The break-up of the Soviet Union and of its sphere of influence traumatised a whole generation in the truncated Russia that emerged. President Putin has translated this mood into a political strategy that is designed to consolidate the Russian state and restore it, little by little, to an equal footing with the USA. He is well aware that this requires not only military force but, above all, a broad and efficient economic basis. Thus, his Eurasia concept positions Russia as the crucial link, both in economic and political terms, between the emerging Asian nations and the prosperous Europeans.
The annexation of the Crimea calls Russia's strategic goal into question in several ways. Putin's rough shod creation of facts on the ground, accompanied by nationalistic, pan-slavic rhetoric, has spread alarm through the whole region. Eurasia has been exposed as a soviet-style straightjacket, and is dead in the water as a political concept. Moreover, the Russian economy - already in difficulties - is being weakened further. The Crimea, with its grave economic problems is now another burden for Russia to carry. Investments from the West, essential as a source of innovation for Russia, will flow less readily. Foreign exchange markets, the stock exchange and capital export statistics are already sending the first, unmistakeable signals. Even in the context of his own ambitions, Putin is paying a high price for his actions in the Crimea. Destabilising Ukraine further would make that price prohibitive. For that reason, further aggression by Russia appears unlikely at the moment. This is a rational expectation, not a political guarantee. The West must certainly be prepared for all contingencies: if Russia were to commit acts of aggression beyond the Crimea, or use military threats to intimidate or take any other steps to destabilise the situation, then wide-ranging, painful sanctions imposed by the West would become inevitable.
The crucial question at the heart of the East-West relationship
What are the next steps to be taken in Ukraine? The West can only find a satisfactory answer to this question jointly with Russia. This will very soon become the crucial question shaping the future of relations between East and West.
One thing seems clear: neither Russia nor the West can stand idly by as a large state in Europe threatens to founder. For this reason, the West will make every effort to give Ukraine economic and political support on its chosen path and in doing so, will be dependent on some measure of cooperation with Russia. To that extent, the West must continue to engage with Russia. Ukraine needs to connect to western markets, norms and ideas just as much as it needs continued access to Russian markets, reliable gas supplies and stable relations with its neighbour to the east. Economic growth is the key requirement for creating political stability in the country. Outside assistance can only spark an economic surge in Ukraine when combined with essential reforms. In this context, thought should also be given to possible forms of decentralisation. The presidential elections in May offer an opportunity of strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the country's political leadership which was brought to power by the Maidan uprising. Eventually, the crucial factor will be Ukraine's success in turning its back on corruption and mismanagement.
Part of this complicated process lies in the hands of the West: the EU, the International Monetary Fund and the wealthy western countries will have to provide the vast majority of the resources and expertise for a Marshall Plan for the Ukraine. Germany has an important role to play here.
As far as the other part of the process is concerned, Ukraine will need Russia's cooperation. It will soon become clear whether Putin is really interested in fair conditions for stable and unrestricted development in Ukraine. The West should take him at his word. Ukraine - and its supporters in the West - would be confronted with enormous problems were Putin to resort to economic or political coercion rather than cooperation. This would create a festering conflict in Eastern Europe that would poison the political climate for years to come and cause tremendous damage to Russia itself.
Ekkehard Brose wrote this text while he was a visiting fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. He is a member of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and served at the German Embassy in Moscow from 1987–1990 and, as Minister (Economic & Commercial), from 2007–2010. The views expressed are the author's own.
