

**SWP**

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik  
German Institute for International  
and Security Affairs



*Alexander Ochs*

# Reviving Transatlantic Cooperation towards a Global Threat

Reflections on INTACT's First High-Level  
Transatlantic Workshop on Climate Change  
Washington, D.C., November 18, 2002

February 2003  
Berlin



\* The German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), the largest think tank on international affairs in Western Europe, started the project INTACT – International Network To Advance Climate Talks, at the beginning of 2002. From its inception, INTACT has been supported by a grant from the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). The GMF is an American institution that stimulates the exchange of ideas and promotes cooperation between the United States and Europe in the spirit of the postwar Marshall plan.

More information on the INTACT project can be found online at:  
[www.intact-climate.org](http://www.intact-climate.org)

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und  
Politik, 2003  
All rights reserved

**SWP**  
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik  
German Institute for International  
and Security Affairs

Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4  
10719 Berlin  
Telephone +49 30 880 07-0  
Fax +49 30 880 07-100  
[www.swp-berlin.org](http://www.swp-berlin.org)  
[swp@swp-berlin.org](mailto:swp@swp-berlin.org)

# Table of Contents

Preface 5

**Introduction: Climate Change as a  
Transatlantic Century Challenge 6**

**Closing the Gap of Misunderstanding:  
What Drives U.S. and European Climate Politics? 7**

**Engaging the Private Sector:  
Joint Industry Perspectives, Opportunities and  
Obstacles for Technology Breakthroughs 10**

**Engaging Major Developing Countries 12**

**Conclusion: The Need for Continuation  
of the Dialogue 14**

## **Appendix**

Invitation 16

Agenda 17

Participants 18



## Preface

The High-Level Transatlantic Workshop on Climate Change was organized jointly by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (WWICS) and the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), and sponsored by the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). The workshop took place at the WWICS in Washington, D.C. on Monday, November 18, 2002. The event was part of the project INTACT – International Network To Advance Climate Talks, started at the beginning of 2002 by the SWP. From its inception, INTACT has been supported by a generous grant from the GMF.

The workshop was designed to facilitate dialogue and greater understanding around respective U.S. and European approaches to climate change within a broader political, economic, technological, and diplomatic context. The dialogue therefore included experts on the transatlantic relationship as well as climate experts and brought together policymakers, foreign policy analysts, business leaders, journalists, and scholars from both sides of the Atlantic.

The workshop organizers did not seek agreement but rather attempted to give all participants the opportunity to have their divergent opinions heard. However, for the organizers it was remarkable to observe the level of consensus that could be reached on important questions. Nevertheless, please note that while trying to summarize some of the major outcomes of the conference in a well-balanced fashion, the opinions expressed in this report do not necessarily represent those of the individual attendants.

The SWP is indebted to the WWICS for hosting and the GMF for generously funding the meeting. The organizers would like to thank all participants for their general willingness and heavy involvement in the dialogue.

# Introduction: Climate Change as a Transatlantic Century Challenge

Climate change is one of the biggest challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Unfortunately, international action thus far has not adequately met this challenge. Whatever has been done, we are far from managing the problem. At times in the past inaction was justified by pointing out an alleged lack of full understanding of the phenomenon. However, today one has to admit that within the last decade science has made considerable progress in research on climate change. It is essential to appreciate that while a better understanding of the world climate system is of course desirable, a 100 percent forecast of the extent of its change and regional consequences will in all probability remain unattainable, even for decades to come. Politicians therefore must decide on effective protection measures *though* being faced with an enduring degree of uncertainty. All in all, it seems reasonable to assume that after a first phase which was mainly designated to the exploration of the problem, a phase in which skepticism towards the danger posed by climate change constantly declined, we have now just entered a second phase in which we must search intensively for effective solutions to the problem and to implement these measures as soon as it is feasible.

Where do we stand today? Even if the targets set by the Kyoto Protocol are entirely fulfilled, global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions will, far from a reduction or even stabilization, continue to rise steeply: the IEA forecasts a 90 percent increase of emissions by the year 2030 and further increase beyond this date should no additional measures be taken. Should this scenario materialize, we will *definitely* lose sight of Article 2 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), i.e., the “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” The commitment to the UNFCCC, however, has been declared often by both the United States and the EU, and was once again confirmed in 2002.

During the year 2002 the process of bringing the Kyoto Protocol into force made significant progress. The Russian Duma has yet to ratify, but this is the only remaining condition in order for the protocol to come

into force. Whereas Europe remains a strong supporter of this multilateral treaty, the Bush Administration has continued to follow its own national path and announced the U.S. Climate Change Strategy on February 14, 2002. However, this development is not as recent as is often proclaimed. On the contrary, we have known since the Byrd-Hagel Resolution in 1997 that the United States has difficulties following the international path designed by the Conferences of the Parties to the UNFCCC, namely the Berlin Mandate, which led to the Kyoto Protocol.

Any solution therefore must begin with the acknowledgement that the United States and Europe, though sharing the same basic values, have adopted different approaches to address climate change. Indeed, the decision to pursue alternative strategies has become a political bone of contention in the transatlantic relationship. The result is a degree of friction between diplomatic relationships extending well beyond the environmental realm.

Nevertheless, there are similarities in both approaches which can and should be used as conjunction knots in a renewed partnership and as starting points for enhanced transatlantic cooperation: Both strategies are linked to a restriction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2012, and both strategies have entered the phase of implementation. It is now time for “thinkers” and decision-makers alike to restructure the challenge and develop strategies for further steps that must be undertaken if both sides actually wish to confront the problem.

Because of the high risks that climate change presents to the environment in general and to human civilization in particular, the topic urgently requires a further upgrade on the international political agenda. There was widespread agreement among participants that the importance of the transatlantic community to cooperate towards this aim can hardly be overestimated. Not only can this truly global problem not be solved by either of these traditional partners alone, but other areas of international policy have shown that there is little that cannot be done if the United States and Europe agree but only little can be done if they do not.

## Closing the Gap of Misunderstanding: What Drives U.S. and European Climate Politics?

A major question to address is how far the differences of the existing approaches towards climate protection (fixed and mandatory targets in the EU versus the U.S. flexible portfolio approach) are to be understood as differences in prioritization amongst the governments. Europeans stressed their deep concern about the threats related to climate change. Their political action can be seen as following a serious practical interest with a sense of urgency. This is primarily caused by the realization of a *direct* threat: floods and other extreme weather conditions directly linked to climate change are occurring with greater frequency. In addition, Europeans feel an *indirect* threat, namely the prognosis of a less stable world due to effects caused by climate change. Predominant is the fear of mass migration as a consequence of environmental disaster, hunger, and civil wars fought for scarcer resources. Furthermore, Europeans acknowledge the possibility that since the latent “North-South conflict” could be heightened by the idea that the North is the main causer and the South the main sufferer from any future climate change, this could then lead to rising opposition to “Western” values in general.

Some participants doubted that climate change assumes the same position on the actual political agenda of the United States. To them, in the inner circle of higher government as well as in the conservative think tanks, climate change is not seen as a pressing issue. They suspect U.S. politics to still be driven by a large degree of skepticism towards the issue. To U.S. officials this assessment is just a consequence of the general hostility of Europeans to U.S. proposals and approaches in the field of environmental politics. They claim that the United States simply wants to take a different path to tackle the problem, and that there is a lack of understanding on the European side. Europeans, however, replied that there is no such gap of misunderstanding, and that the real gap is a political one. Reluctance to agree or even talk about targets and timetables would only be a euphemism for the unwillingness to act effectively. Consequently, no criteria for genuine success could be found in the Bush Administration’s climate proposal: absolute GHG reductions were still permitted to rise further.

Turning to the international arena, Europeans expressed no doubt that the problem must be confronted with a multilateral solution. The Kyoto Protocol, whatever its shortcomings, is where this process has led the international community. There is widespread agreement in Europe that more is to be done, and that Kyoto can only be a first step within a longer commitment to the issue. Thus, since the development of a new and more effective structure will **take** some time, they appealed to continue *unequivocally* with Kyoto for the time being.

Indeed many Europeans agreed that Kyoto has several weaknesses, as U.S. officials have repeatedly criticized in the past. However, what was especially taken as offensive in the eyes of many was the assertion that the Kyoto path is not taken by the United States because it is *not in the U.S.’ interest*. Bearing in mind the huge influence of catastrophes on public attention towards the topic, and thinking about climate change in these human terms, many consider it an affront if U.S. officials say that it is not in the interest of *their* country to be more active.

Is there an opening for the United States to return to the Kyoto structure? Europeans would welcome such a return. For the United States, however, the developing countries also have to accept binding GHG reduction commitments – if not all then at least the top five to ten emitting countries. The U.S. assessment thus far is that most developing countries do not see climate change as an important issue. Therefore, the United States appeals to Europeans to collaborate on helping developing countries to see the link between climate change and more prominent issues, such as poverty, water availability, and sustainable development. Again, Europeans have a slightly different view of this condition put forward by U.S. politics: they suspect the United States of considering the involvement of developing countries a convenient topic with which to break the international process as a whole. Europeans were aggravated after witnessing American companies spending millions of dollars for public relations to pronounce that Kyoto is not truly global and bad for the U.S. economy, while at the same time their CEOs are attending international forums where

they tell developing country leaders *not* to participate themselves because it is also bad for *their* economy.

It became obvious that should the United States attempt to interrupt the process of international coalition-building and destabilize Kyoto, this would give rise to a very negative reaction on the side of the EU, and severely worsen the partnership. U.S. officials stated that the United States will by no means press Russia or any other country, developing or otherwise, to reject Kyoto.

But the United States is not alone in the struggle to convince their critics that it considers climate change serious and is willing to act. To many the EU has a credibility problem as well, and the Europeans' moralistic stance and the pointing at others who do not do their homework cannot be accepted as being sufficient. In their opinion, Europe itself has a responsibility to act and must try harder to reach the already-declared targets. For some, the European market also seems to be large enough to generate the necessary innovations for technological change towards more sustainable, climate-friendly development.

Whether or not it is true that there is already "tremendous" investment in sustainable development (the U.K. alone, for example, generates 2 billion Euros annually in its "carbon trust"), there seems to be the problem that many in the United States believe the EU is not doing anything serious either. Obviously, the EU has to find a way to make it heard that it really is taking strong measures. The importance of EU countries, particularly Germany, working to assure a clearer description of the EU climate efforts in U.S. media was stressed in this context. One cannot overestimate the need for Europe to fulfill its Kyoto commitments, even more so since U.S. climate change policy seems to be at least in part driven by fears of economic losses, particularly in international economic competitiveness. Consequently, the EU has to demonstrate that these fears are unreasonable.

Basically it must be understood that not only has the United States traditionally had difficulties with working in multilateral environmental frameworks, but that other topics of international politics have a distinct influence on the formulation of U.S. climate policy. As an example, one could take the growing gap on defense capabilities between the United States and Europe causing a feeling in America that Europe would free-ride on the United States. This has an effect on the United States' general stance to international politics and particularly leads to an anti-reaction towards those issues where the United States feels

inappropriately criticized, as is obviously the case in climate policy.

Indeed, Europeans had to admit that if not on the international and national levels, then at least on the other levels of political organization in the United States a great deal is done towards climate change: nine states and at least 130 municipalities already have legislation on climate protection in place. There was a widespread feeling among participants that these enterprises at the sub-national level were not sufficiently recognized in Europe. Though the group agreed that these initiatives cannot replace an effective national or international (not to mention global) solution in the long run, there was dissent as to whether the state initiatives can eventually urge the federal government itself to put forward effective legislation. Recent decades have actually shown that the United States has always needed a certain amount of time to effectively deal with pressing environmental concerns (compare, for example, legislation on water safety or the Clean Air Act). One could in many cases delineate a five to ten year period during which the topic was discussed and after a while picked up by some states. National legislation always followed afterward. Accordingly, the United States is still in the early stages. From this perspective it is an improvement that there is little scientific doubting of the problem now, that some states and local authorities have already decided on certain measures, and that even Congress has begun to discuss climate protection bills.

We might see in the treatment of climate change a huge difference between the European states and the United States in the way of general governance and in how society deals with competing interests. Perhaps, as some participants believed, the U.S. public really does not have as much trust in government as its European counterpart. An American participant noted that "we cannot tell our public that we do this or that and then there will be no more floods, hurricanes, etc." It should be accepted that the democratic process in the United States is more complicated, the different interests have it out with each other and are competing for a final best-practice approach.

Europeans seemed to understand this problem on the one hand; however on the other they were essentially unwilling to accept this explanation as an excuse for not taking responsible action. They pointed out the political processes both within the EU body and on the level of its member states. In their view, this two-level negotiating is far from easy, either. As a



consequence Europe is also still trying to find its final way of solution, but at least it is intensely dealing with the topic and only by this will it come progressively closer to an answer. The example of Germany is interesting in this regard: historically you find command-and-control approaches here, then in the 1990s the appearance of voluntary agreements between government and industry, which even reminded one participant of "U.S. corporatism." It is only within the last few years that emission trading has come out ahead.

Climate change is not only an environmental and economic issue in addition to a technological challenge. To many in the group it is even a moral, philosophical, or "ethical" issue. Generation justice as well as North-South equity are the strongest issues in this regard. One fears that the transatlantic gap will widen as long as the different approaches to morality, which seem to underlie the different stances in international climate negotiations, prevail. Whether one has to go so far as to ask if we are "establishing two different civilizations" must remain open to further discussion; in any case it will not be decided solely in the field of climate policy.

# Engaging the Private Sector: Joint Industry Perspectives, Opportunities and Obstacles for Technology Breakthroughs

There was widespread consent at the meeting that a change from the status quo of a heavily fossil-fuel reliant economy to one that merits the term “climate-friendly,” i.e., continuously reducing and eventually producing *no* absolute GHG emissions, is the biggest technological problem humans have ever faced. This assessment is not in the least due to the fact that the past cannot serve as a guide for this challenge, since the economic system of the past has actually caused the problem of climate change. Thus, it seems adequate to speak of a technological *revolution*, not only an *evolution* of technology.

A first matter of dispute was an industry representative’s assessment that the American and European private sectors were closer to each other than their governments. Many disagreed, mentioning that there was much more collaborative action between the private sector and their governments in Europe than in the United States, where one finds a relationship which often can only be regarded as counterproductive. Indeed, it is intellectually thrilling to understand why, despite the prospect that there could be winners and losers on both continents, Europe-based companies (and most interestingly, especially those in the energy-producing branch) are leading the innovation process towards an ecologically sounder economy while some U.S. companies (again, especially those in the energy-producing branch) are even investing in public relations to hinder it.

What one must eventually admit, however, is that in the end, in Europe and the United States alike, all industry is concerned with competitiveness. It is then either the diverging strategies which seem to be responsible for the different behavior (some companies strive for first-mover advantages and green labeling, some concentrate on further profits from proven markets) or the reaction to different national policies, or – and this is most probable – a combination of both.

These observed differences notwithstanding, more and more companies on both sides acknowledge that climate change is a threat which has to be managed. Furthermore, there is a growing number of economic decision-makers who have come to discover that there are practical opportunities for business action on

climate protection. Energy efficiency is just one case in point: investment in energy efficiency pays off from the first day on since it constantly reduces costs after installment.

Looking at the last 200 years of industrial development, one finds that economic progress has always been related to labor efficiency. This development was due to effective investments. Within this time, labor efficiency has risen by astonishing 2000 per cent. For some there is no reason to believe that resource efficiency cannot rise by the same amount within, say, the next 100 years. However, a big problem so far is that recent energy efficiency gains are eaten up completely by productivity gains. Thus one can only conclude that the market signals have to be changed in order to make resource efficiency more rewarding and thereby move it forward more forcefully.

Regarding market signals, it is problematic for industry that while many clients want stronger engines, this is not in line with what politicians want, namely fewer GHG-emitting engines. But again this is exactly why business needs international targets which can only be set by policy makers. Otherwise there will be no even-level playing field. To be sure, companies like BP already invest heavily in solar, wind, hydrogen power, and envision a change from oil- to gas-based fuels. However, an absolute phase-out of fossil fuels is still some 50 years ahead, and in order to reach this aim, we need all industries to participate.

As for the targets, to industry representatives certainty, clarity, simplicity, and transparency are important. A long-term target (or target range) for emissions reductions would be a very powerful, probably the *most* environmentally effective and economically cost-efficient instrument. It is interesting to see that many CEOs today request such a framework for the management of their businesses. They need the political target-setting for a justification of R&D investment, and they are convinced that such a long-term goal can help immediate innovation and even short-term development of environmentally sound techniques.

What business does not want, however, is to have the methods dictated so that they are told *how* to reach these goals. Industry obviously does not want

politicians to intervene in the practical technology development process. According to the attendant business representatives, the California fuel cell partnership was seen as a good model for the way collaboration between government and industry on R&D can be most effective.

Recently there have been calls for a major transatlantic “Apollo-type” R&D program to make world energy production and consumption less carbon-dependent. Europe and the United States were seen to be bound at the center of any such effort. At this workshop, however, there was no final consensus as to whether such an enterprise was a first priority to be fostered within the transatlantic dialogue. Though most participants welcomed *any* additional financial resources flowing into the field of climate-friendly technology development, some thought that there is already massive R&D in place. Furthermore, many innovative products already exist. Hydrogen, biomass and combustion engines, synfuels and sunfuels, wind and solar energy could all play a part in the solution. The question is simply how these renewable energies can be better brought out into the existing energy market and how they can be given a more competitive position. Here again legislation has to provide assistance.

## Engaging Major Developing Countries

There can be no doubt that successful climate protection will eventually require concerned action by populous nations such as China, India, and Brazil, where emissions are growing at an increasing rate. The United States and Europe have the opportunity to coordinate their approaches to these developing countries. But how could this be exercised? There was widespread agreement among participants thus far that the Northern countries have not figured out how complicated and difficult it will be to get the developing countries on board of an international enterprise to tackle the problem.

The biggest obstacle to an intensified engagement of the major developing countries seems to be that they are seriously doubting the credibility of the industrialized countries themselves to effectively approach the climate change problem and hence to be the first to implement strategies to reduce their GHG emissions. To this, however, the industrialized countries have committed themselves in the UNFCCC following the principle of “common but differentiated responsibility.” Developing countries have mainly two questions: first they ask whether the EU is really fulfilling its Kyoto reduction commitments, and second why they should come in the Kyoto structure if the United States stays out?

Clearly, leadership on the side of the United States is lacking, and the EU alone cannot generate it. One has to assume that, for example, China hates to be the nail sticking up but as long as it can point to the US, it is not a concern. Consequently, what one might observe is a mutual obstruction between the United States and the developing countries, both pointing at the other as the culprit who is blocking the process. The job of the EU, which traditionally has close relations to the United States but due to its proactive stance within the UNFCCC negotiation process has often been backed by the developing countries’ Group of 77 (G77), could be to mediate between both camps.

Yet, the suspicion was that not only had the United States stepped out of the Kyoto process but now it was actively undermining this EU-G77 “alliance” in general and their collaboration on developing countries’ entry into the Kyoto structure in particular. The recent G77-EU split regarding the idea of a commit-

ment towards alternative targets was mentioned as a first result of such U.S. interference. American representatives, however, emphatically denied this interpretation. The split, which became obvious at the recent Johannesburg summit, was a consequence of the fact that certain powerful developing countries simply did not consider fixed alternative energy targets to be within their interests. As mentioned above, the United States affirmed that it will not keep one single country from taking over fixed targets within the Kyoto structure. Nevertheless the Europeans, though delighted with this commitment, added that previous U.S. approaches to initiate formal or informal bilateral agreements with some of the developing countries on climate change could be a threat to the multilateral UN process.

In which time frame do we have to think if we talk about the inclusion of developing countries in any kind of multilateral agreement? One must first of all recognize that this is an issue of developing country *involvement* in a fixed-targets structure. The often used term “participation” is inadequate as developing countries are already participating in both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol – though not with fixed-target commitments. So for the negotiation process, which must be intensified as soon as possible, there are commitments in place to build upon. The Clean Development Mechanism, for example, is an instrument to be utilized and a first possible focal point.

What is more, many developing countries already have national climate-protection programs in place. Their implementation efforts are even evidence to some observers that they have made more progress according to their economic potentials than have a number of rich countries of the North. Mexico and Korea, for example, are countries where there are successes already with GHG reduction, though not in national absolute numbers. These countries are aware that they are expected to be the next addressed with signing fixed agreements. Also, Brazil and China are no “hard-liners” against any firm commitments. Quite to the contrary, there have recently been signs of willingness and there are various instruments to encourage and assist them to further move forward.

An idea which it could be worthwhile to develop further is to build a “coalition of the willing.”

A clear majority of participants finally agreed that the industrialized countries have to tell at least the major emitters of the South that they do not necessarily need their fixed target commitment by tomorrow but *sometime* in the future. Here again, a long-term target or target range promises to be both most practical and most effective. A structure is needed that focuses on a fulfillment of commitments, i.e., the achievement of certain targets, until the year 2020 or 2030.

To participants the issue of fairness, i.e., the “ethical reasoning” behind any such future agreement with the developing countries, is enormous. Many experts believe that the developing countries will never accept a baseline-year-based approach for fixed targets as the one taken by the industrialized countries in the existing Kyoto Protocol (“grandfathering principle”). The challenge in the negotiations of a second commitment period will therefore be to search for an approach which is per-capita based. Should a pure per-capita approach prove not to be politically feasible within the next two decades, one could also think of a mixture of the grandfathering and the per-capita approach for a second commitment period (2020, 2030), and pure per-capita-based commitments by, for example, 2050 or 2060.

Some discussants expressed the opinion that it was absolutely unrealistic to think it would be possible for *us* to sit down and agree on how *they* will participate based on “equitable rules.” In the future, this issue will have to be discussed with the participation of developing countries’ representatives. This is the only means by which to avoid antagonizing developing countries policy makers by coming up with yet another process in which their actions are discussed but they themselves are excluded from the discussion. It became clear that if we do not take developing countries’ concerns seriously, there simply will be no chance to firmly bind them to international commitments. The EU already succumbed to India’s demand insofar as it offered the Indian government what it was always asking for: to base the second commitment period on “equality.” But this, on the other hand, begs the question as to what the EU’s position towards equality actually is. The Union has to accept a definition of this term.

In the end, some discussants believe that the international debate is realized in too a negative tone. There are enormous economic and business oppor-

tunities for developed and developing countries alike in investing in climate-friendly high-tech (i.e., win-win situations). They consider it a great challenge as well as a great opportunity for developing countries to take a different development path than that taken by the industrialized countries.

## Conclusion: The Need for Continuation of the Dialogue

The workshop has illuminated just how divergent the perspectives on the challenge of climate change actually are. Truly, there is a transatlantic gap when it comes to the discussion of solutions to this threat. The workshop, however, eventually produced a reasonable amount of optimism. Despite all obvious differences, at least in the intellectual circles there can be no talk of misunderstanding each other once people start openly communicating, nor can there be talk of unwillingness to cooperate further and more closely. All participants supported the general idea that the transatlantic community must envision a common ground for a renewed climate partnership and connect the “dots of excellence” that exist on both sides of the Atlantic. The aim of Article 2 of the UNFCCC, to “prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system,” articulates this *common* goal which should not be let out of sight.

How to move on with the dialogue? The topics discussed above delineate possible connecting factors as well as conditions for improved transatlantic cooperation, the most prominent being the potential for technological collaboration and a common approach towards engaging developing countries – opportunities which should not be passed up. An issue which supercedes all the ingredients of a felicitous climate policy is the challenge of a more precise definition of the final aim for climate change policy: at what level do we consider GHG concentration in the atmosphere a non-dangerous anthropogenic interference? The stipulation of a reasonable level of GHGs in the atmosphere could be a precondition for the specification of a global emissions cap. This, in turn, would facilitate the development of a global emission trading system, arguably the most effective and cost-efficient instrument for protecting the earth’s climate. As learned from the debate, the establishment of a final concentration target keeps the door open for the United States to rejoin the international efforts within the UNFCCC, which had originally seemed to be increasingly impossible since the Kyoto path was designed.

But even if Kyoto’s “second commitment period” alone proves to be too narrow an approach for cooperation, the transatlantic partners have to find a

range of agreed-upon instruments for moving forward with enhanced climate protection. A reformation of the export credits institutions along climate protection criteria is just one option worth considering. Drawing from experiences with different, already existing approaches towards climate protection can serve as an important starting point for combined efforts, too. Ultimately, however, there can be no doubt that the link between the climate change issue and the larger geopolitical context makes an accelerated integration of climate protection into the transatlantic agenda of foreign affairs crucial.

# Appendix



Woodrow Wilson  
International  
Center  
for Scholars

LEE H. HAMILTON

Director

SWP

INTACT

**Invitation: High-level Transatlantic Workshop on Climate Change  
Washington, D.C., November 18, 2002**

Climate change is the source of considerable political debate in the overall transatlantic relationship. The German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) and the Woodrow Wilson Center (WWC), with the support of the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF), invite you to participate in a workshop on November 18, 2002 at the Woodrow Wilson Center to explore opportunities for renewed transatlantic cooperation in this important field.

The workshop will be organized by SWP and WWC for a small, distinguished group of public and private sector leaders from both sides of the Atlantic – about 20 participants each. They will include policymakers, members of the foreign policy community, media, and business, as well as outstanding experts familiar with the climate policy debate and long-term climate challenges.

A shift from the actual transatlantic stalemate on climate policy will only be reached if the participation, not only of key experts but also of those caring for the cohesion of the Atlantic community, can be assured.

The two major sessions will address “Engaging the Private Sector: Joint Industry Perspectives, Opportunities and Obstacles for Technology Breakthroughs,” and “Engaging Major Developing Countries.” Both sessions will be aimed at finding common ground for transatlantic understanding and partnership.

Please let us know if you are able to attend this conference in Washington, D.C. at the Wilson Center at 1300 Pennsylvania Ave, NW. We ask that you RSVP by October 21, 2002. Please feel free to contact our colleagues, Friedemann Mueller or Alexander Ochs (SWP) at +49 30 880 07-0, or Geoff Dabelko (WWC) at +1 202 691-4178 for additional information refer to SWP’s INTACT project website at [www.intact-climate.org](http://www.intact-climate.org).

We look forward to welcoming you at this important workshop.

Sincerely yours,

Lee H. Hamilton  
Director  
Woodrow Wilson Center

Christoph Bertram  
Director  
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik





## Agenda

### INTACT

High-level Transatlantic Workshop on Climate Change  
Washington, D.C., November 18, 2002

#### November 17

7 p.m. **Opening Dinner**  
**By Invitation of Dr. Eberhard Kölsch, Minister and Deputy Chief of Mission,  
German Embassy to the United States**  
Venue: Embassy House, 1900 Foxhall Road, NW, Washington, D.C. 2007

#### November 18

- 08:00 – 08:45 Breakfast and Registration
- 08:45 – 09:15 **Welcome Address**  
*Christoph Bertram and Lee H. Hamilton*
- Presentation of Project and Workshop Strategy**  
*Geoff Dabelko and Friedemann Müller*
- 09:15 – 10:45 **Session I**  
**Climate Change as a Transatlantic Century Challenge**  
*Introduced by Carlo Jaeger and Jessica T. Mathews*
- 10:45 – 11:15 Coffee break
- 11:15 – 12:45 **Session II**  
**Closing the Gap of Misunderstanding:  
What Drives US and European Climate Politics?**  
*Introduced by John Ashton and Harlan Watson*
- 12:45 – 01:30 Lunch
- 01:30 – 03:00 **Session III**  
**Engaging the Private Sector: Joint Industry Perspectives,  
Opportunities and Obstacles for Technology Breakthroughs**  
*Introduced by Kevin Fay and William S. Kyte*
- 03:00 – 03:30 Coffee break
- 03:30 – 05:00 **Session IV**  
**Engaging Major Developing Countries**  
*Introduced by Elliott Diringer and Michael Grubb*
- 05:00 **Reception**

## List of Participants

### INTACT

#### High-level Transatlantic Workshop on Climate Change

Washington, D.C., November 18, 2002

**Dina Abbas**

Environmental Change and Security Project  
Woodrow Wilson Center

**William J. Antholis**

*Director of Studies*  
The German Marshall Fund of the United States

**John Ashton**

*Director for Strategic Partnerships*  
Lead International

**Sylvia Baca**

*Vice President*  
BP America

**Christoph Bertram**

*Director*  
German Institute for International  
and Security Affairs (SWP)

**James Boyd**

California Energy Commission

**Geoff Dabelko**

Environmental Change and Security Project  
Woodrow Wilson Center

**Elliot Diringer**

*Director, International Strategies*  
Pew Center on Global Climate Change

**Johannes Ebner**

*Director, Project Fuel Cell*  
Daimler Chrysler

**Kevin Fay**

*Executive Director*  
International Climate Change  
Partnership (ICCP)

**Christine Federlin**

Delegation of the European Commission  
to the United States

**Jeff Fiedler**

*Climate Policy Specialist*  
Natural Resources Defense Council

**Peter Fischer**

*Deputy Head, Task Force on Environmental  
and Biopolitical Issues*  
German Foreign Office

**Marianne Ginsburg**

*Director, Environment and Special Programs*  
The German Marshall Fund of the United States

**David Goldston**

*Chief of Staff, Committee on Science*  
U.S. House of Representatives

**Kurt-Dieter Grill, MP**

*Member of the German Bundestag*  
(CDU/CSU)

**Michael Grubb**

*Associated Director of Policy*  
Carbon Trust

**Lee H. Hamilton**

*Director*  
Woodrow Wilson Center

**Enno Harders**

*Deputy Head, Division G II 1*  
German Federal Ministry for the Environment,  
Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety

**Astrid Harnisch**

*INTACT Project Associate*

**Steven Hayward**

American Enterprise Institute

**Ned Helme**

*Executive Director*  
Center for Clean Air Policy

**Sarah Hendry**

*Head of Global Atmosphere Division*  
Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs

**Chris Hessler**

*Deputy Staff Director*  
Committee on Environment and Public Works

**Thomas Jacob**

Government Affairs  
DuPont

**Carlo C. Jaeger**

*Head, Department Global Change & Social Systems*  
Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research

**Bernd Kramer**

German Embassy to the United States

**Andrej Kranjc**

*Counselor to the Slovenian Government*  
Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning

**William S. Kyte**

*Head, Corporate Sustainable Development Department*  
Powergen

**Reinhard Loske, MP**

*Member of the German Bundestag*  
(Bündnis90/Die Grünen)

**Jessica T. Mathews**

*President*  
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

**Timothy J. Mealey**

*Senior Partner*  
Meridian Institute

**Alden Meyer**

*Director of Government Relations*  
Union of Concerned Scientists

**David Michel**

The Paul H. Nitze School of  
Advanced International Studies (SAIS)  
Johns Hopkins University

**Benito Müller**

*Senior Research Fellow*  
Oxford Institute for Energy Studies

**Friedemann Müller**

*Head, Research Unit Global Issues*  
German Institute for International and  
Security Affairs (SWP)

**Pierre Noel**

*Research Fellow*  
French Center on the US  
French Institute for International Relations (IFRI)

**Michael Northrop**

*Program Officer*  
Rockefeller Brothers Fund

**Alexander Ochs**

*INTACT Project Manager*  
German Institute for International and  
Security Affairs (SWP)

**Michael Oppenheimer**

Princeton University

**Billy Pizer**

Resources for the Future

**Nigel Purvis**  
The Brookings Institution

**Detlef Sprinz**  
*Senior Research Fellow*  
Department of Global Change & Social Systems  
Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research

**Wolfgang Steiger**  
*Head, Engine Research*  
Volkswagen

**Hans Verolme**  
British Embassy to the United States

**Harlan Watson**  
Bureau of Oceans and  
International Environmental and  
Scientific Affairs  
U.S. State Department

**Ernst Ulrich von Weizsäcker, MP**  
*Member of the German Bundestag*  
(SPD)