models. We will highlight their differences and assess their usability for training in the EEAS in

relation to the identified challenges and training objectives. Beforehand, we give a short overview of current training measures at EU level.

Status Quo of Training at EU Level

At present, training measures at EU level are highly fragmented, as there was no central development of joint programmes or structures for this purpose. Instead a wide range of different training schemes and actors was established, each catering to different needs and backgrounds.²⁵

Former Training measures of the European **Commission** largely aimed at technical and administrative skills. In the run-up to the establishment of the EEAS, particular training to strengthen diplomatic competences was provided. Measures were set up:

- within DG Relex through executive courses,
- within the extended Relex family through the Train4diplo programme, which focuses on diplomatic skills, thematic and geographic issues.

Former **joint training** measures including members from the Commission, the Council and the Member States were provided:

- with regard to the mutual opening up of training programmes, which allow for the exchange of staff, for instance, in the form of the Diplomatic Exchange and Secondment Programme for on-the-job training,
- in the form of the European Diplomatic Programme (EDP), which lasts six to eight months and mainly aims to create opportunities for networking and increasing the awareness for the EU dimension of diplomacy.

Training within the **EEAS** builds upon these former training schemes, and is currently backed by:

- specific training for specific demands, including a compulsory training for Heads of Delegation who are being posted for the first time,
- the introduction of a one-week induction course to EEAS newcomers, however, participation is not compulsory.

Generally, additional training is optional with only few exceptions. A small

²⁵ The following overview is based on information provided in interviews as well as in the papers of Simon Duke: Diplomatic Training and the Challenges Facing the EEAS, In: *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 7 (1), 2012, pp. 95-114; Dieter Mahncke, Sieglinde Gstöhl: Fit for the Future. Training European Diplomats, in: ebd.: *European Union Diplomacy. Coherence, Unity and Effectiveness*, Bruxelles et. al.: College of Europe Studies, Vol. 15, 2012, pp. 241-270; David Spence: The Early Days of the European External Action Service: A Practitioner's View, in: *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 7/2, 2012, pp. 207-226.

coordination unit within the EEAS is responsible for the general planning as well as for the set-up of an annual work programme for strategic training.

Other training initiatives in the larger field of foreign and security policy include the

- European Security and Defence College (ESDC), a virtual college with a permanent secretariat in Brussels and a network of national academies and training institutions, which mainly focuses on security and defence matters,
- Europe's New Training Initiative (ENTRI) (former European Group on Training (EGT)), which is similarly virtual, disposes of a network of training actors and organisations, and aims to strengthen the civilian capacities in the EU's crisis response,
- European Police College (CEPOL) based in Bramshill (England) which provides common training for EU police and law enforcement officials and raises awareness for cross-border cooperation.

Overview of Existing Models of Training

The investment in extensive and systematic diplomatic training has a long-standing tradition as a means chosen by states to react to changes that place it in a more demanding and complex international environment. Thus, countries put great emphasis on the training of its diplomats for two main reasons. On the one hand, “big” nations playing an important regional or global role are forced to prepare their diplomats for a great variety of scenarios and partners in order to meet the broad range of challenges coming with the responsibilities of a global or regional player. On the other hand, small or medium-sized states aim to “punch above their weight”. They train their diplomats extensively in order to provide them with a competitive advantage, which allows them to have a greater impact on the international level than they would normally have, given their size and importance in the international system.²⁶ In some ways, both reasons can be applied to the EU: it aims to be a global player in itself and at the same time the individual Member States are becoming increasingly irrelevant on the international stage and have to arrange their interests in the realm of the EU to ensure their influence. Therefore, both aspirations that of the EU and the Member States, ask for intensive training.

The training schemes employed to achieve these goals (global player, influence) vary from country to country but can be put into two main approaches that follow different lines of thinking: One basic premise is that diplomats need an extensive grounding in all aspects of their job in order to be fully equipped for most of its challenges before being appointed to their first post. This is the idea behind the establishment of a diplomatic academy that trains diplomats during an extensive induction period. Moreover, academy-based training is a sign of prestige which signals to third countries that great importance is placed on diplomatic training in the respective country. The other line of thought maintains that the art of diplomacy is best taught on the job and through the interaction with experienced elders. Countries following this premise rely on mentoring systems, and on-the-job training. Among the EU Member States, two prototypes for these basic models can be identified. The German diplomatic academy is considered to give the most intensive preparation courses to its aspiring diplomats. It has served as an example

²⁶ Armando M. Marques Guedes: Diplomatic Training in the CEI Area and its Comparative Background, In *European Diplomacy: Regional Cooperation, Lifelong Learning and Diplomatic Training*, CEI Dubrovnik Forum, 2011, pp. 14 – 37.

upon which a range of other countries, such as France or Poland, have based or reformed their own institutions. At the same time, the UK's Foreign and Commonwealth Office is widely regarded as having the best and most comprehensive on-the-job training system.²⁷ A third category consists of mixtures of the two models, which, such as in the case of Belgium, combine a shorter centralised induction period with subsequent on-the-job training.

Model I: Training at a Diplomatic Academy

The institutional set-up of a diplomatic academy serves to train aspiring diplomats extensively for a wide range of functions. As diplomats are often subjected to a rotation principle, changing jobs every three to five years, and expected to function as generalists, they can hardly specialise in a specific field or area of work. Therefore, they need extensive training in a broad range of functions.

In the German case, the academy of the Federal Foreign Office is responsible for the competition-based selection procedures to recruit new staff of the Foreign Office as well as all training and further education of German diplomats. Its core competency and its main method consist of organising and conducting lengthy induction courses, but it also organises training for international diplomats.²⁸

First Asset: Extensive Socialisation and Interdisciplinary Training

Between 20 and 40 senior level recruits are trained each year by means of a 14-month-induction programme. Together with the induction programmes for higher and middle level diplomats, it takes place at the academy's own facility. The secluded facility of the academy and the experience of common lodging and free time activities on campus further contribute to the extensive socialisation of the aspiring diplomats. Recruits often enter the service as experts in a specific field. The training is, hence, designed to provide them with interdisciplinary

²⁷ A discussion of different training schemes can be found in: John Dicke: *The New Mandarins. How British Foreign Policy Works*, London: I.B. Tauris, 2007, pp. 44 – 61 and Armando Marques Guedes: *Raising diplomats, genealogical and administrative constraints in patterns of training for diplomacy*, Vienna: Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, 2008.

²⁸ This chapter is based on an interview conducted with a senior official at the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Additional information was found in Enrico Brandt: *Auswärtiges Amt: Diplomatie als Beruf*, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2005; Christopher Gresse, Sebastian Hartmann: *Führungskräfteentwicklung im Auswärtigen Dienst: Ein Vergleich zwischen Auswärtigem Amt und Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Discussion Paper on International Management and Innovation*, Stuttgart: Universität Hohenheim, 2007; Website of the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/AusbildungKarriere/Uebersicht_node.html.

knowledge and qualify them for the broad range of tasks they will encounter during their career. But it is also meant to familiarise them with the norms and values of the Foreign Office and create an *esprit de corps*.

The curriculum of the induction course consists mostly of theoretical education in political sciences, history, economics and European and International public law. These classes are taught by renowned university professors in two to three-week intensive courses, which are concluded by written and oral exams. Theoretical education is meant to provide a basis for the ability of quick and thorough familiarisation with complex new issues needed for a career in the diplomatic service. It also provides the aspiring diplomats with a profound understanding of the distinctive challenges of the German context for conducting and promoting its foreign policy interests. Furthermore, it allows trainees to practice writing reports and similar documents, in preparation for the daily work as a junior staff member. The new recruits also receive language training during their induction. Some trainees with no need for extra language training in French or English can also choose to complete an internship. One example is the “National Experts on Professional Training” (NEPT) Programme, which provides one trainee per year with the opportunity to work at the EEAS. In most cases, the internship serves as direct preparation for the first posting abroad.

Second Asset: Intensive EU-specific Training

A two-week seminar on EU politics and law organised by the Foreign Office’s European department familiarises recruits with the decision-making procedures inside the EU, German EU-policy coordination, the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty and other legal bases of the European Union, and the Union’s central policy areas. The European department presents its day-to-day work and, by means of simulation games, also instructs participants on inter-ministry European policy negotiation and on negotiations in Council working groups. Two days of the seminar are dedicated to deepening the recruits’ knowledge of European law. They learn about the relevant procedures for treaty revisions, are introduced to the legal basis for EU external trade, and study the role of the German Constitutional Court and the German Parliament in European Integration. It is designed to enable recruits to explain and analyse most aspects that may arise in the context or are related to the European level of diplomacy.

Third Asset: Fostering an Individual Working Culture by Means of Thematic Modules

Around twenty thematic or practical modules serve as a means to provide further knowledge and to develop specific skills. For example, media training is conducted in cooperation with instructors from the school for journalists from Deutsche Welle, Germany's international broadcaster as well as staff from the Foreign Office's press department. Trainees also take part in a writing workshop and receive classes on issues such as personal management, rhetoric, negotiation, self-management or team building. Other modules are designed to raise awareness of specific current issues, such as climate change, the relationship between the church and the state, development cooperation, the Islamic faith and the Muslim world or human rights. Generally, recruits seem to acquire a strong and ambitious individual working culture which highlights the need for reflection and sensitivity.

Fourth Asset: Strengthening Intercultural Competencies, Supporting Coordination Reflexes

Additionally, there are "international modules": visits, seminars or simulations which are conducted in cooperation with partner countries. These provide opportunities to network and to enhance intercultural and communication competencies. For instance, induction features two study trips to European institutions and International Organisations or Courts. The first field trip is organised by the Academy and takes recruits to Brussels and Den Haag, where they visit the EU, NATO and the International Court of Justice. As a group building exercise and practical training, the aspiring diplomats are split into two groups for the second trip, and have to organise their own programme. One group visits Vienna, the other goes to Geneva.

The exchange and familiarisation with other institutions and foreign diplomats in the early stages of training facilitates the development of coordination reflexes, as awareness for their role and work patterns is raised.

Summary

Apart from knowledge transfer and skills development, the induction course helps the future diplomats to familiarise with the foreign office's values and norms and network building among trainees. In the German case, the groups of around 20-40 diplomats trained for higher service every year are called "Crews". These serve as a point of identification, as well as a life-long professional and private network. Members of a crew who choose to live on campus not only share the experience of

training for the time of the induction course, but also a large part of their social life. This socialisation helps to build up the high degree of *esprit de corps* which characterises the entire staff of the German Foreign Service.

In addition, the Foreign Office stresses that the lengthy theoretical training provides a level playing field for all junior diplomats, no matter what their background or what their first posting might be. They are well trained in a broad array of fields, allowing them to assume a wide-ranging number of tasks. All recruits receive the same exact training, which means knowledge and skills of the Foreign Office's staff are to a certain extent homogenised.

Awareness of EU matters and roles as well as working routines of international organisations and foreign diplomats is raised early on in their careers. So that generally, recruits leave training with a strong individual working culture and the spark of coordination reflexes.

Model II: Training on the Job

Diplomatic training at the UK's Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) stands as a prototype model of an on-the-job training scheme. Rather than preparing recruits through study, the FCO relies heavily on on-the-job training, mentoring and on-going individualised training throughout a diplomats' career.²⁹

Main Feature: Short Induction, Mentoring and Comprehensive on-going Training

According to the FCO's own assessment, its staff acquires its knowledge through a 70-20-10 model, meaning that 70 per cent of its skills are acquired on the job, 20 per cent through mentoring and talking to colleagues and 10 per cent through formal training. To get familiarised to the service, new recruits start their career with one and a half weeks of induction courses, combined with an e-learning package. The short induction is designed to help recruits understand their role in

²⁹ Information on diplomatic training at the FCO is based on a number of official documents, namely: Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons: *The Role of the FCO in UK Government: Seventh Report of Session 2010-12. Report together with minutes, oral and written evidence*, London: House of Commons 2011; Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons: *FCO performance and finances 2011-12. Fifth Report of Session 2012-13. Report with formal minutes, oral and written evidence*, London: House of Commons 2013; Foreign and Commonwealth Office: *Government Response to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee Report of Session 2010-12 HC 1618 on the Departmental Annual Report 2010-11. Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of her Majesty, June 2012*, London: House of Commons, 2012; Fraser, Simon: *Letter to the Chair of the Committee from Simon Fraser CMG, Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and*

the FCO and the FCO's role within government and the international community. It encompasses information sessions on: expectations, conduct, corporate structure and communication, performance management, health and welfare, career development, language aptitude test, an IT course, and a tour of the headquarters. In addition, there are several thematic sessions on the EU, finances or economics.

After the induction course, recruits join their departments and have to take part in an additional one-week course on international policy skills for policy officers. It focuses on international politics and the analysis and use of evidence and on negotiating and influencing skills. The e-learning packages that entrants have to complete, again serve to transmit organisational information and culture; they deal with, for instance, protecting information, diversity at work, health and safety awareness and finances at the FCO.

First Asset: Close Monitoring and Strongly Fostering an Individual Working Culture

Recruits complete two jobs in their first two years at the FCO, while their first post is normally a position at a department in London. These jobs are selected so that entrants get experience of a policy as well as either a corporate or an operational delivery role. The job description sets out what skills and knowledge the recruits are expected to develop within their new role and what training it requires. They have to produce a personal development plan within six weeks of taking their new role. Therein, they identify development objectives and activities to be undertaken during the first year. From this point onwards, their performance is closely monitored through a system of yearly appraisals.

The personal development plans and yearly appraisals are developed and evaluated in consultation with the new diplomats' 'line manager', a senior officer that serves as a mentor and regularly discusses and coaches the junior diplomats' performance. This means that senior officers not only act as supervisors, but feel responsible for and take an active interest in their 'protégées' further development. Moreover, among the core competencies expected of senior officials is the ability to encourage staff development and coach junior staff. Through such mentoring, young diplomats are socialised into the diplomatic culture of the service, close monitoring is provided and, in particular, the development of an individual working culture is encouraged.

Commonwealth Office; Hague, William: Foreign Secretary speech on diplomatic trade craft. London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2012.

Second Asset: Knowledge Transfer based on a System of Career Incentives

In order to fulfil their training targets, junior British diplomats can choose from the extensive range of courses offered by the FCO. They are expected to sign up for at least three initial courses during their first year. These courses are designed to enable them to take up leadership positions and mainly deal with management issues, such as identifying objectives, managing staff, organising work, or how to take and implement decisions. The FCO offers over a hundred courses for its staff, most of which are carried out by outside contractors such as prestigious universities, business schools, NGOs or consulting agencies. As an additional asset, this fosters understanding and appreciation for the public sector and the interaction with it. The training system is intended to develop the skills and knowledge of UK diplomats up until their final posting. It hence creates a life-long learning environment. For those diplomats deployed overseas, the FCO possesses a comprehensive distance learning library, which gives access to computer-based training as well as to training videos and other virtual learning devices.

The intense language courses of the Foreign Office are often job related or geared towards the requirements of specific posts. Diplomats are normally identified between one and two years in advance for their respective future posts, in order to provide them with the required language training. The FCO has put in place a system of allowances paid to its staff, ranging from around 200 pounds a year for functional French to 4,250 pounds for extensive command of hard languages such as Chinese or Japanese. Students studying hard languages also have the possibility to spend up to a year at universities or language centres abroad. Successfully mastering a hard language can enhance the chance of early promotion of junior diplomats.

As indicated above, the continuous development of skills and knowledge is very important for career advancement in the Foreign Service. Promotion is subject to a highly competitive bidding process, for which dossiers on candidates include, apart from the annual appraisals, lists of language qualifications and training courses attended. Officers who want to qualify for Senior Management posts have to pass a two-day test at the Office's Assessment and Development Centre (ADC). With a failure rate of 58 per cent, it is very hard to pass. Personal development and training is central to the process of retaking and passing this test. In general, the outsourced training scheme, which heavily relies on competition and career incentives, motivates individual life-long learning.

Third Asset: Effective EU-specific Training

Apart from the lectures preparing new recruits for the field trip to Brussels, the FCO offers an introductory course to the European Union. This is a four-day course on negotiation in an EU environment, and classes on influencing and working with EU stakeholders. These appear to be rather successful, as the excellent knowledge and negotiation skills of British diplomats are often credited for allowing the UK to “punch above its weight” in the European Union.³⁰ As part of its newly launched diplomatic excellence initiative, the FCO funded a series of short term secondments of UK diplomats to Foreign Ministries of EU Member States, future Council presidencies in particular. Overall, around two hundred mid-career diplomats per year are seconded to the European Commission, other government departments, NGOs or the private sector as a means of exposing them to a different environment in order to train their skills. Apart from familiarising recruits with the specifics of EU surroundings, this scheme favours coordination reflexes and strengthens the conduct of public diplomacy.³¹

Fourth Asset: Cost-Effectiveness, especially for Smaller Countries

Preparing entrant diplomats on the job is comparatively cost-effective, which can be a considerable advantage, especially for smaller countries. Denmark is a good example of a small country that applies a diplomatic training scheme that focuses on on-the-job training and continued learning.³² At the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, new recruits start immediately after being taken on, filling in a vacant post at the headquarters.³³ The three first years as junior diplomat are officially considered as ‘training time’. Yet, the young diplomats are expected to immediately fulfil all tasks of their position and assume full responsibilities. New diplomats receive training and information sessions in the form of eight to ten ‘generalist basic courses’. These mostly cover half a day, but there are also one-day or two-day courses, given during the first two years every two to three months. Their content is similar to the UK induction session. In addition, great importance

³⁰ Brian Hocking, David Spence: *Foreign Ministries in the European Union. Integrating Diplomats*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, pp. 250–273.

³¹ Note that the perceived unwillingness of the United Kingdom to integrate into the EU is not a matter of a lack of diplomatic skill or adequate training. This rather ranges on the political level which is largely excluded from our assessment.

³² Information on the Danish diplomatic training scheme is based on an interview with a Danish diplomat and the website of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://um.dk/da>.

³³ Denmark does not organise general entry exams for its Foreign Service. Aspiring diplomats apply for vacancies at entry level with their CV and cover letter and go through a selection procedure with psychological and skill tests and interviews. It should also be mentioned, that many recruits

is placed on language training. The courses are organised by a department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and taught both by internal people and external specialised instructors, depending on the content of the course.

As in the UK system, the core of the diplomatic training is learning by doing. In Denmark, junior diplomats learn a lot through getting their work approved in the Foreign Service's system, through which they receive feedback on their work. An experienced team leader is available for advice. The Danish Foreign Service is a small service with a flat structure, which makes it easier for young diplomats to interact with more senior colleagues. The small team and their close interaction help to foster the integration of young diplomats. There are no explicit rules, but generally junior diplomats work for three years in Copenhagen before their first posting abroad. Similarly as in the UK, it is foreseen to do two postings within two different clusters during the first three years, i.e. either traditional foreign policy, development cooperation, or trade policy. On-going training is also encouraged and very present throughout the career of a Danish diplomat. On the one hand, this is due to regular evaluation, but on the other hand the Danish diplomatic service is characterised by a high degree of "flexicurity"; in contrast to most other countries, the appointment as a diplomat does not necessarily provide a life-long employment guarantee. Overall, the individualised, partly outsourced training in combination with the emphasis on mentoring reduces the costs for formalised, institution-based training.

Summary

The most obvious advantage of on-the-job training is its cost-effectiveness. New recruits start working immediately or very soon and provide services to the Ministry for the wage they receive. In addition, young diplomats get a lot of responsibility early on, which can be motivating and may increase the identification with their own job.

Through the systematic evaluations and centrality of training in both, the British and Danish system, individual development is encouraged and promotion chances are objectified. Especially the personal development plans of the UK scheme seem to present a very effective and comprehensive way to systematically address individual development and promote general knowledge and continued life-long learning.

For working culture and socialisation, on-the-job training schemes are highly dependent on the mentors, colleagues and working environment of the new

entering the Danish Foreign Service have studied politics and/ or have benefitted from a student or holiday job at a ministry in Copenhagen. To some extent this can be regarded as pre-training.

SWP-Berlin
Training in the EEAS
July 2013

diplomats throughout first postings. As the system relies to a large extent on input from outside the ministry, the public dimension of diplomacy as well as the initiation of coordination reflexes is strengthened.

Model III: Training as a ‘Mixed Bag’

Apart from diplomatic services using the prototype models of lengthy introductory training at an academy or virtual on-the-job training such as Germany and the UK, respectively, there are many countries that make use of mixed models. They vary in their approach, so that it is difficult to identify a prototype, but we can look at some examples. For instance, Belgium serves as a good illustration of a mixed model. It does not involve an academy, but is conceptualised as a long centralised traineeship, containing both theoretical courses and practical learning through internships and visits.

Main Feature: Combination of Substantive Induction Courses and Work Experience

During the so-called *stage diplomatique* at the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs³⁴ the candidate-diplomat has to complete a two-year programme as a trainee that encompasses theoretical education, skill enhancement and on-the-job training. The training programme is run by the *Maître de Stage*, an ambassador in charge of the organisation and supervision of the programme and the development of the curriculum. S/he is supported in that role by a small secretariat.

The first year of the traineeship is run from the headquarters. The trainees get a thorough introduction to the institutional architecture and the Belgian economic landscape that they will get to deal with on their future jobs. This includes visits to all major departments of the Foreign Ministry, to relevant Belgian federal and regional institutions, to the most important international organisations as well as to firms and institutions that are important to Belgium’s foreign trade. These visits often take the form of a presentation and a Q&A round. Parallel to the visiting activities, the trainees follow thematic courses and intensive language training in their second national language and English. In addition, they receive skill training to improve their communication, rhetoric and negotiation techniques. During the

³⁴ Information on the Belgian diplomatic training scheme is based on two interviews, one with a Belgian diplomat and another with a Belgian attaché for development cooperation, which follows a similar training, and the website of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/>.

last months of the first year, the candidate-diplomats are appointed as trainees to a department of the Foreign Ministry at headquarters in Brussels for three months, where they learn about the daily operation of the Foreign Ministry.

For the second year of the Belgian diplomatic training programme, the candidate-diplomats are sent abroad to a Belgian foreign representation, where they partake in the day-to-day work. Albeit being trainees, the posts appointed to the trainees are unoccupied posts and the trainees fulfil the tasks of a complete diplomatic position. This means, the actual appointment selection takes place at this stage and the trainees normally return to their post after they have passed the final exams.

Like most other foreign services, the Belgian Foreign Ministry applies a rotation and generalist principle. Yet, the Belgian differentiation between diplomats, consuls and attachés dilutes the generalist principle to a certain extent. Further training during the Belgian diplomatic career is provided before the first posting as ambassador and at the so called 'Diplo-days'. Once a year Diplo-days are organised for all the Belgian ambassadors and diplomats. At these days, debates, workshops and training sessions are held. In addition, the Foreign Ministry refunds diplomats for taking language courses in preparation of a new foreign post.

Summary

The Belgian diplomatic training is very practice oriented. The trainees are immediately familiarised with the institutions and actors they will need to work with later on through the visits. The training programme focuses less on theoretical knowledge transfer but is close to the day-to-day work of a Belgian diplomat. In addition, the trainees get to know each other well during the numerous excursions they make and often form a network that they maintain for the rest of their careers. The *maître de stage* functions as a mentor and role model, from which the candidate-diplomats can learn.

Thus, albeit not having an academy, the Belgian diplomatic training scheme achieves group-building and socialisation through common experiences and prepares candidate-diplomats for their job, while at the same time, costs are kept in check. For smaller diplomatic services, with fewer staff to train, putting up an academy is mostly not cost-efficient. In this regard, the Belgian diplomatic training scheme opts to still provide substantive training: by using own staff to give courses and function as mentors, by making use of the general training institute of the federal government (for general courses, like language and skills trainings), by

offering on-the-job training and familiarising diplomats with relevant structures through visits.

Mixed models can be used to accustom to specific needs, ambitions and budgets of countries and other institutions or organisations. For instance, when specific training is deemed necessary but a full-blown academy is not cost-beneficial or not necessary to provide the needed training. Many of the new Member States, such as Bulgaria, Czech Republic and Romania adopted mixed model training schemes when they reformed their diplomatic services after the end of communism.³⁵ A variation of this model is also used by NGOs and companies that send people abroad and recruit new staff through traineeships.³⁶ These often provide some training for their staff members, notably by using in-house trainers, e-learning, simulations and/or experts trainings.

Three Models and their Usability for Training for the EEAS

Following the outline of different models of training, the question is: Which training scheme could contribute the most to the output of EU diplomacy considering the potentials and challenges of the EEAS?

Among the presented models there are three different institutional set-ups: a real academy, a virtual college (e-learning) and a network system. Moreover, two training methods can be distinguished: a lengthy comprehensive induction course and on-the-job training.

The extensive socialisation and unique network-building opportunities, that a German-style institutional academy can provide, could help address many of the staffing challenges at the EEAS. The model has proven very successful at establishing an *esprit de corps*. By having entrants live and learn together, as well as encouraging them to organise events in their spare time, it would also be conducive to the establishment of a coordination reflex and help smooth over diverging national and institutional attitudes. Much like German recruits leave their professional background at the door and are turned into generalists, EEAS trainees could leave their national and institutional background behind. They could be turned into diplomats who see themselves as Europeans first and whose

³⁵ Armando M. Marques Guedes: Diplomatic Training in the CEI Area and its Comparative Background, in: *European Diplomacy: Regional Cooperation, Lifelong Learning and Diplomatic Training*, CEI Dubrovnik Forum, 2011, pp 14-37.

³⁶ For instance, in interviews with employees from the German “Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit“, Ericsson, and the Global Network University similar training schemes were described.

loyalties lie primarily with the EEAS. An academy would also allow candidates to fully concentrate on training, instead of trying to balance the challenges of day-to-day work.

As for the training method of lengthy induction, having all staff members undergo the same exact training not only provides for a level playing field as far as career progress goes, but also ensures that all EU diplomats have the same level of knowledge, at least as far as matters directly related to their job go. This is a major difference to practically oriented on-the-job training, where recruits are trained via mentoring and internships at different desks or embassies. In such a set-up, the quality and content of training depends on various factors such as the type and location of posting, the degree to which a candidate is prequalified for the respective tasks of their first job, the interest supervisors take in a candidate's development or the amount of time they have to spare to serve as a mentor.

Finally, an academy could serve as a highly prestigious entity under the authority of the EEAS, which centralises all training schemes and initiatives, and thus would overcome the current fragmentation of EU diplomatic training measures. This would achieve a better coordination, evaluation and a pooling of means in order to provide for a coherent and comprehensive training programme. A central training institution would also better be able to keep track of the career development of EEAS staff. Ultimately, it could be regarded as a symbol to third parties outside the EU that the EU is finally prepared to conduct foreign policy at the European level and find its 'one voice'. Establishing an academy as an object of prestige, which may also allure to seconded personnel in the EEAS, may well remain a long-term perspective.

However, in light of Member State reservations, the institutional set-up of a prestigious EU-owned academy seems to be highly unlikely. This has been acknowledged by Catherine Ashton in her 2011 report and was implicitly backed by the latest EP recommendation, which no longer advocates for an academy.

Moreover, the German-style training method of lengthy induction courses is, at EU level impractical for various reasons. For one, only a fraction of EEAS staff needing to be trained will be made up of new recruits. The relevance of extensive theoretical training for experienced professionals is questionable and it is hard to imagine that senior diplomats or Commission officials would be willing to undergo longsome training before being transferred to their post. Removing highly paid officials from their day-to-day work for large periods of time for training is not only expensive; it is also likely to be counterproductive. Their ambition to serve at the EEAS under these conditions is deemed to waver. Lengthy induction would thus only make sense for new recruits who plan for a career inside the EEAS, i.e. for the next generation of European diplomats.

Experienced personnel forwarded from other institutions or Member States would be better served by an on-going virtual training scheme and on-the-job training. Notably, including courses on the history, development and goals of European integration and EU external action in order to foster a common understanding of European diplomacy and European identity among EEAS staff would be conducive. The model of on-the-job training allows individualising training schemes and can thus better serve the different levels of knowledge and experience. The UK approach of individual development plans appears to be a successful measure to personalise training schemes and keep track of career development. As the example of the repeated reforms in the UK underlines, a comprehensive, mainly virtual, highly individualised training scheme can easily be adapted to new challenges and is capable to quickly incorporate new trends and priorities in training measures. Considering the political debate, it would also be more realistic to be established. Still, creating a central training department inside the EEAS would be necessary to centralise, adjust and extend the existing training schemes. The cost-efficiency of on-the-job training is also something that has to be considered in the current climate of austerity and budget restraints. Nonetheless, centralising the organisation of training schemes and introducing European-wide individual development plans also demands a stronger commitment from the Member States to allow for such alignment.

The downside of both set-ups, virtual and network is that they cannot provide for the same amount of socialisation as an academy. This is not to say that the UK or Denmark do not have a high degree of *esprit de corps* among their diplomats, they certainly do. However, the EEAS is a newly established institution that does not yet possess the same amount of prestige or tradition as a national diplomatic service. And in contrast to the EEAS, a national service does not have to compete with other national or institutional loyalties.

This is where a particular EU-tailored variation of a mixed model comes into play. It can make use of the socialising effects of a centralised institutional set-up, the motivating effects of virtual on-going learning as well as the flexibility, individualisation and cost-efficiency of on-the-job training. Under such a model, new staff recruited through EPSO could undergo an extended period of induction in a centralised setting while more experienced staff joins recruits only shortly to be introduced to the structures of the EEAS before directly starting to work in their respective posts. An on-the-job training method, especially a mentoring system as well as on-going virtual training for all staff members could then be used to enhance their general knowledge, and to establish a common working culture and coordination reflexes.

Living up to its Potentials: Recommendations for Successful EEAS Training

First and foremost, it has to be stressed that all the examples outlined here employ centralised and streamlined training schemes. The status quo of EU training, on the contrary, is highly fragmented. In this regard, the main premise is: There is an urgent need for a more centralised and more systematic approach to training under the authority of the EEAS.

Since the current financial crisis does not leave foreign policy and national foreign services unaffected, several Member States are already cutting down in terms of recruitment and/ or are considering new synergies, such as co-location. Not to mention, that the EEAS was established on the grounds of budget neutrality. Thus, Member States are likely to be reluctant, i.e. unwilling, to provide any additional financial means. Therefore, any of the options set out for the EEAS must be explained with a clear reference to its added value, possible scale effects and opportunities to reduce duplication.

The EU-tailored variation of a mixed model that we aim to present, builds on a centralised training department within the EEAS. Contrary to the institutional set-up of an EU-owned academy, this is well achievable and less controversial. Given the current fragmentation, it is also likely to prove cost-beneficial, as a certain duplication of training offers can currently not be ruled out.

In light of the different levels of experience and knowledge among staff working in the EEAS, it is necessary to differentiate between new recruits and seconded national and/ or Commission staff. Their heterogeneous background demand individualised training methods.

We therefore propose a multi-tracked approach. This includes centralised, virtual and network schemes, as well as induction and on-the-job training. With that, we believe that it would be possible to take into account both, the different staff categories and the differences between junior and senior level, while still accommodating the identified training objectives: general knowledge, individual working culture, and coordination reflex.

Centralised Extensive Induction for New Recruits

We suggest introducing a more extensive induction period for new recruits as they still need thematic courses for general knowledge and skill training. Ideally, this

SWP-Berlin
Training in the EEAS
July 2013

induction phase would cover two to three months. It should be organised by the EEAS departments at headquarters, combining thematic modules as provided in the German case and practical insights to the working culture at headquarters. Moreover, this induction phase should offer the possibility to complete internships at the Commission and/ or other relevant bodies. Internships should be chosen with a view to both, familiarising the recruits with a policy field and the demands of technical coordination.

In general, these courses or modules should be open to national and EU staff, as this would benefit the budgetary restraints and enhance a European diplomatic culture. The possibility to engage experienced national diplomats to teach negotiation techniques as well as other diplomatic skills and experienced Commission staff to teach technical issues and the particularities of EU structures, should also be assessed.

Short, also Centralised, Introduction for Senior Officials

While senior officials do not need an extended induction phase, we believe that they should join the new recruits on the thematic modules on EEAS procedures, communication lines, the particularities of the EU structure and other specific EU courses. This shortened introduction attended commonly by new recruits and entering senior officials, allows for a certain degree of socialisation, common experiences, and network opportunities. Furthermore, in case of simulations more experienced staff can function as a role model and support the teaching environment. Additionally, such a function for senior national officials may increase the sense of ownership that was initially intended by the Lisbon Treaty, too.

After induction and introduction, respectively, new recruits and new mid-level as well as senior staff should be transferred to their dedicated job positions shifting the focus to on-the-job training.

A Network System for Common Activities

Even when already filling a particular post within the EEAS, joint training exercises of junior and more experienced staff on particular skills, such as intercultural communication, rhetoric and others should be offered. This would promote the needed coordination reflex and sensitise personnel from different backgrounds to each other's perspectives. Understanding one another's perspectives and sensitivities contributes to a good working atmosphere and trust-building leads, eventually, to the required commitment to coordination.

Widening the Mutual Opening of Training Schemes

To cater to the extended needs for on-going training, it is necessary to build on training schemes that already exist. Therefore, the already partly practised mutual opening of training offers should be further elaborated. For instance, the international exchange scheme employed by the German Foreign Service could be broadened, mutual exchanges with the EEAS (as well as the Commission) introduced and/ or the idea of “NEPTs” extended. This would decisively improve coordination reflexes, align working cultures and probably also strengthen the European diplomatic culture. However, to allow for such adjustments, the need for a centralised training department in the EEAS has to be stressed again. Since such mutual opening of training schemes will only be beneficial if there is a department that has an overview of both, all the staff due to rotate and all the training schemes on offer.

Apart from such exchanges, the comprehensive long-distance learning library maintained by the British Foreign Service should serve as a model or a starting point on which EEAS staff posted abroad and national staff prior to their term could build in the future. Such virtual long-distance schemes could provide complementary training and in the perspective of life-long (common) learning increase the common European diplomatic culture.

European-wide Individual Development Plans for On-the-job Training

Each official working in the EEAS should leave either induction or introduction with an individual development plan, as is practiced in the UK model. This way, career development in the EEAS and, in a wider sense, the European Union can be streamlined. To guarantee the best-fitted on-the-job training, the EEAS should promote the adoption of a streamlined appraisal and career development system on the European level. In this regard, the very fragmented current structure of EU training needs to be aligned and cooperation among EU as well as national institutions for training has to be increased. Such individual development plans may also help overcome the current doubts whether secondment to the EEAS is beneficial to one’s career or not.

Alignment of National Rotation Systems and Establishment of a Regular European Conference on Training

European-wide development plans are only possible if national rotation and training systems are aligned with such standards. Namely, timely planning and simultaneous rotation are necessary to allow for the centralised supervision of these development plans. That means, national staff selected to be transferred to

EEAS has to be nominated well in advance. This would also allow for the individual development plans to be drawn up even before the diplomats rotate into the EEAS. In such circumstances, i.e. when all staff is technically prepared before starting introduction at the EEAS, we will be one decisive step closer to establishing a common European diplomatic culture. But, naturally, the gradual alignment of rotation schemes both, with regard to the time frame during which staff rotates and the amount of time granted for advance planning demand a notable commitment on the part of the Member States.

Yet, for the same purpose, we suggest to initiate a regular European conference on diplomatic training. That could be scheduled for the first week of new EEAS recruits as a kick-off to induction and introduction. This serves to increase the exchange and cooperation between existing training institutions, think tanks and academia.³⁷

A Mentoring Scheme Based on “Cross-Grouping” Staff Categories

Finally, and very fundamentally, we believe that an inclusive mentoring system should be established. Similar to the British method of making mentoring skills a condition for career advancement for senior staff, each staff member rotating into the EEAS should be required to assume and object themselves to a mentoring role. More precisely, mentors and mentees should be paired, so that different staff categories overlap: e.g. Commission staff coaches national diplomats on EU policies and structures, national staff coaches Council staff on the particularities of diplomatic negotiation abroad, and Council staff coaches Commission staff on political analyses. In such a system of “cross-grouping”, knowledge is transferred and an *esprit de corps* as well as a coordination reflex encouraged.

Overall, by adopting such a multi-tracked approach of extended induction/ short introduction in a centralised institutional set-up and on-the-job training in the form of network-based joint activities, virtual long-distance learning, cross-grouped mentoring, networking opportunities and European-wide development plans, we believe the EEAS will be aptly fit to finally live up to the potentials of the Lisbon Treaty.

³⁷ A similar forum has been established by the Central European Initiative, which organises the Dubrovnik Diplomatic forum for the cooperation between central European states.