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### ***Session I: The U.S. and China in Asia's security – a debate***

Dr. Zhang Baohui  
Department of Political Science  
Lingnan University (LU)  
Hong Kong

## An Impending Strategic Rivalry? Sino-U.S. Relations after Obama's Pivot toward Asia

*Baohui Zhang*

Given its huge geopolitical impact on world peace, the future of Sino-U.S. bilateral relationship has been drawing global attentions in recent years. This is particularly the case after the United States began to implement a strategic re-balancing of its foreign policy. The Obama administration's "pivot" strategy, announced at the end of 2011, reflects new U.S. concerns about the rise of China. The initiative seeks to preserve U.S. presence in the region through a multitude of measures, which include strengthening partnerships with allies and friends, boosting U.S. military capabilities and repositioning American forces in the region, as well as initiating new U.S.-led multilateral initiatives such as the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) scheme.

This paper first analyzes China's perceptions and responses to the U.S. pivot. While there is a consensus that sees the pivot as a containment effort by Washington, many Chinese analysts also believe the U.S. strategic re-balancing does not pose a direct security threat to China and is doomed for eventual failure. The paper critically assesses the strategic pitfalls of the rebalancing initiative, arguing that by attempting to contain China's influence in the region, the United States has triggered the official on-set of a strategic rivalry that will lead to a more competitive international system in the region. This competitive regional system will discourage security cooperation among the major powers and leave all parties worse-off.

In the last section, the paper argues that while the pivot signals an intensifying strategic competition in the coming decades, the Sino-U.S. rivalry will be less destabilizing for the world than the Cold War. The prospects of wars between China and the United States will remain low due to the absence of any direct territorial disputes. In contrast, the new multipolar system in the region has created far more potent scenarios for Sino-Japanese relations and Sino-Indian relations.

### China's Perceptions and Responses

Chinese strategic thinkers have systematically analyzed the motives of the U.S. pivot as well as its impacts on China's security. In general, it is interpreted as a containment effort by the United States to maintain its dominance in Asia Pacific. Thus, the Chinese perception of the U.S. pivot portrays a strategic competition now officially underway between the two countries.

However, the Chinese are divided in terms of their interpretations of the impact of the U.S. pivot on China's future rise. Some of the initial Chinese analyses argue that the pivot represents a fundamental shift in U.S. strategic focus from the war on terror toward the containment of China. As a result, they suggest that China's so-called "strategic opportunity" has come to an end.<sup>1</sup> Since the U.S. began its all-out war on terror after the 9/11 incident, the Chinese analysts have believed that this strategic diversion created a window of opportunity for China to rise in a relatively relaxed international environment. Hence they created the term "strategic opportunity" to characterize the post-9/11 external environment of China. However, the end of American wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has allowed the U.S. to re-focus on the rise of China. Thus, some predict concerted U.S. efforts to constrain China's further rise. Indeed, the Chinese strategic community has engaged in serious internal debate over whether the U.S. pivot indicates the end of the "strategic opportunity" for China's rise and whether the new international context may force China to modify its peaceful rise strategy in order to break U.S.-led containment efforts.<sup>2</sup>

Over time, Chinese assessment of the U.S. pivot has become less pessimistic. More and more Chinese analysts have begun to suggest that the pivot is primarily designed to contain China's influence in the Asia Pacific region, and is not intended to contain its hard power.<sup>3</sup> First, unlike the Cold War, there is a very high degree of economic interdependence between the two countries. This fact makes it simply impossible for the U.S. to try to contain China's economic rise. Second, Chinese analysts also argue that the re-balancing of the U.S. military presence in the region comprises largely token efforts designed to boost confidence on the part of its allies. For example, they point out that the rotational deployment of U.S. marines to Australia only concerns a small number of forces and the location of Darwin is really far away from zones of potential military conflicts in Asia Pacific.

This more sober analysis of the U.S. pivot has thus begun to relax China's concerns. A consensus view is that the pivot does not pose a direct security threat to China. It is largely a U.S. scheme designed to contain the political and diplomatic influence of China in Asia Pacific. Moreover, Chinese analysts believe the pivot actually reflects an increasing sense of weakness on part of the declining dominant state.<sup>4</sup> As they see it, the pivot is a last ditch effort to arrest the trends of China's ascendance and relative decline of the United States.

More importantly, many Chinese analysts have expressed an unprecedented level of confidence in the country's further rise. The post-2008 changes in Chinese perceptions of global distribution of relative power have generated a transformative effect on China's psychology. For the first time, China has developed confidence in its own rise. Chinese

elite and mass alike believe China's ascendance to the top of the international system is irreversible.<sup>5</sup> Thus, in their analyses of the U.S. pivot, many Chinese strategic thinkers have argued that no country is now capable of containing China's rise since it is now controlling its own fate.

This new level of self-confidence has allowed the Chinese strategic community to dismiss the U.S. pivot as a futile attempt to reverse the trend of history. Indeed, as some have argued, the weight of China's power will suffice to entice other countries not to overtly bandwagon with the United States. Moreover, China's power will even dissuade the United States from adopting overtly competitive policies in the region. In addition, fiscal and economic troubles at home will not allow the United States to fully implement a new containment strategy that is very costly in both military and financial terms.<sup>6</sup>

The above Chinese diagnosis of the U.S. pivot has contributed to the emergence of China's laid-back response. Given its perceived lack of direct threat to China's national security and China's confidence in its own eventual rise, Beijing has opted for a relaxed response to the new offensive posture of the United States. The Chinese strategic community has in general endorsed the idea that "time is on our side," which implies that China will eventually catch up with the United States just by staying on the current course.<sup>7</sup> Thus, the consensus is that China does not need to radically shift course for its peaceful rise grand strategy, its defense posture and its foreign policies for the Asia Pacific region.

Further, Chinese analysts have prescribed the "second strike" concept (*hou fa zhi ren*) that suggests China should wait for the United States to commit strategic errors.<sup>8</sup> They argue that the U.S. lack of self-confidence in its future position in the world may push it to pursue irrational and self-defeating policies. They point to the strategic errors of the Bush administration to illustrate the possibility of similar errors in the Asia Pacific region.

Nevertheless, the Chinese strategic community has also debated specific policy measures to counter the U.S. pivot. One central idea is to provide greater security assurance to China's neighbors. Chinese analysts understand that the U.S. pivot was in part a response to calls from the region. The perception of an increasingly assertive China since 2009 has boosted its neighbors' concerns and their desire to seek closer security ties with the United States. Thus, the Chinese strategic community suggests that China has to re-affirm the peaceful rise strategy to its neighbors. In fact, the Chinese leadership started to repair the image of China at the end of 2010, when Dai Bingguo, the State Councilor in-charge of foreign policy, published a high-profile essay to confirming the intention of peaceful rise.<sup>9</sup>

Further, Chinese analysts have proposed to use additional economic incentives to shape neighboring countries' positions on the Sino-U.S. strategic competition. They are fully aware that China is now the largest trading partner of every single neighboring country and this economic factor can help Beijing counter Washington's containment attempts.<sup>10</sup> Chinese analysts propose to use asymmetric economic relationships to provide incentives for other countries not to bandwagon with the United States. This asymmetric relationship will supposedly allow other countries to gain economic benefits at the expense of China.

Other proposed Chinese responses to the U.S. pivot consist of more strategically oriented options. The most important of these concerns China's alliance strategy. China has traditionally eschewed the strategy of using formal alliances with other countries to improve its international positions. The only alliance that China maintains is the one with North Korea. Now, facing increasing pressure from the United States, some Chinese strategists suggest a radical change in China's alliance strategy. In particular, they propose a formal alliance with Russia to counter the United States and its alliance system in the Asia Pacific region. One of the proponents of this view is Yan Xuetong of Tsinghua University, who has argued that in the context of rising U.S. containment efforts China must have a new thinking about its traditional alliance strategy.<sup>11</sup>

Other Chinese strategic thinkers argue that China should look beyond the region to develop a genuinely global agenda. If its neighbors are wary of China's power and unwilling to accept its further rise, China should look for greener pastures outside East Asia. As Hao Yufan argues, this strategy will allow China to transcend the confinement of U.S.-led regional containment.<sup>12</sup> Outside the region, China is less seen as a security threat and this will allow Beijing to play greater roles in other regional contexts and the global context.

Compared to the alliance strategy, Hao's proposal is eminently practical. Given its rising economic and financial might, Beijing has considerable room to wiggle at both the international level and in other regional contexts, where geography makes the China threat issue less pressing and prominent. Indeed, China has made huge progress in advancing its clout in Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. This has allowed China to emerge as a genuine global power since the middle of the last decade. So while U.S. containment may succeed in limiting China's influence in the Asia Pacific, it will not be able to roll back Beijing's presence in the global context. Ultimately, China's rise to the top of the international system will be decided by whether it can become a world power with influence in all corners of the globe.

## The Pivot's Strategic Pitfalls

This paper argues that the U.S. pivot represents a significant change in its previous strategy toward China. It is an offensive posture intended to maintain U.S. dominance in the Asia Pacific. By embodying a strategic competition with a rising China, the pivot is saddled with serious strategic pitfalls that could potentially harm the U.S. national interests.

The first pitfall of the pivot is that it may turn the two countries toward an increasingly zero-sum relationship. As the pivot is offensive in nature, designed to maximize U.S. influence at the expense of China, both countries may shift toward a competitive posture against each other. The resulting Sino-U.S. strategic competition may leave both sides worse off in the long term. When each is obsessed with its relative influence in the region, both will try to undermine the other whenever possible.

James Steinberg, former Deputy Secretary of State of the Obama administration, recently stated in Shanghai that a zero-sum mentality for Sino-U.S. relations would lead both sides to try to undermine each other. In particular, Steinberg warned against a rising view in the United States that it must now resist the further rise of China.<sup>13</sup> Unfortunately, the Obama administration's pivot, by attempting to dominate Asia Pacific indefinitely, does look like such an effort.

Indeed, China should now have declining incentives to cooperate with the United States on issues important to the latter. Beijing should reasonably conclude that even if it chooses to support Washington on these issues, the latter would nevertheless continue its containment strategy, as preventing China from becoming its peer is the most important U.S. objective. Therefore, China is in a no-lose situation if it chooses not to cooperate. China's recent veto of the U.S. proposed UN sanctions against Syria partially reflected this logic.

This veto by China was in dire contrast to its support for UN decisions on Libya a year earlier. At that time, China was going through an adjustment of its assertive foreign policy that had triggered rising concerns among Asian countries and the U.S. 'return to Asia.' China reasoned that a "responsible" position on the Libyan issue could be reciprocated by the United States in the form of not shifting further toward a competitive posture. However, as offensive realism predicts, the United States did not refrain from looking for further opportunities to improve its relative positions against China. The result was the pivot announced at the end of 2011. After the U.S. "officially" adopted an offensive posture at the end of 2011, China had no more incentives to cooperate with the United States in the United Nations. The result of China's defiance has been that the Syrian regime is still in power, using brutal methods to repress its people on a daily basis.

In fact, according to one interpretation, Beijing also vetoed the sanction proposal to cultivate closer strategic cooperation with Russia.<sup>14</sup> China chose to support Russia on the Syria issue to pave the way for a possible Beijing-Moscow strategic alliance if the U.S. containment escalates further. This alliance politics perspective therefore sees a close connection between the U.S. pivot and China's less cooperative approach in international affairs.

China's perception of the U.S. containment also motivated Beijing to strengthen its ties with North Korea in 2010. After the United States initiated a series of naval war games in the Yellow Sea in the summer of 2010, China significantly increased its political and economic support for North Korea. The main reason was that many in China interpreted the war games as a U.S. deterrence message to Beijing after the *Cheonan* incident. China's increased support for North Korea only emboldened Pyongyang to initiate a new round of military provocation against Seoul, when it bombarded Yan Ping island in December 2010.

Thus, the pivot and its containment motives may lead to outcomes that undermine U.S. strategic interests. By signaling that the United States will never accept the rise of China as a peer state, the pivot may force Beijing to adopt its own competitive strategy that aims to undermine the U.S. interests and influence whenever it can. In this context, both countries could be worse off than if both choose a more cooperative posture toward each other.

The second pitfall of an offensive U.S. posture toward China could be a further deepening of the strategic mistrust between the two countries. In fact, the issue of mutual mistrust has recently become the focus of many academic as well as policy discussions in both countries. A Brookings Institution report, jointly authored by Wang Jisi of China and Kenneth Lieberthal of the United States, sees strategic mistrust as the most destabilizing factor for Sino-U.S. relations.<sup>15</sup> The U.S. pivot has only intensified the mistrust. Many in Beijing now firmly believe that the U.S. has indicated its unwillingness to accept the rise of China as a peer state in the international and regional systems.

China's perception of U.S. intentions may lead to modification of its peaceful rise grand strategy. This is indeed a suggestion emerging from some of the initial Chinese analyses of the U.S. pivot. These analyses warned that new U.S. containment efforts could "push China off the course of peaceful rise." They suggest that China should not have unrealistic expectations of its further rise through peaceful means.<sup>16</sup> Instead, China must give higher priority to its military modernization to hedge against rising possibilities of U.S. and its allies directly challenging core Chinese security interests in the East and South China Seas.

This policy prescription calling for Beijing to strengthen its military power to counter the U.S. containment raises the question whether China's efforts to ensure its security correlate with its threat perceptions and its interpretation of U.S. intentions. Evidence from China's defense spending in recent years does seem to corroborate such a connection.

Although Beijing has in general maintained a robust growth trajectory in defense spending, its decision-making nevertheless shows the influence from perceived U.S. threat to China's national security. China's defense spending for 2010, for the first time in many years, registered a relatively modest single digit increase of 7.5%.<sup>17</sup> This was primarily the result of China's new assessment of its post-2008 security environment. The Obama administration's strategic adjustments in a number of important areas, including the U.S. space and nuclear policies, lessened the perceived pressures on China's own security.<sup>18</sup> His administration's initial accommodation strategy toward Beijing, as reflected by the G2 overture, also changed China's perception of U.S. intentions toward a more benign direction. The resulting Chinese threat perceptions led to a comparatively modest increase in China's defense budget for 2010, which was announced in March of the year.

However, as aforementioned, the Obama administration began to implement a correction of its China policy in the middle of 2010 to ensure greater deterrence against Beijing's rising assertiveness. The "return to Asia" rhetoric began with a new U.S. interest in the South China Sea. Moreover, the U.S. staged a series of war games in the Yellow Sea in the summer of 2010, which were interpreted by the Chinese strategic community as a show of force against China. The perceived turn by the U.S. toward containment direction profoundly changed China's threat perceptions. Inevitably, in the following March China decided to increase its 2011 defense budget by 12.7%.<sup>19</sup> The U.S. announcement of the pivot at the end of 2011 led to even more pessimistic assessments of U.S. strategic intentions. Not surprisingly, China announced an increase of 11.2% for its 2012 defense budget.<sup>20</sup>

The above evidence, though covering a time span of just three years, indicates a strong correlation between China's perceptions of U.S. strategic intentions and its efforts to ensure national security. The U.S. pivot and its perceived containment motivation can therefore set off an arms race between the two countries. Indeed, the "don't push China off the course of peaceful rise" warning has serious implications for the United States. China now spends just 1.5% of its GDP on national defense. This represents a mere 1/3rd of the relative efforts of the United States, which spends roughly 5% of its GDP on national defense. If the U.S. Asia strategy irrevocably changes the Chinese threat perception, China has plenty of room to substantially increase its military spending. Even



if China doubles its military spending, it would still represent just 3% of its GDP, significantly lower than the 5% level of the United States.

Therefore, the U.S. pivot could lead to a more potent military challenge from China, thereby weakening its own security and national interests. This strategic pitfall in fact shows the pernicious effects of the security dilemma in international relations. Efforts by one state to improve its relative position, as embodied by the U.S. pivot, could cause alarms in another state and trigger an arms race that leaves both worse off.

The third strategic pitfall associated with the U.S. pivot concerns a dangerous over-extension of American security obligations. While the pivot is intended to pursue a peaceful strategic competition, its inherent dynamics may push the envelope of the competition. The United States, to shore up the confidence of its friends and allies, may be tempted to take on additional and new security commitments that can eventually create strategic quagmires and undermine its national interests.

One particular example is the U.S. position on the South China Sea disputes. The high-profile U.S. return to Asia actually began with Hillary Clinton's Hanoi declaration in 2010 that the South China Sea dispute is an international issue and America has a stake in its peaceful resolution. Many Chinese analysts see it as the U.S. trying to weaken China's position in the region by taking advantage of other countries rising security concerns.

While the United States has succeeded in achieving this goal, it may also have dangerously over-extended its security commitments. Emboldened by the prospect of direct U.S. security support, countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines may adopt more risky policies that will escalate conflicts with China. If so, the U.S. pivot may generate scenarios that involve Washington in a dangerous military standoff in the South China Sea.

This prospect has been well illustrated by the recent conflict between China and the Philippines at Huangyan Island (the Scarborough Shoals) in April and May of 2012. Indeed, one of the key messages consistently emphasized by Filipino leaders, such as foreign minister Albert del Rosario, was that the United States would certainly provide military support in the event of China using force.<sup>21</sup> This unrealistic Philippine expectation forced the United States to publicly clarify its position on the matter. After a 2+2 dialogue with her Philippine partners, Hillary Clinton declared on May 1, 2012 that the United States is not a party to the conflict.<sup>22</sup> Moreover, Senator John McCain, in a May 2012 speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, also stated that although America supports a strong ASEAN to resolve disputes in the South China Sea, the Philippines should not turn to the United States for assistance in the event of military conflicts.<sup>23</sup>

Although a strategic competition between China and the United States in the Asia Pacific is largely a peaceful soft-power competition, the inherent dynamics of the offensive posture of the U.S. pivot could over-extend American security obligations, thereby creating dangerous scenarios for a direct Sino-U.S. military face-off. As such, the U.S. pivot could potentially harm its own interests by being “chain-ganged” to countries that have territorial conflicts with China. The U.S. position on the recent China-Filipino standoff at least indicates that its decision makers are now aware of the strategic follies in such scenarios.

### Future Outlooks: The Dark Side of Multipolarity

Although the U.S. pivot represents a strategy for strategic competition and carries a number of strategic liabilities, the prospect of direct Sino-U.S. military conflict will nevertheless remain low in the foreseeable future.

First, the pivot represents a new style of containment with 21<sup>st</sup> century characteristics, which will allow the above competition not to follow the militaristic path of the Cold War. This is primarily due to the soft-power nature of Sino-U.S. strategic competition. The pivot’s basic motive is to contain China’s influence, not its hard power. Indeed, due to the high degree of mutual economic dependency, hard power oriented containment is no longer an option for great powers in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Even the U.S. initiated TPP scheme ostensibly welcomes China’s participation. Moreover, China’s economic weight is such that it has already become the driving force of Asia Pacific economies. By becoming the largest trading partner of every neighboring country, Beijing has rendered it impossible for the U.S. to even try to economically isolate China.

Although there is a military dimension of the U.S. re-balancing, it involves largely token gestures to provide assurance to allies and friends. Even the Chinese analysts agree that the most significant aspect of the U.S. military re-balancing, which involves rotational deployment of American marines to Australia, is symbolic in nature and will not have a direct impact on China’s security.

The pivot is therefore mainly designed to compete for diplomatic influence and leadership in the Asia Pacific region. In essence, it is a soft-power competition and thus a “peaceful” competition. This is partly the reason why China has chosen not to take any drastic measures to respond to this new round of perceived containment efforts by the United States. Thus, although the U.S. pivot may institutionalize a strategic competition between the two countries, it will not follow the path of the Cold War.

Second, while the U.S. pivot will intensify strategic mistrusts and security competitions in the region, the lack of direct territorial disputes between the two countries

implies a low probability of militarized conflict in the future. According to studies of strategic rivalries, direct territorial disputes between rival states constitute the most likely trigger of wars.<sup>24</sup>

Although both China and the United States would prefer to be the most influential country in Asia Pacific, they have no direct territorial conflicts with each other. This factor will allow their strategic competition to be confined. Indeed, even the PLA strategists concur with the view that the probability of direct military conflict with the United States will remain very low in the future.

Taiwan once represented a dangerous flash point that could involve China and the United States in direct military conflict. Fortunately, the relaxation of tension across the Taiwan Strait has profoundly reduced the probability of war. It is reasonable to surmise that the cross-strait rapprochement will be consolidated under the second term of the Ma Ying-jeou administration. This scenario will bode well for keeping the Sino-U.S. strategic rivalry within the confines of “peaceful competition.”

However, while the prospect of direct Sino-U.S. military conflicts will remain low in the future, the negative effects of multipolarity could generate truly troublesome scenarios for Asian security. In recent years, East Asian international relations have taken a decisive turn toward intensifying security competition.

This turn is somewhat unexpected. Until recently, scholars suggested that East Asian international relations would not follow the path of balancing and security competition. Progress made in building regional cooperative institutions has solidified “the ASEAN way” of international relations that uses dialogue and consensus-building to achieve peace and stability.<sup>25</sup> Further, some claim that even China has been “socialized” by “the ASEAN way.” The prevailing view is that due to regional institution building and socialization, the rise of China would not heighten security rivalries in East Asia.

However, developments in recent years have contradicted the above prediction. International relations in East Asia have indeed turned toward a competitive direction. The chief culprit that instigated the change is the end of unipolarity and the rise of multipolarity in world politics. As international relations theory prescribes, a multipolar system of power distribution generates greater security competition than either the unipolar system or the bipolar system.<sup>26</sup> As a more horizontally distributed system without a hierarchy, a multipolar system reduces states’ sense of security, thereby triggering more intense security dilemmas and power competition.

The structural change in the international system in recent years has inevitably produced an increasing sense of insecurity in East Asia. The relative decline of the United States, the rise of China and India as well as the diplomatic resurgence of Japan have generated mutual concerns that security is becoming scarce in the region. The new

multiplolar system in the Asia Pacific has forced each major power to be more worried about other countries' intentions as well as capability changes. This change of state behaviors has inevitably intensified the security dilemma in various dyadic relationships.

In particular, the accelerated rise of China has caused an increasingly competitive relationship between China on the one hand and Japan, India and the U.S. on the other. While Sino-U.S. relations face little prospect of militarized conflicts in the future, China-Japan and China-India relations involve far more dangerous scenarios because of existence of territorial disputes in each case.

Indeed, a rising India and a resurgent Japan have both chosen to improve their military capabilities to hedge against possible territorial revisionism on the part of China. The deepening mistrust could lead to dangerous miscalculations by all sides. Indeed, both China and Japan have adopted increasingly confrontational approaches toward their territorial disputes in the East China Sea. Strategic mistrust between China and India has also led both to strengthen military capabilities along the disputed parts of their respective borders. Thus, the new multipolar system in the region has generated strong realist forces that are undermining the stability and peace of the Asia Pacific region. Compared to the previous unipolar era, when the United States provided order and stability through a hierarchical international system, the new multipolar system is pushing the region toward disorder and insecurity.

This negative turn in Asian international relations is further exacerbated by rising nationalism in all the three major Asian countries. The highly nationalistic netizens in China have powerfully constrained the Chinese leadership and its foreign policy-making. In India, a new world power identity has given Indian elite and masses alike a sense of empowerment. More and more in India are calling for a more robust posture toward China. One example is the view that India should use its expanding naval capabilities to thwart China's ambition in the South China Sea.<sup>27</sup> In Japan also, rising nationalism has contributed to the increasingly hard-line territorial positions of the Japanese government. Examples include Japan's recent decision to strengthen its *de facto* control over the disputed Diaoyu Island and its quasi-military aid to the Philippines to counter perceived Chinese ambition in the South China Sea.<sup>28</sup>

In the above contexts of structural change in Asian international relations and the rise of domestic nationalism in all the three major Asian countries, the chance of militarized conflicts is greater than ever before.<sup>29</sup> Therefore, when the world attention closely follows the dynamics of Sino-U.S. relations, strategic rivalries among major Asian powers actually represent far more dangerous scenarios of conflicts and instability.

To safeguard security in the region, the United States may need to shift focus from containment of China to that of an arbiter of regional conflicts. While the U.S. needs to

provide adequate deterrence against a rising China, it must also take a judicious approach toward rising conflicts among major Asian powers. These conflicts, if not well managed, may draw the U.S. into major power wars it does not want. To avoid this scenario, the U.S. must not try to take advantage of the on-going Asian strategic rivalries and overtly side with China's rivals. While this strategy of balancing may on paper improve the relative position of the United States, it could also have the effects of emboldening Japan and India to adopt more risky strategies for addressing their territorial conflicts with China, thereby further destabilizing regional peace and stability.

## Notes

1. The China Security Forum organized a conference in March 2012 to examine the impact of U.S. strategic re-balancing on China's security. For a summary of views expressed at the conference by some leading Chinese security experts, see "Meiguo zhanlue zhongxin dong yi yu woguo anquan" (The Eastward Shift of U.S. Strategic Focus and the Security of Our Country), at [http://www.big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/news/xinhuanet.com/world/2012-03/17/c\\_122846063.htm](http://www.big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/news/xinhuanet.com/world/2012-03/17/c_122846063.htm).
2. The Institute of International Strategic Studies at the Chinese Community Party Central Party School organized a conference on May 5, 2012 to explore China's security strategies after the U.S. strategic re-balancing. See, "Shi wei zhuanjia: zhongguo jueqi bixu yanfang shiwu" (Ten Experts: China's Rise Must Avoid Grave Strategic Errors), Huanqiu shibao (Global Times), May 11, 2012.
3. Lin Limin, "Zheteng bushao, xinyi buduo, meiguo fangwu xin zhanlue zai bian yu bubian jian zhao pingheng" (Much Efforts, Not Many New Ideas: The U.S. Defense Strategy Searching for A Balance between Change and No Change), Huanqiu junshi (Global Military Affairs), February, 2012, pp. 15-20. Li Limin is a scholar at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations.
4. Zhu Feng, "Meiguo yadai gongshi weihe ruci zhayan" (Why Is the U.S. Asia Pacific Offensive So Conspicuous?), December 8, 2011, at <http://www.theory.people.com.cn/GB/82288/112848/112851/16545269.html>.
5. See Major General Yao Yunzhu, "Bubi haipa meiguo chongfan yatai" (No Need to Fear the U.S. Return to Asia Pacific), Huanqiu shibao (Global Times), March 1, 2012. Yao Yunzhu is a strategist at the PLA Academy of Military Science.

6. Zhou Fangyin, “Yingdui meiguo chongfan yazhou” (Responding to the U.S. Return to Asia), *Zhongguo gaige* (China Reform), February 2012, pp. 78-83. Zhou Fanyin is a scholar at the Chinese Academy of Social Science.
7. See Note 17.
8. *Ibid.*
9. Dai Bingguo, “Jianchi zou heping fazhan daolu” (Adhere to the Path of Peaceful Development), December 26, 2010, at <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/gxb/tyb/zyxw/t774662.htm>.
10. Zhou Fangyin, “Responding to the U.S. Return to Asia.”
11. Yan Xuotong, “Weihe zhongguo waijiao ye xuyao gaige gainian” (Why China’s Foreign Policy Should Embrace Reforms?), April 28, 2012, at <http://yanxuotongvip.i.sohu.com/blog/view/213787503.htm>.
12. Hao Yufan, “Zhongguo yingai xuehui yousuo zuowei” (China Needs to Master How to ‘Achieve Something’), *Caijing* (Finance), No. 314 (February 20, 2012), pp. 97-99.
13. Steinberg expressed the view in his speech at the 2012 Shanghai Forum on May 26, 2012. His speech was translated into Chinese by the Chinese media. See “Steinberg: zhongmei ying bimian shui hui ying di xintai” (Steinberg: China and the United States Must Avoid the ‘Who Wins’ Mentality), at <http://opinion.huanqiu.com/1152/2012-05/2761253.html>.
14. For this interpretation, see Yan Xuotong, “Zhongguo fojue UN xuliya jueyian di libi” (Costs and Benefits of China’s Veto of the UN Syrian Resolution), February 8, 2012, at <http://yanxuotongvip.i.sohu.com/blog/view/203112403.htm>.
15. Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, *Addressing the U.S.-China Strategic Distrust* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2012).
16. See Tang Yongsheng, “Zhongmei zhijian bu neng jinxing linghe boyi” (China and the United States Must Avoid a Zero-Sum Competition), No. 6, 2012 (March), *Shijie zhishi* (World Affairs), p. 67.
17. Xinhua News Agency, “China’s Defense Budget to Grow 7.5% in 2010: Spokesman,” March 4, 2010, at [http://www.news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-03/04/c\\_13196769.htm](http://www.news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-03/04/c_13196769.htm).
18. See Baohui Zhang, “U.S. Missile Defense and China’s Nuclear Posture: Changing Dynamics of an Offense-Defense Arms Race,” *International Affairs* (Chatham House, London), Vol. 87, No. 3 (May 2011), pp. 555-569.
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