Inoffizielle Version

Report of the EU/U.S./Russia Troika on Kosovo

December 4, 2007

Summary

1. We, a Troika of representatives from the European Union, the United States and Russia, have spent the last four months conducting negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina on the future status of Kosovo. Our objective was to facilitate an agreement between the parties. The negotiations were conducted within the framework of UN Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) and the "Guiding Principles" of the Contact Group (cf. Annexes 1 and 2). In the course of our work, the parties discussed a wide range of options, such as full independence, supervised independence, territorial partition, substantial autonomy, confederal arrangements and even a status silent "agreement to disagree."

2. The Troika was able to facilitate high-level, intense and substantive discussions between Belgrade and Pristina. Nonetheless, the parties were unable to reach an agreement on the final status of Kosovo. Neither party was willing to cede its position on the fundamental question of sovereignty over Kosovo. This is regrettable, as a negotiated settlement is in the best interests of both parties.

Background

3. A political process to determine the future status of Kosovo, the last major issue related to Yugoslavia's collapse, has been underway for over two years. The United Nations Secretary General appointed Martti Ahtisaari as his Special Envoy in November 2005 to undertake the future status process envisioned in UN Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). After fifteen months of UN-sponsored negotiations, President Ahtisaari prepared a Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, which included measures to protect Kosovo's non-Albanian communities, and a recommendation that Kosovo should become independent subject to a period of international supervision. Pristina accepted the Ahtisaari Settlement in its entirety; Belgrade rejected it.

4. After a period of discussions in the UN Security Council, the Contact Group (France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) proposed that a "Troika" of officials from the EU, the United States and Russia undertake yet another period of negotiations with the goal of achieving a negotiated agreement. On August 1, 2007, the UN Secretary General welcomed this initiative, restated his belief that the status quo was unsustainable and requested a report from the Contact Group on these efforts by December 10, 2007. The United Nations Office of the Special Envoy for the Kosovo Future Status Process (UNOSEK) would be associated with the process by standing ready to provide information and clarification on request (cf. Annex 3).

The Troika's Mission

5. Upon our appointment as Troika representatives, we vowed to "leave no stone unturned" in the search for a mutually acceptable outcome. In pursuit of this goal, we explained to the parties the principles that would guide our work. First, we reaffirmed that UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) and the November 2005 "Guiding Principles" of the Contact Group would continue to be our operating framework. Second, we noted that while the Ahtisaari Settlement was still on the table, we would be prepared to endorse any agreement the parties might be able to reach. Both sides were repeatedly reminded of their responsibility for success or failure of the process.

6. We also explained that the Troika had no intention of imposing a solution. Instead, the burden was on each party to convince the other side of the merits of its position. Although our role would be primarily to facilitate direct dialogue, we also intended to take an active role in identifying areas of possible compromise.

Working Schedule

7. During the four months of our mandate, we undertook an intense schedule of meetings with the parties (cf. Annex 4). This schedule was comprised of ten sessions, six of which consisted of face-to-face dialogue, including a final intensive three-day conference in Baden, Austria, as well as two trips to the region. During the process, Belgrade was represented by President Boris Tadić, Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica, Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremić and Minister for Kosovo Slobodan Samardzić. Pristina was represented by the "Team of Unity" composed of President Fatmir Sejdiu, Prime Minister Agim Çeku, President of the Assembly Kolë Berisha, Hashim Thaçi and Veton Surroi. The Troika appreciated the fact that both delegations were represented at the highest possible level, underlining the importance they attached to the process. In addition to the joint sessions we arranged separate meetings with the parties in order to consult with them individually. Our sessions were long and often difficult, as we confronted a legacy of mutual mistrust and sense of historical grievance about the conflicts of the 1990s. The Contact Group supported our work, and its foreign ministers urged the parties to approach the negotiations with "creativity, boldness and in a spirit of compromise" (cf. Annex 5). We also sought, and received, pledges from the parties that neither would engage in provocative acts or statements during the process (cf. Annexes 6 and 7).

8. As we began our work, we first explored the well-established positions of each side. Pristina restated its preference for Kosovo's supervised independence and reconfirmed its acceptance of the Ahtisaari proposal. Belgrade rejected the Ahtisaari proposal and restated its preference that Kosovo be autonomous within Serbia. As a result, there was no discussion of the Ahtisaari proposal nor any discussion that it should be modified. Both sides employed historical, functional, legal and practical arguments to support their preferred outcome. Belgrade elaborated its model of substantial autonomy to enhance the powers of an autonomous Kosovo and reduce those that it would reserve. It asserted that there would be no return to the pre-March 1999 situation. Pristina presented a draft "Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation," which describes how Kosovo and Serbia, as independent states, could cooperate on issues of mutual concern, establish common bodies, enhance their commitment to multi-ethnicity and support each other's Euro-Atlantic aspirations.

9. Despite our repeated call for fresh ideas and a spirit of compromise, neither side was able to convince the other to accept its preferred outcome. Encouraged by the Contact Group's Ministerial Statement of September 27 (cf. Annex 4), we undertook a more active approach. We developed our assessment in the form of the "Fourteen Points" of possible overlap in the parties' positions (cf. Annex 8, "Troika Assessment of Negotiations: Principal Conclusions"). The parties responded to these points, without accepting them fully.

10. Under our guidance, the parties reviewed outcomes ranging from independence to autonomy, as well as alternate models such as confederal arrangements, and even a model based on an "agreement to disagree" in which neither party would be expected to renounce its position but would nonetheless pursue practical arrangements designed to facilitate cooperation and consultation between them. Other international models, such as Hong Kong, the Åland Islands and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), were discussed. While it was broached, we did not dwell on the option of territorial partition, which was deemed unacceptable by both the parties and the Contact Group. None of these models proved to be an adequate basis for compromise. We concluded face-to-face negotiations between the parties at a high-level conference in Baden, Austria, during November 26-28, where we again encouraged both sides to find a way out of the deadlock.

Conclusions

11. Throughout the negotiations both parties were fully engaged. After 120 days of intensive negotiations, however, the parties were unable to reach an agreement on Kosovo's status. Neither side was willing to yield on the basic question of sovereignty.

12. Nevertheless, despite this fundamental difference on status, which the Troika was unable to bridge, we believe this process served a useful purpose. We gave the parties an opportunity to find a solution to their differences. Under our auspices, the parties engaged in the most sustained and intense high-level direct dialogue since hostilities ended in Kosovo in 1999. Through this process, the parties discovered areas where their interests aligned. The parties also agreed on the need to promote and protect multi-ethnic societies and address difficult issues holding back reconciliation, particularly the fate of missing persons and the return of displaced persons. Perhaps most important, Belgrade and Pristina reaffirmed the centrality of their European perspective to their future relations, with both sides restating their desire to seek a future under the common roof of the European Union.

13. While differences between the parties remain unchanged, the Troika has nevertheless been able to extract important commitments from the parties. In particular, both parties have pledged to refrain from actions that might jeopardize the security situation in Kosovo or elsewhere and not use violence, threats or intimidation (cf. Annex 9). They made these commitments without prejudice to their positions on status. Both parties must be reminded that their failure to live up to these commitments will affect the achievement of the European future that they both seek.

14. We note that Kosovo and Serbia will continue to be tied together due to the special nature of their relationship, especially in its historical, human, geographical, economical and cultural dimensions. As noted by Contact Group Ministers at their meeting in New York on 27 September, the resolution of Kosovo's status is crucial to the stability and security of the Western Balkans and Europe as a whole. We believe the maintenance of peace in the region and the avoidance of violence is of paramount importance and therefore look to the parties to stand by their commitments. We, furthermore, strongly believe that the settlement of Kosovo's status would contribute to the fulfilment of the European aspirations of both parties.