The 2026 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was held in New York in April-May. It was a failure because the delegations had been unable to agree on a final document. This was the third consecutive Review Conference to end without consensus – something that had never happened before in the 56-year history of the NPT. Ahead of the conference, some diplomats and experts had warned that another failure would be catastrophic not just for the treaty but for the entire nuclear order. That is the wrong conclusion to draw. The record of previous Review Conferences, what happened at this year’s meeting and the responses to its outcome all suggest that the NPT – the cornerstone of the nuclear order and an essential pillar of the broader international order – remains resilient. The growing nuclear inequality inherent in the NPT’s division of states parties into five nuclear-weapon states and 186 non-nuclear-weapon states polarises the multilateral nuclear debate in New York, Geneva and Vienna but does not threaten the treaty’s survival. The NPT would be at risk, however, if Russian and Chinese revisionism were to intensify further and US willingness to exercise leadership continued to wane.

Route-based approaches promise a paradigm shift in international refugee and migration policy. Rather than treating individual country contexts in isolation, they shift attention to developments along key migration corridors. The analytical value is obvious, given the complex and transnational character of mobility dynamics. Yet the growing popularity of route-based approaches also follows a political rationale – they resonate across different political camps, offer operational synergies and may help allocate scarce resources more effectively. At the same time, the concept reflects a fundamental tension in international migration policy: route-based approaches can improve protection along migration corridors, but they can also legitimise the out­sourcing of migration control to countries of origin and transit. Whether route-based approaches amount to substantive change or merely repackage a logic of control will depend on how they are implemented.

The United States has accused China of conducting secret nuclear weapons tests in violation of international norms and testing moratoria. Because of its comparatively limited historical testing record, China has strong incentives to obtain additional test data for the modernization of its nuclear weapons programme. Thus, it would be dis­advantageous for Washington to respond by resuming underground nuclear testing, as Russia and China would benefit more from the erosion of international testing norms. For their part, Germany and Europe can take only limited action by promoting greater transparency and confidence-building measures.

In recent years, Germany has gradually reformed the Skilled Immigration Act (FEG) to make the recruitment of workers from third countries easier. Little political atten­tion has been paid to the fact that this also entails an increased risk of exploitative working conditions – particularly since abusive practices often begin as early as the recruitment stage in the country of origin. The Federal Government should therefore complement its efforts to attract international skilled labour with an effective regu­la­tory framework for private recruitment agencies, stronger cross-border cooperation, and a more targeted use of migration-related development cooperation in key countries of origin and transit.

Tensions between Addis Ababa and the Tigray Region are gradually mounting. Mis­calculations could even trigger another large-scale war, although the parties involved may not directly seek one. Since the war in northern Ethiopia ended in November 2022, no new, stable political order has emerged. Tigray remains suspended between war and peace. Responsibility for this lies with both the Ethiopian government and its partner in peace, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Having lost power in the national government in 2018, the TPLF has yet to find a new role for itself; in­stead, it has been marked by internal power struggles and characterised by authoritarian tendencies. Conversely, the Ethiopian government has not done enough to facilitate the return of internally displaced persons and restore Tigray’s territorial integrity. A renewed outbreak of hostilities could draw in Eritrea, Sudan and other regional actors. Germany and the European Union (EU) should firmly commit to crisis prevention in order to avoid further escalation in the already tense Red Sea region.

The war in Iran has led to kerosene prices roughly doubling and forced airlines to cancel thousands of flights. Some voices from the industry have used the crisis to call for climate policies to be relaxed. However, this misreads what the crisis actually demonstrates: Costs are being driven not by too much climate policy, but by dependence on fossil energy itself. In 2026/27 the European Union (EU) will decide whether to end the “stop the clock” exemption that has shielded international flights from the Emissions Trading System (ETS) since 2013 and extend the ETS to all departures from the European Economic Area, or whether such flights will continue to be covered by international offsetting mechanisms. The decision will have implications well beyond aviation: for the EU’s 2040 climate target, the demand for durable CO2 removal, and the credibility of European climate policy more broadly.

Under President Gustavo Petro, Colombia has positioned itself internationally as a leader in climate action and in pursuing a just transition away from fossil fuels. Among other things, Petro’s climate and energy policy relied on supply-side measures to limit the exploitation of fossil fuels – a unique approach among those countries in the Global South that, like Colombia, export fossil fuels. At the same time, Petro has had only limited success in implementing this agenda within his own country. With the election victory of the right-wing opposition candidate, Abelardo de la Espriella, the future of this reform course is now being renegotiated. Whether the transformation in Colombia succeeds without jeopardising short-term economic stability, security of supply, and social cohesion is relevant for many countries that export fossil fuels and have only limited fiscal space. They are therefore closely watching whether, and under what conditions, Germany and the European Union (EU) provide support for Colombia’s transformation. Failure would have political implications beyond Colombia.

Purges and institutional restructuring under a state of emergency

On 21 July 2016, Parliament approved a state of emergency declared by the government. It remained in force until mid-July 2018. Erdoğan used it to carry out comprehensive purges across the state apparatus with 32 emergency decrees. Around 130,000 public-sector employees were dismissed. By the end of 2016, the authorities had arrested around 125,000 people, including 36,000 to 40,000 who were placed in pre-trial detention – with 149 journalists among them. By the end of 2022, the number of arrests and detentions in connection with the coup attempt had risen to around 332,000, with 4,000 judges and prosecutors losing their posts. Thousands of private schools, universities and foundations were closed by decree. A further 131 media companies were shut down, including 45 newspapers, 16 television stations, 23 radio stations and 3 news agencies. The authorities also revoked the passports of tens of thousands of people. 

Extensive repression and the resulting climate of fear significantly restricted political competition and public debate. In this environment, the government initiated a restructuring of Turkey’s institutions.

The decisive step was the constitutional referendum held in April 2017, in which a narrow majority voted to introduce a presidential system that significantly expanded the president’s powers. International election observers reported irregularities and concluded that the referendum was not free or fair. The legitimacy of the result remained controversial, not least because the Supreme Electoral Committee subsequently admitted around two million improperly stamped ballots on election night, thereby pushing the referendum to a narrow victory.

The constitutional amendment strengthened executive power and largely concentrated it in the hands of the president. He was given extensive executive and appointment powers, while Parliament’s oversight and veto rights were restricted. In addition, the growing influence of the executive has weakened judicial independence. Numerous political scientists initially classified Turkey as a “competitive authoritarian” regime, with more recent analyses increasingly assessing it as an “autocracy”.

International governance indices document this development. Turkey’s score in the Liberal Democracy Index nearly halved within a few years. Freedom House downgraded Turkey from “Partly Free” to “Not Free” in 2018. Since the state of emergency, the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index has also shown significant deficits in the rule of law and judicial independence.

The economic consequences of autocratisation in Turkey

Autocratisation was accompanied by a significant erosion of the central institutional framework of the Turkish economy. The weakening of democratic institutions, the rule of law and the protection of property rights, as well as the loss of central bank independence, increased uncertainties about economic policy. The growing concentration of power and the dismantling of institutional constraints on government action have negatively impacted the predictability of economic policy. This was reflected in key economic indicators, which pointed to a marked economic slowdown from 2016 onwards.

In the first five years following the coup attempt, average annual real GDP growth fell from 6.5 in the preceding five-year period to 3.5 per cent, despite expansionary monetary and fiscal policies. At the same time, nominal GDP per capita fell from around $11,000 to $9,700. Foreign direct investment inflows also declined from an average of $15 billion to $11 billion. Export growth slowed from 5 to 3 per cent, while inflation rose from 7 to 14 per cent. The Turkish lira also depreciated significantly and became more volatile.

There are currently no signs of a sustained economic recovery. The ongoing repression against the opposition party CHP and its mayors, as well as the government’s renewed efforts to amend the constitution to secure its hold on power, are increasing political instability and impacting the investment climate.

The Federal President’s trip in mid-June 2026, which took him to Indonesia and the Philippines, among other destinations, has once again signalled the growing awareness within German foreign policy of the importance of Southeast Asia. However, when it comes to Germany’s relationship with the Indo-Pacific, Northeast Asia and India have so far received greater attention. Relations with Southeast Asia remain comparatively underdeveloped and driven by economic interests, with the primary aim of reducing dependence on China. Beyond its economic potential, however, the region has strategic significance in its own right: as an arena of great-power rivalry, a hub for global supply chains, and an increasingly vocal presence in multilateral forums. To strengthen its long-term interests in stability and a rules-based internatio­nal order in the Indo-Pacific, Germany must deepen its cooperation with Southeast Asia – particularly as numerous actors are competing for influence there.

The Trump-Xi summit in May 2026 highlighted a shift in Washington’s posture that introduces deep uncertainty into US-Taiwan relations. While the meeting was no turning-point, it underlined Taipei’s predicament: relying heavily on now question­able American promises. If Washington does reduce its security guarantees, Taiwan could strengthen its strategic alignment with Europe. That would present risks for Europe, but also opportunities.

In January 2027, the first Conference of the Parties to the new United Nations High Seas Treaty will take place. The meeting is expected to address key conflicts between marine conservation and ocean use in the context of climate change. The 2024 ad­visory opinion of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) on climate change is therefore once again attracting attention. Many observers had expected the opinion to clarify the relationship between ocean protection and utilisation in climate policy. Such clarification is particularly important in relation to emerging marine carbon dioxide removal (mCDR) technologies, which seek to enhance oceanic carbon drawdown in order to mitigate climate change. ITLOS confirmed that states are obliged to protect the ocean from pollution caused by atmospheric CO₂. However, it left open the question of whether mCDR should be regarded as marine pollution or as a contribution to marine environmental protection. This ambiguity could be mobilised politically to either promote or restrict mCDR. International organisations, EU institutions, and national authorities should therefore prepare for competing inter­pretations of the advisory opinion that may shape future climate and ocean governance.

Sanctions are a key instrument in the European Union’s foreign and security policy. Although their enforcement depends on the Union’s ability to act legally as well as politically, prosecutions remain constrained by national borders. For this reason, France and Germany proposed in 2022 that the mandate of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) be expanded to cover violations of EU sanctions. That initiative failed to gain sufficient support in the Council, nor was the problem solved by the 2024 directive defining offences and penalties. The change of government in Hungary and the review of EPPO’s mandate scheduled for 2026 offer an opportunity to revisit the issue.

The Chinese leadership has implemented various official directives, plans, and poli­cies that are, step-by-step, coalescing into a comprehensive architecture of volumetric statecraft. Volumetric power integrates spaces such as the atmosphere, the deep sea, the polar regions, the (geological) subsoil, or outer space into political governance. Volumetric states develop special economic and techn(olog)ical capacities to gain control of, and even govern, these spaces. Volumetric statecraft implies the Chinese state’s willingness and capacity to integrate various policy dimensions into a set of comprehensive ecosystems. China’s 15th Five-Year Plan specifically manifests the volumetric dimension in Chinese governance. This directly impacts the type of chal­lenge that China will pose to the European Union (EU) in the coming years, and it will force the EU to adapt a volumetric strategy of its own towards China.

Cybersecurity incidents cause harm – for example, when adversarial states paralyse critical infrastructure or steal sensitive data. Many such incidents are only possible because many software products have known vulnerabilities. Software vendors could fix these, but they have little incentive to invest in the security of their products. To date, cybersecurity policy and protective measures have primarily addressed the symptoms of insecure software, rather than the root cause, namely software insecu­rity itself. This calls for regulation, specifically in the areas of product safety law, pro­duct liability regulations, and cybersecurity requirements for providers of software services. The European Union (EU) has already adopted initial rules, but regulatory gaps remain, and it is unclear whether member states will strictly enforce them. The German government should therefore now advocate for comprehensive European product liability regulations for software, and the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) should impose fines on companies that violate existing rules.

The Indian government is seeking to expand the country’s space programme in order to strengthen national security, promote economic growth and bolster India’s global standing. Its aim is to achieve strategic autonomy in the field of civilian space activities and technological sovereignty in the military sphere. In the area of security policy, India’s quest for sovereign capabilities is a race against time owing to its rivalry with China. But despite improved investment and regulatory conditions, there has not yet been any significant progress towards the development of a robust and competitive space economy. India’s most important strategic partner in the space sector is the US, with which it closely cooperates on trade, security and intelligence matters. In the field of civilian space activities, however, there is a growing interest in cooperation with European actors. India wants to attract more investment into the country, close technology gaps and diversify its partner­ships.

The so-called Russian shadow fleet primarily serves to evade sanctions on oil exports and thereby finance its war of aggression against Ukraine. At the same time, it is increasingly emerging as a security risk with defence implications for Europe. Vessels associated with the shadow fleet are being linked with growing frequency to acts of espionage and sabotage, thereby posing a threat to German and European security as well as to the maritime environ­ment. In close coordination with its partners, the German government should pursue a sys­tematic approach to countering the shadow fleet effectively. The overarching objectives are to preserve the integrity of sanctions regimes, safeguard maritime security, and contain defence-related threats.

Russian attacks and threat posturing are increasingly extending into space as well. This poses risks to infrastructure in Europe, which is becoming ever more dependent on satellite systems. This affects civilian services such as navigation, but also Europe’s defence capabilities. The question is therefore increasingly how such manoeuvres by Russia should be countered, and whether weapons systems should be deployed in space as a deterrent. Europe’s armed forces are far more dependent on space systems than the Russian armed forces. Given this asymmetry, Germany and its partners should focus primarily on the resilience of their satellite systems.

As maritime routes become more vulnerable and fragmentation in the Middle East deepens, Turkey is increasingly focusing on three areas: energy corridors, air connectivity, and the South Caucasus.

Reinforcing its role as an energy hub

Long central to Ankara’s ambitions, energy transit has gained renewed urgency amid recent instability in the Gulf. The Southern Gas Corridor, stretching from Azerbaijan through Georgia and Turkey to southern Europe, has become one of the few overland routes delivering non-Russian gas to the European Union. Its strategic importance has increased as alternative supply routes have become more vulnerable to disruption. 

Ankara is also placing growing emphasis on Iraq’s Development Road Project (DRP), which aims to connect energy resources from Qatar and the United Arab Emirates to Europe via Iraq and Turkey. As risks to maritime shipping rise, the DRP becomes more attractive, allowing Turkey to position itself as a relatively stable and potentially indispensable trade route. 

The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline further strengthens Turkey’s position. In 2025, the pipeline transported around 207 million barrels to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan and has remained one of the few export outlets not directly exposed to Gulf-related disruptions. Energy flows through Turkish territory thus enhance Ankara’s leverage.

Airspace as a strategic asset

Turkey is also consolidating its position as an aviation hub connecting Europe and Asia. With northern routes over Russia and parts of Middle Eastern airspace restricted, Turkish Airlines has expanded its network. Istanbul Airport, Europe’s busiest air hub in 2024, has emerged as a key transit point linking Europe to Central and East Asia. 

This air connectivity reinforces Turkey’s role in global mobility networks and strengthens its ties with emerging markets across Asia. The recent resumption of flights between Istanbul and Tehran, following the partial opening of airspace, revives commercial activity. It also signals a pragmatic diplomatic engagement between Ankara and Tehran despite broader regional tensions.

Expanding the South Caucasus links

The South Caucasus is becoming a critical pillar of Turkey’s connectivity strategy. Following the realignments after the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, new opportunities have emerged for transport corridors linking Turkey to the Caspian and beyond. 

Direct flights between Yerevan and Istanbul restarted after six years of suspension, reconnecting Armenia to Western routes. In addition, Ankara is deepening cooperation with Azerbaijan to develop corridors that bypass both Russia and Iran, integrating the region more firmly into east-west trade networks. 

These efforts are closely tied to the so-called Middle Corridor, which connects energy and transport routes from China to Europe via Central Asia and the Caspian Sea while offering a viable alternative to the Northern Corridor through Russia. If successfully expanded, it could significantly enhance Turkey’s role as a transit country in Eurasian trade while shortening transit times and reducing risks for European supply chains.

Taken together, these initiatives reflect Turkey’s efforts to formalise its ties with regional partners through connectivity. In a context of conflict and fragmentation, Ankara is accelerating this approach, embedding itself deeply in regional networks through infrastructure, energy cooperation, and long-term economic frameworks. For Europe, this has tangible implications: The viability of alternative corridors will shape energy prices, supply-chain resilience, and trade routes in the years ahead.

Yet, Turkey’s strategy carries risks. Many of these corridors run through fragile political environments, from Iraq to the South Caucasus. Instability could just as easily derail Turkey’s ambitions as advance them, leaving European partners exposed to the very disruptions Ankara’s strategy is meant to mitigate.

Since Russia launched its full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine in 2022, the European Union (EU) has pursued its enlargement policy as part of a geopolitical approach. According to the European Commission and candidate states, the EU could admit new members from 2028 onwards, while Ukraine is calling for accession in 2027. Yet significant obstacles remain. Within the EU, the reform process designed to improve its capacity to act and prepare it for a Union of 30 or more has stalled. However, the readiness of accession candidates and the Union’s absorption capacity are key criteria that German European policy has traditionally upheld. There is cur­rently intense debate within the EU regarding gradual integration, fast-track routes, and new safeguard clauses aimed at reducing the tension between geopolitical urgency and sound integration policy. With regard to the Western Balkan states, the EU should adhere to the well-established accession process. In the case of Ukraine, the situation is so acute that the political commitment to admit the country must be reaffirmed. As a preliminary step towards membership, the EU should offer Kyiv a new type of accession association that also includes a security and defence dimension.

The Arctic and the Arctic-North Atlantic region are gaining in geopolitical relevance as Arctic shipping routes and resources become more accessible. Germany should step up its political, military and economic engagement in this part of the world. A successful German Arctic policy requires closer cooperation both with Arctic states and with partners in the EU and NATO, Germany’s stronger engagement with security policy and the improved integration of civilian and military capabilities. The Arctic-North Atlantic region is to be regarded as a single strategic space and viewed in the context of European security. For its part, Germany should actively contribute to the stabilisation of this space and help pre­serve the fragile balance in the Arctic. A German Arctic strategy should not only reaffirm principles such as those of a rules-based order and multilateralism; it should also seek to protect them by means of clearly defined political, economic and security policy instruments. In the long term, a German Arctic strategy must go beyond the 2024 guidelines and identify concrete steps to safeguard German interests in the region. It must also establish clear priorities, outline political and security-policy measures, mobilise resources and both generate and demonstrate overall capacity for action. Germany’s new Arctic policy should be more consistently embedded in a policy framework for Europe as a whole. By ensuring close alignment with EU foreign and security policy and playing an active role in the shap­ing of the EU Arctic strategy, Germany can represent its own interests more effectively and at the same time contribute to Europe’s capacity to act in the region.

US imperial policy towards Latin America and the Caribbean is characterised by a com­bination of dominance ambitions and exclusivity claims. Through drastic coercive measures, Washington is forcing an economic transformation in Venezuela without paving the way for a political transition. At the same time, it is imposing a fuel block­ade on Cuba and threatening to take over that country. Above all, Germany and the EU should support civil society in Venezuela and Cuba. Furthermore, they should un­equivocally acknowledge the already existing violations of international law and adopt a firm stance against the normalisation of violence and disregard for human rights.

Managing goals and expectations

On the third anniversary of the conflict’s outbreak on 15 April, the German government will host an international conference on Sudan together with France, the United Kingdom, the United States, the European Union (EU), and the African Union (AU). Foreign ministers from key countries as well as representatives of the United Nations, humanitarian organisations, and Sudanese civil society are expected in Berlin. 

At the same time, it is important to note that this is not a peace conference. No one should raise their expectations too high. Even a humanitarian truce, which the United States wants to broker with its partners Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, is not currently in sight. It would already constitute some progress if the Sudanese representatives could agree on a declaration to de-escalate the conflict. A joint communiqué of the ministers is unlikely to materialise, given the experience with the lack of consensus at the previous meeting in London.

Placing civilian actors at the centre

Despite its limited scope, the international Sudan conference in Berlin offers the opportunity for a long overdue change in perspective: away from the warring parties and towards those who are already working for societal and political peace.

Of course, the SAF and the RSF themselves must silence the weapons. However, the military actors alone will not even be able to guarantee a permanent end to armed violence. At best, a power-sharing model would produce another fragile civil-military transitional government. Fighting within the armed coalitions would be likely given the divergent interests of their constituents; a renewed flare-up of violence would only be a matter of time. South Sudan has already taken a similar path: There, armed violence has become part of the political system.

Instead, Sudan needs a new, civilian-led political order. It will take time to develop, but creating the necessary framework for discussion is possible even during the ongoing war. This is precisely the goal of the quintet of five international organisations – the African Union, the European Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the United Nations, and the Arab League – which joined forces at the beginning of the year. The quintet is conducting consultations with numerous civil and political groups in Sudan. In contrast to earlier approaches, there is currently greater unity among the participating organisations as well as a coordinated process design. Different political blocs with ties to the conflict parties and independent civil actors are expected to agree on a Sudanese steering committee that sets the agenda and criteria for a political process. 

The conference should support this process. Participants should commit not to organise parallel initiatives and instead align existing projects with civilian actors – especially those from the United Kingdom, Norway, Canada, and Switzerland – in support of this process. 

The civilian components of the conference in Berlin, which is to bring together 40 Sudanese representatives, can be an important step towards a common platform and convey its own messages to the international participants.

Finally, the humanitarian component of the conference should mobilise urgently needed funding. It should also strengthen the ownership, protection, and financing of mutual aid networks such as the Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs). These networks are able to reach Sudanese regions where international aid organisations cannot operate, and their work strengthens social cohesion.

These civilian approaches could help to make the conditions for ending the war more favourable.

The Turkish government’s declaration of 2025 as the “Year of the Family” reflects an increasingly authoritarian approach to managing demographic decline amid conditions of economic strain. Falling fertility rates are framed as a strategic challenge to national resilience, giving rise to a policy agenda that positions the family as the cornerstone of demographic recovery. At the same time, anti-gender politics has moved beyond ideological rhetoric towards a broader governance strategy linking demographic management, fiscal constraints, and authoritarian consolidation. For Germany and the European Union (EU), understanding these developments is essential for engaging Turkey on democratic governance, social policy, and gender equality.

The parliamentary elections held in Bangladesh on 12 February 2026 marked a turn­ing point in the country’s recent history. In August 2024, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who had served for a total of 20 years, with one interruption, was removed from office. An interim government led by Nobel Peace Prize laureate Muhammad Yunus subsequently took power. Following two years of political uncertainty, it suc­ceeded in organising elections that were procedurally sound. Bangladesh’s political system has thus demonstrated a considerable degree of institutional resilience. At the same time, the election outcome raises new questions regarding the future of democratic pluralism in the country. The decisive election victory of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) means that one of the country’s two historic political family dynasties will remain at the helm of government. The Muslim fundamentalist camp gained vote share, which could negatively impact the role of women in society as well as complicate Bangladesh’s renewed rapprochement with neighbouring India.

The Trial Is Polarising the Public and Undermining Trust in the Justice System

For many observers, more is at stake than İmamoğlu’s political fate. It is also a question of whether President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan can maintain his power. He is under pressure because of foreign policy concerns related to the war involving the United States, Israel, and Iran – a conflict Turkey prefers to stay out of – as well as continuing economic difficulties at home. At the same time, his approval ratings are falling.

A large segment of the population considers the criminal proceedings to be politically motivated. Outside Erdoğan’s support base and the pro-government media, an alternative narrative has taken hold: İmamoğlu has been indicted because he triumphed four times against Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Istanbul, and he stands a strong chance of becoming the opposition’s presidential candidate.

Lawyers regard the 3,739-page indictment as resting on thin evidence. They doubt that it is necessary to keep the defendants – first and foremost İmamoğlu – in custody during the trial. The indictment is based on statements given by undisclosed witnesses, and it remains imprecise in parts. Scepticism is also fuelled by the fact that prosecutor Akın Gürlek is known for legally controversial cases against opposition members and those critical of the government. Gürlek is now Minister of Justice, whose appointment is being challenged in court.

There are strong indications that the proceedings serve political ends. The opposition is to be weakened, the Republican People's Party (CHP) politically paralysed, and its leadership persuaded to drop İmamoğlu’s candidacy.

Several CHP district mayors were removed from office and arrested. Some switched to the AKP under pressure arising from the threat of criminal proceedings, while numerous critics were also arrested. Selahattin Demirtaş, former leader of the predecessor party of today’s Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (DEM party), remains in prison despite rulings by the European Court of Human Rights. In several municipalities in south-eastern Turkey, elected mayors of DEM party continue to be replaced by government-appointed trustees.

How Things Could Proceed in the Trial 

As with the Ergenekon trials, the outcome of the case against İmamoğlu is likely to depend heavily on the political climate. In that mammoth case, which took place between 2007 and 2013, military officials, journalists, and academics were charged with allegedly plotting a conspiracy against the government. Many of the sentences were later overturned.

The verdict in the İmamoğlu trial may be delayed or shaped in such a way as to eliminate İmamoğlu as a presidential candidate. The CHP would be weakened, while Erdoğan’s governing bloc would be able to consolidate its autocratic rule. However, the prerequisite for Erdoğan’s renewed candidacy would be either early elections triggered by the dissolution of parliament or a constitutional amendment.

Since Turkey’s economy lacks momentum and broad segments of the population are suffering from a loss of purchasing power, the de-escalation of the Kurdish conflict could become a decisive factor for electoral success. However, the condition for this would be that the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) is disarmed, which would require the CHP to continue supporting the process.

This gives the CHP, as the second strongest parliamentary group, a potentially important negotiating position vis-à-vis the government. If the party leadership is wise, it could help secure İmamoğlu’s release from prison or even his acquittal.

Thirty years after establishing a customs union with the European Union (EU), Ankara sees growing economic risks in the EU’s free trade agreements with third countries, most recently India. While negotiations on the EU–India Free Trade Agreement were concluded at the end of January, and security cooperation between the EU and India is now also to be expanded, Ankara remains on the sidelines. From Turkey’s perspective, the agreement could also weaken its significance in the EU’s strategic calculus. Ankara is therefore making a strong case for the modernisation of the customs union. It cannot be ruled out that the structural asymmetries of the customs union will become even more entrenched to Turkey’s detriment: Market integration without political participation may place Turkey at a lasting disadvantage and strain its rela­tions with the EU. Once the free trade agreement enters into force, Indian products will gain easier access to the Turkish market, whereas Turkish products will not gain corresponding access to India. Due to geopolitical differences with India, Tur­key also sees risks to its own regional interests. Brussels and Berlin could use this constellation to put cooperation with Ankara on a viable institutional footing.

The data covers the following time period: 01.02.2022-01.11.2025

Digital and artificial intelligence (AI)-based systems now shape all phases of inter­national migration – from the pre-screening of applications and profiles to border management and the integration of migrants. States, international organisations, and private providers use digital platforms, biometric systems, and algorithmic processes to manage migration in a more targeted way. At the same time, migrants themselves use digital tools to obtain information, prepare decisions, and secure access to work or support. This development is changing migration not only operationally but also structurally: It enables new forms of digital labour mobility, shifts power relations and dependencies, and embeds migration into a global data economy. For Germany and the European Union (EU), the question arises as to how digitalisation and AI can be shaped in terms of migration, foreign, and development policy so as to deliver effi­ciency gains in administration and procedures, without undermining data protection, equal treatment, and human-rights standards.

US defence policy is characterised by contradictions that are on display once again in the Trump administration’s latest strategy documents. The reasons for this go far beyond the president’s erratic behaviour. At the core lies the unanswered question of how the United States should deal with the loss of global dominance. For Europe, these contradictions present not only risks but also opportunities. But German and European decision-makers should not fall victim to the false hope that NATO in its current form will survive Trump’s second term in office.

Five years after the bloody military coup and amid a civil war, elections have taken place in Myanmar. They were neither free nor fair, nor was any attempt made to keep up an appearance of even minimum democratic standards. From the outset, the main purpose of the elections was not political participation but an authoritarian-led tran­sition from military rule to a “civilian” government. The country’s new executive is intended to appear legitimate both nationally and internationally (on account of the ballot) and at the same time consolidate the military’s dominance. For its part, Myan­mar’s military leadership claims the elections mark a “new beginning” to restore political stability in the country and break its international isolation. The reference here is, among others, to the European Union (EU) and its member states, which have imposed sanctions against Myanmar. However, they should not believe the myth of a “civilian” elected government and a “return” to constitutional order; and, accordingly, they should not seek to normalise relations with Myanmar for the time being.

The acquisition of Greenland has repeatedly been a topic of discussion within US gov­ernment circles since the 19th century. That is because of the island’s strategic loca­tion and its resources. In the summer of 2019, US President Donald Trump made his first bid to purchase Greenland from the Kingdom of Denmark. Since then, he has declared ownership and control of Greenland to be an “absolute necessity” for US national security. For their part, the Danish intelligence services have responded by identifying the United States – for the first time ever – as a potential threat to the security of the Kingdom since Washington is no longer ruling out the use of military force even against allies. But is Trump really concerned about security or simply acquiring what he sees as the world’s largest possible real-estate asset? How should his bid for Greenland be assessed? And what are the implications and policy options for Europe?

African governments are entering the geopolitical competition over critical raw materials with a growing sense of strategic confidence. While the AU-EU Summit in Luanda in November 2025 reaffirmed political commitments on both sides, European initiatives continue to lose ground. It is true that the Critical Raw Materials Act has expanded the EU’s diplomatic footprint; however, its limited project pipeline and fragmented financing under the Global Gateway have left the bloc unable to match the speed and scale of competing offers notably from China, the Gulf States and the US. African partners expect cooperation on industrial projects and deeper integration into value chains. With stronger internal coordination and increased financing under the next Multiannual Financial Framework, the EU can strengthen both its ability to deliver and its credibility.

Persons fleeing their homes are exposed not only to physical dangers but also to severe psychological distress – from the ordeal of displacement itself and the experience of violence to unsafe living conditions and a lack of any prospects at their destination. It is not just those directly involved who are affected by the consequences of such trau­matic experiences; the social cohesion of societies and their economic development and stability are threatened, too. Both in the political discourse and in international aid programmes, mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) in displacement situations is often neglected. But MHPSS measures can have a positive social impact: on coexistence in the host countries and on peace processes in the countries of origin. Thus, they directly support the third dimension of the humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) nexus – the so-called peace pillar. The HDP nexus aims to link humanitarian aid and development to peacebuilding. Such efforts are particularly important in displacement situations.

The political, social and economic reforms spearheaded by Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman serve the goal of consolidating his rule in the long term. Bin Salman has centralised decision-making in his own hands and is in full control of the country’s politics. Authoritarianism under the crown prince is far more radical and uncom­promising than was the case in Saudi Arabia until 2015. From the outset, Bin Salman promoted a pronounced Saudi nationalism, which many observers describe as a “Saudi-first” policy. From the crown prince’s point of view, social and cultural liberalisation is a prerequisite for the success of his economic reforms and thus for the long-term survival of the kingdom and the ruling family. The reforms have had only limited success because Saudi Arabia remains highly dependent on oil revenues, despite a recent economic upturn.

Five of the world’s most active and largest sovereign wealth funds are to be found in the Gulf Region: the Saudi Public Investment Fund (PIF), the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) and the United Arab Emirates’ Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA), Mubadala and ADQ. These funds not only serve to convert oil revenues into investment capital, thereby enabling the transition from rent-based to more diversified economies; they also contribute to expanding the foreign policy capabilities of the countries in which they are based. Institutional and personnel linkages enable the Saudi, Qatari and UAE governments to deploy their funds strategically, which, in turn, allows them to significantly expand their hard, soft, and sharp power – for exam­ple, through domestic and foreign investments in sectors such as armaments, media, sports and new technologies as well as through co­operation with politically influential actors. At the same time, the Gulf monarchies seek to portray their sovereign wealth funds as apolitical and purely profit-oriented – a narrative that is facilitated by the establish­ment of subsidiaries or cooperation with private equity firms. Understandably, Germany and its European partners have an interest in attracting sovereign wealth funds as investors, but they must not overlook the risks involved. These include third parties gaining access to critical infra­structure, sensitive military and security technology being leaked and the Gulf monarchies exercising political influence. Further, Germany and the EU must take a more fundamental look at how the three Gulf monarchies have increased their foreign policy options through the sovereign wealth funds. This is important as the actions of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar – at both the regional and international level – are at times contrary to German and European interests.

The fossil-fuel foreign policy of the United States under President Donald Trump has intensified the conflict between petrostates and electrostates in international climate politics. At COP30 in Belém in November 2025, this cleavage was particularly evident in the dispute over a roadmap for the Transition Away from Fossil Fuels (TAFF). While an increasing number of countries regard TAFF as a necessary consequence of the global energy transition, fossil fuel producers prevented any substantive progress being made. The conference highlighted the structural limits of the capacity of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to mediate this dis­tri­bu­tional conflict. As a result, the EU faces a strategic dilemma: to further politicise the COP process around TAFF or to prioritise the stabilisation of key mechanisms of the Paris Agreement. Whether it can overcome that dilemma will become apparent during the run-up to the next global stocktake, which is due at COP33 in India in 2028.

In Latin America, Mexico (2020), Chile (2022) and Colombia (2022) have all officially committed to a feminist foreign policy (FFP). The introduction of a feminist approach to foreign policy should be seen in the context of a growing awareness of gender issues in international, regional and national politics. In comparison with their European counterparts, the Latin American approaches to FFP exhibit a stronger focus on the domestic dimension, on internal problems. This is especially clear in the case of Mexico, while Chile’s FFP emphasises the feminist perspective in foreign trade and Colombia’s FFP defines itself as pacifist. These countries’ FFPs have not brought about a fundamental political change, but they do inject new momentum into existing gender equality policies and gender mainstreaming. They expand women’s participation and representation and enhance the visibility of women’s contribution to foreign policy. Mexico, Chile and Colombia are important partners for Germany and the EU in matters concerning the global gender and human rights agenda. As these Latin American countries are intensifying their cooperation in these areas, they are also worthwhile partners for the expansion of trilateral cooperation. As the German Federal Foreign Office has dropped its FFP, while the Ger­man Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) is continuing its feminist development policy and the future of Chile’s FFP is uncertain due to the change of power, it will make sense to pursue cooperation on human rights, inclusion and gender issues through vari­able formats and terminological framing. Germany should also benefit from learning processes, and strengthen bi-regional dialogue and exchange, including between feminist and women’s organisations.

Germany is facing a security policy Zeitenwende whose industrial dimension has not yet been sufficiently addressed. The war in Ukraine, rising military threats in Europe, and the long-term underfunding of the German Armed Forces have exposed the limits of existing defence industrial capacity, while the reliability of the United States (US) as a security guarantor is increasingly uncertain. This creates a strategic need for Germany to quickly rebuild its defence industrial base. Yet, despite the increased demand and funding, German defence industries are struggling to scale production quickly, exposing capability gaps that endanger both national defence and NATO commitments. In this context, cooperation with South Korea gains strategic relevance, as plans for localised production by Korean defence firms in Germany could ease bottlenecks, shorten supply chains, and enhance operational readiness without creating new strategic dependencies.

The Clearing-House Mechanism: Technical Tool or Political Lever?

At the centre of this debate lies an instrument with an unassuming name: the so-called BBNJ Clearing-House Mechanism (CHM). It is intended to become a freely accessible platform on which information about activities on the high seas is collected, analysed, and shared. Its objectives include enhancing transparency among State Parties and relevant stakeholders, as well as facilitating international cooperation, particularly in scientific matters. Although the goals and basic structure of the CHM are defined in the treaty text, its concrete design remains the subject of ongoing negotiation – and it is precisely this element that makes the mechanism politically contested.

The treaty text explicitly opens the possibility of incorporating different forms of knowledge into decision-making processes through the CHM. In particular, diverse knowledge systems could be systematically integrated within the framework put forward for mandatory environmental impact assessments. States would be required not only to assess potential environmental impacts, but also to consider the economic, social, cultural, health-related, and cumulative effects of planned activities that take place in or affect the high seas. Such a comprehensive assessment of impacts necessitates contributions from a range of scientific disciplines as well as the knowledge of Indigenous Peoples and local communities.

A further opportunity for the practical implementation of knowledge pluralism is found in the provisions concerning the composition of the Scientific and Technical Body (STB). The relevant wording in the agreement suggests that this body should go beyond purely natural scientific expertise and incorporate a broader spectrum of local, traditional, and Indigenous knowledge related to the marine environment. Since the STB can issue recommendations about activities in areas beyond national jurisdiction on the basis of information provided through the CHM, this represents a key lever for translating the knowledge diversity promised in the treaty text into practice. This depends, however, on whether the STB is in fact constituted in a way that ensures adequate representation of different knowledge systems.

Political Conflicts Delay the Implementation of the Agreement

Despite the treaty’s promising language, the concrete design of the CHM remains politically contentious. Within the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom), which is tasked with operationalising the agreement, this issue has emerged as one of the central points of conflict. At a PrepCom meeting in August 2025, Parties were unable to reach agreement on the composition of an informal expert group intended to develop the technical aspects of the CHM. The selection process for this informal group is of strategic importance, as it could set a precedent for the composition of other BBNJ bodies. Whereas some states are advocating for the broad inclusion of a range of knowledge holders, others seek to reduce the CHM to a purely natural scientific and technical function guided exclusively by academic expertise. Critics warn that such an approach could privilege natural scientific knowledge from the Global North and marginalise social scientific, local, or traditional forms of knowledge.

Against the background of recent attempts by individual states, including the United States, to restrict access to marine data, it becomes clear that knowledge about the oceans is itself increasingly becoming an object of political contestation. Germany and the EU have repeatedly spoken out during international forums in favour of the freedom and diversity of science. In the context of the ongoing negotiations on the operationalisation of the BBNJ Agreement, they should therefore make targeted efforts to ensure that knowledge diversity within the agreement is not merely recognised normatively, but institutionally safeguarded as well. This is primarily about preventing the privileging of certain forms of knowledge within BBNJ bodies, such as the Scientific and Technical Body. At the same time, the CHM platform itself must be designed in such a way that different knowledge types can be made equally accessible.

With climate change advancing, the planned relocation of entire com­munities from risk areas is becoming unavoidable. It is already a reality worldwide and will become increasingly necessary in the future as a measure of climate adaptation and disaster risk reduction. Relocation can save lives and reduce the risk of displacement. Never­theless, this measure is considered a “last resort” because it is expensive, deeply affects livelihoods, social networks and cultural identities, and carries new risks. To be effective, it must be participatory, human rights-based, and accom­panied by development-oriented measures that strengthen the well-being and resilience of those affected and reduce structural inequalities. Many places lack the political will, concrete strategies and resources for this – especially in low-income countries with already limited adapta­tion capacities. These countries are therefore heavily dependent on inter­national support, which has mostly been fragmented, ad hoc and uncoordinated. The longer the absence of adequate structures persists, the greater the risk that human security will be severely compromised, fundamental human rights violated and entire communities (once again) displaced – posing risks to regional stability and global security. The German government should specifically address gaps in the inter­national system, facilitate access to knowledge and resources, and strengthen multi-sectoral learning. Germany’s current engagement in Fiji should be expanded in the medium term to other climate-vulnerable regions and countries, with a focus on community-driven relocation projects.

The higher turnout in Iraq’s recent parliamentary elections reflects advances over the past four years, notably in infrastructure development, security, and political stabil­ity. The election’s outcome and ensuing coalition-building dynamics underscore trends and challenges that will shape Iraq’s domestic and foreign policies. The yet-to-be-formed government will have to balance between the United States and Iran, facing US demands for disarmament of Iraq’s armed groups, managing repercussions of potential instability in Iran, and resisting being drawn into any new confrontation between Iran and either Israel or the United States. It will also have to deal with sub­stantial domestic challenges, including strained relations between Erbil and Baghdad, the potential for renewed Sunni alienation from the state, the future of the Popular Mobilization Forces, financial fragility, and consequences of climate change. European actors have limited influence over the geopolitical dynamics, but can offer support on national development and climate challenges, and should back Baghdad’s striving for stronger agency and sovereignty.

Space capabilities are a core element of any modern defence arsenal. In Europe, how­ever, military space capabilities are limited and dependence on the United States remains high. Europe must develop its capabilities in order to reduce dependencies and enhance its capacity to act on its own, thereby fostering European autonomy. To ensure that European space capabilities are developed efficiently, it is necessary to identify which dependencies on the US are particularly critical and which obstacles would hin­der the development of such capabilities. Priority should be given to space situational awareness, military reconnaissance, navigation resilience and missile early warning.

The conflict between the Republic of Cyprus in the Greek-speaking south and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the Turkish-speaking region recognised only by Ankara, has been largely frozen since the de facto division of the island. This certainly has also been due to UNFICYP’s presence. Since the 1974 ceasefire, the mission has controlled the “Green Line”, a 180-kilometre strip separating the two parts that is intended to prevent direct confrontation.

Nevertheless, the mission continues to record numerous military and civilian violations in and along the buffer zone By doing so, it still prevents “those sparks from bursting into flames”, as Colin Stewart, head of UNFICYP until August 2025, put it. To this day, there still is no direct military contact mechanism between the parties. In fact, the threat perception has increased again on both sides recently.

New impetus for peace efforts

For this reason alone, the European Union and its member states cannot be interested in any further reduction or even a potential withdrawal of the mission. The political process is just beginning to tentatively gain momentum. María Angela Holguín Cuéllar was reappointed as the Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy in May 2025 and is tasked with exploring possibilities for a new round of formal negotiations and breaking the deadlock. 

This is a difficult undertaking. While the UN Security Council continues to pursue a federal solution, Northern Cyprus and Turkey have been promoting a two-state solution for years. However, the election of Turkish Cypriot President Tufan Erhürman in October has raised hopes that the door could open for new negotiations under UN auspices. The first trilateral meeting between him, the President of the Republic of Cyprus, and Holguín has just taken place. But a rapprochement is likely to take time. Confidence-building measures and the safeguarding of peace by the UN therefore remain essential.

The essential role of the UN

As the Republic of Cyprus is a member of the EU, the Union itself can hardly act as an impartial mediator. It therefore primarily supports the UN-led political process. The EU’s options in the security domain are also constrained. A separate EU mission – as is currently being considered for Lebanon following the withdrawal of UNIFIL – would be unrealistic, if only because of the tense relationship between Greece and Turkey, both of which, alongside the United Kingdom, are the guarantor powers for Cyprus. 

Therefore, the stabilising function of the UN mission remains essential for the foreseeable future. It also creates the framework for practical rapprochement, for example through the projects of the Technical Committees. Under joint Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leadership and facilitated by the UN, these initiatives promote understanding between the two communities, and the EU provides a large portion of the funding. 

UNFICYP is in a better financial position than many larger UN missions, as Greece and the Republic of Cyprus cover about half of the budget. However, staffing and operational cuts will be necessary. At the same time, the raison d'être of a mission that has been running for decades is repeatedly being called into question. At the end of January 2026, the mandate is up for renewal again. Despite all the criticisms from the Turkish government and former leaders in Northern Cyprus, the UN Security Council's position has remained unchanged so far. 

In order to break the deadlock in negotiations, there is a need for more economic engagement from the European side to improve the situation in the north. In the short term, however, EU member states should make it clear that UNFICYP – and UN peacekeeping as a whole – is indispensable.

The relationship between Japan and China is of far-reaching importance for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific, as the two countries are the world’s fourth- and second-largest economies, respectively. Over the past 15 years, bilateral tensions have deepened markedly, even as the two countries have maintained close economic ties. During the one-year tenure of Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru (October 2024–October 2025), however, there were signs of a modest thaw in relations. In November 2024, Chinese President Xi Jinping described the relationship as being “in a critical phase of improvement and development”. His statement was followed by a series of diplomatic exchanges and Beijing even agreed to lift import restrictions on Japanese fishery products and beef. Yet, the thaw remained limited. Beijing has reverted to a confrontational posture following remarks on Taiwan by Japan’s new Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae in early November. The relationship remains fragile.

The current US administration plans to protect the entire territory of the United States against any potential air or missile attack. The focus is on deploying large satel­lite constellations capable of detecting and intercepting long-range missiles shortly after launch. Even if only a fraction of this ambitious plan is likely to be implemented, it is probable that there will be progress in missile defense during the coming years. For Germany and Europe, the risks and potential benefits – especially with regard to space-based US missile defense – are difficult to assess at the current time. However, Europe can maintain the largest possible room for maneuver by avoiding an open confrontation over Trump’s plans.

Today’s armed forces are highly dependent on software. Software products are built by complex networks of software components, software vendors, service providers, and other companies that, together, form the software supply chain. In “conventional” cybersecurity incidents, threat actors usually gain direct access to their target. But in the case of the software supply chain, the risks originate upstream in the supply chain itself and have an impact on entities downstream – often the end users. The armed forces are particularly vulnerable to these risks. Software supply chain incidents in the military sector have caused disruption and allowed malicious actors to engage in industrial espionage, political espionage, and sabotage. Policymakers and the Bundeswehr can manage software supply chain risk in the military sector through a set of measures. First, decision-makers should determine the requisite level of protection for the various areas of software use to strike a balance between risk management, on the one hand, and the functionality, cost, and speed of deployment, on the other. Thereafter, the Bundeswehr should establish effective risk management. Further, the federal government and the Bundeswehr should ensure that software suppliers reduce the software supply chain risk posed by their products. By doing so, the armed forces can be given adequate protection.

In addition to the legacy of structural problems, budgetary problems are increasingly exacerbated by geopolitical factors. On the one hand, there is an urgent need for higher spending on defence, energy transition, industrial subsidies and aid to Ukraine due to Russia’s aggression and economic competition from China. On the other hand, rising interest rates on government debt worldwide are limiting European Union (EU) countries’ ability to borrow. This creates the vicious circle: Limited fiscal leeway deepens geopolitical dependence, and geopolitical dependence forces further spending.

Hidden costs of public debt

In the context of rising debt, reference is typically made to the growing costs of debt servicing. This narrows the scope for fiscal policy and diverts resources from growth-promoting sectors such as research and education.

However, rising debt also has hidden geopolitical costs: It reduces the ability of EU countries to act together, exacerbates disagreements – for example between north and south or between large and small member states – and weakens confidence in central institutions such as the European Commission, which monitors compliance with fiscal rules, and the European Central Bank (ECB), whose monetary policy could increasingly be oriented towards stabilising member states’ debt.

In addition, high public debt makes EU countries more vulnerable to external factors such as changes in interest rates internationally. Public debt can also become an instrument of external influence on EU member states. The increasing involvement of investors from third countries – including China and the Gulf states – in European bond markets raises the risk that financial dependencies will be exploited politically.

Escaping the vicious circle

Unlike the United States and China, the EU has few options for mobilising capital. Limited fiscal space and weak capital markets make it vulnerable to external shocks. The integration of financial markets and the restoration of competitiveness in Europe are progressing slowly, according to the conclusions given in reports by Enrico Letta and Mario Draghi. A rapid breakthrough that would lead to a noticeable inflow of capital to Europe cannot be foreseen.

The EU’s highly decentralised fiscal system relies heavily on the economic future of its three largest member states – Germany, France and Italy. Together, these countries account for about two-thirds of the eurozone’s public debt. However, given their limited fiscal leeway, they can no longer reconfigure their economic models and respond to geopolitical challenges. France’s deteriorating public finances are leading to growing populism in economic policy debates. This not only undermines confidence in the country’s economic policy-making capabilities, but could also put the already fragile structure of the EU’s monetary union to the test.

Amid global economic competition, the stability of the euro and the internal market are among the EU’s few “hard” assets that could easily be lost. A new euro crisis – in which Germany no longer plays a stabilising role and the ECB’s measures may no longer prove effective – would not only be an economic but also a geopolitical disaster for the EU. Sustainable public finances must therefore become an essential part of its geopolitical resilience.

Since 2022, the Russian leadership has significantly expanded its activities in the area of military-patriotic education for children and young people. New compulsory measures and voluntary programmes have been introduced. Their apparent diversity notwithstanding, the Kremlin has strict control over these new measures and pro­grammes. Its goal is to educate the next generation in accordance with the Russian leadership’s line, recruit loyal young people for the regime and the armed forces, and identify at an early stage those who might become critics of the regime. The new measures cover a growing number of children and young people and now extend even to kindergartens. Those affected respond with enthusiasm, indifference or opportunism. Overt resistance is evident only in isolated cases owing to the heavy pressure to conform and the repressive nature of the regime.