The Arctic and the Arctic-North Atlantic region are gaining in geopolitical relevance as Arctic shipping routes and resources become more accessible. Germany should step up its political, military and economic engagement in this part of the world. A successful German Arctic policy requires closer cooperation both with Arctic states and with partners in the EU and NATO, Germany’s stronger engagement with security policy and the improved integration of civilian and military capabilities. The Arctic-North Atlantic region is to be regarded as a single strategic space and viewed in the context of European security. For its part, Germany should actively contribute to the stabilisation of this space and help pre­serve the fragile balance in the Arctic. A German Arctic strategy should not only reaffirm principles such as those of a rules-based order and multilateralism; it should also seek to protect them by means of clearly defined political, economic and security policy instruments. In the long term, a German Arctic strategy must go beyond the 2024 guidelines and identify concrete steps to safeguard German interests in the region. It must also establish clear priorities, outline political and security-policy measures, mobilise resources and both generate and demonstrate overall capacity for action. Germany’s new Arctic policy should be more consistently embedded in a policy framework for Europe as a whole. By ensuring close alignment with EU foreign and security policy and playing an active role in the shap­ing of the EU Arctic strategy, Germany can represent its own interests more effectively and at the same time contribute to Europe’s capacity to act in the region.

US imperial policy towards Latin America and the Caribbean is characterised by a com­bination of dominance ambitions and exclusivity claims. Through drastic coercive measures, Washington is forcing an economic transformation in Venezuela without paving the way for a political transition. At the same time, it is imposing a fuel block­ade on Cuba and threatening to take over that country. Above all, Germany and the EU should support civil society in Venezuela and Cuba. Furthermore, they should un­equivocally acknowledge the already existing violations of international law and adopt a firm stance against the normalisation of violence and disregard for human rights.

Managing goals and expectations

On the third anniversary of the conflict’s outbreak on 15 April, the German government will host an international conference on Sudan together with France, the United Kingdom, the United States, the European Union (EU), and the African Union (AU). Foreign ministers from key countries as well as representatives of the United Nations, humanitarian organisations, and Sudanese civil society are expected in Berlin. 

At the same time, it is important to note that this is not a peace conference. No one should raise their expectations too high. Even a humanitarian truce, which the United States wants to broker with its partners Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, is not currently in sight. It would already constitute some progress if the Sudanese representatives could agree on a declaration to de-escalate the conflict. A joint communiqué of the ministers is unlikely to materialise, given the experience with the lack of consensus at the previous meeting in London.

Placing civilian actors at the centre

Despite its limited scope, the international Sudan conference in Berlin offers the opportunity for a long overdue change in perspective: away from the warring parties and towards those who are already working for societal and political peace.

Of course, the SAF and the RSF themselves must silence the weapons. However, the military actors alone will not even be able to guarantee a permanent end to armed violence. At best, a power-sharing model would produce another fragile civil-military transitional government. Fighting within the armed coalitions would be likely given the divergent interests of their constituents; a renewed flare-up of violence would only be a matter of time. South Sudan has already taken a similar path: There, armed violence has become part of the political system.

Instead, Sudan needs a new, civilian-led political order. It will take time to develop, but creating the necessary framework for discussion is possible even during the ongoing war. This is precisely the goal of the quintet of five international organisations – the African Union, the European Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the United Nations, and the Arab League – which joined forces at the beginning of the year. The quintet is conducting consultations with numerous civil and political groups in Sudan. In contrast to earlier approaches, there is currently greater unity among the participating organisations as well as a coordinated process design. Different political blocs with ties to the conflict parties and independent civil actors are expected to agree on a Sudanese steering committee that sets the agenda and criteria for a political process. 

The conference should support this process. Participants should commit not to organise parallel initiatives and instead align existing projects with civilian actors – especially those from the United Kingdom, Norway, Canada, and Switzerland – in support of this process. 

The civilian components of the conference in Berlin, which is to bring together 40 Sudanese representatives, can be an important step towards a common platform and convey its own messages to the international participants.

Finally, the humanitarian component of the conference should mobilise urgently needed funding. It should also strengthen the ownership, protection, and financing of mutual aid networks such as the Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs). These networks are able to reach Sudanese regions where international aid organisations cannot operate, and their work strengthens social cohesion.

These civilian approaches could help to make the conditions for ending the war more favourable.

The Turkish government’s declaration of 2025 as the “Year of the Family” reflects an increasingly authoritarian approach to managing demographic decline amid conditions of economic strain. Falling fertility rates are framed as a strategic challenge to national resilience, giving rise to a policy agenda that positions the family as the cornerstone of demographic recovery. At the same time, anti-gender politics has moved beyond ideological rhetoric towards a broader governance strategy linking demographic management, fiscal constraints, and authoritarian consolidation. For Germany and the European Union (EU), understanding these developments is essential for engaging Turkey on democratic governance, social policy, and gender equality.

The parliamentary elections held in Bangladesh on 12 February 2026 marked a turn­ing point in the country’s recent history. In August 2024, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who had served for a total of 20 years, with one interruption, was removed from office. An interim government led by Nobel Peace Prize laureate Muhammad Yunus subsequently took power. Following two years of political uncertainty, it suc­ceeded in organising elections that were procedurally sound. Bangladesh’s political system has thus demonstrated a considerable degree of institutional resilience. At the same time, the election outcome raises new questions regarding the future of democratic pluralism in the country. The decisive election victory of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) means that one of the country’s two historic political family dynasties will remain at the helm of government. The Muslim fundamentalist camp gained vote share, which could negatively impact the role of women in society as well as complicate Bangladesh’s renewed rapprochement with neighbouring India.

The Trial Is Polarising the Public and Undermining Trust in the Justice System

For many observers, more is at stake than İmamoğlu’s political fate. It is also a question of whether President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan can maintain his power. He is under pressure because of foreign policy concerns related to the war involving the United States, Israel, and Iran – a conflict Turkey prefers to stay out of – as well as continuing economic difficulties at home. At the same time, his approval ratings are falling.

A large segment of the population considers the criminal proceedings to be politically motivated. Outside Erdoğan’s support base and the pro-government media, an alternative narrative has taken hold: İmamoğlu has been indicted because he triumphed four times against Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Istanbul, and he stands a strong chance of becoming the opposition’s presidential candidate.

Lawyers regard the 3,739-page indictment as resting on thin evidence. They doubt that it is necessary to keep the defendants – first and foremost İmamoğlu – in custody during the trial. The indictment is based on statements given by undisclosed witnesses, and it remains imprecise in parts. Scepticism is also fuelled by the fact that prosecutor Akın Gürlek is known for legally controversial cases against opposition members and those critical of the government. Gürlek is now Minister of Justice, whose appointment is being challenged in court.

There are strong indications that the proceedings serve political ends. The opposition is to be weakened, the Republican People's Party (CHP) politically paralysed, and its leadership persuaded to drop İmamoğlu’s candidacy.

Several CHP district mayors were removed from office and arrested. Some switched to the AKP under pressure arising from the threat of criminal proceedings, while numerous critics were also arrested. Selahattin Demirtaş, former leader of the predecessor party of today’s Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (DEM party), remains in prison despite rulings by the European Court of Human Rights. In several municipalities in south-eastern Turkey, elected mayors of DEM party continue to be replaced by government-appointed trustees.

How Things Could Proceed in the Trial 

As with the Ergenekon trials, the outcome of the case against İmamoğlu is likely to depend heavily on the political climate. In that mammoth case, which took place between 2007 and 2013, military officials, journalists, and academics were charged with allegedly plotting a conspiracy against the government. Many of the sentences were later overturned.

The verdict in the İmamoğlu trial may be delayed or shaped in such a way as to eliminate İmamoğlu as a presidential candidate. The CHP would be weakened, while Erdoğan’s governing bloc would be able to consolidate its autocratic rule. However, the prerequisite for Erdoğan’s renewed candidacy would be either early elections triggered by the dissolution of parliament or a constitutional amendment.

Since Turkey’s economy lacks momentum and broad segments of the population are suffering from a loss of purchasing power, the de-escalation of the Kurdish conflict could become a decisive factor for electoral success. However, the condition for this would be that the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) is disarmed, which would require the CHP to continue supporting the process.

This gives the CHP, as the second strongest parliamentary group, a potentially important negotiating position vis-à-vis the government. If the party leadership is wise, it could help secure İmamoğlu’s release from prison or even his acquittal.

Thirty years after establishing a customs union with the European Union (EU), Ankara sees growing economic risks in the EU’s free trade agreements with third countries, most recently India. While negotiations on the EU–India Free Trade Agreement were concluded at the end of January, and security cooperation between the EU and India is now also to be expanded, Ankara remains on the sidelines. From Turkey’s perspective, the agreement could also weaken its significance in the EU’s strategic calculus. Ankara is therefore making a strong case for the modernisation of the customs union. It cannot be ruled out that the structural asymmetries of the customs union will become even more entrenched to Turkey’s detriment: Market integration without political participation may place Turkey at a lasting disadvantage and strain its rela­tions with the EU. Once the free trade agreement enters into force, Indian products will gain easier access to the Turkish market, whereas Turkish products will not gain corresponding access to India. Due to geopolitical differences with India, Tur­key also sees risks to its own regional interests. Brussels and Berlin could use this constellation to put cooperation with Ankara on a viable institutional footing.

The data covers the following time period: 01.02.2022-01.11.2025

Digital and artificial intelligence (AI)-based systems now shape all phases of inter­national migration – from the pre-screening of applications and profiles to border management and the integration of migrants. States, international organisations, and private providers use digital platforms, biometric systems, and algorithmic processes to manage migration in a more targeted way. At the same time, migrants themselves use digital tools to obtain information, prepare decisions, and secure access to work or support. This development is changing migration not only operationally but also structurally: It enables new forms of digital labour mobility, shifts power relations and dependencies, and embeds migration into a global data economy. For Germany and the European Union (EU), the question arises as to how digitalisation and AI can be shaped in terms of migration, foreign, and development policy so as to deliver effi­ciency gains in administration and procedures, without undermining data protection, equal treatment, and human-rights standards.

US defence policy is characterised by contradictions that are on display once again in the Trump administration’s latest strategy documents. The reasons for this go far beyond the president’s erratic behaviour. At the core lies the unanswered question of how the United States should deal with the loss of global dominance. For Europe, these contradictions present not only risks but also opportunities. But German and European decision-makers should not fall victim to the false hope that NATO in its current form will survive Trump’s second term in office.

Five years after the bloody military coup and amid a civil war, elections have taken place in Myanmar. They were neither free nor fair, nor was any attempt made to keep up an appearance of even minimum democratic standards. From the outset, the main purpose of the elections was not political participation but an authoritarian-led tran­sition from military rule to a “civilian” government. The country’s new executive is intended to appear legitimate both nationally and internationally (on account of the ballot) and at the same time consolidate the military’s dominance. For its part, Myan­mar’s military leadership claims the elections mark a “new beginning” to restore political stability in the country and break its international isolation. The reference here is, among others, to the European Union (EU) and its member states, which have imposed sanctions against Myanmar. However, they should not believe the myth of a “civilian” elected government and a “return” to constitutional order; and, accordingly, they should not seek to normalise relations with Myanmar for the time being.

The acquisition of Greenland has repeatedly been a topic of discussion within US gov­ernment circles since the 19th century. That is because of the island’s strategic loca­tion and its resources. In the summer of 2019, US President Donald Trump made his first bid to purchase Greenland from the Kingdom of Denmark. Since then, he has declared ownership and control of Greenland to be an “absolute necessity” for US national security. For their part, the Danish intelligence services have responded by identifying the United States – for the first time ever – as a potential threat to the security of the Kingdom since Washington is no longer ruling out the use of military force even against allies. But is Trump really concerned about security or simply acquiring what he sees as the world’s largest possible real-estate asset? How should his bid for Greenland be assessed? And what are the implications and policy options for Europe?

African governments are entering the geopolitical competition over critical raw materials with a growing sense of strategic confidence. While the AU-EU Summit in Luanda in November 2025 reaffirmed political commitments on both sides, European initiatives continue to lose ground. It is true that the Critical Raw Materials Act has expanded the EU’s diplomatic footprint; however, its limited project pipeline and fragmented financing under the Global Gateway have left the bloc unable to match the speed and scale of competing offers notably from China, the Gulf States and the US. African partners expect cooperation on industrial projects and deeper integration into value chains. With stronger internal coordination and increased financing under the next Multiannual Financial Framework, the EU can strengthen both its ability to deliver and its credibility.

Persons fleeing their homes are exposed not only to physical dangers but also to severe psychological distress – from the ordeal of displacement itself and the experience of violence to unsafe living conditions and a lack of any prospects at their destination. It is not just those directly involved who are affected by the consequences of such trau­matic experiences; the social cohesion of societies and their economic development and stability are threatened, too. Both in the political discourse and in international aid programmes, mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) in displacement situations is often neglected. But MHPSS measures can have a positive social impact: on coexistence in the host countries and on peace processes in the countries of origin. Thus, they directly support the third dimension of the humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) nexus – the so-called peace pillar. The HDP nexus aims to link humanitarian aid and development to peacebuilding. Such efforts are particularly important in displacement situations.

The political, social and economic reforms spearheaded by Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman serve the goal of consolidating his rule in the long term. Bin Salman has centralised decision-making in his own hands and is in full control of the country’s politics. Authoritarianism under the crown prince is far more radical and uncom­promising than was the case in Saudi Arabia until 2015. From the outset, Bin Salman promoted a pronounced Saudi nationalism, which many observers describe as a “Saudi-first” policy. From the crown prince’s point of view, social and cultural liberalisation is a prerequisite for the success of his economic reforms and thus for the long-term survival of the kingdom and the ruling family. The reforms have had only limited success because Saudi Arabia remains highly dependent on oil revenues, despite a recent economic upturn.

Five of the world’s most active and largest sovereign wealth funds are to be found in the Gulf Region: the Saudi Public Investment Fund (PIF), the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) and the United Arab Emirates’ Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA), Mubadala and ADQ. These funds not only serve to convert oil revenues into investment capital, thereby enabling the transition from rent-based to more diversified economies; they also contribute to expanding the foreign policy capabilities of the countries in which they are based. Institutional and personnel linkages enable the Saudi, Qatari and UAE governments to deploy their funds strategically, which, in turn, allows them to significantly expand their hard, soft, and sharp power – for exam­ple, through domestic and foreign investments in sectors such as armaments, media, sports and new technologies as well as through co­operation with politically influential actors. At the same time, the Gulf monarchies seek to portray their sovereign wealth funds as apolitical and purely profit-oriented – a narrative that is facilitated by the establish­ment of subsidiaries or cooperation with private equity firms. Understandably, Germany and its European partners have an interest in attracting sovereign wealth funds as investors, but they must not overlook the risks involved. These include third parties gaining access to critical infra­structure, sensitive military and security technology being leaked and the Gulf monarchies exercising political influence. Further, Germany and the EU must take a more fundamental look at how the three Gulf monarchies have increased their foreign policy options through the sovereign wealth funds. This is important as the actions of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar – at both the regional and international level – are at times contrary to German and European interests.

The fossil-fuel foreign policy of the United States under President Donald Trump has intensified the conflict between petrostates and electrostates in international climate politics. At COP30 in Belém in November 2025, this cleavage was particularly evident in the dispute over a roadmap for the Transition Away from Fossil Fuels (TAFF). While an increasing number of countries regard TAFF as a necessary consequence of the global energy transition, fossil fuel producers prevented any substantive progress being made. The conference highlighted the structural limits of the capacity of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to mediate this dis­tri­bu­tional conflict. As a result, the EU faces a strategic dilemma: to further politicise the COP process around TAFF or to prioritise the stabilisation of key mechanisms of the Paris Agreement. Whether it can overcome that dilemma will become apparent during the run-up to the next global stocktake, which is due at COP33 in India in 2028.

In Latin America, Mexico (2020), Chile (2022) and Colombia (2022) have all officially committed to a feminist foreign policy (FFP). The introduction of a feminist approach to foreign policy should be seen in the context of a growing awareness of gender issues in international, regional and national politics. In comparison with their European counterparts, the Latin American approaches to FFP exhibit a stronger focus on the domestic dimension, on internal problems. This is especially clear in the case of Mexico, while Chile’s FFP emphasises the feminist perspective in foreign trade and Colombia’s FFP defines itself as pacifist. These countries’ FFPs have not brought about a fundamental political change, but they do inject new momentum into existing gender equality policies and gender mainstreaming. They expand women’s participation and representation and enhance the visibility of women’s contribution to foreign policy. Mexico, Chile and Colombia are important partners for Germany and the EU in matters concerning the global gender and human rights agenda. As these Latin American countries are intensifying their cooperation in these areas, they are also worthwhile partners for the expansion of trilateral cooperation. As the German Federal Foreign Office has dropped its FFP, while the Ger­man Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) is continuing its feminist development policy and the future of Chile’s FFP is uncertain due to the change of power, it will make sense to pursue cooperation on human rights, inclusion and gender issues through vari­able formats and terminological framing. Germany should also benefit from learning processes, and strengthen bi-regional dialogue and exchange, including between feminist and women’s organisations.

Germany is facing a security policy Zeitenwende whose industrial dimension has not yet been sufficiently addressed. The war in Ukraine, rising military threats in Europe, and the long-term underfunding of the German Armed Forces have exposed the limits of existing defence industrial capacity, while the reliability of the United States (US) as a security guarantor is increasingly uncertain. This creates a strategic need for Germany to quickly rebuild its defence industrial base. Yet, despite the increased demand and funding, German defence industries are struggling to scale production quickly, exposing capability gaps that endanger both national defence and NATO commitments. In this context, cooperation with South Korea gains strategic relevance, as plans for localised production by Korean defence firms in Germany could ease bottlenecks, shorten supply chains, and enhance operational readiness without creating new strategic dependencies.

The Clearing-House Mechanism: Technical Tool or Political Lever?

At the centre of this debate lies an instrument with an unassuming name: the so-called BBNJ Clearing-House Mechanism (CHM). It is intended to become a freely accessible platform on which information about activities on the high seas is collected, analysed, and shared. Its objectives include enhancing transparency among State Parties and relevant stakeholders, as well as facilitating international cooperation, particularly in scientific matters. Although the goals and basic structure of the CHM are defined in the treaty text, its concrete design remains the subject of ongoing negotiation – and it is precisely this element that makes the mechanism politically contested.

The treaty text explicitly opens the possibility of incorporating different forms of knowledge into decision-making processes through the CHM. In particular, diverse knowledge systems could be systematically integrated within the framework put forward for mandatory environmental impact assessments. States would be required not only to assess potential environmental impacts, but also to consider the economic, social, cultural, health-related, and cumulative effects of planned activities that take place in or affect the high seas. Such a comprehensive assessment of impacts necessitates contributions from a range of scientific disciplines as well as the knowledge of Indigenous Peoples and local communities.

A further opportunity for the practical implementation of knowledge pluralism is found in the provisions concerning the composition of the Scientific and Technical Body (STB). The relevant wording in the agreement suggests that this body should go beyond purely natural scientific expertise and incorporate a broader spectrum of local, traditional, and Indigenous knowledge related to the marine environment. Since the STB can issue recommendations about activities in areas beyond national jurisdiction on the basis of information provided through the CHM, this represents a key lever for translating the knowledge diversity promised in the treaty text into practice. This depends, however, on whether the STB is in fact constituted in a way that ensures adequate representation of different knowledge systems.

Political Conflicts Delay the Implementation of the Agreement

Despite the treaty’s promising language, the concrete design of the CHM remains politically contentious. Within the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom), which is tasked with operationalising the agreement, this issue has emerged as one of the central points of conflict. At a PrepCom meeting in August 2025, Parties were unable to reach agreement on the composition of an informal expert group intended to develop the technical aspects of the CHM. The selection process for this informal group is of strategic importance, as it could set a precedent for the composition of other BBNJ bodies. Whereas some states are advocating for the broad inclusion of a range of knowledge holders, others seek to reduce the CHM to a purely natural scientific and technical function guided exclusively by academic expertise. Critics warn that such an approach could privilege natural scientific knowledge from the Global North and marginalise social scientific, local, or traditional forms of knowledge.

Against the background of recent attempts by individual states, including the United States, to restrict access to marine data, it becomes clear that knowledge about the oceans is itself increasingly becoming an object of political contestation. Germany and the EU have repeatedly spoken out during international forums in favour of the freedom and diversity of science. In the context of the ongoing negotiations on the operationalisation of the BBNJ Agreement, they should therefore make targeted efforts to ensure that knowledge diversity within the agreement is not merely recognised normatively, but institutionally safeguarded as well. This is primarily about preventing the privileging of certain forms of knowledge within BBNJ bodies, such as the Scientific and Technical Body. At the same time, the CHM platform itself must be designed in such a way that different knowledge types can be made equally accessible.

With climate change advancing, the planned relocation of entire com­munities from risk areas is becoming unavoidable. It is already a reality worldwide and will become increasingly necessary in the future as a measure of climate adaptation and disaster risk reduction. Relocation can save lives and reduce the risk of displacement. Never­theless, this measure is considered a “last resort” because it is expensive, deeply affects livelihoods, social networks and cultural identities, and carries new risks. To be effective, it must be participatory, human rights-based, and accom­panied by development-oriented measures that strengthen the well-being and resilience of those affected and reduce structural inequalities. Many places lack the political will, concrete strategies and resources for this – especially in low-income countries with already limited adapta­tion capacities. These countries are therefore heavily dependent on inter­national support, which has mostly been fragmented, ad hoc and uncoordinated. The longer the absence of adequate structures persists, the greater the risk that human security will be severely compromised, fundamental human rights violated and entire communities (once again) displaced – posing risks to regional stability and global security. The German government should specifically address gaps in the inter­national system, facilitate access to knowledge and resources, and strengthen multi-sectoral learning. Germany’s current engagement in Fiji should be expanded in the medium term to other climate-vulnerable regions and countries, with a focus on community-driven relocation projects.

The higher turnout in Iraq’s recent parliamentary elections reflects advances over the past four years, notably in infrastructure development, security, and political stabil­ity. The election’s outcome and ensuing coalition-building dynamics underscore trends and challenges that will shape Iraq’s domestic and foreign policies. The yet-to-be-formed government will have to balance between the United States and Iran, facing US demands for disarmament of Iraq’s armed groups, managing repercussions of potential instability in Iran, and resisting being drawn into any new confrontation between Iran and either Israel or the United States. It will also have to deal with sub­stantial domestic challenges, including strained relations between Erbil and Baghdad, the potential for renewed Sunni alienation from the state, the future of the Popular Mobilization Forces, financial fragility, and consequences of climate change. European actors have limited influence over the geopolitical dynamics, but can offer support on national development and climate challenges, and should back Baghdad’s striving for stronger agency and sovereignty.

Space capabilities are a core element of any modern defence arsenal. In Europe, how­ever, military space capabilities are limited and dependence on the United States remains high. Europe must develop its capabilities in order to reduce dependencies and enhance its capacity to act on its own, thereby fostering European autonomy. To ensure that European space capabilities are developed efficiently, it is necessary to identify which dependencies on the US are particularly critical and which obstacles would hin­der the development of such capabilities. Priority should be given to space situational awareness, military reconnaissance, navigation resilience and missile early warning.

The conflict between the Republic of Cyprus in the Greek-speaking south and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the Turkish-speaking region recognised only by Ankara, has been largely frozen since the de facto division of the island. This certainly has also been due to UNFICYP’s presence. Since the 1974 ceasefire, the mission has controlled the “Green Line”, a 180-kilometre strip separating the two parts that is intended to prevent direct confrontation.

Nevertheless, the mission continues to record numerous military and civilian violations in and along the buffer zone By doing so, it still prevents “those sparks from bursting into flames”, as Colin Stewart, head of UNFICYP until August 2025, put it. To this day, there still is no direct military contact mechanism between the parties. In fact, the threat perception has increased again on both sides recently.

New impetus for peace efforts

For this reason alone, the European Union and its member states cannot be interested in any further reduction or even a potential withdrawal of the mission. The political process is just beginning to tentatively gain momentum. María Angela Holguín Cuéllar was reappointed as the Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy in May 2025 and is tasked with exploring possibilities for a new round of formal negotiations and breaking the deadlock. 

This is a difficult undertaking. While the UN Security Council continues to pursue a federal solution, Northern Cyprus and Turkey have been promoting a two-state solution for years. However, the election of Turkish Cypriot President Tufan Erhürman in October has raised hopes that the door could open for new negotiations under UN auspices. The first trilateral meeting between him, the President of the Republic of Cyprus, and Holguín has just taken place. But a rapprochement is likely to take time. Confidence-building measures and the safeguarding of peace by the UN therefore remain essential.

The essential role of the UN

As the Republic of Cyprus is a member of the EU, the Union itself can hardly act as an impartial mediator. It therefore primarily supports the UN-led political process. The EU’s options in the security domain are also constrained. A separate EU mission – as is currently being considered for Lebanon following the withdrawal of UNIFIL – would be unrealistic, if only because of the tense relationship between Greece and Turkey, both of which, alongside the United Kingdom, are the guarantor powers for Cyprus. 

Therefore, the stabilising function of the UN mission remains essential for the foreseeable future. It also creates the framework for practical rapprochement, for example through the projects of the Technical Committees. Under joint Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leadership and facilitated by the UN, these initiatives promote understanding between the two communities, and the EU provides a large portion of the funding. 

UNFICYP is in a better financial position than many larger UN missions, as Greece and the Republic of Cyprus cover about half of the budget. However, staffing and operational cuts will be necessary. At the same time, the raison d'être of a mission that has been running for decades is repeatedly being called into question. At the end of January 2026, the mandate is up for renewal again. Despite all the criticisms from the Turkish government and former leaders in Northern Cyprus, the UN Security Council's position has remained unchanged so far. 

In order to break the deadlock in negotiations, there is a need for more economic engagement from the European side to improve the situation in the north. In the short term, however, EU member states should make it clear that UNFICYP – and UN peacekeeping as a whole – is indispensable.

The relationship between Japan and China is of far-reaching importance for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific, as the two countries are the world’s fourth- and second-largest economies, respectively. Over the past 15 years, bilateral tensions have deepened markedly, even as the two countries have maintained close economic ties. During the one-year tenure of Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru (October 2024–October 2025), however, there were signs of a modest thaw in relations. In November 2024, Chinese President Xi Jinping described the relationship as being “in a critical phase of improvement and development”. His statement was followed by a series of diplomatic exchanges and Beijing even agreed to lift import restrictions on Japanese fishery products and beef. Yet, the thaw remained limited. Beijing has reverted to a confrontational posture following remarks on Taiwan by Japan’s new Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae in early November. The relationship remains fragile.

The current US administration plans to protect the entire territory of the United States against any potential air or missile attack. The focus is on deploying large satel­lite constellations capable of detecting and intercepting long-range missiles shortly after launch. Even if only a fraction of this ambitious plan is likely to be implemented, it is probable that there will be progress in missile defense during the coming years. For Germany and Europe, the risks and potential benefits – especially with regard to space-based US missile defense – are difficult to assess at the current time. However, Europe can maintain the largest possible room for maneuver by avoiding an open confrontation over Trump’s plans.

Today’s armed forces are highly dependent on software. Software products are built by complex networks of software components, software vendors, service providers, and other companies that, together, form the software supply chain. In “conventional” cybersecurity incidents, threat actors usually gain direct access to their target. But in the case of the software supply chain, the risks originate upstream in the supply chain itself and have an impact on entities downstream – often the end users. The armed forces are particularly vulnerable to these risks. Software supply chain incidents in the military sector have caused disruption and allowed malicious actors to engage in industrial espionage, political espionage, and sabotage. Policymakers and the Bundeswehr can manage software supply chain risk in the military sector through a set of measures. First, decision-makers should determine the requisite level of protection for the various areas of software use to strike a balance between risk management, on the one hand, and the functionality, cost, and speed of deployment, on the other. Thereafter, the Bundeswehr should establish effective risk management. Further, the federal government and the Bundeswehr should ensure that software suppliers reduce the software supply chain risk posed by their products. By doing so, the armed forces can be given adequate protection.

In addition to the legacy of structural problems, budgetary problems are increasingly exacerbated by geopolitical factors. On the one hand, there is an urgent need for higher spending on defence, energy transition, industrial subsidies and aid to Ukraine due to Russia’s aggression and economic competition from China. On the other hand, rising interest rates on government debt worldwide are limiting European Union (EU) countries’ ability to borrow. This creates the vicious circle: Limited fiscal leeway deepens geopolitical dependence, and geopolitical dependence forces further spending.

Hidden costs of public debt

In the context of rising debt, reference is typically made to the growing costs of debt servicing. This narrows the scope for fiscal policy and diverts resources from growth-promoting sectors such as research and education.

However, rising debt also has hidden geopolitical costs: It reduces the ability of EU countries to act together, exacerbates disagreements – for example between north and south or between large and small member states – and weakens confidence in central institutions such as the European Commission, which monitors compliance with fiscal rules, and the European Central Bank (ECB), whose monetary policy could increasingly be oriented towards stabilising member states’ debt.

In addition, high public debt makes EU countries more vulnerable to external factors such as changes in interest rates internationally. Public debt can also become an instrument of external influence on EU member states. The increasing involvement of investors from third countries – including China and the Gulf states – in European bond markets raises the risk that financial dependencies will be exploited politically.

Escaping the vicious circle

Unlike the United States and China, the EU has few options for mobilising capital. Limited fiscal space and weak capital markets make it vulnerable to external shocks. The integration of financial markets and the restoration of competitiveness in Europe are progressing slowly, according to the conclusions given in reports by Enrico Letta and Mario Draghi. A rapid breakthrough that would lead to a noticeable inflow of capital to Europe cannot be foreseen.

The EU’s highly decentralised fiscal system relies heavily on the economic future of its three largest member states – Germany, France and Italy. Together, these countries account for about two-thirds of the eurozone’s public debt. However, given their limited fiscal leeway, they can no longer reconfigure their economic models and respond to geopolitical challenges. France’s deteriorating public finances are leading to growing populism in economic policy debates. This not only undermines confidence in the country’s economic policy-making capabilities, but could also put the already fragile structure of the EU’s monetary union to the test.

Amid global economic competition, the stability of the euro and the internal market are among the EU’s few “hard” assets that could easily be lost. A new euro crisis – in which Germany no longer plays a stabilising role and the ECB’s measures may no longer prove effective – would not only be an economic but also a geopolitical disaster for the EU. Sustainable public finances must therefore become an essential part of its geopolitical resilience.

Since 2022, the Russian leadership has significantly expanded its activities in the area of military-patriotic education for children and young people. New compulsory measures and voluntary programmes have been introduced. Their apparent diversity notwithstanding, the Kremlin has strict control over these new measures and pro­grammes. Its goal is to educate the next generation in accordance with the Russian leadership’s line, recruit loyal young people for the regime and the armed forces, and identify at an early stage those who might become critics of the regime. The new measures cover a growing number of children and young people and now extend even to kindergartens. Those affected respond with enthusiasm, indifference or opportunism. Overt resistance is evident only in isolated cases owing to the heavy pressure to conform and the repressive nature of the regime.

The cybersecurity of governments, companies, and individuals in Europe is heavily dependent on the United States. Specifically, US companies dominate the global mar­kets for cybersecurity applications and information on cyber threats. The US military also plays a role in data-gathering. In addition, Washington provides financial sup­port for vulnerability databases and the open source ecosystem. Taken together, these seemingly isolated technical issues mean that Europe’s ability to act in the field of cybersecurity is limited. This would even remain the case if Europe built its own “EuroStack.” These dependencies can become a problem for Europe in various situa­tions – if the US government ends its financial support for cybersecurity, if it changes its political priorities, or if it openly weaponizes these dependencies in a conflict with Europe. German and European decision-makers should act now to reduce these dependencies and protect Europe’s cybersecurity in the long term.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan brushed aside implicit criticism over Ankara’s failure to meet EU standards, framing judicial action against the opposition as part of an anti-corruption drive. İstanbul’s mayor, Ekrem İmamoğlu, has been held in pre-trial detention since 19 March on charges of aiding terrorism, the misuse of public funds and, more recently, espionage. Meanwhile, multiple cases against the Republican People's Party (CHP), the main opposition, have aimed to place it under state trusteeship and annul the congress that elected its new leader.

Germany’s Strategic Rationale 

Differences also emerged regarding Hamas and Israel. Whereas Germany designates Hamas as a terrorist organisation and provides military support to Israel, Turkey considers Hamas a liberation movement and accuses Israel of genocide. Erdoğan criticised Germany, particularly for its arms deliveries to Israel.

These differences help explain why a breakthrough in relations – for example, on visa liberalisation or modernising the Customs Union – remains a distant prospect. Despite Erdoğan’s assertive stance, Merz remains willing to engage, which is a sign that Germany recognises Turkey’s rising geopolitical importance. In recent years, Ankara has consolidated its regional role by exploiting Russia’s vulnerabilities in Libya and the South Caucasus, backing Azerbaijan’s recapture of Nagorno-Karabakh. Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine has further underscored Turkey’s strategic importance in the Black Sea. In Syria, Ankara remains deeply entangled, seeking a say in the country’s political reshaping.

Erdoğan’s confidence also stems from the understanding that Germany requires Turkey’s collaboration in Syria and Palestine. Both governments are cooperating on Syria’s reconstruction and humanitarian projects to support the return of refugees. Berlin also expects Ankara to help disarm Hamas and play a constructive role in resolving the Palestinian issue. Furthermore, Germany is seeking Turkey’s assistance in returning Turkish citizens who are being forced to leave Germany, and cooperation in the Ukraine crisis.

The Pillars of a Pragmatic Partnership: Security, Defence, and Trade

The need to rebuild its defence capacities has increased Germany’s interest in deepening defence cooperation with Turkey. Berlin has lifted its veto on the Eurofighter procurement process and supports Ankara’s potential participation in the European defence initiative Security Action for Europe (SAFE). Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan welcomed Germany’s positive steps towards Turkey’s participation in the SAFE initiative, stating that Ankara aims to advance joint projects and strengthen the mechanism itself. Both governments emphasise cooperation in security and the defence industry, pursuing joint projects and recognising the strategic value of Turkey’s cost-effective and technologically capable defence sector.

Germany’s interest in Turkey also has an economic dimension. Despite political tensions, bilateral trade remains robust, reaching US$47.5 billion in 2024. Germany is Turkey’s largest export market and its third-largest import partner. Since 1980, German direct investment in Turkey has totalled around US$14.5 billion, including US$687 million in 2023 alone, with over 8,000 German firms employing more than 100,000 people in the country.

Merz’s visit underlines a pragmatic shift in bilateral relations towards security cooperation. Shared geopolitical interests will take precedence, while economic and defence ties continue to expand. Yet pragmatic realignment alone cannot forge a strategic partnership: Fundamental differences persist. A genuine breakthrough will require mutual trust, a clear roadmap, and tangible progress on the rule of law, human rights, and democratic governance – without which closer ties will remain transactional rather than strategic.

The European Commission, Italy, and Greece are seeking to curb irregular migration through Libya. These efforts come at a time when several aspects of European Union (EU) migration policy in Libya must be acknowledged as having failed. This is particularly true of attempts to improve conditions in detention centres, and the situation of migrant workers and refugees more broadly. Most recently, a campaign by Libyan authorities against what they portrayed as EU plans to permanently settle migrants in the country showed that European policy is provoking considerable backlash. As the softer components of this policy have reached an impasse, it has been stripped to its hard core, namely arrangements with Libyan security actors to prevent departures, as well as support for interceptions at sea and returns to countries of origin. These measures are inextricably tied to Libya’s system of arbitrary detention, which serves criminal interests. European attempts to disavow this system have been unconvincing and are preventing a serious reckoning with the political costs involved.

The existential catastrophe faced by the population of the Gaza Strip currently looms large in the foreign policy and security debates. The plight of civilians there is par­ticularly acute. Yet, severe crises persist elsewhere too – from Ukraine and Sudan to Myanmar, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Haiti – where protracted violent conflicts continue to cause grave suffering among civilians. This grim reality is under­scored in the United Nations Secretary-General’s latest annual report, released in May. At the same time, conventional mechanisms for international conflict resolution are failing in an increasing number of contexts. In light of this, it is crucial to system­atically track evolving conflict dynamics and to revise approaches to the protection of civilians accordingly.

The European Union operates largely in accordance with the principles of consensus democracy – that is, it seeks to integrate as many parties spanning the political spec­trum of its member states as possible. Amid the recent growth of far-right parties at both the national and European level, this approach has led to the increased participation of such forces in EU institutions. Analysis of key actors at the EU level shows that since no later than the 2024 European elections, representatives of far-right par­ties have been involved in all major EU decisions. The centres of their influence are the European Council and the Council of the EU, where they participate as leaders or partners in national governments. But they are increasingly becoming more influential in the European Parliament, which has shifted to the right and where alternative majorities are now possible. At the same time, significant differences remain between the far-right parties. Ultimately, the extent of their influence and which far-right trend predominates within the EU system depends mainly on the largest force in European politics – the European People’s Party.

The number of Indian migrants in Germany has risen sharply in recent years. In particular, they are helping alleviate the shortage of skilled workers in STEM professions. For Germany, India is the most important country of origin for labour and education migration. Currently, the profile of migration to Germany is changing: fewer experts are entering on the EU Blue Card (which, until recently, was the most important residence permit for skilled workers), while more students, trainees and professionally qualified people are coming to look for jobs or have their qualifications recognised by the Ger­man authorities. The Migration and Mobility Partnership Agreement (MMPA) concluded by Berlin and New Delhi in 2022 does not expand the German legal frame­work for recruiting skilled workers through the provision of new access routes. However, it does improve the practical implementation of self-organised migration from India – for example, by speeding up visa procedures. The MMPA Joint Working Group offers the opportunity not only to en­gage in a dialogue with the Indian government aimed at harnessing the full potential of increasing migration but also to address the challenges that have arisen from that trend, including the inadequate regulation of private recruitment agencies. The example of India shows that Germany’s external infrastructure and migration-related development cooperation must be used much more effectively in countries of origin in order to develop new approaches to the fair and successful recruitment of skilled workers for the German labour market. Migration cooperation is a bridge builder in German-Indian relations, which are becoming increasingly important. Key areas of bilateral col­laboration – such as digitisation, artificial intelligence and climate pro­tection – should be systematically linked to knowledge exchange and the mobility of skilled professionals in these sectors.

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been undergoing funda­mental structural reform aimed at improving operational preparedness and combat capability. The imperative of a military loyal to the Communist Party dominates China’s defence policy and permeates the PLA’s organisational culture. The centralisation of decision-making power in the hands of the chairman of the Central Military Commission, Xi Jinping, and his insistence on strict Party discipline run counter to a mission command model, as prescribed by the military doctrine. Joint operations capabilities require intensified training and cannot be achieved until there has been a generational change among the commanders. The PLA’s structures and decision-making processes remain opaque. They encourage groupthink and significantly hinder information exchange with external actors. Amid the growing perception in Europe of threats from China, direct engagement with the PLA is becoming more important. Besides formal meetings with the Ministry of Defence and the Central Military Commission, the chiefs of the German and other European armed forces should promote the active and strategic use of more informal formats.

The member states of the European Union are once again arguing about money. More specifically, they are arguing about how much they want to spend on defence, where this money should come from and whether they should spend it jointly. That Europe needs to defend itself better is not in dispute in Brussels or the national capitals. However, despite many discussions, summit decisions, documents and initiatives, it is still unclear what goals the EU should pursue or how it should spend money to improve European defence capabilities. In addition to fresh funding, what is needed above all is agreement on shared European objectives. This would enable the continuation and strengthening of military support for Ukraine, the creation of a single mar­ket for armaments and services and the financing of these from the EU budget.

Russia apparently aims to be capable of attacking targets in the Baltic Sea region from Lake Ladoga, which is located north of Saint Petersburg and only 40 kilometres from the Finnish border. Since 2023, Russia has been evaluating the deployment of corvettes equipped with cruise missiles there. Such warships have already carried out strikes deep into Syria and Ukraine. Their recent deployments to Lake Ladoga could complicate the defence of NATO’s north-eastern allies. Simulated launches were reportedly conducted for the first time in autumn 2024. However, NATO still lacks information about Lake Ladoga. Developments there underscore the need for con­ventional long-range fire capabilities into Russia’s strategic depth to deter Moscow effectively.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine marked the start of a prolonged confrontation between Moscow and Europe – one that is fundamentally reshaping the parameters of European security. The return of Donald Trump to the White House and his stated intent to quickly end the war in Ukraine and put pressure on the European allies including Ukraine to assume greater responsibility for their security is a second criti­cal inflection point. In this rapidly evolving security landscape, Europe faces the dual challenge of ensuring the long-term security of Ukraine, the Baltic states and the Black Sea region and strengthening the European Union’s defence and military capa­bil­ities. Turkey has a strategically significant, albeit politically contentious role to play within both contexts. What kind of an alignment might there be between the EU and Turkey, given that Ankara is simultaneously a partner, competitor, rival and even threat to EU member states? For its part, the European Union should adopt a gradual, pragmatic and interest driven approach to Turkey’s integration into the changing European security architecture. It should aim to reinforce the role of Europe – in­clud­ing Turkey – as a strategic and capable security actor while making clear that enhanced defence cooperation with Ankara and Turkey’s stalled EU accession process are two separate issues.

Turkey’s geopolitically motivated industrial and supply chain policy implies close ties to Germany as well as a security and economic policy orientation towards the EU. Ankara wants to bring production and sales into line with EU standards and establish a green high-tech and services economy. However, its decarbonisation measures remain inadequate. Turkish stakeholders see disruptions to global supply chains as creating the opportunity to relocate European production chains to Turkey (nearshoring). The government, the private sector and business organisations are all working to expand sustainable energy supplies. Turkey’s authoritarian domestic policy – namely, the dismantling of democracy, repression and disregard for the rule of law – makes it extremely difficult to deepen bilateral cooperation. Despite close economic ties, there are normative differences between Germany and Turkey and a consistent strategy to overcome them is lacking. Rather, the Turkish government is focused on using industrial policy to compensate for shortcomings in the rule of law. Amid the geopolitical tensions between the United States and China, Turkey is performing a delicate balancing act: it is maintaining its ties to the West while at the same time expanding its technology partnership with China and energy cooperation with Russia. German policy towards Turkey requires a strategic rethink. It should endeavour to promote economic stability, strengthen Turkey’s security policy integration into Europe and counteract Ankara’s strategic rapprochement with Moscow and Beijing. Going forward, cooperation should be made conditional on democracy, the rule of law and human rights.

In the 50th year of its existence, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is more than ever looking for a new role. The war in Ukraine and other conflicts in the OSCE area show how important the work of civil society organi­sations is in times of war and crisis – especially in fields where the state’s ability to act is limited. In an increasingly fragile international order, the OSCE should refocus on its strengths in regional conflict management and take greater account of the expertise of civil society. Moreover, representatives of civil society should get involved in the structures of the OSCE more systematically than has been the case to date, not only formally but also in practice. The Helsinki Conference on 31 July 2025, which commemorates the adoption of the CSCE Final Act, offers a good starting point.

Stablecoins represent a specific category of crypto currency. Their value is pegged to a particular asset, most commonly a traditional currency such as the US dollar. The Genius Act now integrates stablecoins into the US financial system. In order to comply with regulatory requirements, stablecoins must be fully backed by liquid US-dollar assets, primarily in the form of short-term Treasuries. The new rules establish a clear legal framework for stablecoins in their largest market, but also present significant risks.

Potential risks for Europe

Rapid growth of stablecoins pegged to the US dollar, along with the associated shift in assets and financial transactions, could weaken the euro area’s monetary sovereignty and hamstring its monetary policy. The requirement to back stablecoins 1:1 creates strong incentives to purchase short-term US Treasuries, despite mounting concerns about the sustainability of US debt. This could lead to rising demand for US securities and falling demand for European bonds. This would increase interest rates for heavily indebted euro states.

The greatest risk, however, lies in the opacity of many stablecoin issuers. Although they claim that their products are backed by traditional assets such as Treasury bills, the complex structure of their capital and reserves creates considerable potential for a sudden crisis of confidence. This could quickly lead to market panic, making it unfeasible to convert them into traditional assets. That would have spillover effects on the European financial sector.

The potential conflict of interest arising from the personal involvement in crypto raises particular concerns. According to media reports, companies belonging to the Trump family have made substantial profits in this sector. Given the need to sell more US debt – with which stablecoins could be helpful – it is in Trump’s interest to see that market grow as rapidly as possible. However, this raises questions about the effectiveness of oversight in the United States, as well as the likelihood of public intervention in the event of a crisis.

More reasons to introduce a digital euro

The Genius Act marks a radical departure from EU’s approach to regulating digital currencies. It focuses on rapid development of private currencies pegged to the dollar. By contrast, the EU’s leading initiative is the digital euro, a central bank digital currency to be issued by the European Central Bank. The United States currently prohibits the development of central bank digital currencies on the paradoxically grounds that this form of money, when issued by a central bank, is too risky.

While the Genius Act concentrates on the use of stablecoins to strengthen the influence of the dollar and create incentives to buy US bonds, the EU is pursuing a more cautious, comprehensive and balanced approach. Its MiCA regulation (Markets in Crypto-Assets) prioritises financial stability and consumer protection within the cryptocurrency ecosystem. The divergence between these regulatory approaches has the potential to engender conflict.

In any case, the advent of the Genius Act underlines the need for a secure digital euro that preserves monetary sovereignty in the digital ecosystem and permits private sector innovation, including stablecoins based upon it. Europe must also monitor developments in the United States and identify potential risks. Excessively rapid growth or turbulence there would pose a threat to Europe’s financial stability.

As the search for reliable sources of critical raw materials turns to the ocean floor, international conflicts could result. Although very little is known about the possible impacts of deep-sea mining, Washington has launched an initiative that undermines the existing international regime for seabed minerals. Currently, they are considered a global common good under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). If the United States unilaterally launches commercial deep-sea mining, it would undermine a touchstone of international law and shake the foundations of ocean diplomacy and international maritime affairs. Germany, together with 36 other countries, spoke out against this at the United Nations Ocean Conference (UNOC-3) in June 2025, reaffirming its support for a “precautionary pause” on the introduction of this high-risk technology. In view of current global political turbulence, that line should be maintained.

The United States (US) and European Union (EU) are at risk of entering a full-blown trade war. Three months ago, on “Liberation Day”, US President Donald Trump imposed high import tariffs on almost all countries, including the EU. He then suspended them at short notice to negotiate with over 90 of the affected trading partners. At the beginning of July, when the tariffs were due to come into force, Trump again postponed the tariffs on the EU and other countries by an additional month. In a letter to the EU, Trump threatened higher tariffs, namely 30 per cent, from 1 August. This back and forth shows that Member States must prepare for an escalation of the conflict – one that could go far beyond tariffs and even jeopardise the security of the EU.

Any rational assessment must take into consideration the complex geopolitical landscape in which Turkey operates. Ankara is seeking to secure its influence in Syria, and to play a role in shaping the region’s post-war order. And it rejects federal structures in Syria, fearing they could encourage Kurdish aspirations for autonomy within Turkey.

Fragile alliances and new power dynamics

Erdoğan’s overtures towards the PKK and the Kurds are part of his geopolitical calculus to support Washington’s announced withdrawal from Syria. Tom Barrack, US Ambassador to Ankara and Special Envoy for Syria, recently announced the closure of seven of the eight US bases in Syria. And Washington has fulfilled one of Turkey’s key demands by lifting sanctions on Syria. In return, Erdoğan has significantly softened his rhetoric towards Israel.

Here, Ankara’s interests intersect with Öcalan’s. If Israel gains sway over the Syrian Kurds, Öcalan could lose influence or even fade into irrelevance. The alliance between the Turkish state and the PKK leader is based on power politics and could collapse with any shift in the geopolitical constellation in the Middle East.

Turkey’s influence in Syria remains fragile. Damascus has been making cautious overtures to Israel and is open to the Abraham Accords. Any agreement between Al-Sharaa and Israel would offset Turkey’s dominance in northern Syria and could significantly weaken Ankara’s regional position. This would involve potentially far-reaching consequences – and opportunities – for the Syrian Kurds.

Domestically, Erdoğan has been using the negotiating process to consolidate his power. His central goal is to secure the pro-Kurdish DEM Party’s approval for a constitutional amendment that would allow him to run for a third term. This manoeuvre could once again subvert hopes for a lasting peace.

Much symbolism, few concrete steps

So far, the PKK’s disarmament appears largely symbolic. The process follows no discernible strategy. It is neither internationally monitored, nor accompanied by reintegration programmes or legal guarantees. Will the PKK’s affiliates in Syria and Iran join the disarmament process? And what will happen to the PKK’s weapons? The extent to which the structure of the Turkish state might change also remains unclear. Critics warn of a fragmentation along ethnic and religious lines, which could lead to destabilization.

The conflicting parties’ divergent interpretations of the process highlight the underlying tensions. President Erdoğan frames it primarily as a security issue and presents it as a step toward a “terror-free Turkey” and a historic alliance between Turks, Kurds, and Arabs. Representatives of the Kurdish movement, by contrast, demand a democratic opening, an end to political repression, and restoration of the rule of law.

Tactical détente cannot secure a lasting peace. Institutional reforms, political participation, societal reconciliation, and above all democratic legitimacy are required. These developments are relevant for Germany and should be followed with particular attention. Although Ankara would reject any official mediating role for Berlin, there is a place for German think tanks, political foundations, and civil society actors to pursue track two diplomacy. Informal dialogue could contribute to clarifying the perspectives and expectations of the conflicting parties and thus help build trust.

In recent months, there has been an intensifying debate over whether Europe can still rely on US extended nuclear deterrence or should begin to consider alternatives that are independent of Washington. A binary approach – trust or no trust – is of limited analytical value here; the subject matter demands greater differentiation. Accordingly, this paper presents three scenarios to allow for a better understanding of the key challenges and possible responses. The first scenario is a transatlantic crisis of trust that might be possible to address with moderate effort. The second is a breach of trust requiring increased conventional strength and the appropriate tools for escala­tion control in order to force the US to become involved if necessary. And the third scenario is one in which the Europeans conclude that the US has withdrawn its support completely – a development that would have far-reaching and unpredictable consequences.

The war in Sudan, which broke out on 15 April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), has triggered the largest humanitarian crisis in the world. Civilians are being directly attacked by the warring parties. The violent actors are destroying civilian infrastructure and blocking humanitarian aid as part of their war strategy. Some are also targeting members of specific identity groups, including on an ethnic basis. At the same time, the parties to the conflict claim to be protecting the civilian population. International efforts to pro­tect the civilian population or particularly vulnerable groups have so far been largely unsuccessful. Calls for military intervention have little chance of success in the current global situation. In fact, the committed efforts of Sudanese citizens to protect themselves and others around them deserve more attention and support. Pro­tection efforts can help alleviate the suffering of the civilian population, even if an end to the war remains out of reach.

Authoritarian states are increasingly leveraging non-state cyber capabilities to expand their operational reach, thereby challenging conventional distinctions between state and non-state activity. This practice complicates attribution and presents obstacles for coordinated international responses. Moreover, as cyber threats become more complex and entangled, effective countermeasures necessitate enhanced information sharing, trusted partnerships and the development of response tools that function independently of political attribution.